Peter Hoffmann

The gulf region in German strategic projections, 1940—1942

I

Germany's policy after the First World War stressed the containment of the effects of defeat; economic recovery; and revision of the Treaty of Versailles. From 1930 on- ward, a shift to military policies became increasingly visible1. Four days after Hitler be- came Reich Chancellor in 1933, he assured the Commander-in-Chief and the senior commanders of the Army of his intention to proceed with re-armament2. But he moved with caution. His Middle East policy was governed by the wish to avoid conflict with Britain, and by a pro-Arab stance, which, however, was in jeopardy until 1939 through German encouragement of Jewish immigration to Palestine3. In 1939 Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland. Britain, France, Australia, New Zea- land, South Africa, and Canada declared war on Germany. After the defeat of Poland, Hitler offered peace to Britain and France, which these powers rejected. After the Ger- man defeat of France in June 1940, Hitler again offered peace, which Britain rejected. Three factors changed the position. 1. Winston Churchill became Prime Minister and Britain refused to acquiesce in German conquests, so that Hitler's hands were tied in the west; 2. Hitler failed to secure through aerial attacks a preliminary advantage for an invasion of Britain; 3. when Hitler ordered the invasion of Russia, Britain and Rus- sia settled their differences in the Middle East. The southern flank of a German east- ward advance was not secure. The situation was in flux, however, until the summer of 1941 : the Russo-German non- aggression treaty of 23 August 1939 and the Russo-German border and friendship treaty of 28 September 1939 for a time prevented the predictable power alignments4. There was considerable apprehension in Allied war councils about a German-Italian- Russian threat to the oilfields in the Middle East5. Although Italy had not yet entered the war against Britain, she was engaged in military actions in Africa. The Soviet Union acted as a German ally in her occupation of eastern Poland (17 September 1939) and the Baltic countries, and in her attack on Finland on 30 November 1939. Germany sup- ported the expansion of Russian influence towards the Persian Gulf, as the Command- er-in-Chief of German Naval Forces, Grand Admiral Raeder, said in a briefing of his section chiefs6. In the spring of 1940, the British and French high commands became so worried about German troop movements in the Balkans, and about Soviet troop move- ments in southern Russia, that the Allied Supreme War Council, on the suggestion of Ministerpräsident Paul Reynaud, discussed the destruction of Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus in order to deny Germany access to their product, and in order to curb the military activities of the Soviet Union7. Baku and Batum were photographed by British intelligence air crews on 30 March and 3 April 1940, respectively. In June 1940 Ger- man forces captured in France Anglo-French plans for the destruction of the Cauca- sian oilfields8. The plans proved unrealistic; but apprehension grew about German and Russian advances through the Balkans and into Persia against the Anglo-Iranian oil- fields9. German plans for an invasion of the British Isles were postponed in July 1940. The German Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Fieldmarshal Walther von Brauchitsch, and his Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Franz Haider, discussed alterna- tive moves against Britain on 30 July 1940. Haider noted: 1. an attack on Gibraltar over 61 MGM 2/88 land; 2. sending tank forces to North Africa (Egypt) to support Italy; 3. an attack against the British in Haifa; 4. an attack on the Suez Canal; 5. instigating a Russian at- tack on the Persian Gulf10. Haider continued and agreed:

»Die Frage, ob man, wenn gegen England eine Entscheidung nicht erzwungen werden kann und die Gefahr besteht, daß England sich mit Rußland liiert, den dann entstehen- den Zweifrontenkrieg zunächst gegen Rußland führen soll, ist dahin zu beantworten, daß man besser mit Rußland Freundschaft hält. Besuch bei Stalin wäre erwünscht. Die Bestrebungen Rußlands an den Meerengen und in Richtung auf den Persischen Golf stören uns nicht. Am Balkan, der wirtschaftlich in unseren Wirkungsbereich fällt, kön- nen wir uns aus dem Wege gehen. Italien und Rußland werden sich im Mittelmeer nicht wehe tun. Unter dieser Voraussetzung könnten wir den Engländer im Mittelmeer entscheidend treffen, von Asien abdrängen, dem Italiener sein Mittelmeerreich auf- bauen helfen und uns selbst mit Hilfe Rußlands das in West- und Nord-Europa ge- schaffene Reich ausbauen. Wir können dann einen jahrelangen Krieg mit England ge- trost in Kauf nehmen.«11

