DOCSLIB.ORG

The Lebanese Parliamentary Elections of 2018: Much Ado About Nothing?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Peter Nassif FOKUS | 4/2018 The Lebanese Parliamentary Elections of 2018: Much Ado about Nothing? On 6 May 2018, Lebanon went to the polls humanitarian support for Syrian refugees Political and Security Challenges to elect a new parliament for the first time as well as political support for neighboring in nine years. These elections stand out host countries.3 More important was the The parliament’s elections were postponed for the largest reform in voting laws in CEDRE4 donor conference that was held in 2013 and 2014 because of security Lebanese history, the influence of regional in Paris on 6 April, where 11 billion USD con cerns. During the time, the Syrian War tensions, but also a civil society challen- in credits and grants were pledged to Le- was raging in the Lebanese-Syrian border ging the old guard. After much anticipa- banon during election season – a country region, while the rise of ISIS and frequent tion, the general elections changed less with a gross public debt of almost 80 billi- car bombings in Hezbollah’s southern the political landscape than many people on USD5 and the fifth-highest debt-to-GDP Beirut neighborhoods led to a general had hoped. The results demonstrated that ratio worldwide.6 sense of insecurity. The Syrian government Lebanese voters and political parties are was losing ground and the Lebanese Shiite still far away from running and voting on A Peculiar Political System Hezbollah militia had joined the conflict in policy-based solutions to tackle the socio- 2012 to fight alongside the regime. It took economic challenges facing the country. Lebanon is a consociational democracy until mid-2014 for the Lebanese and Syrian that relies on a system of proportional army with Hezbollah to secure the border Since their last election in 2009, the par- sectarian representation.7 Based on a late region, although pockets of ISIS remained liament had extended its mandate three Ottoman power-sharing formula,8 each in Lebanon until summer 2017. times before agreeing to hold elections of the 18 acknowledged religious sects in in 2018. The delays were so extensive that Lebanon enjoy access to the government: Security is not the only concern in Leba- the last parliament was elected in a diffe- the 128 seats in Parliament are distributed non: the incapability of the Lebanese rent regional context – before the “Arab between sects in accordance with their government to agree on basic infrastruc- Spring” and the Syrian War. Revolutions size of population. After Lebanon’s inde- ture projects led to major crisis in the have reshaped Tunisia and Egypt, while pendence in 1943, a power-sharing deal summer of 2015. Beirut’s main landfill was Syria, Iraq and Yemen plunged into gru- based on the census of 1936 gave the lar- closed without having an alternative at esome wars and experienced the rise and gest sect (Christian Maronite) the Presiden- hand, because political actors could not fall of the Islamic State. In recent months, cy, the second largest group (Sunni Islam) agree on a plan that would benefit them the Trump administration, Israel and Saudi the Prime Minister, and the third (Shia Is- all. Organized waste management became Arabia have been increasingly escalating lam) the Speaker of Parliament. No official impossible for the next eight months, their campaign against Iran, with the US census has taken place since 1936, but the during which municipalities had to store withdrawing from the Iran Deal (JCPOA)1 Taif Agreement of 1989 that ended the Le- waste within the city, often in residential two days after the Lebanese elections. banese Civil War (1975-1990) strengthened neighborhoods – if garbage was collec- the role of the Prime Minister and Speaker ted at all. The notorious corruption and Internally, Lebanon is closely affected by of Parliament in relation to the Presidency. incompetence of the Lebanese political neighboring Syria where the war has pro- Most militias were disarmed after the war, system sparked protests in the summer of duced an outflow of 5.6 million refugees, but Syria continued to occupy Lebanon for 2015 that grew from the garbage crisis to with around 1.5 million refugees living in another 15 years, effectively controlling overall contempt for the government and Lebanon,2 rendering it the country with the country through political proxies and political system. The protest movement the highest count of refugees per capita. its military force. This included the support was able to mobilize and quickly organize Interestingly, the war and refugee crisis of Hezbollah, keeping the group in arms the civil society, surprising the established did not play a large role during election and shielded from accountability. Still, political class. This became apparent in the campaigns – partly because of the lack of virtually all major political parties today municipal elections of May 2016, where feasible solutions and partly because of a had a military wing during the war. After the