Japan’s Roadmap for Technology and Human Resources for LWR Safety
Nuclear Energy Policy Planning Division Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) July 7, 2015 1. Promotion of Strategic Development of Technologies and Human Resources
＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞ Decided by the Cabinet in April, 2014 1. Maintaining and developing high-level nuclear technologies and human resources is imperative for smoothly decommissioning aged nuclear power plants, which are expected to increase in the future, as well as TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants.
2. Because enhancing the nuclear safety in surrounding countries ensures the safety of Japan, maintaining and developing high-level nuclear technologies and human resources which enable Japan contribute to their safety enhancement is essential.
3. GOJ promotes the development of technologies that contribute to safety improvement of LWRs including countermeasures against severe accidents and enhance their reliability and efficiency in order to reduce risks in case of an accident. 4. Under international cooperation, GOJ also facilitates R&D of nuclear technologies that serves the safety improvement of nuclear use, such as high- temperature gas-cooled reactors which are expected to be utilized in various industries including hydrogen production and which has an inherent safety.
2 1-1. The Roadmap for Technology and Human Resources for LWR Safety
Published on June 16, 2015 In response to a request from the Nuclear Power Subcommittee, the Working Group presented issues from the public perspective, while the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) called upon their expertise to work out solutions and the draft of a roadmap. The roadmap for technology and human resources for LWR safety was formulated by bouncing ideas off each other. The objectives of this roadmap are to clarify roles among relevant personnel in academic societies, government agencies, electric utilities, manufacturers, and research institutes, and to serve as a common framework for implementing nationwide activities that will lead to improved safety of LWRs without overlapping efforts. This roadmap targets technologies that contribute to safety enhancements for LWRs, including the smooth and safe decommissioning of NPSs. (Note that technologies related to the disposal of radioactive waste that are the subject of the master plan for basic R&D on geological disposal (the R&D map) and technologies related to the decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS are to be included in another roadmap that will be transparent to the public, and hence are not covered in this roadmap.) This roadmap will be reviewed at least once a year.
Working Group on Present issues from public perspective AESJ Nuclear Energy Voluntary Improvement of Researchers and engineers Subcommittee Safety, Technology and involved in LWR safety Human Resource Present solutions and roadmap draft participate in planning as individuals 3 Method of Evaluating the Priority of Issues based on Their Importance
Eight evaluators selected from industry and academia rate each issue using an evaluation axis having two criteria: (A) effectiveness in enhancing LWR safety and (B) importance to the maintenance and development of technology and human resources for contributing to LWR safety enhancements. The evaluators rate each issue according to three levels of importance: ◎ (very important), ○ (important), △ (less important). The evaluation axis is examined as part of the rolling process implemented by the AESJ in order to review evaluation items having overlap, to simplify expressions, and to review the rating method.
Draw up the roadmap overview with issues arranged along a time axis based on their resolution timelines. Draw up the issue survey for issues that categorize each activity of technological and human resource development required for resolving issues in the roadmap overview into suitable groups. The issue survey includes a summary of the issues, a list of activities, the basis for adopting the issue, an analysis of the present condition, the anticipated effects, correlations with other issues, the process of implementation, and implementing and funding entities. Each issue is sorted into eight groups suggested by the Working Group in accordance with the anticipated effects of their resolution.
Any issue that has not been adequately defined or for which the stakeholders are not clear is not included in the roadmap.
Note: (A) and (B) of the evaluation axis rate the importance of each issue from a short-term and a mid/long- Formulate the roadmap with priorities assigned to issues term perspective, respectively. 4 Conceptual image of the coverage of the roadmap
① Advancement of utilization of risk information for existing light water reactors, etc. General public/ International local site community society ⑥Countermeasures for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security ⑦Development of innovative technologies applicable to light water Communication reactors, which are beyond conventional ideas with society
Off site Continuous revising ④ Measures for minimizing off-site damage in the event ～2020 ～2030 ～2050
of an accident
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source in the energy supply energyinthe source base importantan as appropriately isused power nuclear that so risk residual reducing whilesafety ensuring for needed investmentssteady to make and enhancements safety for activities independent and frameworkinthe confidence public on based system collaborative international an establish To
technology and human resources. human and technology in both communityinternationalthe to contributions provide to and warming global against measures and supply energy sustainablein the role stable a plays power nuclear that so power nuclear of meritsthe enhance and demeritsthe reduce furtherTo
Defense in depth On site ③ Measures for preventing on-site damage from expanding in the
event of an accident
-
In plant ②Reduction of accident ⑤Safe and decommissioning
risk of existing light - demand structure. demand water reactors, etc. of existing reactors
2次系減圧弁
主蒸 大気 気安 全弁 蒸気発生器
非常用冷却ユニット 高性能 蓄圧タンク
制御棒
補助給水系 -
低圧注入 power load
ポンプ RWSP RWSP
⑧ Maintenance and development of human resources required for safe and continuous use of light water reactors 5 Roadmap for “①Advancement of utilization of information on risks of existing light water reactors, etc.” Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 Considering 1F accident to voluntarily reset safety targets Continuously executing studies to obtain information on risks related to safety targets (S101M101L102_z01 , S103M102L101_b01)
(S101M101L102_z01 ) 4.71,4.43 ◎ 4.71,4.43 ◎ 3.86, 3.71 ○
