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How the War Was Won HOW THE WAR WAS WON HOW THE WAR WAS WON Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917–1918 Tim Travers London and New York First published 1992 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. © 1992 Tim Travers All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Travers, Tim How the war was won: command and technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917–1918. I. Title 940.421 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data is available on request ISBN 0-203-41741-0 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-72565-4 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-07628-5 (Print Edition) For Heather, and for Jessica and Nicholas as they start the great journey Contents List of plates ix List of maps xi Acknowledgements xiii List of abbreviations xvii Introduction 1 Prologue: Images of war 4 1 PARALYSIS OF COMMAND: FROM PASSCHENDAELE TO CAMBRAI 11 2 A COMMAND DIVIDED: GHQ AND THE DEBATE OVER TRADITIONAL VERSUS MECHANICAL WARFARE IN EARLY 1918 32 3 CRISIS IN COMMAND: THE GERMAN SPRING OFFENSIVES AND THE USES OF TECHNOLOGY 50 Part I: The ‘Michael’ Offensive, March to April 1918 50 Part II: The Lys and the Aisne, April to June 1918 91 4 COMMAND AND TECHNOLOGY IN ALLIANCE: FROM HAMEL TO AMIENS, JULY TO AUGUST 1918 110 5 COMMAND VERSUS TECHNOLOGY: THE WAR OF MOVEMENT, SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1918 145 6 CONCLUSION 175 Appendix 183 Structure of the BEF in France 183 Skeleton BEF order of battle of the Fifth and Third Armies before 21 March 1918 183 Order of battle of the French troops which came to the assistance of the Fifth Army up to 26 March 1918 186 Notes 188 vii CONTENTS Select bibliography 220 Unpublished sources 220 Printed sources 223 Secondary sources 224 Index 226 viii Plates Note: All of the plates can be found in one section between pages 50 and 51. Plate 1 Sir Douglas Haig talking to Dominion journalists at the Château de Beaurepaire, 7 September 1918. (Q. 11,276: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 2 Panoramic view of the battlefield on Passchendaele Ridge, showing state of country over which the troops had to advance. 2 Canadian Division area, 14 November 1917 (CO.2265: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 3 Cambrai offensive, 20 November 1917. Mark IV tanks standing at a station before the offensive, waiting despatch to the battlefield. (Q. 46,490: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 4 Before the German March offensive. A 60-pounder battery sergeant copying down instructions for S.O.S. lines. Monchy- le-Preux, 18 March 1918. (Q. 10,895: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 5 The German March offensive. British artillery preparing to pull out of Omiecourt on 24 March 1918, having first set fire to stores and huts. (Q. 10,797: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 6 German prisoners waiting to be interrogated on 22 March 1918. Near Bapaume. (Q. 8585: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 7 Prisoners taken during the German offensive in a Prisoner’s Cage. Near Albert, 31 March 1918. (Q. 10,847: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) ix PLATES Plate 8 The Amiens offensive. 1 Australian Division moving past a line of machine gun emplacements which have just been cleaned up by a tank. The action is taking place near Harbonniers on 9 August 1918. (E(AUS).2878: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 9 German barbed wire defences, the Hindenburg Line. At Quéant, 1918. (C.O.3392: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 10 Battle of the Canal du Nord. Near Moeuvres, 27 September 1918. (Q.9346: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 11 Canadian troops advancing through the ruins of Cambrai, 9 October 1918. (C.O.3369: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) x Maps Map 1.1 The battle of Passchendaele, 31 July 1917 13 Map 1.2 The Cambrai offensive, 20 November 1917, and the German counter-attack of 30 November 1917 25 Map 3.1 The German ‘Michael’ offensive of 21 March 1918 52 Map 3.2 Defences of 36 Division (XVIII Corps) alleged to be in place before 21 March 1918 62 Map 3.3 The German Lys offensive, 9 April 1918 92 Map 3.4 The German Aisne offensive, 27 May 1918 101 Map 4.1 The Amiens offensive, 8 August 1918 117 Map 4.2 The Arras offensive, 21 August 1918 135 Map 5.1 The last 100 days: the Canadian Corps 147 Map 5.2 The last 100 days: the British Army 159 xi Acknowledgements Many individuals have provided