Germany's Lessons for Korea: the Strategic Diplomacy of Unification
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https://www.globalasia.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=articles&wr_id=9161 Germany’s unification in 1990 is often referred to as a textbook case for the Korean Peninsula. In this essay, we compare notes on German and Korean unification by looking at entry, tipping and endpoints of strategic diplomacy. We argue that political integration needs to drive the strategic diplomacy of Korean unification. German unification was not preordained, but was the product of strategic choices made at critical junctures of the process. While long-term developments post-1945 created an international environment that facilitated the acceptance of German unification by the key stakeholders, in the Korean case, the US, China, South Korea and North Korea pursue very different strategic goals and interests. To substantiate the argument, this paper is in five sections: section 1 investigates key features of the complex European and Northeast Asian security systems; 2 examines entry points of German and Korean unification diplomacy; 3 highlights the tipping points (potential and actual) of unification; 4 briefly looks at the endpoints of German and Korean unification diplomacy; 5 offers some potential lessons for the Korean Peninsula. 1) THE SYSTEM AT PLAY IN EUROPE AND NORTHEAST ASIA The Cold War system in Europe was designed to address the problem of German power,1 an issue that was paramount for regional and global stability. Western Europe’s post-1945 security system tied the German Gulliver to a web of institutional arrangements — the Western European Union, the European Economic Community, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — designed to tame German power. Closely intertwined was a whole cluster of questions related to the US role in Europe — for example, the US military presence, the relationship with major European allies, especially in the nuclear area, and the rationale for NATO. In a nutshell, this post-1945 security system was extremely complex, with regional security closely interconnected with global order and vice versa. Yet, the vision and grand design was conducive to the achievement of unification more than four decades later. The terms and conditions of the end of the Cold War in Europe were deeply influenced by the long-term vision and aspirations of the early post-war leaders.2 In contemporary Northeast Asia, by contrast, the problem of unequal power remains unresolved. There is no overarching, accepted institutional framework, underwritten by a social compact between major and smaller countries, which would tame and legitimize unequal power, most prominently between China and the US but also between Japan and China. The management of unequal power trumps institutional design; any institutional form must follow the function of a grand bargain on the rules of the regional game.3 Yet, this set of bargains has yet to be struck (see Evelyn Goh’s contribution in this cover package on page 58). As a result, in Northeast Asia, institutional complexity and pluralism are defining features of the regional order4 and there are multiple potential access points and avenues for collective action. Especially after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the US-led hub-and-spoke system of alliances to contain the Soviet Union and China has been transformed into a web of complex relationships, often co-existing, sometimes competing. Despite this 1 of 7 3/01/2017 1:40 PM https://www.globalasia.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=articles&wr_id=9161 pluralism, the US is still the key player in the Northeast Asian security system, which defines the diplomatic dynamics on the Korean Peninsula. 2) ENTRY POINTS FOR UNIFICATION DIPLOMACY There were both long-term and short-term entry points for German unification diplomacy. Looked at from a long-term perspective, unification had been the key strategic goal of West German foreign policy since the creation of the Federal Republic. West Germany’s first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, argued that the rebuilding of German democracy, economic revival and the full integration of Germany into the European and Atlantic co-operative structures would finally produce unification. Western integration was seen as the sine qua non for achieving this goal. Yet, with the division of Europe deepening in the 1950s and 1960s, unification became more aspirational than real. A complementary approach was necessary that focused more on the acceptance of the status quo, accompanied by rapprochement and engagement to lower East-West tensions. This became strongly expressed in Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik beginning in 1969 and was sustained by the succeeding chancellorships of Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl. As Kaiser has rightly observed, “[t]o preserve the essence of a common nation, West German policy inevitably had to deal with an East German state.”5 The explicit acceptance of the status quo was considered necessary and inevitable in order to change it. The short-term entry points of German unification diplomacy were at least three-fold. First, the