Advancing analysis methods and utilizing latest technologies to refine information on risks of earthquakes and tsunami (S106_c04, S106_c05) 4.75,4.50 ◎ 4.63, 4.30 ◎ Based on latest knowledge and technologies, continuously Internationally sharing risk information in which Grasping all risks of natural disasters and accidents other than grasping and refining all risks including those due to large-scale uncertainty is limited and methods of utilization thereof earthquakes and tsunami and reviewing importance of measures natural disasters (M104L103_c06, S103M102L101_b01) (M104L103_c06, S103M102L101_b01)
(S106_c03) 4.43, 4.57 ◎ Grasping various risks variousGrasping
Preparing methods and data to grasp risk information (S111_d13) ◎ ○ ◎ ○ 4.86,3.86 ○ 4.71,4.29 3.86, 3.71 4.71,4.29 3.86, 3.71
Introduction and development of equipment utilizing information on Continuously taking actions to utilize effective risk risks due to large-scale natural disasters reduction measures for designing and to design (S110_c10) 3.88,3.25 ○ Continuously developing equipment that effectively reduces risks including large-scale natural disasters that very rarely occur, and world-standard nuclear plants in which risks are minimized(S111M107L103_d42 ,S111M107L104_d utilizing the knowledge for designing (S111M107L103_d42)
Hardware Introduction and development of equipment utilizing knowledge
10, L103_d16) obtained from 1F accident (S111M107L103_d42) 4.50,4.00 ◎ 4.50,4.00 ◎ 4.50, 4.00 ◎ 4.63,5.13 ◎ 4.25, 4.25 ◎
Arranging scheme and knowledge basis to accelerate risk reduction Arranging scheme and knowledge basis to effectively utilize risk information (S101M101L102_z01, S110M106L103_d02) information(S101M101L102_z01,S110M106L103_d02, Arranging management measures to minimize risks and 4.71,4.43 ◎ 3.50, 3.13○ S103M102L101_b01) 4.71,4.43 ◎ 3.50, 3.13 ○ 3.86, 3.71 ○ organizations and schemes for them (S101M101L102_z01,M101L101_a02,
Software Utilizing risk information for management and decision-making Taking measures based on risk on measuresbasedTaking Reducing risks by improving management and decision-making M103L101_a04) (S111_d29, S102M101_a01, S102_a09) based on latest risk information (M103L101_a04, 4.50,4.38 ◎ 4.43, 3.43 ○ 4.00, 2.88 ○ S102M101_a01) 4.25,3.13 ○ 4.43, 3.43 ○ 4.71,4.43 ◎ 4.00, 2.63 ○ 4.25 3.13 ○ Through attentive discussions, continuously reviewing Having attentive discussions with society about risks of nuclear Having attentive discussions with society about risk reduction safety targets so that they can socially be agreed facilities (S103M102L101_b01) 3.86,3.71 ○ targets of nuclear facilities (S103M102L101_b01) 3.86,3.71 ○ (S101M101L102_z01) 4.71,4.43 ◎ Utilizing risk information to heighten skills for local and broader area Utilizing risk information to continuously heighten skills for local and broader area disaster prevention (S101M101L102_z01, disaster prevention (S104_b04, S104M101L102_b02-1&2&3) S104M101L102_b02-1&2&3, M102L101L104_b08)
4.13,3.13 ○ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.5, 2.25 ○ 4.38, 2.38 ○ 4.71,4.43 ◎ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.5, 2.25 ○ 4.38, 2.38 ○ 3.25, 4.13 ○ with society with Internationally sharing lessons learned from 1F accident Internationally sharing latest knowledge on risk information and safety targets to contribute to worldwide nuclear safety
Sharing risk Sharing information (S110M106L103_d02) 3.50,3.13 ○ (S110M106L103_d02) 3.50,3.13 ○
Developing human resources that can broadly observe various fields related to risks including frequency of occurrence of natural Continuously accepting overseas trainees to training courses with regard to risk management
disasters Human
resource Within Japan, developing human resources that are good at Continuously developing and maintaining human resources that actively act in the risk management fields within Japan and overseas development handling risk information 6 Roadmap for “ ②Reduction of accident risk of existing light water reactors, etc.”
Stage1 Stage2 Stage3
Continuously improving reliabilities of nuclear plant Improving reliabilities of nuclear plant systems systems
g new new g (S111M107L103_d42)
Always (S111M107L103_d42)
measures
into safety safety into knowledge knowledge incorporatin 4.50, 4.00 4.50, 4.00
Advancing plant technologies and operational Drastically improving reliabilities of nuclear plant systems management to prevent troubles Advancing operational performance (M107_d25) (S111M107L103_d42) (S111_d29, S111_d30)
4.50, 4.38 3.63, 2.50 3.63, 3.88
Further clarifying behaviors of reactor cores and Realizing high operation rate and long-term stable cooling water (S111M107_d17-1) operation (S111M107_d24) 3.13, 4.13 4.50, 4.00 4.00, 4.50 Improving fuel reliability (Taking measures for fuel that Improving fuel reliability (Taking measures for fuel that does not cause core meltdown) does not cause core meltdown) (S111M107_d18-1&2, M199L199_d20) (S111M107_d18-1&2,) 4.13, 4.00 4.13, 4.00 3.88, 4.38 Efficiently using fuel with improved reliability
Preventing operational operational Preventing troubles Advancing cores and improving their reliabilities (M199L199_d19, M199L199_d20) Advancing cores and improving their reliabilities (S111M107_d24 , M199L199_d19) (S111M107_d24) 3.13, 4.13 2.50, 4.38 2.50, 4.38 3.88, 4.38 3.13, 4.13 Continuously improving reliabilities of nuclear plant facilities (S111M107_d36) Improving reliabilities of nuclear plant facilities 3.50, 5.00 (S111M107_d36)
Realizing safe operation by very long-life plants 3.50, 5.00 Advancing safety against earthquakes (M106_d40-2, (L104_d41) time M106_d40-1) 3.50, 3.00 3.38, 3.00 Advancing methods to evaluate material degradation
Taking measures Takingmeasures Further heighten performances of plant building (S111_d37)
against degradation against over degradation 3.50, 4.50 structures and materials (M107_d38) 3.50, 3.88 3.00, 5.00
Developing state monitoring technologies for Optimizing operation management and reducing loads Through technical innovation, reducing risks of exposure reduction of exposure and reducing loads to to operators to ensure safe operation (M107_d34) and loads of maintenance and operation to ensure safe environment operation (L104_d35-1, L104_d35-2)
(S111_d32, S111_d33-1) environment Improving work work Improving 4.38, 4.5 4.38, 4.5 3.50, 2.75 3.25, 3.88 4.00, 4.50
Maintaining human resources that can manage plants Developing international human resources that have Human resource Realizing safe operation based on knowledge of phases from designing and knowledge and skills necessary for stable and safe plant development Obtaining and maintaining on-site workers construction to decommissioning operation 7 Roadmap for “③Measures for preventing on-site damage from expanding in the event of an accident” and “④Measures for minimizing off-site damage in the event of an accident”
Stage1 Stage2 Stage3
