February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Counter-Terrorism Issues for feature article the Next President 1 Counter-Terrorism Issues for the Next By Richard Clarke and Rob Knake President By Richard Clarke and Rob Knake

Reports 4 U.S. Security Assistance to Philippines: A Success Story Against Terrorism By Peter Chalk 8 Takeovers of Moderate Muslim Institutions: Radical Islamist Tactics at the Local Level By Madeleine Gruen 10 Radical Madrasas in Southeast Asia By Scott Atran, Justin Magouirk & Jeremy Ginges 14 The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology By Assaf Moghadam 17 Somalia’s al-Shabab Reconstitutes Fighting Force By Anonymous 20 Deconstructing the Myth about al-Qa`ida and Khobar By Thomas Hegghammer 22 Return of the Arabs: Al-Qa`ida’s Military Role in the Afghan Insurgency he next president will inherit and political capital spent on other, less By Brian Williams from the current administration a important matters. In an effort to prevent 25 After Action Report: dysfunctional counter-terrorism this from occurring, the authors propose 1 An Army Lieutenant’s View of AQI’s T apparatus. The U.S. military a three-part framework for combating Operations in al-Khidr and Hanaswa has been stretched thin by the wars in terrorism that involves drying up support By First Lieutenant Jon Patrick Cheatwood Iraq and Afghanistan, the intelligence for terrorism, improving our intelligence community has been discredited by the capabilities and rethinking our approach 27 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity lack of weapons of mass destruction to homeland security. 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts in Iraq and the ongoing failed hunt for Usama bin Ladin, and the Department of Ending the GWOT and Reducing Support for About the CTC Sentinel Homeland Security has so many missions Terrorism The Combating Terrorism Center is an and so many disparate agencies that it The United States is not fighting a “Global independent educational and research is ineffective. An even more challenging War on Terrorism” any more than it fought institution based in the Department of Social task will be to restore to the United States a “War on Drugs” in the 1990s. During Sciences at the United States Military Academy, credibility in the world and to reduce the that time, General Barry McCaffrey, who West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses number of people who bear us ill will. served as “Drug Czar,” was adamant that the Center’s global network of scholars and “war” was a poor metaphor for what practitioners in order to understand and Every new president has about a year when needed to be accomplished. “We’re not confront contemporary threats posed by they can better achieve goals and changes going to run a year- or two-year-long terrorism and other forms of political violence. because of their fresh mandate from the campaign and achieve total victory,” people. Without a clear agenda, however, he said. This sentiment can be applied the first year can be easily squandered equally to the current situation where The views expressed in this report are those of the war metaphor has been counter- the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 1 This essay is expanded in the forthcoming book, productive. Since this problem has been the Department of the Army, or any other agency framed as the GWOT, the Pentagon of the U.S. Government. Richard Clarke, Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters (Spring 2008). has been the driving force behind U.S.

1 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 counter-terrorism policy. Yet, the military have not been capable of offering adequate to operating in cyberspace. Increasingly, is a sometimes ineffective tool. As General alternatives. The program needed to the information spy agencies want David Petraeus has noted, sometimes the address our current intelligence needs to collect is in cyberspace, as are the best weapons don’t shoot. is very different from the program we controls for vital systems. The highly needed to fight and win the Cold War. That skilled personnel and sophisticated To defeat the al-Qa`ida movement, it system relied heavily on our technological systems we need to operate in cyberspace must be recognized as a cancer infecting prowess. Defeating al-Qa`ida, however, are in such short supply that we cannot only a small percentage of the greater will be largely about human intelligence. spread them out over dozens of military, body of peace-loving Muslims worldwide. Breaking the cycle of intelligence failures defense and intelligence agencies. While eliminating the cancer is our end will take a strong Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with experience in - A relatively small, elite, highly trained the intelligence community to shift the and experienced professional intelligence “A relatively small, emphasis from the fiefdoms of expensive analysis organization should serve the elite, highly trained and intelligence collection technologies to DNI and the president. This Intelligence an integrated, analyst-driven structure. Assessment Staff must be institutionally experienced professional The new DNI must energetically pursue insulated from political pressures and intelligence analysis a series of new initiatives aimed at this it must be able to control intelligence purpose: collection to support its analysis efforts organization should serve from being stolen. the DNI and the president.” - For the new DNI to be responsible and accountable for U.S. intelligence, he - For intelligence agencies to be trusted or she needs to control all of the U.S. by the citizenry, there must be a real intelligence agencies and their budgets. program in which someone is actively objective, our more immediate goal is to Today, most of their money is buried in monitoring those agencies to ensure that keep it from spreading. Yet many of our the Pentagon’s budget, and the roles of there is no abuse of laws or policies. Thus, actions aimed at capturing and killing the secretary of defense and the DNI are the national security adviser and the DNI terrorists have alienated wide swathes of overlapping. There should be a single, should create an active Executive Branch the Muslim world. In short, what we have independent, integrated intelligence oversight program for all Intelligence done to eliminate the cancer has served to budget and most of the intelligence Community efforts, especially the spread it. The most important counter- agencies now in the Department of restricted covert action programs. The terrorism tools are law enforcement, Defense need to be shifted to the DNI, existing National Security Council staff intelligence and ideology. When military specifically the National Security mechanism for that oversight are weak action is called for, we must act swiftly and Agency, the National Reconnaissance and under-resourced. decisively, but in the context of defeating Office (NRO) and the National Geo- al-Qa`ida, smart bombs, cruise missiles Spatial Intelligence Agency. Homeland Security and SEAL teams must be applied like a The creation and subsequent dysfunction surgeon’s scalpel to prevent a counter- - Within that integrated budget, we need of the Department of Homeland Security productive reaction among people affected to further shift resources from traditional, reveals many of the reasons why the U.S. by the collateral damage. costly satellite collection systems run government fails so often at national by the NRO to fund other programs in security. For several years, during two It is the authors’ judgment that removing cyberspace and in the field of human U.S. troops from Iraq is the single biggest intelligence. step we can take to reduce support “The DNI must rationalize for al-Qa`ida and eliminate anti-U.S. - The National Clandestine Service (NCS), the roles, missions and sentiments across the globe. By ending the our human spy agency, should continue war in Iraq, we will remove a justifiable its slow efforts to expand the use of Not capabilities of the various grievance that is the rallying cry for the Official Cover (NOC)2 programs, but it U.S. intelligence agencies al-Qa`ida movement. Other steps must should also recast our spying effort to include sincere efforts to bring peace to reflect the reality that most information when it comes to operating Israel and Palestine and to help our allies will continue to come from open in cyberspace.” in the Muslim world move away from sources, walk-ins and liaison services. oppressive tactics of government. We Americans are not likely to become good should not, however, force democracy at spying anytime soon and, therefore, onto nations and cultures that are not the Clandestine Service should focus its administrations of different political prepared. Most importantly, we need to efforts at enhancing what we can do well. parties, people engaged in federal work with our Islamic friends to promote management and in national security tried ideological counter-weights to al-Qa`ida. - The DNI must rationalize the roles, to resist a politically motivated drive to missions and capabilities of the various be seen to “do something” about security Intelligence U.S. intelligence agencies when it comes through bureaucratic reorganization. Our reliance on military solutions to the When, after the September 11 attacks, threat posed by al-Qa`ida stems in part 2 NOC refers to spies based outside of U.S. government that drive became irresistible, the chief from the fact that our intelligence agencies facilities. criteria in designing and managing the

2 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 major new government enterprise was homeland security equation, and securing In order to meet this demanding agenda, appearance and politics, not problem the country’s borders. the next president will need to inspire, solving. The largest federal department recruit and retain a new generation created in more than 50 years was During the past seven years, the of civilian civil servants. Both the slammed together with insufficient federal government has thrown billions Department of Homeland Security of grant dollars at cities and states and the Intelligence Community have without providing any guidance on how outsourced too much of their mission “The next president these funds should be used. The results to private contractors. National must make brokering the have been less than impressive. At the security requires a dedicated corps of same time, the federal government has professionals, appropriately trained necessary compromises to cut support for local law enforcement. and motivated to perform the essential secure the borders a top We need to establish clear goals for functions of analysis, planning, contract vulnerability reduction and capacity oversight and crisis management. The priority.” enhancement and develop three and people who perform these functions five year plans to fund and meet them. should not be contractors and they One of the main goals in this effort must should not solely be political appointees. be to make local law enforcement a The next president must make it a resources and regulatory powers. reliable part of our prevention efforts by priority to bring many of these jobs Worse yet, far from recruiting the best funding intelligence positions in police back “in-house” and work to attract managers that government and industry departments dedicated to counter- the next generation of dedicated public could assemble, it was laced with terrorism and finding a formula to make servants. political appointees and contractors to a fusion centers work. degree never seen before in any federal Richard A. Clarke is the Chairman of Good agency. The next president must make brokering Harbor Consulting LLC, a homeland security and the necessary compromises to secure the cyber security consulting firm. Mr. Clarke served In order to make our homeland security borders a top priority. This cannot be done the last three presidents as a senior White House apparatus work, we first need to break without also creating a migrant worker Advisor. Over the course of an unprecedented 11 it up into manageable components. The program to reduce the number of illegal consecutive years of White House service, he held drive to centralize everything related immigrants so that we can focus on the the titles of: Special Assistant to the President for to homeland security under one roof security threat posed by border crossings. Global Affairs, National Coordinator for Security showed a basic lack of understanding This reform will also require establishing and Counterterrorism, and Special Advisor to the of how government agencies work. One a secure credentialing system with civil President for Cyber Security. Prior to his White person cannot lead an agency responsible liberties and privacy protections. House years, Mr. Clarke served for 19 years in the for both screening airline passengers and Pentagon, the Intelligence Community, and State responding to hurricanes. Instead, the The Keys to Getting it Right Department. During the Reagan Administration, organizing principle should consolidate The agenda we have laid out is ambitious, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for around the functions the agencies especially since the president will be Intelligence. During the Bush (41) Administration, perform: simultaneously addressing a host of other he was Assistant Secretary of State for Political- demanding issues including withdrawal Military Affairs and coordinated diplomatic - FEMA should be broken out and efforts to support the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the given responsibility as an independent subsequent security arrangements. agency for mitigating and responding to “In order to meet this emergencies. demanding agenda, the Robert K. Knake is a Director at Good Harbor Consulting where he specializes in homeland - Domestic intelligence functions within next president will need to security and critical infrastructure protection. DHS and the FBI should be moved into a inspire, recruit and retain a Mr. Knake joined Good Harbor after completing single new agency under the control of the a master’s degree in international security studies DNI. new generation of civilian at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of civil servants.” Government. Prior to his graduate studies, Mr. - The remaining components of DHS Knake was a research associate in national security are largely uniformed, law enforcement studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He entities responsible for border and received his BA in History and Government from immigration security and transportation from Iraq, responding to global warming Connecticut College in 2001. security. These agencies should remain and solving the health care crisis. Having in the same organization but under a new a risk management system that is itself and less Orwellian name, perhaps the a high risk of failure, however, is not Department of Border and Transportation prudent. We are, after all, talking about Security (BTS). the security of the United States, a national government’s first priority and The remaining agenda for DHS includes one that must be done well. two major issues: bringing state and local government meaningfully into the

3 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3

U.S. Security Assistance to Although Janjalini originally created The criminal disaggregation of the ASG, his movement as one predicated on the however, proved to be only short lived. the Philippines: A Success localized imperative of establishing an Beginning in 2003, concerted attempts Story Against Terrorism MIS, he quickly tied this objective to the were made to re-energize the group regional and global supremacy of Islam as an integrated and credible Islamic By Peter Chalk through armed struggle. Toward that force. The bulk of these efforts were end, the ASG paralleled its anti-Christian coordinated under the combined auspices the southern philippines currently agenda in Mindanao with an effort to of Khadaffi Janjalini (the younger brother constitutes a main focus of U.S. concern establish logistical and operational of Abdurajak) and Jainal Antel Sali regarding terrorism and trans-border links with external terrorist groups.2 (also known as Abu Solaiman, a self- militant threats, with American diplomats Concrete evidence of these transnational proclaimed ASG spokesman), both of darkly referring to the region as the “new ambitions first emerged in 1995 when Afghanistan.” The wider Mindanao area five ASG cells were directly implicated “The United States clearly has not only been connected to numerous in Oplan Bonjinka—a multi-pronged plot high-profile terrorist attacks that have aimed at assassinating the Pope and views the ASG as posing taken place since 9/11—both within U.S. President Bill Clinton, bombing a direct threat to a highly and beyond the Philippines—but it has Washington’s embassies in Manila and also been identified as an increasingly Bangkok and sabotaging U.S. commercial important ally in Southeast important hub for leading members of the airliners flying trans-Pacific routes from Asia.” so-called pro-bombing faction of Jemaah American West Coast cities. The plan was Islamiyah (JI). Although several extremist hatched by Ramzi Yousef, the convicted entities exist in the southern Philippines, it mastermind of the 1993 attack against the is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG, or “Bearer World Trade Center in New York, and whom sought to return the group to its of the Sword”) that Washington generally was only foiled when volatile explosive militant jihadist origins following the considers to represent the principal compounds ignited a fire in the apartment arrests and killings of several leading terrorist threat to its own strategic and he was renting in Manila.3 bandit commanders. Notably, these security interests. Accordingly, the thrust included Ghalib Andang (also known as of foreign military security assistance to The fervor of the ASG’s Islamic agenda— “Komander Robot”) and Aldam Tilao (also Manila has been directed toward vitiating both domestic and international—began known as Abu Sabaya), two domineering the operational tempo of the ASG—an to atrophy in the wake of the discovery personalities who had orchestrated many effort that, at this point, has met with of Bonjinka, a process that gathered pace of the earlier KFR operations claimed in some relatively significant results. rapidly three years later when Janjalini the group’s name.5 Although now dead, was killed in a shootout with Philippine the influence of Khadaffy and Solaiman6 The Abu Sayyaf Group police on Basilan Island. At the time, has been significant in reorienting the The ASG was founded on Basilan Island this latter event proved to be a defining tactical and strategic direction of the ASG. in 1991 under the leadership of Ustadz moment in the ASG’s evolutionary The group now routinely refers to itself Abdurajak Janjalini, a former member of history, triggering a leadership crisis that by its original nomenclature—al-Harakat the Filipino Muslim Brigade that fought was followed by the loss of ideological al-Islamiyah—and, under the direction of Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan direction and a subsequent process of Commander Radullan Sahiron (who, in during the 1980s. Originally known factionalization that effectively saw the the absence of a nominated amir, now acts as al-Harakat al-Islamiyah, the group group degenerate into a loosely configured as the de facto leader of the organization),7 has stated its goals as the eradication of but highly ruthless Kidnap-for-Extortion 4 all Christian influence in the southern (KFR) syndicate. Economic Review, September 7, 2000. Philippines and the creation of an Islamic 5 Andang was killed while trying to escape from jail in State of Mindanao (MIS) whose “nature, Studies (IDSS), Singapore, January 12, 2006. March 2005; Tilao was shot in an offshore gun battle in meaning, emblem and objective are basic 2 Personal interviews, police and military intelligence Mindanao in June 2001. The latter was behind the sen- 1 to peace.” officials, Manila, March 2005. sational abduction of 20 hostages from the resort island 3 For more on Oplan Bonjinka, see “Asia’s Own Osama,” of Palawan in May 2001, including Americans Martin 1 These objectives were first set forth in an undated Time, April 1, 2002; Anthony Spaeth, “Rumbles in the and Gracia Burnham. For an interesting account of this ASG proclamation, the “Surah I-al Fatiha,” that pro- Jungle,” Time, March 4, 2002; “Disparate Pieces of Puz- episode and the events leading up to Tilao’s eventual fessed to refute the false lies and insults hurled at the zle Fit Together,” Washington Post, September 23, 2001; death, see Mark Bowden, “Jihadists in Paradise,” The Islamic religion by Christians and to liberate Mindanao “Muslim Militants Threaten Ramos Vision of Summit Atlantic (March 2007). from the clutches of oppression, tyranny and injustice as Glory,” The Australian, January 13, 1996; and “The Man 6 Khadaffi died after sustaining serious injuries during experienced under the Catholic-dominated Philippine Who Wasn’t There,” Time, February 20, 1995. a firefight with the Armed Forces of the Philippines on government and military. Despite these pronounce- 4 A number of these kidnappings proved to be highly September 4, 2006. Solaiman was killed by a Special ments, the ASG has never articulated a clear strategic profitable. Abductions of several Western tourists in the Forces unit on January 16, 2007. Zachary Abuza, “On plan for how it would actually establish a pure Islamic first half of 2000, for instance, are believed to have net- the Defensive: Rebels Lose Ground in the Southern state in the southern Philippines or, indeed, prepare lo- ted ASG an estimated $20 million in ransom payments. Philippines,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (April 2007). cal Muslims for home rule. “Abu Sayyaf Group Profile,” See “No More Ransoms,” Economist, June 2, 2001; Seth 7 At the time of writing, the ASG had not announced unpublished document supplied to the author by the Maydans, “Libyan Aid Helps to Free Hostages Held a nominated amir to succeed Khaddafi Janjalini largely International Political Violence Terrorism Research in the Philippines,” New York Times, October 21, 2001; because an accepted consensus candidate who retained Center (IPVTRC), Institute of Defense and Strategic and Deidre Sheehan, “Buying Trouble,” The Far Eastern both theological and military credibility had not been

4 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 has enshrined the concept of a wider Asia—acting as the main vehicle for security strategy. These considerations Islamic state in Mindanao as the basis furthering its operational and logistical have caused Washington to place a of its ideological agenda.8 Moreover, the activities in Mindanao. Intelligence premium on supporting Manila with a group has steadily scaled back its lucrative sources in the Philippines confirm that robust program of international defense KFR activities in favor of a more directed militants associated with the bloc continue and security assistance. Instituted focus on hitting high-profile civilian and to pass through areas under ASG control through the Joint United States Western targets in major metropolitan and that at least three of the most wanted Military Assistance Group-Philippines areas. Some of the more notable attacks men in Southeast Asia are now based in (JUSMAG-P), the essential thrust of and plots attributed to the organization in Patikul under the group’s protection: this backing is to enhance American- recent years include: Joko Pitono (also known as Dulmatin), Filipino military interoperability in Umar Patek and Marwan (also known as order to deny and defeat the terrorist ∙ The 2004 firebombing of Philippine Manobo).10 threat emanating from the ASG.11 SuperFerry 14 (which resulted in 116 deaths and remains the most destructive act of The U.S. Dimension The Armed Forces of the Philippines maritime terrorism to date). The United States clearly views the ASG as (AFP) is now the largest benefactor of the ∙ A series of coordinated explosions that posing a direct threat to a highly important Pentagon’s Foreign Military Financing took place in Davao City, General Santos ally in Southeast Asia. The present (FMF) budget,12 which grew from zero City and Manila in February 2005 (the so- Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration between 1994 and 1998 to $9 million in called “Valentine’s Day” bombings). constitutes one of the most ardent 2004, $11 million in 2005, $12 million in ∙ Preempted strikes on several venues supporters of President George W. Bush’s 2006 and $13 million in 2007.13 The bulk popular with foreign tourists and global war on terrorism that in addition of this money has been used to promote businessmen in Makati City that had been to complementing regional American defense reform and underwrite the planned for March 2005. politico-strategic policies also remains logistics for ongoing counter-terrorism ∙ The bombing of a crowded supermarket crucial to legitimating U.S. basing options efforts in the southern Philippines through on the southern island of Jolo in March in the wider Asia-Pacific. Moreover, the 10 priority programs: Multi Year Defense 2006. Philippines is part and parcel of a highly Planning System; Intelligence, Operations ∙ Three simultaneous attacks on the sites dynamic East Asian economic hub that and Training; Logistics; Professional hosting the Association of Southeast offers vibrant export markets, long-term Development; Professional Management; Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asian Capability Upgrade Program; Budget regional summits in January 2007.9 and Management; Defense Acquisition “In addition to FMF, System; Strategic Communication; and Arguably more importantly, the ASG has Manila continues to be one Information Management.14 sought to consolidate ties with the pro- bombing faction of JI—which currently of the principal recipients In addition to FMF, Manila continues represents the most significant and of Department of Defense to be one of the principal recipients of dangerous jihadist entity in Southeast Department of Defense (DoD) International (DoD) International Military Education and Training (IMET) support. The main purpose of this identified. Sahiron (also known as Commander Putol) Military Education and is the closest that the group has to such an individual. assistance is to sponsor serving officers He is old (in his 70s), however, and suffers from acute Training (IMET) support.” of the AFP to undertake Professional diabetes. The other potential amir, Isnilon Hapilon (also known as Salahuddin), is from the Yakan tribe, which is 11 Joint United States Military Assistance Group not acceptable to the Tausugs. Personal interviews, AFP (JUSMAG) and United States Defense Representative officials, Zamboanga, January 2008. energy supplies (especially in the form of (USDR) Philippines briefing, Manila, January 15, 2008. 8 Personal interviews, police and military officials and oil and liquefied natural gas) and crucial 12 FMF essentially consists of a trust fund that is set security analysts, Manila, January 2008. sea lines of communication for maritime up in recipient countries and which is administered by 9 Anthony Davis, “Philippines Fears New Wave of trade. The emergence of a concerted the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in the Office Attacks by Abu Sayyaf Group,” Jane’s Intelligence Review jihadist beachhead in Mindanao of the Secretary of Defense. Money is deposited into the (May 2005); Abuza, “On the Defensive: Rebels Lose would not only negatively impact the trust and used to purchase American defense articles Ground in Southern Philippines”; “4 More Suspects in general stability of the Philippines and services as provided through the U.S. Foreign V-Day Bombings Nabbed,” ABS-CBN News, Febru- and its neighbors, but it would place Military Sales system. Funds mostly pay for hardware ary 23, 2005; “Car Bombing Plot Foiled, Says AFP,” under pressure existing bilateral and and technical training, although a certain amount is The Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 30, 2005; Tarra multilateral relations that are emerging also employed to promote defense reform in recipient Quismundo and Donna Pazzibugan, “Bomb Found Out- as a key component of Washington’s countries. side Makati Bldg,” The Philippine Daily Inquirer, March post-9/11 national and international 13 Personal interview, U.S. State Department (USSD) 28, 2005; Jim Gomez, “Extremist Groups in Philippines officials, Washington, D.C., December 2007. See also Are Forming Alliances,” Associated Press, March 12, 10 Personal interviews, AFP officials, Manila and Malcolm Cook and Kit Collier, Mindanao: A Gamble 2005; “Captured Indonesian Suspect: ASG Plans to Zamboanga, January 2008. These three individuals Worth Taking (Sydney: Lowy Institute Paper 14, 2007), Bomb Crowded Places in Central Manila,” FBIS, March are considered especially dangerous in terms of IED p. 44. 24, 2005; “Bomb Rocks Philippines Ahead of Summits,” construction given their respective proficiencies: Mar- 14 Personal interview, AFP officials, Manila, January USA Today, January 11, 2007; “Blast Hits Southern wan and military ordinance; Patek and chemicals; and 2008; Philippine Defense Reform briefing, Manila, Philippines,” BBC News, March 27, 2006. Dulmatin and electronics. January 15, 2008.