civil society that formed in the previ- tacit agreement among parties to avoid commanding militias (or the army) during ous summer earned considerable votes in this path. An important aspect was the the war, today’s party leaders maintain several districts – particularly Beirut, where buildup of major international conferences their power through a system of patro- they won 40% on specific seats. Due to the where Lebanon wanted to give a positi- nage and sectarianism. majority-based electoral system at the time, ve image and avoid populist campaign the votes where not enough to win any rhetoric: On 24 and 25 April 2018, the seats, but they demonstrated that the civil Brussels II conference was held to secure society was a force to be reckoned with.9 1 The Lebanese Parliamentary Elections of 2018 FOKUS | 4/2018 The Lebanese Game of Chess interests. Instead, the move weakened running against them in other areas. the KSA’s position in Lebanon and with it Other implications include: First, indepen- At the same time, a political crisis had that of its ally Hariri, while Hezbollah and dents and popular candidates could no been looming: the Lebanese President’s President Aoun were praised for keeping longer rely on their own weight but rather term had run out in May 2014 with no calm, uniting the country and solving the had to attach their candidacy to strong successor in place and the Parliament’s crisis diplomatically. lists that expected to win seats. Second, two main blocks were in a deadlock over because the system no longer follows a whom to elect. It wasn’t until early 2016 Changing the Electoral Law winner-takes-all approach, the seats of that the rival Christian parties Lebanese each sect gained considerable weight, Forces (LF) and Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Before 2018, elections in Lebanon were even in areas that were traditionally seen Movement (FPM) came to an agreement based on an old majority-based electoral as strongholds of a particular sect and that secured the Presidency for Michel law that followed a winner-takes-all logic. In their respective parties. Third, the diaspora Aoun. Having initially pushed for a diffe- an attempt to avoid the deadlock produced vote opened the elections to a completely rent candidate, Saad Hariri, Sunni leader by previous elections, the law was changed new ecosystem of Lebanese nationals. and son of the late Prime Minister Rafik to a more proportional voting system. Since Lebanese citizens living abroad are Hariri, was forced to agree on the deal believed to amount to roughly the same that would also make him the new Prime The Lebanese parties primarily repre- size as inside Lebanon, this may have Minister. As such he led a government that sent religious sects and family relations, considerable impact if enough diaspo- included almost all major parties, inclu- although minor ideological differences ra Lebanese choose to take part in the ding Hezbollah –, which Hariri opposes on may still occur, particularly within the elections.12 a political and sectarian level. Amid a regi- sects. Hence, parties very rarely engage onal rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, their constituents on the level of ideology The 2018 Election Outcome Hezbollah enjoys the strong support of or political programs. The pronounced Iran, while Hariri is seen as Saudi Arabia’s sectarian identity of Lebanese voters and After nine years without elections, there man in Lebanon.10 In October 2016, a party loyalty is passed on within fami- was a general mood of excitement, and national agreement was reached when lies and over generations. Shifts in voter although the candidate registration Michel Aoun’s election ended a 29-month alignment are unlikely because parties was not cheap (ca. 4400€),13 close to a vacuum in the presidency. The new nati- focus on religious rhetoric, clientelism and thousand candidates signed up to run for onal unity government was finally able to family affiliations instead of a program- office, including a record number of 86 sign a series of pressing is sues into laws matic platform. This would make it nearly women (in 2009 only 12). For a parliament and completely overhaul the electoral law impossible for political parties to escape that had only four women – all represen- for parliamentary elections, which was an the deadlock in the political system by ting powerful men (the wife, daughter or outstanding issue regarding the political changing their programmatic orientation. sister of another politician), this could have process in Lebanon. Instead, the system itself needs to be chan- been an important step towards more ged, thus parties agreed on changing the gender balance. Furthermore, the large In late 2017 however, Lebanon was once voting system. amount of young and alternative candida- again reminded of how closely its fate is tes gave hope to the civil society and those tied to the regional rivalry between Saudi In 2017, a consensus was reached that demanding a change.
Recommended publications
  • Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm

    Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm

    LEBANON: MANAGING THE GATHERING STORM Middle East Report N°48 – 5 December 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. A SYSTEM BETWEEN OLD AND NEW.................................................................. 1 A. SETTING THE STAGE: THE ELECTORAL CONTEST..................................................................1 B. THE MEHLIS EFFECT.............................................................................................................5 II. SECTARIANISM AND INTERNATIONALISATION ............................................. 8 A. FROM SYRIAN TUTELAGE TO WESTERN UMBRELLA?............................................................8 B. SHIFTING ALLIANCES..........................................................................................................12 III. THE HIZBOLLAH QUESTION ................................................................................ 16 A. “A NEW PHASE OF CONFRONTATION” ................................................................................17 B. HIZBOLLAH AS THE SHIITE GUARDIAN?..............................................................................19 C. THE PARTY OF GOD TURNS PARTY OF GOVERNMENT.........................................................20 IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 22 A. A BROAD INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR A NARROW AGENDA .......................................22 B. A LEBANESE COURT ON FOREIGN
  • Political Party Mapping in Lebanon Ahead of the 2018 Elections

    Political Party Mapping in Lebanon Ahead of the 2018 Elections

    Political Party Mapping in Lebanon Ahead of the 2018 Elections Foreword This study on the political party mapping in Lebanon ahead of the 2018 elections includes a survey of most Lebanese political parties; especially those that currently have or previously had parliamentary or government representation, with the exception of Lebanese Communist Party, Islamic Unification Movement, Union of Working People’s Forces, since they either have candidates for elections or had previously had candidates for elections before the final list was out from the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. The first part includes a systematic presentation of 27 political parties, organizations or movements, showing their official name, logo, establishment, leader, leading committee, regional and local alliances and relations, their stance on the electoral law and their most prominent candidates for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The second part provides the distribution of partisan and political powers over the 15 electoral districts set in the law governing the elections of May 6, 2018. It also offers basic information related to each district: the number of voters, the expected participation rate, the electoral quotient, the candidate’s ceiling on election expenditure, in addition to an analytical overview of the 2005 and 2009 elections, their results and alliances. The distribution of parties for 2018 is based on the research team’s analysis and estimates from different sources. 2 Table of Contents Page Introduction .......................................................................................................
  • European Union Election Observation Mission to the Republic of Lebanon 2018 EU Election Observation Mission – Lebanon 2018 FINAL REPORT

    European Union Election Observation Mission to the Republic of Lebanon 2018 EU Election Observation Mission – Lebanon 2018 FINAL REPORT

    Parliamentary Elections 2018 European Union Election Observation Mission to the Republic of Lebanon 2018 EU Election Observation Mission – Lebanon 2018 FINAL REPORT LEBANON FINAL REPORT Parliamentary elections 2018 EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION www.eueom-lebanon2018.eu This report has been produced by the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Lebanon 2018 and contains the conclusions of its observation of the parliamentary elections on 6 May. The contents of this report do not necessarily reflect the official position of the European Union. 1 EU Election Observation Mission – Lebanon 2018 FINAL REPORT Table of Contents I. Executive summary ................................................................................................. 3 II. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 8 III. Political background ............................................................................................... 9 IV. Implementation of previous EOM recommendations ............................................ 10 V. Legal framework ................................................................................................... 11 VI. Election Administration ........................................................................................ 14 VII. Voter registration ................................................................................................. 17 VIII. Registration of candidates and political parties ....................................................
  • The Pennsylvania State University Schreyer Honors College

    The Pennsylvania State University Schreyer Honors College

    THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES PROGRAM TO THEM WE ARE ALL ANTS: LEBANON- FROM INDEPENDENCE TO UNCERTAINTY MOHAMED SALIM RAOUDA BALAH Spring 2011 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for baccalaureate degrees in History and International Politics with honors in History Reviewed and approved* by the following: Dr. Arthur Goldschmidt Professor Emeritus of Middle East History Thesis Supervisor Dr. Catherine Wanner Associate Professor of History, Anthropology and Religious Studies Honors Adviser * Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College. ABSTRACT The evolution of the Lebanese state is marred by the sectarian order established by the National Pact at the time of Lebanese independence in 1943. As of 2011 the current political crisis in Lebanon has polarized the Sunni community supporting the March 14 party and the Shi’a population supporting the March 8 party. Many of their issues have been dragged across history with no clear, long term, solution to address them. As a result, these problems have culminated in today’s political crisis, adding a new dynamic with the emergence of Hizbullah as a major player in the Middle East. This thesis examines the historical roots of Lebanese independence as a tool for understanding the circumstances allowing Hizbullah to gain prominence. Then it aims to analyze recent historical events between the end of the civil war and the present day to draw conclusions about the current state of affairs. Through this historical and political analysis, I will show the reader that over the period of Lebanese history, the opportunity to reform the country and remove foreign influence has been thwarted by the sectarian divisions.
  • U.S.-Lebanon Dialogue Program Lebanon's Upcoming Elections