Developing technologies and schemes for Arranging technologies and schemes for observation and prevention of natural disasters Continuously optimizing observation schemes for observation based on latest observation and prevention of natural disasters to (S105_a05, S107_c08) 4.50, 4.00 ◎ 3.00. 2.63 ○ knowledge and technologies contribute to improvement worldwide natural disaster prediction Grasping impacts of disasters occurring outside of plant including natural disasters and aircraft Renewing latest knowledge about large-scale disasters including large-scale crashes except earthquakes and tsunami and evaluating risks (S106_c03, S106_c07) 4.43, 4.57 ◎ 3.75, 3.38 ○ earthquakes and large tsunami that very rarely occur, improving methods for Drastically reducing impacts of large-scale measurement of their impacts and evaluation of their risks, and continuing studies disasters disasters that very rarely occur and of disasters disasters of Establishing technologies for evaluation of impacts of earthquakes including fault displacements and to reduce uncertainty (M104L103_c06) uncertainty of risks (M104L103_c06)
including natural natural including 4.71,4.29 ◎
Grasping impacts impacts Grasping slope failures. Systematizing tsunami-proof engineering (S106_c04, S106_c05) outside of power power outside plant of Grasping Grasping from impacts 4.75,4.50 ◎ 4.63, 4.30 ◎ 4.71,4.29 ◎ Continuously improving methods to grasp and evaluate various behaviors
Improving analysis codes and evaluation tools used to analyze behaviors during accidents including those due to large-scale disasters to reduce uncertainty related to including severe accidents (S112M107_d08) Through utilization of innovative 5.00,4.88 ◎ evaluation (S101M101L102_z01, S103M102L101_b01) technologies and latest knowledge including ◎ ○ 4.71,4.43 3.86, 3.71 those for large-scale disasters, designing Designing light water reactors that drastically reduce accident risks(S111M107L104_d10) world-standard light water reactors that 4.63,5.13 ◎ Continuously designing light water reactors that drastically reduce accident risks (S111M107L104_d10) drastically reduce accident risks to
Developing instruments and equipment used to better grasp the plant condition at time of 4.63,5.13 ◎ contribute to worldwide nuclear safety (S111M107L104_d10,M199L199 occurrence of an accident (S111_d11-2, S111_d32, S111_d14) Including accident management to designing to lead to development of innovative _d19) 4.75,4.13 ◎ 4.38, 4.50 ◎4.25, 2.88 ○ technologies(S111_d12,M199L199_d20,M106_d06,S111M107L1 ◎ ○ 04_d10) 4.63,5.13 2.50, 4.38 Developing, diversifying, and appropriately maintaining facilities and equipment to prepare for 4.63, 4.00 ◎ 3.88, 4.38 ○ 3.13, 2.88△ 4.63, 5.13 ◎ accidents (S111_d33-1 , S111_d11-1, S111_d14, S104_c02, S111_d13,
Knowledge and technologies and Knowledge S111_d30) 4.38,4.50 ◎ 4.63, 3.75○ 4.25, 2.88 ○ 5.00,3.38 〇 4.86, 3.86 ○ 3.63, 2.50 △ Utilizing innovative technologies and external emergency support organizations Optimizing management including improvement of management such as improvement of methods
to arrange management that can minimize of communication with leaders and workers and introduction of new management methods Based on international trends, improving severe accident impacts to outside of power plant even in (S105_a05, S102_a12) 4.50,4.00 ◎ 3.13, 3.25 △ management including that for large-scale accidents that case of severe accidents including large- very rarely occur to continuously reduce risks scale disasters Reviewing SA measures based on latest international knowledge (S110_c10, S111_d13, (M103L101_a04,M106_d07,S110M106L103_d02) S110M106L103_d02) Through international standardization of
Management 3.88, 3.25 ○ 4.86,3.86 ○ 3.50, 3.13 ○ Preventing accident from broadening from accident Preventing management, contributing to worldwide nuclear safety (M101L101_a02, Improving training manuals and training methods to advance training courses for preparation for M103L101_a04,
accidents (S104_c02) ○ △ ○ 5.00,3.38 ○ 4.25,3.13 3.38, 2.63 3.50, 3.13 S110M106L103_d02)
Improving skills to respond to accidents within power plant power within accidents to respond to skills Improving Enhancing functions of emergency support organizations including Optimizing organizational structure and functionality to enhance risk management skills of introductions of new technologies and arrangement of schemes ○ ○ ○ organizations (S104_c02, S102_a03) 4.00, 2.63 4.25,3.13 3.50, 3.13
ons, etc. ons, 5.00,3.38 ○ 3.50,2.75 △ (M101L101_a02)
Organizati 4.00,2.63 ○
Strengthening collaboration between plant and society (S104M101L102_b02-2, Utilizing nuclear disaster prevention skills S104M101L102_b02-1, S104_b03)
4.50,2.25 ○ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.13, 2.13 ○ including use of external emergency support Strengthening collaboration between plant and society, improving local nuclear Arranging a scheme for introduction and utilization of dosimetry instruments that are available even organizations that have been enhanced, in disaster prevention skills, and expanding the skills for broader-area disaster order to enhance various, local and broader- in case of a broader area disaster in order to exactly grasp condition around plant at time of an prevention area disaster prevention skills accident (S104_b04) 4.13,3.13 ○ (S104M101L102_b02-3, S104M101L102_b02-1, (M101L101_a02,S104M101L102_b02-1,
society S104M101L102_b02-2, M103L101_a04) Enhancing local disaster prevention skills against nuclear accidents through improvement of S104M101L102_b02-2, S104M101L102_b02-3, M103L101_a04) (outside plant) (outside of disaster prevention plans (S104M101L102_b02-1, S104M101L102_b02-2,
4.38,2.38 ○ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.50, 2.25 ○ 4.25, 3.13 ○ 4.00,2.63 ○ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.50, 2.25 ○ prevention skills of of skills prevention Enhancing disaster disaster Enhancing S104_b04) 4.38,2.38 ○ 4.25, 3.13 ○ Disaster Disaster prevention skills 4.25,2.75 ○ 4.50, 2.25 ○ 4.13, 3.13 ○ Developing human resources that can show leadership and lead multiple Developing human resources that can Developing leaders and workers who are good at responding to accidents organizations to respond to accidents internationally act with regard to response to Human resource accidents development Making efforts to increase human resources that can utilize scientific knowledge including that Developing and retaining human resources that continuously study knowledge about large-scale disasters and accidents that rarely about natural disasters for improvement of nuclear plant safety occur and can utilize the knowledge for safety improvement 8 Roadmap for “⑤Safe decommissioning of existing reactors” Stage1 Stage2 Stage3
Standardizing decommissioning plan (S113_d43)
3.00, 3.50
Considering methods for efficient decommissioning Considering better reactor designs from decommissioning (M107_d47)
(S113_d43) 2.88, 3.13
