The Messenger Matters: Race, Party, and the Perception Of

THE MESSENGER MATTERS: RACE, PARTY, AND THE PERCEPTION OF

CANDIDATES BY WHITE AND NON-WHITE VOTERS

CHASE B. MEYER

(Under the Direction of Ryan Bakker)

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the impact that race has on voter’s support for different candidates and political parties, as well as their perceptions of the different candidates and parties. This dissertation attempts to answer if the race of the candidate running for office impact’s how voters of different races perceive the candidate and vote for the candidate/the candidate’s party. I determine that the race of the candidate matters and that the race of the candidate provides an ideological cue to voters about where the candidate stands on issues. If a candidate is white or non-white it provides a different message to voters regarding where the candidate stands on issues, specifically race-based issues.

However, these perceptions can be overcome by candidates and only occur in countries where race is a prominent dimension for political competition.

INDEX WORDS: Race and Politics, Ideology, Heuristic Cues ii

THE MESSENGER MATTERS: RACE, PARTY, AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF CANDIDATES

BY WHITE AND NON-WHITE VOTERS

CHASE B. MEYER

B.A., The University of Texas at Austin, 2009

M.A., American University, 2011

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA 2017

iii

Chase B. Meyer

THE MESSENGER MATTERS:

RACE, PARTY, AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF CANDIDATES

BY WHITE AND NON-WHITE VOTERS

CHASE B. MEYER

Major Professor: Ryan Bakker Committee: Jamie Monogan M.V. Hood III Shane Singh

Electronic Version Approved:

Suzanne Barbour Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia May 2017

ACKOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge several individuals whose help and support have been critical to the writing and completion of this dissertation. First and foremost I would like to thank my chair Dr. Ryan Bakker for his guidance and support, not just on this dissertation but for my entire time as a doctoral student at the University of Georgia. I will forever be thankful for his instruction and support from the moment I arrived at the

University of Georgia.

I would also like to acknowledge my other committee members as well as other faculty members at both the University of Georgia and other universities I have attended.

Dr. Jamie Monogan, Dr. M.V. Hood III, and Dr. Shane Singh have all been incredible mentors in guiding me through this dissertation. Learning under these incredible and dedicated scholars have made me a better political scientist than I ever could have imagined. I also would like to acknowledge other professors who guided me during my time as a doctoral student, including Dr. Michael Lynch, Dr. James Adams, and Dr.

Jamie Carson for their courses and feedback they have given me over the past few years in both California and in Georgia.

This dissertation was made possible thanks to the help of numerous scholars and professors, but I would be remiss not to point out the professor who first planted the seed of this dissertation in my mind, Dr. Sean Theriault at the University of Texas, who first had me question the impact a non-white candidate might have on vote choice back in

2006. I also could not possibly have completed this dissertation without the support from

v my family, my friends, my fellow graduate students, and Dr. Kait Boyle who helped push me across the finish line in finishing this project. I cannot thank you all enough, and you are all in my thoughts, I owe you all a tremendous debt of gratitude.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv

CHAPTERS

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2 THE ROLE OF RACE IN CANDIDATE PERCEPTIONS:

HOW A VOTER’S RACE IMPACTS PERCEPTIONS

OF WHITE AND NON-WHITE CANDIDATES ...... 7

Abstract ...... 8

Introduction ...... 8

Previous Literature ...... 10

Theory and Hypotheses ...... 14

Data and Methods ...... 20

Results ...... 25

Discussion ...... 33

3 CANDIDATE POSITIONS IN BLACK AND WHITE:

THE IMPACT OF A CANDIDATE’S RACE AND

ISSUE POSITIONS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS ...... 36

Abstract ...... 37

Introduction ...... 37

Non-White Candidates ...... 40

vii

Heuristic Cues and Race-Based Issues ...... 41

Data and Methods ...... 45

Results ...... 49

Discussion ...... 53

4 THE DIMENSION OF RACE IN POLITICAL

COMPETITION IN CANADA ...... 57

Abstract ...... 58

Introduction ...... 58

Previous Literature ...... 60

Theory and Hypotheses ...... 63

Data and Methods ...... 65

Results ...... 67

Discussion ...... 73

5 CONCLUSION ...... 75

REFERENCES ...... 81

TABLES AND FIGURES ...... 89

APPENDICES ...... 110

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At the 2016 Republican National Convention held in Cleveland, Ohio, a remarkable event occurred. As the 2,472 convention delegates cast their votes, an overwhelming majority voted for Donald Trump but many delegates cast their votes for

Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Ben Carson. In fact, these three candidates earned the votes of 24.84% of the delegates. What makes this event remarkable is that this was the most votes ever won by racial and ethnic minority candidates at the Republican Convention.

Previous non-white Republican Presidential candidates, such as Alan Keyes in 1992,

1996, and 2000, earned far less than 1% of the Convention vote.

This increased vote share for minority Republican Presidential candidates occurs at a time when the non-white population in America is growing far faster than the white majority. In 1990 Hawaii was the only state that was less than 50% non-Hispanic white, three states were less than 60% non-Hispanic white, and a grand total of sixteen states were over 90% non-Hispanic white. Since 1990 America has become increasingly diverse and increasingly less white. Compare those 1990 numbers to 2012 when only four states were greater than 90% non-Hispanic white, thirteen states were less than 60% non-Hispanic white, and in four states non-Hispanic whites were less than 50% of the population.

This increased diversity in America has been reflected in the composition of our elected officials as well as the candidates who run for elected office. As our country

2 becomes more diverse, it is only natural that the people elected to office will reflect this diversity. A grand total of nine African-Americans have served in the US Senate since our founding, six of which did not start serving until after 1990, and five of which did not start serving until 2005. This same trend is also present for Latinos serving in the Senate.

A total of eleven Senators have identified as Latinos, six of which did not start serving until 2003. This trend of greater diversity in elected officials and candidates is present in both parties as Democrats elected Barack Obama to the White House in 2008 and 2012 as well as the campaigns of Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Ben Carson in 2016.

This growing racial diversity is not unique to the United States, as the neighbor to the north, Canada, is experiencing a similar demographic trend. According to Canada’s

2011 Census 19.1% of all Canadians identified as a “visible minority,” a large growth from counting only 9.4% in 1991. This growing diversity can also be found in the

Canadian Parliament as the percentage of visible minorities elected to Parliament from the 1993 election to the 2011 increased from 4.4% to 9.1%.

Given the growing racial diversity in both the population as well as among elected officials in both the US and Canada it is important to study the impact that this growing diversity will have on elections in the two countries. This dissertation will attempt to answer the questions of how voters of different races perceive and evaluate candidates of different races. How do white voters perceive and evaluate non-white candidates? Do non-white voters view non-white candidates the same as white voters? Also, if any differences in candidate evaluations are found, which white and non-white voters are making these different evaluations?

These questions are important in understanding candidate perceptions and evaluations in a rapidly diversifying America and Canada. But one more step needs to be taken: what impact do political parties have on these same perceptions and evaluations of candidates? It is well known that when voters know nothing more about a candidate than the candidate’s party they are able to make relatively accurate predictions about the candidate due to heuristic cues. Having a ‘D’ or an ‘R’ next to a candidate’s name gives voters a cue on what positions the candidate may have and what issues they support.

The candidate’s party has rarely been explored by previous studies on candidate evaluations and the race of the candidate. This dissertation contributes to the current literature by examining the race and the party of the candidate to determine if voter evaluations of non-white candidates are consistent or different between Republican and

Democratic candidates, as well as Conservatives, Liberals, and NDP candidates in

Canada. Very few articles examine the partisan impact of race by both white and non- white voters, and even fewer examine this question cross-nationally.

This dissertation is divided into several chapters, each exploring a different aspect of voter evaluations and perceptions of white and non-white candidates across the different political parties. This dissertation includes three substantive chapters examining these questions in the US and Canada, as well as a concluding chapter that summarizes the findings and examines what next steps should be taken in exploring this topic. A short summary of the substantive chapters can be found below.

The first substantive chapter, titled “The Role of Race in Candidate Perceptions:

How a Voter’s Race Impacts Perceptions of White and Non-White Candidates,” explores voter perceptions of actual candidates running for the US Senate. While many studies

4 look at the perceptions of white voters, this will include both white and non-white voters and how they evaluate real candidates for office, as opposed to simulated candidates used in experiments. While many works on race and politics use experimental studies, I will be examining voters’ preferences to actual candidates running for the Senate in the United

States from 2006 to 2014. This eight-year period covers a period of time when many

Latino and black Republican and Democratic candidates ran for office. Using the

Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) I find that minority candidates are perceived differently than white candidates, but this perception differs based on the party of the candidate.

Specifically, non-white candidates are viewed as being more left-wing than white candidates, but only when the non-white candidate is a Democrat. For Republican candidates for the Senate, voters perceive the ideology of white Republicans to be the same as non-white Republicans or slightly more right-wing. Both white and non-white voters hold this left-wing perception of non-white Democrats, although the gap in perceptions is greatest among non-whites. This ideological gap is important due to its impact on voting behavior, with voters preferring candidates that they believe are ideologically closer to the center.

The second substantive chapter, titled “Candidate Positions in Black and White:

The Impact of a Candidate’s Race and Issue Positions on Voter Perceptions,” attempts to answer what the mechanism is that drives this ideological distance between white and non-white Democrats. Using an experiment on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website, participants viewed mailers for a Republican and a Democratic candidate for the Senate.

The race and issue positions of the candidates were manipulated for different

5 respondents, so that some respondents saw a white Democrat and some saw a black

Democrat, some saw a Democrat with consistently liberal policy positions while others saw a Democrat who took a right-wing position on some specific issues.

Using this experiment I determined that voters see non-white Democrats to be more left-wing because they perceive non-white Democrats to be more supportive of race-based issues such as affirmative action. This stereotype informs their heuristic cue that non-white Democratic candidates are more supportive of race-based issues. They see no difference between a white and black Democrat on issues such as trade policy and the environment, as these issues are not impacted by the stereotype. Non-white Democrats can counter these liberal perceptions by giving voters new information by taking a right- wing position on race-based issues. The experiment finds that when a black Democrat and a white Democrat both announce their opposition to racial quotas the black Democrat is no longer viewed as being more left-wing on race-based issues. Thus, new information can be used to counter and overcome an existing stereotype for non-white candidates for office.

The third substantive chapter, titled “The Dimension of Race in Political

Competition in Canada,” explores whether race is a political issue in other countries as it is in the United States. Canada is examined to determine whether policy positions on race-based issues differ by race and if the parties of Canada are divided by race as well.

Looking at the policy positions of voters in the United States and Canada we find that non-white voters in both countries are more supportive of race-based issues that benefit racial minorities, than are the majority whites in both nations.

Non-white candidates in the United States receive fewer votes than do white candidates but this is not true in Canada where non-white candidates are supported at nearly the same rate as white candidates. Furthermore, non-whites in the United States are far more likely to vote for other non-white candidates, but when looking at non- whites in Canada the results are far different. Non-white voters in Canada are no more likely to vote for other non-white candidates than they are to vote for a white candidate.

These findings seem to indicate that race is not a political dimension that the parties compete on. In fact, the three main parties all nominate almost the exact same proportion of white to non-white candidates. So while there may be some policy differences between whites and non-whites in Canada, it does not translate to party choice and voting behavior as it does in the US.

These papers taken together suggest that in the United States the messenger does in fact matter. If the Democratic Party wants to win a Senate seat in the United States, nominating a white candidate versus a non-white candidate will result in differences at the ballot box and differences in how voters perceive the candidates. Furthermore the race of the candidate gives voters a cue on what that candidate stands for, which results in different views of white and non-white Democrats on race-based issues. The non-white politician can change the cue that voters receive by strategically changing their message regarding their policy positions. This is only true in the US and other countries where race is a political dimension on which the parties compete, but in other countries such as

Canada, voters get the same message about policy positions no matter the race of the candidate. But in the US, different candidates can result in voters receiving a different message regarding policy positions, which in turn can impact the outcome of elections.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROLE OF RACE IN CANDIDATE PERCEPTIONS:

HOW A VOTER’S RACE IMPACTS PERCEPTIONS OF

WHITE AND NON-WHITE CANDIDATES1

1 Meyer, Chase B. Submitted to Political Behavior, 9/15/16.

Abstract:

This paper examines how voters of different racial backgrounds perceive the ideology of white and non-white candidates running for the Senate from the 2006 to the

2014 election cycle. Previous literature has suggested that non-white Democrats receive less support than white Democrats, but this effect has not been found with non-white

Republicans. This study finds that non-white Democrats are perceived by voters to be more liberal than white Democrats while non-white Republicans are perceived to be just as conservative, if not more conservative, than white Republicans. These liberal perceptions of non-white Democrats are made by both white and non-white voters, but with a greater gap coming from non-whites. This perceived leftward distance of non- white Democrats has a real impact on non-white candidates making it more difficult to win votes.

Introduction:

Since the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States, there has been a renewed interest among scholars regarding the impact a candidate’s race has on voting behavior. While the question of whether white voters would support non-white candidates has been asked and explored for decades, a more recent trend has been to examine how voters perceive white and non-white candidates. These studies have examined perceptions of white and non-white candidates through an ideological lens in hopes of uncovering the mechanism of why white voters seem less supportive of non- white candidates.

Proximity voting suggests that voters will support the candidate that they view as being closer to them ideologically, thus if voters perceive non-white candidates as being

9 further away ideologically they will be less likely to give support to these candidates

(Downs 1957; Hotelling 1929). Experimental studies support this notion, finding that minority candidates are viewed as being more left-wing than white candidates (Jones

2014). But do these leftward perceptions influence all candidates for office? Are non- white Republicans also viewed as being more liberal than white Republicans, or does this only affect Democratic candidates?

The party a candidate belongs to has rarely been explored in previous studies on candidate evaluations of white and non-white candidates. The few studies that do examine the impact of party have found that only non-white Democrats are viewed as being more left-wing (Jacobsmeier 2014; Visalvanich 2016). While these studies are important in understanding how voters view non-white candidates, there are limitations to them. Jacobsmeier only examines incumbents running for election, excluding all non- successful general election candidates. Visalvanich only examines the perceptions of white voters, excluding non-white voters. Furthermore, both studies only look at the

House and ignore higher profile races such as contests for the Senate.

This article contributes to the literature on perceptions of non-white candidates in several ways. The first is that this study will examine all candidates for the US Senate, incumbents and challengers, over an eight-year period. Furthermore, while many studies look at the perceptions of white voters, this study will include both white and non-white voters and how they evaluate real candidates for office. While many works on race and politics use experimental studies, I will be examining voters’ preferences for actual candidates running for the Senate in the United States from 2006 to 2014. This eight-year

10 period covers a period of time when many Latino and black Republican and Democratic candidates ran for office.

This paper will study the perceptions of white and non-white voters to determine if the race and party of a candidate influences the voter’s perception of the candidate’s ideology. I will evaluate whether white voters perceive white and non-white candidates the same as non-white voters, as well as the ultimate vote choice for candidates of different races. Using the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) I find that minority candidates are perceived differently than white candidates, but this perception differs based on the party of the candidate. Furthermore, these perceptions influence which candidate a voter will support.

Previous Literature:

Numerous scholars have examined minority candidates running for office and have come to many different conclusions regarding their chances of winning elections.

When it comes to minorities winning office, specifically Congress or local office, many scholars have found mixed results. While some have found little to no support for the notion that white voters are less likely to support minority candidates (Highton 2004,

Voss and Lublin 2001, Bullock 2000), others have found mixed evidence for white voters supporting minority candidates (Carsey 2001). However, another set of scholars has found strong evidence that whites are in fact less likely to support minority candidates with their votes (Gay 1999; Bullock and Dunn 1999, Washington 2006), and this white bias against non-white candidates even extends to turnout (Krupnikov and Piston 2015).

With the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States, however, studies have reexamined white support for minority candidates and have overwhelmingly

11 found that race had a great impact on voting for Obama for President (Schaffner, 2011;

Kinder and Dale-Riddle, 2012; Stephens-Davidowitz, 2013; Lewis-Beck, Tien and

Nadeau, 2010; Highton, 2011). These findings regarding President Obama’s election strongly imply that, overall, white voters are less likely to vote for a minority candidate for office. Experiments regarding vote choice have also found similar results with whites being less supportive of minority candidates (Terkildsen 1993), while others have found that a candidate’s race has no impact on the voting behavior of whites (Sigelman et al.

1995).

The impact of race has also been found to influence voters before they cast their vote for candidates, and when they enter the voting booth, most notably with the ‘Wilder effect.’ This refers to the phenomenon of white voters voicing support for minority candidates in pre-election polls before they enter the voting booth, but upon entering the voting booth they instead vote for the white candidate (this is sometimes also known as the Bradley effect). The Wilder effect refers to the campaign of Douglas Wilder for governor of Virginia in which pre-election polls showed him winning by a large margin but the actual result was far closer. It has been hypothesized that white voters told pollsters that they would support the African American candidate, but actually lied and voted against Wilder in the voting booth.

