DOCSLIB.ORG

Justice and the Libyan Crisis: the ICC's Role Under Security

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Justice and the Libyan Crisis: the ICC's Role Under Security Briefing Paper Justice and the Libyan crisis: the ICC’s role under Security Council Resolution 1970 Max du Plessis and Antoinette Louw Pretoria, 31 May 2011 Briefing Paper Justice and the Libyan crisis: the ICC’s role under Security Council Resolution 1970 Max du Plessis and Antoinette Louw Pretoria, 31 May 2011 Contents Introduction . .1 Security Council Resolution 1970 in focus . .1 Prospects going forward . .2 Africa – again and again . .3 The African court involves itself . .4 From 1970 to 1973: the importance of keeping the baby in the bathwater . .4 Conclusion . .7 About the authors . .7 Notes . .7 Justice and the Libyan crisis: the ICC’s role under Security Council Resolution 1970 INTRODUCTION committed in Libya, including indiscriminate armed attacks against civilians, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary On the evening of Saturday 26 February 2011 the United arrests, [and] detention and torture of peaceful Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously passed demonstrators’.1 The Security Council was also mindful of Resolution 1970 (2011) referring the situation in Libya expressions of concern and condemnation of the Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The regime from high-profile regional and global bodies, resolution was part of a robust set of Security Council several of which called for some type of international measures directed at the Libyan regime, including a intervention. travel ban and asset freezes for Libyan leader Muammar A statement was released on 21 February by the Gaddafi and his associates, and an arms embargo. It was European Union Foreign Affairs Council, and on 22 the first concrete action by the Security Council in February by both the secretary general of the respect of the events that began several weeks earlier, as Organisation of the Islamic Conference,2 and the Council increasing reports of attacks on civilians in Libya of the League of Arab States.3 That same day, UN High confirmed the lengths to which Gaddafi would go to Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called for cling to power. an international investigation into Libya’s attacks on anti- Intervention by the international community at this government protesters, saying they may amount to stage was largely welcomed across the globe and among crimes against humanity.4 On 23 February the AU issued Libyans on the receiving end of Gaddafi’s offensive. Less its first public statements on the issue. AU Commission than three months later, and in the wake of a second chairperson, Jean Ping, condemned the ‘disproportionate Security Council resolution authorising a no-fly zone use of force against civilians’ and together with the AU’s and the use of ‘all means necessary’ short of foreign Peace and Security Council (PSC) appealed for an occupation to protect civilians in Libya (Resolution immediate end to the violence. The PSC also decided to 1973), much has changed. urgently send a mission to Libya to assess the situation.5 The role of international military forces in ending the On 25 February, the UN’s Human Rights Council – in bloodshed is now being questioned and criticised in a meeting that marked the first time that a council Africa, at the African Union (AU), and beyond. While member was the subject of a special session16 – expressed the focus of this condemnation is on the nature and its strong condemnation of the attacks on civilians and impact of military operations underway in Libya, there is a real chance that the justice leg of the Security Council’s rejected ‘the incitement to hostility and violence … made 7 intervention will be tarred with the same brush. For from the highest level of the Libyan government’. The African leaders – most of whom are already reluctant to Human Rights Council also resolved to appoint an support the ICC – a rejection of international international independent commission of inquiry to interventions in Libya more broadly can all too easily be investigate ‘all alleged violations of international human extended to the ICC’s work in that country. Given the rights law in Libya’ in order to ensure that ‘those 8 potential that the ICC has in this case to prevent future individuals responsible are held accountable’. atrocities by acting quickly and decisively, a lack of During this time the voices of Libyan civilians were cooperation from African states would be regrettable for seldom heard given the regime’s targeting of journalists as the thousands of victims of crimes against humanity and well as the blocking of public access to the internet and 9 war crimes in Libya. telecommunication networks. Nevertheless, on 21 February, Ibrahim Dabbashi, the then deputy permanent representative at the Libyan mission to the UN, held a SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION press conference at which he distanced himself from 1970 IN FOCUS Gaddafi’s government and reported that mercenaries Resolution 1970 represents