efficient process
decommissioning Considering use of site (M107_d48) Creating a scheme for scheme a Creating 3.00, 3.50 2.25, 2.50
Developing technologies for safe dismantlement (S113_d44) 3.63, 4.13 Standardizing dismantling technologies (M107_d47) Operating sites while getting consensus (L103_d49)
developing Using technologies and ideas used in foreign countries dismantlement Introducing and and Introducing and at 1F site (S113_d44)
technologies for safe for technologies 3.63, 4.13 2.88, 3.13
Considering schemes and methods to reduce and reuse wastes (S103_b05) 2.75, 3.00
Obtaining people’s understanding of the way of waste Operating and managing disposal sites disposal (S103_b06) (M107_d46) 4.00, 3.00
Developing technologies to construct disposal sites (S113_d45) Controlling wastes safely wastes Controlling 3.50, 3.13 3.38, 2.63 2.50, 2.38
Human Developing human resources that can predict the Developing human resources that can contribute to safety ways of use of nuclear power that are consistent with Continuously maintaining human resources that can of light water reactors by entirely grasping plant life cycle resource decommissioning plan and the relationship with the manage the safe decommissioning process from designing through operation and maintenance to development energy policy decommissioning
9 Roadmap for “⑥Countermeasures for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security”
Stage1 Stage2 Stage3
Incorporating nuclear security measures into designs to expect a Continuously improving both nuclear security measures and synergistic effect of reduction of accident occurrence risks safety measures (S109M104L103_c12, (S109M104L103_c12, 3.88, 3.25 3.88, 3.25 S109M104L103_c11) S109M104L103_c11) 3.38, 3.00 3.38, 3.00
Introducing concept of resistance against nuclear proliferation Deriving performance standards for designs with high resistance and considering improvement of safeguard effectiveness by against nuclear proliferation and demonstrating their designing and improvement of difficulty of radioactive material effectiveness diversion (S109M104L103_d26) Improving plant designs plant Improving (S109M104L103_d26) from viewpoint security offrom viewpoint 2.88, 3.50 2.88, 3.50 Establishing nuclear plant management systems dedicated for no nuclear security risk and for peaceful use
(S109M104L103_c12，S109M104L103_d28 ,
S109M104L103_d27, S109M104L103_c11, S109M104L103_d26) Developing technologies and schemes to detect nuclear Establishing technologies and schemes to reduce risks by nuclear security threats security threats as much as possible (S109M104L103_d28) (S109M104L103_d28)
3.50, 3.38 3.50, 3.38 3.88, 3.25 3.50, 3.38 3.13, 3.38 Analyzing computer security threats to continuously advance the 3.38, 3.00
Grasping computer security state (S109M104L103_d27) protection measures 2.88, 3.50
from viewpoint security offrom viewpoint Improving schemes of plant plant schemesofImproving operation and management and operation (S109M104L103_d27)
3.13, 3.38 3.13, 3.38
Through efforts for non-proliferation and nuclear security at Japan should actively contribute to international problems of non- facilities within Japan, obtaining reliability from people and proliferation and nuclear security international society While the international framework is advanced for measurements for non-proliferation and nuclear security, human resources from Japan should highly contribute to the operation of it Arranging a scheme to effectively developing human resources
proliferation and and proliferation Making efforts to educate and develop human resources by
- that are responsible for plant operation, etc. based on mutual qualifying systems with regard to nuclear security education, etc. understanding of safety and security
Giving enlightenment and education to countries newly Supporting independence of education systems in countries newly Establishing and developing an unremitting network introducing nuclear power plants, mainly in Asia, and introducing nuclear power plants, mainly in Asia, and establishing a with education organizations (COE) in countries newly Contributing to international international to Contributing supporting establishment of education organizations (centers
developing human resources) human developing introducing nuclear power plants and other countries
efforts for non for efforts network with education organizations (COE) nuclear security and (Educating security nuclear of education: COE)
10 Roadmap for “⑦Development of innovative technologies applicable to light water reactors, which are beyond conventional ideas” Stage1 Stage2 Stage3
Introducing innovative technologies into plants while continuously improving reliability of nuclear plant systems (S111M107L103_d42)
4.50, 4.00
Incorporating accident management into designing to lead to development of innovative technologies Through utilization of latest knowledge (S111_d12, M106_d06, S111M107L104_d10, M199L199_d20,) including that for large-scale disasters, designing international-standard light water 4.63, 4.00 3.13, 2.88 4.63,5.13 3.88, 4.38 reactors that drastically reduce accident risks in order to contribute to international nuclear safety (S111M107L104_d10, M199L199_d19, Improving fuel reliability (Taking measures for fuel that does not cause core meltdown) M199L199_d20,) (S111M107_d18-1, S111M107_d18-2, S111M107_d24, S111M107L104_d10, M199L199_d19) 4.13, 4.00 4.13, 4.00 3.13, 4.13 4.63,5.13 2.50, 4.38 4.63,5.13 2.50, 4.38 3.88, 4.38
Through technical innovation, reducing Developing state monitoring technologies for reduction of exposure and optimizing operation exposure risks and loads to maintenance and
management to reduce loads to maintenance and operation staff and to ensure safe operation operation to ensure safe operation Realizing and maintaining safe operation operation safe maintaining Realizing and
by innovation of designs and technologies and designs of innovation by (S111_d32, S111_d33-1, M107_d34) (L104_d35-1, L104_d35-2) 4.38, 4.5 4.38, 4.5 3.50, 2.75 3.25, 3.88 4.00, 4.50
Establishing nuclear plant management systems dedicated for no nuclear security risk and for peaceful use ( S109M104L103_c12，S109M104L103_d28，S109M104L103_d27, S109M104L103_c11, S109M104L103_d26) 3.88, 3.25 3.50, 3.38 3.13, 3.38 3.38, 3.00 2.88, 3.50
Human resource Developing young resources from medium- and long-term viewpoint to retain resources that are responsible for future nuclear safety development 11 （Ref.） Results of priority rating for each issues (AESJ) ①
(B) Technological / (A) (B) (A) Effectiveness of human resource safety improvement maintenance / Overall ID Corresponding title in the task survey sheet development that assessment of ① ② ③ ① ② ③ for light water contributes to safety importance reactors improvement for light water reactors
S101M101L102_z01 Safety goal setting and risk recognition in light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident 4.71 4.43 ◎ 1.71 1.57 1.43 2.00 1.29 1.14
