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The Tsunami LETTERS by Andrew Tabler

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The Tsunami LETTERS by Andrew Tabler AJT-4 MIDDLE EAST Andrew Tabler is an Institute Fellow based in Damascus and Beirut studying Lebanese ICWA affairs and Syrian reform. The Tsunami LETTERS By Andrew Tabler JUNE 2005 Since 1925 the Institute of BEIRUT, Lebanon–Riding south in a rickety ’70s Mercedes taxi along the Leba- Current World Affairs (the Crane- nese coast toward Beirut, I could not even hear myself think. The radio was blar- Rogers Foundation) has provided ing, not music, but the sounds of shouting and commotion. The station’s micro- phones could be heard falling to the floor. After about ten minutes of this torture, long-term fellowships to enable a voice suddenly pierced the chaos. outstanding young professionals to live outside the United States “Shut Up!” it boomed. The radio fell silent, except for the muffled sound of and write about international bodies rustling around microphones. areas and issues. An exempt operating foundation endowed by The voice was that of Michel Aoun, arriving at Beirut International Airport the late Charles R. Crane, the following 15 years’ exile in France. It was a day I never thought I would see. Institute is also supported by Politics is often defined as “the art of the possible.” Following the assassination of contributions from like-minded former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri on February 14, Syria’s hurried individuals and foundations. withdrawal from Lebanon on April 27, and the major political reconfigurations that have since shocked the Lebanese political system, it seems most anything is possible — even the return of a man who nearly took Lebanon to the brink of TRUSTEES destruction in the last years of that country’s disastrous civil war in the late 1980s Bryn Barnard and early ’90s. Joseph Battat Mary Lynne Bird Following his initial outburst, Aoun began orating. As the taxi driver and I Steven Butler listened to Aoun speak to reporters for about 20 minutes, I watched the driver’s Sharon F. Doorasamy response to Aoun’s rambling speech, in which he claimed primary responsibility Peter Geithner for Syria’s withdrawal from Gary Hartshorn Lebanon. Katherine Roth Kono Cheng Li As Aoun ended the press con- Peter Bird Martin ference, the driver turned the David Z. Robinson radio’s volume down. We looked Carol Rose at each other and simultaneously John Spencer raised our eyebrows. Edmund Sutton “Well, what do you think?” I asked. HONORARY TRUSTEES David Elliot “He does not speak like a cul- David Hapgood tivated, intelligent man,” the Pat M. Holt driver said. “Mukh jeesh [Military Edwin S. Munger mind]. But you know where he Richard H. Nolte stands.” Albert Ravenholt Phillips Talbot Or do we? Aoun has always been an enigma for me. Preparing to return from exile, he predicted Institute of Current World Affairs the impact of a “tsunami” on the The Crane-Rogers Foundation Lebanese power structure. And Michel Aoun returns to Lebanon after 15 years Four West Wheelock Street indeed, after his return Aoun cata- in exile in France. Security concerns have been Hanover, New Hampshire 03755 U.S.A. pulted himself back to the top of so high that Aoun frequently speaks from Lebanese politics, as his initial behind a bulletproof shield. Thousands of Aoun supporters greeted “the general” in a rally on Martyrs’ Square upon his return. success in Lebanon’s recent Parliamentary elections This list was then submitted informally to Damascus, grabbed international headlines. Prior to his return, he whose forces had occupied large parts of Lebanon dur- was vehemently anti-Syrian. In the days after he got back, ing the war. Shuttling back and forth between Damascus he negotiated to join forces with the “opposition bloc” — and Beirut was US Ambassador Richard Murphy, who the alliance that demanded Syria pull out of Lebanon fol- claimed his country had no preferred candidate. lowing Rafik Hariri’s assassination, led by al Hariri’s son Baha and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Those talks Syrian President Hafez al Assad refused the list, and quickly broke down, however. In the final stage of the instead nominated former Lebanese President Sulieman election, he aligned himself and his party, the Free Patri- Franjiyyeh as his preferred candidate. Franjiyyeh was re- otic Movement (FPM), with Lebanon’s pro-Syrian politi- jected by Aoun and Samir Geagea, leader of the Leba- cal leaders in a bid to stop Baha al Hariri’s bid for a par- nese Forces (LF) Christian militia. Aoun, himself a liamentary majority. If a loose cannon can ride a tsunami, Maronite Christian, said that he would not stand for the Aoun has been a mixed metaphor ever since. Presidency — but would serve if elected. In reality, Aoun negotiated behind the scenes with the United States and Or perhaps he always has been. General Michel Aoun Syria to become president. When both parties instead was Commander of the Lebanese Army in 1988 when