    U.S.-Lebanon Dialogue Program Lebanon's Upcoming Elections

    U.S.-Lebanon Dialogue Program Lebanon’s Upcoming Elections Summary Lebanon’s democratic process is a complex system intended to ensure a balance of ethnic and religious representation at all levels of government. Because certain electoral districts must be represented by a set mix of ethno-religious representatives, the prospect of a single party winning a broad mandate for leadership is very low. The nature of the governing coalition depends heavily on how electoral alliances are stitched together in the days immediately before and after the elections. According to the most recent polls, the elections today are still too close to call. What does seem clear is that whoever wins will likely hold a very slim majority in parliament, quite possibly leading to a continuation of some form of the current power sharing arrangement. This would mean that there would be no radical shift in Lebanon’s regional orientation, but would likely continue to slow further reform efforts with the need to secure approval from all sides. March 14 leaders have consistently rejected this idea, however, leading to fears that if Hezbollah and its allies win a majority, they may have to govern alone and face the curtailment of essential international aid. The Lebanese Political System Lebanon’s three top national positions – president, prime minister and speaker of parliament – are reserved for Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shia Muslims respectively. The deputy premiership and deputy speaker of parliament are reserved for the Greek Orthodox. The parliament and cabinet are apportioned along a 50-50 split between Muslims and Christians, with proportional representation of each sect within those two blocs.
  • We Buried the Jungle Under Tons of Asphalt and Call It Home Re-Imagining Beirut Through the Spatial Practices of Lebanon’S Post-War Generation

    We Buried the Jungle Under Tons of Asphalt and Call It Home Re-Imagining Beirut Through the Spatial Practices of Lebanon’S Post-War Generation

    We buried the jungle under tons of asphalt and call it home Re-imagining Beirut through the spatial practices of Lebanon’s post-war generation Written by Anna Klinkspoor ‘’WE BURIED THE JUNGLE UNDER TONS OF ASPHALT AND CALL IT HOME’’ RE-IMAGINING BEIRUT THROUGH THE SPATIAL PRACTICES OF LEBANON’S POST-WAR GENERATION MASTER THESIS CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: SUSTAINABLE CITIZENSHIP ANNA KLINKSPOOR, 3797023 SUPERVISOR: REBECCA BRYANT SECOND SUPERVISOR: NIKKIE WIEGINK UTRECHT UNIVERSITY – MARCH 15, 2019 COVER PHOTO BY JAD EL-KHOURY 2 Abstract Solidere, one of the Main companies that was responsible for the reconstruction of Beirut’s city center after the civil war (1975-1990), stated that they would ‘’Provide a faMiliar and coMforting Physical environment, one which reinforces the citizens’ sense of belonging.’’ However, scholars argue that the opposite can be observed: they erased the MeMories of the past like a tabula rasa and built on the status quo of a fragMented, segregated city where only the elite have the right to. In this process of post-war rehabilitation, it is argued, young citizens are being Marginalized. Based on three Months of ethnograPhic fieldwork, this thesis sets out to explore how young urban activists and artists construct and negotiate feelings of belonging through actively (re)shaping Beirut’s existing infrastructure in a bottom-up way. The research deMonstrates that Beirut’s Public sPaces are contested domains of in- and exclusion wherein ‘’being political’’ is often associated with sectarianism, corruption and ‘’the war lords that are leading the country.’’ In three arguMents I deMonstrate that the young Beirutis create spaces of belonging: by bringing back the civil war’s MeMories into public spaces (chapter 1), by strategically using syMbols, colors and ornaments that are not associated with political parties (chapter 2) and by creating ‘alternative’ Public sPaces on Beirut’s public stairs – an environment where local and global processes intersect (chapter 3).
  • Patterns of Social Control at the Lebanese University

