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D I P L O M a R B E I T View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by OTHES D i p l o m a r b e i t Titel der Diplomarbeit Der Offensivgeist des Conrad von Hötzendorf Verfasser Dieter Hackl angestrebter akademischer Grad Magister der Philosophie (Mag. Phil.) Wien, 2009 Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 312 Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Geschichte Betreuer: Doz. Dr. Hans Safrian Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Einleitung - Forschungsfragen ..........................................................................3 2. Conrad von Hötzendorf – „Genie in der Sandkiste“.........................................9 2.1. Biografie.......................................................................................................................... 9 2.2. Militärische Erfahrung in Bosnien Herzegowina.......................................................... 10 2.3. Die Philosophie des Sozialdarwinismus ....................................................................... 11 2.4. Conrad und seine „Lebensfrauen“................................................................................. 13 3. Die Bündnispartner: C. v. Hötzendorf und H. v. Moltke................................17 3.1. Erste Kontaktaufnahme................................................................................................. 17 3.2. Österreichs Aufmarschplan im Falle einer serbischen Provokation ............................. 18 3.3. Das militärische Abkommen im Schatten des Schlieffenplanes................................... 19 3.4. Conrad und Moltke – Es gab keinen gemeinsamen Kriegsplan.................................... 21 4. Die „offensiven“ Kriegspläne der Entente......................................................23 4.1. Frankreich...................................................................................................................... 23 4.2. Russland ........................................................................................................................ 24 4.3. Großbritannien .............................................................................................................. 25 5. Die verheerende Auswirkung des MG´s auf die Offensivtaktik.....................27 5.1. Erster großer Einsatz von MG´s in Kolonialkriegen..................................................... 27 5.2. Die Wirkung des MG´s im russisch-japanischen Krieg................................................ 28 5.3. Conrads Infanteriereglements im Jahre 1911................................................................ 29 6. Die logistische Voraussetzung für eine Offensivkriegstaktik.........................30 6.1. Eisenbahnlogistik .......................................................................................................... 30 6.2. Artillerieüberlegenheit .................................................................................................. 32 7. Der Fall Redl 1913 und die Auswirkungen auf die Aufmarschpläne.............36 7.1. Der Ruf der k. u. k. Armee............................................................................................ 36 7.2. Militärische Konsequenzen aus dem Fall „Redl“ ......................................................... 37 8. Die letzten Monate vor dem „Großen Krieg“ von Mai – Juni 1914...............40 8.1. Das Verhältnis zu Italien............................................................................................... 40 8.2. Das letzte Treffen mit Moltke vor Kriegsbeginn .......................................................... 42 8.3 Das Verhältnis zu Russland............................................................................................ 43 9. Die Gründe für den „Großen Krieg“...............................................................46 9.1. Das Attentat von Sarajevo............................................................................................. 46 9.2. Der Präventivschlag gegen Serbien............................................................................... 47 9.3. Wie erlebte Conrad von Hötzendorf das Attentat? ....................................................... 48 9.4. Der k. u. k. Ministerrat .................................................................................................. 49 9.5. Ministerrat für gemeinsame Angelegenheiten am 19. Juli 1914................................... 51 9.6. Das Zeitfenster der militärische Antwort wurde verpasst............................................. 52 9.7. Das Ultimatum an Serbien ............................................................................................ 53 9.8. Die „ritterliche Weltanschauung“ von Conrad von Hötzendorf ................................... 54 9.9. Moltke und die Unumstößlichkeit des Schlieffenplanes............................................... 55 10. „The Great War“ begins................................................................................58 1 10.1. Die Verantwortung der Generäle ................................................................................ 58 10.2. Der Kriegsfall „B“ gegen Serbien............................................................................... 58 10.3. Der Aufmarsch gegen Serbien .................................................................................... 59 10.4. Erste Kriegshandlungen gegen das Königreich Serbien ............................................. 61 11. Österreich-Ungarn erklärt Russland den Krieg.............................................64 11.1. Der Aufmarsch gegen Russland beginnt..................................................................... 64 11.2. Das Armeeoberkommando.......................................................................................... 64 11.3. Der Sommerfeldzug in Galizien.................................................................................. 65 11.4. Die Kontrahenten im militärischen Vergleich............................................................. 66 11.5. Die Schlachten um Lemberg....................................................................................... 67 11.6. Das erste Treffen Conrads mit General Erich Ludendorff.......................................... 76 11.7. Conrad ersucht um deutsche Unterstützung an der Karpatenfront ............................. 76 12. Die Konsequenzen der Feldzüge nach Kriegsbeginn ...................................78 12.1. Die Verluste an Mann und Ausrüstung....................................................................... 78 12.2. Die Zersplitterung der Kräfte aufgrund des Zwei-Fronten-Krieges............................ 78 12.3. Die Artillerie als Achillesferse der k. u. k. Armee...................................................... 81 12.4. Die strategischen Fehlentscheidungen des Conrad von Hötzendorf........................... 83 12.5 Die Konsequenzen für Conrad von Hötzendorf........................................................... 85 12.6 Stabilisierung der Front mit deutscher Hilfe ................................................................ 86 12.7. Verlegung des AOK im November 1914 nach Teschen ............................................. 87 12.8. Die Offensive bei Limanowa und Lapanow im Dezember 1914................................ 87 12.9. Die Kämpfe in den Karpaten im Winter 1914/15 ....................................................... 90 12.10. Potioreks Herbstoffensive in Serbien........................................................................ 91 12.11. Der Ausblick auf die Durchbruchsschlacht bei Tarnow-Gorlice .............................. 92 13. Die interne Kritik am „Offensivgeist“ des Conrad von Hötzendorf.............97 13.1. Die loyalen Gefolgsleute im Offizierskorps................................................................ 97 13.2. Conrad von Hötzendorf handelte gegen seine eigene militärische Doktrin................ 98 13.3. Conrads Beharren auf Bewegungsschlachten ............................................................. 98 13.4. Conrads größter militärischer Kritiker – General Csicserics von Bacsany................. 99 14. Interview mit Generalstabschef General Mag. E. ENTACHER ................101 15. Resumée ......................................................................................................106 16. Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis...............................................................110 16.1. Österreichiches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv............................................................... 110 16.2. Veröffentlichte Briefe, Memoiren und Dokumente .................................................. 110 16.3. Monografien, Artikel und allgemeine Literatur ........................................................ 110 16.4. Internetquellen........................................................................................................... 113 16.5. Interview.................................................................................................................... 114 16.5. Abbildungsverzeichnis.............................................................................................. 114 17. Abstract........................................................................................................115 18. Curriculum Vitae.........................................................................................116 Persönliche Angaben.......................................................................................................... 116 Schulische Ausbildung......................................................................................................
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