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Military Education (PME) in the United round is scheduled for February-March Second is USAID, which is the main States. The hope is that by attending these 2008 and will be devoted exclusively to agency responsible for distributing and courses, participants will not only gain a civil military operations in Basilan, Tawi- overseeing development assistance to the thorough grounding in macro areas such Tawi and Sulu.18 Philippines. Many of its programs are as rules of engagement, human rights undertaken in direct conjunction with awareness, international military law and Besides the DoD (which remains the the Defense Department and focus on legal aspects of peacekeeping operations principal source of security backing using “soft power” to alleviate poverty (that will then be disseminated back to to Manila), at least two other federal and unemployment, both of which are their home units and institutions), but will government bureaucracies are currently regarded as powerful drivers—if not also build solid cooperative relationships working to boost counter-terrorism root causes—for militant extremism with their American counterparts.15 In efforts in the Philippines. The first is the in Mindanao. The main thrust of these 2007, $2.75 million was allocated to the U.S. State Department, which provides endeavors, which are instituted through Philippines in IMET funds; covering the an average of between $1 and $1.5 million the Growth and Equity in Mindanao PME costs for 146 students, this made it every year in International Narcotics and (GEM) program, has been to foster small- one of the largest programs of its kind Law Enforcement (INL) support.19 Most of scale community infrastructure projects currently run by Washington anywhere these monies are being used to enhance the that are liable to have an immediate impact in the world.16 forensic capabilities of the national police on civilians’ day-to-day lives such as the and help build a more comprehensive legal construction of manual water pumps, On a more directed combat level, several framework for charging and prosecuting sanitation systems and market access hundred U.S. personnel deployed as part those implicated in terrorist crimes (a roads and the promotion of local fish farms of JUSMAG-P’s Joint Special Operations Resident Legal Adviser Program is active and collective business cooperatives.22 Taskforce Philippines (JSOT-P) are to further buttress this latter endeavor). In 2006, JUSMAG-P started channeling providing comprehensive counter- The State Department has also earmarked these development efforts through U.S. terrorism training to all relevant AFP $5 million in 1207 funds20 to promote military forces stationed in the south, elements involved in the fight against domain awareness and capacity building which has ensured that GEM initiatives the ASG.17 Principally aimed at Special in the maritime realm as part of a wider are now systematically coordinated with Forces, Scout Ranger and Marine Corps effort to augment security in the Malaysia- U.S. security troops and implemented in battalions as well as several army Philippines-Indonesia (MALPHINDO) areas that can be quarantined from attack reconnaissance companies, modules tri-border region.21 and sabotage by militant entities.23 mainly focus on operations intelligence fusion, unit interoperability, logistics and 18 Personal interviews, AFP officials, Zamboanga and Assessment of U.S. Defense and Security aspects of engineering, equipment and Manila, January 2008. Balikatan 08 will exercise eight Assistance maintenance. Although U.S. troops are medical civil action programs (MEDCAPS) and four en- The U.S. defense and security assistance barred from actually engaging in active gineering civic action programs (ENCAPS); MEDCAPS program has paid dividends in a number hostile actions (which is prohibited under will involve 15 AFP personnel/project, ENCAPS 20 of respects. Operationally, there is little the Philippines’ constitution), they do AFP personnel/project. doubt that the AFP has benefited from participate in annual counter-terrorism 19 It should be noted that the USSD also works with FMF funding and JSOT-P training. This exercises with the AFP to test and audit the Department of Justice in supporting an Interna- is perhaps best reflected by the military’s imparted techniques, procedures and tional Criminal Investigative Training Program in the successes against the ASG in Mindanao. practices. Known as Balikatan (literally Philippines. This is a relatively minor effort that consists The group is currently estimated to “shoulder-to-shoulder”), these drills mostly of sponsoring courses for selected PNP person- have been ongoing since 2002. The latest nel to attend courses on crime scene investigation, com- central command post—to be known as the Maritime munity policing and instructor development. Director Information and Coordination Center (MICC)—that will 15 Former Secretary of State Colin Powell once re- General Oscar Calderon, Philippine National Police: One- provide fusion for intelligence collection, analysis and marked that, dollar for dollar, IMET was one of the most Year Report (Manila, Camp Crame: Philippine National dissemination. The MICC will be staffed by interagency effective security assistance programs run by the U.S. Police, 2007), p. 19. personnel and headed by the AFP (which will provide government. 20 Although 1207 funds are DoD sourced, the program the initial seed money for underwriting the start-up 16 Personal interviews, USSD officials, Washington, uses defense dollars to perform a USSD function, with costs for CWS). The current development plan for the D.C., 2007 and Manila, January 2008. Worldwide, State acting as the ultimate arbiter of how these monies system is split between an initial Implementation Phase roughly 125 countries receive IMET funding. In are distributed and employed. (lasting 0-3 years), an Integration Phase (lasting 2-6 Southeast Asia, the main established programs are with 21 Personal interviews, DoD and USSD officials, years) and a Full Mission Capable Phase (lasting 5-9 the Philippines and Indonesia; smaller arrangements Washington, D.C., December 2007 and Australian years). An Executive Order for implementing the first have been concluded with Cambodia, East Timor, Laos, and Philippine Navy officials, Manila, January 2008. phase has already been drafted and should be ready for Malaysia and Thailand (although at the time of writing Most of the effort in terms of promoting Philippine presidential signature before the end of the first quarter all military assistance to Bangkok had been frozen as a maritime capacity building is focusing on Coast Watch in 2008. result of the September 2006 military coup that ousted South (CWS)—an interagency project patterned after 22 Personal interviews, DoD officials, Washington, the civilian administration of Prime Minister Thaksin the offshore monitoring and surveillance system that D.C., December 2007. See also Cook and Collier, Mind- Shinawatra). is employed in Australia. The Philippine version will anao: A Gamble Worth Taking, p. 44. 17 JSOTF-P training missions are currently being involve setting up surveillance and interdiction sta- 23 Glenda Gloria, “War Without End: The Military is headquartered out of Camp Aguinaldo in Manila, Camp tions across Mindanao to cover the whole gambit of Treading on Dangerous Ground with its Counterinsur- Navarro in Zamboanga and Camp Bautista in Jolo. JUS- maritime threats in zones around the country’s so-called gency Experiments,” Newsbreak, December 2007-Febru- MAG and USDR briefing, Manila, January 15, 2008. “southern back door.” These stations will be tied into a ary 2008, p. 38.

6 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 have around 380 fighters, most of whom to Mindanao who have served with steps are being undertaken to modify the are scattered in small pockets across distinction and who have been active in prohibitive provisions of the HSA, and Jolo Island in Sulu Province. This is a promoting action against human rights sources in Manila are confident that a substantial reduction from the 1,270 abuses, graft, embezzlement and other revised and more “balanced” version will cadres that were thought to have made questionable practices. The scheme has be ready for signature before the end of up the organization at the height of its been particularly instrumental in eliciting 2008.31 strength in 2000.24 Several high-value the support of the public in general ASG targets—defined as leading/mid- counter-terrorism efforts by visibly It is clear that one of the main factors level commanders overseeing at least demonstrating that the security forces accounting for the success of U.S. security six cadres—have also been neutralized. are respectful of human rights and fully aid in the Philippines is the regularity by Apart from the aforementioned Khadaffi committed to safeguarding the interests which military reform and modernization Janjalini and Abu Solaiman, these have of the local population.27 is brought up in bilateral official included Jundam Jamalul (also known as relations—a frequency that clearly reflects “Black Killer”), Borhan Mundus, Abdullah Finally, on a law enforcement front, the the perceived importance the country Abas, Jamal Taib, Abdul Yebnon, Binang police now have at their disposal a nascent has to U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Sali (also known as Sali), Muskin Ahaddin but growing computer-based system for Southeast Asia. Equally as significant, (also known as Hussein), Ibrahim (also storing and cross-referencing forensic however, is the fact that Manila has heard known as Muksin), Gufran (also known information, which should help to the message, accepted that it needs help as Abu Samur) and Abdul Sakandal (also substantially boost the evidentiary basis and has taken ownership of the problem by known as “Boy Negro”).25 and credibility of Philippine National endorsing the provision of comprehensive Police (PNP) cases brought to trial.28 A support and assistance packages.32 In a Perhaps more importantly, there are new anti-terrorism law—officially known region that continues to jealously guard signs that defense reform within the AFP as the Human Security Act (HAS)—was the dual principles of sovereignty and is being institutionalized and taking on also passed in January 2007, which has non-interference in internal affairs,33 this the type of self-sustaining character that been hailed as an important development represents a major and willing departure is necessary for achieving long-term, in further equipping the state with the from the norm, the salience of which systematic change. The government necessary legal tools to address violent should not be underestimated. is now committing approximately five political extremism. The legislation not billion pesos ($125 million) over five only provides a statutory basis for defining Dr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst with the years of its own funds to further the and proscribing terrorist acts, but it also RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. In process of internal security capability underwrites a range of extrajudicial addition to this position he serves as an Adjunct building and in 2005 drafted its first surveillance and arrest powers for the Professor with the Postgraduate Naval School formal plan for guiding future defense police.29 It is true that the PNP has been in Monterey, California and the Asia Pacific asset prioritization and procurement.26 somewhat reluctant to fully embrace Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. Moreover, significant steps are being the HSA due to clauses that sanction Apart from his professional affiliations, he acts as taken to root out corruption and inculcate extremely severe penalties in the event that Associate Editor of Studies in Conflict and an ethos of military professionalism the act is judged to have been employed Terrorism, one of the foremost journals in the through a so-called “honorable warrior” inappropriately.30 Nevertheless, active international security field. initiative. This innovative program, which is run by the AFP’s J7, singles out 27 Personal interview, U.S. Special Forces liaison of- members of the armed forces deployed ficer, Manila, November 2005. 28 Conviction rates are notoriously low in the Philip- 24 AFP J2 briefing given to author, Manila, January pines, largely because the police have tended to base 2008. See also Barbara Dacanay, “Joint Effort Clips their cases on unsubstantiated (and, hence, legally Insurgents’ Wings,” Gulf News, January 8, 2008. unreliable) eyewitness accounts and confessions rather 25 Personal interviews, AFP officials and security ana- than solid physical evidence. lysts, Manila, January 2008. The high rate of captures 29 The HSA provides the government with an explicit arguably also reflects the success of the U.S.-funded authority to imprison all persons who commit an act Rewards for Justice Program, which provides financial punishable under the provisions of the Revised Penal incentives to encourage the public to voluntarily work Code if the purpose is explicitly designed to sow and with the authorities and supply them with information create “a condition of widespread and extraordinary charged with a terrorist offense and then acquitted has that is relevant to the movement and whereabouts of fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the the right to demand 500,000 pesos ($125) for each day extremist high-value targets. government to give into an unlawful demand.” Congress that he/she was held—the cost of which is personally 26 Personal interviews, USSD officials, Washington, of the Philippines, An Act to Secure the State and Protect borne by the arresting officer. D.C., December 2007 and AFP officials, Manila, Janu- Our People from Terrorism (Republic Act No. 9372), 31 Personal interview, National Security Council of- ary 2008. It should be noted that Manila conceives Thirteenth Congress, Third Special Session, February ficials, Manila, January 2008. defense reform as necessary to address the whole 19, 2007. 32 Personal interviews, DoD and USSD officials, Wash- gambit of internal security threats that it currently 30 Personal interviews, PNP and Western officials, ington, D.C., December 2007. confronts and not merely the challenge emanating from Manila, January 2008. Penalties for unauthorized, 33 Sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs the ASG. Indeed, the government presently counts the malicious or inappropriate use of the HSA include both are the two main procedural norms that govern policy New People’s Army communist insurgency, not Islamist imprisonment (to a maximum of 12 years) and financial and decision-making in both ASEAN and the ASEAN terrorism, as its number one priority. compensation. In the latter case, any individual who is Regional Forum.

7 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3

Takeovers of Moderate its resources, radical Islamist groups The Takeover of the Morgantown Mosque position themselves in mosques, The Morgantown mosque in West Muslim Institutions: student associations and community Virginia was too small to have its own Radical Islamist Tactics at centers. Such bases of operations imam. Instead, the governing board the Local Level enhance the capabilities of extremist determined who would lead prayers groups by allowing them direct control and deliver sermons.1 One Friday in By Madeleine Gruen of communications resources, such as 2004, a Wahhabi-influenced student institution newsletters and websites. from West Virginia University delivered the success of radical Islamists in They may also gain new sources of the sermon. His message was acerbic, spreading extremist doctrine has been a income as a result of more direct telling the moderate congregation that largely uncontested battle in the ongoing access to businesses operated by to love the Prophet Muhammad is to war on terrorism. As long as extremist worshippers or association members, “hate those who hate him” and that the groups are able to circulate their doctrine and to the charitable donations made without challenge, radicalization will by the institution’s patrons. Control “Indeed, it is not the role occur, and new threats will be generated over an institution means ideological indefinitely. In order to achieve their control of the message delivered to its of U.S. law enforcement ultimate objectives, extremist groups and members and the ability to set agendas to police ideological movements operating in the United States and choose speakers for educational continually seek to expand their spheres programs and public activities. In other perspectives.” of influence by seizing control of Islamic words, they can create an atmosphere organizations and institutions from in which their audience will be isolated moderate Muslims. from any other perspective but that of the radical Islamist group that occupies “enemies of Islam” are those who do not In most cases, extremist groups the seat of control. These conditions practice it in the strictest form. When the successfully take over moderate Islamic are undesirable not only to the greater board of directors disintegrated due to institutions without breaking any laws. community, which will run a higher infighting, the West Virginia University Therefore, any conflict between those risk of suffering a terrorist attack student who had delivered the sermon, who previously occupied the venue and perpetrated by a homegrown cell or by and several other radical students from the extremist infiltrators is considered a lone actors, but also to the moderate the university, stepped in to take over civil matter and not a criminal situation Muslim community, which finds it five vacant spots on the board. Control difficult to defend itself against radical of the board gave them control of the “In most cases, extremist Islamist takeovers. mosque, which meant control over the ideological discourse that took place in groups successfully take Extremist group tactics play out similarly the mosque from that point forward. over moderate Islamic in almost all publicly reported cases of Most of their sermons came directly takeover bids. Newcomers arrive who from www.alminbar.com, a Saudi-based, institutions without are highly educated and are intellectually English-language website that specializes persuasive as they talk politics at every in providing subject matter material for breaking any laws.” opportunity or when admonishing others sermons for those who do not have proper to practice Islam according to the most religious training. Al-Minbar’s suggested literal interpretation. They plant seeds topics include the United States and that would require law enforcement of suspicion among the institution’s its “dirty war against Islam,” and “the intervention. Indeed, it is not the patrons, perhaps suggesting that the only way to defeat the Jews is by jihad.” role of U.S. law enforcement to police current leadership is embezzling from Anyone in the Morgantown mosque who ideological perspectives. Nevertheless, the community’s financial reserves. found this genre of topic distasteful and as law enforcement agencies continue to They discredit the leadership, hoping who confronted the new leadership about develop an understanding of extremist that lack of confidence will lead to it was socially ostracized. Eventually, the group strategies and tactics, they will discord. They are dynamic, energetic and extremists’ control went unchallenged recognize patterns that indicate the eventually persuade people to join their and was absolute. ongoing development of power bases by side. Once they have achieved enough radical Islamist groups is deliberate and support, they will challenge for control What are the indicators that a mosque, methodical, and that the success of these of the board of directors and other key or any other Islamic establishment, is in groups will create a problematic future positions of responsibility. Ultimately, the hands of extremists? Asra Nomani, brought on by the increase in radicalized they will dictate the rules and set the who bravely exposed the takeover of individuals within their jurisdictions. agenda. Those who disagree will either be the Morgantown mosque in the New pushed to leave the institution or forced York Times, says that one can tell from Case Studies of Takeovers to put up with the extremist doctrine and the instant the extremists set foot in the 2 To satisfy their requirement to access watch silently as friends, colleagues and establishment. Nomani says that there an audience that is potentially receptive fellow worshippers embrace the radical to their message, and to increase their ideology. 1 Asra Q. Nomani, “Hate at the Local Mosque,” New power over the local community and York Times, May 6, 2004. 2 Personal interview, Asra Nomani, January 16, 2008.

