The United States and the Cairo Conference: an Aspect of American Strategy in Asia in World War II

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The United States and the Cairo Conference: an aspect of American strategy in Asia in World War II

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Authors Hitchcock, William Samuel, 1937-

Publisher The University of Arizona.

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318004 THE UNITED STATES AND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE; AN ASPECT OF AMERICAN STRATEGY IN: ASIA IN WORLD WAR II

"by William Samuel Hitchcock

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF" HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE. UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1 9 6 7 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other Instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

H.E. BATEMAN ry p Date Professor of History .PREFACE

The selection of this subject was motivated by the desire to acquire a better understanding of the historical events of World Mar II, and insight into the forces which influenced the course of America8s military and political policies in- Asia."' The research for this work was conducted at the Library of the University of Arizona, while the material was organized at the Chicago Public Library, and the Newberry Library in Chicago, Illinois. I gratefully acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Professor Herman E. Bateman for his counsel and guidance, not only in the preparation of this thesis, but also throughout the course of my graduate study at The University of Arizona. My sincere appreciation is also extended to Professor James A. Beatson, and Professor Earl H. Pritchard whose invaluable suggestions have profoundly added to the scholarship of this work. I would also like to extend my eternal gratitude to my parents William and Sophie Hitchcock whose patience and faith made this study possible. TABLE OF CONTENTS' Page

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iv ABSTRACT

In World War II the United States relegated" postwar political objectives: to a secondary position in endeavoring- to achieve an*, immediate ■ and", total military victory over her enemies0; American global strategy was formulated on the premise^ that Germany was the? primary enemyy and' all military decisions were directed to defeating; the Nazi nation: as- soon as possible's' Therefore1; the; European Theater received precedence over the; military and naval effbrts in the; Pacific; Ocean1," while operations in Asia were committed' to last place*' .. ■ • President - Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired’ a strong Asian front to , support , the:; Pacific; campaign and" believed the;Republic of China provided the;means. of’ securing; this goals' Roosevelt also envisaged" China as a postwar Oriental power„ equal in status and stature to the' major: nations of? the; world<= At Cairo, Egypt in. November, 19^3 the; Americans conferred" with'.the leaders; of" China and Great Britain on establishing the: military strategy designed to realize: these aspirations®' Although the-conference- succeeded" in promoting Chian®; Kai-shek8 s prestige and" prepared’ a foundation for a strong China by postwar territorial adjustment si, the; Allies failed to agree; on the: w military policy necessary in implementing;’ the political objectiveso INTRODUCTION'

Under the leadership of President Franklin' D. Roosevelt: and Prime Minister; Wins ton: L& S » Churchill the United States of'America and' Great Britain esta,blished'one? of" the: greatest military coalitions in history;' Allied' with the: Union ofT Soviet Socialist Republics, in Europe, and:' the Republic of China1, in Asia), the two western democracies fought a global conflict against the: Axis Powers of Nazi Germany and'Imperial Japan, .Through this network of alliances American strategists faced the military and’ political realities of the: Second World War,1 In Januanyv 1942 Churchill and Roosevelt: met with their military leaders in Washington", D«C, to confer on global strategy and' establish the administrative machinery to co-ordinate their war effort. This was the first of a series of wartime Anglo-American conferences in which the Allies collaborated on the direction of their operations. Here they agreed’ to concentrate:their forces against thein primary enemy, Germany, and adopted a defensive;; strategy in the. Pacific Ocean against Japan, They also established the. Combined Chiefs of Staff as the top-level military agency for co-ordinating: the activity of their individual planning; staffs,' This organization, was comprised of the members of the: American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the:British Chiefs of Staff e Each nation*, provided7 a permanent representative of junior officers to continuously confer in Washington for the; purpose- of exchanging; information and maintaining; continuity between major sessions when* the senior: members wouUdl meet to decide on: global strategy. The: Allied" leaders- also agreed to accept: General- issimo Chiang: Kai-shek as Supreme Allied' Commander of " the?. China Theater,' This area included1 China and1 99such parts* of; Thailand: and Indochina as might be occupied by what were? now: called the United: Nations«.11 As Supreme Commanders Chiang; was recognized’ as autonomous * in this theater of: operations 8 responsible to nobody but: himself:’. Thus, any projected Allied action in Southeast Asia would" have to be: based! on separates and. independent: commands of strategic responsibility,*2 In March further guidelines for facilitating more: efficient operations were established. The Allies agreed"to a triple division of global areas of strategic responsibility. The United States was vested with direction

1 , Gordon.A, Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, Vol. II of The European Theater of Operations: United States Army in World" War II, ed, Kent R, Greenfield (98 volsV; Washington: U,S, Government Printing-Office; 19A6- )9 pp. 6-8 , 2 . Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell9s Mission to China. Vol, I of China: Burma: India Theater: United States Army in World War II, ed; Kent R. Greenfield'% 98^'1^oIs7~; Washington: U.S, Government Printing: Office, 1,946- ), p. 62. 3 of:' the war in ther Pacific: and Far East 8 including China0 Great Britain was given military responsibility from Singapore to the Middle Easta The war against Germany in Europe and the Atlantic Ocean was acknowledged as a joint efforts and both nations would exercise co-ordinated" control in this areal The President: and Prime Minister adopted this policy with the mutual understanding: that any large - scale- operations designed to seizes the initiative in a particular theater would" require joint: agreement through the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of StaffI As commander of an autonomous theater the Americans realized that achieving; Chiang6 s co-operation in accepting their strategic concept of operations against Japan would have to be acquired" 3 through diplomacy. By October, 19^3 the soundness in the basic concept of global strategy had been demonstrated. The decision to first defeat Germany led to the early crystalization of tactical operations in the European war with military and" naval success in the Atlantic Ocean and the- Mediterranean Theater. The submarine menace in the- North Atlantic was neutralized, while-British and" American forces had" expelled" Axis troops from North Africa. After the conquest of Sicily and the invasion of southern Italy, the Allies had forced" the capitulation of the Italian government. Although operations in Italy were meeting stiff German resistance,

3® Ibid.'.. pp. 86-87. the Americans were anxiously/ preparing- for the direct invasion of northwestern Europe, Tactical "bombardment against vital German military and industrial targets was increasing, with mounting devastation", and in the East , Russian forces were driving the Na,zies back into central Europe, Despite the fact that Germany still possessed a formidable military force, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the Allies were now ready to meet and defeat her army in a powerful frontal assault on 8,Festung Europa, Optimism was high and the Combined"Staff Planners: were predicting victory 89as early as the spring of 19^4 o68^ Success was also evident in the Pacific where American military and naval forces had stopped the Japanese southeastern advance toward7Australia, Although the United - States lacked a well-defined strategic concept to pursue against Japan, American strategists had adjusted to the

4, Samuel Eliot Morison. Strategy and Compromise (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958), p, 83« Richard M, Leighton, "Overlord Versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences, 1943," Command Decisions, ed, Kent R® Greenfield (Hew York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), pp. 183-85® 5® Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. Vol. XI of The War in the Pacific: United States Army in World War II/ edv Kent R* Greenfield"(98 vols®; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946- ), p. 668. 5 situation; and adopted a policy of 65tactical opportunism* The principle behind this policy was defensive in nature» but offensive in execution* Realizing;;" the-main effort was in Europe8 the primary mission assigned to Allied forces in the Pacific Theater was to. stop and hold: the Japanese from advancing their control and domination in the:'-area* After the victories at Coral Sea and Midway Island in the.spring- of 19^2* the Americans began to exploit their success by a series of limited offensive engagements designed to prevent the Japanese from consolidating their positions and" keep them off“balance* This led to further Allied operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific under the naval command" of Admiral Chester Nimitz, and military command of General Douglas MacArthur respectively; and the gradual transition from: a defensive posture to a full-scale offensive drive• toward Japan* The momentum of these operations had carried" MacArthur8 s forces past the Huon Peninsula in New Guinea to the important: enemy naval bastion at Finschafen8 and in the South Pacific to Bougainville in the Solomon Islands« On November 22 , 19^3 the United States Navy had started its

6 * Ray S, Cline, Washington Command Post: The ■ Operations Division, Vol. II of The War Department: United States Army in World .War II. ed. Kent R. Greenfield (98 vols* 1 Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946- ), p." 334 o drive through the Central Pacific with the conquest of Tarawa and Hakin Islands in the Gilbert Archipelago*^ It was apparent that 18tactical opportunism” had . exceeded initial Allied expectations9 but this improvisation could not continue in face of the logistical and personnel demands of modern warfaree: Therefore# the Combined^Chiefs of Staff began to consider the formulation of a well-defined strategic; concept for operations against Japan. At Washington onrMay 20, 19^3 the Anglo-American planners established a general outline for the eventual determination of a specific- strategic policy* They decided on a course of action which would lead to the eventual objective of securing; the area encompassing]- the South China Sea. The United States would advance westward-via two seperate but- co-ordinated routes through the?Central and Southwest Pacific for the purpose of liberating]- the Philippine Islands„ The British would advance north through the Straits of Malacca, and secure Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies? while the Chinese would advance on Hong Kong® All three Allied drives would meet in the South China Sea and'