S102_a03 (During normal operation) Optimization of organizational structure/functional division 3.50 2.75 △ 1.13 1.13 1.25 1.75 0.50 0.50
S102_a09 Sophistication of organizational management toward risk information utilization 4.00 2.88 ○ 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.63 0.63 0.63 Framework building and human resource development toward comprehensive decision making based on S102_a12 3.13 3.25 △ 1.38 0.88 0.88 1.50 0.63 1.13 risk information (including uncertainty) ・Launching an examination of a structure for utilizing risk information (including related human resource S102M101_a01 development) 4.43 3.43 ○ 1.57 1.57 1.29 1.57 0.71 1.14 ・Establishment of a structure for utilizing risk information (standardization of sophisticated risk S103M102L101_b01 Conduct of communication utilizing risk information 3.86 3.71 ○ 1.57 1.00 1.29 1.86 0.71 1.14
S104_b03 Efforts for smooth cooperation between on-site SA countermeasures and off-site emergency preparedness 4.13 2.13 ○ 1.63 1.13 1.38 1.50 0.25 0.38
S104_b04 Provision of external event information useful for effective emergency preparedness measures 4.13 3.13 ○ 1.75 1.38 1.00 1.63 0.50 1.00 Sophistication of emergency procedures and training for responding personnel (strengthening of response S104_c02 5.00 3.38 ○ 1.88 1.63 1.50 1.63 0.75 1.00 capabilities to accident, etc.) Strengthening of cooperation between nuclear emergency response organizations/structures (including S104M101L102_b02-1 4.25 2.75 ○ 1.75 1.25 1.25 1.63 0.50 0.63 involvement with local emergency preparedness) S104M101L102_b02-2 Efforts for smooth information linkage between on-site and off-site emergency preparedness 4.50 2.25 ○ 1.88 1.38 1.25 1.63 0.25 0.38 ・Preparedness for nuclear emergency response that takes into account wide-area emergency S104M101L102_b02-3 4.38 2.38 ○ 1.88 1.38 1.13 1.50 0.38 0.50 preparedness (promotion of on-site and off-site cooperation) Sophistication of criteria for information sharing and decision making in emergency response S105_a05 4.50 4.00 ◎ 1.75 1.38 1.38 1.75 1.00 1.25 (sophistication of environmental impact assessment and event progress prediction) and training on Early identification of risks caused by external events other than earthquakes and tsunamis, and extraction S106_c03 4.43 4.57 ◎ 1.71 1.57 1.14 1.71 1.57 1.29 of external events to be examinated continuously Establishment of techniques for assessing safety/securing safety for nuclear plant against tsunamis S106_c04 4.75 4.50 ◎ 1.75 1.63 1.38 1.75 1.50 1.25 (systematization of tsunami-protection engineering) Establishment of a technique for earthquake impact assessment used for risk assessment (including S106_c05 4.63 4.25 ◎ 1.50 1.63 1.50 1.88 1.13 1.25 assessment of risks such as fault displacement and slope failure) Operation control that takes into account external events (occurrence prediction technique, impact S106_c07 3.75 3.38 ○ 1.13 1.38 1.25 1.50 1.00 0.88 assessment technique, etc.) S107_c08 Establishment of a structure for surveying/monitoring low-frequency external events 3.00 2.63 △ 1.00 1.13 0.88 1.13 1.00 0.50
S110_c10 Achieving a framework for continuous efforts for new findings on external events (natural phenomena, etc.) 3.88 3.25 ○ 1.25 1.38 1.25 1.63 0.88 0.75 ・Participation in formulation of IAEA standards, etc. concerning external events in light of the Fukushima S110M106L103_d02 Daiichi accident 3.50 3.13 ○ 1.38 1.25 0.88 1.50 0.88 0.75 ・Contribution to formulation of IAEA standards, etc. concerning external events S111_d11-1 Diversification and sophistication of the final heat sink 4.63 3.75 ○ 1.88 1.63 1.13 1.63 1.00 1.13 Diversification and sophistication of SA instrumentations and SA equipment, and equipment design S111_d11-2 4.75 4.13 ◎ 2.00 1.38 1.38 1.63 1.38 1.13 technology Fundamental improvement of accident controllability through efforts for design that comprehensively S111_d12 4.63 4.00 ◎ 1.88 1.63 1.13 1.63 1.13 1.25 considers layers 1 to 3 (design) to layer 4 (AM countermeasure) and layer 5 (emergency preparedness) of S111_d13 Improvement of the risk assessment method and its application to SA countermeasures 4.86 3.86 ○ 1.86 1.43 1.57 1.57 1.00 1.29
S111_d14 Optimization/sophistication of operation management of SA components 4.25 2.88 ○ 1.75 1.38 1.13 1.50 0.75 0.63
S111_d29 Sophistication of maintenance/operation control through risk information utilization 4.50 4.38 ◎ 1.25 1.63 1.63 2.00 1.00 1.38 12 （Ref.） Results of priority rating for each issues (AESJ) ②
(B) Technological / (A) (B) (A) Effectiveness of human resource safety improvement maintenance / Overall ID Corresponding title in the task survey sheet development that assessment of ① ② ③ ① ② ③ for light water contributes to safety importance reactors improvement for light water reactors
S111_d30 Establishment of maintenance control of SA components 3.63 2.50 △ 1.75 0.88 1.00 1.25 0.63 0.63 Sophistication of state surveillance/monitoring techniques (precursor monitoring/diagnosis, remote S111_d32 4.38 4.50 ◎ 1.13 1.88 1.38 1.75 1.25 1.50 monitoring/diagnosis, etc.) Sophistication of exposure reduction technologies (water quality management technology, remote S111_d33-1 4.38 4.50 ◎ 1.50 1.50 1.38 1.50 1.50 1.50 operation/robot technology, radiation protection technology) S111_d37 Increase in reliability of structural material 3.50 4.50 ○ 0.75 1.50 1.25 1.75 1.25 1.50
S111M107_d17-1 Sophistication of technique for assessing core/thermal-hydraulic design 4.00 4.50 ◎ 1.13 1.63 1.25 2.00 1.00 1.50
S111M107_d18-1 Reliability improvement and sophistication of fuels 4.13 4.00 ◎ 1.25 1.63 1.25 1.63 1.00 1.38 Reliability improvement of fuels (establishment of fuel standards, etc. and clarification of safety margin S111M107_d18-2 4.13 4.00 ◎ 1.13 1.63 1.38 1.88 0.88 1.25 assessment method) S111M107_d24 Sophistication of plant operation technology and core design control 3.13 4.13 ○ 0.38 1.38 1.38 1.75 0.75 1.63
S111M107_d36 Sophistication of ageing assessment method/countermeasure technique 3.50 5.00 ◎ 0.63 1.50 1.38 2.00 1.38 1.63
S111M107L103_d42 Reliability improvement and sophistication of systems, structures and components (SSC) 4.50 4.00 ◎ 1.75 1.63 1.13 1.50 1.13 1.38
S111M107L104_d10 Establishment of global-standard light water reactor design with strengthened resilience 4.63 5.13 ◎ 1.88 1.63 1.13 1.75 1.63 1.75