    Patterns of Social Control at the Lebanese University

    FOCUS 64 Introduction Much has been written about sectarianism When Crisis Promotes Proximity: and sectarian clientelism in Lebanon from Patterns of Social Control at the the viewpoint of political history (Sinno; Sharāra; Makdissi). Little has been pub- Lebanese University lished about how it works on the micro- sociological level, certainly when it comes to the country’s highly diverse education system (Nucho; Deeb and Harb). In the context of political systems such as the Lebanese, sectarianism or communal- ism (Arabic: madhhabiyya or ṭāʾifiyya) is a mode of distributing legal, political and administrative power among different reli- gious groups. Beyond this meaning, sec- tarianism is often used to mark a mentality, a pattern of loyalty which channels con- tacts and forges relationships. This con- cept of sectarianism widely overlaps with the one of clientelism. Both concepts, sec- tarianism and clientelism by themselves Jonathan Kriener have little explanatory or illustrative power in order to understand institutional rela- During the Lebanese war of 1975 to 1990, terms of the dynamics of social control tions. To look a bit deeper into the mecha- the only public university of Lebanon that resulted from it. It shows that by the nisms, by which they work, I was searching branched out into more than 40 locations perspective of social control, sectarianism for a different perspective when studying all over the country. While this deed and clientelism can be observed as the Lebanese higher education land- reflects the inner division of Lebanon, it related with, but distinct from one scape. also moved the University nearer to the another.
  • The Insecure City

    The Insecure City

    THE INSECURE CITY THE INSECURE CITY Space, Power, and Mobility in Beirut Kristin V. Monroe Rutgers University Press New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Monroe, Kristin V., 1974– author. Th e insecure city : space, power, and mobility in Beirut / Kristin V. Monroe. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–8135–7463–9 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–8135–7462–2 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–8135–7464–6 (e-book (epub)) — ISBN 978–0–8135–7465–3 (e-book (web pdf)) 1. Sociology, Urban —Lebanon—Beirut. 2. Public spaces—Lebanon— Beirut. 3. City traffi c—Lebanon—Beirut. 4. Violence—Lebanon—Beirut. 5. Urban anthropology—Lebanon—Beirut. 6. Beirut (Lebanon)—Social conditions. I. Title. HT147.L4M66 2016 307.76095692′5—dc23 2015021869 A British Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Copyright © 2016 by Kristin V. Monroe All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without writt en permission from the publisher. Please contact Rutgers University Press, 106 Somerset Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901. Th e only exception to this prohibition is “fair use” as defi ned by U.S. copyright law. Visit our website: htt p://rutgerspress.rutgers.edu Manufactured in the United States of America For my mother, Ann CONTENTS List of Figures ix Acknowledgments xi Note on Language xv Introduction 1 1 Th e Privatized City 18 2 Th e Space of War 35 3 Politics and Public Space 56 4 Securing Beirut 79 5 Th e Chaos of Driving 101 6 “Th ere Is No State” 121 Conclusion 139 Notes 145 References 165 Index 177 vii FIGURES Figure I.1 Internal Security Forces billboard 15 Figure 1.1 Map of Beirut in Lebanon and the region 19 Figure 1.2 Neighborhood map of Beirut 20 Figure 1.3 Cafe at a Beirut public garden during the late Ott oman period, ca.
  • The Reconstruction of Downtown Beirut in Post-Civil War Lebanon

    The Reconstruction of Downtown Beirut in Post-Civil War Lebanon

    LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE Actually Existing Neoliberalism: The reconstruction of Downtown Beirut in post-civil war Lebanon Hadi Makarem A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations London, September 2014 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was proofread for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Grove Proofreading & Editorial Services. 2 Abstract This thesis assesses neoliberal urban developments in post-civil war Lebanon. It does so by focusing on the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut, which contributed towards: firstly, increasing a public debt that was burdening the country at the time; and secondly, reproducing sectarian divisions in Lebanese politics and society. To explain this outcome, this thesis analyses the policies of specific agents who were involved in, and in control of, the reconstruction process.
  • Processes of Making and Informing Maronite Identity in Beirut Divin Boutros University of South Carolina - Columbia

    Processes of Making and Informing Maronite Identity in Beirut Divin Boutros University of South Carolina - Columbia