7* Kenneth S. Davis, Experience of War: The United States in World War II (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965) s p T W f 'Leighton, p.: 183* Samuel Eliot Morison, Aleutians. Gilberts and Marshalls. June 1942-Aoril 1944. Vol. VII of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II Cl 5 vols.; Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1947-1962), p. 182. - proceed to exploit’: their success by preparing f or the" invasion of:' thes Japanese home islands. In the: meantime; tactical bombing: operations would" commences against Japan8 s vital industrial and communication facilities,, as soon as possible* and naval forces would impose a blockade of Japan,^ Like the Pacific. Theater the United" States had? no comprehensive; plan f or operations on the.; Asian,Continent; but* unlike the Pacific conditions in China were bad and" getting worse. By the summer of 19^3 the l?Asiatic war was' the bleakest of United Nations Theaters,68^ In May* 19^2 the Japanese had completed." their conquest of: Southeast Asia when they captured"the northern Burma communication center of Mytikyina, This cut all Allied land" communication with the: Republic of China* and left the Chinese almost completely- isolated from the Americans and British, The only source of: supply to China was the air transport route: which extended from: airfields: in: Assamy India to bases i n ■ Yunnan» China., These planes flew over the Himalayan Mountains * and the. particular Santsung; Range gave the name "Hump88 to these operations s which were conducted" by the American Air

8 , Mori son. Strategy and". Compromise, p, 81. 9 *. Walter Mill!s (ed.), The War Reports of General of. the Army George C « Marshall, General of the~ Army H.H. Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King~~(New Yorks J,B. Lippincott Company^ TqWTT^pT 209. Transport Command from." British installations„ Goods from the United States were shipped' to the Indian ports of Karachi„ Bombay, and" Calcutta where they were transferred via railway to Imphal and" Dinjan in. eastern Assam and flown to Yunnanyi and. Kunming': in: western Yunnan. It wa,s a, slow complex process 9 but: it wa.s 81 the sole means by which a combat 1 0 theater’was nourished..81 Competition.for these supplies between the Chinese Air Force and Army was extremely-acute-, and except: for aviation fuel, bombs, and small arms ammunition assistance was virtually negligible. China's greatest needs were trucksy tanks, artillery and other heavy equipment. Items which were extremely difficult, if not:impossible to airlift. If China was going to provide major assistance: to the: Allied'military effort against Japan it was imperative: that land communications be restored to facilitate the 1 1 restoration: of her armed forces. ’

10. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (eds.), Services Around"the World. Vol. VII of The Army Air Forces in World'War II (7 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19^8-1958), p. 116. 11. Leighton, pp. 192-93* Millis, p. 209* F U m x m the gohfeheige;

The Hurley Mission On October l4s 19^3 Brigadier General Patrick Jo Hurleys Personal Representative of the President of. the? United States, left Washington-, DoC«, on a 18special mission” to Chungking, China*-1 2 Earlier in thee year President Roosevelt': and" Generalissimo Chiang; Kai-shek had expressed" a mutual desire for a personal meeting: in the' autumn, and now General Hurley was ordered" to ”arrange the final details” for a conf erence between the two Allied leadersThe: American Ambassador was instructed to learn if the Chinese leader, would be willing; to meet -Marshall Stalin and assist the Soviet Union in the event Russia declared" war against Japan, and to ascertain the Generalissimo6s attitude toward America9s political objectives in Asia and military strategy in the: Pacific* The President also asked Hurley to familiarize himself with the Allied military position in i h, Southeast Asia*’

12 * UoSoj Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 (Washington; U,8 , Government Printing: Office, 19 6 lT7~p7 30V 13= Donald Lohbeck, Patrick J * Hurley (Chicago; Henry Regnery Company, 1956)» p, 203= 14« Joseph We Stilwell and Theodore H. White (ed>), The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloan Associates, 1948), p= 236V

9 10 H '-A While"- Hurley proceeded, on his mission to the Par - East'® President: Roosevelt simultaneously increased his efforts: to plan a meeting between himself’. Prime:-Minister' Churchill, Marshall Stalin, and: Generalissimo Chiang/: Kai- shek* He wrote to Churchill about including’ Chiang Kai-sheh in their conference with Stalin; but, as prospects for: seeing: thee Marshall diminished the President asked Churchill if’ he: would like; to meet 65with small staffs, in North Africa or even: at thee Pyramids', and toward" thee close: of" oun talks get thee Gbneralissimo to join us for two or three days?"^^ The Prime. Minister replied he would bee delighted to meet the: President:, and to see the? Generalissimo after their own conversations» 18Excel].ent' arrangements15 he said 88can be made for Chiang in Cairo though not: at the: same: momenta88 Churchill wanted to discuss: global strategy with:Roosevelt: before: they met either Stalin or Chiang# He also suggested" the:; cryptic term1 88Sextant” as the code: name for: thee conf erence^ which the- President readllyr accepted".17 Roosevelt then informed!, Chiang; about: his desire for-the 88full-blown: partnership of" China, Great Britain, Russia and.’ the United Statesand his anxiety to meet with: him and "Churchill at a reasonably early date: somewhere between the:

15. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 39* l6« Ibid,, p. 55* 17. Ibid.. p. 50* i a twentieth and the-twenty-fifth of"November."* On November 8 the President: invited’ the- General issimo to join him and the Prime Minister for.-a conference: at Cairo19 Egypt: on November 2 2 Ghiang; accepted the; invitation on the condition: that he would see both men prior po to their meeting: with' Stalin0 " Lieutenant General Brehon B'e Somervell* Commanding. General Army Service Forces* who had". recently returned from Asia, informed1 Roosevelt that Chian®' would" indefinitely postpone their: meeting.- if he:: could" not- see the: President before his talks with:Stalin. 21 President Boosevelt!r9 therefore, accepted" the: Generalissimo8 s request and" told him, "I agree with you fully that we should meet: together before I see Stalin." 22 Thus3 before General Hurley saw Chiang; Kai-shek, the President had. arranged the--time and place for a Sino-Anglo-American chiefs-of-state-1 conference^' It now remained"fbr Hurley to collect the latest information on the existing: political and military situation in the? Far East The itinerary of Hurley8 s trip to China included" a stop at New Delhi, India for a series of interviews with

18. Ibid.: p. 47» 19>’ Ibid., p. 72. 20 . Ibid.. p. 73'.- 21. Ibid.: p. 56.: 22.' Ibid. . p. 77. 12 Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten* Supreme Allied Commander off the: Southeast Asia Command; General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander^in^Chief of British Forces inc India; and’ General Sir Archibald" Wavell, British Viceroy of IndiaAdmiral Momtbatten9 s staff was preparing: a comprehensive plan., called Champion.s fbr the reconquest of:' Burma and the- opening; of land" communications with ChinaIt envisaged the employment" of American, British, Chinese, and Indian troops in a simultaneous land-sea operation-® Operation: Tarzan would encompass an: offensive strike against Myitkyina, a vital center of Japanese logistics and communications in northern Burma; and Operation: Buccaneer, an amphibious' assa.ult on the Andaman Islands, a Japanese air and naval base located- approximately. 250 miles? southwest of' Rangoon, Burma in the? Bay of Bengal® Success of the total plan was dependent on the? co-operation of the? British and Chinese governments, which were going to supply the bulk of the: available? naval 2h and manpower requirements®

23® The Southeast Asia Command"was formed".by the? Allies:-at the? Quebec Conference: in August, 19^3° Mountbatt'em assumed’ command', on: November? 1, 19^3° The theater was? a, British area of responsibility and encompassed Burma, Siam, Ceylon, Sumatra, and the Malaya Peninsula® 24h Charles F® Romanus and' Riley Sunderland, Stilwell8s Command Problems’® Vol. II of China: Burma: India Theater: United"States-Army in World War II, ed. Kent R. Greenfield" '(98 volsJ; Washington: U*S« Government Printing- Office, 1946- O , p. 51® Henry L. Stimson and1 McGeorges Bundy, On Active Service in Peace?and War (New York: Harper & Brothers,' 1947) , p. 528® 13 As the AmbassadbK' acquainted' himself: with the'- military situation: in this theater of the war he observed the: nationalist antagonisms existing between: the British and. Chinese'*' The Chinese hatred", for colonial imperialism and.' concern with reference to Britain9 s postwar designs on the7 commercial exploitation of: Asia; and the: British fear that the: "nationalistic: fervor" of the Chinese Nationalists would spread through Asia to their colonial possessions of India', Burmag and Malaya served" to stimulate: the: "mutual distaste:»v«to both of whom any failure: of the: other was” a source of." racial satisfaction®It appeared" to Hurley7 that 86inter-Allied politics were occupying a lot more time” and using: up a lot more energy than was being; expended' on mi litany activity," At the- conclusion of his talks with: the Allied" commanders' in Southeast Asia, Hurley, accompanied" by Major' General George: E, St rat emey ety Commanding; General of the: American Air Forces in India-Burma, flew to Chungking to participate in his first meeting with the President of the' National Government of the Republic: of China, In his opening?conversation with Chiang Kai-shek, Hurley expressed Boosevelt9 s basic questions pertaining to the top-level conference?of Allied leaders. The Generalissimo stated that