support, encouragement and advice as this book was researched and written over a period of some five years. In England, a number of historians offered convivial company as well as criticism and suggestions. Hew Strachan kindly offered hospitality and took the time to comment on an early article; David French read and critiqued the manuscript; the members of the military history seminar at the Institute of Historical Research, London University, under the able direction of Brian Bond, David French and Michael Dockrill, heard and commented on an early version of some aspects of the manuscript; Ian Beckett, Brian Bond, David French, Brian Holden-Reid, Keith Simpson and David Woodward all offered support and encouragement at one time or another. Tim Wakefield took the trouble to make arrangements so that I could see the restricted Sir Harold Hartley papers at Churchill College, Cambridge. The Earl Haig was kind enough to invite me to his house in Scotland, and share his memories of his father, as well as offering generous hospitality. In Canada, Keith Neilson and Toby Graham were generous and useful in commenting on the proposed research. Wesley Wark was good enough to let me look at the Ironside diaries temporarily in his possession. Don Smith thoughtfully provided me with useful information from the McRuer diary, located in Toronto. Also from the History Department at Calgary, there was much help and encouragement from Chris Archer, David Bercuson, John Ferris and especially Holger Herwig. Of course, none of the above bear responsibility for the contents of the book, since all errors of fact or interpretation are my own. I am grateful to a number of institutions for valuable financial support: the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a generous research grant; the trustees of the Killam Fellowship for providing free time to write and finish the manuscript; the University of Calgary Research Grants committee for two research grants; and the University of Calgary Endowment Fund for a subvention to assist with maps and photographs. I wish, further, to express my appreciation to xiii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS the following for their kind permission to cite and quote from private papers and copyright sources: the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives for the Liddell Hart, Montgomery-Massingberd, Edmonds, Fuller and Lister Papers, and the representatives of the Robertson and Spears families for their respective papers; the Earl Haig for the Haig Papers; the Trustees of the General Sir Aylmer Haldane Papers; Mrs Maxse and the County Archivist of the West Sussex Record Office for the Maxse Papers; Churchill College, Cambridge, for the Bonham-Carter, Cavan, Hartley and Rawlinson of Trent Papers; the Imperial War Museum for the Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, Dawnay, Hemming, Gwynne, Haldane, Maxse and Wilson Papers; the Royal Artillery Institution for the Anstey, Anderson, Mackenzie, Mockler- Ferryman, Riley, Uniacke, Rawlins and Tudor Papers; the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland for the Haig and Aylmer Haldane Papers; the editors and trustees of the Journal of Military History for permission to publish extracts from an article that originally appeared in that journal; the Trustees of the National Library of Ireland for the Parsons Papers, the National Library of Scotland for the Davidson, Haig, Haldane and Lawrence Papers, the Royal Air Force Museum for the Sykes and Trenchard Papers (Crown copyright material in the Royal Air Force Museum is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office), the Royal Armoured Corps Museum for the Brisco, Fuller, Lindsay and Swinton Papers, and the editors of Buchan & Enright for permission to quote from Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality. Every effort has been made to trace and secure permission from copyright holders for all material under copyright that is quoted in this book. If I have inadvertently infringed upon such rights, I offer sincere apologies. Bill Mills again prepared the maps with his usual care and accuracy, and was good enough to read the manuscript before commencing his work. Joyce Woods again made heroic efforts in typing and conveting my Macintosh version of the book on to an IBM machine, and patiently making many changes. Leslie Nuttall kindly undertook a research assignment in reviewing Air Force files at Hendon and the Imperial War Museum with his usual thoroughness and attention to detail.
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