Scholars have examined this phenomenon and have found support for the ‘Wilder effect’ (Keeter and Samaranayake 2007). Explanations of the ‘Wilder effect’ suggest that the phenomenon is due to white voters not wanting to reveal to others their socially stigmatized true preferences (Berinsky 1999, 2005; Reeves 1997). Other evidence supporting the ‘Wilder effect’ are surveys during the 1989 governor election in which

12 support for Wilder was greater in face-to-face surveys than with phone surveys (Traugott and Price 1991). Recently, however, Hopkins examined election results spanning over two decades and found that the Wilder effect dissipated over time and by the late 2000’s it did not exist (2009).

This literature paints a mixed picture of minority candidates being supported by voters. While most of the evidence seems to indicate that minority candidates are less supported by white voters than are white candidates, the findings are not unanimous. The evidence is not universal in finding that all minority candidates are hurt by their race at the ballot box, and recent elections of minority candidates have clouded the evidence even more. The 2014 election of African American Republican Tim Scott in South

Carolina has produced numerous studies on white support for his candidacy. Research has found that racially resentful white voters were just as likely to support the African

American Tim Scott as the white Lindsey Graham (Meyer & Woodard 2016). Polling suggested that support for Tim Scott came from the same people who supported Lindsey

Graham (Huffmon, Knotts, and McKee 2016).

While Tim Scott and Barack Obama are both African Americans, unlike Barack

Obama, Tim Scott is a Republican. This finding suggests that perhaps the party of the minority candidate can be a mitigating factor in whether voters support a minority candidate for office. Few articles have examined the influence that party has on how voters view minority candidates for office. One example is Kinder and McConnaughy

(2006), who find that Colin Powell was immune to racial stereotypes due to being a

Republican. Recent minority Republicans running for governor and for the Senate have found equal levels of support from white conservatives as other Republican candidates

(Hood and McKee 2015). Furthermore, members of the Tea Party and racially resentful voters in Virginia were just as likely to support a black Republican for office as a white

Republican (Hood, Kidd and Morris 2015).

In one of the few articles that examine the effect that the candidate’s party has,

Visalvanich, using the 2010 and 2012 CCES, finds that white voters perceive African

American and Latino candidates to be more liberal but only if they are Democrats (2016).

Visalvanich’s article is different from many of the previous studies as it examines the voters perceptions of the candidate’s ideology, as opposed to vote choice. However the study only gives insight into white voters, excluding non-white voters and their perceptions of candidates. Adding to these findings is Jacobsmeier who also found that minority House incumbents are perceived to be more liberal than white House members

(2014). Furthermore, experimental methods have also found this link. Using a quasi- experiment for local judge races, McDermott found that voters perceived African

American candidates to be more liberal (1998). Also using experiments, Jones finds that minority candidates are perceived to be more liberal, and voters are more likely to assume that non-white members of Congress are Democrats rather than Republicans

(2014).

The study of perceptions of candidates may help explain why some minority candidates, such as Republicans, receive the support of white voters in the voting booth while other candidates do not. Jacobsmeier explores this topic and finds that the perceptions held by white voters are what cause them not to vote for the minority candidate (2015). This impact of perceived ideological distance has a greater impact than the voter’s own racial bias against non-white candidates. This finding suggests that a

14 deeper exploration of how voters perceive the ideology of white and non-white candidates for office is needed.

Theory and Hypotheses:

These previous studies seem to imply that white voters generally are less likely to support minority candidates, and are more likely to find minority candidates more left- wing than white candidates however the party of the candidate can mitigate these effects.

But what is making white voters perceive minority candidates in this different, left-wing, light? I hypothesize that voters are using heuristic cues in their perception that non-whites are more left-wing, and thus minority candidates are less likely to win the votes of whites. These heuristic cues are informational shortcuts so that voters can make educated guesses on the positions a candidate stands for (Popkin 1994).

It appears that voters are using the race and the party of a candidate as a cue to inform them on where the candidate stands on issues. So what issue stances would a candidate’s race inform the voter on? And why would these stances lead to a more liberal evaluation? This is likely due to minorities overwhelmingly voting and supporting

Democrats, and most minority politicians are liberal Democrats. For example, in the 2012 election African Americans and Latinos gave Democratic President Obama 93% and

71% of their votes, respectively. Furthermore, support for race-based issues such as affirmative action and comprehensive immigration reform are also liberal, left-wing positions. Research has supported this as experiments on candidate positions have found that voters perceive African Americans to be more supportive of aid to inner cities and raising taxes (Karl and Ryan 2016) and these findings are strongest among whites who

15 have negative stereotypes about African Americans (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman

1997).

Much like race, other demographic cues have been shown to impact how voters evaluate and judge candidates. The most important heuristic in this study, aside from race, is party ID. A candidate that is a Republican or a Democrat gives voters a cue as to which candidate is likely to be conservative versus liberal or pro-life versus pro-choice

(Rahn 1993). A candidate’s religion has been shown to be a significant factor in how voters perceive the candidate. Candidates who run as evangelical Christians are perceived better and receive more support from Republicans than Democrats when holding their issue positions constant (Campbell et al. 2010). The reason for this support from

Republicans is due to the fact that evangelical Christians are perceived as being more conservative (McDermott 2008). This is particularly true for white candidates who are religious (McLaughlin and Thompson 2016). This same phenomenon is also found with

Jewish politicians who, because of their religion, are perceived as being more liberal

(Berinsky & Mendelberg 2005).

Why do voters perceive evangelical Christians as more conservative and Jews and women as more liberal? This is primarily because the stereotype of these individuals points in these ideological directions. Evangelical Christians are more likely to support school prayer and oppose abortion and gay marriage; these positions create a stereotype of evangelical Christians, which is applied to anyone with the label of evangelical

Christian, including politicians. In fact, the political connection between social groups and political parties has been shown to be very strong and the perceptions of the party they identify with impact perceptions of these groups (Berelson et al. 1954; Miller et al.

1991). If a politician is an evangelical Christian then voters will use the cue of the candidate’s religion to recall the stereotype and thus apply the stereotype to the candidate.

While stereotypes can change over time, such as with US Catholics, whatever a group’s current stereotype is determines how the cue is perceived today (McDermott 2007).

Gender is another cue that results in different perceptions. Female candidates are perceived as having a more liberal ideology (King & Matland 2003, Koch 2000). This perception is due primarily to their gender-linked personality traits such as women being more connected to ‘compassion’ than men (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993). The perceived liberalness of women candidates has been shown even with well-known candidates for high office (Fridkin & Kenney 2009), as well as in low information races (McDermott

1998, Matson & Fine 2006). The use of this heuristic cue is most commonly found among voters with high political knowledge (Sanbonmatsu 2003).

Based on the previous research regarding heuristic cues on religions and gender, when it comes to looking at minority candidates, voters will draw upon their stereotypes about minorities as well as their stereotypes about the candidate’s party. By being a

Democrat voters will perceive that candidate to be more liberal than a Republican based on the stereotype about Democrats being left-wing liberals, thus the label of Democrat will cue voters to that stereotype and they will apply it to the candidate. Race will have a similar impact; and being a minority will cue voters to stereotypes about minorities, as well as the issue positions they might take (such as affirmative action and immigration).

But what would happen when these two factors intersect and there is a minority

Republican compared with a minority Democrat? Given that some research has found that minority Republicans are not perceived to be liberal, as opposed to minority

Democrats, indicates that the party cue of Republican might outweigh and overwhelm the cue of being a minority. To be a Republican, it is assumed that one is pro-life, pro-tax cuts, anti-affirmative action, pro-border wall, and anti-environmental protections.

The cue of being anti-affirmative action and pro-border wall is in contrast to the policy stereotypes that one would have about black or Latino candidates. To be a non- white Republican voters would recognize that the stances of the Republican Party do not match with many issue positions espoused by most non-whites. The stereotypes for

Democrats however indicate that they would be more amenable to affirmative action programs and more supportive of citizenship for illegal immigrants and so the liberal cue would be compounded.

By perceiving minority Democrats as being more liberal than white Democrats, it could explain why some of the literature suggests minority Democrats receive fewer votes than white Democrats. This is likely due to most voters being in the ideological middle, and thus being less likely to vote for a candidate they view as being ideologically further away from them (Downs 1957, Hotelling 1929). This effect is likely compounded with white voters, on average, being more conservative than non-white voters. These greater liberal perceptions for non-white Democrats are in fact what cost minority

Democrats votes in contrast to white Democrats (Jacobsmeier 2015).

Thus, we see how the heuristic cue of the party ID of the candidate for office may impact the heuristic cue of the race of the candidate, and how this impacts elections.

Voters do not just view candidates as white and non-white, but rather as white

Republican/non-white Republican, and white Democrat/non-white Democrat. Democrats give voters a liberal cue, as does being a minority. When these two cues are combined

18 voters will perceive a minority Democrat as being more liberal than a white Democrat.

But when it comes to Republicans, the stereotypes about Republicans and their issue positions overwhelms those of non-whites. Thus, Republicans, whether they are white or non-white will be viewed as being equally conservative, or possibly even more conservative than white Republicans. Given the surprise that many voters would have at a minority running as a Republican, it is possible that voters will assume that for a minority to run as a Republican they must be incredibly ideologically conservative. Figure 1 below displays where I expect voters to perceive the ideology of different candidates based on their party and their race.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

Figure 1 shows how voters overall will view non-white and white Republicans and Democrats. While non-white Democrats will be perceived as being more liberal and left-wing than white Democrats, there will be no liberal perception among non-white

Republicans when compared to white Republicans. Non-white Republicans will be viewed as being ideologically the same as white Republicans, or possibly slightly more conservative. What matters, however, is that the left-wing cue only impacts non-white

Democrats. This claim is tested with hypothesis 1 below:

H1: Minority candidates for office will be perceived as being more liberal than white candidates for office, but only when the candidate is a Democrat.

With all candidates divided by their race, the next step is not only to look beyond all voters, but to examine both white and non-white voters. But which set of voters holds these stereotypes? On one hand, it would be logical to conclude that whites hold negative

19 stereotypes of minorities and being placed as more left-wing than white candidates punishes minority candidates. However, minorities might also see this ideological gap between minority candidates and white candidates. Research has shown that non-white voters approve of non-white candidates more than white candidates, even when controlling for legislative activity (Tate 2001). Furthermore, non-white members of

Congress are more likely to act differently than white members of Congress in regard to race based issues, whether through oversight (Minta 2009; Williams 1998), or voting on bills (Canon 1999; Lublin 1997; Tate 2003; Welch and Hibbing 1984; and Whitby 1997).

These differences, made on behalf of non-white voters, are likely to be recognized by both whites and non-whites Therefore, it is likely that this liberal perception of non-white candidates is present in both white and non-white voters, as stated in hypothesis 2:

H2: Minority Democrats for office will be perceived as being more liberal than white candidates for office by both white and non-white voters.

Lastly, proximity voting suggests that these leftward perceptions of candidates will have an impact on whether voters support them on Election Day or not. The study of voters’ perceptions of white and non-white candidates is important only if voters use these perceptions to help inform their vote. I hypothesize that whether the candidate is white or non-white, voters will be more likely to vote for the candidate that they perceive as being ideologically closer to them. The race of the candidate may have some impact on vote choice, but what will matter far more than race is the ideological distance of the candidate. And if there is evidence for the first two hypotheses, then this would indicate that by perceiving non-white Democrats as being more left-wing, voters are less likely to vote for non-white Democrats due to this greater ideological distance.

H3: The proximity between the perceived ideological distance of the candidate and the voter will have a greater impact on vote choice than the race of the candidate.

Data and Methods:

To test these hypotheses, data on voters’ ideological perception of candidates for office are collected. Many surveys, such as the American National Election Study

(ANES), ask voters to place candidates for office on a left-right ideological spectrum and have been used in previous research. However, this study will use data from the

Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere 2010; Ansolabehere 2010;

Ansolabehere 2012; Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2013; Schaffner and Ansolabehere

2015). The Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) is used for its large sample size, which ensures that a large number of minority voters will have their opinions recorded. Unlike the ANES, the CCES interviews nearly 50,000 voters for each election. Furthermore, the ANES has stopped running their survey during mid-term election years, which is problematic as many minority candidates ran for office in 2014 such as Republican Tim Scott in South Carolina.

Dependent Variable

The primary dependent variable for this study will be the ideological perceptions, made by voters, of candidates running for office. This question, asking voters where do they place/rate candidates on an ideological scale, has been asked in every CCES (the

CCES has been conducted in the following years: 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014).

The 2006 and the 2008 CCES asked voters to place the candidates running for office on a

0-100 scale (0 being the most liberal and 100 being the most conservative) while the

2010, 2012, and 2014 CCES asked the voters to place the candidates on a 1-7 scale (1

21 being very liberal and 7 being very conservative). To account for this discrepancy the

2006 and 2008 studies are recoded from the 0-100 scale and are standardized into a 1-7 scale to match the later studies. After this transformation, the ideological perception of all candidates is on a 7-point scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. The 7- point scale is then again recoded to range from -3 to 3, so that the most moderate candidates are a zero while liberal candidates are negative and conservative candidates are positive.

Previous studies examining this subject have focused on US House candidates

(Visalvanich 2016) or House incumbents only (Jacobsmeier 2014). The CCES asks voters to place both House and Senate candidates on the ideological scale. These previous studies have ignored Senate candidates in favor of House candidates, and thus Senate candidates will be the focus of this study. One reason for focusing on Senate candidates, as opposed to House candidates is due to the fact that far more Senate races are competitive every year than are House races. In October of 2014, the non-partisan Cook

Political Report rated 11 of the 36 Senate elections as the most competitive, either toss-up or leaning towards one party (31%). At that same time only 35 House races (8%) were given that same designation. Competitive races see more campaign activity and greater television and radio ads. Due to the higher proportion of Senate races that are competitive, a greater share of voters will be aware of the contest and will know something about the candidates, particularly the race of the candidates.

For many House contests it is unlikely that voters would know anything about the challenger in an uncompetitive contest, not even their race or ethnicity. This is likely to be even greater as many minority Republicans who ran for the House in 2014 were not in

22 competitive races.2 In Senate races, we can be confident that voters are at least aware of the race of a candidate. Previous studies that were based only on House elections rely on voters to ideologically place House candidates who they, likely, know nothing about.

This becomes increasingly problematic when attempting to gain insights on minority

Republican candidates.

One other benefit in using Senate candidates is that it allows for a large number of respondents in every contest where there is a minority candidate running for office. This is important due to the rarity of minority Republicans running for office. While the CCES prides itself on having respondents from every Congressional district, in most election years there is only a handful of minority Republicans running for Congress. In 2014, a record year for the number of African Americans running for Congress, only 18 black

Republicans ran for the House of Representatives.3 The number of respondents in the

2014 CCES who could evaluate the ideological position of non-white Republican House candidates would be very small. Furthermore, many of those candidates ran in majority- minority districts, which means that having a robust number of white respondents in these districts is unlikely. However, in that same year Republican African American Tim Scott ran statewide for the Senate in South Carolina. The 2014 CCES included nearly 800 respondents from South Carolina, giving a large, racially diverse sample to judge the ideology of non-white Republican candidates.

To test hypothesis 3 a different dependent variable is used. Hypothesis 3 focuses on who voters actually cast their ballot for, and whether the perceived ideological

2 Southern Political Report, “Southern Blacks and Whites 2014” http://www.southernpoliticalreport.com/2014/11/03/southern-blacks-and-whites-in-2014/ 3 USA Today, “Black Candidates for Congress Hit Record High in 2014.” http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/01/black-candidates-new-record/16547083/

23 proximity has an impact on the voter’s decision. The CCES asks voters in all of their surveys who the voter cast their ballots for in all races from the President to House member. The dependent variable to test the third hypothesis will be whether the voters cast their vote for the Democratic Senate candidate, or for the Republican Senate candidate.

Independent Variable

The primary independent variable for this study is the race of the candidate running for office. The race and ethnicity of every candidate who ran for the Senate between 2006 and 2014 was researched and each candidate was coded as to what their race was and whether they were white or non-white (a complete list of minority candidates can be found in the Appendix). Due to the most populous racial/ethnic minorities in the United States being African Americans and Latinos, they will be the focus of this study (Asian American candidates are thus excluded from the study).

The other major independent variable in this study is the race/ethnicity of the voter responding to the CCES survey. This study focuses on the difference between white and non-white candidates among white and non-white voters, thus the race of the respondent will be simplified into whether the respondent is white or non-white. What differentiates this study from others is the inclusion of non-white voters, as many others solely examined white voters.