only the second time that the were being used to suppress peaceful demonstrations in Security Council has used its discretion under the ICC’s Libya: Rome Statute to refer a matter to the court for possible prosecution. The first referral, under Resolution 1593 Gaddafi’s regime has already started the genocide (2005), was made in respect of the situation in Sudan’s against the Libyan people since January 15. His soldiers Darfur region, which led to arrest warrants being issued and the mercenaries being flown into the country were for, among others, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir ordered to shoot to kill. for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. (Al-Bashir remains at large.) Dabbashi, surrounded by a dozen Libyan diplomats from The vote for Resolution 1970 followed increasing the mission in New York, then spelled out several reports of ‘gross and systematic human rights violations demands, including among others, the following: Justice and the Libyan crisis: the ICC’s role under Security Council Resolution 1970 1 We are calling on the UN to impose a no-fly zone on all Further, the referral is not limited to crimes against Tripoli to cut off all supplies of arms and mercenaries to humanity and individuals could potentially be charged the regime. … We call on the UN Security Council to with other crimes under the Rome Statute such as war use the principle of the right to protect to take the crimes (and possibly even genocide). In a statement on necessary action to protect the Libyan people against 16 May the prosecutor confirmed that indeed arrest the genocide. … We call on all countries in the world warrants are being sought for suspects accused of not to permit Gaddafi to escape to their territories and committing crimes against humanity and war crimes. In call on them to watch carefully for any amounts of order for war crimes to be alleged, the situation in Libya money which may be flowing outside Libya. … We also must amount to an internal armed conflict, which the call on the prosecutor of the International Criminal Rome Statute defines as a situation of ‘protracted armed Court to start immediately investigating the crimes conflict between governmental authorities and organised committed by Gaddafi. … We are calling on the Human armed groups or between such groups’. According to the Rights Council in Geneva to meet in an emergency Rome Statute, this excludes ‘situations of internal session to study the situation in Libya and find a way to disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and protect the Libyan people from the crimes against sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature’. 10 humanity and crimes of war. Again, although Resolution 1970 suggests that the situation in Libya does amount to an armed conflict The diplomat’s views were likely supported by several when it urges the Libyan authorities to respect colleagues, as reports filtered in that Libyan envoys international humanitarian law (the law that relates to posted to Australia, Bangladesh, France, India, the US, war crimes), the ICC will have to make its own the UN in New York and Geneva, and the Arab League determination in this regard. resigned from their positions in opposition to the Second, as far as the persons potentially falling within Gaddafi regime’s actions.11 the ICC’s jurisdiction are concerned, the resolution While there was some support for international action contains a controversial provision excluding ‘nationals, in Libya, up until the Security Council vote on 26 current or former officials or personnel’ of states other February it was not clear whether China and Russia than Libya from the court’s jurisdiction in respect of (states openly hostile to the ICC) would allow the ‘alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to resolution to pass. In the end the decision was adopted operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or unanimously. Of equal significance is that the three authorised by the Council’. Such persons might only be African members of the Security Council – Gabon, prosecuted if their home states waive their jurisdiction. Nigeria and South Africa – supported the referral, This proviso, which would apply to any members of notwithstanding ongoing tensions between African states an international peacekeeping operation authorised by and the ICC over the court’s Darfur and Kenyan the Security Council, was included at the insistence of the investigations. United States, as a pre-condition to allowing the Notably, Resolution 1970 made explicit reference to article 16 of the Rome Statute, which allows the Security resolution to pass. Contrary to media reports, however, Council to defer an investigation by the ICC in order to the proviso does not place the alleged mercenaries in maintain international peace and security. This was Libya outside the ICC’s jurisdiction since they are included as a result of concerns raised by some states that obviously not acting with the authority of the Security the referral might become an obstacle to future peace Council.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Discussion Paper: Libya and R2P and Regime Change