8 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 are physical indicators: “Are the women In the United Kingdom, however, even and its supporter, the United States. `Abd worshipping in the same room as the men, though political Islamist groups like Hizb al-Rahman’s supporters in New York set or are they secreted behind curtains at the al-Tahrir (HT, often spelled Hizb ut- the stage for him to take the pulpit in back of the room? Do those who lead the Tahrir) have been banned on university three area mosques, including Brooklyn’s sermons encourage or reject relationships campuses, they continue to penetrate Abu Bakr, whose worshippers were with people of other faiths? Are the men Muslim student associations by using mostly middle class Egyptian immigrants rolling their pants up over their ankles?”3 covers. HT’s covers are usually blown who did not subscribe to `Abd al- fairly quickly by savvy British students, Rahman’s ideology. `Abd al-Rahman’s “Unfortunately, law who are well aware of HT’s doctrines supporters were immediately apparent due to the group’s highly public profile to the moderate congregants—they were enforcement cannot in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, extremely political, speaking almost tackle the problem alone; by the time of the discovery HT has exclusively about Egyptian politics and usually managed to parlay its position holy war against the Egyptian regime. agencies must rely on within the Muslim student society to the cooperation of the influence its members. HT is alleged During prayer meetings, `Abd al- to have had a “stranglehold” on the Rahman’s men aggressively challenged Muslim community, which Islamic Society of Bradford University the moderate imam’s credibility and is equally concerned by in Yorkshire, which not only gave them successfully undermined his control control over the choice of speakers who so that when `Abd al-Rahman was the presence of radical attended the society’s meetings, but brought into Abu Bakr it was easy for Islamists.” also over the imams who delivered the his supporters to put him at the pulpit. Friday prayers.4 A former member of Many of the younger members of the HT, who is also a Bradford University congregation preferred `Abd al-Rahman’s student, said, fiery style to the old imam’s dry delivery,6 There are a different set of indicators and within six months of his arrival `Abd when political Islamists are present; an The issue with HT is not that al-Rahman’s supporters were in the observer will likely see politics become it exposes people to violent a more important topic than culture or ideologies per se, but rather that religion. Nomani says that any of these it creates a worldview in which it “As law enforcement indicators are like a canary in a coal mine, is normal to see the world divided becomes more aware of and although they are not a sure signal of into camps of “us” versus “them.” trouble to come, they are all attitudes that This creates a fairly easy jumping the phenomenon, they will exist in radicalizing environments. off point to the world of violent become a more sympathetic ideas, which is the real danger.5 The Takeover of University Islamic Societies in and able partner to the the UK and U.S. On occasion, a single group will have Muslim community.” The infiltration of Muslim university a complete monopoly over a student campus associations by extremist groups association; however, it is more common may be as commonplace in the United to see several extremist groups present. States as it is in the United Kingdom, As students pass through the university, majority, making it possible for them to although the phenomenon is not reported the profiles of the campus student assume control of the mosque’s board of in the U.S. media to the extent it is in associations tend to change. An Islamic trustees. With control over the board, it Britain. One explanation for this might society that was considered a hotbed of became nearly impossible for anyone to be that the extremist groups operating radicalization two years ago may have organize `Abd al-Rahman’s ouster. As a in the United States have never operated been passed on to a more moderate result, worshippers were either forced to as openly as they have been able to in the leadership; however, the university listen to his furious calls for jihad or leave United Kingdom. U.S.-based extremist Muslim student associations are prized the mosque. To `Abd al-Rahman and his groups have operated behind fronts targets for control by extremists because supporters, it did not matter how many and covers so successfully that their they are the most ideal place to reach their of the congregants left the mosque; it was target recruitment and indoctrination primary demographic for recruitment and their intention to maintain an audience populations are often unaware of any indoctrination. only with those who would be most affiliations to known radical Islamic receptive to jihadist ideology. groups. Therefore, while American The Takeover of Abu Bakr Masjid Muslim students might not like the Shaykh Umar `Abd al-Rahman, the It is reasonable to conclude that `Abd al- ideological perspective of the president former leader of al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya, Rahman’s high-profile presence served of their student association, there is no arrived in New York City in May 1990 as a lightening rod to those who were apparent sponsoring organization at and immediately continued his long-time attracted to his style and to his ideology, which they can point their finger. effort to topple the Egyptian government and it is likely that his reputation inspired

4 Tom Smithard, “University Islamic Society Front for 6 Peter Waldman, “Fiery Muslim Preaching Jihad in Militants,” Yorkshire Post, January 15, 2008. the U.S. Mosques Faces Uncertain Future,” Wall Street 3 Ibid. 5 Ibid. Journal, January 7, 1993.

9 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 supporters to give money and other forms Radical Madrasas in The Role of Radical Madrasas in Terrorist of assistance to his cause. Had his presence Attacks in New York been limited to a Brooklyn Southeast Asia It is true that most madrasas are peaceful apartment and an office in Jersey City, his and serve a constructive role in societies scope of influence would likely have been By Scott Atran, Justin Magouirk and Jeremy Ginges where education is often a privilege rather far more limited. than a right, and where, as in Pakistan, senior government officials in the the state has increasingly released mass Conclusion and Lessons for Law Enforcement United States, United Kingdom and education and student welfare to madrasas Although U.S. law enforcement agencies France, among other countries, have as it continues to spend many times have made consistent and effective repeatedly voiced concerns about the more on the military.2 Yet this overlooks efforts to thwart terrorist operations threat to world security posed by Islamic the fact that elsewhere, particularly in at the tactical level, a more holistic schools that allegedly teach hate and Indonesia and Malaysia, madrasas such counter-terrorism strategy is desired, murder. In 2005, Peter Bergen and Swati as al-Mukmin, Lukman al-Hakiem and one which should include measures to Pandey published an op-ed with the New al-Islam have been vitally important in detect and disrupt opportunities for York Times on “The Madrassah Myth,” furthering the mission of some of the extremist groups to radicalize domestic where they argued that most madrasas, or most volatile terrorist groups, such as Muslim populations. Unfortunately, Islamic boarding schools, are moderate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), in efforts to attack law enforcement cannot tackle the and are not associated with terrorism and American, Australian and other Western- problem alone; agencies must rely political violence. After examining some related interests. In fact, the majority of JI on the cooperation of the Muslim high-profile attacks, they surmised that: terrorist attacks—including the Christmas community, which is equally concerned Eve bombings of 2000 and Bali I in 2002, by the presence of radical Islamists. While madrassas are an important as well as the Jakarta Marriott bombing in As the aforementioned case studies issue in education and development 2003 and the Australian Embassy attack demonstrate, laws are generally in the Muslim world, they are not in 2004 (which involved JI members but not broken during the process of an and should not be considered a were not institutionally JI)—have been extremist takeover. Disputes between threat to the United States. The staffed and led by individuals associated factions in an Islamic establishment tens of millions of dollars spent with radical madrasas. are usually civil issues. Yet, because every year by the United States most law enforcement agencies have through the State Department, the To explore these competing claims developed positive relationships Middle East Partnership Initiative, and to address the madrasa question with special interest groups within and the Agency for International systematically, data was recently analyzed their jurisdictions, there is a greater Development to improve education from the ongoing Global Transnational possibility that they will be notified of and literacy in the Middle East and Terrorism (GTT) Project.3 Overall, the a negative presence. With training, law South Asia should be applauded as findings demonstrate that attendance enforcement agencies will be able to the development aid it is and not and other forms of association (teaching, recognize the signs of radical Islamist as the counterterrorism effort it socializing or attending lectures) with infiltration in their jurisdictions when cannot be. JI-linked radical madrasas are correlated they cannot count on being notified with both participation and role in JI by members of the community. As law In an extension of this argument in The terrorist attacks. By using aggregate level 1 enforcement becomes more aware of Washington Quarterly, Bergen and Pandey data on Indonesian education rates, it is the phenomenon, they will become a conclude that we must eliminate the clear that JI-linked madrasa attendance more sympathetic and able partner to “assumption that madrassas produce rates of the jihadists that took part the Muslim community. An increase in terrorists capable of carrying out major in the Bali I, Marriott and Australian understanding will lead to enhanced attacks” in order to “shape more effective Embassy bombings are 19 times greater cooperation, and, in the event that a policies to ensure national security.” than the highest estimated rates of the crime is committed, a complaint will be general population. Using an ordered made faster and with a greater level of Overall, this analysis is a welcome logit statistical analysis of 75 jihadists trust and comfort. respite from the rash rhetoric that often involved in the same operations, we characterizes responses to terrorist found that JI-linked madrasa attendance Madeleine Gruen is an intelligence analyst who attacks such as 9/11 and the 2005 is associated with a greater role in JI works with law enforcement. Her research on Hizb London Underground bombings. Yet, in terrorist operations, decreasing the al-Tahrir, radicalization and indoctrination tactics attempting to rectify the typical hysterical media responses to madrasas, the argument has been published widely. Ms. Gruen is a master’s 2 Even before September 11, the ratio of defense spend- may go too far. degree candidate at Columbia University’s School ing to health and education spending in Pakistan was of International and Public Affairs. 239:1. See Stephen Burgess, “Struggle for Control of Pakistan,” in Barry Schneider and Jerrold Post eds., Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures, 2nd ed. (Collingdale, PA: Diane Pub- lishing Company, 2004). 1 Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa 3 Undertaken in collaboration with Marc Sageman and Scapegoat,” The Washington Quarterly 29 (Spring 2006): Dominick Wright, and under the auspices of the Air pp. 117-125. Force Office of Scientific Research.

10 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 probability that a jihadist will take a low and plotters were heroic mujahidin.7 good government implement the laws level role on a terrorist operation by more of Shari`a” (not a significant difference than 19% and increasing the probability After exploring attitudes toward Islam and statistically, P > 0.4). that a jihadist will play a major role by other religions, no significant differences 16%.4 between the NU and MMI schools were Another finding is that radical madrasas found, whereas al-Islam stood apart on a in Southeast Asia are important not Data was also analyzed from structured variety of measures.8 At al-Islam, 91% of only as tools of indoctrination, but also interviews with more than 100 students the students (compared to 35% of students as “focal points” to draw like-minded in four Indonesian madrasas (pesantren, at the other madrasas) believed that it was radicals together, a point often missed by or boarding schools) to attempt to their duty as Muslims “to fight and kill explain these associations, and striking non-Muslims such as Christians.”9 At correlations were found between unusual al-Islam, 74% of the students (compared “Association with a JI- belief systems and radicalization. Two to seven percent of the students at other linked radical madrasa of the schools, Darussalam and al- schools) believed that all people “were Husainy, are associated with Nahdlatul born evil but some learn to become is a strong predictor of a Ulama (NU), or Revival of Islamic good.”10 Across all schools, students who jihadist’s role in terrorist Scholars, a mass movement that had believed people are “born evil” were about originally played a key role in the fight 11 times more likely to believe it was their operations in Southeast for independence against Dutch rule and duty to kill non-Muslims.11 Asia.” which is associated with a traditional and non-dogmatic Indonesian form of Students were also asked to imagine what Islam influenced by Balinese Hinduism, would happen if a child born of Jewish Buddhism and Sufi mystical beliefs. One parents were adopted by a religious terrorism analysts. Association with a JI- school, Ibnu Mas’ud, is funded by the Muslim couple. While 83% of students linked radical madrasa is a strong predictor Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), or from other schools thought that the child of a jihadist’s role in terrorist operations Council of Indonesian Holy Warriors, an would grow up to be a Muslim, only 48% in Southeast Asia. For example, both Islamist coalition whose goal is to convert of students at al-Islam shared that belief.12 the spiritual guide of the Bali operation, Indonesia into a strict Sunni state ruled This essentialist belief that a child born of Mukhlas, and the field commander, by Shari`a law.5 The remaining school, another religion could never fully become Imam Samudra, attended or associated al-Islam (in Tengulun, East Java), was a Muslim was strongly related to support with JI-linked radical madrasas, and built for violence. Students with this belief their financial, logistical and operational “At al-Islam, 74% of the were about 10 times more likely than network around madrasa ties. The same other students to believe that it was their is true for Dulmatin and Azhari Husin, students (compared to duty to kill non-Muslims.13 Note that the the main bomb-makers in the operation. seven percent of the difference between al-Islam and the other The study found that association with schools cannot be attributed to different Lukman al-Hakiem, a radical JI madrasa in students at other schools) levels of religiosity, or even different Malaysia, increases the probability that believed that all people levels of agreement with political Islam. a jihadist will play a major role by more Fewer students at al-Islam (71% compared than 23%. Based on this analysis, it can be ‘were born evil but some to 82% of students at the other schools) surmised that JI-linked radical madrasas learn to become good.’” believed it was “very important…that a are both production sites and service centers for jihadists. Indonesia,” Boston Globe, October 17, 2002. 7 Cited in Scott Atran, “The Emir: An Interview with The following page shows a social network established in 1992 by the father of three of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast diagram of the 2002 Bali bombing that the main Bali bombing plotters (Ali Imron, Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization,” Spotlight on illustrates the connections between the Amrozi and Mukhlas) and modeled on Terrorism 3:9 (2005). different jihadists that took part in the the famous al-Mukmin school in Ngruki 8 Median age at NU schools was 16, and 18 at the bombing. Note that 16 of the 27 jihadists (Solo, Central Java) created by JI founder other schools. Females comprised nearly half of the either attended or were associated with Abdullah Sungkar and his colleague Abu student body at the NU schools, five percent at al-Islam the radical madrasas Lukman al-Hakiem 14 Bakr Ba’asyir. After Sungkar’s death in and none at the MMI school. Questionnaires were or al-Mukmin, including most of the 1999, Ba’asyir became al-Islam’s patron distributed only to males. Interestingly, at al-Islam leadership, planners and operators. and officiated at graduation ceremonies. 71% of respondents said they joined the school through After the Bali bombing, Ba’asyir said that pre-existing social networks of friends, whereas 70% he believed the victims of the bombing of respondents at the other schools were sent there by 6 would go to hell, and that the bombers their family. 9 Chi-square = 43.01, P < 0.0001. 4 Justin Magouirk, “Connecting a Thousand Points of 10 Chi-square = 38.39, P < 0.0001. Hatred,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31:4 (2008). 11 Wald = 13.042, 95% CI for OR = 2.98-39.73, P = 14 Node size is based on the reputation of the individual. 5 MMI is led by Abu Bakr Ba’asyir and has a member- 0.0003. Reputation is derived from a mathematical algorithm ship that overlaps with but is broader than JI. 12 Chi-square = 36.166, P < 0.0001. that addresses both organizational role and attack 6 Cited in Indira Laksshaman, “Islamic Leader Warns 13 Wald = 9.139, 95% CI for OR = 2.3 - 49.7, P = 0.003. history.

11 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3

Bali Network 2002

Suicide Serang Bombers Countryside

Thailand Planning Group

Bombing Group Operations Group

Leadership Group in Indonesia

Peripherals

LEGEND = Lukman Group Group = Afghan Ties Completely Linked Group = Al-Mukmin Ties ŷ Weak Tie = Other Serang Ties ŷ Medium Tie = Misc. Other Ties ŷ Family / Strong Tie = al Qaeda Core

12 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3

After the Bali I operation, most of the the killing of Muslims is allowed.16 It is beliefs on the sanctity of their missions18; individuals who helped hide Ali Imron, clear from the data that the role of radical however, the number of jihadists that one of the bombers, were students at or madrasas concerns only the takfiri wing of hold such unyielding beliefs prior to were associated with al-Islam, where he JI, which allows both attacks on Indonesian their association with radical madrasas was a teacher. For instance, Hamzah Baya soil and the killing of Muslims as well as or other focal points is relatively small. (class of 1999), Eko Hadi Prasetyo (1998), foreigners for the sake of jihad. Accounts of the key Bali bombers show Sukastopo (met Imron at al-Islam), Sofyan that radicalization occurred through Hadi (1998), Imam Susanto (2001), Sirojul Radical madrasas have provided operatives association and attendance at radical Munir (parent of al-Islam student), Ilham for every major JI attack outside of the madrasas and through militant training bin Abdul Muthalib (2001), Muhammad strictly local conflicts between Muslims in Afghanistan and the Philippines.19 Rusi bin Salim (1998), Azhari Dipo and Christians in Ambon and Poso.17 Disrupting the radical madrasa source Kusuma (teacher at al-Islam at the same Most of the Bali attackers and planners through competition could eliminate time as Ali Imron), Sumaro (1997) and either attended or were associated with key radicalization centers for young Abdullah Salam (1999) were all arrested one of three JI-linked radical schools— males.20 (and released in 2006) for hiding or al-Mukmin, al-Islam or Lukman al- helping Imron flee after the bombing.15 Hakiem—and similar radical madrasa Efforts should also focus intelligence Two others were tried in district court on representation in other JI attacks indicates gathering on radical madrasas that charges of aiding Ali Imron, one of which repeatedly produce terrorists. By focusing was a relative of Ali Imron and the other “Radical madrasas have on a select group of radical madrasas, anti- a parent of a former student at al-Islam. terrorism efforts may be able to disrupt The 2002 Bali operation is not unique. provided operatives for networks that form the basis for future every major JI attack attacks. This includes neutralizing the Implications for an Anti-Terrorism Policy hardcore group of jihadists such as Bali From this data, a number of implications outside of the strictly local bombers Mukhlas and Imam Samudra, for an effective anti-terrorism policy conflicts between Muslims who are most often part of these can be drawn. First, allied governments networks. This is a realistic mission for should hone their focus on a small subset and Christians in Ambon two reasons. First, the number of radical of radical madrasas. There is no evidence and Poso.” madrasas that preach takfiri ideology is that madrasas in general spawn, or are even quite small—our estimate is that under correlated with, terrorism; nevertheless, five percent of Indonesians attend radical our research shows that, at least for madrasas. Second, within the small pool Indonesia and Malaysia, there is strong that the radical madrasa factor is not an of radical madrasas, it should be possible statistical evidence that radical madrasas isolated phenomenon or one restricted to to focus specifically on those that have are correlated with terrorism and support “unimportant” regional conflicts. direct ties to JI, as these are the schools for violence against those who hold that have funneled recruits to terrorist different beliefs. These radical madrasas Second, governments should focus operations from 2000-2005.21 Sidney preach a jihadist version of takfiri ideology. both foreign aid and counter-terrorism Jones, Southeast Asia project director for Takfiris view contemporary society as funding on combating this small but the International Crisis Group, counts 30 antithetical to Islamic values and consider important group of radical schools. There such schools in Indonesia (out of about the killing of fellow Muslims to be justified are numerous social entrepreneurship 14,000, or 2/10 of a percent).22 in their cause to purify the community organizations, such as Ashoka, that of alien influences. Takfiri jihadists act as venture capital firms and fund reject standard Salafist teaching, which innovative education programs in proscribes the killing of fellow Muslims and places like South and Southeast Asia, 18 Scott Atran, “Global Network Terrorism,” NSC brief- the overthrow of states ruled by Muslims where education is often a privilege for ing, White House, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2006. because this would produce division and the affluent. The effectiveness of such 19 See Sally Neighbour, In the Shadow of Swords: On the discord (fitna) in the community. In fact, the programs should be considered, whose Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia (Sydney: strict Salafist schools are generally the most “soft power” to wean away potential and HarperCollins Australia, 2004). virulent opponents of jihadism in Indonesia future candidates for terrorism reliably 20 The Bali examples support evidence that jihadists and elsewhere. Within JI there has been a produces wider and longer lasting tend to radicalize each other when they are isolated debate over whether attacks are legitimate results than direct diplomatic pressure away from family and mainstream society. See Marc on Indonesian soil and, if so, whether or “hard power” alternatives that often Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia, PA: University backfire or cause blowback. It may not be of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 15 Thanks to Sidney Jones for providing this informa- possible to dissuade the small group of 21 JI could start to recruit from non-JI affiliatedmadra - tion. The al-Islam supporters were clearly not terrorists hardcore jihadists that hold unyielding sas, and if this occurs the counter-terrorism focus would in the sense that the bombers were. Most of them were have to change. Although Noordin Top, the current members of KOMPAK, an Islamic charity linked to JI 16 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Background- attack leader of JI, has successfully enlisted operatives (as well as other militant Islamic groups), but not part er: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix,” from outside the JI cadre of jihadists, he has still shown of JI. In his new book, Ali Imron deeply regrets getting September 13, 2004. a strong tendency to rely on JI-affiliatedmadrasas . Ac- them into trouble. See Ali Imron, Sang Pengebom (Ali Im- 17 There were more attacks in Poso between 2003 and cordingly, this small group of madrasas still presents a ron, the Bomber) (Jakarta: Republika Press, November 2006 than in the rest of Indonesia combined. None of good place to commence counter-terrorism efforts. 2007). the perpetrators there went to JI schools. 22 Personal interview, Sidney Jones, January 18, 2008.

