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CIVIL - MILITARY FUSION CEN TRE Mediterranean Review Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises 07 September 2011 INSIDE THIS ISSUE This document provides an overview of developments in Libya and elsewhere in the Mediterranean Basin from 31 August — 06 September 2011, with hyperlinks to source material highlighted and un- Diplomacy Security derlined in the text. For more information on the topics below or other issues pertaining to the region, Development please contact the members of the Med Basin Team, or visit our website at www.cimicweb.org. ABOUT THE CFC Diplomacy Kendall Allen ► [email protected] The Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) is an information The international community continued to make efforts to move into the post-Gaddafi era even and knowledge management as fighting continued and Gaddafi and sons remained defiant and on the loose. Many nations organisation focused on gathered for a ‘Friends of Libya’ meeting hosted by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. More improving civil-military nations recognised the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate government of interaction, facilitating Libya. Many nations and organisations worked to lift sanctions and unfreeze assets in order to information sharing and provide aid to the NTC and Libyans in need. At the same time, Algerian-NTC relations enhancing situational awareness remained strained. The Mubarak trial continued to polarise Egypt, as pro- and anti-Mubarak through the CimicWeb portal demonstrators clashed outside the courtroom. and our weekly and monthly publications. NTC and the international community NTC, which was reported on 01 September by CFC products are based upon the New York Times. On the same day, the and link to open-source he international community has European Union also pushed towards a information from a wide variety continued to make decisions intended normalisation with Libya by lifting the of organisations, research T to increase the legitimacy of the NTC financial freeze on six Libyan ports, including centres and media sources. as the new government of Libya during this those of Tripoli and Brega. However, the CFC does not transitional period. British Prime Minister endorse and cannot necessarily David Cameron and French President Nicolas guarantee the accuracy or Sarkozy held a post-conflict summit to focus Even though legitimacy is increasing rapidly objectivity of these sources. on both the economic and political for the NTC in the international community, reconstruction of the damaged country. some diplomatic officials continue to advise CFC publications are Labelled as the “friends of Libya summit”, the NTC on how to conduct its business in the independently produced by representatives were present from over 50 coming months. British Foreign Secretary Knowledge Managers and do countries. The NTC has pledged to offer William Hague has cautioned the NTC to do not reflect NATO policies or benefits to countries that supported them its best at adhering to the plan for a transition positions of any other during the revolution. to a democratic government. Under the NTC’s organisation. current 20-month transitional plan (see Individual countries have also taken steps paragraph below), elections should occur in toward normalising relations with the new eight months. However, Hague also believes political authority of Libya. On 31 August, the that this date could change depending on Italian Foreign Minister released a statement internal circumstances in the country. The indicating the plan to reopen the Italian Guardian quotes Hague as saying the most embassy in Libya. According to the report important goal is for the NTC to fulfil its role from Al-Jazeera, Italian diplomats would be in creating the “free, inclusive, democratic CONTACT THE CFC arriving in Tripoli within a short time and Libya that they are committed to.” begin resuming normal functions. Germany For further information, contact: publicised its support for the new ambassador The NTC in Libya from Libya (and member of the NTC), Ali On 02 September, Agence France-Presse Med Basin Team Manager Masednah al-Khotany, and has declared that (AFP) released the details of the NTC’s 20- Dr. Matthew Hall the former Libyan ambassador must leave [email protected] month democratic transition plan. The NTC’s Germany by 15 September. For the first time, representative in Britain, Guma al-Gamaty, The Mediterranean Team Russia has granted political recognition to the discussed with BBC radio the steps that will [email protected] occur in the next year and a half. During the next eight months, foreign minister of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, responding to the NTC will be responsible for leading Libya and will soon rumours regarding a convoy of loyalist fighters from Libya, complete its physical relocation to Tripoli. At the end of this denied Moammar Gaddafi is in Niger. The Daily Telegraph eight-month span, a council of released an article with information approximately 200 members will be from the