    Thinking About Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and Regime Change: A “Lessons Learned” Discussion Paper Robin Collins October, 2011 This discussion paper on the application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in Libya is intended to stimulate dialogue among members of the World Federalist Movement – Canada (WFMC) and other R2P advocates. We begin with the assumption that there was a real need for the international community to respond to the threats and behaviour of the Libyan government of Moammar Gaddafi. In the circumstances, the UN Security Council resolutions that followed Gaddafi‘s actions, resolutions 1970 and 1973, and then resolution 2009 which recognized the National Transitional Council after the fall of Gaddafi, were appropriate responses to the crisis. There was explicit reference to a responsibility to protect civilians and civilian areas. The International Criminal Court was referenced (in resolutions 1970, 1973 and 2009). There was demand for a ceasefire, to diplomatic channels being opened, to dialogue towards political reform (resolution1973), and to an arms embargo and freezing of assets. In resolution 1973 “all necessary measures” were authorized, as was a no-fly zone to protect Libyan civilians, including those in Benghazi. However, there were many rough edges and a fair amount of (intended?) ambiguity. These topics are important to explore so that we are clear about where mandates were followed, or violated. Our goal is to strengthen the R2P doctrine so that it becomes a reliable new normative framework for future international diplomacy and protection of civilians. The experience of application in Libya will impact future efforts by the United Nations to invoke R2P.
    [Show full text]
  • Date with History As UN Acts Over Libya by Harvey Morris , 27 February 2011
    Date with history as UN acts over Libya By Harvey Morris , 27 February 2011 Muammer Gaddafi, at his only appearance before the UN, ripped pages out of its founding Charter and branded its Security Council the Terror Council. Less than 18 months on, that same council has now acted with unprecedented speed and unanimity to try and hasten his downfall. There was a forgivable atmosphere of self-congratulation among diplomats of the 15 council members on Saturday night after a grinding day of bargaining that led to the adoption of sanctions against the rapidly shrinking Libyan regime. The question, as always: will they work? The intention, summed up by Susan Rice, US envoy to the UN, was “stopping the violence against innocent civilians”. But are an asset freeze, a travel ban, an arms embargo – even the threat of future prosecution for war crimes – enough to deter a regime fighting for its survival? Diplomats acknowledge that the measures might not divert Colonel Gaddafi from his murderous intention to crush the Libyan uprising. However, they could persuade his cohorts of military and security henchman that there is still time to bail out before the inevitable end. Why fight on in a lost cause, only to end up penniless in an international court, facing life imprisonment for war crimes? For the first time, the Security Council unanimously referred a case of state violence to the International Criminal Court. That alone was a big victory for the resolution’s British and French drafters and could set an important longer-term precedent. The UK and France are the only permanent members of the council even to have ratified the Rome Treaty that established the court.
    [Show full text]
  • Amateur Computerist Newsletter
    The Amateur Computerist Webpage: http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ Winter 2012 Libya, The UN, and Netizen Journalism Volume 21 No. 1 Table of Contents by the UN in making possible the aggression against Libya. The actions taken by the Security Council and Introduction.. Page 1 other United Nations bodies like the Human Rights Int’l Media: 16th Member of the Security Council. Page 2 Council were contrary to the obligations of the UN Security Council Libya Mtg: Smoke and Mirrors. Page 5 charter and other principles of international law. The UN SC on Libya: Killing the International Law. Page 11 articles in this issue document the process by which Abuse of UN Processes by Security Council. Page 12 the UN became an accomplice in a NATO war against U.S. Uses UN to Bypass Congress to Go to War.Page 21 a sovereign nation that is a member of the United Journalism as a Weapon of War in Libya . Page 22 Nations. Open Letter From Concerned Africans on Libya.Page 23 These articles serve to argue that starting in What Does Gaddafi’s Fall Mean For Africa?. Page 26 February 2011 there was a media blitz supporting the ALBA Declaration on Libya and Syria. Page 27 NATO actions, largely based on unverifiable claims UNGA Debates NATO Attack on Libya. Page 29 by the opposition against the government of Libya. Lies of the Mainstream Media: TeleSUR. Page 30 The story that emerged is based on broadly circulated Munich to Tripoli: Aiding Aggression.. Page 32 falsifications of what was happening on the ground.