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By focusing government aid and The Salafi-Jihad as a The Functions of Ideologies intelligence gathering on a small group Ideologies have several core functions, of radical madrasas, lives and interests Religious Ideology of which the first is to raise awareness could be saved, with little if any effect on to a particular group of people that a the network of moderate madrasas that By Assaf Moghadam certain issue deserves their attention. provide masses of people with needed Ideologies explain to that “in-group” why education in parts of Southeast Asia and in recent years, a growing number of social, political, or economic conditions elsewhere. analysts and policymakers have referred are as they are. Since individuals often to the doctrines guiding al-Qa`ida and seek explanations in times of crisis, Scott Atran is a political violence consultant its associates as an ideology, and they ideologies are particularly appealing for RTI International. He received his Ph.D. appear to have influenced the Bush when a group of people perceives itself in anthropology from Columbia University. administration into adopting the term as to be in a predicament. The second Dr. Atran is currently research director well. In an address at the Capital Hilton function is a diagnostic one, whereby the in anthropology at the National Center for in Washington, D.C. in September ideology attributes blame for the present Scientific Research in Paris, France, visiting 2006, for example, President Bush predicament of the in-group upon some professor of psychology and public policy at characterized the 9/11 suicide hijackers “out-group.” The out-group is identified the University of Michigan and presidential as men who “kill in the name of a clear with a certain behavior that, according 1 scholar in sociology at the John Jay College of and focused ideology.” In the National to the narrative offered by the ideology, the City University of New York. Published in Strategy for Combating Terrorism undermines the well-being of the in-group. leading scientific journals, such as Science (NSCT) released in the same month, A third function of ideology lies in the magazine and Behavioral and Brain the authors described al-Qa`ida’s set creation of a group identity. At the same Sciences, his work has also been covered of beliefs as “an ideology of oppression, time that the out-group is blamed for the 2 by news and print media around the world, violence, and hate,” as well as “a form predicament of the in-group, the ideology including feature stories in the New York of totalitarianism following in the path identifies and highlights the common 3 Times and Wall Street Journal. of fascism and Nazism.” characteristics of those individuals who adhere to, or are potential adherents Jeremy Ginges is an Assistant Professor of Although descriptions of the precepts of, the ideology. The fourth and final Psychology at the New School for Social and beliefs guiding al-Qa`ida and its function of ideologies is a programmatic Research in New York City. Dr. Ginges associates as ideological in nature one. It consists of the ideology offering a received his doctorate from Tel Aviv certainly hit the mark, few serious specific program of action said to remedy University and has had appointments at attempts have been made to justify the the in-group of its predicament and urges the University of Pennsylvania and the use of the term “ideology” in connection its adherents to implement that course of University of Michigan. He has published with the Salafi-jihad—the guiding action.5 widely on the psychology of terrorism and doctrine of al-Qa`ida, its affiliates, 4 intergroup conflict. associates and progeny. This article Ideologies are links between thoughts, will discuss the nature of ideologies and beliefs and myths on the one hand, and Justin Magouirk spent two years as the examine the extent to which the Salafi- action on the other hand. They can be Manager and then Executive Director for the jihad can be compared to other ideologies instruments of preservation in as far as Global Transnational Terrorism Project. He such as fascism or communism. It they can help a given group to preserve received his MA and Ph.D. in Political Science concludes that the Salafi-jihad is best its political power. More commonly, (focus on terrorism) from the University of described as a religious ideology rather however, ideologies are used as Michigan. Dr. Magouirk currently works for than a secular ideology such as fascism instruments of competition and conflict, a Seattle-based consulting firm. or National Socialism. The final part whereby a group can utilize ideology as will explain why a proper labeling of a means of opposition and contestation. the Salafi-jihad has important policy Once a group internalizes the sets of implications. beliefs associated with a given ideology, that ideology provides a “cognitive map” that filters the way social realities are perceived, rendering that reality easier 1 “President Discusses Global War on Terror,” Septem- to grasp, more coherent, and thus more ber 5, 2006, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/ meaningful. It is for that reason that releases/2006/09/20060905-4.html. ideologies offer some measure of security 2 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Septem- and relief in the face of ambiguity— ber 2006, p. 5, available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ particularly in times of crisis. nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf. 3 Ibid., p. 11. Ideology may help create significant 4 For the purposes of this article, the terms Salafi-jihad, divides between adherents and non- Salafi-jihadists and Salafi-jihadist refer to the core doctrines and beliefs of al-Qa`ida and its associated 5 A similar categorization of the functions of ideology movements—i.e., its ideology. It does not refer to the is used in Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, Political larger social movement comprised of al-Qa`ida and its Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal, 3rd ed. (New York: associates. Longman, 1999).

14 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 adherents. According to Christopher source of Islam’s conundrum in the its adherents and those who reject its Flood, individuals who are especially persistent attacks and humiliation of doctrines. Westerners are commonly convinced by an ideology can exhibit Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic described as infidels, while moderate “a remarkable ability to ignore, deny, alliance of what it terms “Crusaders,” Muslims and Arabs are labeled apostates. or reinterpret information which is “Zionists” and “apostates.” To the most extreme Salafi-jihadists, incompatible with tenets of their belief Muslims who reject the tenets of Salafi- system.”6 Ideologues themselves, The third function of the Salafi-jihad also jihad are tantamount to infidels, thus meanwhile, “tend to be explicit in their parallels that of other ideologies, namely deserving of death. cognitive claims, exclusionary in their its attempt at creating a new identity for its membership, authoritarian in their adherents. Several scholars have argued Like leaders of other ideologies, Usama leadership, rigorous in their ethical that Muslims and Western converts bin Ladin and leading figures of mandates, and insistent on the rightness adopting Salafi-jihadist tenets suffer Salafi-jihadist groups ignore, deny, or of their causes.”7 from a crisis of identity.8 To those who are reinterpret information that counters or disoriented by modernity, the Salafi-jihad could potentially weaken their argument. To the in-group, ideology confers provides a new sense of self-definition For instance, Salafi-jihadists ignored identification with a particular cause, and Western support to Muslim Indonesia in thus a sense of purpose. That shared sense “To those who are the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami. They of purpose can form a common identity interpret their violence on other Muslims among the members, while at the same disoriented by modernity, as religiously sanctioned, ignoring time heighten opposition and feelings of the Salafi-jihad provides a sections of Muslim holy texts that prohibit separation from individuals who do not internecine fighting or the killing of share these beliefs. new sense of self-definition civilians. They single-handedly blame the and belonging in the form West for each and every misfortune that The Salafi-jihad: Religion or Ideology? has befallen Muslims. The Salafi-jihad is more akin to an of a membership to a ideology than to a religion because like supranational entity.” As an ideology, the Salafi-jihad has much other ideologies it is a by-product of the in common with radical leftist ideologies industrialization that swept through of 20th century Europe. Like the radical Europe beginning in the 19th century and left, the Salafi-jihad describes its action is hence an outgrowth of modernity. It is and belonging in the form of membership in part as a revolt against injustice, and intimately linked to the dislocating and to a supranational entity. Salafi-jihadists it rejects bourgeois values, imperialism turbulent effects of globalization, which attempt to instill into Muslims the notion and materialism. The goal of both the introduced rapid changes in the social, that the only identity that truly matters leftist movements and Salafi-jihadists political and economic realms of life. is that of membership in the umma, the is essentially an elusive quest to help Those transformations have challenged global Islamic community that bestows bring about a more just society—violence established and rooted notions of comfort, dignity, security and honor upon is seen as a justified means to an end. identity associated with traditional social the downtrodden Muslims. Both Salafi-jihadists and radical leftist structures. revolutionaries believe that the scope Finally, like all ideologies, Salafi-jihadists of their activities and the importance of The Salafi-jihad is an ideology because its present a program of action, namely their actions are global in nature, as are functions are essentially congruent with jihad, which is understood in military their goals. As Stephen Holmes observed, those of other ideologies. Analogous to the terms. They assert that jihad will reverse for Salafi-jihadists the caliphate “is the first, explanatory function of ideology, the the tide of history and redeem adherents religious equivalent of Marx’s Communist Salafi-jihadists’ goal is to raise awareness and potential adherents of Salafi-jihadist utopia.”10 among Muslims that their religion has ideology from their misery. Martyrdom is been on the wane. Whereas Islam used extolled as the ultimate way in which jihad If the Salafi-jihad is thus an ideology, to be at its peak during the first centuries can be waged—hence the proliferation what is its relationship with religion—and of its existence, Salafi-jihadists urge of suicide attacks among Salafi-jihadist how do ideologies differ from religions? Muslims to understand that the tide has groups.9 Religions differ from ideologies in two turned, and that Islam is in a constant important respects, namely their target state of decline in religious, political, Similar to other ideologies, the Salafi- audience and their relationship toward military, economic and cultural terms. jihad sharply distinguishes between the existing order. In terms of their target audience, the primary focus of ideologies Secondly, and analogous with the 8 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New is the group, whereas that of religions diagnostic function of modern ideologies, Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); is the individual. As Bruce Lawrence the Salafi-jihad identifies the alleged Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Mar- has pointed out, “religion focuses on tyrs (London: Pluto Press, 2005). maximizing individual benefit through 6 Christopher G. Flood, Political Myth: A Theoretical In- 9 Indeed, Salafi-jihadist groups are the dominant per- troduction (New York and London: Garland, 1996), p. 20. petrators of suicide attacks today. See Assaf Moghadam, 10 Stephen Holmes, “Al-Qaeda, September 11, 2001,” 7 Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamental- The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, in Diego Gambetta ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions ist Revolt against the Modern Age (Columbia, SC: Univer- and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore, MD: Johns (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), sity of South Carolina Press, 1995), p. 77. Hopkins University Press, forthcoming in 2008). p. 170.

15 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 group participation, while ideology is jihadists describe their strategy and of targeting Islam as a whole. intent on maximizing group benefit mission as a religious one. Their struggle through individual participation.”11 is a jihad, which they themselves define in If the vast majority of non-Muslims find it Precisely because of its preoccupation with military terms, as opposed to the “internal difficult to strike the right chord between the group as a whole, ideology demands war” against human temptations. Their attacking Salafi-jihadists without great loyalty and commitment on the part main tactic, they claim, is not suicide being perceived as attacking Islam, of the individual member. Ideologies, attacks, but “martyrdom operations”—a the hurdles for the United States and like religions, demand verbal assent from term whose origin is ironically associated its allies seem almost insurmountable. their members, but more than religions with Shi`a Islam, which itself is deemed Therefore, a counter-terrorism approach ideologies also demand complete control apostate by Salafi-jihadists. Finally, they that highlights the corruption of Salafi- over the thoughts, words and deeds of justify acts of violence with references jihadist ideology not on religious, but on their adherents.12 This characteristic also drawn selectively from the Qur’an. Most secular grounds, is more likely to have the applies to al-Qa`ida and like-minded Muslims, including non-violent Salafists, desired effect of weakening that ideology’s groups, who have prominently adopted cite a number of sources from the Qur’an appeal. Rather than highlighting the an approach of “you are either with us or and hadith against the killing of civilians. doctrinal and theological inconsistencies against us.” Salafi-jihadists, on the other hand, cite a among Salafi-jihadists, the United States and its allies should grasp every Second, religions tend to support existing opportunity to highlight the disastrous orders, while ideologies tend to confront “It is a fact that al-Qa`ida consequences that Salafi-jihadist violence them. “Ideologies are not merely world- and associated groups has wrought on the everyday lives not reflecting but world-constituting,” only of Westerners, but first and foremost wrote Lawrence. “They tend to have a offer no vision for Muslims on Muslims themselves. It is a simple, ‘missionary’ zeal to show others what other than perennial though not sufficiently emphasized fact they need to do, to correct and help them that the primary victims of Salafi-jihadists to that end.”13 Thus, unlike religious jihad—hardly an appealing are Muslims, who are killed and maimed leaders, Bin Ladin goes beyond merely prospect.” in far greater numbers than non-Muslims. disagreeing with those who do not share Salafi-jihadists openly justify the killing his beliefs—he battles them. of civilians, including Muslims, under a logic of the ends justifying the means. Yet, while the Salafi-jihad is distinct number of Qur’anic verses and Hanbali It is equally a fact that leaders of Salafi- from Islam due to the former’s ideological rulings in support of their claim, such as jihadist organizations hypocritically nature, it also differs from ordinary Sura 16:126: “And if you take your turn, preach about the benefits of martyrdom, ideologies in an important respect—it then punish with the like of that with but rarely, if ever, conduct suicidal tends to use religious words, symbols which you were afflicted.” operations themselves, or send their loved and values to sustain itself and grow. ones on such missions. It is a fact that al- Ideologies are usually devoid of religious Policy Implications Qa`ida and associated groups offer no symbols. Ian Adams, for instance, Accurately labeling the nature of Salafi- vision for Muslims other than perennial wrote that “what separates [religion jihadist doctrine as a religious ideology jihad—hardly an appealing prospect. from ideology] is that while the central is not merely an exercise in academic feature of a religious understanding is its theorizing, but has important policy Waging a battle against a religious ideology concept of the divine, the central feature implications. Most importantly, it should such as the Salafi-jihad is a challenging of an ideological understanding is its be obvious that the United States and its task that requires commitment and conception of human nature.”14 allies are not facing a religion—Islam—as ingenuity. Yet, highlighting a few simple, their main enemy, but an ideology, namely yet damaging facts about the actual results Unlike secular ideologies, however, the the Salafi-jihad. The fact that the Salafi- of Salafi-jihadists can go a long way. Salafi-jihad is a religious ideology because jihad is no ordinary secular ideology, but it invokes religion in three ways. First, it a religious one, however, is of additional Assaf Moghadam, Ph.D., is a Senior Research describes itself and its enemies in religious significance because it renders the Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at terms. Salafi-jihadists label themselves attempt to challenge that ideology far West Point, where he directs the CTC’s new using such religious names as the “Army more complex. Salafi-jihadists employ Shi`a Ideology Project. He is also a postdoctoral of Muhammad,” the “Lions of Islam,” and religious rhetoric and symbols to advance fellow at the International Security Program/ of course “jihadist.” At the same time, they their cause. Although they selectively Initiative on Religion in International Affairs at describe their enemies in religious terms pick from the Islamic tradition only Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science as well, referring to them as Crusaders, those elements that advance their narrow and International Affairs. Dr. Moghadam is the apostates, or infidels. Secondly, Salafi- agenda, they nevertheless draw from the author of The Roots of Terrorism (New York: same religious sources that inform the Chelsea House, 2006). His second book, The 11 Lawrence, Defenders of God, p. 79. lives and practices of more than a billion Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, 12 Ibid. other Muslims. It is for that reason that Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide 13 Ibid. ordinary Muslims—not to speak of non- Attacks, is forthcoming with Johns Hopkins 14 Ian Adams, The Logic of Political Belief: A Philosophical Muslims—find it particularly difficult and University Press in October 2008. Analysis of Ideology (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, dangerous to challenge Salafi-jihadists 1989), pp. 86-87. without running the risk of being accused

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Somalia’s al-Shabab and his long-time mentor, Shaykh recruited into al-Shabab in Mogadishu Hassan Dahir Aweys.2 In July 2004, alone. Reconstitutes Fighting the CIA received a tip that bomb-maker Force Abu Taha al-Sudani was holed up in a By late 2005, al-Shabab had turned compound in Mogadishu that belonged into a highly disciplined fighting force, By Anonymous to Ayro. A raid on the compound was whose professionalism and dedication subsequently carried out by militiamen surprised even Ayro.6 The vast majority in january 2008, the African Union loyal to factional leader Mohamed of the recruits were foot soldiers, who (AU) issued a warning that the Somali Qanare. Neither al-Sudani nor Ayro were by and large nationalists, not radical militant group al-Shabab had were inside, but Ayro’s brother-in- religious fanatics.7 Their allegiance was expanded its activities to areas outside of law was killed during a brief firefight.3 not specifically to Ayro but to the Islamic Mogadishu and were training new recruits Shortly after that raid, Ayro began a Courts Union (ICU), an amalgamation and planning attacks. AU Commission covert recruitment drive in Mogadishu of different clan-based religious courts Chairman Alpha Konare said al-Shabab’s to establish an army “to protect Islam which, for several years, had been strategy appeared to be that of and save the Somali nation from gaining credibility and popularity among infidels.” Clan elders did not initially Mogadishu’s war-weary residents for further weakening the TFG react with alarm, apparently because their work in setting up hospitals and [Transitional Federal Government] many viewed the effort as little more schools, as well as resolving legal disputes by destabilizing as many areas than an attempt by Ayro, who did not and maintaining a tough stance on law as possible, fully aware that command a militia, to build a team of and order.8 the government does not, at the personal bodyguards.4 moment, have the capacity to deploy Yet, several hundred elite al-Shabab significant numbers of troops in all Ayro shrewdly targeted the most plentiful fighters, handpicked by Ayro mostly regions.1 and the most vulnerable segment of from his Ayr sub-clan, were of a different the population—poor, disillusioned breed; they were fiercely loyal to their Konare’s statement is significant for two and disaffected young men, looking leader and thoroughly committed to the reasons. For one, it was the first public desperately for work, a sense of belonging goal of creating a new Islamic caliphate admission by the AU that it believes al- and self-worth. Ayro brought them on in greater Somalia.9 According to an Shabab, which suffered heavy losses board with a message that skillfully interview with an al-Shabab fighter, most, in battles against Ethiopian troops blended Somalia’s powerful nationalist if not all, of these fighters were flown in December 2006, has been fully re- sentiment and its traditional reverence to Eritrea and given advance training constituted as a fighting force and is for Islam: “Gain self-respect and dignity in explosives and guerrilla war fighting gaining strength in areas that it previously by defending your religion and people tactics, including how to make roadside had little or no influence. Second, it from non-believers and imperialists, who bombs, car bombs and suicide vests revealed the AU’s growing concern about are trying to destroy us,” he stated.5 By using explosive material cannibalized al-Shabab’s potential to deal a death blow the time Ethiopia launched its invasion of from various weapon systems.10 Another to the UN-backed TFG, which is on the Somalia in December 2006 to oust Somali verge of collapse following a bitter power Islamists from power, as many as 5,000 6 Personal interview, Somali journalist source, Mogadi- struggle in October between its president, young men were thought to have been shu, January 3, 2007. Abdullahi Yusuf, and its former prime 7 Personal conversations with three unidentified al- minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi. 2 Aden Hashi Ayro was the former military chief of the Shabab foot soldiers in Mogadishu, January 4, 2007. Hawiye-dominated Islamic Courts Union, a position All three emphasized that they were drawn to al-Shabab The Origins of al-Shabab to which he rose through his clan ties (Ayr sub-clan of primarily because they saw it as a group dedicated An on-the-ground investigation the Habr Gedir) and close association with the ICU’s to fighting Ethiopia, a traditional enemy which they strongly suggests that the radical religious head, Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Aweys, believe is “bent on destroying our religion and turning al-Shabab organization, which is an Islamic fundamentalist who led the radical Somali Somalia into a vassal state to plunder her resources and claiming responsibility for the Iraq- militia al-Ittihad al-Islami in Puntland in the early control her ports.” They said they were also impressed style violence in Somalia, may have 1990s, is believed to have met Usama bin Ladin in with Ayro, whom they describe as a “kind, charismatic, emerged in 2004 partly as a reaction Sudan in the mid-1990s and arranged to have Ayro and caring” father figure. to a failed CIA attempt to capture one trained by al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan sometime between 8 Personal interview, security source, Mogadishu, of the three Somalia-based al-Qa`ida 1997 and 2000. January 3, 2007. operatives wanted in connection with 3 Personal interview, Matt Bryden, former Inter- 9 Ibid. the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in national Crisis Group analyst, Nairobi, December 5, 10 Personal interview, 18-year-old al-Shabab fighter Kenya and Tanzania. Fazul Abdullah 2006. Al-Sudani was unwittingly killed on or about “Abdi,” Mogadishu, January 5, 2007. According to Mohammed, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan January 23, 2007 near the Somali-Kenyan border in an Abdi, he and about 300 others who performed well in and Tariq Abdullah (also known as Ethiopian air attack on fleeing Islamists. Americans a basic training course held in Mogadishu in July 2006 Taha al-Sudani) were believed to be and Ethiopians did not realize al-Sudani was dead for were flown to Eritrea in late September to receive two hiding in Somalia under the protection several months. months of additional training from Eritrean and Somali of al-Shabab founder Aden Hashi Ayro 4 Personal interview, Ayr clan leader, Mogadishu, instructors at an undisclosed camp outside of Asmara. January 4, 2007. Abdi noted that before any recruit received advanced 1 “Somalia: Anti-Government Activities Spreading, 5 Personal interview, 27-year-old al-Shabab foot soldier training, a thorough background check was conducted Warns AU,” IRIN, January 21, 2008. “Hassan,” Mogadishu, January 5, 2007. to ensure he was not a spy.