    University of South Carolina Scholar Commons Theses and Dissertations 2018 Urban Social Landscapes And Urban Places: Processes Of Making And Informing Maronite Identity In Beirut Divin Boutros University of South Carolina - Columbia Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd Part of the Geography Commons Recommended Citation Boutros, D.(2018). Urban Social Landscapes And Urban Places: Processes Of Making And Informing Maronite Identity In Beirut. (Master's thesis). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5011 This Open Access Thesis is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. URBAN SOCIAL LANDSCAPES AND URBAN PLACES: PROCESSES OF MAKING AND INFORMING MARONITE IDENTITY IN BEIRUT by Divin Boutros Bachelor of Arts University of South Carolina, 2015 Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts in Geography College of Arts and Sciences University of South Carolina 2018 Accepted by: Amy Mills, Director of Thesis Caroline R. Nagel, Reader Hamid Khan, Reader Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School © Copyright by Divin Boutros 2018 All Rights Reserved. ii DEDICATION I dedicate this thesis to my parents who left everything behind in Lebanon to give me and my sister a better life here in the United States of America. I will never express enough gratitude for everything they have done for me and my sister. I can’t even begin to imagine selling my house and business and going across the planet to a place where I don’t even speak the language.
  • Lebanese Democracy: Outcomes and Limits of the Calfat Confessional Framework

    Lebanese Democracy: Outcomes and Limits of the Calfat Confessional Framework

    Contexto Internacional vol. 40(2) May/Aug 2018 http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0102-8529.2018400200002 The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy: Outcomes and Limits of the Calfat Confessional Framework Natalia Nahas Calfat* Abstract: Lebanon is frequently referred to as a model of a plural and stable democracy in the Mid- dle East: a multi-ethnic and pluri-religious society that guarantees political representation through a power-sharing confessional framework. Numerous authors also see the consociational model as the best democratic alternative given such a high degree of domestic heterogeneity. However, by em- phasising Lebanese stability vis-à-vis a troubled regional scenario, these positive perceptions have neglected some elements of how democracy actually works in Lebanon. In this article, I analyse two domestic dimensions that hinder the success of the Lebanese democratic experience (the pre-attri- bution of seats and distortions of representation) and point to the limits, effects and consequences of consociationalism in this specific confessional reality. The results of this case study indicate that highly institutionalised consociational arrangements can lead to sectarianism, institutional instabil- ity, clientelism, and state frailty. I also lay out some lessons and implications that can be derived from such a framework in terms of harmful sectarian narratives at both the local and regional levels. Keywords: Consociationalism; Lebanon; Confessional Frameworks; Democratic Limits; Case Study. Sectarian conflict in the Middle East today is the perpetuation of political rule via identity mobilization. Nader Hashemi and Danny Poster (2017: 5) Introduction Lebanon is frequently referred to by scholars, and by conventional wisdom, as an example of consociational democracy in the Middle East.
  • In Iraq and Lebanon? Middle East and North Africa Programme Power Relations and April 2021 Social Control

    In Iraq and Lebanon? Middle East and North Africa Programme Power Relations and April 2021 Social Control

    Research Where is the ‘state’ Paper in Iraq and Lebanon? Middle East and North Africa Programme Power relations and April 2021 social control Renad Mansour and Lina Khatib Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a world-leading policy institute based in London. Our mission is to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. Contents Summary 2 01 Introduction 4 02 Rethinking the state 6 03 Power relations and the state 9 04 Conclusion 27 About the authors 29 Acknowledgments 29 1 Chatham House Summary — Disillusionment with an unaccountable and incoherent political system and elite political class has pushed many Iraqis and Lebanese into feeling that their countries are effectively stateless. Western policymakers also often share this interpretation of the governance picture, at times labelling Iraq and Lebanon as failed or failing states. — Yet in a practical sense, the state in some form is very much present in both countries, even though it may not appear so to those who define the state as a concept emerging from European history. In both countries, state power is not vested principally in formal institutions, but resides to a considerable degree in horizontal power relationships among elements of the elite, in vertical power relationships between the elite and citizens, and in interactions between these two axes. — This paper interrogates the nature and effects of these power relationships. It takes as its starting point the proposition that power in Iraq and Lebanon is not fixed. Although formal structures do play a role, power is principally exercised socially: through competition and cooperation between diverse actors such as political parties, armed groups and societal leaders.