25. Stimson, p. 528. 2 6 .! Lohbeck, p. 2 0 5 . due to his 68suspicions concerninig; Russians desires to communize:China and perhaps for a complete conquest and; annexation; to Russia, of a portion of China” he could" not amicably confer with Stalin, ^ He was', however, willing; to co-operate:; with'the: Soviet Union if" the Russians declared wax against Japan® Despite Hurley® s argument of 195Stalin9 s renunciation of world communism,” and his conviction that Russia was ”no longer subsidizing or directing;communist activities in other: nations” Chiang: continued to hold, graves doubts'”of. the friendly intentions of the Soviet Government: toward China®.” 28 The Generalissimo was also adamant on the; matter of seeing;Roosevelt before the" President met Stalin, and if' that could not be arranged" he insisted on postponing; their meeting®' Thus, Ambassador Hurley was presented with two fundaments,! points which Chiang Kai-shek refused to relinquish®: If there was to be a conference between Franklin Roosevelt and"Chiang: Kai-shek it would" have to be on these terms: (1) the Chinese leader would"not meet the:Russians; and (2 ) the Americans would have: to meet the Chinese prior" to their conference with the Russians® Chiang*s insistence: on "keeping face” virtually nullified a joint conference

27® Ibid® 28® U,S®„ Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and" Tehran ® p ®"1 1 0 2 ® 15 amongr Roosevelt^ Churchill", Stalin:, and" himself After discussing the impending: conference the conversation turned to the subject of American military strategy, in the Pacific: war* Without any mention: of? specific: dates and"targets. Hurley gave the Generalissimo a general outline of the concept of 89island" hoppingo89 Based on naval supremacy this doctrine concentrated" on seizing; and occupying; strategically located objectives ‘ while* isolating; heavily fortified' positions» Chiang was in complete agreement: with this policy and1 Sihoped" that it would make possible in the near future a landing; on the mainland of China by American forces, as a prelude to an all-out attack on JapanThe Generalissimo "spoke with great clarity of the: strategy of attacking Tokio and all Japan through China o Their second discussion took place at dinner in the: Generalissimo9s residence on the evening"off November 1 2 . After their meal Chiang asked Hurley for a description of America,9s political objectives-in Asia. The Ambassador complied" and gave a broad outline of. President Roosevelt9s" political goals in the Far East.' The policy of the: United"

29o; Romanus and" Sunderland, Stilwell9s Command". Problems» p. 52° 3 0 . Lohbeek, p. 2 0 6 . 31° U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 264. States Government' was to maintain-Great Britain as a major- world power. Although that was a primary objective8 America was opposed’ to all forms of imperialism, and believed that after the war democracy would- triumph.and become the dominant"; political ideology in the world. In corroboration of this attitude the United States military strategy was directed at striking; the most direct blow against the Japanese homeland, without diversionary efforts to drive' the enemy out off the former colonial possessions of' Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands for the purpose of ■ 32 re-establishing': their imperialist empires. Hurley then explained the political aspirations of his government: for China, He told the Generalissimo that it was America's intention to support his leadership in establishing; a "free, strong's democratic' China as the: predominant force in postwar Asia." In light of this encouraging, statement Chiang replied that "the long-range political view is sometimes more important than a short- range military one.5 1 In reference to this subject the; Generalissimo desired a reaffirmation of the principles of the; Atlantic: Charter written into the declaration of the impending conference at Cairo, and a reiteration of'Allied' war aims as expressed in the Four FreedomsHe particularly

32®' Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command' Problems, p, 59® Stilwell, p. 2 3 6 , 33® Lohbeck, p. 2 0 6 . XI emphasized" the guarantees of no territorial aggrandizement and the respect for national self-determination.^ Chiang Kai-shek favored the ideals of liberty and democracy^ but continually expressed his contempt for the": principles of communism and imperialism. .He candidly stated" 59the■ Japanese are only lice on the body of China, but Communism is a disease of the heartDespite these feelings, however, the Generalissimo acknowledged the fact that in the mutual interest of the joint war effort Roosevelt would have to "temporize with imperialism and" communism,99 since Allied' success depended on 18his ability, to assimilate rather than eliminate divergent ideologies." He also requested Hurley to inform the President of his "implicit confidence98 in Roosevelt9 s efforts to seek a common accord" among, the" Allies, and his intention to follow the President*s "leadership on the diplomatic and political questions" which would be under consideration at their

On August 14, 1941 Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to the war aims of the Western Powers and enscribed them in eight points under the title of the Atlantic:" Charter: (1) No territorial aggrandizement; (2) No territorial changes without the consent of the people concerned; (3 ) Restoration of .all sovereign rights and independence to all nations forcibly deprived of them, and the right of self-determination for all peoples; (4) Economic equality for all nations; (5) Economic security for all nations; (6) Freedom from fear and want; (7 ) Freedom of the seas to all nations; (8) Disarmament of all bellicose nations to prevent future aggression." 35® Lohbeck, p. 2 0 6 . 18 meeting;. 36 Before the meeting adjourned". Chiang stressed' one further point. He said" he would be willing: to place- Chinese troops under the unified Allied command of Admiral Mountbatten for offensive operations in northern Burma; but- emphasized the fact he must remain: Supreme Commander in China. If, for any reason, an attempt was made to place-him in a secondary role, his position of leadership in China would be seriously jeopardized due to the debilitating; effect it would have on his image within his nation. Therefore, it would be ’’better for himself and China and the United Nations that he should remain the ultimate authority. In assessing: thee Chinese Theater, General Hurley regarded China’s military position as inadequate to initiate effectively any offensive action. He believed it would be more advisable ”to give important consideration to the: relative importance placed by the Chinese Central Government upon-conserving its strength for maintenance.of its postwar internal supremacy as against the more immediate objective of def eating- Japan.

3 6 . U.S., Department: of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 264. 37T Ibid. 38. Ibid., p. 2 6 5 . 19 While:- ini China Hurley had’ the:: opportunity to meet with] Lieutenant: General JosepBi.¥«. Stllwell, who held) t'hei positions7: off Commandingr General» United' States Army Fbrees', China-Burma-India Theater; Deputy Supreme- Allied" Commander,: Southea.st Asia Command!; Chief of Staff to Chiang; Kai-shek; and Commanding General* Chinese Army in India. General Stilwell was planning: the Chinese: invasion of northern Burma9 in conjunction with Operation Champion,, and was determined’ to demonstrate the: value of the: Chinese Army. He? contended! the British had" little: confidence in the: fighting ability of Chiang;9 s forces» and were thus inclined! toward" limiting: any efforts in buildings them up. He argued that if the Chinese?failed to attack it would providb the British with' 19an excellent? argument for giving; up any plans for: reopening' communications" with China." The Generalissimo also acknowledged' the importance' o f a successful campaign and. supported Stilwell with the promise of reinforcements and.' equipment=y After his talks with the Chinese leader9 Ambassador Hurley left Chungking for Cairo to await the arrival of the American delegation. Here he"compiled his report on the: results of his: fact-finding journey,, and prepared to assume hi"s position as an adviser to the President at the

39® Bomanus and Sunderland^ Stilwell8s Command' Problems, p. 5 6 . 20 forthcoming conference«, During the course of his two month Oriental tour he conferred with the principal Allied commanders in Asia, and personally observed the;; prevailing- conditions existing-in that area of the war against Japan, He recognized General Stilwell’s difficult position of working amidst the contending rivalries of the Chinese and British, and favored his efforts to build the Chinese Army into a first-class fighting;, force. Ambassador Hurley was blunt concerning, the issue of imperialism. He oppossed any form of imperialism and supported Chiang Kai-shek’s request for a joint' 8ino-Anglo-Arnerican reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter,^ The Generalissimo’s refusal to see Marshall Stalin precluded any meeting between the four major Allied statesmen; but his expressed" confidence in-America’s objectives toward China provided the promise of a successful conference. The importance of the? Hurley Mission lay in the- fact that on the eve of1 President Roosevelt’s meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek he was provided with a reliable account of the: current- political views of the Chinese leader, as well as the latest

40. William D, Leahy, X Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt: and-’ Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the: Time (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Incv, 1950)s p. 188, Lohbeck,pp. 208-09, 214, 21 Information' on the-military situation in the Far East.-

Military Objectives The primary objective of American military strategy in Asia was directed toward maintaining.: China8 s active participation in the war against Japan. President Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that progress toward an Allied victory would be greatly accelerated: if” the enormous reservoir of Chinese manpower could be trained and supplied'with the techniques and equipment of modem Uo warfare. ^ General of the Army George C» Marshall9 U.S. Army Chief of Staffs feared that if Chiang8s forces were decisively defeated and his government' forced to capitulate the? Japanese would'be "free to exploit? the? tremendous resources of" China without harassement 8" and in* the: event: of an Allied'invasion of the.Japanese homeland "to flee to China, and continue the war on a great and rich land mass General Stilwell prepared" a comprehensive^ program- which the-- Chinese planned" to initiate to strengthen their armed" forces, and a list of' recommendations for the? necessary American assistance to insure its realization.