17 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 al-Shabab fighter, known as “Hassan,” In June 2006, al-Shabab fighters led control of Somalia’s infrastructure and explained how he had been trained at one the ICU to victory in Mogadishu over a natural resources, and used the threat of of the half dozen secret training camps U.S.-backed alliance of self-styled anti- terrorism as an excuse to brutally crack set up by Ayro around Mogadishu.11 At terrorist warlords. Once in power, Ayro down on dissent and punish opponents.16 the camps, new recruits were divided into seized the position of military chief of the The consensus among Western Somali small groups. Each group had to complete ICU. Ayro, his mentor Shaykh Hassan observers is that the TFG’s rapid descent a six-week fitness program, designed Dahir Aweys, and other hardliners are into factional politics, and Ethiopia’s to strengthen endurance and improve said to have used al-Shabab to intimidate, apparent disinterest in doing anything running, crawling and jumping skills. threaten and sideline scores of moderate other than propping up the TFG militarily, The final lesson was learning how to shoot ICU leaders, the latter of whom criticized has provided an ideal environment for al- accurately on the run. Hassan said that Shabab to re-organize, recruit and expand those who performed well overall were the group’s reach.17 sent to the front lines to battle Ethiopian “Some Somalis say troops. He also confirmed reports that the Youth Mujahidin To that extent, it appears that the Ayro had incorporated foreign fighters command structure of al-Shabab may have among the ranks of al-Shabab; about 25 Movement (YMM) is an been decentralized and the group broken Arabs fought alongside Hassan outside offshoot of al-Shabab.” down into cells to give regional al-Shabab the town of Bur Hakaba, near Baidoa.12 commanders greater independence to carry out attacks when and where they Between June and November 2006, see fit. For example, Ayro’s former deputy UN arms monitors compiled a report efforts to strengthen ICU ties with Eritrea in the ICU, Muktar Robow (also known that accused Eritrea of being one of 10 and al-Qa`ida and were fearful of the as Abu Mansour), is said to be leading a countries in Africa and the Middle East increasing presence of foreign fighters in cell in his home region of Bay, targeting that had provided fighters, weapons, Mogadishu and elsewhere in central and Ethiopian and government troops training and logistics support to Somalia’s southern Somalia.15 protecting the Somali parliament in the Islamist movement.13 The report did town of Baidoa.18 Another high-ranking not mention al-Qa`ida by name, but it The Return of al-Shabab and its Connection militant in the ICU, Hassan Turki, is is widely assumed that in addition to with the Youth Mujahidin Movement believed to be leading an al-Shabab Eritrea, semi-autonomous al-Qa`ida cells After the Ethiopian military intervention cell in his stronghold in the Lower Juba in various countries had actively assisted ended the ICU’s six month rule, the region. He is thought to be responsible for Ayro in turning al-Shabab into the most government of Yusuf and Gedi, installed January’s remotely-detonated roadside feared organization in Somalia.14 in its place, had a window of opportunity bombing, which killed several foreign to turn public distrust of the TFG into aid workers and Somalis in the town of 19 11 Personal interview, 27-year-old al-Shabab foot grassroots support by including moderate Kismayo. soldier “Hassan,” Mogadishu, January 5, 2007. Has- Islamists in the ICU in a broad-based san went through al-Shabab boot camp two months governing structure. Western powers, A decentralized command structure could before Ethiopia began its military invasion of Somalia including the United States, had hoped also explain why it is not yet clear who is in December 2006. He said that he was trained at Fish that the arrangement could isolate the in overall charge of the group. Ayro was Trafico, one of half a dozen secret training camps Ayro radical elements of the ICU, curb their wounded during a U.S. airstrike near had set up around Mogadishu. An al-Qa`ida training ability to find new recruits and bring the Islamist stronghold of Ras Kamboni camp in Ras Kamboni may have also been used to train enough stability for a speedy withdrawal on January 7, 2007 and disappeared for recruits, but Hassan said he did not meet anyone who of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. had been sent there. 12 Ibid. Hassan did not know from which countries the From the start, however, Yusuf and 16 Personal interviews, Hawiye clan elders, Somali Arabs had come, but he said all of them spoke reason- Gedi entrenched themselves in corrupt journalists, civil society leaders, businessmen and West- able amounts of Somali. Somali clan politics, determined to carry ern aid workers, Mogadishu, April-June 2007. 13 Leaked UN arms report to the Security Council, out their own personal agendas. Instead 17 Views of the Western Somali observers are best November 15, 2006. The report accused 10 countries, of working on building consensus and reflected in an article by Michael Weinstein, “Somalia’s including Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Saudi trying to forge an alliance with moderate New Reality: A Strategic Overview,” Power and Interest Arabia, Syria and the Lebanese militia Hizb Allah of ICU exiles in Eritrea, Yusuf and Gedi News Report (PINR), December 27, 2007. funneling arms and other aid to militants in the ICU. concentrated their efforts on fighting 18 “Local Officials Flee Town Near Baidoa, Cite Islamist Some of the report’s allegations have been largely each other for political dominance, for Gunmen,” Garowe Online, January 7, 2008. The report discredited, in particular the finding that 720 Somali said that in late November 2007 the governor of Bakool mercenaries fought alongside Hizb Allah in its July roadside bombings, against Ethiopian troops in Somalia. region said al-Shabab fighters were organizing in Bakool 2006 battle with Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and The journalist sources with clan ties to radical militia and Bay regions, with unconfirmed reports that the that Iran shipped arms to Somalia’s Islamic militants in fighters said that they feared as many as 3,500 mostly fighters belonged to Muktar Robow. In an interview return for access to uranium mines. disbanded al-Shabab members in Mogadishu stood with Reuters on December 16, 2007, Muktar Robow 14 Personal interviews, Somali journalist sources, ready to re-group and heed al-Qa`ida’s call because the acknowledged that he was based in the southern Bay Mogadishu, January 9, 2007. On January 5, 2007, an terrorist group “had already given a lot of al-Shabab province. audio recording, allegedly by al-Qa`ida’s number two fighters good training to carry out such attacks.” 19 “INGO vehicle struck by RCIED in Lower Juba, Kis- leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, was released, urging Soma- 15 Personal interviews, Hawiye clan elders, Mogadishu, mayo Town,” NGO SPAS Security Advisory 004/08, lis to use guerrilla tactics, including suicide attacks and January 10, 2007. January 28, 2008.

18 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 several months.20 In March 2007, al- on the internet, a common al-Qa`ida In an interview with Reuters on December Qa`ida named Ayro as its top leader in propaganda tactic not previously seen in 16, 2007, Muktar Robow said that al- Somalia, leaving open the possibility that Somalia.25 In March, 2007, YMM produced Shabab was now “financially and morally he was still engaged in al-Shabab activities their first-ever martyr video, showing supported by the population.”29 That claim and communicating with his commanders a man reciting prayers from the Qur’an is somewhat backed up in interviews in Mogadishu from a hideout in Ras before apparently blowing himself up in with Mogadishu residents and business Kamboni.21 Ayro did resurface in the a suicide attack on an Ethiopian base in leaders, who describe government capital in August 2007, but he apparently north Mogadishu. Since then, al-Shabab/ officials, soldiers and Ethiopian troops as did not stay long, rejected by clan elders YMM has claimed responsibility for “looters, robbers, and rapists.” A majority who asked him to leave the city because missile attacks on planes and suicide and admit to giving food, money and shelter to IED attacks on Ethiopian and TFG forces al-Shabab insurgents, generally viewing in Mogadishu and elsewhere, suggesting them as “freedom fighters.”30 “For now, al-Shabab that al-Qa`ida-linked groups in Iraq, appears to be singularly Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle At the same time, al-Shabab can hardly East may be continuing to provide arms, be regarded as a champion of freedom, focused on the tasks training and personnel.26 Reliable sources conducting activities that appear to be of throwing out the in the capital and in Baidoa, however, say alienating the public in much the same that they have not seen foreign fighters way that the ICU began losing popular Ethiopians and re- in their towns and the attacks are being support after hardliners in the ICU began establishing Islamic rule planned and carried out by Somalis.27 enforcing strict Shari`a laws in areas they controlled. Mogadishu residents say in Somalia as quickly as Al-Shabab Looks Inward for Now they live in fear of al-Shabab informants, possible.” For now, al-Shabab appears to be singularly who roam the streets in jeans and t-shirts focused on the tasks of throwing out the and listen in on private conversations. Ethiopians and re-establishing Islamic Anyone overheard criticizing al- rule in Somalia as quickly as possible. The Shabab or its tactics is labeled an infidel they feared he would “bring more trouble familiar hard line rhetoric of establishing or a government collaborator and is to everybody.”22 Ayro is now said to be a greater Somalia under the banner of usually sentenced to death. In Islamist constantly on the move, never staying in radical Islam has been replaced for the strongholds in the capital, movie theaters one town or in one area for more than a few time being with calls for self-sacrifice in have been ordered to shut down. Owners days.23 Last month, a report appeared on a the name of patriotism. In Mogadishu who have disobeyed the order have been Somali website announcing the election mosques, al-Shabab’s senior leaders such executed.31 of Shaykh Muktar Abdirahman (also as Shaykh Fu’ad Shongole urge all Somalis known as Abu Zubeyr) as the new amir of to join the insurgency, praying for Allah By adopting many of the same tactics al-Shabab in Mogadishu.24 Little is known to return “Somali dignity, prosperity, and used by al-Qa`ida and the Taliban, al- about Abu Zubeyr other than he, like respect taken by traitors, evil Christian Shabab’s leadership in the past year Ayro, received training in Afghanistan crusaders and occupiers.”28 has demonstrated their readiness, if not under the Taliban and is virulently anti- willingness, to be incorporated into a Western. larger effort to expand terrorist networks 25 YMM battle reports have appeared on a regular basis in the Horn of Africa. Worryingly, many It is unclear what connection Ayro, Muktar since early March 2007 on the Somali-language internet ordinary Somalis appear to have given Robow, Hassan Turki or Abu Zubeyr may website www.dalkanews.com. up on the TFG and are angry with the have, if any, to a radical Somali group 26 Chris Tomlinson, “Islamic Militants Rebound in West for supporting Ethiopia’s military that emerged in Mogadishu last February. Somalia,” Associated Press, April 27, 2007. In the occupation. Somali militants are taking Some Somalis say the Youth Mujahidin report, Tomlinson said that al-Shabab had provided al- advantage of that anger to woo and Movement (YMM) is an offshoot of al- Jazira television with the video of the March bombing. radicalize the population. Indeed, leaving Shabab. Others say it is al-Shabab trying Another video obtained by AP in June 2007 showed a Somalia to fester in its current state to re-define itself as a popular movement. Somali man pointing a shoulder-held missile launcher virtually guarantees the creation of an al- Whatever the truth, YMM alarmed the at the sky and then firing. The video suggests that Qa`ida haven in the Horn, sooner rather Western world, posting battle reports al-Shabab fighters had brought down a Russian-built than later. Ilyushin-76 that crashed in flames shortly after deliver- 20 Alex Perry, “Somalia on the Edge,” Time, November ing equipment for Ugandan peacekeepers in Mogadishu This report was authored by anonymous. 27, 2007. Ayro’s personal effects were found at the site on March 23, 2007. All 11 aboard were killed. Witnesses of the AC-130 attack on his convoy. and airport staff reported the plane was brought down 29 “Somali Insurgency to Intensify—Islamist Leader,” 21 “Al-Qaeda Names Ayro its Leader in Mogadishu,” by a missile, but government officials said at the time Reuters, December 16, 2007. Reuters, March 22, 2007. that the pilot had called the control tower to say the 30 Randomly-selected personal interviews with 15 22 Personal interview, Ayr clan elder, Mogadishu, plane had engine problems. residents in the Hodan district and Suqa Huluwa September 4, 2007. 27 Personal telephone interviews, Mogadishu-based (recently renamed Little Falluja) area of Mogadishu and 23 Ibid. journalist sources and human rights activists, October five business community leaders in Bakara Market, 24 Abu Zubeyr’s announcement appeared on the 24, 2007. December 6, 2007. Somali-language website Dalkanews.com on December 28 Personal interview, security source, Mogadishu, 31 Personal interview, journalist source, Mogadishu, 21, 2007. December 2, 2008. December 6, 2007.

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Deconstructing the Myth attack.5 Perhaps reflecting its bipartisan Many would also argue that Bin Ladin also mandate, the 9/11 Report assigned blame to had the operational capability. Al-Qa`ida- about al-Qa`ida and all of the above, by stating that linked militants undertook several military Khobar operations overseas in the early 1990s, the operation was carried out from an alleged assassination attempt on By Thomas Hegghammer principally, perhaps exclusively, by the former king of Afghanistan in Rome in Saudi Hezbollah, an organization November 1991, to the hotel bombings in the at 10 pm on june 25, 1996, a gigantic that had received support from Yemeni port of Aden in December 1992, to explosion struck the Khobar Towers the government of Iran. While the guerrilla warfare in Somalia in 1993. There housing compound for the U.S. Air Force evidence of Iranian involvement is also evidence that Bin Ladin sought to in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.1 A tanker truck is strong, there are also signs that operate in Saudi Arabia from approximately filled with several tons of TNT detonated on al-Qaida played some role, as yet 1994 onward. In mid-1994, Saudi authorities a nearby parking lot, killing 19 U.S. soldiers unknown.6 allegedly intercepted a shipment of and injuring more than 200 people.2 The explosives sent by al-Qa`ida from Sudan to attack, the largest on a U.S. target since the The issue of Iranian involvement is Saudi Arabia.9 According to a declassified 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, shrouded in so much secrecy and high level Iraqi document, Bin Ladin met with an Iraqi prompted three official inquiries in the politics that any assessment based on open government representative in Khartoum in United States, as well as the relocation sources remains impossible. The question early 1995 and discussed “carrying out joint of most U.S. military personnel in Saudi of al-Qa`ida’s involvement, on the other operations against foreign forces” in Saudi Arabia from the Eastern Province to Prince hand, can now be addressed because vast Arabia.10 The Yemeni jihadist Nasir al- Sultan Airbase outside Riyadh. amounts of new information about both al- Bahri has also said that Bin Ladin “opened Qa`ida and Saudi jihadism in the 1990s have branches of the al-Qa`ida organization in Despite its scale and repercussions, the emerged in the past few years. This article Saudi Arabia” in 1996.11 Khobar bombing continues to be the subject will examine the hypothesis that al-Qa`ida of considerable speculation, not least alone was behind Khobar as well as the The third reason to suspect al-Qa`ida concerning the identities of the perpetrators. theory that Usama bin Ladin collaborated involvement is that prior to the Khobar In 2001, a U.S. court formally indicted a with Tehran. bombing Saudi Arabia experienced two group of Saudi Shi`a allegedly linked to a violent attacks by Saudi Arab Afghans.12 militant group called Saudi Hizb Allah.3 In Assessing al-Qa`ida’s Role The first was the so-called al-Hudhayf 2007, William Perry, secretary of defense The principal reason to suspect al-Qa`ida’s incident in November 1994, in which at the time of the bombing, stated that he involvement is the fact that Usama bin Ladin Abdallah al-Hudhayf threw acid in the face believed al-Qa`ida was responsible.4 The had a motive to attack. Since late 1990, Bin of a police officer to avenge the arrest of the then FBI director, Louis Freeh, claimed on Ladin had expressed deep dissatisfaction leaders of the moderate Islamist opposition the other hand that Iran had ordered the with the U.S. military presence in his native two months earlier.13 The second attack was Saudi Arabia, a presence he considered the November 1995 car bombing of the U.S. 1 For detailed accounts of the Khobar bombing, see a violation of the sanctity of the “Land of training mission to the Saudi National Guard the three official inquiries:The Khobar Towers Bombing the Two Holy Places.” In August 1996, he in central Riyadh, in which five Americans 14 Incident (Washington, D.C.: House National Security declared war on U.S. troops in the Arabian and two Indians were killed. In their Committee, August 14, 1996); Report to the President Peninsula. Although this declaration televised April 1995 confessions, the four and Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed postdates the Khobar bombing, Bin Ladin Abroad (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, had declared his readiness to attack U.S. 24 Americans were killed in two bombings is clear September 15, 1996) (the so-called “Downing Report”); troops several years earlier in informal evidence of the huge anger of Saudi people against 7 and Independent Review of the Khobar Towers Bombing settings. Moreover, Bin Ladin applauded America. The Saudis now know their real enemy is (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, October 31, 1996). the Khobar operation in a number of America.” See Independent, July 10, 1996. Later that 8 See also Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou (Washing- statements and interviews after the attack. year, Bin Ladin expressed his “joy at the killing of the ton, D.C.: WINEP, 2000), pp. 83-98; Anthony Cordes- American Soldiers in Riyadh and Khobar,” which “are man, Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on 5 Louis Freeh, “Khobar Towers,” Wall Street Journal, the sentiments of every Muslim.” See Nida’ul Islam no. al-Khobar (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, June 2001); and Ed June 23, 2006. 15, December 1996. In March 1997, Bin Ladin told CNN Blanche, “Security and Stability in the Middle East–The 6 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton that he considered as “heroes” those men who “killed Al-Khobar Factor,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 13:6 (2001). & Co., 2004), p. 60. the American occupiers in Riyadh and al-Khobar.” 2 Estimates of the quantity of explosives used vary from 7 In a speech recorded in Saudi Arabia around 1991 and 9 “Overview of the Enemy—Staff Statement Number ”3,000-8,000 pounds” (Downing Report) to ”20,000 posted on the internet in 2006, Bin Ladin can be heard 15,” www.9-11commission.gov, April 16, 2004. pounds” (Air Force Report). advocating resistance to the U.S. presence. See Muzaf- 10 Peter Bergen, “Enemy of Our Enemy,” New York 3 U.S.A. v. Ahmed al-Mughassil et al., Eastern District of fir al-Ansari, “Bin ladin shaban…an’am wa akram,” Times, March 28, 2006. Virginia, 2001. Muntada al-Hisba, May 14, 2006. According to Jamal 11 Al-Quds al-Arabi, March 20, 2005. 4 “Perry: U.S. Eyed Iran Attack after Bombing,” UPI, al-Fadl, Bin Ladin, Abu Hajir al-Iraqi and Saad al-Sharif 12 According to the “Downing Report,” there had also June 6, 2007. On December 22, 2006, a U.S. federal declared in internal al-Qa`ida meetings around 1993 been three minor isolated attacks on U.S. personnel dur- court ruled that Iran was responsible for the bombing that it was necessary and legitimate to use force against ing the Gulf War in 1991. and ordered that the Iranian government pay $254 U.S. troops in the Gulf and in Somalia. See U.S.A. v. 13 “Statement 38,” Committee for the Defence of Legiti- million to the families of the 19 U.S. citizens killed. See UBL, Southern District of New York, 2001, p. 266ff. mate Rights, 1995; Personal interview with Abdallah Carol D. Leonnig, “Iran Held Liable In Khobar Attack,” 8 In early July 1996, Bin Ladin told the journalist Robert al-Utaybi, Riyadh, April 2004. Washington Post, December 23, 2006. Fisk that “what happened in Riyadh and Khobar when 14 Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou, pp. 73-82.