Control Variables

Several controls are also needed to account for factors that could influence how voters perceive candidates. One obvious control variable would be to control for how interested the respondent is in current events and politics. Those who are more interested

24 in politics and current events are more likely to be able to accurately place the ideology of a candidate versus one who has little interest in current events (Powell 1989; Wright and Niemi 1983). The CCES asks respondents to rate their level of interest in current events for all of their surveys and is included as the variable ‘Interest in Current Events.’

Other factors that could influence how a person perceives the ideology of a candidate for Senate include whether that Senator is a challenger or an incumbent, as incumbents are usually far better known than challengers. A person’s education level, gender, and age are controlled for as well. To account for candidates in the South being much more conservative than candidates nationwide, a dummy variable for voters living in the South is also included (comprising of the 11 states of the former Confederacy). A voter’s party identification is also accounted for with dummy variables for party.

When examining voter’s beliefs regarding minority candidates, a common control that is included is the respondent’s racial resentment level. Racial resentment is usually derived from asking the respondent a series of questions to measure their underlying racial animosity. However, the 2006 and 2008 CCES did not ask the typical racial resentment questions. Furthermore, the later CCES studies only asked two of the typical four questions. This problem can be solved by instead using the CCES question asking respondents their position on affirmative action programs, which was asked in every

CCES. While this measure is not traditionally used, it highly correlates with respondent answers on the two racial resentment questions asked in 2010, 2012, and 2014, and asking only two racial resentment questions has been found to be just as good as asking four (Knuckey 2016).

The next control that must be included is the candidate’s actual ideology. If this study focused on incumbents, the logical control would be Poole’s DW-NOMINATE scores. However, candidates who never won office do not have DW-NOMINATE scores, and thus a different measure of ideology must be used. Bonica’s Dynamic CF scores, based on candidate contributions, is a perfect measure to use to account for the candidate’s actual ideology (Bonica 2014). Much like DW-NOMINATE scores,

Dynamic CF scores assign liberal candidates negative values and conservative candidates positive values and can be compared across time.

The last variables that need to be accounted for are how respondents view themselves and the political parties of the candidates running. The CCES asks respondents where they place the Republican and Democratic Party. This variable is also recoded into a 7-point scale, like candidate ideology, with 0 as the mid-point. Lastly, the respondent’s own ideology is controlled for to account for the phenomenon of ideological extremists perceiving their opponents to be far more ideological than they actually are

(Hare et al. 2015). In this case, liberals do not think conservatives are just slightly right wing, but are very far right wing (and vice versa). Much like the perceived placement of the candidate ideology, the scale of these two variables shifted between the 2008 and the

2010 CCES, going from a 0-100 scale to a 1-7 scale. Again, the data are recoded into a 1-

7 scale, and again transformed to range from -3 to 3 with 0 in the middle.

Results:

To test my hypotheses I utilize Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed effects for election year (excluded from the tables below). While the dependent variable only ranges from -3 to 3, OLS is used due to the transformation of the 2006 and 2008

CCES from a 0-100 scale to a 7-point scale. This transformation resulted in many non- integer values between -3 and 3. It is difficult for many voters to fully understand and comprehend a left-right scale and may result in many voters placing candidates randomly. To account for this, I excluded from this study any respondent who did not place the Democratic Party to the left of the Republican Party. This may in fact bias this study against finding results, as it is likely that people who do not accurately place the parties are likely to be uninformed, and uninformed voters are, in all likelihood, more likely to rely on stereotypes such as race to a greater extent. If evidence is found to support the hypotheses, we can be confident in its results as it is based on a sample that is likely to be at least somewhat aware of the candidates running for office.

[Insert Table 1.1 here]

Table 1.1 (which covers the 2006-2014 elections) above displays the results of the

OLS regression in two different models. The first examines Democratic candidates only, while the second examines Republican candidates only. In both models, the variable of interest is ‘Non-white Candidate’ which is a dummy indicating if the candidate is black or Latino. If there is evidence for Hypothesis 1, then we would expect to see the variable for ‘Non-white Candidate’ negative and statistically significant for Democrats, while the variable for Republicans might be positive and significant or insignificant. Negative values in the table indicate more liberal perceptions while positive values indicate more conservative perceptions. However, because we expect that this perception will only affect Democrats and not Republicans, only in the first model will the coefficients be both negative and statistically significant. (An alternative model that separates black and

Latino candidates into their own categories can be found in the Appendix. The results of this alternative model support my hypothesis)

As Table 1.1 shows, voters perceived non-white Democratic candidates running for the Senate to be more liberal than white Democratic candidates. This trend is only present among Democratic candidates and absent when it comes to minority Republicans.

For non-white Republican candidates for the Senate, black candidates and Latino candidates are viewed as being slightly more conservative than white candidates. While the finding for non-white Republicans is surprising, this is evidence to support the first hypothesis.4

A quick glance at the control variables gives us confidence in our results as the coefficients for the control variables are in the expected direction. Voters who have high levels of interest in current events and politics place Democratic candidates more to the left and Republican candidates more to the right. This is credible as knowledgeable voters are more likely to recognize that Democrats are liberal and Republicans are conservative.

Furthermore, candidates in the conservative South were perceived to be more to the right than candidates nationwide and the more conservative a candidate’s actual ideology is

(measured by Dynamic CF scores) the more conservative people place the candidates, indicating a high level of accuracy in the placements.

Table 1.1 presents evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, but the question now is who is fueling these liberal perceptions about minority Democratic candidates that are placing them to the left of white Democratic candidates? Is this perception of minority

4 Due to the DV for 2006-2008 originally ranging from 0-100 while the DV from 2010-2014 ranging from 1-7, the concern was raised that the significance found could have simply been driven by the greater variation from the 2006 and 2008 elections. To account for this, the analyses were rerun for 2006-2008 only and 2010-2014 only and the results were nearly identical to these findings, with only non-white Democrats being found to be more left-wing. These results can be found in the appendix.

Democrats being more liberal than white Democrats a product of white stereotypes regarding minorities or do both whites and non-white voters supply this liberal perception? To answer this question the race of the candidate will need to be interacted with the race of the voter. By interacting these variables we can determine if both white and non-white voters view minority candidates the same way, or if one racial group holds a liberal bias while the other does not.

Even when ignoring the control variables and only looking at the perceived ideological position of white and non-white candidate we see the pattern. Table 1.2 below displays the average ideological placement voters gave white and non-white candidates.

The differences are clear and statistically significant. Non-white Democrats are viewed, on average, as being slightly less than 0.2 units more liberal than a white Democrat. The difference between white and non-white Republicans, while still significant, is much less with non-white Republicans being viewed as less than 0.1 units more conservative.

[Insert Table 1.2]

The next step is to determine if all voters see these ideological differences, or if white or non-white voters only see these differences. To test Hypothesis 2 the candidate’s race is interacted with the race of the voter. Table 1.3 below replicates Table 1.1, but the

‘Non-White Candidates’ variable is now interacted with white voters. In Table 1.3, the coefficient for the interaction term is positive and significant in both the Republican and

Democratic models. These results warrant further examination.

[Insert Table 1.3 here]

To further examine this, Figures 1.2 and 1.3 of the predicted ideological placement of white and non-white candidates are created. Figure 1.2 presents to the

29 results for Democrats while Figure 1.3 presents to the results for Republicans. In both figures we can see how both whites and non-whites evaluate the ideologies of white and non-white candidates. Again, lower values indicate that voters see candidates as more liberal, and higher values indicate that voters see the candidates as more conservative.

[Insert Figure 1.2 here]

[Insert Figure 1.3 here]

Looking first at Democratic candidates in Figure 1.2 we find that among both white and non-white voters, minority candidates are perceived to be more liberal than white candidates. While white and non-white voters see non-white candidates as more left-wing than white candidates, the gap is different between the two groups of voters.

White voters on average only see a slight difference between white and non-white candidates while non-white voters see a significant gap between the candidates. In fact, both whites and non-whites perceive non-white candidates almost equally as liberal but non-white voters see white candidates as much more moderate than do white voters.

We see a different situation with Republican candidates. In Figure 1.3, we can see that non-whites, on average, do not see much of a difference between white and non- white Republicans. But among white voters, minority Republican candidates are seen as being more conservative than white Republicans. Furthermore, white voters perceive

Republicans of any race as being more conservative than how non-whites perceive

Republicans.

This informs us that non-white voters drive much of the liberal perception we witnessed among non-white Democratic candidates, primarily due to non-white voters’ finding white Democrats to be less left-wing than white voters. There is support for

Hypothesis 2 in that both white and non-white voters found non-white Democrats more liberal than white Democrats, but the difference was significantly larger for non-white

Democrats.

The last question to examine is what impact these perceptions have on vote choice. As hypothesis 3 stated, the closer a person views a candidate to their ideological position the more likely they will be to vote for that candidate, and this ideological distance will impact vote choice much greater than will the race of the candidate. To test this, the CCES asks respondents whom they voted for; this question will be the new dependent variable, whether the voter cast their vote for the Democratic candidate or for the Republican candidate,

The previous dependent variable of perceived candidate ideology is now subtracted from the voter’s ideological position. The absolute value of this distance is taken to determine how near or far a voter views their Republican and Democratic candidate for Senate. This ideological distance is interacted with the race of the candidate to determine the impact that ideological distance has on both white and non-white candidates for the Senate. Similar controls to the previous regressions are used with some differences as the incumbency of both candidates is accounted for and the log of the spending difference as well (as non-incumbent candidates and candidates that are badly outspent rarely win). The results of this logistic regression, with fixed effects for election year, are below in Table 1.4 with one model examining whether the voters cast their votes for the Democratic candidate or not, while the other examines whether the voters supported the Republican candidate.

[Insert Table 1.4 here]

As the odds ratio in Table 1.4 shows, in both models, the absolute value of the distance between the perceived ideology of the candidate and the ideology of the voter is significant and below one, indicating a negative relationship. This indicates that the greater the perceived ideological distance, the less likely a candidate is to receive a vote.

Looking at the odds ratios for non-white candidates, there is a positive relationship with non-white Republicans and a negative relationship with non-white Democrats. Given that most non-white Democrats in this sample lost their election, many of them badly, and most non-white Republicans won their election, this finding is not a surprise (only 2 out of 11 non-white Democratic Senate candidates were successful, while 3 of the 4 non- white Republican Senate candidates were successful).

The variable of interest is the interaction term between ideological distance and non-white candidates, which is significant for either Republicans or Democrats. This suggests that the impact of ideological distance is slightly different for white and non- white candidates. However, to determine the true impact of ideological distance and race of the candidate on vote choice, predicted probability plots are created. In Figures 1.4 and

1.5 below the predicted probabilities of voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate for the Senate is plotted at different levels of perceived ideological distance.

[Insert Figure 1.4 here]

[Insert Figure 1.5 here]

As the two plots show, the probability of voting for a white and non-white candidate differ at various levels of perceived ideological distance. When a voter perceives a candidate as being 5 or 6 points away from their ideological position, they are incredibly unlikely to vote for the candidate, no matter the candidate’s race. But when the

32 candidate is ideologically close to the voter, voter’s are more likely to support a white

Democrat over a non-white Democrat and a non-white Republican over a white

Republican (much of this is likely due to non-white Democrats losing most of their

Senate races in this sample).

The important question, however, is whether the race of the candidate is more important than the ideological position. As we see in the plots above, the probability of supporting a white or non-white candidate when the candidate is two points away, while a significant difference, is not that large. A much larger difference is supporting a candidate when he or she is one unit further away from the voter’s perceived position.

This indicates that perceived ideological distance between a voter and a candidate matter far more than a candidate’s race. This informs us that when voters fail to support the non- white candidate for office it is primarily because voters perceive non-white Democrats as being more liberal, and by perceiving the Democrat as being more liberal and further away, they are less likely to support that candidate.

This suggests that the race of the candidate is a double-edged sword when it comes to vote choice. Non-white Democrats are already less likely to be voted for even when they are ideologically close to a voter. But that ideological position is likely inaccurate, as voters view non-white Democrats as being even more left-wing than they otherwise would a white Democrat.

If a voter perceives a Democratic candidate to be 6 units more liberal then the voter is, that candidate is highly unlikely to be the voter’s pick. But if a voter perceives a

Democratic candidate to be 3 units more liberal than the voter is, that candidate is slightly more likely to win the vote if they are white. But, if that candidate is non-white then it is

33 likely that the voter will misperceive the candidate’s position of being 3.5 units more liberal, when in fact they are only 3 units more liberal, thus exacerbating the difficulty of non-white Democrats to win office. Perceived ideological distance is critical to vote choice, and with minority Democrats being perceived as more liberal than white

Democrats it would result in fewer votes for the minority Democratic candidates.

Discussion:

Many previous studies found conflicting evidence of white support for non-white candidates. This paper examines voters’ perceptions of candidates, with ideological perceptions being a major factor in which candidate a voter supports. While some previous research found evidence that voters see minority candidates as being more liberal, most of theses studies did not examine the impact the candidate’s party had. Other studies focused only on members of the House, or House candidates, and only examined the perceptions of white voters. This study is unique in that it examines white and non- white candidates for the Senate over five different elections as well as the perceptions of these candidates by both white and non-white voters, and whether these perceptions actually impact vote choice.

The results, on the whole, support the hypotheses that Democratic non-white candidates, but not Republican non-white candidates, will be viewed as more liberal.

Furthermore, both white and non-white voters provide this liberal perception regarding non-white candidates. This liberal perception is harmful to non-white Democrats as voters use the perceived ideological distance between themselves and the candidate to determine vote choice, with this distance mattering more than the race of the candidate.

But, there is much more to be explored. While both white and non-white voters view

34 minority Democrats as more liberal than white Democrats, future research needs to determine why non-white voters view white Democratic candidates far more conservatively than do white voters.

These are questions that future studies should examine and attempt to answer. But for now, we have ample evidence that minority Democrats are perceived to be more liberal than white Democrats while minority Republicans do not face the same liberal penalty from voters, and may be seen as being more conservative. This finding is critical as the proximity model of voting suggests that people are more likely to vote for the candidate/party that they believe is closer to them ideologically, which this paper has found further support of. With people perceiving minority Democratic candidates to be more liberal than they actually are it results in minority Democratic candidates receiving fewer votes than we would normally expect them to. This finding is supported by other political scientists have recently found this, with minority candidates who are perceived to be more liberal end up getting fewer votes (Jacobsmeier 2015).

This study provides the first comprehensive examination of how both white and non-white voters perceive real white and non-white candidates and whether there is any difference between the perceptions of liberal and conservative voters over the course of multiple election cycles. While previous studies have suggested that non-white

Republicans are not perceived as being more liberal, this study is the first to examine which set of voters (whites or non-whites) are responsible for this perception.

Furthermore, this study shows that while both white and non-white voters see non-white candidates as more liberal than white candidates, the reason for this gap primarily is that

35 non-white voters perceive white Democratic candidates to be far more conservative than do white voters.

Future research should examine whether minority Democratic candidates can overcome this perceived liberal bias, whether through issue positions or other means. For now, however, we have clear evidence for how actual voters across several elections perceive white and non-white candidates. This examination of observational studies of

Senate candidates adds to the growing race and politics literature and firmly establishes that both white and non-white candidates, as well as the voter’s perceptions, should be studied when looking at the race of candidates running for office.

CHAPTER 3 CANDIDATE POSITIONS IN BLACK AND WHITE: THE IMPACT OF A

CANDIDATE’S RACE AND ISSUE POSITIONS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS5

5 Meyer, Chase B. To be submitted to Electoral Studies.

Abstract: Previous studies on non-white candidates running for office have found that non- white Democrats are perceived to be more left-wing than white Democrats. This article attempts to answer why this misperception occurs and ways that non-white candidates can overcome it. Using original data from an online experiment this study finds that non- white Democrats are perceived to be more left-wing only on specific race-related issues.

Furthermore, when non-whites take a position that is counter to the stereotype of non- white positions on race-related issues, then voters see no difference between the white and non-white candidate.

Introduction:

When it comes to voting for politicians and political parties voters have a number of different ways of deciding how to cast their ballot. Many might vote in their economic self-interest or for the candidate who the voter has seen all over the television with commercials. Many voters, however, rely on heuristic cues and stereotypes about parties and candidates. For some voters, these stereotypes are incredibly important in deciding their vote choice.

Many scholars studying heuristic cues in the United States have focused their research on how voters use these cues when it comes to non-white candidates running for office. With a growing racial diversity in both the American electorate and among elected officials many studies have attempted to answer if voters perceive white and non-white candidates for office in the same way, both ideologically and on specific issue positions.

When voters see a non-white candidate running for office, do they view this candidate

38 any differently than a white politician of the same party? What cues and stereotypes do they rely upon when making these perceptions?