Hitler's priorities and the rational nexus between his various objectives during the Sec- ond World War were distorted by his overriding concern with Russia and by his racial policy12. Hitler recognized in August 1940:1. that Britain might not be defeated during that year; 2. that the United States might intervene in the war in 1941 ; 3. that the exist- ing German-Russian relationship might change in 1941 — a euphemism for a war aris- ing either from Russian designs, from German preventive action, or from Hitler's deci- sion to realize his long-term goal of acquiring Lebensraum™. The Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov revealed Russia's long-term goals to Hitler and to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Berlin in November 194014. Molotov's state- ments were not reassuring: Russia was looking for control in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, and for full freedom of movement in the Baltic and Black Sea. These goals could not be contemplated unless Germany was presumed absorbed with the war against Britain, or, better still, defeated by the Western Powers. The ideas ventilated by Brauchitsch and Haider were pursued temporarily in 1940, al- though Hitler had no use for them in the framework of his aims. Japan wished to secure her flank for her »southern program« and initiated negotiations with Germany at the end of August, seeking to improve relations with the Soviet Union through German mediation15. Ribbentrop discussed the proposition with Mussolini and the Italian For- eign Minister Count Ciano during his visit to Rome on 19 September. It appears, how- ever, that the clearest concepts for dealing with the German-British conflict were devel- oped in the Naval High Command. Grand-Admiral Raeder had developed the concept of Axis domination of the entire Mediterranean region as an alternative to the invasion of Britain {Seelöwe). He placed his views before Hitler on 6 September 1940, explaining that all available forces ought to be concentrated for the defeat of Britain before the intervention of the United States which Raeder considered inevitable16. Raeder spoke to Hitler again on 26 Sep- tember 1940. Hitler temporarily tended toward the idea of a continental block of Ja- pan, Russia and the Axis Powers against the British Empire. He thought this might force Britain out of the war; then he could launch the German Army on the destruction of the Soviet Union. Raeder, on the other hand, wanted to defeat Britain and hoped to dissuade Hitler of his plans against Russia17. Raeder proposed the conquest of the Canary Islands, Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and an advance through Palestine and Syria to the Turkish border, thus placing Turkey in German hands. The Russian problem would be solved, because Russia was afraid of Germany and an intervention against Russia from the north would no longer be necessary. Hitler agreed18. Raeder repeated his proposals to Hitler on 14 November and 27 December 194019. Hitler had regarded the Mediterranean an Italian sphere of interest ever since the Ger- man-Italian discussions of October 193620. He would have preferred to assign the role of anti-British foe in that region to Italy, or to a Mediterranean block consisting of Ita- ly, Spain, and Vichy France. He replied to Raeder immediately, in September 1940, that he would be in contact about this with the Duce and possibly with General Franco as soon as the German-Japanese alliance was sealed. In October 1940, he travelled to Hendaye on the Franco-Spanish border for discussions with Franco; he met with Ministerpräsident Laval and Marshal Pétain, during stops in Montoire on the way to and from Hendaye, respectively; on the return journey he travelled on to Florence to meet the Duce21. He told Raeder further that he would seek to induce Russia to move southward against Persia and India for access to the Indian Ocean which was more im- portant to Russia than positions in the Baltic. Hitler had shifted to the idea of a con- tinental block with Russia against Britain22. Raeder had not presented a global strategic concept but one for a duel between Ger- many and Britain, although he expected an American intervention. Raeder seemed to assume that Britain would agree to peace after the loss of her imperial position in the Mediterranean. This was fallacious at least insofar as the trans-Atlantic sea-lanes for supplies and support from America were far more important to Britain and her strate- gy23. In any case, Hitler did not agree with Raeder that the defeat of Britain must have priority over the attack against Russia24. The commitment of some military forces in the Mediterranean area in 1941 could have been so interpreted. But this diversion of German forces was necessary to help maintain Italy as a political factor in the Mediter- ranean after set-backs in Greece had thrown her into military disarray. Hitler's ideas, however, were more complex. He had expected Britain to come to an ar- rangement with Germany after the defeat of France and to give him a free hand in the east25. When Britain failed to do so, Hitler concluded, between 21 and 31 July 1940, that Britain must be deprived of the hope of using Russia against Germany. The Soviet Ambassador in London, Maisky, offered the same interpretation to Churchill in Sep- tember 194126. But Britain must be deprived also of American support. Since Hitler could not eliminate America, he tried to neutralize the threat through the elimination of the Soviet Union whom Britain and the United States might set against both Ger- many and Japan. The elimination of Russia would not merely deprive Britain of »her last hope in Europe«, but at the same time upgrade the power-political position of Ja- pan in Asia. The Japanese threat against American positions in the Pacific would para- lyze America in the Atlantic. Hitler believed that he could outmanoeuver the seapow- ers, Britain and America, if Germany and Japan dominated defensible »large-scale re- gions« (Großräume) in the eastern hemisphere. Military and technical reasons prevent- ed a »quick« campaign against Russia in the autumn of 1940, which Hitler would have preferred, and so he issued instructions on 2 August 1940 for its preparation for May 1941 27.

II

The British government considered its dominant influence in the Persian Gulf an es- sential link in Britain's imperial positions from the Mediterranean to India28. The Ang- lo-Italian rivalry between the wars led Britain to reinforce her military establishments in the Gulf region; in the mid-1930's Britain transferred her naval bases from Hengam and Bassidou to Bahrain29. The virtual Russo-German alliance challenged the British position. In 1940 the Soviet Union advanced claims on the Gulf region. On 26 Novem- ber 1940, Molotov declared during preliminary discussions for an alliance between Russia, Germany, Italy and Japan that the projected treaty must include recognition of the area south of Baku and Batum in the general direction of the Gulf as a sphere of aspiration of the Soviet Union30. By June 1941, the tables had been turned, Russia and Britain were on the same side in the war. They were soon challenged by Axis designs on the Gulf region. A synchronized partial invasion of Iran by British and Soviet forces in August 1941 countered the Axis threat31. A coup d'état in Iraq on 2 April 1941 brought to power a government friendly to the Axis Powers and headed by Rashid Ali al-Gailani32. As the British could not spare any troops in the Mediterranean area to counter Axis intervention in Syria and Iraq which Rashid Ali requested and which the Military Intelligence Branch (MI 14) of the British Imperial War Office expected, they moved troops from India to Basra; these arrived on 18 April33. The contest for the control of the Gulf region had entered an active phase. Hitler had considered and, on 3 November 1940, rejected the idea of sending a tank force to North Africa while German forces were engaged in support operations for the Italian campaign in Greece. Nevertheless, a German-Italian offensive against British positions in North Africa began in February. While preparations were going forward for the airborne operation against Crete (20 May 1941), MI 14 anticipated on 2 May 1941 a German operation in Syria and in Iraq that could threaten the British position in Basra34. In fact, Germany produced a detailed plan on 6 May 1941 for such action, in consulta- tion with the Mufti of Jerusalem, Emin el Husseini, and after the French Vichy govern- ment had agreed to send arms by train from Syria to Iraq and to permit the use of Syr- ian bases by the German Air Force35. At least 24 German Air Force planes (He 111 and Me 110) were sent to Syria and Iraq. General Felmy was sent to Aleppo in May to or- ganize further re-inforcements. The German Air Force planes bombed British forces in Iraq on 14 May36. But it proved impossible to concentrate enough forces in the region to deny the British control of it. Rashid Ali's government fell, and the British concluded an honourable truce with Iraq on 31 May that gave them full freedom of movement throughout Iraq37. It was an important British success and helped off-set the loss of prestige in the defeat on Crete; failure could have had »serious consequences for the British«38. Nevertheless, Churchill was concerned »to prevent the Germans getting a footing in Syria with small forces and then using Syria as a jumping-off ground for Air domination of Iraq and Persia«39. Fear of a German move into Syria had not been dispelled by the revelation in the first week of May that Crete was an immediate target40. On 12 May it became known that German aircraft had landed at Damascus, and on 14 May Enigma decrypts confirmed the arrival of German Air Force aircraft in Syria, en route to Iraq, and showed that »the Vichy Government's High Commissioner [General Dentz] in Syria was providing them with landing facilities« and cooperating in the dispatch of arms trains to Rashid Ali. Whitehall authorities became convinced that a German occupation of Syria could be prevented only by an early British counteraction41. There were also reports from other sources that German forces were infiltrating Syria, some of them as »tourists«, in preparation for an airborne landing42. On 15 May 1941, a Chiefs of Staff résumé said there were reports showing Germany trying to isolate Turkey by occupying Syria, and that »there are other indications that the centre of gravity of German activity has moved to south-east Europe, and it seems that the Germans have been led by develop- ments in Iraq to concentrate on the eastern Mediterranean and beyond. By advancing through Turkey into Syria, and at the same time renewing their offensive in north Afri- ca, they could develop once again the pincer movement which they have used so con- sistently in all their recent campaigns."43. Churchill ordered immediately, on 20 May, an advance of Free French troops with British logistic, military and air support. On 21 May Cyprus or Syria were considered likely targets of another airborne expedition aft- er Crete44. Such estimates, however, ignored the absence of confirming local intelli- gence, the poor state of communications in the area which would delay another opera- tion for about six weeks, and the mounting evidence that Germany was concentrating major forces against Russia45. In the two weeks following 20 May 1941, a decyphered German Enigma message car- ried »an order from Hitler that all German personnel in Syria and Iraq were to be vol- unteers and all GAF [ = German Air Force] aircraft were to have Iraqi markings«, indi- cating that the German force in the area was to remain small, although it was also be- coming clear that Vichy French forces in Syria would resist a British invasion46. In his Directive No. 30 of 23 May 1941, Hitler declared:

