What Should Solidarity Do? the Diplomatic Stance By
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10 essay 11 SOLIDARITY DESPITE RESERVATIONS BY KLAUS MISGELD & KARL MOLIN POSTWAR POLAND WAS SHAKEN repeatedly by protest ac- tive was far from the minds of contemporary onlook- reducing tensions between the blocs in Europe and tions and uprisings against the Soviet-backed commu- ers. They remembered the outcomes of earlier reform building bridges between East and West. nist regime: in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and again, most movements, especially the bloody disintegration of In the following, we paint a picture of the views of successfully, from 1980 to 1981. The democratic opposi- the Prague Spring in 1968. The reformist policies of Al- diplomats and union leaders on, first, how Solidarity tion of the 1970s was monitored with keen interest in exander Dubçek had been stymied by tanks from the should act to prevent leading itself and the world over Sweden. The Swedish media reported frequently on the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. After the brink of ruin and, second, how they should them- Workers’ Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robot- the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet leader Leonid selves act in order to responsibly support the democra- niczów, KOR, in 1977, Social Self-Defense Committtee/ Brezhnev had declared that when a threat to the cause tization of Poland. Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej KSS–KOR), and of socialism arose in a socialist country, it was not only articles by well-known KOR activists like Adam Mich- a problem for the country concerned, but for all social- WHAT SHOULD nik and Jacek Kuroń were published in newspapers ist countries. The events in Poland of 1980–1981 unfold- SOLIDARITY DO? and journals of varying political stripe. The strikes of ed in the shadow of the policy the world came to call August 1980, which led to the formation of a new so- the Brezhnev Doctrine. THE DIPLOMATIC STANCE cial movement, the Independent and Self-Governing There was no doubt among Swedish diplomats Swedish diplomats in Warsaw who reported on the Trade Union “Solidarity” (Niezależny Samorządny and union leaders, who are the focus of this article, developments, with Ambassador Knut Thyberg in the Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”, NSZZ Solidarność), that they would support the independent trade union vanguard, recognized early on the historical dimen- headquartered in Gdańsk, were met with tremendous movement that had suddenly appeared on the Polish sions of the events. The Gdańsk Accord signed in late sympathy throughout the Western world.1 Over the 16 stage and which soon totaled 10 million members (in a August opened the door to independent unions and months that the burgeoning organization Solidarity — the country of 38 million). Still, they could not ignore the sparked somewhat euphoric hopes for “humanization name we will use here — was able to act entirely above risk of renewed military intervention that would have of the communist system”2 and a “more humane socie- ground, until General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared mar- had disastrous consequences for Poland and security ty”3. Still, the embassy was convinced that the changes tial law on December 13, 1981, Solidarity was the object in Europe. A balance had to be struck between sup- had to happen within the framework of a socialist sys- of frenetic diplomatic activity and extensive international port for a movement with which one strongly sympa- tem and preservation of Poland’s membership in the ANICKI/ZIN-ZIN PRESS J aid efforts. Sweden manifested agreement and support, thized (and which demanded nothing more than what Warsaw Pact. despite political and ideological reservations. it had been guaranteed by several international treaties Thus, the principle that the Communist Party’s NDRZEJ A The dramatic events in Poland during 1980 and ratified by the regime) and acceptance of political and leading role was central to the system could not be un- 1981 now stand out as the beginning of the end of So- military realities. The actors involved were also obliged dermined. The embassy had long been convinced that viet hegemony in Eastern Europe, but that perspec- to uphold official Swedish policy, which was aimed at some form of equilibrium between the Party and Soli- ILLUSTRATION: ILLUSTRATION: Poland 1980: when an internal affair goes public. Definition of a revolutionary process! 