A common strategy by political parties and candidates is to take more moderate issue positions to pick up more votes (Downs 1957, Hotelling 1929). If this is true, then taking moderate issue positions would help candidates win office. This however may be problematic, as heuristic cues can signal to voters that a candidate is not ideologically moderate. Many recent studies, examining race and candidate evaluations, have found that non-white candidates are stereotyped as being more ideologically left-wing than white candidates (Visalvanich 2016; Jacobsmeier 2014; Meyer unpublished).

This stereotyping of non-white candidates as being ideologically left-wing can potentially impact their chances on winning office. Evidence suggests that greater perceived ideological distance between a voter and a candidate/party results in fewer votes (Fazekas and Meder 2013). Given that most voters are relatively centrist, and evidence in Western democracies shows that electorates overwhelmingly have ideologically normal distributions of voters with the modal result being centrist (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009), any stereotype that pushes some candidate’s away from the center would hurt their chances of winning office.

Non-white candidates for office face this unique challenge of having to overcome racial stereotypes in order to win an elected office, especially if their constituency is made up of white voters. If a non-white candidate runs for statewide office in a state where the median voter is a centrist they would have to overcome this left-wing heuristic cue in order to win. Perhaps non-white candidates should adopt a strategy of trying to

39 overcome the heuristic cue with new information. Specifically by moderating their position on some specific issues in hopes that this new ideological information will overwhelm the left-wing cue by giving voters information that the candidate is not a liberal, but rather a moderate.

This article examines these questions regarding heuristic cues and new information and what impact emphasizing some issue positions over others might have for non-white candidates. This article finds that, overall, non-white candidates are viewed as being more left-wing than white candidates only on race-based issues. Furthermore, the use of strategic position taking by candidates has the same impact on voter perceptions of candidates for both white and non-white candidates – in that when both black and white candidates take more right-wing positions they are viewed as being more right-wing. But, on race-based issues this right-wing perception of candidates benefits non-white Democrats more than white Democrats. This seems to suggest that non-white candidates for office may want to emphasize their position on racial issues if their actual position goes against left-wing stereotypes in order to overcome the race-based stereotypes that voters have.

In other words, both a white and black Democratic candidate for office will be viewed the same on their positions on issues such as the environment and trade, even if they take moderate positions on other issues. This is due to the fact that the heuristic cue voters have about non-white candidates is not related to issues such as the environment, but rather to race-related issues. Due to the heuristic cue on race, a black Democrat will always be viewed as more left-wing on race-based issues, which ultimately will cause them to be perceived as being more liberal than the white Democratic candidate. To

40 overcome this heuristic cue and to be perceived as being no different than the white

Democrat, a black Democrat can use new information on race-based issues such as affirmative action.

Non-white Candidates:

The question of the electoral impact a candidate’s race has on their vote total has been asked numerous times in political science. Many studies have previously found that there is little to no support for the notion that non-white candidates do worse at the ballot box than white candidates (Highton 2004; Voss & Lublin 2001; Bullock 2000). However, more recent research has challenged these claims, particularly in regards to the election of

Barack Obama (Terkilsden 1993; Gay 1999; Bullock & Dunn 1999; Washington 2006;

Schaffner, 2011; Kinder & Dale-Riddle, 2012; Stephens-Davidowitz, 2013; Lewis-Beck,

Tien & Nadeau, 2010; Highton, 2011, Jacobsmeier 2015). These newer studies find evidence to suggest that non-white candidates, particularly Barack Obama’s Presidential run, receive fewer votes than a white candidate would.

This is not to say that all non-white candidates perform worse than white candidates. Many recent studies have examined exactly which non-white candidates have done worse than others and have found that the candidate’s party plays a major impact.

This research has found that only when the non-white candidate is a Democrat is there an impact on the candidate, and it appears that when a non-white candidate runs as a

Republican their overall vote total is not impacted in any different way than a white

Republican would (Meyer & Woodard 2016; Huffmon, Knotts, and McKee 2016; Hood,

Kidd and Morris 2015).

In efforts to explain why it appears non-white candidates, specifically Democratic non-white candidates, receive fewer votes than white candidates, many scholars have looked at the ideological perceptions of candidates by voters. This has resulted in many studies finding that non-white candidates are perceived to be more liberal by voters than other white candidates, particularly when the non-white candidate is a Democrat

(McDermott 1998; Jones 2014; Jacobsmeier 2014; Meyer unpublished; Visalvanich

2016). The reason then, that non-white Democratic candidates receive fewer votes, is that voters perceive them as being ideologically more distant. This would suggest that a non- white Democrat would win fewer votes than a white Democrat, as voters misperceive the non-white candidate to be ideologically further away.6 But white and non-white

Republicans are viewed as being ideologically the same distance away, thus only the candidate that is viewed as being more distant loses votes as proximity voting would suggest (Downs 1957; Jacobsmeier 2015).

Heuristic Cues and Race-based Issues:

Given the abundance of literature that suggests that non-white Democrats are perceived to be more left-wing than white Democrats, the question becomes why this is.

What is the mechanism that is causing voters to perceive non-white Democrats as more left-wing than white Democrats? And if an answer can be ascertained to why, then is there anything non-white Democrats can do to alter these perceptions. Can new information be used by non-white Democrats to combat this left-wing perception?

6 This is identified as a misperception as an examination of the first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores for Senators since the 107th Congress shows that for most Congresses there is no difference in the NOMINATE scores of white and non-white Democrats.

The most likely answer as to what causes voters to perceive non-white Democrats as being more left-wing is heuristic cues. Heuristic cues are informational shortcuts so that voters can guess what positions a candidate supports or opposes (Popkin 1994). The party ID of a candidate serves as one heuristic cue, as Democrats are perceived to be more left-wing than Republicans, particularly on issues such as abortion (Rahn 1993).

Given that these perceptions are driven by heuristic cues held by voters, what perceptions would voters have about non-white candidates versus white candidates that would cause the non-white candidates to be viewed as being more left-wing?

One possible reason is that people perceive non-white Democrats to be more left- wing on specific race-related issues. Recent studies may provide an answer to this as Karl and Ryan find that voters perceive African Americans to be more supportive of the inner cities as opposed to white candidates (2016). This stereotype is strongly related to race as the term “inner cities” is used in the United States to refer to neighborhoods that are overwhelmingly non-white. This suggests that voters see non-white candidates as being more supportive of other non-whites than of white voters, thus they believe that non- white candidates favor policies that favor non-whites over whites.

Furthermore, whites with negative stereotypes about blacks are more likely to judge blacks harshly on race-based issues such as crime and welfare (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997). Other research has also found this connection between those with negative stereotypes about minorities and policy judgment (Bobo and Kluegel 1993;

Carmines and Sniderman 1992). There are reasons for voters to believe and support this stereotype as white and non-white members of Congress have been found to act different on issues such as bill sponsorship (Rocca and Sanchez 2007), are more likely to focus on

43 group interests (Baker and Cook 2005), and more likely to use their oversight powers on racial issues (Minta 2009).

Looking at other potential issue positions candidates can take, such as environmental policies or trade policies, it is unlikely that voters would have any stereotypes regarding the positions of white and non-white candidates on these issues. In fact, evidence suggests that African-Americans and whites have the same policy positions on global warming (Lubell et al. 2007). As for trade, trade policy is an issue of low salience for the vast majority of Americans and votes are unaware of how their members of Congress vote on trade issues (Guisinger 2009). However, on issues that clearly benefit non-white voters, people will perceive the non-white candidate to be more supportive of these policies, and thus more left-wing and liberal overall. Thus, non-white

Democratic candidates for office, who want to win votes at the same rate as a white

Democrat, should find someway to neutralize the impact of race-based issues.

If race-based issue positions were the mechanism that causes non-white candidates to be perceived as being more left-wing than white candidates, would non- white candidates be given any boost from coming out against these race-based issues?

The stereotype that many people hold is that non-whites and Democrats overwhelmingly support issues like affirmative action, but if a white-Democrat and a non-white Democrat both announced their opposition to affirmative action might the non-white Democrat see a somewhat larger boost in support than the white Democrat?

A Democrat will almost always be perceived, due to heuristic cues and stereotypes about Democrats, as being more supportive of affirmative action, more

44 supportive of labor unions, more supportive of environmental policies, among other perceived policy positions. Any Democrat that takes a position counter to these positions will likely be viewed as being more moderate, whether this Democrat is against labor unions or against affirmative action. If both a white and a non-white Democrat announced their opposition to labor unions it would impact a voter’s perception on that candidate, but not, I hypothesize to the same extent that would occur when a white and non-white Democrat announce their opposition to affirmative action.

Unlike labor unions, affirmative action is a race-based issue in which voters likely perceive that non-white Democrats are more supportive of than white Democrats. These race-based issues are the mechanism as to why non-white voters are viewed as being more liberal than white Democrats. Thus, it is likely that only when non-white Democrats come out in opposition to race-based issues, giving information that counters the existing heuristic cue, will they be viewed the same as white Democrats. A non-white Democrat announcing their opposition to labor unions would do nothing to change the voters’ perceptions of their support for race-based issues, as this new information does not violate the existing heuristic cue. It is thus likely that the only way to neutralize the liberal perceptions that voters have of non-white Democrats is for non-white Democrats to violate the heuristic cue and come out in opposition to race-based issues. Thus, using new information to overwhelm the existing cue.

The following hypotheses test these suppositions of whether non-white

Democrats are viewed to be more left-wing on race-based issues alone, and whether non- white Democrats can overcome this cue with new information by strategically taking a position on race-based issues:

H1: Non-white Democrats will be perceived as holding more left-wing positions on race based issues than white Democrats.

H2: Non-white Democrats, when professing issues that counter racial stereotypes, will be viewed as no different than white Democrats with similar beliefs.

Hypothesis 1 tests whether non-white Democratic candidates are viewed as being more left-wing on all issues, or only on race-based issues. If evidence is found in support of hypothesis 1 then it would identify the mechanism of why non-white Democrats are viewed as being more left-wing. Hypothesis 2 then tests if there is anything a non-white

Democrat can do to counter these perceptions and if new information can outweigh a heuristic cue. If evidence is found for hypothesis 2 it would show that heuristic cues can be overcome, and that voters take in new information.

Data and Methods:

To test these hypotheses an experiment was carried out on Amazon’s Mechanical

Turk (also known as M-Turk) website. Numerous scholars have used M-Turk for their experiments and studies regarding the participants on M-Turk and the effectiveness of the experiments on M-Turk have suggested that the respondents are representative of the population (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010) and the data are as reliable as data produced by traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwag, and Gosling 2011). This website allows participants to take a job for a small cash payment. In this instance, workers on M-

Turk were paid $0.45 to take a short survey regarding candidate ideology and positions.

While the M-Turk sample of respondents was slightly whiter and slightly more left-wing

46 than the population, it is still a representative sample. Table 2.1 below displays the characteristics of the survey respondents.

[Insert Table 2.1 here]

These respondents on M-Turk were each shown different campaign mailers for a hypothetical US Senate race (each respondent saw one Republican mailer and one

Democratic mailer). These mailers were typical of the kind that voters receive from candidates running for office (the mailers used in this experiment were designed based on actual campaign mailers, the original mailers can be found in the Appendix). Each mailer had the picture of a candidate running for the hypothetical Senate race in the state of

Georgia, the candidate’s name and party affiliation, and some bullet point information on the candidate’s issue positions. The mailers that participants were shown were randomized with the randomization being the candidate’s picture, name, and issue positions. All other information on the mailer remained the same for every participant.

After viewing the mailer, the participants answered survey questions regarding the candidate’s issue positions and ideology. Some of the respondents were shown a picture of a white Democratic candidate for Senate with a last name that is rarely used by non-whites (Engle). Other respondents were shown a picture of a black Democratic candidate for office with a name that is rarely used by whites (Cooks). The first name

(Bill) was one that both black and white elected members of Congress have had, and was used for both the white and black candidate. To ensure that the only physical difference between the candidates was their race, both Democratic candidates are balding, have

47 facial hair, have an American flag over their right shoulder, and a flag pin on their left lapel (the candidate mailers can be seen in the Appendix).

On each mailer was a short description of their issue positions. On the control groups for both the black and the white candidate, the mailer mentions that the candidate wants to protect Medicare, is against Wall Street, and is against ‘Big Oil.’ This control ensures that both the black and white Democrat are espousing traditional Democratic and left-wing stances that would suggest that the Democratic candidate is a fairly standard

Democrat and does not oppose normal Democratic orthodoxy.

The first treatment changes the wording of the ‘Big Oil’ issue position to being against racial quotas. This ensures that the candidate takes a position that is directly at odds with the stereotype of the positions Democrats and minorities take regarding race- related issues. This treatment, changing the ‘Big Oil’ position to one opposing affirmative action, is applied to both the black and white Democratic candidates. The candidates in this treatment are no longer standard left-wing Democrats, but profess two left-wing issues (supporting Medicare and opposition to Wall Street), and one right-wing position

(opposition to racial quotas). This treatment will test whether voters care about new information, and whether new information can counter an existing heuristic cue.

Another treatment was applied as well, one discussing an opposition to labor unions. Again, in this treatment the candidates are professing two left-wing positions

(supporting Medicare and opposition to Wall Street), and one right-wing position

(opposition to labor unions). The difference is that this treatment focuses not on a race- based issue that Democrats usually support, but on a normal non-race related issues that

Democrats typically support. Democrats are typically strong proponents of labor unions and this treatment was included to see if there is any difference from when Democrats take a surprising right-wing position overall, or one that is race specific.

Respondents on M-Turk are then asked, after viewing and reading the mailers, what they think the candidate’s position is on specific policy issues. Specifically, respondents were asked what they think the candidate’s position is on issues ranging from free trade to affirmative action. For Hypothesis 1 to be true then we will see the black Democratic candidate being viewed as more left-wing on the race-based policy issues than the white Democratic candidate, but no difference on the non-race based issues. For Hypothesis 2 to be correct, we would then expect that the racial treatment

(regarding racial quotas) would result in the black and white Democratic candidates to have the same position on race-based issues.

In other words when voters are given new information, that information can counter and outweigh a heuristic cue. When both the black and white Democratic candidate espouse typical Democratic positions then the voter’s stereotype about black

Democrats will inform them that the black Democrat is more supportive of affirmative action than the white Democrat. But when new information is given that counters the stereotype, the Democrats being against racial quotas, the voters will weigh the new information and will adjust their beliefs to this new information. In this case, we expect that voters will see no difference between the white and black Democrat on the issue of affirmative action when both Democrats come out against racial quotas.

Results:

Due to this study being an experiment with random selection determining which respondent would see which campaign mailer, we can examine the average placement of the candidates that respondents gave for the different issue positions. Simple difference of means tests should provide evidence if voters use new information and whether that new information can overcome the existing racial cue. Each respondent was asked what they thought the candidate’s position was on affirmative action and were given five possible responses “Strongly opposes affirmative action,” “Somewhat opposes affirmative action,” “Somewhat supports affirmative action,” “Strongly supports affirmative action,” as well as “I don’t know.” The responses were coded 1-4 with the response of “Strongly opposes affirmative action” being 4, and the “I don’t know” responses being excluded. Thus, higher values indicate opposition to affirmative action.

[Insert Table 2.2 here]

Table 2.2 above shows the average rating the respondents gave the white and black Democratic candidate regarding the candidate’s positions on affirmative action, free trade, and cutting greenhouse gases, as well as if there was a statistically significant difference in the ratings. Looking first at the responses to the affirmative action question

(the first row and first column in the table), among those who saw the black and white

Democratic mailers with no treatment (in which the candidate espouses three left-wing position) we find some support for Hypothesis 1 as respondents gave the black candidate an average rating of 1.451 while the white candidate was 1.784. This difference is statistically significant and suggests that respondents view black Democrats more

50 supportive of affirmative action than white candidates, indicating that they have an existing ideological cue regarding black Democrats.

The rest of the values in this first row in Table 2.2 will be used to determine if voters use new information and if the new information can overcome the existing heuristic cue. The second column shows the average position respondents gave the white and black Democrat on affirmative action when the treatment of being against racial quotas was used, which I call the ‘racial treatment.’ Here, we would expect that because the candidates are taking a right-wing stance (one right-wing position and two left-wing positions as opposed to three left-wing positions) both the white and black Democrat with the racial treatment would be viewed as being more right-wing than the non-treatment.

Second, unlike before where the black candidate was viewed as being more left-wing, under the racial treatment I expect that there will be no difference in expected position on affirmative action, as the new information will effectively counter the cue.