    [Show full text]
  • The Tide Turns
    November 2011 Anthony Bell, Spencer Butts, and David Witter THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION THE TIDE TURNS PART 4 Photo Credit: Fighters for Libya’s interim government rejoice after winning control of the Qaddafi stronghold of Bani Walid, via Wikimedia Commons. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. ©2011 by the Institute for the Study of War. Published in 2011 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War. 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036. http://www.understandingwar.org Anthony Bell, Spencer Butts, and David Witter THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION THE TIDE TURNS PART 4 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Anthony Bell is a Research Assistant at ISW, where he conducts research on political and security dynamics on Libya. He has previously studied the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and published the ISW report Reversing the Northeastern Insurgency. Anthony holds a bachelor’s degree from the George Washington University in International Affairs with a concentration in Conflict and Security. He graduated magna cum laude and received special honors for his senior thesis on the history of U.S. policy towards Afghanistan. He is currently a graduate student in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Spencer Butts is a Research Assistant for the Libya Project at ISW. Prior to joining ISW, Mr. Butts interned at the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the Army War College where he wrote a literature review of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • NEW YORK UNIVERSITY the Libyan War: a Diplomatic History
    NEW YORK UNIVERSITY CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION The Libyan War: A Diplomatic History | February - August 2011 Emily O’Brien and Andrew Sinclair Preface by Richard Gowan August 2011 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International cooperation is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges. The NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) works to enhance international responses to conflict, insecurity, and scarcity through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community. CIC’s programs and research activities span the spectrum of conflict, insecurity and scarcity issues. This allows us to see critical inter-connections and highlight the coherence often necessary for effective response. We have a particular concentration on the UN and multilateral responses to conflict. Table of Contents The Libyan War: A Diplomatic History | February-August 2011 Emily O’Brien and Andrew Sinclair Preface by Richard Gowan Preface 2 Authors and acknowledgements 4 Brief chronology of the Libyan war 5 The Libyan War: A Diplomatic History | February-August 2011 7 February 7 March 9 April 14 May 17 June 20 July 24 August 26 Endnotes 27 The Libyan War: A Diplomatic History | are numerous unresolved disputes over how both major powers February-August 2011 and international organizations responded to the Libyan crisis. Non-Western governments have, for example, accused NATO of Preface pursuing a policy of regime change while claiming to protect Richard Gowan civilians. Western officials grumble that their critics have been naïve or disingenuous in calling for a mediated settlement.
    [Show full text]
  • International Criminal Court Prosecutor Briefs Security Council on ‘Libya
    International Criminal Court Prosecutor Briefs Security Council on ‘Libya... http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10433.doc.htm 2 November 2011 Security Council SC/10433 Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York Security Council th 6647 Meeting (PM) INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT PROSECUTOR BRIEFS SECURITY COUNCIL ON ‘ LIBYA CASE’, SAYING UP TO FUGITIVES TO SURRENDER, UP TO COUNCIL, STATES TO ENSURE JUSTICE Prosecutor Says Investigations Focused on Two Indictees, Gender Crimes, but Allegations of Crimes by NATO, Other Forces Will Also Be Examined The International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecution was galvanizing efforts to ensure that Libya’s former intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Senussi, would face justice, following the death of Muammar Qadhafi on 20 October, the Security Council was told this afternoon. Briefing the Council on his activities regarding Libya, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, of the International Criminal Court, said information had been received that a group of mercenaries might be endeavouring to facilitate the escape from Libya of the late leader’s son, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi. He called upon States to do all they could to disrupt any such operation, saying: “It is up to Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi and Abdullah al Senussi to decide if they will surrender themselves, remain in hiding or try to escape to another country. It is up to the United Nations Security Council and States to ensure that they face justice for the crimes for which they are charged”. He said the Office’s current investigations were focused on collection against the two indicted and into gender crimes in Libya.