»Ich habe mich daher entschlossen, die Entwicklung im Mittleren Orient durch Unter- stützung des Irak vorwärts zu treiben.«47 But he added: »Ob und wie die englische Stellung zwischen Mittelmeer und Persischem Golf — in Zusammenhang mit einer Of- fensive gegen den Suez-Kanal — später endgültig zu Fall zu bringen ist, steht erst nach Barbarossa zur Entscheidung.« Therefore, the main purpose of German diplomatic and military activity in the Middle East region at that time was not focussed on Iraq, but on moving Turkey closer to Ger- many with a view to an alliance that would permit Germany to move weapons and troops across Turkish territory and thus open a land-route to the Gulf region48. Hitler thought little of Turkey and called her useless, politically unreliable, militarily ineffec- tive. He rejected the idea of arms transports through Turkey49. But the treaty of 18 June 1941 with Turkey did not exclude a repetition of shipments on the Bagdad Railway such as those of May 1941. It also helped Turkey to close the Straits to British ships, thus securing the German flank against Russia. Turkey declared her neutrality on 23 June 1941, a day after the start of »Barbarossa«5C. But in fact Turkey forestalled German arms shipments through their territory51. Again, in a memorandum presented on 6 June 1941, Raeder pressed Hitler to continue the Middle East strategy, and to exploit its operational opportunities52. The memoran- dum maintained that Britain could be defeated as long as American support had not yet reached decisive proportions, although it acknowledged that the war against Russia had become »inevitable«. At 2 a.m. on 8 June, British, Australian, Indian and Free French forces moved into Syr- ia. In the first week of June, decrypted Enigma communications showed that the Ger- man Air Force detachment was leaving Syria and Iraq; on 10 June Enigma communica- tions confirmed that General Felmy's Aleppo troops had been withdrawn53. But: »These clues were disregarded by the planners in Cairo and Whitehall.«54 Thus the British-Australian-Indian and Free-French advance into Syria, a date for it having been set on or immediately after 30 May, was launched on 8 June at 2 p.m.55. There were few Germans in Syria, but the French Vichy forces under General Dentz opposing the British-Free-French invasion outnumbered the attackers: There were 25 000 regulars, 20 000 local troops, and 90 tanks under his command. The campaign was slow and lasted until 12 July56.

Ill

The war diary of the German Armed Forces Supreme Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) mentions under 17 February 1941 an order by Hitler to prepare studies for a deployment of troops in Afghanistan against India, after »Barbarossa«57. This presupposed access through Iran, and another land-bridge through either Turkey or the Caucasus. The plan was, firstly, to deal a crippling blow to British imperial posi- tions, particularly in India, and to British oil supplies; and secondly, to seize the Rus- sian and Iranian oilfields in order to secure supplies for German military operations. There is in the war diary, under 19 June 1941, a reference to subversive operations by the military intelligence sabotage section, OKW/Amt Ausland/Abwehr/Abt. II (Sabo- tage) in the Caucasus and in Iran where a number of suitable persons were in readiness; Abwehr II also organized one-hundred Georgians in Roumania; the installation of an Abwehr II officer in the German Consulate in Tabriz was requested58. In briefing notes of Army High Command/Operations Section dated 15 July 1941 concerning control of the territory of the Soviet Union after »Barbarossa«, there is a provision for an »op- erations group for the project Caucasus-Iran« consisting of two tank divisions, a me- chanized division, and two Alpine divisions 59. Hitler's Directive No. 32 of 14 July 1941 projected an attack on British positions from Libya through Egypt, from Bulgaria through Turkey, and from Transcaucasia through Iran60. A few days later, a memo- randum of Naval High Command began with the statement: »Das Gesetz dieses Krieges ist die Niederringung Englands.« The memorandum referred to Hitler's Rus- sian campaign as designed to secure an eastern flank and a supply basis for food and fuel61. A further study, written after November 1941, projected an attack through the Caucasus and western Iran to occupy the Rewanduz and Khnaquin passes on the Ira- nian-Iraqi border in June 1942 with Bagdad as the ultimate target62.