Algerian newspaper, El- elected and given the task of drafting During the next eight months, the NTC will be Watan, reporting that Algeria refused a constitution. Once the constitution responsible for leading Libya and will soon to grant Gaddafi asylum, even is drafted, it will be debated and then though the country did accept submitted to a referendum. Al- complete its physical relocation to Tripoli. members of his family last week (See Gamaty said elections, both Mediterranean Basin Review 30 parliamentary and presidential, will August 2011). occur within a year of the constitutional council’s election, “and the Libyan people will have elected the leaders they want to lead their country.” As for other members of the Gaddafi family, the Libyan rebels announced on 04 September they were certain that Khamis, Although the NTC’s roadmap to democracy seems to be son of Gaddafi, was indeed dead. According to rebel military coherent and feasible, there are concerns that internal divisions spokesman Ahmed Omar Bani, Khamis died along with the may prevent the rebels from gaining full control of the son of the regime’s intelligence chief, Mohammed al-Senussi, country. The New York Times suggests that chaos may be and was buried in Bani Walid. This is the third time that lurking under the surface of the liberated Tripoli, as fighters Khamis has been declared dead by the rebels. Aisha, the from different areas of the country claim territory and daughter of Gaddafi who fled Libya last week, gave birth responsibility for different parts of the city. The NTC merely hours after crossing the Algerian border. It is reported leadership has also struggled to unify its rebel fighters under a that both she and the baby are in good condition. As of 05 single commander, which points to deep-rooted rivalries September, NTC chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil informed the between tribes and factions. Despite the lack of a single BBC that two sons of Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam and Mutassim military command, the NTC rejected the offer from a UN Gaddafi, have fled from Bani Walid. envoy to deploy international military observers in the country. Libya's deputy representative to the UN, Ibrahim Dabbashi, told the BBC that “it’s very clear that the Libyans want to Egypt – the Mubarak trial avoid any kind of military deployment of the UN or others.” As the trial continued last week, riot police were again faced with the challenge of stopping violent clashes between pro- and anti-Mubarak factions outside the courthouse. On 05 The Gaddafi family and North Africa September, the BBC reported that there were even scuffles The whereabouts of Moammar Gaddafi are still unknown, inside the courthouse itself. The correspondent on the scene even though various speculative reports continue to emerge. In recounted that during a recess in the trial, an individual raised a recent audio message, Gaddafi vowed to keep fighting. The a photo of Mubarak, and afterward it was seized and burnt. Al New York Times quotes Gaddafi in the audio message as Jazeera is maintaining a frequently-updated live blog of the saying, “We are not women. We will keep fighting. Let there trial, and has posted that the trial has been adjourned until 07 be a long fight and let Libya be engulfed in flames.” The September. Security Melodee M. Baines ► [email protected] Gaddafi loyalists refuse to surrender despite being under siege in Sirte and Bani Walid. Conditions in Tripoli and Misrata remain unsecure and chaotic. There were a number of reports regarding foreign fighters in Libya, especially black Africans from the Sahel. NATO officials sought to clarify the future of the mission. Concerns about weapons smuggling, Islamism and AQIM were raised. n 30 August, Libya’s interim leader, Mustafa Abdel continue fighting and accused the international community of Jalil of the National Transition Council (NTC), issued forcing Libya into a civil war. CNN contrasts the euphoria of O a deadline of 03 September for Gaddafi loyalists to two weeks ago to the uncertainty of today, calling the battle for surrender. Gaddafi, however, promised in an audio message to Libya “not quite over”. RECOMMEND REPORT TOPICS TO THE CFC: MEDITERRANEAN REGION IN TRANSITION In order to meet the growing demand for information regarding the dynamic, complex events in Libya specifically and North Afri- ca generally, the CFC has begun publishing special reports on the region in addition to our weekly newsletters. To date, our re- ports have covered the Libyan rebels, as well as constitutional reform in North Africa. Please send your recommendations for fu- ture report topics to: [email protected]. We greatly appreciate your input. Page 2 07 September 2011 in a position to serve as mediator. Middle East Online Sirte, Bani Walid and Tripoli chronicles the story of Silimane Albaka, “one of hundreds of Meanwhile rebel forces surrounded Gaddafi’s hometown of Niger’s Tuaregs” recruited by Gaddafi to fight against the Sirte, awaiting the outcome of talks between Gaddafi loyalists rebels.
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