    [Show full text]
  • Reports and Accounts Are Spotty in Libya Due to Perpetual Snags In
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Hafed Al-Ghwell [email protected] Tel +1-202-390-6902 Libya Outreach Group LIBYA: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Washington – Feb. 22, 2011 -- Libyans are under siege. Each and every Libyan knows that protesting is a death sentence yet they continue to take to the streets. The Gaddafi regime has declared war against the people of Libya, stating that it would fight to the very last bullet. As of February 21, 2011, the International Coalition Against War Criminals has reported 519 deaths, 3,980 wounded and at least 1,500 missing in Libya since the start of demonstrations a few days ago. The numbers being reported by Libyans on the ground are much higher, with thousands more injured. As the Libyan Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Ibrahim Dabbashi declared, “the regime of Gaddafi has already started the genocide against the Libyan people. We are sure that what is going on now in Libya is a crime against humanity and a crime of war…We find it is impossible to stay silent and we have to transfer the voice of the Libyan people to the world”. The UN Security Council needs to mobilize immediately. Nations around the world have a moral imperative to stand on the right side of history—the side of the people heroically, peacefully protesting for their freedom and dignity against Gaddafi’s tyranny, terrorism, and oppression. We ask all nations to stand with the Libyan people by: 1. Establishing a no-fly zone to prevent Gaddafi from using the air-force against the Libyan people.
    [Show full text]
  • Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense
    POPULAR PROTEST IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (V): MAKING SENSE OF LIBYA Middle East/North Africa Report N°107 – 6 June 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION: THE UPRISING .............................................................................. 1 II. THE NATURE OF QADDAFI’S REGIME ................................................................... 6 A. THE EARLY YEARS ...................................................................................................................... 6 B. THE JAMAHIRIYA AND THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY ........................................................................... 7 C. THE FORMAL POLITICAL SYSTEM ................................................................................................ 8 D. INFORMAL POWER NETWORKS................................................................................................... 10 1. The Men of the Tent .................................................................................................................. 10 2. The Revolutionary Committees Movement ............................................................................... 10 3. Tribes and “Social People’s Leaderships” ................................................................................. 11 E. QADDAFI’S FAMILY ................................................................................................................... 12 F. THE ROLE OF PATRONAGE
    [Show full text]
  • Making Sense of Libya
    POPULAR PROTEST IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (V): MAKING SENSE OF LIBYA Middle East/North Africa Report N°107 – 6 June 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION: THE UPRISING .............................................................................. 1 II. THE NATURE OF QADDAFI’S REGIME ................................................................... 6 A. THE EARLY YEARS ...................................................................................................................... 6 B. THE JAMAHIRIYA AND THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY ........................................................................... 7 C. THE FORMAL POLITICAL SYSTEM ................................................................................................ 8 D. INFORMAL POWER NETWORKS................................................................................................... 10 1. The Men of the Tent .................................................................................................................. 10 2. The Revolutionary Committees Movement ............................................................................... 10 3. Tribes and “Social People’s Leaderships” ................................................................................. 11 E. QADDAFI’S FAMILY ................................................................................................................... 12 F. THE ROLE OF PATRONAGE
    [Show full text]
  • FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE [email protected]
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE [email protected] WAR CRIMES AGAINST LIBYA Washington – Feb. 22, 2011 -- Libyans are under siege. Each and every Libyan knows that protesting is a death sentence yet they continue to take to the streets. The Gaddafi regime has declared war against the people of Libya, stating that it would fight to the very last bullet. As of February 21, 2011, the International Coalition Against War Criminals has reported 519 deaths, 3,980 wounded and at least 1,500 missing in Libya since the start of demonstrations a few days ago. The numbers being reported by Libyans on the ground are much higher, with thousands more injured. As the Libyan Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Ibrahim Dabbashi declared, “the regime of Gaddafi has already started the genocide against the Libyan people. We are sure that what is going on now in Libya is a crime against humanity and a crime of war…We find it is impossible to stay silent and we have to transfer the voice of the Libyan people to the world”. The UN Security Council needs to mobilize immediately. Nations around the world have a moral imperative to stand on the right side of history—the side of the people heroically peacefully protesting for their freedom and dignity against Gaddafi’s tyranny, terrorism, and oppression. We ask all nations to stand with the Libyan people by: 1. Establishing a no-fly zone to prevent Gaddafi from using the air-force against the Libyan people. 2. Calling on the United Nations Security Council to take decisive action and invoke Chapter 7 to stop the massacre of innocent civilians, and deployment of International Peace-keeping troops.