Looking at whether respondents believed the candidates supported affirmative action or not we find that the white candidate with the racial treatment is placed at 2.931 while the black candidate is placed at 2.881 (again, on a scale of 1-4 with 4 being most against affirmative action). This difference is not statistically different, which tells us that when both a black and white Democratic candidate gives right-wing positions on race- based issues, the black candidate is no longer viewed as being more left-wing than the white candidate, overcoming the cue.

Also, it should be noted that when the candidates give one right-wing position, as opposed to zero right-wing positions, they are viewed as being slightly more right-wing.

This finding is encouraging as it shows that the respondents are in fact paying attention to the issue positions on the mailers and they are processing the new information. They find that Democrats, white or black, with all left-wing positions are more left-wing than

Democrats with mixed issue positions.

However, one could argue that any minority Democrat espousing right-wing positions, whether on race-based issues or not, would be viewed as more right wing, and possibly be viewed as no different than a white Democrat espousing right-wing positions.

Because of this the second treatment is added to the experiment. This treatment replaces the right-wing language of being against racial quotas instead with language indicating the candidate is against labor unions (this treatment will be called the non-racial treatment). In this treatment the candidates espouse two left-wing positions and one right- wing position regarding labor unions. If it is true that non-white Democrats are viewed as being more left-wing only on race-based issues then voters should view the black

Democrat as being more supportive of affirmative action than white Democrats, even when they both espouse right-wing positions on labor unions. Looking at the last column in Table 2.2, with the non-racial treatment, participants rated the white Democrat as

1.800 while the black Democrat was rated as 1.574. This difference is statistically different with the black Democrat being slightly more supportive of affirmative action than the white Democrat.

While how voters place the white and black Democratic candidates on the issue of affirmative action does provide strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, other tests need to be taken to ensure that non-white Democrats are only viewed as being more left-wing on race-based issues and that the cue for non-white Democrats focuses on race. Is this

52 discrepancy in perceived issue positions for white and non-white Democrats also present on non-race-based issues? To answer these questions participants were also asked what position they think the candidates take on cutting greenhouse gases and support for free trade.

The race of a candidate and their perceived support of non-whites over whites on issues such as supporting inner cities and affirmative action should have no bearing on issues such as free trade and environmental issues. Stereotypes held by voters about non- white candidates are unlikely to include issues such as free trade or cutting greenhouse gases. Therefore, I do not expect there to be any difference in the perceived issue position between the black and white Democratic candidate on theses issues, regardless of what treatment is received.

Looking first at the question of what the participant thinks the candidate’s position on free trade deals are (1-4 with 4 being strongly against free trade), the perceived position of the white and black Democratic candidate is 2.356 and 2.329 when no treatment is applied (this difference is not statistically different). When the racial treatment is applied participants give the white candidate a rating of 2.403 and the black candidate a rating of 2.398, again no difference in their perceived position. And with the non-racial treatment the black candidate was given a rating of 2.300 and the white candidate 2.555 (also not statistically different). This shows that voters do not see any difference between the white or black Democrat on the issue of free trade. The cue that voters get from the race of the candidate only informs them on the candidate’s positions on race-based issues.

These same results are found on the perceived position on cutting greenhouse gases (1-4, 4 being strongly against cutting greenhouse gases). Here there is no statistical difference between the white and the black Democratic candidate when there is no treatment (1.629, 1.612), the racial treatment (1.814, 1.752), nor the non-racial treatment

(1.786, 1.845). Also of note, is that, as like before, the perceived positions of the candidates slightly change along with the treatments, as mentioning one-right wing policy position (whether it is racial quotas or labor unions) results in participants viewing the candidates as slightly more right-wing than the group without any treatment. This strengthens my findings as the participants are absorbing the new information and applying this new information logically. White and black Democrats are viewed as having more right-wing positions when they take right-wing positions, whether we are examining their position on affirmative action, cutting greenhouse gases, or supporting free trade (although, it should be noted that the differences on the free trade issue were the least different).7

Discussion:

This paper looks at the question of why non-white Democratic candidates are perceived as being more left-wing than white Democratic candidates and whether new information could be used to overcome existing cues. Using original data gathered on

Amazon’s M-Turk website we are able to begin answering these questions. It appears that non-white Democrats are perceived as being more left-wing than white Democrats because voters believe that non-white Democratic candidates will be more supportive of

7 These findings were consistent whether all respondents were examined, as well as examining only whites and examining only non-white respondents. This indicates that both whites and non-whites hold the perceptions of non-white candidates being more left-wing on race-based issues.

54 non-whites than whites on issues that clearly favor non-whites, in this case affirmative action.

Voters have an existing stereotype about non-whites and about Democrats that results in voters perceiving non-white Democrats to be more liberal on race-based issues such as affirmative action, but no different on other issues such as the environment and trade agreements. This existing heuristic cue can, however, be overcome when voters are given new information. When both the white and non-white Democrat takes conservative positions on racial quotas, the gap between the perceived positions of the black and white

Democrats disappears. This suggests that voters do take in new information, and this new information can be used to overcome existing stereotypes. For non-white Democrats running for office, taking right-wing positions on race-based issues eliminates the perceived ideological gap between white and non-white Democrats. It is important that these right-wing positions are only on race-related issues, as right-wing positions on issues such as labor unions, do not appear to erase this ideological gap.

When non-white Democrats are viewed as being more left-wing than white

Democrats, it does not appear to be about their positions on environmental issues or economic issues, and likely not about their positions on other economic or social issues either, but rather on their positions on race-based issues, as these are the issues that feed the stereotypes that voters have. Non-white Democrats are not viewed as being more supportive of environmental policies than are white Democrats, but they are viewed as being more supportive on affirmative action than white candidates. This heuristic cue held by voters about non-white candidates is what causes non-white candidates to be viewed as more left-wing than other Democrats.

This left-wing perception of non-white Democrats is important and significant, as it could potentially impact a candidate’s chances of winning office, and would likely harm those chances. Since this experiment uses a hypothetical US Senate race, looking at the ideological positions of the 50 US States would be beneficial in showing the impact these stereotypes would have. The 2012 CCES asked voters in every state to place themselves on a 7-point ideological scale and there was very little variation among the different states. The average ideology of a Massachusetts voter was 3.73, which is only slightly to the left of the national average of 4.27. This means that, when running for the

Senate, it would likely benefit a candidate to be perceived as a centrist as opposed to a liberal.

The best way non-white Democrats can be perceived as being ideologically equal to other white candidates is to publicly and explicitly disavow their support for any issues, such as affirmative action, that would potentially advantage non-whites over whites. Only by doing this can non-white Democrats overcome the stereotype regarding their position on race-based issues. Being perceived as less liberal is critical as ideological distance is crucial to vote choice (Downs 1957, Hotelling 1929), and voters in the US and in other Western democracies are much more centrist than extremist (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009).

This suggests that if an African American wants to run for office as a Democrat, they would better their chance of winning by strategically denouncing affirmative action publicly. Obviously, taking a right-wing position on any position would make a candidate appear slightly more moderate, but to truly be viewed the same as a similar white candidate, a non-white Democrat who cares only about winning an election should

56 publicly oppose affirmative action and similar policies. This new information, when given to voters, can impact a voter’s perception of a candidate, and can outweigh the impact of an existing heuristic cue.

This paper is the first step in determining the mechanism of why non-white candidates are seen by voters as being more left-wing, with the reason seeming to be existing stereotypes of minority candidates and the perception of support for race-based issues. This cue is used by voters in absence of countervailing information and is applied to non-white candidates. However, when given new information, voters process this information, and use it to evaluate non-white candidates for office. More research needs to be done on this subject, such as exploring more issue positions to see if these liberal perceptions towards non-white candidates emerges on other race-related issues. Also, future research could examine actual candidate positions, to see if non-white candidates running in for office do try to use new information when appealing to voters. For now, candidates for office, especially non-white candidates, should find comfort in the fact that voters receive and process new information, and candidates can use their issue positions to inform voters and overwhelm existing stereotypes.

CHAPTER 4

THE DIMENSION OF RACE IN POLITICAL COMPETITION IN CANADA8

8 Meyer, Chase B. To be submitted to the Canadian Journal of Political Science.

Abstract:

The role of race in elections has been examined by numerous studies in the United

States, but it has rarely been tested in countries where race is not as prominent of a political issue. Like the United States, Canada has a sizable and growing non-white population with many diverse ethnic backgrounds. The paper examines the political dimension of race in Canada and whether non-whites have politically different views on policy from whites and how this impacts their voting behavior. This study finds while whites and non-whites disagree on race-related issues, whites in Canada are just as likely to support white candidates as they are non-white candidates. Furthermore, non-whites are not more supportive of other non-white candidates as we see in the United States.

These findings suggest that race is not a primary dimension for party competition in

Canada unlike in the United States.

Introduction:

Race, race relations, and immigration have recently dominated news coverage and have become a common topic for debate in Western nations in recent years. While much of Europe has been dealing with the refugee crisis from the Middle East, the United

States has dealt with protests from the Black Lives Matter movement. These events have brought the issue of race to the forefront in Western nations and the politicians and political parties of these countries have had to confront the issues.

In the United States the results have been the Republican Party and Republican politicians strongly disapproving of the Black Lives Matter movement, pushing for stronger immigration controls, and opposing plans to re-settle Syrian refugees in

America. The Democratic Party and Democratic politicians have had a different take on these issues by generally supporting Black Lives Matter (although not fully embracing

59 the movement), supporting more immigration, and going along with President Obama’s plan to settle more Syrian refugees.

This outcome should not be surprising to those who study and pay attention to

American politics. The Democratic Party for the past few decades has been the home of non-white voters and has been more supportive of issues that benefit non-whites, such as affirmative action, than the Republican Party. Throughout Western nations ethnic minorities have overwhelmingly supported left-wing and social democratic parties

(Adams et al. 2005). But is this the case for every Western nation? Is the issue of race and race relations a political dimension in all Western nations or only in some?

This paper explores the question of whether the issue of race is a political dimension that parties and voters are divided on. Specifically, this paper will be using a looking at two very similar countries to answer this question: the United States and

Canada. While the issue of race and race relations has recently affected many western democracies, this study will examine these two countries due to their similarity. These two nations both have a large and growing non-white population that is present in their politics as the 42nd Canadian Parliament (elected in 2015) featured 14% of its members being non-white while the 114th Congress (elected in 2014) is 17% non-white.

Furthermore, both nations primarily speak English, use first-past-the-post electoral systems, and have a small number of major parties.

An exploration of the political impact of race in these two countries will be an important first step in answering how race impacts the politics and parties in western democracies overall. While this paper is only an exploration, it does find evidence that while whites and non-whites in both nations differ on their positions on race-based issues,

60 only in the United States is there a racial dimension to party competition. This suggests that not race may not be a dimension of party competition in all western democracies and is only relevant in certain countries.

Previous Literature:

When discussing race and how it relates to party competition and voting, contact theory is in many cases the first theory of discussion. Contact theory states that one racial group having frequent contact with other racial groups will end up having more positive feelings towards the other racial groups (Allport 1954). Other studies have found similar effects with whites in the United States, as those with the most racial prejudice were isolated from minority populations (Kinder and Mendelberg 1995). However, not everyone subscribes to this theory as others have found an increase in racial animosity in locations where minority populations are large (Key 1949).

Looking at other countries throughout the world an interesting pattern emerges. In the United Kingdom ethnic minority candidates have been found to receive fewer votes from white voters (Fisher et al. 2014). And candidates with non-European sounding surnames also received far fewer votes than those with European surnames (Thrasher et al. 2015). Some evidence has emerged that ethnic minority Conservative Party candidates do not lose votes while ethnic minority Liberal Democrats and Labour candidates do

(Mostimore 2002), however other studies have suggested the opposite on minority

Conservative members in that they do lose votes (Curtice, Fisher, and Steed 2005). But, nominating multiple ethnic minority candidates does lead to an increase in support by other ethnic minorities (Zingher and Farrer 2014). The United Kingdom also finds a clear party preference for non-whites, as non-white voters strongly prefer the Labour Party

(Saggar and Heath 1999). Other countries, such as Brazil, have similar electoral results with non-whites preferring candidates of their own race (Aguilar et al. forthcoming).

These findings in other nations suggest that non-whites are more supportive of other non- white candidates, whites are less supportive of non-white candidates, and non-whites and whites differ on which party they support.

In the United States there is ample literature on the impact race has on politics and elections. Numerous studies, examining both Congressional races and the election of

Barack Obama as President have shown non-white candidates receiving fewer votes than a white candidate would (Gay 1999; Bullock and Dunn 1999; Washington 2006;

Schaffner 2011; Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Stephens-Davidowitz 2013; Lewis-Beck,

Tien and Nadeau 2010; Highton 2011; Terkildsen 1993). However, research has found that only when the non-white candidate is a Democrat does race become an issue for the candidate’s vote totals (Meyer & Woodard 2016; Huffmon, Knotts, and McKee 2016;

Hood, Kidd and Morris 2015). Much of this is due to perceptions that non-whites will focus on inner-cities and raise taxes as well as the perception of non-white candidates having a more liberal ideology (Karl and Ryan 2016; Meyer unpublished; Jones 2014;

Jacobsmeier 2014; Visalvanich 2016).

The impact of race in Canadian politics has been examined as well, although not to the extent as in the United States. While there are many ethnic minorities (sometimes called visible minorities) in Parliament, they are still underrepresented (Andrew et al.

2008; Black 2002). Even with this underrepresentation, Canada has a reputation on the international stage of being welcoming and with few racial issues (Kymlicka 2004). One stereotype, regarding Canada that has evidence to support it, is that it is successful at

62 integrating immigrants and Canada has generally been supportive of immigrants

(Kymlicka 1989; Kymlicka 2010; Reitz and Benerjee 2007; Harrell 2010). Furthermore, native Canadians have become more accepting of immigration and racial diversity over time (Bilodeau, Turgeon, and Karakoc 2012). While the literature suggests these welcoming and harmonious stereotypes have some truth to them, there is other evidence that suggest race might matter in Canadian politics.

The feelings regarding ethnic minorities by white voters in Canada is not too different than in other nations such as the US. Whites in high socio-economic neighborhoods have more pro-immigrant and pro-minorities feelings, but whites in diverse neighborhoods have the opposite opinions (Blake 2003). Using “comfort ratings”

Canadians are most comfortable with those whose names are Canadian or European in origin (Berry and Kalin 1995). Furthermore, the experience of ethnic minorities in

Canada mirror those of other Western nations as Canadian immigrants earn lower salaries and have higher unemployment levels than non-immigrants (Hun and Simpson 2004).

Canadian elections seem to follow a similar pattern as well. There is some evidence that, on the local level, candidates with foreign-sounding names receive fewer votes than other candidates (Blanchet and Tessier 2016). Ethnic minority candidates even claim that discrimination and racism have played a role in their election loses (Tossutti and Najem 2002). There also appears to be strong affinity among Canadian non-whites to vote for other non-whites. In races where no incumbent is running ethnic minorities are more likely to vote for other ethnic minorities than whites are (Bird et al. 2015). Tolley and Goodyear-Grant find that among Chinese-Canadians there is an affinity to support other Chinese-Canadians for office (2014). Numerous scholars have observed this n-

63 group bias in Canadian politics (Berry and Kalin 2015; Besco 2015). But, strangely, for some ethnic groups there seems to be a reverse effect, with greater support for white candidates than South Asian Candidates among non-South Asian minorities in Canada

(Bird 2011).

Even with these similarities to other Western nations such as the US there is some evidence to suggest that there may not actually be a racial dimension in Canada. Contrary to other studies, Black and Erickson suggest that minority candidates receive the same levels of support as white candidates (2006). Also, while whites in 1997 that were less sympathetic to minorities had greater support for the Reform Party, it does not suggest that whites overall differed from non-whites in party support (Nevitte et al. 2000).

Furthermore, the reason for the lack of minority representation in Parliament could be due to parties simply not running minority candidates in competitive races (Pelletier

1991).

Theory and Hypothesis:

This research suggests that Canada, unlike the United States, may not have a racial dimension of party competition. While there is evidence that white and non-white

Canadians have different opinions on issues, and whites in Canada may be racially resentful to some extent, the evidence that these feelings actually affects the vote choice is mixed. Contrast this to the United States where there is a clear racial divide in party support.

In the United States there is a racial dimension to politics where the issue of race divides the parties and the parties’ support are thus divided by race. Overwhelmingly in the United States whites support the Republican Party more than the Democratic Party,

64 while Latinos, blacks, and Asians overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party. The results of the 2012 Presidential election show this racial divide clearly as Democrat

Barack Obama won 39% of whites, 93% of blacks, 71% of Latinos, and 73% of Asians, according to exit polls. There are several reasons why there is a racial dimension in the

United States ranging from a history of slavery, discrimination, and Jim Crow, to non- whites strongly supporting left-wing race related policies such as affirmative action.