S112M107_d08 Sophistication of the safety analysis method 5.00 4.88 ◎ 1.88 1.63 1.50 2.00 1.13 1.75 Strengthening of the response capabilities of the emergency organization for minimizing the risk of the M101L101_a02 4.00 2.63 ○ 1.63 1.13 1.25 1.38 0.63 0.63 whole plant (strengthening of external support, etc.) Establishment of an innovative technology and a light water reactor system that will achieve waste and M102L101L104_b08 3.25 4.13 ○ 0.63 1.63 1.00 1.13 1.25 1.75 TRU reduction M103L101_a04 Establishment of risk governance for responding to large-scale natural disasters 4.25 3.13 ○ 1.75 1.25 1.25 1.63 0.75 0.75 ・Continuous contribution to reduction of uncertainties concerning findings on low-frequency external events M104L103_c06 4.71 4.29 ◎ 1.57 1.71 1.43 1.86 1.14 1.29 ・Continuation of research on reduction of uncertainties concerning findings on low-frequency external M106_d06 Deepening and implementation of defense in depth according to the safety improvement 3.13 2.88 △ 1.13 1.13 0.88 1.63 0.50 0.75 Development of specific criteria for judging whether or not to restart operation after external events such as M106_d07 3.38 2.63 △ 1.00 1.00 1.38 1.75 0.75 0.13 earthquakes, and their sophistication M106_d40-1 Maintenance control tied with assessment of seismic safety (buildings) 3.38 3.00 △ 1.13 1.25 1.00 1.63 0.50 0.88
M106_d40-2 Maintenance control tied with assessment of seismic safety (components) 3.50 3.00 ○ 1.00 1.38 1.13 1.63 0.63 0.75
M107_d25 Sophistication of running performance (event progress suppression, shutdown function, L/F, etc.) 3.63 3.88 ○ 0.88 1.50 1.25 1.88 0.88 1.13 Reduction of burdens on maintenance staff/operators through streamlining and labor saving of M107_d34 3.50 2.75 △ 0.50 1.38 1.63 1.63 0.38 0.75 maintenance/operation control M107_d38 Sophistication of building structures and materials 3.50 3.88 ○ 1.13 1.38 1.00 1.50 1.25 1.13 Pursuit of life extension of fuels by developing an innovative technology (material development, etc.) and M199L199_d19 2.50 4.38 ○ 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.63 1.25 reviewing the fuel concentration M199L199_d20 Development of a fuel/control rod resistance to accidents 3.88 4.38 ○ 1.75 1.25 0.88 1.38 1.75 1.25 Development of a design technology/maintenance control method for minimizing the whole plant risk posed L103_d16 4.25 4.25 ◎ 1.38 1.63 1.25 1.75 1.13 1.38 by external events Application of an innovative technology (automation of maintenance/operation, etc.) that increases the L104_d35-1 3.25 3.88 ○ 0.88 1.38 1.00 1.63 1.00 1.25 effect of maintenance and supports operation Application of an innovative technology (remote operation, robot technology) that minimizes the exposure L104_d35-2 4.00 4.50 ◎ 1.50 1.50 1.00 1.50 1.38 1.63 risk Development of an innovative technology (material development, etc.) for ultra-long life plant operation L104_d41 3.00 5.00 ○ 0.63 1.13 1.25 1.63 1.63 1.75 13 (operation for over 60 years) 13 （Ref.） Results of priority rating for each issues (AESJ) ③
(B) Technological / (A) (B) (A) Effectiveness of human resource safety improvement maintenance / Overall ID Corresponding title in the task survey sheet development that assessment of ① ② ③ ① ② ③ for light water contributes to safety importance reactors improvement for light water reactors
S103_b05 Achievement of clearance cycle 2.75 3.00 △ 0.50 0.75 1.50 1.63 0.63 0.75
S103_b06 Securing of disposal sites 4.00 3.00 ○ 1.13 1.50 1.38 1.88 0.75 0.38 Establishment of a method for establishing a decommissioning plan based on the past record of S113_d43 3.00 3.50 △ 0.63 1.00 1.38 1.75 0.63 1.13 decommissioning, and its review based on the past record of decommissioning S113_d44 Disassembly of components with high radioactive level 3.63 4.13 ○ 0.75 1.63 1.25 1.63 1.00 1.50
S113_d45 Improvement of social acceptance by establishing technique for designing/assessing disposal sites 3.50 3.13 △ 0.88 1.38 1.25 1.38 0.63 1.13
M107_d46 A rational method for managing L3 disposal facilities for decommissioning 3.38 2.63 △ 0.63 1.25 1.50 1.50 0.63 0.50
M107_d47 Reflecting the past record of decommissioning in the plant 2.88 3.13 △ 0.38 1.13 1.38 1.38 0.75 1.00
M107_d48 Reuse of buildings/sites after plant component removal 2.25 2.50 △ 0.38 0.75 1.13 1.63 0.50 0.38
L103_d49 Support for site release after plant component removal 2.50 2.38 △ 0.38 1.00 1.13 1.25 0.63 0.50 ・Mitigation and minimization of the impact of sabotage (formulation of a crisis management/emergency response plan, etc.) S109M104L103_c11 3.38 3.00 △ 1.13 1.38 0.88 1.75 0.63 0.63 ・Mitigation and minimization of the impact of sabotage (establishment/assessment of a structure ) ・Mitigation and minimization of the impact of sabotage (internationalization) ・Assessment of the impact of the strengthening of nuclear security measures on the safety measures S109M104L103_c12 ・Examination of the safety risk posed by man-made hazards 3.88 3.25 △ 1.13 1.63 1.13 1.75 0.75 0.75 ・Integration of safety and nuclear security in “defense in depth” ・Examination of applicability of the nuclear proliferation resistance concept ・Derivation and demonstration of the effectiveness of a design basis with high resistance to nuclear S109M104L103_d26 2.88 3.50 △ 0.50 1.38 1.00 1.50 0.88 1.13 proliferation ・Application of a design basis with high resistance to nuclear proliferation ・Computer security - analysis of threat and defense from it S109M104L103_d27 ・Computer security - sophistication of defense 3.13 3.38 △ 0.38 1.38 1.38 1.63 0.88 0.88 ・Computer security - further sophistication of defense ・Development of a method for detecting nuclear security threats S109M104L103_d28 ・Development of a monitoring/detection system using big data 3.50 3.38 △ 0.63 1.50 1.38 1.38 1.13 0.88 ・Management with nuclear security threat risk reduced to the extent possible
14 Appendix 1. Nuclear Energy Policy in the New Strategic Energy Plan of Japan
＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞ Decided by the Cabinet in April, 2014 Nuclear power is an important base-load power source as a low carbon and quasi- domestic energy source, contributing to stability of energy supply-demand structure, on the major premise of ensuring of its safety, because of the perspectives; i. superiority in stability of energy supply and efficiency, ii. low and stable operational cost and iii. free from GHG emissions during operation.
16 1-1. Dependency on nuclear power generation
＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞ Dependency on nuclear power generation will be lowered to the extent possible by energy saving and introducing renewable energy as well as improving the efficiency of thermal power generation, etc. Under this policy, GOJ will carefully examine a volume of electricity to be secured by nuclear power generation, taking Japan’s energy constraints into consideration, from the viewpoint of stable energy supply, cost reduction, global warming and maintaining nuclear technologies and human resources.
○GOJ has started discussion on the energy mix in the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy and established a new experts’ Working Group to examine cost of each power source. The draft proposal on the energy mix has just been shown by the Advisory Committee in the end of April 2015 and this proposal will be further discussed toward the final conclusion.