12 essay 13 darity was necessary: “a new balance that preserve[d] berg’s views diverge? One possible answer is that Thy- a cold war against Soviet systems in Eastern Europe. the social system but provide[d] greater self-gover- berg, who was closer to the new reform movement, The organization could not appear to be “the errand nance and equality.”4 The gathering storm clouds, of understood that, for its leadership, the alternative to boy of the USA”, an accusation Polish and Soviet media which there were many, were the result, partly, of hard- progress was not to stop and maintain a position, but soon aimed at LO. Their opponents must not be given liners on both sides of the Polish drama: radicals within to regress and go the way of earlier reform projects. the chance to paint Solidarity as being in the hands of Solidarity who rejected the passage in the Gdańsk Ac- During past reform efforts, once passions had cooled, foreign organizations. cord on the preeminent role of the Party, and dogma- the regime had reneged on its concessions and the bas- For this reason, the Swedish position initially con- tists within the Communist regime who were looking tions once torn down had been repaired. flicted with the position of the ICFTU and the Polish for a reason to abandon the policy of negotiation and policy of the AFL-CIO, America’s union association. To adopt harsher measures.5 The moderate, negotiatory WHAT SHOULD forestall accusations by the Polish government and the approach was personified by Solidarity leader Lech Soviet Union that Sweden was supporting anti-Com- Wałęsa and the new Party boss Stanisław Kania.6 The SOLIDARITY DO? munist activity in Poland and to protect their own sup- tacit interpretation was that if they had their way, Po- THE SwEDISH portive actions, the Swedish organization wanted only land would opt for a cautious but still system-trans- TRADE UNION direct relations with Solidarity and insisted on keeping forming policy of reform.7 CONFEDERATIon’S in the background the ICFTU, the International Trade But Solidarity did not choose the cautious approach Secretariats (the international organizations of the na- for which the Swedish observers had hoped. New de- STANCE tional unions), and Polish exile groups in Sweden who mands accompanied by strikes and threats of strikes The Swedish trade union movement also lived in the were cooperating with the IFCTU and the AFL-CIO and threw Poland into an immediate state of crisis. Radi- shadow of the Brezhnev Doctrine. There was no ques- accepting “American money”. For the same political cal voices dominated the Solidarity congress in mid- tion about its proffering support to the new Polish trade reasons, LO was unwilling to support what they consid- September 1981. The experience led the embassy to union, but it wanted its aid to be as un-provocative as ered to be Solidarity’s political ambitions. reevaluate its earlier analysis. Any hopes the West may possible to the Kremlin leadership. For that matter, Solidarity leadership shared the have had that Solidarity was working towards a new Cooperation between the Swedish trade union opinion that LO should have nothing to do with “Amer- balance, a modus vivendi with the Communist Party, movement and Solidarity was already established by ican money”13 but were less concerned about the risk now seemed illusory. All signs indicated that Solidarity the fall of 1980. Supportive activities continued through of Soviet intervention in Poland. Signals that Solidar- was aiming to “once and for all fundamentally change Solidarity’s underground period and afterward to the ity sent to Sweden in 1980 and 1981, in particular via the social system and break the dominance of the Com- mid-1980s, when the movement was able to act increas- union channels, were often predicated on the notion munist Party — and the USSR — in Poland.”8 ingly openly until it was legalized again in the spring of that Poles were loath to believe any intervention would Solidarity now demanded that the workers’ councils 1989. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (“LO”) happen.14 at Polish companies should have the right to appoint initially undertook to build up printing offices in Po- One consequence was that LO, in order to avoid ac- management. The Party’s right to appoint all holders land with the help of the Swedish Union of Printing cusations of political involvement, refused to cooper- of key posts would be abolished. In the embassy’s judg- Workers (“GF”). LO cooperated with the International ate with KOR and representatives of KOR in Sweden. ment, the regime was facing the choice of mounting an Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU, after Lech Rune Molin, LO National Secretary, was very clear at a attack against Solidarity, and perhaps triggering civil Wałęsa had asked LO in the fall of 1980 to coordinate meeting of the LO executive committee on January 12, war, or conceding to union demands and risking Soviet international union support activities. This particu- 1981: “[W]e should avoid any contact with KOR, which military intervention. The regime chose the latter alter- lar assignment and LO’s own comprehensive support is a political organization, because it may give rise to native, hoping that the Russians would find the price of would become the topic of some discussion and give misunderstandings. Contacts should be organized di- an invasion too high.9 rise to conflict. rectly between the union organizations.”15 The embassy in Warsaw had now abandoned any In a letter of November 7, 1980, to ICFTU and LO, This view also emerges clearly in a letter Molin sent notions about necessary equilibrium.