Due to Canada’s greater acceptance of immigrants and non-whites and integration of immigrants it is likely that political views of race would be different than in the US.

Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest this, as all the parties in Canada have recruited non-white candidates to run for office, while in the US the Republican Party lags far behind the Democratic Party in this regard. In the 2011 Federal Election in Canada the top three national parties (NDP, Conservative, and Liberal) all nominated roughly the same number of non-whites (estimated that of the 233 non-Quebec candidates each party nominated, 28 NDP were non-white, 32 Conservatives were non-white, and 31 Liberals were non-white).

It appears possible that race is not a dimension of party competition in Canada if we consider the near parity in party recruitment of non-white candidates and the lack of evidence that non-white voters receive fewer votes than white candidates. Contrast this with the US where acceptance of immigrants and non-whites lags behind Canada, clear evidence of non-white candidates receiving fewer votes, and one-party dominance in minority recruitment, and it is clear that race is a dimension of political competition.

These findings result in the following hypotheses that will be tested in this paper.

H1: Whites in Canada and in the US will be less supportive of policies and issues designed to specifically benefit ethnic minorities.

H2: Only in the US will non-white voters significantly support one party over other options.

H3: Only in the US will non-white candidates receive less support from white voters than white candidates from white voters.

H4: Only in the US will non-white voters be more supportive of other non-white candidates.

Hypothesis 1 tests whether minorities in both the US and Canada share different opinions than their white countrymen on race-based issues. This is important as one could argue against the claim that there is no racial dimension in Canadian politics by saying that non-whites in Canada simply have the same position on race-based issues as white

Canadians. Hypotheses 2 tests whether non-white voters in Canada have a clear party preference, like non-whites do in the US, with the expectation that such an effect will be found in the US but not in Canada. Hypothesis 3 tests what impact non-white candidates have on support from voters and whether they receive fewer or more votes, again with the expectation of the effect only being found in the US. And hypothesis 4 tests if non-whites are likely to support other non-white candidates as some of the previous literature suggests, but this effect should only be found in the US.

Data and Methods:

To test these hypotheses, data was collected for vote choice in both the United

States and in Canada. Furthermore, every candidate running for office in both the United

States and Canada was coded based on their race as well as the race of the voter. The data

on Canadian elections comes from the 2011 Canadian Elections Study (CES), for the

United States the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) is utilized (the 2011

CES is used, as opposed to the more recent 2015 CES due to the 2015 version not asking respondents certain questions that were applicable to this study). In both datasets a large

sample of voters are questioned regarding their opinions about the parties, current political issues, and their vote choice. Demographic information about the voters, such as

their age, race, and gender are also in the datasets.

The important question of this study is how voters react to white and non-white candidates. To determine the race of each candidate Internet searches were conducted to find news articles that mentioned the candidate’s race as well as searches for pictures or videos of the candidate that would identify them as a racial minority. For a few candidates, the race could not be determined; these candidates were thus excluded from the study. For Canada, each candidate who ran in 2011 from the three main parties in non-Quebec Canada (ROC) were coded as to whether they were white or a racial minority (and further to what their specific race was), as well as whether the candidate was the incumbent member of parliament in that riding. For the US, each candidate for the Senate was coded based on their incumbency status and their race.9 Due to only 1/3rd of all Senate seats being up for election every two years, multiple elections were included and the candidate’s races were coded. Thus, every November Senate election from the

2006 cycle to the 2014 cycle was included for the US.

9 Some might argue that using the House would be a better comparison to the Canadian Parliament. However, the Senate is used for multiple reasons. First, many previous articles have already established this trend in the House such as Jacobsmeier 2014 and Visalvanich 2016. Also, the race of all House candidates could not be determined, while the race of every Senate candidate was found.

Hypotheses 2-4 examine vote choice in both the US and in Canada, thus the dependent variable for these hypotheses will be who the respondent votes for. Hypothesis

1, on the other hand, required a different dependent variable, one examining specific policy issues. Hypothesis 1 examines feelings for race-based policies by different races.

For the US, the CCES asks voters how they feel about affirmative action policy and their level of support for it. While the CES does not specifically ask about affirmative action, it does ask voters how much more should be done by the government for racial minorities.

While these two questions are not identical, they both show the underlying support for policies that benefit ethnic minorities.

Beyond the race of the candidates and of the respondent other variables will be needed for controls. The self-ideological placement of each respondent is collected due to voters typically supporting the party they are ideologically closer to (Downs 1957,

Hotelling 1929). Other controls that might impact vote choice and support for race-based policies are a person’s gender, age, education level, interest in politics/current events, as well as their party identification with dummy variables for being a Republican or

Democrat with Independent’s being the reference category. The CES does not explicitly ask voters what their party identification is; instead voters are asked which party they are closest to. For Canada, this variable will act as the person’s party ID.

Results:

Hypothesis 1 is tested first, using ordered logit, with the dependent variable being support for affirmative action and government support for minorities, due to the variables being on an ordered scale. Positive values in the tables below indicate greater support for affirmative action/government support for minorities. If hypothesis 1 is correct, then the

68 variables for the various racial minorities will be positive and significant. Table 3.1 shows the result for the US, using only the 2012 CCES, while Table 3.2 shows the results for Canada using the 2011 CES.

[Insert Table 3.1 here]

[Insert Table 3.2 here]

As both tables show, racial minorities in both the US and Canada are more supportive of government action/policies that help other racial minorities. In both tables white Americans and Canadians are the reference categories. For US minorities, Asians, blacks, and Latinos are all significantly more likely to support affirmative action. In

Canada those who are East Asian, other Asian (South Asian or middle-eastern), and other races (which includes blacks, Latinos, Caribbean, etc.) are also more likely to support these policies. The only exception is with indigenous Canadians, as the coefficient for the dummy variable is not significant. However, it should be noted that only 30 Canadians identified themselves as indigenous in the 2011 CES, thus it is difficult to read too much into their results.

Of note in both tables are the variables for party ID. In the US, those who identify as Democrats are far more likely to support affirmative action while those who identify as

Republicans are far more likely to be against affirmative action – and this after controlling for the race of the respondent. Compare this to Canada; the variables for party

ID are all insignificant. This means that there is no difference between members of the

NDP, the Liberals, and the Conservatives on their opinions on government support for minorities. This supports the theory that in Canada there is no racial dimension for political competition.

The next step is to test whether there is a difference in support for the political parties by race and whether minority candidates receive fewer votes or not. To determine this, the dependent variable shifts from opinions about policy to actual vote choice. If hypothesis 2 is correct then non-white voters in the US will be significantly more likely to vote for the Democratic Party, but in Canada the variable for a voter’s race will be insignificant and not impact their vote choice. Hypothesis 3 states that non-white candidates in the US will receive fewer votes than white candidates, but the candidate’s race will be insignificant for Canada. Table 3.3 below presents the logit results for the

US, with the dependent variable indicating whether the voter supported the Democratic candidate for Senate or not. Table 3.4 shows the multinomial logit results for Canada with support for the Conservative Party as the reference category.

[Insert Table 3.3 here]

[Insert Table 3.4 here]

Looking first at Table 3.3, we see that the variable for the voter’s race is significant and positive, indicating that non-white voters are more likely to vote for the

Democratic candidate over the Republican candidate. Also of interest is the race of the candidate, the coefficients for both non-white Republicans and non-white Democrats is significant and negative. This indicates that non-white Democrats receive fewer votes than white Democrats, but that non-white Republicans receive more votes, relative to their Democratic opponent, than white Republicans. Table 3.4 gives far different results as the variable for non-white voters are not significant for both supporting the Liberal

Party and the NDP, meaning that non-whites are just as likely to support the Conservative

Party as they are the Liberal Party and just as likely to support the Conservative Party as

70 the NDP. All the variables for the candidate race are also insignificant; Canadian voters were just as likely to vote for the Liberal, NDP, or Conservative party whether the candidate for any of those parties was white or non-white.

These findings give strong support to hypotheses 2 and 3. Non-whites in Canada did not give their votes more to one party or another during the 2011 election. This is in contrast non-whites in the US who support the Democratic Party far greater than they do the Republican Party. Furthermore, non-whites who run as Democrats in the US receive less support than white Democrats do, while in Canada non-white Liberals,

Conservatives, and NDP’s get the same support as their white counterparts. This gives strong evidence that race is not a dimension of political competition in Canada, and while non-whites in Canada support race-based issues more than whites, these issues are not reflected in the overall political debates and party competition.

This, however, only looks at voters in the dichotomy of white and non-white. But might there be differences between the different races and ethnicities that make up non- whites? Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below replicate Tables 3.3 and 3.4, but this time the non- whites are broken down into individual races. As in Tables 1 and 2, non-whites in

America are now categorized as Asian, black, and Latino, and non-whites in Canada are categorized as Indigenous, East Asian, other Asian, and other races. This is done for both the candidates and the voters.

In Table 3.5 below we have similar results as Table 3.3. Voters are less likely to support black and Latino Democrats, but more likely to support black and Latino

Republicans, while there is no difference in support for Asian Republicans and

Democrats. This is likely due to how few Asian Americans have run for office (only 3

Asian Americans have run for the Senate in this sample). Also, like Table 3.3, all non- white races are more likely to support the Democratic candidate for Senate than the

Republican candidate.

Table 3.6 has some slight differences, but overall similar results as in Table 3.4.

Looking first at the voters, Indigenous Canadians, East Asians, and other Asians are just as likely to support the Liberal candidate as they are Conservative candidates, while those of other races are less likely to support Liberals over Conservatives. Indigenous

Canadians, other Asians, and those of other races are just as likely to support the NDP as the Conservatives, while East Asians are more likely to support the NDP over

Conservatives. With the exception of the NDP advantage with East Asians and the

Conservative advantage with other races, we can still claim that overall non-white voters are not as predisposed to support one party in Canada over another. In the US all minority groups strongly supported the Democratic Party while in Canada the results are far more mixed and on the whole it does not point to on party dominating the non-white vote over another party.

Next, looking at candidates for office, Table 3.6 shows that no matter the race of the NDP candidate, the Conservative candidate, or the Liberal candidate, voters are just as likely to support the Liberal Party over the Conservative Party with the lone exception being when the Liberal Candidate is East Asian. When the Liberal Party nominates East

Asian candidates, voters are more likely to support the Conservative Party over the

Liberal Party. Looking at how voters respond to the NDP versus the Conservative Party when candidates are a different race we find similar results. Again, for all races of candidates voters are just as likely to support the NDP Party as the Conservative Party

72 with the lone exception when Liberals nominate East Asians. In this case voters are more likely to support the Conservative Party over the NDP. Taken together it is clear that the race of the candidate does not matter for voters. Only when the Liberals nominate East

Asians is there any difference in voting behavior. However, it should be noted that only in 4 of the 233 candidates of the Liberal Party in non-Quebec Canada are East Asian.

Therefore caution should be taken with this finding. Overall, however, the results of

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 do not contradict the findings of Tables 3.3 and 3.4, giving further support to hypotheses 2 and 3.

[Insert Table 3.5 here]

[Insert Table 3.6 here]

The last hypothesis suggests that non-white Canadians will not be more supportive of other non-white candidates while in the US non-white voters will disproportionally support other non-white candidates. To test this, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are replicated, but the variable for the voter’s race is interacted with the race of the candidate.

If the interaction term were significant it would indicate that non-white voters are more likely to support other non-white candidates. Table 3.7 shows the result of the logit for

US Senate races while Table 8 shows the multinomial logit result for the 2011 Canadian election below.

[Insert Table 3.7]

[Insert Table 3.8]

Looking first at Table 3.7, we again see a party difference in non-white support.

Specifically non-whites are far more likely to vote for other non-whites in the US, but only when the non-white is a Democrat. When non-whites run as Republicans, non-white

73 support is no different than if the Republican was white. However, when Democrats nominate non-whites, it results in an increase in support from non-white voters. The results are very different in Canada as no matter which party nominates a non-white, the support from non-white voters is the same as if they had nominated a white candidate.

The coefficients on ever interaction term in Table 3.8 are insignificant, indicating that non-white candidates in Canada do not draw extra support from other non-whites.

Discussion:

These results paint a very clear contrast between the US and Canada. In the US the parties are neatly divided by race with the majority whites clearly preferring the

Republican Party, resulting in non-white Democrats receiving fewer overall votes, and non-white voters rallying to the defense of non-white Democrats while whites shift away from their candidacy. This is further seen as Republicans overall are less supportive of affirmative action an non-whites being ambivalent to the nomination of non-white

Republicans, as opposed to non-white Democrats.

In Canada the story is much different. Just like the US, non-whites in Canada support policies that specifically benefit non-whites, but the similarities end there. In the realm of political competition in Canada race has virtually no impact in a model that also accounts for ideology. Non-whites show no preference to any party and are no more likely to support a non-white candidate as a white candidate. Non-white candidates, no matter their party, do not see the drop in support that happens with non-white Democrats in the US. Even when non-whites are broken down to their individual ethnicities we see virtually no difference, although East Asian Liberal candidates do merit further study.

These factors all point to Canadian politics not having a racial dimension like we see in the US. Non-white voters, no matter their location, generally seem to support policies that would benefit non-whites. And while this policy position is political, it does not mean that the politics in that country are structured around a racial dimension. In the

US race is an ever-present dimension dividing the two parties and dividing whites from non-whites. In Canada, this racial dimension is not present, as non-whites appear to support the three parties without any clear preference for one of them. While non-white candidates in the US face racial benefits and downsides if they run for office, in Canada it appears that a non-white candidate will perform the same with voters no matter their party, all other factors held equal.

The issue of race, immigration, and minority rights does not appear to be diminishing in the near future and will be one that politicians and parties must be prepared address in the coming elections. But this does not mean that race has the same effect in every nation. Only in nations where race is a political dimension do the parties fight over and jockey for position on will there be an impact on non-white voters and candidates. The evidence in this paper clearly suggests that race is a dimension that parties contest in the US, but in Canada race does not appear to have any impact on vote choice or party support, no matter the race of the voter or the candidate. While the issues of immigration and race relations will continue to be at the forefront, in Canada at least, race is not an issue that divides the parties.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This dissertation examined numerous questions in regards to how voters perceive and react to white versus non-white candidates and how this impact changes, or does not change, based on the race of the voter. While many other studies have explored some of these questions before, this dissertation explores the question with both observational data and newly collected experimental data, as well as examined this question cross- nationally in both the United States and Canada. While there are more questions still to be answered in regards to non-white candidates running for political office in majority white countries, these papers answer many of the most important and pressing questions.

Overall I find that non-white candidates are seen as being more left-wing than white candidates, but only when the candidate is a Democrat, not a Republican. This is due to non-white candidates being viewed as being more supportive of race-based issues that would only benefit other non-whites, than white candidates. White Democrats and non-white Democrats are not viewed any differently on issues such as the environment, only on race-based issues. Thus, the candidate’s perceived support for issues favoring non-whites, is what drives voters to think that non-white Democrats are more left-wing than white Democrats.

White voters alone do not fuel this perception, as both whites and non-whites see non-white Democrats as being more left-wing. In fact, the evidence suggests that non- white voters see an even larger ideological gap between white and non-white Democrats than do white voters. White and non-white voters also see the difference in perceived support for race-based issues, as both white and non-whites view non-white Democrats as being more supportive of these issues, while both whites and non-whites see no difference in the candidates’ support for environmental issues.

These misperceptions of non-white Democrats are significant as it has an impact on vote choice. Because non-white Democrats are viewed as being more left-wing than they actually are, they are thus perceived to be ideologically further away from voters.

This results in fewer votes for the non-white Democratic candidate. However, this impact is not found in Canada, as non-white candidates there are just as likely as white candidates to receive a voter’s support. In Canada race is not an issue of political competition and non-white candidates do not get less support than white candidates in their party.

Furthermore, while in the United States there appears to be significant levels of support from non-white voters towards non-white candidates, this is not apparent in

Canada. Non-white voters are no more likely to support other non-white candidates, and when broken down by the individual ethnicities, the results largely hold up with most races being no more supportive of a candidate of their specific race. Those of South

Asian or Middle Eastern descent, for example, are no more likely to vote for the NDP candidate nor the Liberal Party candidate, than the Conservative Party candidate even when the candidate of the NDP and Liberal Party are also South Asian or Middle Eastern.

Non-white Democratic candidates can find ways to make themselves look as ideologically similar to white Democrats by countering the heuristic cue with strategic position taking. Given that voters perceive non-white Democratic candidates as more liberal on race-based issues, non-white Democratic candidates interested in winning their election could announce their opposition to race-based policies such as affirmative action or racial quotas as a way to use new information to counter existing stereotypes. While a non-white Democrat who says nothing regarding race-based issues will be seen as being to the left of a white Democrat who says nothing on race-based issues, a non-white

Democrat will be seen as ideologically similar to a white Democrat when they both denounce affirmative action policies.