17 (Ref.) Evaluation of Nuclear Power Generation -Economic Efficiency ＜Projected costs of generating electricity (2014 model plant)＞ Small- & Solar Solar Gas Oil Geother- Hydropo- Nuclear Coal LNG Wind medium- Biomass Oil (10kW (less than cogener- cogener mal wer hydraulic more) 10kW) ation ation Capacity Factor 70％ 70％ 70％ 20％ 83％ 45％ 60％ 87％ 30・10％ 14％ 12％ 70％ 40％ Operation Year 40 years 40 years 40 years 20 years 40 years 40 years 40 years 40 years 40 years 20 years 20 years 30 years 30 years
Generation Cost １０.１～ １２．３ １３．７ ２１．６ １６．９ １１．０ ２３．３ ２９．７ ３０．６ ２４．２ ２９．４ １３．８ ２４．０ Yen/kWh (８．８～) （１２．２） （１３．７） （１５．６） （１０．９） （１０．８） （２０．４） （２８．１） ～４３．４ （２１．０） （２７．３） ～１５．０ ～２７．９ （３０．６ （１３．８ （２４．０ ～４３．３） ～１５．０） ～２７．８）
Sensitivity analysis ※１ The result of the sensitivity analysis of ※２ Capacity factor in 2011 calculation Additional safety measures cost doubles ＋０．６ Decommissioning cost doubles the change in fossil fuel price. Coal:80％、LNG:80％、Oil：50％、10％ ＋０．１ Decommissioning and compensation cost Sensitivity analysis of the fossil fuel price change ＋０．０４ ※３ () : Costs without policy related cost Legend increases by 1TYen The impact of the 10% Coal LNG Oil Reprocessing and MOX Fuel fabrication cost ＋０．６ change of the fossil Policy ±０．４ ±０．９ ±１．５ doubles fuel price（Yen／kWh） related Yen/kWh cost 40.0 0.01 Accident 35.0 2.5 0.03 risk cost 2.5 CO2 30.0 1.6 2.1 25.0 3.4 Fuel 21.7 3.3 0.03 Deduction of 20.0 2.8 1.6 heat value 6.0 21.0 3.0 24.7~(7.7~9.3) Operation 15.0 0.04 0.02 30.1 & manage- 3.4 6.0 12.8 ment 1.3 0.2 2.6~ 23.9 Deduction of 10.0 1.3 3.0 heat value 0.3 2.3 7.7 17.9 Additional 1.5 10.8 5.1 15.6~(6.3~7.0) 5.0 3.3 5.5 12.1 4.2 3.8~ safety 0.6 8.5 7.6 17.5 measures 3.1 1.7 0.6 5.8 11.4 1.7 2.3 0.0 2.1 1.0 3.0 1.1 2.2 cost Nuclear Coal LNG Wind Geothermal Hydropower Small- & Biomass Oil Solar Solar Gas Oil medium- (10kW more) (less than cogeneration cogeneration hydraulic 10kW) Capital 【Source】 Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 7th Working Group on Verification of Power Generation, Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI 18 (Ref.) Evaluation of Nuclear Power Generation -Economic Efficiency The nuclear power generation cost is estimated with consideration not only for cost directly related to power generation, but also for future cost such as decommissioning cost, nuclear fuel cycle cost including cost for permanent disposal of radioactive waste, accident risk cost including damage compensation cost and decontamination cost, social cost, namely policy related cost including subsidies for power plant siting and R&D expense for “Monju” and etc. Nuclear power Accident risk cost (0.3Yen/kWh～) ・The accident response cost of the Fukushima Daiichi accident is estimated 12.2TYen which can generation cost be corrected to 9.1TYen in consideration of power output of model plant and etc. Social Social cost ・The lower limit of the estimated value is presented because the damage compensation cost can 10.1Yen/kWh～ increase in the future. The accident risk cost will increase 0.04Yen/kWh as decommissioning and compensation cost increases 1TYen.
Accident risk cost 0.3Yen～ Policy related cost (1.3Yen/kWh) ・The cost contains 345BYen (2014FY) subsidy for power plant siting （130BYen/year） and R&D
Policy related cost 1.3Yen cost for “Monju” （130BYen/year） and etc. Power generation cost generation Power Nuclear fuel cycle cost 1.5Yen Nuclear fuel cycle cost (1.5Yen/kWh) Additional safety measures cost 0.6Yen ・The half of spent fuel is stored for 20 years and reprocessed after that, and the other half is stored for 45 years and reprocessed after that. Operating and ・The cost contains front-end cost (0.9Yen), back-end cost (total: 0.6Yen, reprocessing : 0.5Yen, high-level radioactive waste：0.04Yen）. maintenance cost 3.3Yen Additional safety measures cost (0.6Yen/kWh) ・Add 60.1BYen which is the estimated cost for additional safety measures for new regulation
Capital cost 3.1Yen Operating and maintenance cost (3.3Yen/kWh) ・Employment cost (2.05BYen/year), repair cost (2.2％), overhead cost (8.44BYen/year) ※Capacity: 1.2GW Operating rate: 70％ Capital (3.1Yen/kWh) Discount rate: 3％ ・Building cost (0.37MYen/kW（440BYen/plant）), fixed asset tax (1.4％)、decommissioning cost Operating period of plant: 40 years (71.6BYen) 【Source】 Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 8th Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI 19 (Ref.) Energy Best Mix – Outlook of Composition of Electric Power Sources Composition of electrical sources and electricity generation（billion kWh）
2030 Average in the Oil 31.5 3% last 10 years 2030 before 3.11 Coal 281.0 26% LNG 284.5 27% LNG 27% (approx.) LNG 27% Nuclear power 231.7～216.8 22～20% Renewable energy 236.6～251.5 22～24% Coal Total 1065.0 100% 26% (approx.) Coal 24%
Oil 3% (approx.) Oil 12% 2030 Renewable energy Renewable Solar 74.9 7.0% 22~24% (approx.) energy 11% Wind 18.2 1.7% Nuclear Geothermal 10.2～11.3 1.0～1.1% Nuclear power power 22~20% (approx.) 27% Hydropower 93.9～98.1 8.8～9.2%
Biomass 39.4～49.0 3.7～4.6%
※All the numbers are approximate 【Source】 Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 8th Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI 20 1-2. Mid-and-Long Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPPs Dec. 2011 Nov. 2013 Present Dec. 2021 30 to 40 years in the future
Efforts to stabilize Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 the NPP
Cold shutdown achieved Period up to the Period up to the • Achieve cold shutdown start of the fuel Period up to the start of the fuel debris • Significantly reduce completion of radiation releases removal from the removal (within 10 years) decommissioning spent fuel pool measures (30 to 40 Fuel Removal (within 2 years) years in the future) from Spent Fuel Pools of Unit 1-4 Steps for Spent Fuel Removal ; Unit 4 ① ② ③ （Removal was completeｄ） ①Rubble Removal & Dose Reduction ②Installing Fuel Handling Machine Unit 1 Preparing for rubble removal ③Fuel Removal Unit 2 Dose reduction is underway Unit 3 Rubble removal & dose reduction is underway Fuel Debris Dose Reduction, Leakage Identification & Installation of Fuel Debris Removal from Stop Leakage, Technology Development for Fuel Debris Unit 1- 3 Debris Removal Removal Equipment Removal The current Roadmap was revised in June, 2013. The Government of Japan is now in the process of the revision, taking account of
the “Strategic Plan” which NDF has just released on April 30. 21 1-2. R&D Activities for Decommissioning Governmental total budget from FY2011 to FY2016 for decommissioning and contaminated water management is 189.2 BY.
