How the War Was Won

HOW THE WAR WAS WON

Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917–1918

Tim Travers

London and New York First published 1992 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Travers, Tim How the war was won: command and technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917–1918. I. Title 940.421

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data is available on request

ISBN 0-203-41741-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-72565-4 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-07628-5 (Print Edition) For Heather, and for Jessica and Nicholas as they start the great journey

Contents

List of plates ix List of maps xi Acknowledgements xiii List of abbreviations xvii Introduction 1 Prologue: Images of war 4 1 PARALYSIS OF COMMAND: FROM PASSCHENDAELE TO CAMBRAI 11 2 A COMMAND DIVIDED: GHQ AND THE DEBATE OVER TRADITIONAL VERSUS MECHANICAL WARFARE IN EARLY 1918 32 3 CRISIS IN COMMAND: THE GERMAN SPRING OFFENSIVES AND THE USES OF TECHNOLOGY 50 Part I: The ‘Michael’ Offensive, March to April 1918 50 Part II: The Lys and the Aisne, April to June 1918 91 4 COMMAND AND TECHNOLOGY IN ALLIANCE: FROM HAMEL TO AMIENS, JULY TO AUGUST 1918 110 5 COMMAND VERSUS TECHNOLOGY: THE WAR OF MOVEMENT, SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1918 145 6 CONCLUSION 175 Appendix 183 Structure of the BEF in France 183 Skeleton BEF order of battle of the Fifth and Third Armies before 21 March 1918 183 Order of battle of the French troops which came to the assistance of the Fifth Army up to 26 March 1918 186 Notes 188

vii CONTENTS

Select bibliography 220 Unpublished sources 220 Printed sources 223 Secondary sources 224 Index 226

viii Plates

Note: All of the plates can be found in one section between pages 50 and 51.

Plate 1 Sir Douglas Haig talking to Dominion journalists at the Château de Beaurepaire, 7 September 1918. (Q. 11,276: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 2 Panoramic view of the battlefield on Passchendaele Ridge, showing state of country over which the troops had to advance. 2 Canadian Division area, 14 November 1917 (CO.2265: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 3 Cambrai offensive, 20 November 1917. Mark IV tanks standing at a station before the offensive, waiting despatch to the battlefield. (Q. 46,490: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 4 Before the German March offensive. A 60-pounder battery sergeant copying down instructions for S.O.S. lines. Monchy- le-Preux, 18 March 1918. (Q. 10,895: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 5 The German March offensive. British artillery preparing to pull out of Omiecourt on 24 March 1918, having first set fire to stores and huts. (Q. 10,797: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 6 German prisoners waiting to be interrogated on 22 March 1918. Near Bapaume. (Q. 8585: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 7 Prisoners taken during the German offensive in a Prisoner’s Cage. Near Albert, 31 March 1918. (Q. 10,847: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London)

ix PLATES

Plate 8 The Amiens offensive. 1 Australian Division moving past a line of machine gun emplacements which have just been cleaned up by a tank. The action is taking place near Harbonniers on 9 August 1918. (E(AUS).2878: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 9 German barbed wire defences, the Hindenburg Line. At Quéant, 1918. (C.O.3392: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 10 Battle of the Canal du Nord. Near Moeuvres, 27 September 1918. (Q.9346: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London) Plate 11 Canadian troops advancing through the ruins of Cambrai, 9 October 1918. (C.O.3369: reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London)

x Maps

Map 1.1 The battle of Passchendaele, 31 July 1917 13 Map 1.2 The Cambrai offensive, 20 November 1917, and the German counter-attack of 30 November 1917 25 Map 3.1 The German ‘Michael’ offensive of 21 March 1918 52 Map 3.2 Defences of 36 Division (XVIII Corps) alleged to be in place before 21 March 1918 62 Map 3.3 The German Lys offensive, 9 April 1918 92 Map 3.4 The German Aisne offensive, 27 May 1918 101 Map 4.1 The Amiens offensive, 8 August 1918 117 Map 4.2 The Arras offensive, 21 August 1918 135 Map 5.1 The last 100 days: the Canadian Corps 147 Map 5.2 The last 100 days: the British Army 159