41. Elliott Roosevelt’s As He Saw It (New York; Duellg Sloan and Pearce, 1946) p. 204. 42.’ John: R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (NewYork; The Viking Press, 1946), p. 225. Ernest J «. King and" Walter Muir Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King:; A Naval Record (New Yorks W . Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), p. 506. 43. Mi Hi s, p. 209. 22 It expressed thei Generalissimo9s intention: to train and equip ninety combat divisions in three groups of thirty each with the first thirty at full strength by January ly tykk and the last two groups operational by August 1944 and) January 194-5 respectively, Stilwell recommended that China undertake a major offensive in northern' Burma in conjunction with.the British campaign in Southeast Asia, If this, operation wa,s successful then Chiang would mount a further operation, aimed at the C ant on- HongKong area to open a direct route to the sea. In return for this effort the Chinese leader would a,sk the United States for logistical support of the- ninety infantry divisions, and sufficient equipment to build the Chinese Air Force into a potent offensive weapon. General Stilwell proposed two fighter groups, one: medium bomber group, one reconnaissance squadron, one transport squadron, and a heavy bomber group as the:minimum requirement for an effective Chinese air arm,^ The Chinese also intended to ask President Roosevelt: for an all-out Allied land, sea, and air offensive in northern Burma to help guarantee their chances for a quick and decisive victory. Their last request would be for an American troop commitment of'ten infantry divisions and" three armored divisions for operations against Central and

44. U.S., Department of State, The:Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 159® 23 North China after the seizure of Canton and7 Hongkong," Stilwell also recommended" an increase in the; air ferry 85Hump11 tonnage from; 8 j000 to 1 0 s000 tons of supplies per month, and long-range American bombers for attacking: the" Japanese main land from China, The Generalissimo accepted these recommendations and on November 11, the Chinese National Military Council gave its official sanction-to the entire" program,1 The: blueprints for the development of a formidable Chinese military ■ force, ca,pable of dominating' the Asian Continent", had been prepared by Stilwell and approved by Chiang Kai-shek," It now remained' for the: future to see : whether or not it would be transformed from- a dream into a. reality. The Chinese leader and his American Chief of Staff were harmoniously working together in planning:China® s. military strategy. The Generalissimo was most receptive: to Stilwell6s suggestions, and the General, who now found' himself 68high in Chiang6s favor,,18 energetically devoted himself to preparing China6 s case for the approaching conference,1 "Thus, on the eve of Sextant the opportunity of. creating an effective Sino-American effort in Asia seemed* to exist,58^

45. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell6 s Command Problems, pp. 57$ 59° 46, Ibid.,. pv 59 24 In 1943 the United States intended' to capitalize on the potential value of China8s geographic proximity to Japan. The development of a modem and powerful Nationalist Army, and the- employment'- of China as a base of operations for the aerial bombardment of the Japanese coke and steel industries afforded an excellent prospect for opening:up a [tin formidable second front against Japan® On November 1 0 , President Roosevelt informed Chi eng' Kai-shek of America's military plans to construct five bomber airfields in the vicinity of Chengtu, China by March 1944 in. order to 85launch heavy bombing attacks upon vital Japanese homeland objectives.*..8 8 The following day the: American Joint Staff Planners submitted a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the-subject of tactical bombing operations from the China^Burma-India Theater. They believed that the construction of five B-29 airfields in the: Chengtu area, and four similar support facilities in the vicinity of Calcutta, India would greatly intensify the execution of offensive actions against Japan from China. Their recommendations called for the immediate construction of these installations in co-operation with the Chinese Government in order to ensure completion by the Spring of

47. Cline, p. 334® MiHis, p. 215. 48. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 172. • 25

The United States military strategists were anxious to mount intensive aerial bombardment action against the- home islands of Japan; but the limited range of existing, operational aircraft, and the great distances from- American positions in the Southwest and Central Pacific to Japan- prevented such operations. Now this condition began to improve because the:increased range of the new B-29 bomber, scheduled' for full-production in early; 19^ , could bring; the, war directly to the doorstep of." the Japanese people. Chengtu was approximately 2,000 miles from Tokyo, Japan and currently represented the best position for the development of suitable airbases. The major problem in China wa,s the logistical support of American as well as Chinese military forces„ To prevent'* the imposition of additional transport burdens on the already overworked" Hima.layan Ferry Route the: B-296s would be required' to maintain their own supply channels by carrying;their own gasoline, ammunition, and spare parts to their Chinese bases» This self-sustaining operation would have to be continued until the Allies could re-conqueror sufficient territory in northern Burma to

49= Ibid..- p. 168. Matloff, p. 396. MiIlls, p. 338. The B-29 was a four engine heavy bomber, also called the Flying Superfortress. 26 construct direct land' communications with China, General Henry H» Arnold, Commanding General U.S. Army Air Force, believed this was the only logical way to resolve this situation, whether it was "for 40 aircraft or 4,000*"^^ The essential element in considering; the location of the landing- fields was contigent on the amount of security the Chinese Army could provide from Japanese attacks, Thus, if the forces of the Generalissimo could be strengthened t':o liberate and defend territory in their homeland additional aircraft could be sent to China to reinforce the military squeeze on the Japanese, and promote the value of the Eastern Front and Chiang’s role as an Asian leader,' For as China6s role in the war increased, the prestige of the Generalissimo was proportionally strengthened, and this development was in harmony with Roosevelt's objectives in Asia. The only reservation in the execution of this policy was the fact the United States could not unilaterally achieve it.’ The importa:nce of China's determination to assume her role in the destruction of the Japanese Asian blockade acquired added significance.when viewed from the total context of Allied operations against the Japanese Empire. Because the United States was involved in fighting a

50. H.H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 447. 27 global war and assisting, in the logistical support of most of her allies there was a definite limitation on her resources of men and material,' This situation and the obvious fact of geography, in which any major land campaign in Asia would have to be mounted primarily by Chinese forces accentuated the importance of their co-operation and determination to fight/ In this respect Chiang’s willingness to commit his forces in concert with America6 s efforts to promote the Asian Theater into a major combat front would' be- a decisive factor in the ultimate outcome of this policy. Another consideration which would influence the course of American planning/- was the attitude of Great Britain.' Since the most direct approach to China lay through the British colonial possession of Burma, any operation in that area would have to be initiated from a British base. Thus, the interests of all three allies came to focus on ■Burma*' In analysing the situation Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, commented "it was the peculiar difficulty of the American policy that it was dependent upon a British Cjl base and Chinese manpower»5 Two of the most pressing problems confronting President Roosevelt and his military staff at the moment were finding the means of securing the earliest possible

51. Stimson, p. 528. 28 defeat and the unconditional surrender of Japan, and establishing: the measures to prevent future Japanese aggression in Asia! This concern was manifest in their desire to formulate an 88overall plan for the defeat of Japan,and intention to obtain a major Allied military decision on the order and scale of offensive operations. The. American planners 'were thinking in strictly military terms in their determination to confront the Axis Powers by the: most direct route, free of involvement in any peripheral <2 action which might prolong the conclusion of hostilities. Although the United States placed a great deal of faith in the potential value of China as a military ally, a significant development was beginning'to appear in America*S' subordinate planning echelons. Their recommendations began to de-emphasize the importance of the Asian Theater as the campaigns in the Central and Southwest Pacific approached1 major proportions, The Strategic Section of the Army Operations Division believed an Allied converging attack on the HongKong"C ant on area would not be consistent with the direction of the two major offensives in the Pacific Theater, and would divert their attention from a direct

52, Cline, p. 335® Kent B. Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963) , P« 23. U».S,, Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 38, 157, 2?1. 29 assault':, on- Japan. They further maintained'' that any advantage; in securing- airbases in Central China would' be offset by the extreme" cost of men and" equipment: expended" in an Asian campaign.- Therefore';, Colonel Joseph J. Billo, Chief* of the Strategy Section:, advised" the Operations Division that the United States should" only contemplate.- limited* support off the Asian Theater.' He recommended’ a minor bomber offensive from' China, and"sufficient equipment for the support of sixty Chinese combat divisions. The Joint Strategic: Survey Committee expressed" a similar opinion to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They considered" an all-out offensive through the; Pacific" Ocean as the 13key to the early defeat of Japan They believed"Southeast Asia would comprise one of the* major topics of discussion at the next Anglo-American conference, and reported to President Roosevelt, on October 2 2 , that strategy in the- Pacific Theater would 55not require substantial modification at this time The President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not: deny the fact: that the: prospect of bringing; about: an early victory over: Japan was becoming- more apparent: as the: Pacific War brought the: forces of the United" States closer’ to Japan. 81 The means . for1 a major thrust across the Central