20 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 alleged perpetrators, three of whom were existed in the Saudi jihadist community in in the wake of the Khobar attack before Arab Afghans, said they were influenced the 1990s. Fourth, the report of the alleged “God allowed for the real perpetrator to be by Usama bin Ladin, Abu Muhammad al- congratulatory calls, apart from being discovered.”21 Al-`Uyayri’s assessment is Maqdisi and Saad al-Faqih.15 Although the uncorroborated by other sources, does not particularly important and credible because Riyadh attack was initiated “from below” constitute evidence of direct responsibility. he grew up in Dammam and knew the and not orchestrated by Bin Ladin himself, Bin Ladin himself did not initiate the calls, jihadist community in the Eastern Province it showed that Sunni militants were able and presumably he did not explicitly admit well. and willing to use car bombings against U.S. responsibility in his response, as this would targets in Saudi Arabia.16 also have been reported. In other words, it seems unlikely that Bin Ladin orchestrated the Khobar bombing. Finally, a specific piece of intelligence would More importantly, anyone arguing in favor Did al-Qa`ida play an indirect and low- seem to link Bin Ladin to Khobar. A retired of the al-Qa`ida hypothesis would have to profile role in the attack? CIA official has said that two days after the explain two spectacular gaps in the record bombing, the National Security Agency of evidence on Khobar. The first gap is Al-Qa`ida-Iran Collaboration? intercepted phone calls from al-Qa`ida the absence of any forensic or other direct Another hypothesis that enjoys support in second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri evidence linking al-Qa`ida to the operation. certain U.S. government and intelligence and Ashra Hadi (head of Palestinian Islamic This absence is all the more glaring when circles is that al-Qa`ida secretly collaborated Jihad) allegedly congratulating Bin Ladin on compared to the wealth of publicly available with Shi`a militants in an Iran-sponsored the Khobar attack.17 attack on Khobar. The 9/11 Commission, for “The expertise for such an example, noted that “we have seen strong On closer inspection, however, these four but indirect evidence that his organization arguments do not hold scrutiny. First, Bin operation does not seem to did in fact play some as yet unknown role Ladin’s statements on Khobar amount to have existed in the Saudi in the Khobar attack.”22 This hypothesis endorsements, not claims of responsibility. is part of a broader theory about a secret It is entirely natural that Bin Ladin, jihadist community in the alliance between Iran and al-Qa`ida dating when prompted by a journalist, would 1990s.” back to the early 1990s and facilitated by speak positively about an attack on a U.S. the legendary Hizb Allah operative Imad military target in Saudi Arabia. Second, Mughniyyeh.23 the operational capacity of Bin Ladin’s network in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s evidence on other al-Qa`ida operations and The nature and full scale of the alleged was not as high as is often assumed. Bin on other violent incidents, large and small, evidence for this theory is difficult to assess Ladin’s exile in Sudan and association with involving Sunni militants in the Saudi because it has remained classified to this revolutionary-minded Egyptian militants kingdom. Although secret evidence may day. The principal open source information had weakened his links to the Saudi exist, it is doubtful that it would be in large pointing to the existence of an Iran-al- Islamist scene, and many of his potential quantities. A former U.S. intelligence official Qa`ida alliance is the testimony of former collaborators were imprisoned after the has noted that in the course of reviewing the al-Qa`ida member Jamal al-Fadl in the so- 1995 Riyadh bombing.18 Third, the Khobar bulk of the evidence on the Khobar attack called Embassy Bombings Trial in 2001. attack differed considerably from any during 1996-1997, he never saw any reliable Al-Fadl said that around 1993 Abu Hajir operation undertaken by Sunni Islamists evidence of al-Qa`ida involvement.19 al-Iraqi, a prominent al-Qa`ida ideologue, in Saudi Arabia both before and after 1996. advocated cooperation between Sunnis The Khobar bomb contained between 20 The second gap is the silence on Khobar in and Shi`a in the fight against the United and 100 times more explosives than the the jihadist literature. The Saudi jihadist States.24 Al-Fadl also allegedly witnessed a November 1995 Riyadh bomb. The expertise literature treats Khobar quite differently meeting between al-Qa`ida leaders and an for such an operation does not seem to have from other incidents in the kingdom in the Iranian representative in Khartoum.25 Al- 1990s, such as the Riyadh bombing, the 15 “Four Saudis Held for Riyadh Blasts,” Arab News, al-Hudhayf affair or the 1998 Hijaz missile 21 Sawt al-Jihad, no. 1 (2003), p. 17. In another text, April 23, 1996. plot. While Abdallah al-Hudhayf and the al-`Uyayri criticized the government for its “premature” 16 The 9/11 Report concluded that “nothing proves that Riyadh bombers are hailed as martyrs and accusations against the people on the “list of 19” for the Bin Ladin ordered [the 1995 Riyadh] attack.” See 9/11 the Hijaz missile plotters proudly named, no May 12, 2003 Riyadh bombings, saying “they did not Report, p. 60. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef ruled reference has ever been made to the identities issue verdicts against the rafida who blew up Khu- 20 out al-Qa`ida involvement. See al-Siyasa, November 4, of the Khobar bombers. Moreover, while bar.” See “ghazwat al-hadi ‘ashar min rabi’ al-awwal: 1998. Bin Ladin’s former bodyguard Nasir al-Bahri de- several al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula ‘amaliyyat sharq al-riyadh wa-harbuna ma’ amrika wa nied such a connection. See al-Quds al-Arabi, March 31, militants have highlighted their links to ‘umala’iha,” www.qa3edoon.com, September 3, 2003, 2005. Bin Ladin himself expressed regret at not having the Riyadh bombers, no one has claimed a p. 45. been involved. See his interview with CNN, March 1997. connection to the Khobar attackers. On the 22 “Overview of the Enemy—Staff Statement Number 17 Simon Reeve, The New Jackals (London: A. Deutsch, contrary, al-Qa`ida representative Yusuf 15,” 9/11 Commission, April 16, 2004. 1999), p. 187; Lawrence Wright, “The Man behind Bin al-`Uyayri later blasted Saudi authorities 23 See, for example, Dan Eggen, “9/11 Panel Links Al Laden,” New Yorker, September 16, 2002. for innocently arresting and torturing him Qaeda, Iran,” Washington Post, June 26, 2004; Al Venter, 18 Thomas Hegghammer, Violent Islamism in Saudi “Bin Laden’s Tripartite Pact,” Jane’s Intelligence Review Arabia, 1979-2006: The Power and Perils of Pan-Islamic 19 Personal interview, Wayne White, February 2, 2008. 10:11 (1998). Nationalism, Ph.D. Thesis, Sciences-Po Paris, 2007, p. 20 See, for example, Abu Jandal al-Azdi, “Khuribat 24 U.S.A. v. UBL, p. 287. 343ff. Amrika,” www.qa3edoon.com, 2003, p. 81. 25 Ibid., p. 289.

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Fadl further said that a group of al-Qa`ida group Hizb Allah al-Hijaz (or Saudi Hizb Return of the Arabs: members, including top al-Qa`ida operative Allah).29 The pro-Khomeini Hizb Allah al- Sayf al-Adl, went to south Lebanon in the Hijaz had never accepted the deal struck Al-Qa`ida’s Current early 1990s to train with Hizb Allah.26 Some in 1993 between the pro-Shirazi Shi`a Military Role in the have interpreted Iran’s post-9/11 refusal opposition and the Saudi regime.30 No less Afghan Insurgency to extradite top al-Qa`ida leaders (among anti-American than their Sunni Islamist whom Sayf al-Adl) as an indication of counterparts, the radical Shi`a splinter By Brian Glyn Williams Tehran’s fear of revealing its long-standing group may have seen the Khobar attack as a connections with al-Qa`ida.27 way to demonstrate strength, protest against in the pashtun tribal belt, from the the 1993 peace deal and embarrass the Saudi JDAM-blasted ruins of Usama bin Ladin’s From an outside vantage point, it is not regime. They may also have speculated bombed out terrorist camp at Darunta difficult to challenge this hypothesis. As that an attack on a U.S. target would not near Jalalabad to the “red zone” between interesting as al-Fadl’s account may be, it spark the same draconian retaliation as the volatile provinces of Khost and Paktia, is not corroborated by any other publicly would an attack on a Saudi government local Afghans are increasingly talking in available sources and thus hinges on one target. The scale and professional execution concerned tones about the return of the testimony alone. Moreover, there may of the attack was due to the instruction “Araban” or “Ikhwanis,” as Arab fighters and logistical assistance provided by the are known in Pashtu.1 Wealthy al-Qa`ida Lebanese Hizb Allah. Whether or not there “Bin Ladin welcomed the financiers are said to be lurking in the was official Iranian support is another issue distant mountains distributing large sums operation, but he was which cannot be assessed in academia. of cash to Pashtun tribes on the other probably not responsible.” side of the Pakistani border, hardened Al-Qaida’s involvement in the 1996 Khobar Arab fighters from Iraq are rumored to bombing, however, can be ruled out until be training Pashtuns in the previously substantial new evidence to the contrary taboo tactic of suicide bombing and al- be many reasons behind Iran’s refusal emerges. Bin Ladin welcomed the operation, Qa`ida leaders are reported to have an to extradite al-Qa`ida leaders post-9/11. but he was probably not responsible. In increasingly strong voice in the Taliban Needless to say, a number of al-Qa`ida fact, his strongest link to the bombing may shuras (councils) in Waziristan and Quetta. associates have categorically denied the have been the involvement of his family’s If the rumors are true, it seems that al- existence of a link between al-Qa`ida and construction company, the Saudi Bin Ladin Qa`ida is putting renewed emphasis on Iran.28 Finally, this hypothesis still does Group, in the rebuilding of the Khobar galvanizing military resistance in a land not answer the question of the nature of al- Towers site.31 that has tremendous symbolism in jihadist Qa`ida’s alleged contribution to the Khobar circles as the original theater of action for operation. Until significant new evidence Dr. Thomas Hegghammer is a Postdoctoral the modern jihad movement. to the contrary is made public, this must be Research Associate at Princeton University and considered a conspiracy theory. a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defense The following is a preliminary effort to sift Research Establishment (FFI). He is the author through these vague rumors and reports in Conclusion of Jihad in Arabia (Cambridge University order to gain a clear picture of al-Qa`ida’s Of course, conspiracies do occur, and Press, forthcoming) and the co-author of Al- actual role in a Taliban guerrilla war that nothing is impossible in the murky world Qaida dans le texte (Paris: PUF, 2005). Dr. has, to all outward appearances, morphed of terrorism and espionage. Nevertheless, Hegghammer has published widely on militant into an Iraqi-style terrorist insurgency. in the case of the Khobar bombing, the Islamism and has conducted extensive fieldwork straightforward explanation is both more in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. His current Precursors: Al-Qa`ida’s Field Army plausible and supported by more evidence. research focuses on jihadism in Saudi Arabia, In 1987, Usama bin Ladin proudly radical Islamist ideology and the history of the proclaimed that the somnolent Arab Both the U.S. and the Saudi investigations Arab Afghans. Dr. Hegghammer is currently youth living under the munafiq (apostate) concluded that the operation was carried writing a book about the life and ideology of governments of the Middle East could out by a cell affiliated with the radical Shi`a Abdullah Azzam. come to his Ma`sada al-Ansar (Lion’s Den of the Companions, a tunnel base built 26 Ibid., pp. 290-291. The group that went to Lebanon 29 For summaries of the available evidence, see refer- in the mountains of the Afghan border allegedly included Abu Talha al-Sudani, Sayf al-Islam ences in footnote 1. Further classified evidence allegedly province of Paktia) to fight for their honor al-Masri, Abu Ja‘far al-Masri, Abu Salim al-Masri and supports this conclusion; former intelligence officials and faith against the “atheist infidels.” By Sayf al-Adl. with the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence all accounts, Bin Ladin and his “Ansars” 27 Peter Finn and Susan Schmidt, “Iran, al Qaeda and and Research who followed the Khobar investigation subsequently fought ferociously against Iraq,” Washington Post, September 6, 2003. saw convincing independent evidence linking Saudi Soviet Spetsnaz (Special Forces), defending 28 In a 1994 interview, Ayman al-Zawahiri responded Hizb Allah to the bombing. Personal interview, Wayne their positions with mortars, RPGs, fiercely to allegations of such cooperation. See Ayman White, February 2, 2008. machine guns and AK-47s. al-Zawahiri, “mawqifna min iran - al-radd ‘ala tuhmat 30 Gerd Nonneman, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and al-ta’awun bayna al-haraka al-jihadiyya al-salafiyya Iris Glosemeyer, Terrorism, Gulf Security and Palestine: While many media savvy Arab volunteers wa iran al-rafidiyya,” al-Ansar, no. 91 (1994). Another Key Issues for an EU-GCC Dialogue (Florence: European witness in the Embassy Bombings Trial, L’Houssaine University Institute, 2002), pp. 30-31. Kherchtou, rejected the possibility of links between al- 31 Jane Mayer, “The House of Bin Laden,” New Yorker, 1 Personal interviews, Pashtun tribal belt, April-May Qa`ida and the Iranians; U.S.A. v. UBL, p. 1385. November 5, 2001. 2007.

22 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 earned a reputation as “gucci jihadists” Following the mixed success of Shah-i- Al-Libi’s propaganda films featured during the Soviet period, some did move Kot, the remaining Arab fighters retreated combat footage of Arabs carrying out on to become seasoned fighters. In the over the border into Pakistan where they suicide bombings against U.S. soldiers, late 1990s, for example, Bin Ladin helped were given sanctuary by major Taliban firing mortars at U.S. Forward Operating make the Arab jihadist dream of fielding a leaders such as Jalaladin Haqqani, who Bases (including one sequence that shows bona fide Arab jund (army) come true when had fought alongside Arabs in the Khost Arabs firing shells with the name Zarqawi he formed the 055 International Brigade area during the 1980s. Up and coming painted on them), using IEDs against U.S. to fight against the Northern Alliance. middle-ranked Taliban commanders, troops and ambushing U.S. soldiers.4 Based in Rishikor, a former Communist such as Baitullah Mehsud and Nek According to the Arabic sub-headings, base just outside Kabul, this foreign Muhammad, also provided the Arabs and these videos were filmed in a series of legion—which was often known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan jihadists Pashtun border provinces in Afghanistan Ansars (Companions)—played a key role with sanctuary in the Waziri tribal lands ranging from Kunar Province in the north in the Taliban’s defense of Kabul against of North and South Waziristan. Another to Uruzgan and Zabul in the south.5 In Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Pakistani tribal agency to the north, other words, these were the very border Massoud, and in the Taliban conquests Bajaur, served as the third fallback area provinces where the first generation of of Northern Alliance General Rashid for retreating Arab fighters. Ominously, Arab Afghan volunteers (many of whom Dostum’s capital at Mazar-i-Sharif and all three border agencies previously had had married local women, learned Pashtu Massoud’s capital of Taloqan. a history of serving as rear area staging and settled in the region) had fought in grounds for Arab and Afghan mujahidin the 1980s. In addition to their activities as terrorists during the 1980s jihad and they would who attack “soft” civilian targets, as seen soon serve that role again. By 2006, a more developed al-Sahab in the case of the infamous Hamburg akhund began to feature jihad anasheed (songs), (cell) that attacked the U.S. mainland on Building a “Pyre for the Americans” video montage epitaphs for dozens of slain 9/11, al-Qa`ida also had a fighting wing. While many in the West thought al-Qa`ida Turkish and Arab martyrs from Kuwait, This branch was engaged in frontal was nearly finished in the aftermath of the Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and images combat, often driving old Soviet-era toppling of the Taliban, the coalition had of young Arabs wearing the Arab Ansar tanks, utilizing light artillery and acting a difficult time killing or capturing high- al-Mujahidin “uniform”—Arab kaffiyya as shock troops for the Taliban in their value targets such as Bin Ladin, Ayman scarves or Afghan pakhols (the round felt struggles with the Northern Alliance. al-Zawahiri (who narrowly missed being hat that became a status symbol for the Thousands of Arabs in Afghanistan killed by a Hellfire missile strike in 2006) first generation of Arab Afghan jihadists), actually fought under al-Qa`ida’s al-Raya and a new generation of leaders who were Afghan-style shalwar kameez baggy shirts, (flag) in frontal combat from 1997-2001. operating in the Pashtun tribal areas, camouflage jackets and the mandatory Arab fighters who were trained in these such as charismatic commander Abu sneakers. The videos also showed platoon camps bolstered the Taliban regime Yahya al-Libi.2 The latter leader seemed sized units of Arab fighters training in the when it decided to confront the U.S.-led to be most successful in running a media forested mountains of Waziristan with coalition in the fall of 2001. In light of their operation with al-Sahab Media Production AK-47 assault rifles, PK machine guns, well-known fervor, it is not surprising (The Clouds, which refers to the cloud RPG-7s, mortars and even anti-aircraft that Arab fighters tenaciously held their covered mountains of Afghanistan). It guns.6 By 2007, they also featured images positions in Taloqan, Kunduz, Kabul and was this media operation that began to of Arab fighters ambushing Pakistani Kandahar when the indigenous Taliban provide a unique window into al-Qa`ida’s soldiers in the mountains of Waziristan, proved less inclined to fight to the death. re-calibrated military operations in and the Pakistani authorities began to Afghanistan. suspect that Arabs were bolstering the Yet, the technologically advanced Taliban insurgency in their country.7 Americans were not the Soviets, and While the media-savvy al-Qa`ida in Iraq key al-Qa`ida military leaders Juma leader Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi stole the As in the previous jihad against the Namangani (the military head of the 055 limelight from 2003-2005, by 2005 al- Soviets, the Arab fighters seemed much International Brigade) and Muhammad Libi’s media service began to compete more concerned about photographing `Atif (al-Qa`ida’s military leader) were with Iraqi insurgent webpages. Al-Libi killed by precision-guided U.S. munitions began by posting a series of online videos 4 For an example of an Arab attack on a convoy, see in November 2001. With the Arab state- that showed small numbers of Arabs “As-Sahab Media: Mujahideen Attack and Destroy Sup- within-a-state in the Taliban Emirate of carrying out attacks on “Christian kafirs ply Convoy of Occupation American Forces in Afghan,” Afghanistan collapsing around them by (infidels) and puppet munafiq (apostate) available at www.liveleak.com/view?i=96a_1185478707. December 2001, the Arab Ansars withdrew Afghan army troops.” These included 5 See, for example, “Pyre for the Americans in Kha- from Kabul and Kandahar to the remote such videos as “Pyre for the Americans rasan—Video of Mine Explosion Near a Gathering of Shah-i-Kot Valley of eastern Afghanistan. in Afghanistan” and “The Winds of American Forces in Konar,” available at www.archive. 3 In this valley they fought with greater Paradise.” org/details/Konar-Afghanistan. effect against U.S. troops in 2002’s 6 See, for example, “Taleban/Al Qaeda Training Operation Anaconda, an asymmetric 2 Although in December 2005 a senior operational Camp in Waziristan,” available at www.youtube.com/ guerrilla fight that more closely resembled planner, Abu Hamza Rabia, was killed in a Predator watch?v=0uJYY9Yg_lg&feature=related. the mujahidin’s skirmishes with Soviet attack in North Waziristan. 7 See, for example, “The Mujahideen of Waziristan,” heliborne Spetsnaz troops in the 1980s. 3 See Qaeda al-Jihad’s surprisingly sophisticated video available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=N_ at www.liveleak.com/view?i=184_1201720200. kDBEJRDpI&NR=1.

23 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 and filming themselves than their simple also distributed tutorial jihadist videos Most recently, Arabs have also been Afghan hosts, and this appears to be part throughout the Pashtun regions that give sighted farther afield fighting in the of a calculated effort to recruit young instructions on how to build car bombs, unstable southern province of Helmand men for the jihad in Afghanistan and IEDs and inspirational “snuff film” images under a first generation Arab Afghan Pakistan. By 2007, jihadist websites from of U.S. troops being killed in Iraq. The first leader named Abu Haris.12 Local Chechnya to Turkey to the Arab world wave of suicide bombings in Afghanistan Helmandi villagers also reported seeing began to feature recruitment ads calling seems to have been carried out by Arabs, Arab fighters in the village of Musa Qala, on the “Lions of Islam” to come fight in and it appears clear that it was al- a town that was occupied by the Taliban Afghanistan. It appears that many heeded Qa`ida—which has long had an emphasis for most of 2007.13 They reported that the call.8 This was especially true after the on istishhad (martyrdom) operations—that the Arab fighters set up suicide bombing Anbar Awakening of anti-al-Qa`ida tribal taught the local Taliban this alien tactic. facilities and were extremely brutal.14 leaders and General David Petraeus’ As in previous eras where they earned “surge strategy” made Iraq less hospitable “By 2007, jihadist websites a reputation for butchery (in 1991, for for foreign volunteers. example, Arab fighters hacked captured from Chechnya to Turkey Communist Afghan Army soldiers to Al-Qa`ida Adds an Edge to Taliban Insurgency to the Arab world began pieces following the capture of Jalalabad), Since 2002, one of al-Qa`ida’s main roles the Taliban’s Arab allies were reported has been diverting wealth from the Arab to feature recruitment to have executed locals they suspected of Gulf States to funding the struggling ads calling on the ‘Lions being “spies.” Taliban. One recently killed Saudi shaykh named Asadullah, for example, was of Islam’ to come fight in Such actions hardly endeared the locals described as “the moneybags in the entire Afghanistan.” to the Taliban, and there are bound to be tribal belt.” Men like Asadullah have paid future tensions between the Arabs and the bounties for Taliban attacks on coalition Taliban that echo those that often caused troops, provided money to Taliban “red on red” conflict between Afghan commanders such as Baitullah Mehsud to Arabs such as Abu Yahya al-Libi have mujahidin and Arab Wahhabis in the encourage them to attack Pakistani troops also been influential in encouraging the 1980s. The distrust between the Arabs— and launch a suicide bombing campaign technophobic Taliban fundamentalists to who come to the “backward” lands of in that country, and used their funds to create “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” Afghanistan from the comparatively re-arm the Taliban.9 Local Pashtuns in online videos of Zarqawi style beheadings, developed Gulf States—are said to stem Waziristan and in Afghanistan’s Kunar IED attacks and suicide bombings. from the Arab puritans’ disdain for local Province have claimed that the Arab Afghan Sufi “superstitions,” their most fighters pay well for lodging and food and Furthermore, it appears that Arab un-Afghan desire to achieve “martyrdom” provide money for the families of those fighters have actively partaken in and their wish to lead their own fighting who are “martyred” in suicide operations. insurgent activities within Afghanistan units. According to online videos and local itself in increasing numbers. Insurgents reports, al-Qa`ida is also running as in the Kunar Valley in Nuristan, for A local Taliban commander captured many as 29 training camps in the region, example, have chosen Abu Ikhlas al- the ambiguous nature of the Taliban- albeit less elaborate than those found in Masri, an Egyptian who speaks Pashtu al-Qa`ida alliance when he claimed of Afghanistan in the 1990s. and is married to a local woman, to lead the Arabs: “They come for the sacred a group of as many as 170 fighters. Arab purpose of jihad. They fight according to The Arabs have also played a key role in operations in this area are facilitated Shari`a law.” He then, however, added “al-Qa`idifying” the Taliban insurgency by its cross-border proximity to Bajaur an important caveat: “No foreign fighter and importing the horror tactics of Agency and support from a local Taliban can serve as a Taliban commander.”15 the Iraqi conflict to Afghanistan. Key leader named Ahmad Shah and insurgent Even key al-Qa`ida field commanders, Taliban leaders, such as the recently slain leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the latter of such as the recently slain Libyan leader Mullah Dadullah, have claimed that they which has a long history of working with Abu Laith al-Libi (the commander who learned suicide bombing techniques from Arabs. Arabs have also filmed themselves led al-Qa`ida’s retreat from Afghanistan their Arab “brothers.”10 Al-Qa`ida has attacking coalition targets in Nangarhar, in 2001), operated under the command of Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Uruzgan, Logar 11 8 Surprisingly, Turks seem to be joining the jihad in and Zabul provinces. 12 Abu Haris appears to have created his own mixed Afghanistan, and their martyrdom epitaphs and calls Arab Afghan unit called the Jaysh al-Mahdi. See Waliul- for Turks to fight in Afghanistan have appeared on such lah Rahmani, “Al-Qaeda Uses Jaish al-Mahdi to Gain jihadist websites as www.cihaderi.net. For more on previously had taboos on suicide bombing, see Brian Control over Helmand Province,” Terrorism Focus 4:34 Turkish involvement, see Brian Glyn Williams, “Turks Glyn Williams, “Afghan Suicide Bombing,” Islamic Af- (2007). Join the Jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Terrorism Focus fairs Analyst, August 13, 2007. 13 Jason Straziuso, “U.S. Intensifies Fight Near Taliban- 3:47 (2006). 11 See, for example, an Arab attack in Khost, “As-Sahab held Town; Talks Under Way to Oust Arab Fighters,” 9 Zarqawi declared a jihad against the Musharraf “pup- Media: Mujahideen fire BM rockets on Occupation Associated Press, October 28, 2007. pet” government, and al-Qa`ida agents have tried killing American Base in Afghanistan,” available at www. 14 “All Eyes on Musa Qala,” www.afgha.com, October the Pakistani leader on more than one occasion. liveleak.com/view?i=01f_1185675192; and an Arab attack 10, 2007. 10 For the direct role of Arabs in transferring suicide on a U.S. convoy in Zabul, available at www.liveleak. 15 “Foreign Taleban Rile Helmand Residents,” Institute bombing tactics from Iraq to the Deobandi Taliban, who com/view?i=dc1_1184687663. for War and Peace Reporting, October 30, 2007.