Acknowledgements

Many individuals have provided support, encouragement and advice as this book was researched and written over a period of some five years. In England, a number of historians offered convivial company as well as criticism and suggestions. Hew Strachan kindly offered hospitality and took the time to comment on an early article; David French read and critiqued the manuscript; the members of the military history seminar at the Institute of Historical Research, London University, under the able direction of Brian Bond, David French and Michael Dockrill, heard and commented on an early version of some aspects of the manuscript; Ian Beckett, Brian Bond, David French, Brian Holden-Reid, Keith Simpson and David Woodward all offered support and encouragement at one time or another. Tim Wakefield took the trouble to make arrangements so that I could see the restricted Sir Harold Hartley papers at Churchill College, Cambridge. The Earl Haig was kind enough to invite me to his house in Scotland, and share his memories of his father, as well as offering generous hospitality. In Canada, Keith Neilson and Toby Graham were generous and useful in commenting on the proposed research. Wesley Wark was good enough to let me look at the Ironside diaries temporarily in his possession. Don Smith thoughtfully provided me with useful information from the McRuer diary, located in Toronto. Also from the History Department at Calgary, there was much help and encouragement from Chris Archer, David Bercuson, John Ferris and especially Holger Herwig. Of course, none of the above bear responsibility for the contents of the book, since all errors of fact or interpretation are my own. I am grateful to a number of institutions for valuable financial support: the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a generous research grant; the trustees of the Killam Fellowship for providing free time to write and finish the manuscript; the University of Calgary Research Grants committee for two research grants; and the University of Calgary Endowment Fund for a subvention to assist with maps and photographs. I wish, further, to express my appreciation to xiii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS the following for their kind permission to cite and quote from private papers and copyright sources: the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives for the Liddell Hart, Montgomery-Massingberd, Edmonds, Fuller and Lister Papers, and the representatives of the Robertson and Spears families for their respective papers; the Earl Haig for the Haig Papers; the Trustees of the General Sir Aylmer Haldane Papers; Mrs Maxse and the County Archivist of the West Sussex Record Office for the Maxse Papers; Churchill College, Cambridge, for the Bonham-Carter, Cavan, Hartley and Rawlinson of Trent Papers; the Imperial War Museum for the Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, Dawnay, Hemming, Gwynne, Haldane, Maxse and Wilson Papers; the Royal Artillery Institution for the Anstey, Anderson, Mackenzie, Mockler- Ferryman, Riley, Uniacke, Rawlins and Tudor Papers; the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland for the Haig and Aylmer Haldane Papers; the editors and trustees of the Journal of Military History for permission to publish extracts from an article that originally appeared in that journal; the Trustees of the National Library of Ireland for the Parsons Papers, the National Library of Scotland for the Davidson, Haig, Haldane and Lawrence Papers, the Royal Air Force Museum for the Sykes and Trenchard Papers (Crown copyright material in the Royal Air Force Museum is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office), the Royal Armoured Corps Museum for the Brisco, Fuller, Lindsay and Swinton Papers, and the editors of Buchan & Enright for permission to quote from Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality. Every effort has been made to trace and secure permission from copyright holders for all material under copyright that is quoted in this book. If I have inadvertently infringed upon such rights, I offer sincere apologies. Bill Mills again prepared the maps with his usual care and accuracy, and was good enough to read the manuscript before commencing his work. Joyce Woods again made heroic efforts in typing and conveting my Macintosh version of the book on to an IBM machine, and patiently making many changes. Leslie Nuttall kindly undertook a research assignment in reviewing Air Force files at Hendon and the Imperial War Museum with his usual thoroughness and attention to detail. I have learnt much from him about the role of the RFC/RAF in 1917 and 1918. X Librarians and archivists in all the libraries, museums and archives mentioned were invariably helpful and generous with their time and advice. It would be invidious to name some of those who helped and not others, since all were kind in their attention to often time-consuming requests. However, David Fletcher at the Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum at Bovington put me on the track of some valuable tank battle sheets, while Barbara Wilson at the National Archives of Canada went out of her way to xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS track down some files for me. And, as usual, the visual experts at the Imperial War Museum saved me much time in locating photographs. Finally, but more important in other ways, was the support of my wife, Heather, and the interest of Jessica and Nicholas. Nor should I forget the hospitality of my father in England, who at 91 has experienced much military history, also my parents-in-law, and friends and family in England, Scotland, Ireland and Canada, who did much to keep the author more or less sane and sensible.

Abbreviations

AAG Assistant Adjutant General ADC Aide-de-camp ADMT Assistant Director of Military Training ADSD Assistant Director of Staff Duties AG Adjutant General APM Assistant Provost Marshal AQMG Assistant Quartermaster General BEF British Expeditionary Force BGGS Brigadier General, General Staff BL British Library Cab Cabinet Office paper at PRO CCC Churchill College, Cambridge CGS Chief of the General Staff CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff C-in-C Commander-in-Chief CO Commanding Officer CRA Commander Royal Artillery (usually a brigadier command ing divisional artillery) CRE Commander, Royal Engineers (usually a brigadier command ing divisional engineers) CSO Chief Staff Officer DA Director of Armaments DCIGS Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff DDSD Deputy Director Staff Duties DGS Director, Gas Services, at GHQ DMI Director Military Intelligence DMO Director Military Operations DMT Director Military Training DSD Director Staff Duties FSR Field Service Regulations GHQ General Headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding xvii ABBREVIATIONS

