The Orthodox Conception of the Hereafter: Saʿd Al-Dīn Al-Taftāzānī’S (D

CHAPTER 21 The Orthodox Conception of the Hereafter: Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī’s (d. 793/1390) Examination of Some Muʿtazilī and Philosophical Objections

Thomas Würtz

1 Introduction

Belief in life after death is an integral part of Islam. This dogma was proclaimed by Muḥammad and soon gave rise to a controversy with his opponents in Mecca. It is also considered an integral part of some final judgment as known from Christianity, followed by an afterlife in a paradise garden or in hellfire. This second existence is also connected with an idea of justice, because dwell- ing in paradise or hell is considered the result of human behavior during one’s first, earthly existence. In the early history of Islamic theology (ʿilm al-kalām) it seemed to be uncontested; the second creation and the bodily existence of human beings in the hereafter were seen as being within the capability of an almighty God. In the emerging debates between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿarī school in the ninth and tenth centuries some eschatological matters were discussed, as we see later, but the existence of paradise and hellfire and their material character were not called into question. The situation changed after the arrival of Greek philosophy in Muslim thought and the discussion thereof. Islamic eschatology was now challenged by the ideas of the Islamic philosophers, especially al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) and Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), who considered the path to the hereafter as a spiri- tual resurrection instead of a second material creation. Theologians rejected this idea, the belief in the eternity of the material world, and the view that knowledge logically demonstrated is more true than revealed knowledge in the holy book. Nevertheless, the argumentation established by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā deeply influenced the theology of that time: The logical method of argumentation came to be fully accepted in the Ashʿarī school from the time of al-Ghazālī.1 Also in their terminology, the late Islamic theologians followed the conception of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics, which is based on the difference between what is necessary and what is possible. God himself is described as

1 Rudolph, Neubewertung der Logik 73–5.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004333154_022 The Orthodox Conception of the Hereafter 469 necessarily existing (al-wājib al-wujūd) in contrast to all other created things, which are possibly existing (al-mumkin al-wujūd).2 In the end, the Ashʿarī posi- tion came to be widely accepted and seemed, from an outside perspective, to be victorious over that of the philosophers, although the internal philosophi- cal influence on Islamic theology (ʿilm al-kalām) cannot be denied. In the later kalām-theology of the seventh/thirteenth century, which is under consideration here, the discussion of eternal destiny becomes mingled with older debates involving questions not based on philosophical challenges, but rather consisting of debates between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿarī school.3 Against this background, in what follows I show how the renowned scholar Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (722–93/1322–90) presents the Ashʿarī conception of the hereafter. Like his predecessors al-Bayḍāwī (d. 716/1316) and al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), he refutes the philosophical and theological objections. But on examination of the details of his theological argumentation, we find several instances of the influence of medieval Islamic philosophy. This may be shown in the analysis of the Arabic term for resurrection, the above-mentioned question of bodily or spiritual resurrection, and the question of whether paradise and hell should be considered as already created abodes existing alongside our earthly world or as subjects of creation at doomsday. Another question of interest deals with the value of the repentance of one’s sins as counterbalancing misdeeds in the final judgment. Before doing so, we should have a short look at the author and his work.

2 Taftāzānī and Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid

Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī was well known for the breadth of his learning, which covered mainly theology, rhetoric, and law.4 He was born in Taftāzān in 722/1322 as the descendant of a family well established in scholarship for several generations. His grandfather Fakhr al-Dīn was a judge (qāḍī). After his education he started teaching at several courts in the northeast part of what is now Iran and Afghanistan. Later on, he lived in Khwārazm, but when this town was seized by the conqueror Tīmūr (d. 807/1405), he joined the group of famous scholars living at Tīmūr’s court in Samarqand, although he refused Tīmūr’s first invitation, because he was planning a journey to the Hijaz5 – most

2 Madelung, At-Taftāzānī und die Philosophie 231. 3 Fakhry, History 203–5. 4 Madelung, Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī 95. 5 Khwāndmīr, Tārīkh-i ḥabīb iii, 545.