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Mullah Omar. After Action Report: intelligence assessments had clearly defined the communities to our north Despite the potential for tensions, al- An Army Lieutenant’s View as safe havens for AQI since a coalition Qa`ida’s head of operations in Afghanistan, of AQI’s Operations in al- presence did not exist north of a small an Egyptian named Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid, Khidr and Hanaswa school known as OP3. The areas our who is said to have good relations with the operations were designed to clear allegedly Taliban, has proclaimed that al-Qa`ida in By First Lieutenant Jon Patrick Cheatwood contained between as many as 30-50 Afghanistan recognizes the authority of active AQI members or sympathizers. Mullah Omar. For its part, the Taliban has the iraqi villages of al-Khidr and Estimates at the time asserted that AQI charged one Mehmood Haq Yar, a Taliban Hanaswa are located immediately east had taken over the towns of Hanaswa commander who has allegedly been to of the Euphrates River. They are simple, and al-Khidr through intimidation, Iraq to learn the Iraqi insurgents’ tactics, small towns, similar to what one would find harassment and murder. Families with making sure Arabs play a role in driving through Kansas. On December 10, from those areas were forced to choose the Afghan jihad. It appears that both 2007, elements from Berserker Company between retaining their homes while sides are united in their desire to topple and attachments began operations aimed supporting AQI, relocating elsewhere, the Hamid Karzai government and carve at clearing 4.7 kilometers north along the or not supporting AQI and accepting out an Islamic state in the tribal areas of Euphrates to al-Khidr, an area controlled the risk associated with such a decision. Pakistan. completely by al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI), Established and with unmitigated control, according to intelligence estimates. The AQI planned operations against coalition Conclusion purpose of this report is to highlight forces and the government of Iraq, and While it is difficult to estimate the operations undertaken against al-Qa`ida Shari`a law was reportedly imposed. As number of Arab fighters in the region,16 in Iraq and to add substantively to recent best understood, this was the portrait of it seems obvious that al-Qa`ida central academic discussions regarding AQI from areas to our north. is determined to play a key role as analysis derived at the tactical level. a fundraiser, recruiter and direct For approximately eight days, U.S. forces, contributor to the military efforts in both The Move North in conjunction with the Iraqi Army and Afghanistan and Pakistan.17 Moreover, Moving into al-Khidr immediately after Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) groups, unlike the earlier generation of “gucci seizing a foothold south of the town was worked to clear north along a stretch of jihadists” who made little if any real an eerie experience. The bombed-out road parallel to the Euphrates. Exceptional contribution to the jihad against the remnants of houses in the area displayed air strikes preceded the beginning of the Soviets, the current generation seems little to no signs of life as the vast operation, totaling 2,500 pounds in close determined to remind the West that the 1 majority of the town had been reduced air support munitions alone. Moving “Lions of Islam” have not forgotten the to rubble. It was a matter of days before north, soldiers took limited small-arms “Forgotten War” in Afghanistan. fire and were hit by three Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), thanks in large Brian Glyn Williams is currently Associate “The areas our operations part to the route clearance team attached Professor of Islamic History at the University were designed to clear to Berserker Company that was able of Massachusetts-Dartmouth. Previously he to find multiple IEDs along routes in taught at the University of London School of allegedly contained the area.2 Operationally, the movement Oriental and African Studies. In addition to his between as many as 30-50 north also focused on the emplacement scholarship, which includes numerous articles on of CLC locations. Similar to the sahwa, jihadi terrorism, ethnic violence, and nationalism active AQI members or or “awakening councils,” witnessed in in Islamic Eurasia, he has a book entitled The sympathizers.” other provinces, the partnership between Crimean Tatars. The Diaspora Experience Sunni Iraqis and U.S. forces called for and the Forging of a Nation (2001). His groups of locals to join in defense of their field work has ranged from Kosovo to Kashmir to communities against extremist elements. Kazakhstan and varies from living with Northern we encountered the first residents of the As we moved, emplacing CLC locations Alliance warlords in Afghanistan to interviewing village (all of whom were returning to al- became a key task, with the goal of Kosovar Albanian field commanders. Most recently Khidr from towns to the north and east). securing lines of communication along he served as an expert witness at Guantanamo Bay Flatbed trucks carried the lives of families the Euphrates River Valley being critical in the case of Salim Hamdan, Bin Ladin’s driver. 3 displaced as social networks slowly to our success. filtered back into the area. Elements of AQI who had inhabited al-Khidr when we 1 These figures were confirmed by 1LT Marshall 16 Coalition forces have killed or arrested hundreds of began our operations were not present; it Tucker, Fire Support Officer for B/3-7 IN. Army avia- foreigners; Afghan government officials have spoken of was clear that they had vacated and left tion and field artillery assets also provided critical fire “hundreds” of Arabs operating in some provinces; and little behind for coalition forces to find support leading up to and during operations in the area, the Pakistanis claim to have arrested thousands and aside from the emptiness caused by their destroying safe houses while also providing immediate killed 488 foreign fighters since 2001. prior residence. support to soldiers on the ground. 17 Sahil Nagpal, “600 Pakistan Security Men Killed in 2 Route Clearance Team and soldiers from B/3-7 IN 28 Suicide Attacks After Lal Masjid Operation,” ANI, A line in the sand existed subsequent to found 22 different types of IEDs or assorted caches dur- November 14, 2007. the arrival of Berserker Company. Prior ing the same period. 3 Total amount of U.S. dollars spent on CLC programs

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Offensive operations ended with the with AQI were Iraqi. The majority of Vigilant patrolling will likely keep establishment of Patrol Base Kelsey just these personnel also hailed from the a defeated AQI in check. There is a south of the Iskandariyya Canal.4 In the al-Khidr and Hanaswa areas. It does strong sense that significant numbers of coming months, Berserker Company will appear that the composition of AQI has individuals formerly aligned with AQI attempt to maintain security and build been degraded both by the emergence currently form the ranks of recently in the areas cleared of AQI. To date, of the Sunni sahwa and infighting with developed CLC programs. In our case, local leaders have signed eight contracts other insurgent groups.5 In addition, the the question of whether this current employing approximately 2,500 local difficulties associated with “pragmatic alignment constitutes an ideological nationals in the CLC program. considerations” highlighted by Dr. victory is questionable. Also troubling is Mohammed M. Hafez seem to factor into the fact that the CLC program has made Defining al-Qa`ida in Iraq Today the failure of AQI here as well.6 Strategic the U.S. military a primary means of One of the more interesting topics of missteps have disabled AQI at the tactical employment in the region; this is a burden contemporary debate focuses on the level. that is likely to be unsustainable and adds significance and status of AQI. Some little to the region’s long-term economic scholars have been quick to proclaim infrastructure. the defeat of AQI, and while evidence to support such conclusions does exist, Following operational success with careful analysis remains to be completed. small victories is the best way to benefit What follows is an assessment of AQI from the promise currently in place. in our area of operations, which ideally These small victories should first be will add to further discussions occurring visible, demonstrating to the population throughout Iraq. the positive change occurring since the move north to al-Khidr.7 Second, every The strength of the ideology underpinning effort should ensure that the programs AQI is perhaps the first and most undertaken actually add to basic important measure needing assessment infrastructure needed throughout the when addressing the state of the group 1LT Jon P. Cheatwood, SGT Thomas Putnoky, SSG Robert region. Creating these victories will be no today. The extent with which ideology Korish and SSG Brian Spera (left to right) at the location of a small task. played in the al-Khidr and Hanaswa areas cache found east of Hanaswa - January 2008. remains ambiguous. As is often the case, As with most counter-insurgency struggles, identifying the true motivations of those The elements of AQI that existed in the al- creating durable accomplishments from associated with extremist groups can often Khidr area seem to have been homegrown; operational successes remains the be a complicated matter. Nevertheless, however, the extent that ideology actually fundamental, outstanding question. interactions with locals—many of whom influenced these individuals remains Capitalizing on the promise currently in were previously displaced—often reveal up for debate. Although it appears the place, while also ensuring security, will an image of AQI that appears largely jihadist leadership vacated the area, the likely offer the best chance for coalition criminal in nature. Members of AQI in localized nature of the threat points to success. al-Khidr and Hanaswa received support a support network that has likely gone from families through coercion. They underground. It is possible that in the First Lieutenant Jon Patrick Cheatwood is an conducted recruitment in a similar near future elements of AQI will attempt infantry officer serving as a platoon leader with manner; the decision not to join AQI to re-infiltrate. Today, however, relative Berserker Company, Third Battalion, Seventh carried great risk. Intimidation trumped peace characterizes the area. Infantry Regiment stationed out of Fort Stewart, ideology; power often meant more than Georgia. 1LT Cheatwood graduated from the political change. If this representation is Moving Forward: Potential and Problems United States Military Academy at West Point in accurate and jihadist tenets have taken The push to al-Khidr was an operational 2006 with a BS in American Politics. His military a backseat to simple gang behavior, we success, and today AQI is largely defeated awards include the Airborne and Air Assault indeed face a much different threat. in our sector. Counter-insurgency now badges, as well as the Ranger tab. demands taking requisite actions to Composition is another factor deserving ensure that operational success leads consideration when assessing the current to greater overall victory. In the coming condition of AQI. Operations undertaken months, the goal must be to capitalize on to clear AQI were unable to discover the current situation, while attempting significant evidence that would reveal to resolve outstanding problems in AO the identities of key leadership in the Berserker. area or profiles of the enemy. Based off interviews, however, it appears that the 5 Arguments from Mohammed M. Hafez’s “Al-Qa`ida vast majority of individuals affiliated Losing Ground in Iraq” analysis in the December 2007 issue of the CTC Sentinel hold true in our area of opera- in our area of operations currently stands at $1,770,750. tions. Specifically, the discussion of conflicting agendas 7 One of Berserker Company’s first small victories oc- 4 The patrol base established was named after SGT between AQI and more nationalistic Sunni insurgent curred when it hosted a MEDCAP in al-Khidr on Janu- Samuel Kelsey, E/3-7 IN, who tragically lost his life dur- groups holds true. ary 28, 2008, which treated more than 200 individuals ing operations on December 13, 2007. 6 Ibid. from the local area.

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Recent Highlights in AP, January 16 imposed on them by the U.S. Treasury Department since December 2007. – AP, Terrorist Activity January 15, 2008 (LEBANON): Arrest January 16 warrants were issued for 10 al-Qa`ida January 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): suspects already in custody, charging January 16, 2008 (IRAQ): A female suicide A roadside IED injured four Canadian them with a number of crimes, including bomber targeted Shi`a worshippers as soldiers in Kandahar Province’s Panjwaii planning to execute terrorist attacks. It they prepared for a ceremony marking district. – Canwest News Service, January is not clear when the 10 were originally `Ashura, the minority sect’s holiest day. 14 detained. In addition, arrest warrants The attack, which took place in Diyala were issued for a separate 10 alleged Province, killed at least nine people. January 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Eight al-Qa`ida militants who are not yet in According to the Associated Press, the police officers were killed after Taliban custody. – AP, January 15 attack marked the fourth case of a female militants stormed their checkpoint. The suicide bombing in three months, all of attack occurred in Maywand district of January 15, 2008 (LEBANON): A bomb which occurred in Diyala Province. – AP, Kandahar Province. – AP, January 13 targeted a U.S. Embassy vehicle in the January 16 Beirut suburb of Dora, killing three January 13, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Scotland Lebanese bystanders and injuring the January 16, 2008 (IRAQ): Three U.S. Yard detectives investigating the death vehicle’s driver. According to a Chicago soldiers were killed by small-arms fire in of former Prime Minister Benazir Tribune reporter, “The last time American Salah al-Din Province. – Reuters, January Bhutto have found that al-Qa`ida-linked interests were systematically targeted 16 militants were likely responsible for the in Lebanon was in the 1980s, when assassination. – The Sunday Times, January bombings against U.S. Marine barracks January 17, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A 13 and embassies in Beirut killed hundreds.” suicide bomber detonated his payload – Chicago Tribune, January 16 in a Shi`a mosque in the Mohalla Jangi January 14, 2008 (THAILAND): At least neighborhood of Peshawar, killing at least eight soldiers were killed when a bomb January 16, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Militants nine people. The attack occurred during exploded in Chanae district of Narathiwat believed linked to Baitullah Mehsud the annual Shi`a festival of Muharram, Province. – AP, January 14 stormed a paramilitary fort in South and it is believed that the bomber was a Waziristan, killing 22 soldiers and taking teenage boy. – New York Times, January 18; January 14, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. some hostage. The attack, which was Los Angeles Times, January 18 military announced that with the claimed by Tehrik-i-Taliban, involved assistance of Iraqi forces they killed 60 approximately 200 fighters who charged January 17, 2008 (IRAQ): Shi`a militants and detained 193 more during the Sararogha Fort, breaking through the worshippers preparing for a ceremony the first week of a large offensive against fort’s walls with rockets and explosives. marking `Ashura, the minority sect’s al-Qa`ida in northern Iraq. The operation – AP, January 16 holiest day, were targeted by a suicide was launched on January 8. – Reuters, bomber, leaving at least 11 dead. The January 14 January 16, 2008 (UNITED STATES): attack, which occurred in Ba`quba in Former congressman Mark Deli Siljander Diyala Province, took place at the door of January 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): was indicted for allegedly sending more a mosque. The incident is separate from a A group of militants attacked Kabul’s than $130,000 to al-Qa`ida and Taliban similar attack that occurred the previous luxury Serena Hotel, killing at least eight supporter Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. day in Diyala Province, which involved a people. The Taliban claimed immediate According to the Associated Press, female suicide bomber. – AP, January 18 responsibility. – CNN, January 14 Siljander was charged with “money laundering, conspiracy and obstructing January 17, 2008 (PAKISTAN): According January 14, 2008 (IRAQ): Appeals court justice for allegedly lying about lobbying to news reports, Pakistani paramilitary judge Amir Jawdat al-Naeib was killed senators on behalf of an Islamic charity troops fled the Sipla Toi military post by gunmen while on his way to work. that authorities said was secretly sending in South Waziristan over concerns that The high-ranking Sunni judge was killed funds to terrorists.” The charges are militants were planning a raid on the in Mansour district of western Baghdad part of a 42-count indictment against the base. The development comes a day after after he was ambushed by gunmen in two Islamic American Relief Agency, a charity hundreds of militants associated with vehicles. – AP, January 15 that was based in Columbia, Missouri and Tehrik-i-Taliban successfully overran a was designated as a terrorist fundraiser fort in South Waziristan Agency, killing January 15, 2008 (UNITED STATES): by the Treasury Department in 2004. more than 20 soldiers. – BBC, January 17 New charges were added in the “Fort – AP, January 16 Dix” court case, where five foreign- January 17, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): born Muslims face a number of charges January 16, 2008 (KUWAIT): The UN British Home Secretary Jacqui Smith revolving around an alleged plot to attack Security Council placed sanctions on three announced that her government would the U.S. military base at Fort Dix in 2007. Kuwaitis charged with recruiting fighters examine ways to remove al-Qa`ida-linked The men include three ethnic Albanians for al-Qa`ida and funding the group’s websites from the internet. “Where there from the former Yugoslavia, a Turk and operations. The men—Hamid al-Ali, Jaber is illegal material on the net, I want it a Jordanian. The trial is set for March 24, al-Jalamah and Mubarak Mushakhas removed,” she told reporters. Smith although it is expected to be delayed. – Sanad al-Bathali—already had sanctions said that she would work with experts