On 14 July 1941, in his East Prussian headquarters Wolfschanze, Hitler suggested to the Japanese Ambassador Oshima a grand coalition against Russia63. After the defeat of Russia the coalition would turn against Britain and America. But in the Japanese government, only the Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, supported the plan; he lost his post on the day after Hitler's offer to Oshima. On 9 August 1941 the Japanese cab- inet decided not to intervene in the German-Russian war64. On 7 December 1941 Ja- pan began the war against America: America had priority for Japan, while Russia had priority for Hitler. Nevertheless Hitler declared war on the United States on 11 De- cember 1941. America supported Britain from the early weeks of the war. Congress lifted the prohi- bition against the sale of arms to belligerents in November 1939, and America supplied Britain with, in President Roosevelt's words, »in everincreasing numbers, ships, planes, tanks, guns«. The United States also waged an undeclared war against German naval forces in 1941. But Hitler wanted to avoid a war with the USA65. It is not clear that Hitler could have averted the commitment of American forces against Germany. On the other hand, the First World War seemed to him to have shown that Russia could be defeated in a war of attrition, but not America and Britain who had decided the war against Germany. If Japan prevented America and Britain from attacking Germany with major forces until Russia was defeated, Hitler could calculate that there was a chance of Japan and Germany together defeating the Western Powers afterwards. The German declaration of war against the United States was thus a worthwhile price to pay for a promise that Japan would not conclude a separate peace but keep America committed in the Pacific66. Japan's war plan was adopted at Imperial Headquarters on 5 November 194167. It pro- vided for the conquest, as a first step, of British Malaya, the Philippines, Hongkong, Guam, Wake; and, as a second step, for the conquest of Borneo, Sumatra, Java, Ce- lebes, the Sunda Islands, Dutch Timor, the Bismarck Archipelagos, and Burma. Oil- fields particularly were objectives of the offensive. It was begun with good prospects of success at a time when the colonial powers — France, Britain, the Netherlands — were engaged in Europe, and in the Mediterranean, where Britain had just launched an of- fensive in the Cyrenaica. The Japanese operation was designed to free Japan of danger- ous American economic pressures, and to secure her freedom of action. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was launched to eliminate the American Pacific fleet which could have interfered with Japan's two-step southern offensive. The Japanese General Staff demanded adoption of a defensive strategy after these ini- tial operations. They argued that Japan's war potential was inadequate for the defeat of Britain and America, and that the land war in China required all other resources68. The Japanese Admiral Staff, on the other hand, wished to continue the naval offensive. They wanted Australia "occupied before it could become a glacis for an aerial war of at- trition against Japan. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet, Rear-Admiral Ugaki, however, thought it more important to engage the American fleet through the occupa- tion of Midway, Jonston, Palmyra and Hawaii. Finally, the Combined Fleet Staff First Operations Officer, Rear-Admiral Kamahito Kuroshima, proposed a western offen- sive into the Indian Ocean to destroy the British eastern fleet and, in conjunction with the Army, to occupy strategic points. Kuroshima urged a combined offensive by the Axis Powers in the Middle East to support the Japanese western offensive69. The military agreements reached in Berlin on 18 January 1942 between Japan, Ger- many and Italy, however, failed to provide for common action in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean. Kuroshima's plan thus lacked its most important precondition, and it was not adopted when it was proposed at Imperial Headquarters on 27 January 194270. The Combined Fleet pursued Kuroshima's plan independently, without Army support, and its offensive produced considerable successes. But it failed to locate and to destroy the British eastern fleet which withdrew to the East African Kilindini base and evaded a battle that could have ended in disaster71. A few weeks after the failure of the attack on Moscow, on 3 January 1942, Hitler told Ambassador Oshima that he intended no further attack in the centre of the Russian front for the time being, but that he was going to attack in the south towards the Cau- casus because he needed the oil of Iran and Iraq, and that he hoped to stimulate and support the Arab freedom movements72.

IV

Churchill cabled President Roosevelt on 4 and 5 March 1942 with requests for assis- tance in keeping the United Kingdom supplied with the necessities of war, and express- ing grave concerns about the Japanese advances and the fate of the southern flank of Russia in the »attack which the Germans will deliver upon Russia in the spring«73. The Chief of the American General Operations Division (formerly War Plans Division), Assistant Chief of Staff Brigadier Eisenhower, drafted for the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, considerations for a reply to Churchill. Roosevelt based his reply on the ad- vice he received; but Eisenhower, recognizing Churchill's understanding of the situa- tion, formulated much more clearly what the Allies' objectives must be for 1942:

»a. Securing the United Kingdom, including routes thereto. b. Maintaining Russia in the war as an active and powerful participant. c. Maintaining the Middle East and India as the necessary buttress to prevent junction between our two most powerful enemies.«74 In a memorandum to General Marshall dated 25 March, Eisenhower repeated this ur- gently:

»We are principally concerned in preventing the arise [sic] of any situation that will au- tomatically give the Axis an overwhelming tactical superiority; or one under which its productive potential becomes greater than our own. The loss of either England or Rus- sia would probably give the Axis an immediate ability to nullify any of our future ef- forts. The loss of the Near East or of England would probably give the Axis a greater productive potential than our own. Consequently the immediately important tasks, aside from protection of the American continent, are the security of England, the retention of Russia in the war as an active ally, and the defense of the Middle East. In this connection the defense of the Middle East not only prevents the junction of our two most powerful enemies but it renders a definite support to the left flank of the Rus- sian armies and keeps open an important supply line for Lend-Lease materials flowing to Russia. All other operations must be considered in the highly desirable rather than in the mandatory class.«75

Three days later, Eisenhower noted : »We must save that region or run the risk of los- ing the war!«76 In April General Marshall went to London, at President Roosevelt's direction, »to se- cure an overall agreement with the British affecting major strategy«77. The importance of the defence of the Middle East and India was prominent. On 9 April Marshall cabled Eisenhower from London asking for details on the importance of the Persian Gulf oil- fields and the Abadan Refinery to the prosecution of the war in the Middle East and India78. On 10 April Eisenhower replied with details on oil production and refinery ca- pacities, and the effects of the loss of the Middle East oil supplies on the operations of the Axis Powers and the Allied Powers, respectively. He concluded:

»All authorities agree that the loss or destruction of Middle East refineries would pre- clude naval operations by the United Powers in the Indian Ocean and would very quickly result in the collapse of our entire defenses in the Middle East and India.«79 Again, in a memorandum for Secretary of War Stimson, dated 12 April, Eisenhower stated :

»The importance of India and the Middle East (the area lying between the Red Sea and India) to eventual Allied victory can scarcely be overemphasized. Loss of the region would permit our two principal enemies to join hands, with the result that their eco- nomic, industrial and military position would be almost unassailable. Russia would be completely isolated on the south, and her position badly weakened. China will be com- pletely isolated, and lost. One of the most valuable oil fields of the world, with an enor- mous productive capacity in the critical item of 100 octane gasoline, would be denied to us and would become available to the enemy. Loss of the Persian Gulf oil resources would prohibit Naval and air operations by the Allied Powers in all the great area lying between Madagascar and Australia. The retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to an Allied victory. If the bulk of the German armies, now engaged against Russia, should become free for employment in the occupation and protection of Western Europe, any opportunity for a successful offensive against the European Axis would be practically eliminated.«80 General Marshall's telegram to the Deputy Chief of Staff in the War Department, Ma- jor-General McNarney, dated 14 April re-stated the consequences of Japanese control of the western Indian Ocean from the point of view of the British Chiefs of Staff :