    [Show full text]
  • Governance in North Africa Following the Uprisings in 2011-2012
    GOVERNING UNCERTAINTY: THE FIRST PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN TUNISIA AND LIBYA FOLLOWING THE UPRISINGS IN 2011-2012 By Sabina Henneberg A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland February, 2017 Abstract This dissertation examines the actors, institutions and strategies that characterized the first provisional administrations (the governing structures in place from anti-authoritarian uprisings to first elections) in Tunisia and Libya in 2011-2012. It explores two central research questions. First, to what extent are first provisional administrations shaped by pre-existing structures, and to what extent are actors able to shape them? Second, to what extent do first provisional administrations impact the phases of political change that follow them? The results are based on interviews with Tunisians and Libyans and a wide array of secondary sources, including books, journal articles, and reports by international organizations. The dissertation argues that the two first provisional administrations were largely shaped by pre-existing institutions. In addition, the distinct choices made by actors in both— while also constrained by pre-existing institutions—had important effects on later phases of post-authoritarian governance. A comparison of the actors, institutions and strategies of the first provisional administrations in Tunisia and Libya show that, in fact, Libya’s building of democratic institutions was more profoundly challenged than Tunisia’s even before the first transfer of power via the ballot box. Committee members: Dr. Peter Lewis, Dr. William Zartman, Dr. Karim Mezran, Dr. Eva Bellin, and Dr. Jennifer Seely ii Acknowledgments I owe sincere thanks to each member of my dissertation committee: Peter Lewis, William Zartman, Karim Mezran, Eva Bellin, and Jennifer Seely, for their support and guidance.
    [Show full text]
  • The US Commitments to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period ——A Case Study on Libya Abstract
    This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Journal of Transatlantic Studies published by Taylor & Francis: https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2015.1125165 Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/30240 The US Commitments to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period ——A Case Study on Libya Author: Yanan Song Abstract The recent history of the US commitment to NATO has been dominated by economic pressures, squabbles over NATO’s military performance in Afghanistan, and the apparent American preference for ‘leading from behind’ in Libya. The case study on Libya will be especially important in exploring the Obama administration’s understanding of the purpose of NATO in the context of current economic pressures, domestic US debates about post-War on Terror interventions, and of increasing American preoccupation with Pacific (rather than European) security. In the case of Libya, the US apparently hesitated to unfold military operations against Libyan military targets. It seems to be the first time that the US followed rather than led its European allies to a campaign. The reason why the US was reluctant to intervene in Libya at the very beginning; why it changed its mind to join the operation later; and why it transferred the Libyan mission to NATO and adopted the strategy of ‘leading from behind’, reflected on not only the redefinition of ‘American way of war’, but also the future of NATO. Key words: US foreign policy; Obama administration; NATO; Libya; Syria 1 Introduction The geopolitical conditions which led to the creation of NATO in 1949 rapidly disappeared following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
    [Show full text]