Given that the proximate goal of all members of Congress is to win their election

(Mayhew 1974), it may be beneficial for non-white Democrats to take conservative positions on race-based issues to aid in their election. Voters do not see any difference between white and non-white Democrats on other issues such as trade policy or environmental policy, even when the two Democrats take overwhelmingly left-wing positions or mostly left-wing positions with a few conservative positions. But on race- related issues the only way to be seen as ideologically similar to a white Democrat is to come out against affirmative action policies.

While this dissertation answers many of the pertinent questions regarding non- white candidates running for office, many more remain to be answered in future research.

Future research should examine what other issues white and non-white Democrats are perceived to have the same position versus hold diverging positions on. Issues less explicit in their racial overtones, such as unemployment insurance and food stamps,

78 should be studied along with the previously studied positions of affirmative action, trade, and the environment.

Other research should examine the exact issues touted by candidates for office, and if they in fact are strategic in their positions on race-based issues. Non-white

Democratic candidates running in majority-minority districts are likely to be more open about supporting affirmative action, but do non-white candidates running in other districts openly oppose affirmative action or simply ignore the issue? Furthermore, does the percentage of the district that is white have any impact on what issues the non-white candidate openly advocates for?

Another avenue for research would be to examine what non-white members of

Congress do once elected. Non-white Republicans are perceived to be no different from white Republicans ideologically, but does this hold up with their voting record and actions in Congress? Do non-white Republicans vote different from Republicans on race- related issues? Do they offer more bills or amendments on these issues as opposed to other white Republicans?

There are also limitations with the findings of this dissertation that should also be addressed. First, I conclude that non-white Republicans are perceived to be just as conservative as white Republicans, but there were not many non-white Republicans running for the Senate included in the dataset. Due to so few non-white Republicans running for office the data would be far better with more election cycles included. The

2016 election included one Latino Republican in Florida as well as one African-

American Republican in Colorado. Replicating the analysis of Senate candidates using

79 the CCES would be far improved with the 2016 edition of the CCES added once the version is released to the public.

Furthermore, the experiment conducted over M-Turk used a sample that was whiter, more educated, and more left-leaning than the population as a whole. Conducting the experiment again using a normal survey and a representative sample would be ideal.

Other limitations to this dissertation include the study of only one other nation. A proper cross-national study would include more than just the US and Canada but should include other Western democracies with large non-white populations such as the United

Kingdom, Australia, France, and Germany.

While these limitations are real, the results of this dissertation still hold. This dissertation confirms previous findings regarding the perceptions of non-white candidates and adds to it with new information. Voters view the ideology of a candidate differently based on factors such as party and race, as well as with the intersection of race and party.

Non-white Democrats are viewed as being ideologically more left-wing than white

Democrats, which results in fewer votes. This is due to voters, both white and non-white, believing the non-white Democrat is more supportive of affirmative action policies, but this can be alleviated if the non-white Democrat strategically announces their opposition to race-based issues. However, these findings appear to only impact Democrats, as non- white Republicans are perceived to be just as conservative as, if not more so than, white

Republicans. They are also only limited in countries where race is an issue of political competition, unlike in Canada.

The topic of ideological perceptions is one that will continue be studied for many years. This dissertation adds to it by looking at ideological perceptions through the lens of race and how race is used in political competition. From these studies, we have new understanding at who it is that perceives non-white candidates as being more left-wing and the effect party has on these perceptions. The nominee of a party cues voters in to their position on different issues, and voters receive different cues and different messages depending on the race of the candidate. The messenger matters in how voters perceive the ideology and issue positions of the party and the candidate. A white candidate and a non- white candidate, even when they actually have the exact same positions on issue, give different messages of ideology and issue positions to voters.

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TABLES AND FIGURES:

Table 1.1: Ideological Placement of Candidates for Senate (2006-2014) Democrats Republicans Variable Non-White Candidate -0.142* 0.092* (0.015) (0.020) Candidate Ideology 0.563* 0.902* (0.017) (0.026) Self Ideological Placement -0.015* 0.005 (0.004) (0.004) Party Ideological Placement 0.439* 0.399* (0.005) (0.005) Affirmative Action Belief -0.064* -0.036* (0.005) (0.006) Education -0.038* 0.046* (0.003) (0.003) Male -0.077* 0.071* (0.009) (0.009) Age -0.002* 0.003* (0.000) (0.000) White -0.061* 0.124* (0.012) (0.012) Republican Identification -0.185* 0.008 (0.012) (0.012) Democrat Identification -0.024* 0.141* (0.013) (0.013) South 0.113* 0.057* (0.012) (0.011) Interest in Current Events -0.163* 0.232* (0.007) (0.008) Incumbent Senator -0.269* 0.163* (0.010) (0.012) Constant 1.215* -1.320* (0.042) (0.046)

N 73,097 72,329 R2 0.241 0.191 Root MSE 1.154 1.162 Results for election fixed effects omitted, Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

Table 1.2: T-test of Average Ideological Distance Between White and Non-White Candidates (2006-2014)

Average Placement Std. Dev. White Democratic Cand. -1.662 2.613 Non-white Democratic Cand. -1.841 2.596

White Republican Cand. 1.118 2.553 Non-white Republican Cand. 1.189 2.354 Difference between the means for the Democratic candidates and the Republican candidates is statistically significant

Table 1.3: Ideological Placement of Candidates for Senate by Respondent Race (2006-2014) Democrats Republicans Variable Non-White Candidate -0.188* -0.010 (0.030) (0.036) Non-White Cand. X White Resp. 0.059* 0.137* (0.033) (0.040) Candidate Ideology 0.563* 0.902* (0.017) (0.027) Self Ideological Placement -0.015* 0.005 (0.004) (0.004) Party Ideological Placement 0.439* 0.399* (0.005) (0.005) Affirmative Action Belief -0.064* -0.036* (0.005) (0.006) Education -0.038* 0.046* (0.003) (0.003) Male -0.077* 0.071* (0.009) (0.009) Age -0.002* 0.003* (0.000) (0.000) White -0.068* 0.112* (0.012) (0.012) Republican Identification -0.185* 0.009 (0.012) (0.012) Democrat Identification -0.024* 0.141* (0.013) (0.013) South 0.113* 0.056* (0.011) (0.011) Interest in Current Events -0.163* 0.231* (0.007) (0.008) Incumbent Senator -0.269* 0.165* (0.010) (0.013) Constant 1.224* -1.293* (0.042) (0.046)

N 73,097 72,329 R2 0.241 0.191 Root MSE 1.154 1.162 Results for election fixed effects omitted, Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

Table 1.4: Odds Ratios of the Impact of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice (2006- 2014) Democrats Republicans Variable Ideological Placement Distance 0.423* 0.460* (0.005) (0.006) Non-white Candidate 0.607* 2.478* (0.056) (0.341) Non-white Cand. X Ideol. Place. Dist. 1.078* 0.907* (0.039) (0.050) Affirmative Action Belief 0.417* 2.704* (0.007) (0.046) Education 1.058* 0.968* (0.011) (0.010) Male 0.958 1.093* (0.029) (0.033) Age 0.995* 1.006* (0.001) (0.001) White 1.107* 0.920* (0.047) (0.039) Republican Identification 0.172* 8.682* (0.006) (0.333) Democrat Identification 9.365* 0.118* (0.375) (0.005) South 1.030 0.962 (0.040) (0.036) Candidate Spending Diff. 1.097* 1.050* (0.012) (0.012) Rep. Incumbent Senator 0.888* 1.357* (0.043) (0.066) Dem. Incumbent Senator 1.315* 0.902* (0.056) (0.038) Constant 79.296* 0.223* (8.441) (0.023)

N 66,684 63,182 Pseudo R2 0.672 0.652 AIC 30,359.970 30,439.900 Log Likelihood -15,160.986 -15,200.950 Correctly Predicted 0.912 0.906 Results for election fixed effects omitted, Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

Table 2.1: Description of M-Turk Respondents Male: 48.04% White: 78.52% Average Age: 36.86 Age Range: 18-81 At least a College Degree: 60.49% Ideological Placement (0-100): 42.26% Number of Participants: 1,402

Table 2.2: Table of Average Respondent Placement of Candidates on Different Policy Issues

With With Non- No Racial Racial Treatment t-statistic Treatment t-statistic Treatment t-statistic White 1.784* 2.931 1.800* Against Candidate (0.724) (0.991) (0.644) Affirmative -4.893 -0.307 -1.806 Action (1-4) Black 1.451* 2.881 1.574* Candidate (0.652) (1.184) (0.704) White 2.356 2.403 2.3 Against Candidate (0.873) (0.774) (0.869) Free Trade 0.289 -0.039 -1.538 (1-4) Black 2.329 2.398 2.555 Candidate (0.860) (0.917) (0.904) White 1.629 1.814 1.786 Against Candidate Cutting (0.779) (0.675) (0.780) -0.23 -0.553 0.442 Greenhouse Black 1.612 1.752 1.845 Gases (1-4) Candidate (0.688) (0.688) (0.644) Note: * indicates if the difference between the white and black candidate for each issue (affirmative action, free trade, greenhouse gases) in each of the three treatment groups is statistically different at the .05 level. The coefficient in each cell is the mean placement position with the standard deviation in parentheses below.

Table 3.1: Support for Affirmative Action 2012 (USA) Coef. Std. Err. Ideological Self Placement -0.453 * 0.007 Asian 0.907 * 0.074 Latino 1.224 * 0.036 Black 2.535 * 0.033 Male -0.132 * 0.018 Age 0.003 * 0.001 Education 0.091 * 0.006 Interest in Politics -0.005 0.012 Democrat 0.761 * 0.024 Republican -0.323 * 0.026 /cut 1 1.792 /cut 2 -0.293 /cut 3 -1.911

N 47,025 Log Likelihood -50,089.359 Prob > chi2 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.204 AIC 100,204.700

Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p -values in the table are from a one-tailed test

Table 3.2: Should the Federal Government Do More For Minorities (CAN) Coef. Std. Err. Ideological Self Placement -0.224 * 0.037 Indigenous 0.161 0.598 East Asian 0.757 * 0.454 Other Asian 1.217 * 0.625 Other Race 1.506 * 0.760 Male 0.052 0.121 Age 0.007 * 0.004 Education 0.108 * 0.031 Interest in Politics 0.063 * 0.033 Closest to Conservative -0.372 0.239 Closest to Liberal -0.299 0.219 Closest to NDP 0.229 0.219 /cut 1 -2.905 0.501 /cut 2 -1.325 0.482 /cut 3 1.149 0.480 /cut 4 2.792 0.490

N 987.000 Log Likelihood -1,237.326 Prob > chi2 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.056 AIC 2,506.653

Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one- tailed test

Table 3.3: Senate Vote Choice (USA) Coef. Std. Err. Dem. Cand. Non-White -0.239 * 0.039 Rep. Cand. Non- White -0.433 * 0.061 Ideological Self Placement -0.968 * 0.010 Non-White 0.688 * 0.032 Male -0.101 * 0.025 Age 0.002 * 0.001 Education 0.030 * 0.009 Interest in Politics -0.137 * 0.017 Democrat 2.215 * 0.032 Republican -1.545 * 0.031 Dem. Cand. Incumbent 0.332 * 0.031 Rep. Cand. Incumbent -0.417 * 0.036 Constant 4.247 * 0.083

N 87149 Log Likelihood -23,374.906 Prob > chi2 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.613 AIC 46,775.810

Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

Table 3.4: Party Vote Choice (CAN) Coef. Std. Err. Liberal Conservative Cand. Non-White 0.023 0.642 Liberal Cand. Non-White -0.450 0.653 NDP Cand. Non-White 0.096 0.710 Ideological Self Placement -0.509 * 0.120 Non-White -0.112 0.766 Male 0.009 0.394 Age 0.028 * 0.015 Education 0.067 0.097 Interest in Politics 0.121 0.103 Closest to Conservative -4.738 * 0.994 Closest to Liberal 1.275 0.902 Closest to NDP 1.233 1.150 Con. Cand. Incumbent -0.458 0.796 Lib. Cand. Incumbent 0.898 0.862 NDP Cand. Incumbent -0.414 0.971 Constant 0.523 1.933 NDP Conservative Cand. Non-White -0.362 0.680 Liberal Cand. Non-White -0.779 0.686 NDP Cand. Non-White -0.190 0.729 Ideological Self Placement -0.437 * 0.117 Non-White 0.354 0.771 Male 0.260 0.394 Age 0.013 0.015 Education 0.064 0.096 Interest in Politics 0.035 0.102 Closest to Conservative -3.929 * 0.914 Closest to Liberal -0.108 0.894 Closest to NDP 2.987 * 1.120 Con. Cand. Incumbent -0.390 0.796 Lib. Cand. Incumbent 0.368 0.860 NDP Cand. Incumbent 0.749 0.928 Constant 1.758 1.888 N 676 Log Likelihood -286.974 Prob > chi2 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.601 AIC 637.948 Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

Table 3.5: Senate Vote Choice (replication of Table 3.3) (USA) Coef. Std. Err. Democrat Dem. Cand. Black -0.459 * 0.060 Dem. Cand. Asian -0.065 0.082 Dem. Cand. Latino -0.167 * 0.060 Republican Rep. Cand. Black -0.497 * 0.139 Rep. Cand. Asian 0.281 0.450 Rep. Cand. Latino -0.326 * 0.072

Ideological Self Placement -0.989 * 0.010 Asian 0.370 * 0.114 Latino 0.309 * 0.054 Black 1.802 * 0.057 Male -0.076 * 0.025 Age 0.002 * 0.001 Education 0.026 * 0.009 Interest in Politics -0.122 * 0.017 Democrat 2.079 * 0.032 Republican -1.516 * 0.031 Dem. Cand. Incumbent 0.354 * 0.031 Rep. Cand. Incumbent -0.440 * 0.037 Constant 4.268 * 0.084

N 87149 Log Likelihood -22994.868 Prob > chi2 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.619 AIC 46027.740

Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

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Table 3.6: Party Vote Choice (replication of Table 3.4) (CAN) Coef. Std. Err. Liberal Conservative Cand. Race Indigenous 0.234 1.121 East Asian -0.612 1.206 Other Asian -1.285 1.168

Liberal Cand. Race Indigenous -0.310 1.840 East Asian -3.577 * 1.620 Other Asian -0.182 0.864 Other Race -11.697 2518.717

NDP Cand. Race Indigenous -1.167 1.187 East Asian 13.993 1194.952 Other Asian 0.554 1.318 Other Race 0.176 1.314

Ideological Self Placement -0.557 * 0.128 Indigenous -2.253 1.473 East Asian -0.008 1.641 Other Asian 1.457 1.609 Other Race -2.980 * 1.770 Male 0.023 0.418 Age 0.031 * 0.016 Education 0.058 0.102 Interest in Politics 0.143 0.109 Closest to Conservative -4.965 * 1.029 Closest to Liberal 1.240 0.938 Closest to NDP 1.415 1.199 Con. Cand. Incumbent -0.894 0.877 Lib. Cand. Incumbent 0.597 0.932 NDP Cand. Incumbent -0.962 1.045 Constant 1.078 2.018 NDP Conservative Cand. Race Indigenous -1.941 1.404 East Asian -0.529 1.184 Other Asian -0.191 1.131

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Liberal Cand. Race Indigenous -0.035 1.749 East Asian -2.954 * 1.605 Other Asian -1.218 0.939 Other Race -12.306 2470.868

NDP Cand. Race Indigenous -1.652 1.330 East Asian 11.950 1194.953 Other Asian 0.154 1.308 Other Race -0.199 1.357

Ideological Self Placement -0.463 * 0.125 Indigenous -2.207 1.477 East Asian 2.014 * 1.131 Other Asian 1.786 1.633 Other Race -17.681 923.693 Male 0.331 0.420 Age 0.013 0.016 Education 0.068 0.102 Interest in Politics 0.086 0.109 Closest to Conservative -4.229 * 0.957 Closest to Liberal -0.183 0.933 Closest to NDP 3.235 * 1.172 Con. Cand. Incumbent -0.520 0.855 Lib. Cand. Incumbent 0.104 0.915 NDP Cand. Incumbent 0.434 0.979 Constant 1.882 1.972

N 676.000 Log Likelihood -272.731 Prob > chi2 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.621 AIC 653.462

Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one- tailed test

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Table 3.7: Senate Vote Choice Race and Party Interaction (USA)

Coef. Std. Err.