»(1) the Allies would be unable to support forces in the Middle East, and the Germans would gain access to oil and other resources of the area, and the Far East; (2) the loss of oil supplies from Abadan would be irreparable; (3) the southern supply route to the Soviet Union would be cut and (4) Turkey would fall an easy prey to tne Germans, and German naval forces would be able to enter the Black Sea and turn the Soviet position in the Caucasus.«81 If the American and British assessments were not unduly pessimistic, the Allies were fortunate that neither Hitler nor the Japanese military leaders seized the opportunity of a combined Middle East and Indian strategy. Hitler pursued his Russian obsession, and Japan abandoned both the western and Australian options and turned to the operation against Midway with the aim of blocking supply routes between America and Austra- lia, and to lure the American fleet into a decisive battle. The decision to launch the 68 Midway operation was reached in April 194282. ν

The issue was well understood by German and Japanese strategists. Leading planners in the German Naval High Command Staff (Seekriegsleitung) and in the Armed Forces Staff (Wehrmachtfiihrungsstab = WFSt) urged curbing further Army advances into the Russian vastnesses, insisting instead on securing the key position for an attack across the Caucasus. Both General Warlimont (Chief of Section Territorial Defence in Armed Forces Operations Staff, WFSt/L) and Captain (Navy) Junge (WFSt/L/Op M) were convinced that the combination of the Japanese western attack and the German Middle East strategy could bring about the collapse of the Allies' strategies and force them to end the struggle83. The German Naval High Command particularly was in agreement with Admiral Naokumi Nomura who led the Japanese delegation in the German-Italian-Japanese Military Commission. Nomura negotiated in Berlin and in Wolfschanze in December 1941 and in January and February 1942, urging a joint battle against Britain84. Nomura explained that it was precisely the intention of Britain and the United States to get Germany bogged down in Russia so that Germany could not put much force into attacks against Britain and British positions in North Africa, at Su- ez, and in the Middle East. The German Chief of Staff of Naval Operations (Seekriegsleitung), Vice-Admiral Kurt Fricke, repeatedly supported a joint German-Japanese thrust towards the Persian Gulf in his discussions with Admiral Nomura85. The war diary of Naval High Command noted on 17 February:

»Die Erkenntnis des Fehlschlagens der russischen Karte, die Uberwindung des eigenen Ölengpasses und das Zerreißen der Empirelinie durch das Mittelmeer nach Indien zu- gunsten der Herstellung einer deutsch/italienisch/japanischen Verbindungslinie unter dem stetigen unablässigen Druck des Zufuhrkrieges würden ausreichen, dem Endziele zum mindesten erheblich nahe zu kommen.«86

In a memorandum for Hitler, dated 25 February 1942, three Naval Staff planners — Commander Hansfrieder Rost, O KW I opa; Vice-Admiral Heinrich Gerlach, I op 1. Ski.; Captain Heinz Assmann, lb 1. Ski. — explained these views at some length87. Fieldmarshall Keitel told Naval High Command not to meddle; but Assmann scoffed at the Chief of OKW, claiming that with a central role for the Navy the war could be won. Assmann added: »daß >auch die Armee Rommel ... in diesem Zusammenhang ein Organ der Gesamtseekriegführung< sei.«88 On 13 February 1942, Grand Admiral Raeder reported to Hitler at length on the Japa- nese advances in East Asia:

»Mit Rangoon, Sumatra und Java geraten die letzten Ölquellen zwischen Bahrein und amerikanischem Kontinent in Verlust. Australien und Neuseeland müssen aus dem Persischen Golf bzw. von Amerika mit Öl versorgt werden. Ceylon als Basis japani- scher Schlachtschiffe, Flugzeugträger, U-Boote und der japanischen Flottenluftwaffe wird England zur Bildung stark gesicherter Geleitzüge zwingen, wenn es Verbindung mit Indien und Vorderen[sic] Orient aufrechterhalten will. Dabei stehen für englische Großkampfschiffe nur Alexandria, Durban und Simonstown als Reparaturbasen zur Verfügung. Suez- und Basrah-Position sind die Westpfeiler der britischen Herrschaft im indischen Raum. Gelingt es, diese Positionen durch gemeinsamen Druck Achsen- mächte [sie] zum Einsturz zu bringen, so müssen die strategischen Folgen für das briti- sche Reich vernichtend sein. Baldiger deutsch-italienischer Stoß gegen britische Schlüsselstellung Suez wäre strategisch gesehen daher von allergrößter Bedeutung. (Völlige Bereinigung Mittelmeerlage [sie], Mossulölquellen (!!), Rückwirkung auf Haltung Türkei, Naher Orient, arabische und indische Bewegung, Rückwirkung auf Ostfront, Kaukasus). Engländer selbst sehen n. vorliegenden Nachrichten gegenwärti- ge Bedrohung im ägyptischen Raum als äußerst stark an und befürchten Herstellung strategischer Verbindung deutsch-ital. mit japan. Kampfführung. Japaner streben in Erkenntnis entscheidender Bedeutung aufrichtig Herstellung Verbindung [sie] auf See- und Luftweg mit Deutschland an.«89

Hitler himself had said to Ambassador Oshima on 3 January 1942 : »Wenn England In- dien verliert, stürzt eine Welt ein. Indien ist der Kern des englischen Empire.«90 On the day following his meeting with Hitler, Raeder related Hitler's reaction at Naval High Command: The Führer had re-affirmed the priority of solving the Russian ques- tion in Russia, but had not closed his mind to Raeder's concepts91. Hitler, however, refused to support the Naval High Command's plans. Raeder knew he could not win over Hitler once most of the German resources were again committed in Russia. He tried again in a meeting with Hitler on 12 March 1942, suggesting the Ja- panese be pressed for an operation against the Gulf region, »als Vorbereitung für eigene Herbstaktion gegen Suez«. At the same time, probably without the knowledge of Naval High Command, a Japanese intervention with the German government aimed at ending the German-Russian war altogether92. But the Japanese had no intention to commit themselves in their western theater; the advocates of a direct attack against America prevailed. Their strategy led to the sea-air battle of Midway93. Until 1943 Hitler did not change his conviction that the major military effort must be made in Russia94. Nor did the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Colonel-General Haider, see much sense in what Naval High Command had concocted. On day 356 of the Russian campaign, on 12 June 1942, he noted in his war diary:

»Vizeadmiral Fricke [Chef d. Stabes SKI.] (mit Kapitän Assmann): Lagebesprechung. Das Bild der Kriegslage, wie es sich die Seekriegsleitung macht, weicht von unserer nüchternen Betrachtung der Dinge weit ab. Die Leute träumen in Kontinenten. Sie nehmen auf Grund der bisherigen Erfahrungen mit Heer ohne weiteres an, daß es nur von unserem guten Willen abhängt, ob und wann wir auf dem Landweg über den Kau- kasus an den Persischen Golf oder aus der Cyrenaika über Ägypten bis zum Suezkanal durchstoßen. Man spricht von Landoperationen über Italienisch-Afrika nach der afri- kanischen Ostküste und Südafrika. Die Probleme des Atlantiks werden mit Überheblichkeit, die des Schwarzen Meeres mit verbrecherischem Leichtsinn behandelt. Abends sind die Seeoffiziere mit Blumentritt, Heusinger und Grolman zu Tisch. Es wird viel leeres Stroh gedroschen.« 95 In February 1943 the German Sixth Army capitulated at Stalingrad. On 13 May 1943, the remnants of Rommel's Africa Corps went into captivity. On 24 May 1943 Grand Admiral Dönitz broke off the submarine offensive against the North Atlantic convoys. In July Germany lost the largest tank battle in history at Kursk. Italy got set to change sides. Japanese military men could not even think of operations in the Indian Ocean or the Gulf region96. But instead of seeking to break off the lost war, Hitler ordered on 3 November 1943 that major forces be committed to defending western Europe against an Allied landing. The success of such a landing, Hitler declared, could have »immeas- urable consequences«, unlike the loss of some of the conquered territory in the east. The war would be decided in the final battle against the Western Allies97.