1. Spent Fuel 2-② Water Confinement Management of PCV ‒ Remote grouting etc. 2-① Decontamination NARAHA Remote Technology inside R/B Development Center ‒ Robot machine （Mock-Up Test Facility） etc. 2-④ Retrieval of Fuel Debris ‒ Remote retrieval system ‒ Criticality control 2-③ Investigation and ‒ Transfer & Storage etc. Analysis inside Reactor ‒ Robot investigation ‒ “Muon” detection ‒ SA code analysis 3. Radioactive Waste etc. Management
OKUMA Analysis and Research Center （Radioactive Material Analysis and Research Facility） 22 1-3. Existing Light Water Reactors
＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞ ○On the premise that safety comes before everything else and that every possible effort is made to resolve the people’s concerns, judgment as to whether nuclear power plants meet the new regulatory requirements will be left to the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA).
○In case that the NRA confirms the conformity of nuclear power plants with the new regulatory requirements ,which are of the most stringent level in the world, GOJ will follow NRA’s judgment and will proceed with the restart of the nuclear power plants.
23 (Ref.) Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (As of July 1, 2015) Tomari Kashiwazaki Kariwa ２５ ２３ ５ Ohma ２９ ２４ ２１ ２０ ２５ １８ １７ Shika Higashidori(Tokyo) ２１ ９
Tsuruga ９ Higashidori(Tohoku) ２８ Onagawa Mihama ３８ ３１ １９ １３
Ohi Fukushima Daiichi ３６ ３５ ２３ ２２
Takahama Fukushima Daini ４０ ３９ ３０ ２９ ３２ ３１ ３０ ２７ → Permitted in Feb. 2015 Tokai Shimane ３６ ２６ Genkai Hamaoka
３４ ２１ １７ ２７ ２１ １０ Under NRA Review for basic design and concept Sendai Ikata (Total 25 Units） Capacity ３０ ２９ ３７ ３３ ２０ Age Reactor-type → Permitted in Sep. 2014 (Applied Date for NRA Review) BWR ABWR PWR Not Start Operation 24 (Ref.) Outline of processes for restart of NPPs Safety Reviews and Inspections process of NRA Review of basic design and Review of detailed concept (for permission of reactor design (for approval of installment license change) construction works plan)
Assessment of Operation management systems, etc. (for approval of operational Permitted reactors safety programs *NotDate required byReactor the nuclearApplicant Approved reactors Sep. 10reactor Sendai law NPS, Kyusyu Electric Date Reactor Applicant Date 2014 Unit 1 and 2 Power Mar. 18 Sendai NPS, Kyusyu Feb. 12 Takahama NPS, Kansai Electric 2015 Unit 1 May 27 Electric 2015 Unit 3 and 4 Power 2015 May 22 Sendai NPS, Power 2015 Unit 2
Local acceptance process * No legal requirements Local acceptance process
Disaster prevention and evacuation plan
*Not a legal Preparation and enhancement prerequisites for restart of the disaster prevention and evacuation plan **Based on “the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures” and “the Act on Special Measures concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness” 25 1-4. GOJ’s Stance on Spent Fuel Management (Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy)
＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞ 【Promotion of the nuclear fuel cycle policy】 1. GOJ will make efforts to reduce the volume and harmfulness of radioactive waste and create a nuclear fuel cycle that contributes to effective utilization of resources while adequately taking the past history into consideration and continuing to seek the understanding of relevant municipalities and the international community and will promote reprocessing and plutonium use in LWRs. 2. Specifically, GOJ will promote plutonium use in LWRs, and proceed with such measures as completion of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, construction of a MOX fuel processing plant, and completion of the Mutsu interim storage facility on the underlying premise of ensuring safety. GOJ remains committed to the policy of not possessing reserves of plutonium without specified purposes. Also GOJ will promote R&D of fast reactors, etc., through international cooperation with the U.S. and France etc. 3. GOJ will position Monju as an international research center for technological development, such as reducing the amount and toxic level of radioactive waste and technologies related to nuclear nonproliferation. GOJ will take necessary measures for issues to be overcome , such as the re-establishment of systems to implement the above mentioned actions on its own responsibility.
26 (Ref) Current situation of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant
In January 2014, JNFL applied for a conformity assessment with the new safety standards which were enforced in December 2013. JNFL now plans to complete the RRP in March 2016.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Water Tests Apr.2001 Sep.2004
Chemical Tests Nov.2002 Dec.2005
Uranium Tests Completion Dec.2004 Jan.2006 (Planned)
Active Tests
Mar.2006 Mar.2016
(Planned)
Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5
27 (Ref) Current Situation of MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant
Although JNFL started construction work of MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant in October 2010, construction work was interrupted temporarily by the influence of the earthquake etc.
In January 2014, JNFL applied for a conformity assessment with the new regulations which were enforced in December 2013.
JNFL now plans to complete the MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant in October 2017.
Maximum fabrication capacity 130 ton-HM / year
MOX fuel assembly for domestic Light Products Water Reactors（BWR and PWR） 85 m x 85 m Size of main building 3 basements, 2 elevated Progress of construction: 8.6% Neighborhood of (September 2014) Location place Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant 28 Construction cost 210 billion yen (Ref.) Japan-France Cooperation on ASTRID Project - Outline of Cooperation -
General arrangement “GENERAL ARRANGEMENT ON THE ASTRID PROGRAM AND SODIUM FAST REACTOR COLLABORATIONBETWEEN THE FRENCH COMMISSARIAT A L’ENERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ENERGIES ALTERNATIVES, THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY AND THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY” was signed on May 5th, 2014 (Termination: Dec. 31st, 2019). Implementing Arrangement “IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENT ON THE ASTRID PROGRAM AND SODIUM FAST REACTOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH COMMISSARIAT À L’ÉNERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ÉNERGIES ALTERNATIVES, AREVA NP, JAPAN ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., AND MITSUBISHI FBR SYSTEMS, INC. ” was signed on August 8th, 2014 (Termination: Dec. 31st, 2019). Japan and France are cooperating SFR development, including ASTRID program in the area of plant system design and R&Ds (Component and General Arrangement analysis code development, Measures for severe Signing Ceremony at Palais de l'Élysée accident, Fuel). (May 5th, 2014) 29 (Ref) Situation of Radioactive Waste Disposal etc.,
Radioactive wastes shall be disposed by the methods described below based on the radioactive level and type.
97.6％ (※1) The radioactive level is not higher 2.2％ (※1) than clearance level. Dismantled concrete and metals （In this case, wastes don’t need to Near surfaces trench disposal (L3) be clarified as the radioactive waste. 0m 0.2％ (※1) Low
Waste fluid, filter, expendable suppliers Radioactive levelRadioactive such as gloves Origin of waste Near surfaces pit disposal (L2) Generated weight of waste：537k ton（※１） 0.01％ (※1) Nuclear power plant Reactor internals , control rods and etc.,
Intermediate depth disposal (L1)50 m
300m Geological Spent Fuel High level radioactive waste disposal
Reprocessing facility※2 Vitrified Waste High
※1：Waste amount and rate based on the example of BWR(1100MW) Plant Reference: Prepared by ANRE based on the release from Nuclear Regulation Authority ※2： Geological disposal only from reprocessing facility and 2007 Report of Advisory Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
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