settled on a Maronite MP, Mikhail Daher, Aoun and the the term of President Amin Gemayal expired. In the LF blocked Lebanese deputies from assembling to vote months leading up to Gemayal’s departure, various Leba- on Daher in August 1988. nese factions tried to find a consensus Maronite candi- date to assume what was then Lebanon’s most powerful The result was constitutional crisis. On September political post. Under “confessionalism” the system of sec- 22, in his last 15 minutes in office, Gemayal issued an tional and religious power-sharing put in place in 1943 order appointing Aoun Prime Minister, heading a military when Christians were a majority, the President was al- government made up of the country’s “confessionally” ways to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a balanced Military Council. This broke the rules of Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi’ite Lebanon’s “National Pact” of 1943, which said that the Muslim. Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim. Promptly, the three Muslim members of the Military Council resigned, Consensus building in Lebanon on such issues in- and the sitting Prime Minister, Selim al Hoss, refused to volves both domestic and international players, however. recognize the Aoun government. As Lebanon’s civil war raged on, the Lebanese put for- ward a list of five candidates for the post of president. For his part, Aoun refused to recognize the Hoss gov- 2 AJT-4 ernment. And since the Lebanese constitution says that Beirut. Civilians fled to the mountains, as Aoun’s forces if the post of President falls vacant, the powers of the launched successful offenses to gain control of the Port Presidency are entrusted to the Council of Ministers, of Beirut — the LF’s material lifeline for weapons sup- Aoun professed to believe he then controlled both the plied by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Prime Ministry as well as the Presidency. As Aoun’s massive battles against the LF made in- The result of this constitutional crisis, or showdown, ternational headlines, the international community be- was the creation of two governments — Aoun’s in the gan to see Ta’if as a way out of the Lebanon quagmire. Ba’abda Presidential Palace and Hoss’s in West Beirut. As Washington began working behind the scenes to Aoun controlled the Lebanese Army, which quickly be- implement Ta’if with sponsor Saudi Arabia, Aoun became gan implementing his policy of bringing Lebanese terri- more agitated. In a fit of anger, Aoun said in an inter- tory under the control of his government. Wars between view that the only way to attract the attention of the militias had devastated Lebanon, as various factions United States was to kidnap its citizens — a cheeky ref- fought each other at the behest of each warlord. These erence to Washington’s ongoing efforts to free American conflicts were also internecine, with Shias fighting Shias, hostages in Lebanon. The Administration of George H. Sunnis fighting Sunnis. Bush duly closed its embassy in East Beirut. Aoun was now isolated. In the early days of his government, Aoun gained the respect of Lebanese throughout the country for try- Aoun’s battles with the LF ended in stalemate — a ing to put an end to such conflicts. Divisions soon sur- situation that might have continued indefinitely, had not faced, however, over efforts to end the war. A year ear- both parties’ patron, Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait lier a meeting of the Lebanese Parliament, convened in in August 1990. Washington needed Syria’s support to Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, passed what was called the “Accord isolate Hussein. Although the Bush Administration never for National Reconciliation.” Now known as the Ta’if admitted it, Syria’s support for the US effort to oust Iraqi Accord, the agreement outlined a process to reform the forces from Kuwait was in exchange for Washington’s Lebanese political system, to end the war, to establish a tacit agreement for Syria to implement the Ta’if Accord “special relationship between Lebanon and Syria” and a by force. On October 13, 1990, Lebanese forces under the framework for an initial redeployment of Syrian forces command of Emile Lahoud, together with Syrian Army to Lebanon’s Biqa Valley two years following the end of units, laid siege to the Ba’abda Presidential Palace. After hostilities. promises to stay and fight to the end, Aoun escaped to the French Embassy and into exile. Initially, Aoun had allowed deputies from areas un- der his control to travel to Ta’if to participate in the meet- Aoun promptly fell into obscurity. In the mid 1990s, ing. Following their return, Aoun rejected the agreement he founded the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), whose out of hand, since Syria was not required under the Ac- activists began protesting in front of Lebanese and Syr- cord to carry out a complete withdrawal of its troops from ian embassies in Paris and elsewhere in Europe.
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