1 A. Hillgruber: Die gescheiterte Großmacht: Eine Skizze des Deutschen Reiches 1871—1945. Düsseldorf •'1982, pp. 63-80. 2 Völkischer Beobachter (München), 6. Febr. 1933, p. 1; T. Vogelsang: Neue Dokumente zur Ge- schichte der Reichswehr. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (= VfZG) 2(1954), pp. 434-435; K.-D. Bracher / W. Sauer / G. Schulz: Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung: Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933/34. Köln, Opladen 21962, p. 719. 3 F. R. Nicosia: The Third Reich and the Palestine Question. Austin, Texas 1985. 4 Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918—1945 (= AD AP). Serie D: 1937—1945. Baden- Baden 1950-1970. Vol. VII (1956), nos. 228, 229, pp. 206-207; vol. Vili (1961), nos. 157, 158, 159, pp. 127-129. 5 F. H. Hinsley / E. E. Thomas / C. F. G. Ransom / R. C. Knight: British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. Vol. I. London 1979, p. 198. 6 Vice-Admiral Heinz Assmann: »Die Seekriegsleitung und die Vorgeschichte des Feldzuges gegen Rußland« [July 1943], document 170-C, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Nürnberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946. Vol. XXXIV. Nürnberg 1949, p. 681. 7 J. R.M.Butler: Grand Strategy. Vol. II. London 1957, pp. 119—122; Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 198. 8 Ibid.; Hitler referred to the plans in public: Völkischer Beobachter, 9 and 11 July 1940. 9 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 198; see also the detailed investigations of G. Kahle: Das Kaukasusprojekt der Alliierten vom Jahre 1940. Opladen 1973, and H.-J. Lorbeer: Westmächte gegen die Sowjet- union 1939—1941. Freiburg i.Br. 1975; cf. L. Woodward: British Foreign Policy in the Second World War. Vol. I.London 1970,pp. 101-104, 108, 111-113; vol. II. London 1971. 10 Generaloberst Halder: Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939—1942. Hrsg. vom Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung. Bearb. von H.-A. Jacobsen in Ver- bindung mit A. Philippi. Bd. I: Vom Polenfeldzug bis zum Ende der Westoffensive (14. 8. 1939—30. 6. 1940). Stuttgart 1962, p. 45; Bd. II: Von der geplanten Landung in England bis zum Beginn des Ostfeldzuges (1. 7. 1940—21. 6. 1941). Stuttgart 1963. The Foreign Office also looked into the possibilities of taking control of the Middle East; cf. »Aufzeichnung des Gesandten Grob- ba«, 27. Aug. 1940, AD AP, D (see fn. 4), vol. X (1963), no. 403, pp. 459-461. 11 Halder II (see fn. 10), p. 45-46. Cf. E. Jäckel: Hitlers Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer Herrschaft. Erweiterte und überarbeitete Neuausgabe. Stuttgart 1981, pp. 29—78; R. Binion: Hitler Among the Germans. New York, Ox- ford, Amsterdam 1976; R. Hilberg: German Railroads/Jewish Souls. In: Transaction Social Science and Modern Society 14 no. 1 (November/December 1976), pp. 60—74; A. Hillgruber: Die 12 »Endlösung« und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus. In: VfZG 20(1972), pp. 133—153, p. 151 and passim. A. Hillgruber: Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung 1940—41. München 21982, p. 225; Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab) 1940—1945. Geführt von H. Greiner und P. E. Schramm. Im Auftrag des Arbeitskreises für Wehrforschung hrsg. von P. E. Schramm. Bd. I: 1. August—31. Dezember 1941. Zusammengestellt und erläutert von 1} H.-A. Jacobsen. Frankfurt a. M. 1965, p. 968; Bd. II: 1. Januar 1942 bis 31. Dezember 1942. Frankfurt a. M. 1963. AD AP, D (see fn. 4), vol. XI. 1 (1964), pp. 448-478; Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), pp. 304—307, 727; R. Cecil: Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941. London 1975, pp. 169—170. Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), pp. 204—205, 240, based in part on H. Lupke: Japans Rußland- politik von 1919 bis 1941. Frankfurt/M., Berlin 1962. 14 Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 241; H. Umbreit: Die Rückkehr zu einer indirekten Strategie 165 gegen England. In: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Hrsg. vom Militärgeschicht- lichen Forschungsamt. Bd 2: Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent. Von K. A. Maier, H. Rohde, B. Stegemann, H. Umbreit. Stuttgart 1979, p. 409. 17 Assmann (see fn. 6), p. 691; Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 189. 18 Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939—1945. Hrsg. von G. Wag- ner. München 1972, pp. 143—146; Assmann (see fn. 6), p. 691. 19 Assmann (see fn. 6), pp. 693—695. 20 Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 107. 21 Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4: Führer-Hauptquartier 1. Aug. 1940—31. Dez. 1940, National Archives, Washington, D. C., microcopy T-78 roll 351 ; AD AP, D (see fn. 4), vol. XI. 1, nos. 212, 220, 227, pp. 301-306 (Laval), 315-319 (Franco), 326-332 (Pétain); E. Jäckel: Frankreich in Hitlers Euro- pa: Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Stuttgart 1966 ( = Quellen und Darstel- lungen zur Zeitgeschichte. Bd 14.), pp. 105—123; cf. Hillgruber: Strategie (seefn. 13), p. 190. 22 Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 190. 23 Ibid., pp. 51-52,191; Butler II (see fn. 7), pp. 9-11. 24 Assmann (see fn. 6), pp. 695—696. 25 Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), pp. 223—225. 26 The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O. M. 1938-1945. Ed. by D. Dilks. London 1971, p. 404; Woodward II (see fn. 9), pp. 28-35. 27 Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 224—225. 28 British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898—1914. Eds.: G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley. Vol. IV. London 1929, p. 371 ; K. Helfferich : Georg von Siemens : Ein Lebensbild aus Deutschlands großer Zeit. Vol. III. Berlin 1923, pp. 109-112. 29 G.-R. Tadjbakhche: La question des lies Bahrein. Paris 1960, p. 26, based on Revue Maritime de Paris, 2. Sept. 1935, p. 265; Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen 72 (1941), p. 279. 30 Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjetunion 1939—1941. Dokumente des Auswärtigen Amtes. Hrsg. von A. Seidl. Tübingen 1949, nos. 183—189, 192, pp. 245—290, 296-297; ADAP, D (see fn. 4), vol. XI. 1, nos. 325-348, 404, pp. 448—499, 597—598; cf. Hillgru- ber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 307. 31 J. Meister: Die britisch-sowjetische Intervention im Iran im August 1941 (I). In: Marine-Rund- schau 79 (1982), pp. 652-654, and Marine-Rundschau 80 (1983), pp. 25-35; A. Hiilgruber/G. Hümmelchen: Chronik des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Kalendarium militärischer und politischer Ereignisse 1939—1945. Königstein/Ts., Düsseldorf 1978 (bearb. Neuauflage), p. 92. 32 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 409; Β. P. Schröder: Deutschland und der Mittlere Osten im Zweiten Welt- krieg. Göttingen 1975, pp. 74—76; Woodward I (see fn. 9), pp. 560—584. 33 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 410; Schröder (see fn. 32), pp. 78—80, 107—110; G. Schreiber: Politik und Kriegführung 1941. In: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Hrsg. vom Militärge- schichtlichen Forschungsamt. Bd 3 : Der Mittelmeerraum und Südosteuropa. Von der »non belliger- anza« Italiens bis zum Kriegseintritt der Vereinigten Staaten. Von G. Schreiber, B. Stegemann, D. Vogel. Stuttgart 1984, pp. 551—552. 34 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), pp. 415, 573; Hillgruber/Hümmelchen (see fn. 31), pp. 49, 74. 35 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 411 based on J. S. O. Playfair: The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Vol. II. London 1956, pp. 193-195; Schröder (see fn. 32), pp. 95-100, 109-111, 119-121, 126 with variation in timing; cf. Schreiber (see fn. 33), p. 554. 36 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), pp. 411—414; cf. Schreiber (seefn. 33), p. 554. 37 Schreiber (see fn. 33), pp. 555. 38 Butler II (see fn. 7), pp. 460-463. 39 M. Gilbert: Winston S. Churchill. Vol. VI. London 1983, p. 1082. 40 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 419; Butler II (see fn. 7), pp. 510-515. 41 Butler II (see fn. 7), pp. 517-518; Gilbert (see fn. 39), pp. 1089-1090; cf. Schroder (see fn. 32), pp. 126-129; Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 422. 42 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 422; Schröder (see fn. 32), pp. 132, 150—162. 43 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 423; cf. Schröder (see fn. 32), pp. 150—154. 44 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 423. 45 Butler II (see fn. 7), pp. 541—544; Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 423; cf. Schröder (see fn. 32), pp. 154-155. 46 Butlerll (seefn. 7), pp. 517-518 ; Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 424; Schröder (see fn. 32), pp. 129, 156. 47 Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939—1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. Hrsg. von W. Hubatsch. München 21965 (dtv-Ausgabe.), pp. 139—142; Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 478. 48 Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), pp. 478—479; Halder II (see fn. 10), p. 412; Ribbentrop to Papen 19 May 1941 AD AP, D (see fn. 4), vol. XII (1969), no. 538, pp. 706-707. 49 Briefing on 31 May 1941, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht I (see fn. 13), p. 399. 50 Konferenzen und Verträge. Vertrags-Ploetz. Ein Handbuch geschichtlich bedeutsamer Zusam- menkünfte und Vereinbarungen. Bearb. von H. K. G. Rönnefarth und H. Euler. Part II. Vol. 4. Würzburg21959, pp. 196—198; Hillgruber: Strategie (seefn. 13), p. 497. 51 Schreiber (seefn. 33), pp. 567,571. 52 Assmann (see fn. 6), pp. 706—707. 53 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 424; Schröder (see fn. 32), pp. 130—139; cf. Schreiber (see fn. 33), pp. 561-562. 54 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), p. 424; Schreiber (see fn. 33), pp. 562—567. 55 Gilbert (see fn. 39), pp. 1103-1104. 56 Hinsley I (see fn. 5), pp. 425-427; Playfair II (see fn. 35), p. 203; W. S. Churchill: The Second World War: The Grand Alliance. Vol. III. Boston 1950, pp. 322—332, 477; differing estimates of military strengths in Hillgruber/Hümmelchen (see fn. 31), pp. 77, 85; see also Hillgruber: Strategie (seefn. 13), pp. 480—481 ; Schröder (seefn. 32),pp. 150-178. 57 Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht I (see fn. 13), p. 328. 58 Ibid., pp. 406-507. 59 Ibid., pp. 1022-1023. 60 Hitlers Weisungen (see fn. 47), pp. 151—162. 61 M. Salewski: Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935—1945. Bd III: Denkschriften und Lagebetrach- tungen 1938-1944. Frankfurt/Main 1973, p. 192, Bd. II: 1942-1945. München 1975. 62 Meister (see fn. 31), p. 653 63 Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler. Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslandes 1939—1942. Hrsg. von A. Hillgruber. Frankfurt/M. 1967, pp. 541—549, 598—608. Since the publication of this work the documents have been more fully decyphered and printed in: ADAP, D (see fn. 4), vol. XIII (1970), pp. 829-834; Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 731. 64 Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 731. 65 Hillgruber/Hümmelchen (see fn. 31), p. 17; United States of America Congressional Record: Pro- ceedings and Debates of the 77th Congress. First Session. Vol. 87. Part 1. Washington 1941, p. 46 (6 Jan. 1941); S. E. Morison: The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston and Toronto 1963. 66 E. Jäckel: Die deutsche Kriegserklärung an die Vereinigten Staaten von 1941. In: Im Dienste Deutschlands und des Rechtes. Festschrift für Wilhelm G. Grewe zum 70. Geburtstag am 16. Oktober 1981. Hrsg. von F. J. Kroneck und Th. Oppermann. Baden-Baden 1981, pp. 117—137; Hillgruber: Strategie (see fn. 13), p. 733. 67 J. Rohwer: Die See-Luftschlacht bei Midway 1942. In: Entscheidungsschlachten des Zweiten Welt- krieges. Im Auftrag des Arbeitskreises für Wehrforschung hrsg. von H.-A. Jacobsen und J. Rohwer. Frankfurt/M. 1960, p. 189. 69 Ibid., pp. 189-191. 69 Ibid., p. 191. 70 Ibid., pp. 191-192; ADAP, E (see fn. 4), vol. 1(1969), pp. 260-262. 71 M. Howard : Grand Strategy. Vol. IV. London 1970, pp. 75—76 ; Rohwer (see fn. 67), p. 194. 72 Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht II (see fn. 13), p. 5. 73 W. S. Churchill : The Second World War [Bd 4] : The Hinge of Fate. Boston 1950, pp. 189-194. 74 Eisenhower to Marshall 6 March 1942, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The War Years. I. Eds. A. D. Chandler, Jr., et al. Baltimore and London 1971, pp. 169—170; Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. Eds. Francis L. Loewenheim et al. New York 1975, pp. 187-188. 75 Eisenhower to Marshall 25 March 1942, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower I (see fn. 74), p. 205. 76 Eisenhower, note 28 March 1942, ibid., p. 213. 77 Eisenhower to Secretary of War H. L. Stimson 12 Apr. 1942, ibid., p. 241; cf. p. 207 n. 1, where it is suggested that Marshall went to London to obtain approval for »Bolero«, the building up of Ameri- can forces in the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations, which was only in fact a part of his agenda. 78 Ibid., p. 207 n. 1, 238 n. 1; M. Matloff/E. M. Snell: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942. The War Department. Washington 1953 (= United States Army in World War II. Se- ries 1. Vol. 3), pp. 202-203. 79 Eisenhower to Marshall 10 Apr. 1942, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower I (see fn. 74), pp. 238-239. 80 Eisenhowerto Stimson 12 Apr. 1942, ibid., pp. 241—242. 81 Matloff/Snell (see fn. 78), p. 203 n. 21. Rohwer (see fn. 67), p. 194 cites only this cable, without its antecedents, suggesting a pivotal importance of it in Allied strategic thought. 82 Rohwer (see fn. 67), pp. 195—197. 83 Salewski II (see fn. 61), pp. 79—82. 84 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 85 Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht II (see fn. 13), p. 16. 86 Salewski II (see fn. 61), pp. 83-84. 87 Ibid., pp. 82—83; Salewski III (see fn. 61), pp. 266—274. 88 Salewski II (see fn. 61), p. 85 (ellipsis by Salewski). 89 Ibid., pp. 82—83; Lagevorträge (see fn. 18), p. 356. 90 H. A. Jacobsen: 1939—1945. Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten. Darmstadt 1959, p. 290. 91 Salewski II (see fn. 61), p. 83. 92 Lagevorträge (see fn. 18), pp. 360—361 ; quotation by Salewski II (see fn. 61), p. 89. 93 Salewski II (see fn. 61), pp. 91-92. 94 See Hitler's directives of 10 Jan. and 28 March 1942, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht II (see fn. 13), pp. 7, 47-48. 95 Halder III (see fn. 10), p. 455. 96 Hillgruber/Hümmelchen (see fn. 31), pp. 170—171. 97 Hitlers Weisungen (see fn. 47), pp. 270-275.