53<• Eomanus and* Sunderland, Stilwell's Command" Problems, p. 55« 54. U.S.,, Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 109. 30 Pacific- were coming: to hand and so was the realization of China9s diminishing: strategic importance**ss"^ This was only an incipient development in the strategic: thought of junior- planning officers; but it served' to compound' the importance: of Chiang®s willingness to respond' to -America’s efforts in assisting: 0hina»^^ In their estimate of the enemy situation in the Orients the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed Japan would' remain on the strategic defensive in an effort-'to strengthen and consolidate her military and economic control of East Asia and the western Pacific* The Japanese would'undertake only limited offensive action to prevent the Allies from establishing: airbases within- striking; distance of their homeland, and reinforcement of then Chinese armies. The Americans were aware of Japanese troop and" equipment increases in. Southeast Asia, which they interpreted as obvious moves aimed" at countering; any attempt to open a land route through Burma to China. As of November 1, 19^3 the: Japanese occupied an area of 81 great natural strength,68 but the existence of three facts threatened their security.; The existence of Allied forces in the Melanesia area. The presence of unoccupied territory in China within bombing

55° Bomanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems. p. 53° 56° Ibid.'. pp. 53-56® Hatloff, p. 337° Mori son, pp. 83-87. 31 range of: Japan. The third was Russia9s possession of' eastern Siberia. The senior strategists recognized" China9 s military situation as serious but not hopeless and believed if the Chinese could be provided with sufficient air support they would be able to defend their important" strategic positions against the Japanese. The debilitating effects of war fatigue, world" isolation, and loss of vital commercial and" industrial areas had left China in a "generally anemic condition.89 The Joint Chiefs stated the Chinese would "probably intend to remain on the defensive, pending: the re- equipping; and training of their a,rmy for offensive" action at a later date.85 After evaluating: the strengths and weaknesses of" the; Allied and enemy positions in the Fan East the Americans decided on the course of future operations in- Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Admiral Mountbatten be asked to submit his plans for a major Burma, campaign to the Combined" Chiefs of Staff. Fleet Admiral King,' Chief of Naval Operations, suggested an assault on the northern Malayan Peninsula aimed a,t Bangkok, Thailand", which he believed would sever the Japanese lines of communication, and offer the benefit of Burma and Thailand, as well as China and’ India, in the war against Japan.

5?.: U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 232-3^« 58. Ibid., p. 243° King, p. 510. Leahy, p. 198. 32 The prevailing: attitude of the American planning: staff, was definitely oriented toward a major offensive operation in Southeast Asia for the purpose of opening land1' communication: with China,' China needed help and" the hope of receiving, it sustained" her faith, in continuing; the struggle,' The United States was anxious to hear Mountbatten®s proposals for the Burma campaign, and was willing to support his plans with the necessary land, sea, and air forces consistent with the global war effort. The latent potential of China,5s enormous wealth of manpower, and the- prospect of initiating' bombing- raids against Japan flour the- only bases within range were two objectives which, the Americans felt, justified their strong support for an active and formidable Asian Theater, Although junior staffs were beginning; to counsel "a policy, of limited assistance: to China, Chiang Kai-shek®s favorable response to General Stilwell9s effbrts in building up China9s military forces served" to strengthen the resolve of General Marshall and' Admiral King in encouraging the spirit of the Generalissimo* s co-operation,. The United States was carrying the major burden in the: Pacific Theater against Japan*s eastern front, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to support their forces by assisting the Chinese Nationalist Government in developing; a major threat on Japan®s western front„ The emergence of a strong and active Asian Theater would intensify the military 33 pressure on Japan and accelerate the possibility of:an early victory* A direct route to China was necessary if the' Asian Theater was to materialize into a primary Allied combat front’s and the United States needed the active-support and' co-operation of the British and Chinese to realize this objective,

Political Objectives The faith President Roosevelt displayed in the judgment and action of his military staff» and the latitude he gave this body was not shared by the American Foreign Service, Roosevelt had great faith in his ability to influence people through the persuasive charm of his personalitys and he preferred to conduct foreign affairs on 5q the basis of personal diplomacy. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was not invited by the President to confer with him and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military affairs* and although Roosevelt readily informed Hull of the contents of their decisions he rarely asked" for his advice on the- diplomatic-'significance of their military decisions. This attitude extended to the President's personal conversations

59® Hatloff * p, 3^8 , Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p, 6l . U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 271. 60. Samuel I, Rosenman, Working- With Roosevelt (New York: Harper & Brothers, 195?),_p. 403. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and HopkinsJka .Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948T7™pT44§. 34 with foreign chiefs of state, and would also prevail at the forthcoming, conference with Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. Presidential Aide: Harry L® Hopkins candidly referred to most career diplomats as ,8c:ookie-pushers, pansies - and" isolationists to bootV!! which Under-Secretary of.' State- Sumner Welles regarded" as indicative" of. the; Chief' Executive6 s. ^deep-rooted prejudice against the* permanent: officials of the: Department of State.68^^ Cordell Hull, however, 'believed'ther existence: of poor liaison was due: to the President'6 s preference; for involving' himself" in military affairs, and his desire to be referred to as Commander-in™ Chief" f eeling- 66this all-important position was now more- important than that of Presidents.59^ Regardless of the individual explanations in the: nature of this attitude- the: fact remains that Roosevelt was a strong leader who insisted on exercising; a direct influence on the affairs of state; Through his prerogative: as Chief of State, President:: Roosevelt; incorporated most of." the responsibilities, of' the: Secretary of State into his personal leadership, and'with the assistance of his military chiefs and personal adviser,

61® Sherwood, pV 774, 62. Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped; History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950)» P» 216. 63f Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. IT (New York: The Macmillan: Company, 1948), p. 1111. 35 Harry Hopkins, undertook the direction! of: preparations for: the impending? ®alr© Gonf ereneei* All off Roosevelt ® s decisions pertaining:to America°s relations with the KepmMie of China were motivated by two overriding ohjeetives 0 He was predominantly concerned with keeping? China in the war and promoting the friendship of the Chinese for the people of the United States» The President regarded China as one of the four major Allied powers and sought every opportunity to bolster her stature as a great world power equal to the United States» Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, He recognized' the enormous world prestige she would receive as a result of her sueessful participation in a victorious war fought to guarantee the principles of: democratic freedom, Roosevelt also envisaged China®s role as an invaluable partner In the maintenance of postwar peace and security, firmly entrenched in a strong tradition of. Sino-American friendship and understanding;^^ By the time of the Cairo Conference the United States had taken several major steps in substantiating the: sincerity of this policy. On January 11, 19^3 America

64, Elliott Roosevelt (ed,), F,D,R, His Personal Betters3 1928-1945, Vbl, II (Hew Xorks Buell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), p, 1468, Sherwood, p, 740, Stimsony p, 532,' U,S,, Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p, 47, 36 relinquished7 all her extraterritorial rights in China» and’ on October 1 1 , the-President appeared before Congress asking- for the repeal of the" Chinese Exclusion LawSe^ Prior to the. President's departure for Egypt Cordell Hull had returned" . from the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in Russia. The Secretary of State had successfully worked for the inclusion of China as an original signatory of the "Four Nation Declaration which provided for the esta.blishm.ent of a postwar international.peace-keeping- organization.^^ Now, at Roosevelt's invitation, the Generalissimo was about to confer with the?President and the Prime Minister in their first meeting of the war, where the value of China's role in the Par East would be determined. Japan's initial victories over the Western nations in China and"Southeast Asia, and ensuing occupation of their

j. former territorial possessions had greatly accelerated" the; demise of Colonial imperialism. In its place the Japanese

65. Hull, p. 1585* Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.). The Tide Turns t 194-3 Volume, Vol XII of The Public Pacers and" Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (13 vols.; New York! Harper & Brothers, 1938-1950)» pp. 427-28. The Chinese Exclusion Laws were passed by the U.S. Congress between 1882-1913® They prohibited Chinese immigration into the United.States, and declared them ineligible for citizenship. Extraterritoriality was a policy of the Imperialist nations providing for the protection of their nationals living in China, and subjecting them to the laws of their respective countries and not to the laws of China. 66 , Hull, p. 1583. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee"on Foreign Relations, Hearings, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., 1950, Senate Doc. 123, p. 11. 37 institued their own form of colonialism with the creation of the Co=East Asia Prosperity Sphere and its concomitant propoganda theme of 18Asia for the Asiatics.Although foreign domination continued to be exercised over these subject people the significance of the situation lay in the fact that the European was replaced by an Oriental ruler, in mo:st cases a racial equal. President Roosevelt told his son Elliott 88that a majority of OhineSe think more highly of Japanese colonial policies than they do of British or French or Dutch.88^ The President was aware of the rise in the universal spirit of nationalism in Asia and regarded it as potentially one of the most volatile issues confronting the maintenance of peace and stability in the postwar world. In their struggle for national freedom the subjugated races were most susceptible to communism, and Roosevelt believed the danger inherent in this fact could be avoided if the United States and Great Britain assumed the leadership in preparing these people for the responsibilities of self-government by assuring their liberty and educating them in the principles of democracy. The President opposed Russian, as well as