Dem. Cand. Non-White -0.322 * 0.045 Dem. Cand. Non-White*Non-White 0.327 * 0.087 Rep. Cand.Non- White -0.418 * 0.072 Rep. Cand.Non-White*Non-White -0.056 0.125

Ideological Self Placement -0.969 * 0.010 Non-White 0.643 * 0.035 Male -0.100 * 0.025 Age 0.002 * 0.001 Education 0.031 * 0.009 Interest in Politics -0.137 * 0.017 Democrat 2.214 * 0.032 Republican -1.544 * 0.031 Dem. Cand. Incumbent 0.331 * 0.031 Rep. Cand. Incumbent -0.423 * 0.036 Constant 4.256 * 0.083

N 87149

Log Likelihood -23,367.767

Prob > chi2 0.000

Pseudo R2 0.613

AIC 46,765.530

Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

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Table 3.8: Party Vote Choice Race and Party Interaction (CAN) Coef. Std. Err. Liberal Conservative Cand. Non-White 0.009 0.669 Cons. Cand. Non-White*Non-White -0.806 2.591 Liberal Cand. Non-White -0.643 0.689 Lib. Cand. Non-White*Non-White 1.728 2.624 NDP Cand. Non-White 0.014 0.749 NDP Cand. Non-White*Non-White 0.211 3.153 Ideological Self Placement -0.515 * 0.121 Non-White -0.385 0.905 Male 0.007 0.395 Age 0.027 * 0.015 Education 0.066 0.097 Interest in Politics 0.121 0.103 Closest to Conservative -4.735 * 0.995 Closest to Liberal 1.276 0.903 Closest to NDP 1.288 1.161 Con. Cand. Incumbent -0.435 0.804 Lib. Cand. Incumbent 0.916 0.867 NDP Cand. Incumbent -0.405 0.975 Constant 0.616 1.931 NDP Conservative Cand. Non-White -0.450 0.715 Cons. Cand. Non-White*Non-White 0.073 2.646 Liberal Cand. Non-White -0.994 0.727 Lib. Cand. Non-White*Non-White 1.403 2.752 NDP Cand. Non-White -0.344 0.771 NDP Cand. Non-White*Non-White 0.647 3.221 Ideological Self Placement -0.439 * 0.117 Non-White -0.061 0.901 Male 0.256 0.395 Age 0.012 0.015 Education 0.068 0.097 Interest in Politics 0.034 0.102 Closest to Conservative -3.935 * 0.914 Closest to Liberal -0.113 0.895 Closest to NDP 3.056 1.132 Con. Cand. Incumbent -0.338 0.801 Lib. Cand. Incumbent 0.390 0.863 NDP Cand. Incumbent 0.780 0.931 Constant 1.822 1.886

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N 676 Log Likelihood -286.300 Prob > chi2 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.602 AIC 648.601

Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

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Figure 1.1

Expected Ideological Placement of White and Non-white Democratic and Republican Candidates

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-1.5 -1.6 -1.7 Perceived Candidate Ideology (Smaller Values (Smaller Ideology Candidate Perceived Liberal) More -1.8 Non-whites Whites

White Democratic Candidates Non-White Democratic Candidates

Figure 1.2 Predicted Ideological Perceptions of White and Non-white Democratic Candidates by Voter’s Race

107 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 Perceived Candidate Ideology (Smaller Values (Smaller Ideology Candidate Perceived Liberal) More 1.4 Non-whites Whites

White Republican Candidates Non-White Republican Candidates

Figure 1.3 Predicted Ideological Perceptions of White and Non-white Republican Candidates by Voter’s Race

108 1 .8 .6 .4 .2 Pr(Voting Candidate) Senate for Democratic 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Absolute Distance Between Self Ideological Placement and Candidate Placement

White Candidates Non-white Candidates

Figure 1.4 Predicted Probability of Voting for a White and Non-White Democratic Candidate by Ideological Distance

109 1 .8 .6 .4 .2 Pr(Voting Candidate) Senate for Republican 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Absolute Distance Between Self Ideological Placement and Candidate Placement

White Candidates Non-white Candidates

Figure 1.5 Predicted Probability of Voting for a White and Non-White Republican Candidate by Ideological Distance

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APPENDICES:

Appendix A: Supplemental material for The Role of Race in Candidate Perceptions: How a Voter’s Race Impacts Perceptions of White and Non-White Candidates

A.1. List of Racial and Ethnic Minority Senate Candidates

Latino Republicans: Cruz, Rubio Latino Democrats: Menendez, Noriega, Carmona

Black Republicans: Steele, Scott Black Democrats: Booker, Figures, Fleming, Ford, Greene, Joyce, Meek, Thurmond

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A.2. Replicated Tables

Table A.2.1 - Replication of Table 1: Ideological Placement of Candidates for Senate – Black and Latino Separate Categories Democrats Republicans Variable Black Candidate -0.210* -0.011 (0.019) (0.044) Latino Candidate -0.027 0.118* (0.024) (0.021) Candidate Ideology 0.572* 0.898* (0.017) (0.027) Self Ideological Placement -0.016* 0.005 (0.004) (0.004) Party Ideological Placement 0.439* 0.400* (0.005) (0.005) Affirmative Action Belief -0.064* -0.036* (0.005) (0.006) Education -0.038* 0.046* (0.003) (0.003) Male -0.076* 0.071* (0.009) (0.009) Age -0.002* 0.003* (0.000) (0.000) White -0.060* 0.123* (0.012) (0.012) Republican Identification -0.185* 0.009 (0.012) (0.012) Democrat Identification -0.024* 0.142* (0.013) (0.013) South 0.124* 0.052* (0.012) (0.012) Interest in Current Events -0.163* 0.232* (0.007) (0.008) Incumbent Senator -0.270* 0.167* (0.010) (0.012) Constant 1.230* -1.296* (0.042) (0.046)

N 73,097 71,815 R2 0.2439 0.1913 Root MSE 1.152 1.162 Results for election fixed effects omitted, Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

There are many similarities to the original Table 1.1, but some notable differences. First, while in the original Table 1 all non-white Democratic candidates were viewed as being more liberal, here liberal perception is not present for Latino Democrats.

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This suggests that it is black Democrats are drive the liberal perception of non-white

Democrats. For Republicans, we see the opposite pattern. Black Republicans are not viewed as being ideologically different from white Republicans, but Latino Republicans are viewed as being more conservative. There are many possible explanations for Latino

Republicans being viewed as being more right-wing. Only two Latino Republicans ran for the Senate during this time period, Ted Cruz of Texas and Marco Rubio of Florida.

This rightward bias in Latino Republican perceptions could be entirely due to candidate specific qualities and would be mitigated if other Latino Republicans run for the Senate.

What makes both Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio unique candidates is they both won highly contested primaries against a more “establishment” white Republican by running to the right of those candidates (Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst in Texas and Governor

Charlie Crist in Florida). These successful primaries against white Republicans may have enhanced their perception as being very conservative, perhaps more so than they actually were. Future research should further examine this phenomenon, however, this finding does not impact the hypothesis. We still find that minority Democratic candidates, not minority Republicans, are viewed as being more left-wing.

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Table A.2.2 - Replication of Table 1: Ideological Placement of Candidates for Senate – Divided by Election Democrats (’06-’08) Democrats (’10-’14) Variable Non-white Candidate -0.136* -0.139* (0.026) (0.018) Candidate Ideology 0.665* 0.504* (0.033) (0.021) Self Ideological Placement -0.017* -0.019* (0.006) (0.005) Party Ideological Placement 0.614* 0.381* (0.008) (0.006) Affirmative Action Belief -0.070* -0.056* (0.008) (0.007) Education -0.011* -0.047 (0005) (0.004) Male -0.020 -0.099* (0.014) (0.011) Age -0.001 -0.002* (0.000) (0000) White -0.042* -0.054* (0.019) (0.014) Republican Identification -0.217* -0.150* (0.020) (0.015) Democrat Identification -0.070* 0.013 (0.019) (0.016) South 0.285* 0.036* (0.018) (0.014) Interest in Current Events -0.134* -0.174* (0.014) (0.008) Incumbent Senator -0.079* -0.358* (0.017) (0.012) Constant 0.982* 1.213* (0.072) (0.050)

N 20,841 52,256 R2 0.368 0.208 Root MSE 0.990 1.202 Results for election fixed effects omitted, Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

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Table A.2.3 - Replication of Table 1: Ideological Placement of Candidates for Senate – Divided by Election Reps. (’06-’08) Reps. (’10-’14) Variable Non-white Candidate -0.052 0.113* (0.063) (0.022) Candidate Ideology 1.163* 0.797* (0.048) (0.032) Self Ideological Placement 0.031* -0.013* (0.007) (0.005) Party Ideological Placement 0.518* 0.348* (0.008) (0.006) Affirmative Action Belief -0.038* -0.034* (0.009) (0.007) Education 0.025* 0.055* (0.006) (0.004) Male 0.028 0.085* (0.017) (0.011) Age 0.000 0.004* (0.001) (0.000) White 0.103* 0.127* (0.023) (0.014) Republican Identification 0.024 0.020 (0.023) (0.014) Democrat Identification 0.242* 0.108* (0.024) (0.015) South 0.032* 0.060* (0.019) (0.014) Interest in Current Events 0.281* 0.207* (0.020) (0.009) Incumbent Senator 0.342* 0.081* (0.020) (0.015) Constant -2.156* -1.088* (0.090) (0.054)

N 18,648 53,681 R2 0.292 0.152 Root MSE 1.117 1.171 Results for election fixed effects omitted, Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

In the two replicated versions of Table 1.1 above, the years are broken down due to changes in the dependent variable. For the years 2006 and 2008 the CCES employed a

0-100 scale for ideological perceptions, but for 2010-2014 only employed a 1-7 scale.

The 0-100 scale was rescaled to a 1-7 scale for the analyses in this paper. To determine if

115 these findings of ideological perceptions of non-white candidates are accurate, the years are split based on the change in the scale. As the above tables show, minority Democrats are perceived to be more left-wing than white Democrats in both time periods. However, non-white Republicans are only viewed as being more right-wing in 2010-2014. This could be due to Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz running for office in 2010. While further exploration of Republicans is needed, the evidence for Democratic candidates remains strong.

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Appendix B: Supplemental material for Candidate Positions in Black and White: The Impact of a Candidate’s Race and Issue Positions on Voter Perceptions

B.1. Actual Campaign Mailers:

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B.2. Mailers Used in Experiment: Mailers of Republican Candidates:

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Mailers of Democratic Candidates:

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Racial treatment Mailers:

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Non-racial treatment Mailers:

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B.3. Ordered Logit Due to being a randomized experiment these comparison of means tests should be enough evidence to support the hypotheses, but ordered logit is performed with multiple control variables on these issue positions as well to provide further support for the hypotheses. Due to the predicted issue positions on affirmative action ranging from 1-4 ordered logit is employed. The dependent variable in these ordered logits is the participants’ placement of the candidate’s position on the issue of affirmative action, ranging from strongly supporting affirmative action to strongly opposing affirmative action. The independent variables of interest are the race of the candidate, the issue position treatment, and the interaction of these variables. Controls includes are the respondent’s self-placement on the left-right scale, the placement of the Democratic Party on the scale, the respondent’s racial resentment level, education level, gender, age, race, their 7-point party identification, and the race of the Republican candidate from the

Republican mailer the respondent also saw.

As the table below shows, where there is no treatment the black Democratic candidate is viewed as having more liberal positions toward affirmative action (positive values indicate stronger opposition to affirmative action). But, when the racial treatment is applied both the white and black Democrat are perceived to be more moderate (the reference category is no treatment). The results from the table provide further evidence for the hypotheses, and strengthen the argument that non-white Democratic candidates are perceived to be more left-wing on race-based issues, but by taking a position against race-based policies this discrepancy can be overcome. A second ordered logit is run, this time with no controls (this is possible due to random assignment) with similar findings.

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With the coefficients being so similar and no change in statistical significance this confirms that assignment in this experiment was random.

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Table B.3.1: Ordered Logit Opposition to Affirmative Action Variable Coef. Std. Err. Candidate Black -0.987 * 0.208

Experiment Treatment Racial Treatment 2.505 * 0.306 Non-racial Treatment -0.073 0.314

Race and Treatment Black*Racial Treatment 1.031 * 0.375 Black*Non-racial Treatment 0.515 0.436

Self Ideology -0.001 0.006 Dem. Party Placement 0.011 * 0.005 Racial Resentment 0.012 0.024 Education 0.127 0.088 Male -0.037 0.166 Age -0.008 0.007 White -0.174 0.194 Party ID -0.087 0.079 Republican Non-white -0.398 * 0.178

Cut 1 -0.621 0.487 Cut 2 1.466 0.495 Cut 3 2.497 0.509

N 633 Log-likelihood -652.003 Pseudo R2 0.168 AIC 1,338.006 Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

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Table B.3.2: Ordered Logit Opposition to Affirmative Action – No Controls Variable Coef. Std. Err. Candidate Black -0.949 * 0.201

Experiment Treatment Racial Treatment 2.417 * 0.288 Non-racial Treatment 0.080 0.294

Race and Treatment Black*Racial Treatment 0.930 * 0.356 Black*Non-racial Treatment 0.353 0.418

Cut 1 -0.353 0.141 Cut 2 1.708 0.165 Cut 3 2.771 0.199

N 660 Log-likelihood -698.437 Pseudo R2 0.151 AIC 1,412.875 Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test

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B.4. University of Georgia Experiment

Before this experiment was conducted on M-Turk, a pilot study was conducted with undergraduate students at a Southeastern United States university. This pilot study was similar in many ways to the M-Turk study, but there were some important differences. First, this pilot study only included the treatment of the race of the candidate

(black and white), and did not include the treatment for the issue positions. That said, the campaign mailers that were used were nearly identical to the ones that were used in the

M-Turk study and many of the same questions were asked. Because of this, the pilot study can be used to confirm some of the findings of the M-Turk study.

Unlike the M-Turk study, using simple difference of means tests may not be appropriate for the pilot study. The experiment was given to students in the spring of

2016 that were enrolled in the several Introduction to American Government courses during their teaching-assistant led small “breakout” sessions. This means that there is not true random assignment, as to take the study one had to be enrolled (and attend their class) in Introduction to American Government. Furthermore, the treatment of showing students a white candidate versus a black candidate could not be perfectly randomized, and the treatment of candidate race was done by each different breakout session. Because of this, regression with control variables is more appropriate than difference of means tests. Differences of means tests, like the ones in Table 2.2, are still done and can be found below the regression. The regression is an ordered logit (due to the dependent variable asking what level of support they candidate gives to a given issue) to determine where the student’s perceived the white and black candidate’s position is on the issues of

126 cutting greenhouse gases, expanding free trade, and opposition to affirmative action with negative values in indicating a more liberal position.

As the table below indicates, in the pilot study on college students indicates that ideological differences are only found between black and white Democratic candidates on the issue of affirmative action. This supports Hypothesis 1 in the paper in that the heuristic cues that voters draw on when examining non-white candidates comes from their stereotype of non-white candidates supporting race-based issues. This is found even when controlling for the respondent’s perceived placement of the candidate’s overall ideology, their own ideology, their party ID, their gender, racial resentment levels, and their race. The table of difference of means tests is not so emphatic however. This is likely due to the experiment not having true random assignment. That said, the results of the ordered logit with control variables gives further weight to the findings in this paper.

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Table B.4.1: Pilot Study: Democratic Candidate Perceived Issue Positions Variable Greenhouse Free Trade Affirmative Gases Action Black Cand. -0.086 -0.248 -0.583* (0.216) (0.227) (0.236) Cand. Ideology 0.007 0.003 -0.014 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) Self Ideology -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 7 Point Party 0.025 0.130 0.046 ID (0.126) (0.125) (0.138) Male -0.243 0.056 0.135 (0.218) (0.228) (0.236) Racial 0.007 0.002 -0.051 Resentment (0.061) (0.064) (0.064) White -0.215 0.194 -0.097 (0.262) (0.270) (0.285)

Cut 1 -0.681 -0.996 -1.908 (0.580) (0.641) (0.663) Cut 2 1.500 0.676 0.234 (0.587) (0.638) (0.652) Cut 3 2.832 2.600 1.720 (0.624) (0.664) (0.698)

N 315 260 268 Pseudo R2 0.889 0.716 0.018 Log likelihood -353.106 -332.567 -291.400 AIC 726.212 685.133 602.800 Note: * indicates significance at p < .05, p-values in the table are from a one-tailed test. Standard errors are in parentheses

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Table B.5: Pilot Study: Table of Average Respondent Placement of Candidates on Different Policy Issues Ave. Position t-statistic Rating White 1.882 Against Candidate (0.807) Affirmative 1.411 Action (1-4) Black 1.757 Candidate (0.771) White 2.405 Against Candidate (0.910) Free Trade 1.692 (1-4) Black 2.232 Candidate (0.896) White 1.898 Against Cutting Candidate (0.830) 0.217 Greenhouse Black 1.880 Gases (1-4) Candidate (0.814)