Breaking Point? Yemen's Southern Question
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BREAKING POINT? YEMEN’S SOUTHERN QUESTION Middle East Report N°114 – 20 October 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. ONE STATE OR TWO?................................................................................................... 1 A. TWO STATES, TWO SYSTEMS, ONE GOAL: UNITY ........................................................................ 1 B. UNIFICATION AND THE 1994 CIVIL WAR ...................................................................................... 3 III. RE-EMERGENCE OF THE SOUTHERN ISSUE ........................................................ 5 A. TWO POST-WAR NARRATIVES ..................................................................................................... 5 B. EMERGENCE OF THE HIRAAK ....................................................................................................... 6 IV. THE “YEMENI SPRING” AND THE QUESTION OF THE SOUTH ..................... 10 A. THE 2011 UPRISING ................................................................................................................... 10 B. HIRAAK’S FALTERING SUPPORT FOR THE UPRISING ................................................................... 11 C. THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR A UNIFIED SOUTHERN VOICE ........................................................... 12 D. TWO TRACKS: SEPARATION AND FEDERALISM ........................................................................... 14 V. PRINCIPAL ACTORS ................................................................................................... 15 A. THE RULING GENERAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS ............................................................................. 15 B. THE OPPOSITION JOINT MEETING PARTIES ................................................................................ 16 1. Islah ........................................................................................................................................... 17 2. The Yemeni Socialist Party ....................................................................................................... 18 C. THE HIRAAK .............................................................................................................................. 19 D. EXTERNAL ACTORS ................................................................................................................... 21 1. Saudi Arabia............................................................................................................................... 21 2. The UK ...................................................................................................................................... 22 3. The U.S. ..................................................................................................................................... 22 VI. SPECIAL ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 23 A. THE CASE OF ADEN ................................................................................................................... 23 B. THE CASE OF HADRAMAWT ....................................................................................................... 24 C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOUTHERN ISSUE AND “MIDDLE YEMEN” ............................ 25 D. AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA ................................................................................... 26 VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND SCENARIOS ........................................................... 29 A. A UNITARY STATE WITH A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT .................................................... 29 B. A UNITARY STATE WITH STRONG LOCAL GOVERNMENT ........................................................... 29 C. A FEDERAL STATE ..................................................................................................................... 30 1. A multi-state federal system ...................................................................................................... 30 2. A two-region federal system ...................................................................................................... 30 D. SEPARATION .............................................................................................................................. 31 E. EVALUATING THE OPTIONS ........................................................................................................ 32 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 32 APPENDICES A. MAP OF YEMEN ............................................................................................................................... 34 B. GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND ACRONYMS ........................................................................................... 35 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 36 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2008 ... 37 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 39 Middle East Report N°114 20 October 2011 BREAKING POINT? YEMEN’S SOUTHERN QUESTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Ten months of popular protest spiked by periodic out- uprising that became the Yemeni Spring, its influence and bursts of violence have done little to clarify Yemen’s po- popularity in the South clearly were on the ascent. litical future. Persistent street protests so far have failed to oust President Ali Abdullah Saleh or bring about genuine Could the popular uprising open up fresh opportunities to institutional reform. The country is more deeply divided peacefully resolve the Southern issue? If the various sides between pro- and anti-Saleh forces than ever, its economy act reasonably, it should. From the start, it facilitated co- is in tatters and both security and humanitarian conditions operation between Northern and Southern protesters and are deteriorating. Amid the uncertainty fuelled by this lin- broke through barriers of fear, allowing a larger spectrum gering crisis, the country’s unity – and notably the status of Southerners to join the national public debate on the of the South – hangs in the balance. Old grievances are status of the South. Most importantly, it has facilitated coming into sharper relief and, among some, secessionist debate and growing consensus around federal options. If aspirations are gaining steam. There remains an oppor- political foes can reach agreement on a transition of pow- tunity for Yemen’s rulers, opposition groups and protest- er in Sanaa and launch an inclusive national dialogue, they ers to reach agreement on a political transition that would could seize the moment to negotiate a peaceful compro- give priority to the Southern question and redefine rela- mise on the Southern issue as well. tions between centre and periphery, for example by mov- ing toward a federal model. Should this chance be missed, The problem is that there is no indication Yemen is head- the conflict risks getting bloodier. And Yemen’s unity ing there. Instead, as mass protests have continued with- could be a thing of the past. out result, frustration has grown and so too has Southern distrust that anything that happens in the North will im- The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) prove their lot. The risks are many. An enduring political merged with its northern neighbour, the Yemen Arab Re- impasse could prompt further collapse of security and public (YAR), on 22 May 1990 to form the Republic of economic conditions throughout the country, producing Yemen. From the start, this was a troubled unification that greater unrest and instability in the South. Alternatively, a resulted in a short, bloody civil war in 1994. The North full-fledged civil war could break out between Northern emerged victorious, but this hardly closed the chapter. In rival elites, a scenario that could prompt Southern stake- the wake of the conflict, two profoundly different narra- holders to pursue a serious bid for separation. Already, tives took shape. Under one version, the war laid to rest the early euphoria generated by coordination between pro- the notion of separation and solidified national unity. Ac- testers in the North and South is giving way to resurgent cording to the other, the war laid to rest the notion of uni- calls by some for Southern independence. ty and ushered in a period of Northern occupation of the South. This is a dangerous brew. The South’s secession almost certainly would be resisted by the North and could spark a The most recent tensions did not suddenly erupt in the violent conflict. Any effort toward independence also context of the January 2011 Yemeni uprising. In 2007, could trigger in-fighting and additional fragmentation with- a broad-based popular protest movement known as the in the South itself. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Southern Movement (Al-Hiraak al-Janoubi) had come to other violent groups already are prospering amid growing the fore. The Hiraak originated as a rights-based move- instability and chaos; further deterioration would only ment requesting equality under the law and a change in expand their reach. relations between North and South – all