constellation of leadership at the highest levels was remarkable. In 1989-90, the cast of leaders in key countries had unusual long-term experience, and had previously co-operated and developed personal relationships, which clearly facilitated what would become “the most intensive phase of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in European history.”6 Second, both Moscow and Washington expressed a clear and unequivocal commitment to peaceful change. This was particularly important since East German security forces had made preparations to use armed force to suppress mass demonstrations in Leipzig and Dresden. Yet, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed from the beginning that the East German Politburo’s refusal to engage in controlled reform had become an increasing problem for Moscow. Despite initial discussions about a military intervention in East Germany, he was ultimately unwilling to support any action that could have led to a repeat of the Tiananmen incident. Third, the diplomacy of German unification was driven by a range of tipping points, actual and potential, which defined the pace and the dynamics of the process. In sum, the long-term and short-term entry points of German unification diplomacy produced a number of strategic opportunities that created new momentum for the redesign of the Cold War European order. Yet these strategic opportunities were accompanied by a clear tactical sense about the institutional process that translated strategies into diplomatic outcomes. Equally important was the agreement on a strategic narrative (“One Europe whole and free”) to generate the necessary “buy-in” from the wider international community. In this context, the two-plus-four process, commencing with the first ministerial meeting in Bonn in May 1990, constituted the strategic hub and “pivot”7 that allocated roles and responsibilities to bilateral and multilateral forums to discuss the political, economic and military ramifications of German unification. The entry point was the jointly developed agreement by the two German states on the external aspects of unification, which was then communicated to and negotiated with the Four Powers. As a result, German unification was not the result of a major peace conference but of the Treaty on the Final Settlement, signed by the six parties on Sept. 12, 1990, in Moscow. Looked at from the perspective of strategic diplomacy, the German case highlights three interconnected entry points — two long-term and one short-term — that are relevant for the Korean Peninsula. First, the fundamental importance of functioning bilateral relations between the divided countries. Inter-Korean relations have been a — and sometimes are the — critical issue in the Northeast Asian regional order. 2 of 7 3/01/2017 1:40 PM https://www.globalasia.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=articles&wr_id=9161 Hence, unification diplomacy itself is an important entry point to the complex Northeast Asian security system. The Sunshine Policy of South Korea toward North Korea from 1998 to 2007 in many respects resembled the core tenets of West Germany’s late 1960s Ostpolitik. South Korea’s Nordpolitik constituted a long-term entry point based on the idea of peaceful co-existence and normalization of inter- Korean relations.8 The Sunshine Policy aimed at shaping the system to facilitate Korean unification diplomacy. The three principles underlying the Sunshine Policy — a) no armed provocation by North Korea will be tolerated; b) South Korea will not attempt to absorb the North in any way; and, c) South Korea will actively engage in co-operation — effectively accept the status quo in order to achieve long-term change. In sum, Trustpolitik is the sine qua non of the strategic diplomacy of Korean unification. A long-term solid engagement approach needs to complement any short-term coercive policies such as sanctions, military confrontations or suspending joint high-profile projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The second long-term entry point is the effective management by the great powers — the US and China — of issues related to the Korean Peninsula. Historically, the US has been supportive of unification. Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton backed peaceful unification based upon “terms acceptable to the Korean people.” In 2009, President Lee Myung-bak and President Barack Obama announced the Joint Vision for the Alliance in which both presidents expressed their commitment to peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula.9 Furthermore, in 2013, President Park Geun-hye and Obama announced that they would foster “peaceful unification based on the principles of denuclearization, democracy and a free market economy.”10 Notwithstanding such declarations, it is not certain whether US operational policy would support Korean unification as it did in the German case. According to a Council on Foreign Relations report, US priorities toward the Korean Peninsula are: 1) prevent horizontal proliferation; 2) stop vertical proliferation; 3) denuclearize; 4) plan for contingencies; 5) promote engagement; and, 6) improve the situation for the North Korean people.11 That is, US priorities lie in denuclearizing North Korea.