67» Ostensible name for a political and economic area in Asia free of foreign control and interventions but actually the propogamdie term of the Empire of Japan through which the Japanese exercised their influence and domination. 68. Roosevelt, As He Saw It. p. 165. 38 British colonialism and feared if" the" European nations resumed"these policies at the conclusion of the present war, the basis for another world conflict would rapidly materializes The: United Nations were fighting: to establish the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and not to perpetuate the antiquated designs of imperialism and" communism,' The Allies9 therefore* were morally committed" to this objective and Roosevelt was determined to effect its realization,^^ America looked to the Republic of China as the answer to the problem of postwar security in Asia, If the United States could assist the Nationalist Government in establishing a strong, unified', and democratic: state, then China could effectively replace Japan as the' Asian force capable of maintaining: a balance- of power with any nation in the Far East, President Roosevelt anticipated that China would assume the leadership in guiding; the forces of Asian nationalism in the direction of democratic liberalism and" moderation. He believed she could provide an invaluable service to world" stability by maintaining- a successful example for other nations to emulate, and assisting- fellow Asians in creating-their own states. The development of a

69„ Lohbeck,.pp, 206, 209-15° Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 19^1-19^5 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965 ), P° 91° Welles $ p« 14?, free and independent China, equal in stature to the great nations of the: Western world, would"demonstrate to the people of" Asia the sincerity of America9s efforts in promoting: their quest for self-determination and" national sovereignity. It would also present an effective counter to Japanese propoganda which attempted" to justify their cause by saying they were fighting’ a racial war against the- domination of the white man. As long, as China maintained' an active role in the war the dangerous implications of’a struggle of’ East against West could be rendered false and" ineffective^ Consequently, China not only occupied a prominent! position in the President9 s concept of a postwar system for world order, but also represented his determina tion to bring: democracy to the people of 'Asia, As President: of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai- shek was recognized by the United States as the legally . constituted leader of the- Chinese people. The dictatorial inclinations of the Generalissimo and the Nationalist Government9 s reluctance to institute democratic reforms was a source of profound" concern to President Roosevelt, who was aware of the graft and corruption which permeated the

70, Willard Range, Franklin D» Roosevelt9s World Order (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1959) $> p. 178, Harold M. Vinacke, The United States and the Far Bast. 1945-1951 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 29. political structure of the “Fascist"tinted" Kuomintang«.13^ He believed^ however$ that Chiang; was the only man capable of commanding: the loyalty of the Chinese Army and leading China to political unifications “There$s just no other leader the President said, “With all their shortcomings, we-*ve got; to depend on the Chiangs»69 It would have been contrary to America's policy of self-determination to interfere in China's internal affairs; therefore, Roosevelt endeavored'to support the Generalissimo and encourage the enactment of liberal legislation through his government. Consequently, Chiang's co-operation and willingness to receive Roosevelt's advice was a major factor in achieving; political success in Asia, and the President was firmly committed to the maintenance; of good relations with the Chinese leader. 73 v Another situation confronting the United States in China was the internal conflict between the: Nationalist Government and" the Chinese Communists. The portentous danger inherent in this struggle threatened America's hopes for postwar peace and China's place among; the major world

?1 ® Sherwood", pi* 739* The Kuomintangr was the name of the national and revolutionary party of the Chinese Republic established under the leadership of"Dr. Sun Tat- sen. It gained" control of China between 1926 and 1928. Kuo: National, Min; People's, Tang: Party.' 72. Roosevelt, As He Saw It. pp. 153-5^* 73* Sherwood, p. 7^0 . Welles, p. 151. 41 powers„ So long as this problem continued' the chance of civil war erupting’ in China after Japan's defeat was a real probability with the portent; of? escalating; into an ideological confrontation, between the United' States and' Soviet Russia, Although.Marshall Stalin "apparently was not; interested in either faction in. China," Roosevelt: feared the possibility of"Russian intervention on the Communist8s behalf„ and worked to prevent?the materialization of such a nK oontigency. Furthermore, the conflict kept? the Chinese from establishing' a united military front against the Japanese, which served to weaken the; effectiveness of the Asian Theater, The Allies were fighting a common enemy in Asia, but the; Generalissimo was also involved in a domestic struggle for political survival and control of China, His strong anti-communist views and.feelings that they were his most dangerous enemy presented a formidable obstacle to Roosevelt6 s efforts in resolving this problem. It was obvious that before China could assume a major role' in maintaining peace after the war, her own internal stability would have to be assured. The political unification of the Republic of China, under Chiang's. leadership, was one of the primary objectives of America's Asian policy, and its realization was a necessity if the United’States hoped to

74, Sherwood", p, 739® 42 to see China emerge as a major world power*^ The success of America9s immediate and future plans for China not only depended on the Generalissimo5s co operation, but also required an effective joint war effort* President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were aware of the military and political significance of these facts and wemphasized" that the Allied' Nations must not be put" in the position of being responsible for the collapse of China®5 Roosevelt stressed the fact that everything, possible must be undertaken to keep China in the war* He believed the Communist guerilla forces would continue to fight Japan as long as Russia remained in the war against Germany| but feared" the- possibility that the: Generalissimo might conclude a separate peace with the Japanese, As the military pressure began to mount against Japan her leaders endeavored" to make peace with China in order to concentrate on America5s Central and Southwest Pacific advances. Although the Chinese resisted their peace efforts the: Nationalist Government never lost an opportunity in demanding more supplies and representation in Allied strategy deliberations» As early as February 1943 Chiang;

75® Lohbeck, p, 258, Smith, p, 97= Tang Tsou, America5s Failure in China (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1963)» P= 34. Welles, pp. 152, 154= 76, Leahy, p.’ 157* Kai-shek had informed' the United States Government that unless he received more logistical support and aircraft he could not be counted on to participate in any future- Allied operations«, On September 22, 19^3» Dr. T. V . Soong, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, told Cordell Hull that 65his government had one matter most strongly in mind; namely, more recognition in connection with the work of the7 Combined Chiefs of Staff.”^ China®s isolated position, the; military defeats suffered through years of defensive war fare, and her feeling of being relegated to a minor and sub-ordinate position in the Allied coalition served to compound Roosevelt’s concern for a personal interview with the Generalissimo.^^ To sustain China’s morale and strengthen her determination- to fight", the President planned to offer Chiang the prospect of a great future for the Republic of China as a major world power, and the restoration of all territory taken from her by Japan. The United States was also determined to prevent future Japanese aggression in the Orient, and intended to dissolve her colonial empire.

77. Arnold, p. 422 78. Hull, p.. 1584. 79» Herbert Peis', Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1957)» P® 247. Sherwood, p. 740, m Roosevelt believed' that these incentives would, produce a collateral effect in stimulating’ the development of Chinese patriotism and providing:the national cohesion necessary for the- stable unification under Chiang9s leadership* He regarded the settlement of territorial affairs as one of the most important' political issues confronting the Allied leaders$ since their agreement on areas of national sovereignity would eliminate a major source of future international disputation. It would also establish the' basis for a just and lasting peace in the Par East. China.6s desire for equal rights with the Soviet Union in Outer Mongolia s exclusive control of Mane hurls „ and her consent: to Russia6 s efforts in acquiring "a nice big" port and" communications to Darien*” were recognized as matters which ”might cause trouble*.66 and would require particular atten tion.®0 The President also anticipated the problem.of convincing Prime Minister Churchill of the soundness in America6s political and military objectives regarding the Republic of China. The British statesman was less inclined than the:: American6 s in accepting "the excessive estimates of Chiang Kai-shek6 s power or the future helpfulness of

80. U.S.„ Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran.'p. 257. ^5 81 China»«..«13 The British saw the: United" Statesv support-ofT the Republic of" China as a manif estation' of" her anti- colonial views. This assessment was reinforced' by the President8s endorsement of. the Generalissimo, who was an outspoken critic of Western Imperialism, and"served" to consolidate British opinion in the belief" that Roosevelt:6s political objectives ran counter to their interests in establishing'their own power and prestige in the Orient. The Prime Minister was willing to co-operate with the President's policies as long as they did not interfere with Great Britain's strategic goals« Roosevelt recognized the™ danger inherent in this conflict of Allied'interestss and" prepared to influence the™ British in accepting; America's view that postwar peace could only be™achieved through implementing the ideas of national self-determination and" Q p territorial sovereignity. The political and military plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were based on the common demoninator.' of keeping China in the war. They were confidently looking; forward-' to their conference" with China and Great Britain, and expected" to obtain a united accord