73 Veröffentlichungen des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes:

Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939—1945, Teil A. Faksimile-Edition : Im Auftrag des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes in Verbindung mit dem Bundesarchiv- Militärarchiv und der Marine-Offizier-Vereinigung herausgegeben von Werner Rahn und Gerhard Schreiber unter Mitwirkung von Hansjoseph Maierhöfer

Bereits erschienen: Band 1: August/September 1939, 248 Seiten Band 2: Oktober 1939, 270 Seiten Band 3: November 1939, 284 Seiten Band 4: Dezember 1939, 258 Seiten Band 5: Januar 1940, 274 Seiten Band 6: Februar 1940, ca. 250 Seiten In Kürze erscheint: Band 7: März 1940, ca. 250 Seiten Band 8: April 1940, ca. 340 Seiten

Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Herford 1988 ff.

Einzelband: DM 78,— Subskription: DM 64,— pro Band Die Edition umfaßt den Faksimile-Nachdruck der 68 Monatsbände von August/September 1939 bis April 1945. Der Umfang erfordert im Einzelfall eine Teilung in Halbbände. Ergän- zungen, handschriftliche Korrekturen und Bemerkungen im Original werden in einem Anmer- kungsapparat erläutert. Hinweise auf andere Teile des Kriegstagebuches bzw. Aktenbestände der Ski erhalten genaue Angaben zu den Fundorten. Jährlich sollen 12 Monatsbände erschei- nen. Es ist geplant, vor Abschluß der Edition einen Ergänzungsband herauszugeben, der u. a. eine umfangreiche wissenschaftliche Einführung in das KTB, ein ausführliches Abkürzungs- verzeichnis sowie die wichtigsten Marinequadratkarten enthalten wird.

Neben dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab) gehört das Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, Teil A, zu den grundlegenden und umfas- sendsten Geschichtsquellen des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Von Tag zu Tag dokumentiert es das La- gebild, die strategischen und operativen Überlegungen sowie Entscheidungen der Marine.

Das KTB wurde regelmäßig vom Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine abgezeichnet. Hitler und die Führungen der anderen Wehrmachtteile hatten keine Kenntnis von seinem Inhalt. Wenn auch der Schwerpunkt der KTB-Führung beim Seekrieg liegt, so geben die Aufzeichnungen darüber hinaus einen tiefen Einblick in die politischen, strategischen und rüstungswirtschaftli- chen Probleme der deutschen Kriegführung.