GOCRA General Officer Commanding Royal Artillery (at Corps HQ) GQG French Army High Command (Grand Quartier Général) GSO 1 General Staff Officer, First Grade GSO 2 General Staff Officer, Second Grade GSO 3 General Staff Officer, Third Grade HE High Explosive I Intelligence IWM Imperial War Museum KCL King’s College, London University MGGS Major General, General Staff MGO Master General of the Ordnance MGRA Major General Royal Artillery MUN Munitions paper at the PRO NLS National Library of Scotland OHL German Army High Command (die oberste Heeresleitung) PAC Public Archives, Ottawa, Canada PRO Public Record Office PSC Passed Staff College QMG Quartermaster General RA Royal Artillery RAF Royal Air Force (from 1 April 1918 replaced the RFC title) RAFH Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, Middlesex RAI Royal Artillery Institution RCHA Royal Canadian Horse Artillery RFA Royal Field Artillery RFC Royal Flying Corps RGA Royal Garrison Artillery RHA Royal Horse Artillery SAA Small Arms Ammunition SOS Call for emergency artillery support TMB Tank Museum, Bovington, Dorset (Museum of the Royal Armoured Corps) WO War Office WSRO West Sussex Record Office

xviii Introduction

At the beginning of 1918, the prospects for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and its allies did not look promising. Russia had given up the war, the French army had suffered a serious mutiny and a considerable decline in morale in 1917, the Italian front had experienced a major setback at Caporetto in October 1917, while BEF morale was at a dangerously low level following the losses of the Passchendaele offensive. This was reinforced by the shock of the German counter-attack after the Cambrai tank and artillery offensive in late 1917, when the German army was supposed to be in dire straits. Soon to come, in March 1918, was the German spring offensive and the precipitous retreat of the British Army’s Fifth and Third Armies, with the loss of 40 square miles of territory. Yet in three or four short months, the tide turned and the BEF and allies went on to victory in 1918. How did this happen? What changed in 1918 to enable victory to come about? There are a number of explanations, which, however, are not mutually exclusive. For example, did new ideas make a difference? Did new tactics and strategy affect the outcome? Did new weapons and technology shift the balance, particularly tanks and aeroplanes? Or was success the result of using old technology, but much more of it? Was 1918 really a victory of attrition for the BEF, so that manpower was the key? Perhaps a revitalized GHQ leadership was crucial, with Douglas Haig now coming into his own? Maybe the whole BEF had simply become more efficient, with army, corps and divisional commanders all improving? Possibly the arrival of the Americans was decisive? Or did the Germans really defeat themselves through serious strategic mistakes and a subsequent loss of morale? Therefore, was the German offensive of March 1918 really the turning point of the war? Strangely enough, these questions have not been properly answered, and in most cases not even posed by those books that concern themselves with 1918. In fact, interpretations of what happened to the BEF on the Western Front in 1918 really fall into three categories. They are, first, the external or exogenous explanations, which attribute victory to German 1 INTRODUCTION mistakes (particularly those of Ludendorff), or the American intervention, or the collapse of Germany’s allies.1 Then secondly, there are the internal or indigenous explanations that focus on the decisive achievements of the BEF and the leadership of Douglas Haig, whether in 1918, or through the offensives of 1916 and 1917 which wore the Germans down and thus ultimately led to the collapse of German morale in 1918. Somewhat naturally, Haig himself, and his supporters, have espoused this explanation.2 Finally, thirdly, there is a variation of the latter (internal) explanation, which stresses the impact of new BEF technology in 1918, leading to improved BEF tactics and the wearing down of the German army.3 The present study will argue for a combination of all three explanations, but will emphasize German mistakes and the impact of the technology of the BEF. Nevertheless, in attempting to answer the fundamental question of how the war was won, two themes emerged, plus a third subsidiary theme, and this book is really about these themes, and ultimately their relationship to the winning of the war. The first and most important theme, which runs as a central thread throughout, concerns the matter of command. Was 1918 really the triumph of Sir Douglas Haig and his GHQ? How did the BEF’s overall command structure hold up from late 1917 to November 1918? Did the high command function well during the Passchendaele and Cambrai offensives? Then, in particular, did Haig and his GHQ organize the defence of the BEF against the German 1918 spring offensives in a sensible manner? Did the BEF’s command structure conduct itself in an organized way during those spring offensives? Turning next to the midsummer Hamel and Amiens offensives, how did the command structure prepare for these Allied offensives? And during the necessary adaptations of the remaining months of the war, how relevant was GHQ and how did the rest of the command structure perform in mobile warfare?4 The second theme relates to the innovation, acceptance and integration of technology into the BEF during this period. On the one hand, certain new or relatively new forms of technology became increasingly significant, particularly tanks and aeroplanes, but also Lewis guns, mobile trench mortars, smoke and gas, and this led, in fact, to the origins of mechanical warfare. How was this ‘new’ technology accepted, integrated and used in the BEF? What sort of new tactics were evolved for mechanical warfare, and did this entail a new strategy for winning the war? On the other hand, the BEF came to rely more and more on ever greater amounts of ‘old’ or traditional technology, especially the artillery, which was improved by increasing the number of heavy guns, and given greater range through streamlined shells; and the machine gun, which was turned into a corps, and given a wider variety of roles. How were tactics and strategy altered to fit the remarkable growth in the sheer numbers of this 2 INTRODUCTION traditionaltechnology, just as the supplies of manpower were dwindling in tragic fashion? Finally, a third and subsidiary theme deals with the question of when the war was won. And here, it will be suggested that the war was ‘over’ much earlier than previous evaluations have concluded.5