27 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 to find out “how you can filter out after they were engaged by security forces. January 20, 2008 (IRAQ): U.S. military content, how you can work with Internet – Reuters, January 19 warplanes bombed the Arab Jabour service providers, how you can work rural area in southern Baghdad with the internationally to get illegal stuff off the January 19, 2008 (GUINEA-BISSAU): goal of destroying roadside bombs and Internet.” – AFP, January 18; Financial Concerned that its decision to extradite weapons caches. The attacks were part Times, January 18 five al-Qa`ida-linked terrorists on of Operation Phantom Phoenix, which January 12 will make the country a target began on January 8. The same area was January 18, 2008 (YEMEN): Two Belgium for retaliatory terrorist attacks, Guinea- bombed previously on January 10 and women and their Yemeni driver were Bissau has taken a number of security January 16, and the January 20 attack was gunned down in a remote desert mountain actions, including tightening border an extension of those. – AFP, January 20 valley in Yemen’s eastern Hadramawt controls, increasing the number of police region. The two Belgium victims were patrols and increasing inspection of January 20, 2008 (IRAQ): Six people part of a group of 15 Belgium tourists who foreigners. – Reuters, January 19 were killed in Anbar Province as a suicide were on an organized tour to visit ancient bomber walked into the home of a man ruins and other historical attractions. January 19, 2008 (IRAQ): Two U.S. who had just been released from U.S. The convoy of at least four vehicles soldiers were killed in separate incidents. custody, blowing himself up and killing was attacked as it was leaving the town One died in a roadside bomb in Arab those celebrating the release in addition to of Hajrin, and it is believed that the Jabour, which is in southern Baghdad. the just released detainee. The attack took assailants were affiliated with al-Qa`ida. The second soldier was killed during place near Falluja. – Reuters, January 20 – AP, January 19 combat operations in Anbar Province. – Bloomberg, January 21 January 21, 2008 (IRAQ): Approximately January 18, 2008 (UNITED STATES): 18 people were killed as a suicide bomber A New York court sentenced Canadian January 19, 2008 (IRAQ): Six policemen detonated his payload inside a funeral al-Qa`ida member Mohammed Mansour were killed outside their station by two tent. The attack took place in Hajaj Jabarah to life in prison for his role in a to three suicide bombers near Ramadi in village, which lies between Tikrit and plot to bomb U.S. embassies in Manila Anbar Province. – Reuters, January 20; Beiji—approximately 155 miles north of and Singapore in 2001. The 26-year-old AP, January 22 Baghdad. The target of the attack may militant is a Canadian citizen of Iraqi have been Ahmed Abdullah, who is the descent. After the 2001 plot was foiled January 20, 2008 (ALGERIA): The U.S. deputy governor in charge of security for by authorities in Singapore, Jabarah was Embassy in Algiers issued an official Salah al-Din Province. A witness told an apprehended in Oman in 2002. – AFP, warning to U.S. citizens, stating that “in AP reporter that policemen guarding the January 18 response to continuing indications of tent were not searching visitors. – AP, possible terrorist attacks in Algiers, the January 22 January 18, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani embassy has instructed its employees authorities apprehended 10 militants to avoid non-essential movements January 22, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide after a raid in the Tank area of the North- around the city until further notice, and bomber targeted a high school in Ba`quba, West Frontier Province. The military may occasionally restrict movement Diyala Province, killing one individual announced that some of the captured completely.” The warning comes after and wounding 21 more. According to an fighters were commanders. – Reuters, a series of recent terrorist attacks in the AP report, the bomber was “pushing an January 19 country. At least 41 people were killed electric heater on top of a cart packed on December 11 when two suicide attacks with explosives” and detonated the load January 19, 2008 (SPAIN): Authorities hit the capital, one of which targeted UN at a gate in front of the school shortly after apprehended 14 suspected Islamist staff. – AFP, January 20 classes began. – AP, January 22 terrorists for planning an attack on Barcelona. The suspects were Pakistani January 20, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): One January 22, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Five and Indian and allegedly belonged to NATO soldier was killed, and five others Pakistani troops were killed as Islamist Tablighi Jama`at, which is known as wounded, when an explosion hit their militants attacked a fort and observation an Islamic proselytizing group. During convoy of vehicles. The attack took place post at Ladha in South Waziristan. A the raids—conducted at the well- in southern Afghanistan. – AFP, January Pakistani military spokesman said that known Torek Ben Ziad mosque, but also 20 in the ensuing gunfight, approximately including private apartments and a prayer 37 militants were killed. Following the hall—authorities discovered explosives January 20, 2008 (MAURITANIA): incident, the Pakistani military launched materials such as timing devices. – New Four suspected terrorists were charged airstrikes on targets in Ladha. A statement York Times, January 19 with “furnishing logistical support to released by a spokesman for the militants the perpetrators of a terrorist act” due to claimed that the number of their dead January 19, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani their alleged role in the killings of four was exaggerated by the military, and that military forces announced the capture French tourists on December 24, 2007. they had killed 10 soldiers and captured of 40 militants in the Chaghmalai area Four other suspects were released from 13 more. It is believed that the attack of South Waziristan. The announcement custody. The government has said that was conducted by forces part of Tehrik- comes a day after militants ambushed the accused are linked to al-Qa`ida in the i-Taliban. – AFP, January 21; Guardian a convoy in the same area, and they Islamic Maghreb. – AP, January 20 Unlimited, January 22 reportedly suffered 20-30 fatal casualties

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January 22, 2008 (UNITED STATES): January 25, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi Prime Asians. – ABC News, January 31; AP, U.S. citizen Jose Padilla, an enemy Minister Nuri al-Maliki announced that February 1 combatant who was accused of planning to his government will soon launch an detonate a radioactive device in the United extensive operation against al-Qa`ida January 29, 2008 (ALGERIA): A suicide States, was sentenced to 17 years in prison. fighters in Mosul. The announcement bomber drove his vehicle at a police Padilla, who has been detained for more comes after a series of terrorist attacks station in Thenia, approximately 30 miles than three years and who had attended an in the northern Iraqi city. – Voice of east of Algiers, killing at least four people. al-Qa`ida training camp in Afghanistan America, January 25 Security forces opened fire on the vehicle in 2000, was arrested and declared an before it reached the station, causing the enemy combatant when he returned to the January 25, 2008 (LEBANON): A car bomber to detonate his explosives early. United States in 2002. Prosecutors were bombing killed a senior Lebanese – AFP, January 29 seeking a life sentence for Padilla. Two intelligence officer, Captain Wissam Eid, co-defendants—Adham Amin Hassoun along with his bodyguard. Eid was one January 29, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): and Kifah Wael Jayyousi—received 15 and of Lebanon’s top terrorism investigators. Approximately 500 women in Kandahar 12 year sentences, respectively. – New York Two others were also killed in the attack, protested the abduction of Cyd Mizell, a Times, January 22 which occurred in Beirut. – AFP, January female American aid worker who was 25; AP, January 27 kidnapped on January 26. During the January 22, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): gathering, the women drafted a resolution The British government announced that January 27, 2008 (IRAQ): U.S. military that stated, “We strongly condemn young Muslim women are increasingly spokesman Rear Admiral Gregory Smith the abduction of a foreign woman who involved in “violent extremism.” The told reporters that al-Qa`ida in Iraq was working for Kandahar people and government announced that there is “no is using teenagers as suicide bombers. Kandahar women.” No group has claimed single profile” of a radicalized citizen, but Smith said, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq is trying to responsibility for the kidnapping. – AFP, that “they are likely to be young—generally brainwash children with hate and death... January 29 younger than 30—and male, although they seek to create a culture of violence, the number of women who support hate and despair…[and] are sending January 29, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A and participate in violent extremism is 15-year-old boys on suicide missions to roadside bomb exploded in Kandahar increasing.” – AFP, January 22 spread death and helplessness.” – AFP, Province, killing two civilians. It is January 27 believed that the bomb was intended for January 23, 2008 (GLOBAL): A new government or international security 28-minute videotape featuring al-Qa`ida January 28, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A grand forces. – AFP, January 30 operative Abu Yahya al-Libi appeared jirga of 18 tribes in Orakzai Agency of on Islamist web forums. During the the Federally Administered Tribal Areas January 30, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): recording, al-Libi calls on Islamic scholars (FATA) was convened in the morning, Four Afghan roadworkers were beheaded to support the jihad and for militant and an agreement was reportedly reached by Taliban militants, according to the groups to fight strictly for Islamic causes, to form a lashkar (tribal army) against Afghan Interior Ministry. The workers rather than national or political ones. Taliban fighters. According to Pakistani were abducted a week earlier in Nuristan – AP, January 24 press reports, some “ten to fifteen Province in the country’s northeast. thousand armed men” attended the jirga. The militants had demanded a ransom January 23, 2008 (IRAQ): Approximately – Daily Times, January 30 payment for the release of the workers, 38 people were killed after a bomb and according to the Afghan government exploded and destroyed an estimated January 28, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): A the families failed to comply with the 50 buildings in a slum in Mosul. – AP, woman was abducted by the Abu Sayyaf demands. – AFP, January 30; Reuters, January 26 Group (ASG) on Jolo Island in the January 30 southern Philippines. ASG has apparently January 24, 2008 (IRAQ): Brigadier demanded a ransom for the captive’s January 30, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): General Salah al-Juburi, the chief of release. – Gulf News, January 29 A suicide car bomber targeted a NATO police of Ninawa Province, was killed by convoy in Kandahar Province, yet a suicide bomber in Mosul. The assailant January 28, 2008 (SOMALIA): Two missed its target and instead injured four was in a police uniform, and the attack Somalis and two aid workers from civilians. There were no NATO casualties. occurred as al-Juburi was inspecting Medecins Sans Frontieres were killed – AFP, January 30 a bomb attack from the previous day. after a roadside bomb struck their vehicle – AFP, January 24 near Kismayo. – Reuters, January 28 January 30, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): According to Philippine Armed Forces January 24, 2008 (TURKEY): Turkish January 28-29, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Top Chief Hermogenes Esperon Jr., the authorities raided suspected al-Qa`ida al-Qa`ida operative Abu Laith al-Libi number of active Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) hideouts in southeastern Turkey. One was believed killed by a Predator drone operatives in the Philippines has been police officer and at least one militant in North Waziristan. Jihadist websites reduced to approximately 20 men from a were killed during the operation, which have released congratulatory martyrdom previous high of 30-40. When questioned occurred in the city of Gaziantep. statements recognizing al-Libi’s death. as to whether JI is receiving funding – Guardian Unlimited, January 24; Reuters, Twelve others were also believed killed in from abroad, the military chief said, January 24 the attack, including Arabs and Central “We have some indications that there

29 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 are some funding still coming into them separated the two attacks. – Bloomberg, been orchestrated by Muslim insurgents, but not as much as they could. The global February 1; AFP, February 1 seriously wounded the district’s chief. community has grown so weary about – AP, February 4 illegal transactions, illegal transfers of February 2, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Three funds. We are on the lookout for that.” Islamist militants and two policemen February 4, 2008 (THAILAND): Six – Sun Star, January 30 were killed after a long firefight in the people were wounded in Muang district North-West Frontier Province. The attack in Yala Province after a bomb exploded in January 30, 2008 (KYRGYZSTAN): erupted after police surrounded a house the front basket of a motorcycle. – Bangkok Authorities arrested Abdulkhai that was believed to contain militants. Post, February 4 Yuldashev, who they accused of being tied – AFP, February 2 to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. February 4, 2008 (ISRAEL): One person – AP, January 31 February 3, 2008 (SOMALIA): Eight was killed and 11 wounded when a civilians were killed after a roadside bomb Palestinian suicide bomber detonated his January 31, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A exploded near a minibus in Mogadishu. payload in the Israeli town of Dimona. car bomb targeted an Afghan army bus – Anchorage Daily News, February 2 According to the London paper The Times, in Kabul, wounding four civilians and the bombing was “claimed by a Gaza- one soldier. The attack took place in the February 3, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): based splinter group of Fatah.” – The capital’s Taimani neighborhood. – AP, Two Taliban commanders were killed in Times, February 5 January 30 Bakwa district of Farah Province after Afghan and international troops raided February 5, 2008 (IRAQ): According to January 31, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A the compound in which they were being U.S. Director of National Intelligence suicide bomber exploded inside a mosque sheltered. – Reuters, February 4 Mike McConnell, al-Qa`ida is sending in Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province, operatives from Iraq to other countries killing provincial Deputy Governor Pir February 3, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): to establish terrorist cells. The decision, Mohammad along with five others. – AP, Afghan security forces killed 10 Taliban according to McConnell, is a result of al- January 31 fighters in Deh Rawood district of Uruzgan Qa`ida’s weakening presence and ability Province. – Reuters, February 4 to operate in Iraq. – AP, February 5 January 31, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Philippine soldiers launched an operation February 4, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A February 5, 2008 (IRAQ): Eight members on an Abu Sayyaf Group camp in Tawi- police patrol in Helmand Province was of an Awakening Council were killed as a Tawi in the southern Philippines. targeted by a roadside bomb, killing two suicide bomber detonated his explosives Although the raid targeted Jemaah officers. The attack, which took place outside the home of Shaykh Shathr al- Islamiyah leader Dulmatin, he managed inside Kandahar city, was blamed on Obeidi, who leads the council in Awad to elude capture. Abu Sayyaf commander Taliban militants. – The Canadian Press, village 40 kilometers north of Baghdad. Radi Upao, however, was killed in the February 5 – AFP, February 6 attack. – AFP, February 1 February 4, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A February 5-6, 2008 (SOMALIA): At least February 1, 2008 (MAURITANIA): roadside bomb caused damage to a taxi in 20 people were killed in Bosasso after Gunmen fired shots at the Israeli Embassy Helmand Province, killing five civilians; a terrorists planted grenades in a building in Mauritania. No casualties were suffered woman and two children were among the that was primarily used by Ethiopian by the embassy staff, although three dead. – The Canadian Press, February 5 migrants. – BBC, February 6 civilian bystanders were injured. The attack was conducted at approximately February 4, 2008 (IRAQ): Mosul’s February 6, 2008 (IRAQ): Twenty- 2:00 AM, and the terrorists fled in a regional command of the Islamic State eight suspected militants were arrested vehicle after the attack. Al-Qa`ida in the of Iraq posted a statement on an Islamist by a tactical Iraqi security force near Islamic Maghreb later claimed credit for website that they have started a campaign Salman Pak, 20 miles south of Baghdad. the operation. – AFP, February 1 to attack U.S. troops, Iraqi Shi`a and The operation was conducted under the Kurdish peshmerga forces in northern supervision of U.S. Special Forces, and the February 1, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Two Iraq. – AP, February 4 detained militants were believed linked to Frontier Corps troops and four policemen al-Qa`ida in Iraq. – UPI, February 7 were killed in North Waziristan Agency, February 4, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide as a suicide car bomber targeted a security bomber riding a motorbike killed at least February 6, 2008 (IRAQ): According checkpoint. The attack took place near six people in Rawalpindi. The bomber to the U.S. and Iraqi militaries, al- Mir Ali. – Reuters, February 1 detonated his payload when he was next to Qa`ida in Iraq is training children as a bus filled with members of the security gunmen and kidnappers. An AFP report February 1, 2008 (IRAQ): More than forces. – al-Jazira, February 4 on the development states that “in the 90 people were killed in Baghdad when [captured] videos released to reporters, terrorists remotely detonated explosives February 4, 2008 (THAILAND): One boys apparently as young as nine are seen that were carried on the bodies of two person was killed in Mayo district of wearing balaclava masks and European women with Down syndrome. One blast Pattani Province after a bomb exploded soccer jerseys and brandishing pistols, occurred in al-Ghazal, while the other was 20 yards from an Islamic boarding school. machine-guns and rocket launchers in al-Jadida district. A span of 10 minutes The attack, which was believed to have during a series of training exercises.”

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– AFP, February 7 in Sangin district, Helmand Province. February 10, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A – Reuters, February 9 newly released poll by the U.S.-based February 6, 2008 (PAKISTAN): According group Terror Free Tomorrow found that to various press reports, the Pakistani February 8, 2008 (IRAQ): Four U.S. support for Usama bin Ladin in Pakistan military has agreed to a temporary cease- soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb has dropped considerably. According to fire with Baitullah Mehsud and his during a patrol northwest of Baghdad. the poll, which was conducted last month, Tehrik-i-Taliban in South Waziristan – Reuters, February 9 only 24% of Pakistanis approve of Bin Agency. – National Post, February 9 Ladin. In August 2007, a similar survey February 8, 2008 (MAURITANIA): found that 46% of Pakistanis approved February 6, 2008 (THAILAND): One France announced that it will increase of Bin Ladin, a considerable drop. The soldier was killed after a bomb, hidden in security assistance to Mauritania. The January poll also found that only 18% of the basket of a motorcycle, exploded near decision came in the wake of a series of the population supports al-Qa`ida and a Chinese shrine in southern Thailand’s terrorist attacks that have occurred in the only 19% supports the Taliban. – AP, Pattani Province. Authorities suspect country in the last few months. – Reuters, February 10 Muslim insurgents were behind the blast. February 9 – AP, February 6 February 10, 2008 (IRAQ): U.S. military February 9, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi authorities officials announced that they recently February 6, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A announced the death of an al-Qa`ida in captured documents from al-Qa`ida statement by al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan Iraq leader, Abu Omar, who was killed in Iraq leaders demonstrating how the leader Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid appeared by security forces in Samarra. – Voice of terrorist group has been weakened in on Islamist internet forums in which he America, February 9 the country. According to a U.S. military vowed revenge for the killing of al-Qa`ida spokesman, the documents provide “clear commander Abu Laith al-Libi, who was February 9, 2008 (SOMALIA): Gunmen and compelling evidence that the Iraq allegedly targeted by a Predator drone attacked a UN compound in Mogadishu, volunteer citizens’ groups…are restricting in Pakistan in late January. – Reuters, striking the facility with assault rifle the terrorists’ freedom of movement,” February 6 fire and rocket-propelled grenades. and “shows that al-Qa`ida regards these There were no known casualties at the groups as a grave threat and the terrorists February 7, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): compound. – AP, February 9 are increasingly targeting them.” The Three NATO soldiers were wounded by documents were captured in November a suicide car bomber in Khost Province. February 9, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 2007. – AFP, February 10 – Voice of America, February 7 Mullah Abdul Wasay Akhund accidentally killed himself, along with his two children February 10, 2008 (IRAQ): A firefight February 7, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): and two other men, after he prematurely between a Sunni neighborhood watch The government signed an extradition detonated a bomb he was building at group—known as the Sons of Iraq—and al- order that will send Abu Hamza al-Masri, his home in Helmand Province. – CNN Qa`ida in Iraq fighters left five members who is currently in prison for inciting International, February 11 of the group dead along with 10 al-Qa`ida racial hatred, to the United States for fighters. The al-Qa`ida ambush and trial. The well-known former preacher of February 9, 2008 (PAKISTAN): subsequent firefight occurred in Ninawa the Finsbury Mosque, al-Masri faces 11 Approximately 15-20 people attending Province. – CNN, February 10 terrorism-related charges in the United an Awami National Party opposition States. – CNN, February 7 rally were killed by a suicide bomber in February 10, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Charsadda, in the North-West Frontier The Norwegian Embassy in Kabul was February 8, 2008 (GERMANY): The Province. – AFP, February 9 closed due to terrorist threats. The move German government announced that comes after terrorists attacked the Serena “German security authorities have seen February 10, 2008 (UNITED STATES): Hotel in Kabul on January 15, in which a qualitative increase in al-Qaida activity According to U.S. officials, six a Norwegian journalist was killed. The on the internet.” According to an Interior Guantanamo Bay detainees, among them Norwegian foreign minister was in the Ministry spokesman, “We have very Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, may soon be hotel at the time, but did not suffer any clearly seen that al-Qa`ida increasingly charged for their roles in the September injuries. – AP, February 10 uses the internet for three components—a 11 attacks. Prosecutors may seek the massive radicalization, recruiting and death penalty against at least one of the February 10, 2008 (IRAQ): At least the spreading of technical information on detainees. – Voice of America, February eight civilians were killed as a suicide how to carry out a terror attack, including 10 car bomber detonated his explosives construction of explosive devices.” near Balad, 50 miles north of Baghdad. Furthermore, German authorities believe February 10, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): It appears that the attack targeted a that al-Qa`ida increasingly sees Germany Approximately six people were wounded checkpoint, but the bomber detonated as a target for future attacks. – AP, after a bomb ripped through an amateur his explosives prematurely after coming February 8 song and dance contest in Lanao del Norte under fire. – AP, February 10 Province in Mindanao. – Manila Times, February 8, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): February 12 February 10, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi security Two Afghan soldiers were killed after forces and U.S. soldiers arrested the a roadside bomb struck their vehicle acting director of a psychiatric hospital in

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Baghdad, accusing him of “supplying al- CTC Sentinel Staff Qa`ida in Iraq with the mentally impaired women that it used to blow up two crowded Editor-in-Chief animal markets in the city on February 1, Erich Marquardt killing about 100 people,” according to a Senior Editor, CTC February 12 report in London’s The Times.

Editorial Board February 11, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Top Jarret Brachman, Ph.D. Taliban commander Mullah Mansour Director of Research, CTC Dadullah was wounded and captured by Pakistani security forces in Baluchistan Brian Fishman Province. A military statement said that Senior Associate, CTC “initial information reveals that Mullah Mansour Dadullah is injured and has Assaf Moghadam, Ph.D. been arrested while trying to enter into Senior Research Fellow, CTC Pakistan.” Dadullah’s current role in the Taliban is not clear since it is believed that James Forest, Ph.D. Taliban leader Mullah Omar dismissed Director of Terrorism Studies, CTC him from command recently. – Reuters, February 11 LTC(P) Joseph Felter, Ph.D. Director, CTC February 11, 2008 (IRAQ): Twin car bombs ripped through Baghdad, killing at least COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. 11 people. It is suspected that the attack Deputy Department Head was aimed at Shaykh Ali Hatem, one of Department of Social Sciences (West Point) the main forces behind the “awakening” movement. – New York Times, February 12 COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. Department Head February 11, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin, disappeared in Pakistan’s tribal Khyber region, and Contact authorities suspect that he may have been Combating Terrorism Center abducted. – guardian.co.uk, February 11 U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall February 11, 2008 (PAKISTAN): At least West Point, NY 10996 six people were killed when a suicide Phone: (202) 425-8578 bomber exploded at a political rally in Email: [email protected] Eidak, North Waziristan Agency. The rally Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ was affiliated with the Awami National Party. – guardian.co.uk, February 11 * For Press Inquiries: (202) 425-8578 February 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): support One NATO soldier was wounded after a suicide car bomber exploded next to a The Combating Terrorism Center would convoy in Farah Province. – AP, February like to express its gratitude to its financial 12 supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like February 12, 2008 (SYRIA): Top Hizb the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If Allah operative Imad Mughniyyeh was you are interested in learning more about killed in a car bomb in Damascus. – Reu- how to support the Combating Terrorism ters, February 13 Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1553.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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