81. Winston L„ 8 e. Churchill, Closing- the Ring, Vol. V of The Second World War (New York: Bantam Books, Inc.,. 195 177 7 7 2 5 0 7 82.' Lohbeck, p. 211. Sherwood, p.- 773= Smith, p. 91» 46 .on the: .means which, would "be employed'in: realizing: this, objective:* The Americans knew that in the immediate future: the Chinese could only offer a limited contribution to the Allied war effort, but believed-' if provided with the: necessary military assistance they could develop into a formidable opponent of the Japanese0 As a result of this attitude they favored" the adoption of a combined"Allied offensive operation in Southeast Asia directed at opening; up land communications with China through Burma» A successful campaign could be used'to strengthen the Chinese Nationalist Army and create an active second" front in support of the Pacific advances of the United States» This would intensify the pressure on Japan and increase the possibility of an early Allied"victory* Although the interest expressed" in this plan was motiva/ted by the military considerations of accelerating the conclusion of hostilities and securing; Japan5 s unconditional surrender, it possessed added significance, It: was consistent: with Rooseveltes political objectives of building: the: Republic of China into a great world power under Chiang; Kai-shek9 s leadership. An operation designed to exploit China's value to the Allied war effort would, if successful, promote the development of a strong- army and" provide the Generalissimo a base from which he could work for national unification® The President intended to eliminate Japan as an aggressive force and replace her with the Republic of China as a stabilizing power in the Far East* A united and democratic China, oriented toward a strong tradition of Sino-Ameriean friendship would be an invaluable asset in establishing order and maintaining peace in the Orient; therefore, Roosevelt advocated a policy of promoting China as a major world power equal to Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, He believed that the British and Americans should prepare the people of Asia for independence by educating them in the principle of democracy, and regarded China as an influential source of inspiration to the Asian in their pursuit of Self=determination, To bolster China0s morale and strengthen the Generalissimo8s prestige as a world figure, Roosevelt invited Chiang to confer with him and Churchill on the war against Japan at Cairo, Egypt, This would be the first war time meeting among the three men, and the President planned to present America°s views on the Asian War to the Allied leaders for their consideration, since the success of any policy in Southeast Asia required the co-operation of all three nations. proceedings : o f : t h e : c o n f e r e n c e

Ehroute- to North Africa, aboard the U •.£>«.S., Iowa, President: Roosevelt', held two meetings on the 15th and. 19® of. November-with his personal advisers, and the Joint Chiefs' of Staff® 8 T At these meetings the: American delegation, outlined’ a tentative agenda fbr the Allied conference.^ and presented1 their individual views on the relevant: issues of the Asian War® ,5We were prepared said Admiral Leahy, 68to hear British objections to the Burma operation particularly its amphibious phase, but the President seemed determined' that we formulate the best, possible plans to support the nU Chinese war. effort*89 The President told the: staff that he desired a separate conference with the-Generalissimo, prior to any meeting with the Prime Minister® At Roosevelt6 s request the Joint, Staff Planners, submittbd" a list of proposals for* his

8 3 Present at this meeting;.were President" Roosevelt-; Harry Hopkins; Admiral Leahy; General Marshall; Admiral Kingf General Arnold"; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, Naval Aide; to the President; and' Captain Forest B*. Royal, U«.SsN*., Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff® 84® Leahy, p® 198®

48 consideration in planning- for. the conversations with Chiang; Kai-shek* Their recommendations included items pertinent to future, political* as well as present" military objectives* They suggested that the Generalissimo describe the: existing military situation in China* and state his opinion on Russia9 s intervention in the war.against Japan* The American9s should outline the status of the- Pacific War, and emphasize: the> importance:' of China9s assistance to operations in northern Burma* Airba,sesy logistical support, and the: training: and' equipping’ of the Nationalist Forces were also included as important subjects for discussion* The United States should be prepared, they continued, to discuss arrangements for the Chinese occupation of Japan, and the-, establishment: of machinery for the maintenance of postwar security in the- Orient* The fear of a postwar territorial dispute emerging: over Russia9 s desire: for access to the wa.rm w%ter port of" Dairen, Manchuria, and Chiang9 s claim- for Chinese sovereignity over Manchuria was a real possibility* The President; intended" to avert this danger by obtaining: the Generalissimo9s consent to the creation of""free zones” which would assure China9s control over Manchuria, while- providing the-. Russians with free economic: and commercial

85» U.S*, Department of State, The Conferences at. Cairo and Tehran, pp« 145-46, 199® rights of entry into Dairen.' At the: same time he informed" his staff" of Chiang5s: plan for a jointly administered" Russo- 8ino-Arnerican trusteeship of Korea. In reference to America8s strategic planning; in the Pacific Theater, Roosevelt" said" he would only give Chiang a general descrip tion of offensive operations scheduled against Japan, without specifically mentioning any dates. He also believed that China would probably be interested in participating^ with the United"States in the postwar occupation of Japan. Japan would"be reduced to an insular nation, and" Formosa would be returned to China, with the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, China, and possibly the Philippines, the Netherlands, and Chile all participating; in a United"Nations administration of an international trusteeship over the Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean. In referring to a State Department memorandum prepared for him by Under-Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr., the President mentioned" that this would be" t9a very satisfactory solution of the government of ex enemy territory. President Roosevelt acknowledged China's desire- to control the Bonin Islands in the northern Pacific, but did" not elaborate any further on this subject. For the purpose-: of security, the United States planned to occupy only the

86, Ibid., p. 197." 51 strategic1 military and naval installations in the Mandated' group', and definitely- did not' want to administer unilaterally any of the: smaller islands„ Harry Hopkins commented' that in the interests of mutual security the: Generalissimo would'readily furnish the- Americans with temporary base rights to Formosa, upon, their request = 871 During- these conversations General Marshall had the- opportunity to inform the staff about the: military preparations underway for the Burma campaign» The Army had organized"a special infantry brigade comprised of 3,000 American volunteers® They were trained to precede the Chinese forces into the- Burmese jungle: and conduct long- range penetration operations.against the Japanese, He also reported that General Stilwell was not receiving sufficient; reinforcements for his Yunnan Army from the.Generalissimo, and the replacements which were reporting were in poor physical condition,' They not only lacked proper training: and equipment, but many of. them suffered from malnutrition. He' then referred to the fact that 59the British were despondent: 88 regarding the matter of Yunnan forces,” Because of the apparent: antagonism existing; between

8?* Ibid.. pp. 257-59, Harley A, Hotter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparations, 1939-19b^„ U.S. Dept, of State Publication No. 258 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 125. 88. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 258. American equipped Chinese Divisions in Yunnan, China. the British and Chineses and the difficulty of supporting: the Asian Theater via the:: Hump 9 General Marshall believed' “it would be a serious error to clamp down additional United States troops between the-Chineses British, and the Indian troops*”^ However, he mentioned' that 4,000 men were being; sent to India to assist in the: construction of a railroad* and airfields. Marshall observed that the.- subject of" Southeast Asia was not on the proposed agenda for the: President's discussions with Churchill, and said “the Prime: Minister was in favor of operations against Suma.tra , or the Andaman IslandsAdmiral King commented that the British were saying "that without more help from us they can only do the Andaman Islands operation, which' is certainly a case of marking; time."^ In regard' to the problems of Hump traffic. General Arnold" said that due to the employment- of night flying and improved defensive aerial techniques he hoped" to support China with a total of" 10,000 tons of equipment", per month by by the end of" November, 1943; but, he asserted, this increase would require the presence of American forces in China to sustain and protect these operations* It was becoming clear that unless the British and Chinese gave their full co-operation to American plans for strengthening;

89. Ibid.„ 90. Ibid.,. p. 260. 53 the Republic of China, am ambitious effort in Southeast Asia would necessitate a substantial build-up of American combat troops<, The Joint Chiefs were in complete agreement on providing China with military support and were prepared to press the British for an offensive operation in Southeast Asia.9%

Although the President held strong political views regarding America9s support for the Nationalist Government of Chiang Eai-shek, both he and his military chiefs were primarily motivated by the military considerations of achieving a decisive and early victory over the Axis Powers. In endeavoring to realize this objective against fapan, they hoped to open a strong second front in Asia to support their operations in the Pacific. The logistic and personnel requirements of the global war exerted a profound influence on strategic planning, and decisions had to be based on a careful analysis of the existing situation since one mistake in the. allocation of troops and equipment could prove disastrous against a powerful enemy. Consequently, the United States looked to Russia, as well as China, for assistance in Asia. The Americans believed that Russia9s territorial

91e Ibid., p. 257-60. John Ehrman, Grand Strategy August 19^3-8entember 1944, Vol. V of History of the Second World War (London: Her Majesty9s Stationery Office, 1956), p. 162. proximity to a potentially hostile power„ and.her national interest in Asian affairs would eventually cause her intervention in the. war against Japan,. Therefore, they haped" to collaborate with the Soviet Union in developing; airbases in eastern Siberia, The Joint Staff Planners included this subject in their recommendations for the President's conference with Stalin at Tehran, Iran, Roosevelt favored this idea and said" !Sif Germany should"" be cleaned up, we must study how many bombers could be operated from the vicinity of’ Vladivostok» General Arnold informed the President" that the Air Force was formulating a plan under the direction of Major General Follet Bradley, Commanding/ General First Air Force, for the employment of" 100 bombers against the Japanese home islands from airfields in Siberia, The General was anxious to initiate tactical bombing;operations from as many positions as practicable, and was interested in acquiring. Russia's co-operation, America's consideration for the value of the Soviet Union's role in the Asian War was an expedient designed to exploit as many opportunities as possible in accelerating; Japan's defeat, Russia's passive intervention would provide the.United States with invaluable military installations, and her active participation would help build the Asian Theater into a formidable front, China was a belligerent: and

92, U«.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p, 258, . 55 provided the only- alternative in building; an effective base of operations on the continent, and Russia could be an important asset in supplementing China9s role. The inherent" significance of Russia6 s co-operation against Japan existed in the fact that if the Republic of China dropped out of the war or failed to produce - a strong, army, the active participation of the Soviet Union would assure the United States the support of a formidable combat front in Asia, 93 In the course of these preliminary meetings. President Roosevelt gave his chiefs a clear and concise impression of his views on America6s Asian policies. Advance knowledge of the direction of the President9s thinking, and the opportunity to express their individual opinions on the situation in Asia provided the staff with a common purpose in facilitating'a united stand on the proposals they planned to present to their allies at Cairo, The Americans were concerned"with the postwar political problems and the current military conditions in the Orient, and incorporated both aspects into their preparations for the conference. They intended to eliminate Japan as a threat to postwar peace and security in Asia, and

93e Ibid,. pp» 157, 238-39* 24?, 258, Arnold, p. 148. Deane, p, 225. Hull, p. 1339® Leahy, p. 148. W*D« Puleston, "Blunders of World War II," U.S. News and World Report._Vol. XXXVIII (February 4, 1955), p. 1?. John L . ” Snell, Illusion and Necessitys The Diplomacy of GlobaT War, 1939-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^3)» p. 193. replace her with a strong and friendly China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek„ Their primary military objective was directed at breaking the Japanese blockade and gaining direct access to China to promote- the- development of a strong and active Asian Theater. Now, all that remained was securing the co-operation of Great Britain and" China to Oil' effectively implement the means of achieving' these goals.

Initial Sessions The British and" Chinese delegations were already present when the United States party arrived at Cairo on the morning of Monday, November 22; and" as the: Americans prepared' for their- first meeting Admiral Leahy predicted" Ma busy and probably controversial conference.”^ Prime Minister Churchill and his staff were chagrined over the- appearance of the. Generalissimo1 s entourage: for they had" wanted to discuss European strategy with the Americans prior to their talks with the Russians and Chinese. The Prime Minister had intended to hold a preliminary Anglo-American meeting: on the island" of Malta before proceeding to Cairo, but Roosevelt-disagreed and told Churchill it would i5be simpler in every wa.y for the: Combined" Chiefs and Planners to meet in: Cairo...^Therefore I think I should ask Chiang; to

9^. Matloff, p. 338. Sherwood, p. 9^8. 95» Leahy, p. 198. 57 get to Cairo "by the 22cUi?'^ Since" Russia was not at war against Japan» the President', preferred to defer European matters until the Tehran Conference. Chiang Kai-shek's a.dama.nce in seeing Roosevelt and Churchill before they saw Stalin precluded an earlier meeting with the; Soviet Union* and"the President's determination to reach a conclusive; decision on China's status in the Asian War predetermined that Asian affairs would dominate the discussions at Cairo. Thus, to Churchill'S" dismay: "All hope of persuading Chiang;;. and his wife to go and see the Pyramids and enjoy themselves til we returned from Tehran fell to the ground, with the; result that Chinese business occupied first instead of last place at Cairo*85^ An example of British sentiment- toward, the Chinese was reflected"in the personal observations of General Sir Alan Brooke» Chief of the-British Imperial General Staff* who described' the. Generalissimo as "a cross between a pine- martin and a ferret. A shrewd", foxy sort of face. Evidently with no grasp of war in its larger aspects, but determined to get the best of all bargains." Madame Chiang Kai-shek impressed" Brooke as "a study in herself; a, queer character

96. U.S. 9 Department of State*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 67. Roosevelt wanted to avoid any suspicion that he and Churchill were "ganging, up" on Stalin with a pre-arranged plan. 97. Churchill, p..279. 58 in which sex. and politics seemed to predominate, both being; used" t'o achieve hen endsThe representatives of Great Britain had expected to participate solely with the American delegation in considering: the plans for Overlord", the. Allied invasion of'" Northwest Europe in the Spring of 1944, and discuss its relationship to future operations in the Mediterranean Sea.. Now, with the presence of the Chinese these intentions were drastically altered when the conference was about to convene much to the dissatisfaction of' the British. The Americans were extremely anxious to achieve a firm agreement- on the time and place to Initiate a direct invasion of Europe, but they opposed any attempt to delay the. Overlord operation in lieu of peripheral offensives in" the eastern Mediterranean. Both nations wanted" to undertake Overlord, but they disagreed" on the timing of the operation and the objectives of secondary campaigns. The British, and particularly the Prime Minister, advocated a strategy of' attrition against Germany and believed the safest means of assuring a swift and successful assault on Nazi Europe was to weaken gradually her defenses through strategic bombing

98. Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1959)', P« 51« 99» Ibid.. p. 50. Churchill, p. 279* -Ehrman, pp. 157-58. Peis, Churchill, Roosevelt. Stalin, p. 24?. Hastings Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay (New York: The Viking.Press, i960), p. 334. 59 and flanking, attacks» Therefore, they stressed an operation in the Balkans which would have tied"up additional German troops, but would" have delayed the eventual date for Overlord. The Americans, however, were anxious to initiate the direct invasion of Europe and wanted to schedule this operation for the earliest possible date. They opposed" any suggestion which might postpone the: execution of Overlord, and emphatically rejected any attempt of getting involved in the politically volatile affairs, and mountaneous terrain of" southeastern Europe.' General Marshall considered" an Allied" offensive in the Balkans as military dangerous for it would materially prolong hostilities, and specifically lengthen the Pacific War. The Americans intended to transfer their- combat forces from Europe to the Pacific as soon as Germany was defeated; consequently, decisions on strategy against J Germany directly affected the war against Japan.- The United States wa,s preparing a full-scale commitment in men and material for the invasion of western Europe and planned' to obtain Russia6 s support in opening: up a second major front against Germany. Therefore, they preferred to defer European matters until the Tehran Conference. If the British insisted on a Balkan campaign and attempted to 96 6 ditch6 Overlord," General Marshall said he was prepared to inform them that the Americans would" "pull out and go into the Pacific with all our forces.""100

100. U.S.,, Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 259• 60 President Roosevelt: and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarded China6s assistance-against Japan as an important factor in their strategy in the Pacific, and favored" a campaign in Southeast Asia which would strengthen China6s war effort, Churchill, however, did not share Roosevelt6s faith in the potential value of the Republic of China, Although he repognized" the Generalissimo6s staunch resistance to Japanese aggression, the Prime Minister doubted Chiang6s ability to mount an offensive operation and was satisfied to keep China in the war merely 66as a sponge to soak up Japanese resources»9611 " 01 He believed the tremendous reservoir of Chinese manpower should be kept' in the war,.and accepted the idea that a direct supply route in northern Burma would sustain China6s morale, "but it is apparent" that he did this out of deference to Roosevelt6s sentiments - or, perhaps, he thought of them as whims - and not from any profound convictions of his own,661 02 British strategy in the Asian War was based on sea power and directed at the re-conquest of their colonies in Burma and Malaya, Their military policies were predicated on the principle that Japan could be defeated through the strangulation of a naval blockade. They considered Singapore and Hong Kong; as essential objectives in their campaign to

101, Ehrman, p.' 125. 102, Sherwood, p. 773» 61 re-establish Imperial prestige in the Orient'; The Chinese mainland'was strategically unimportant and it was clear that Great Britain8s interest in Burma, lay to the south and" Singapore, and not to the east toward Chungking. The United" States was in Southeast Asia to assist China and pursue the best course in achieving* the earliest possible victory over Japan. They were not there to promote British, or any other form of imperialism. So long as the British were not pressed to support actively Chlang Kai-shek8s regime they were- willing to give tacit approval to American's Asian policies, but now the- United States planned" to ask Great Britain to assume a dominant foie in the- execution of a major military operation in Southeast Asia, whose objectives were contrary to their own strategic goal's. This offensive would also conflict with Churchill8s plans for a campaign in the Balkans by competing for. the precious resources of men and 1 01 equipment." v Prior to their first conference with the British, John G. Wlnant, United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom, had informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the: Prime,Minister6s desire for a campaign in the eastern Mediterranean, and expressed his opinion that the ^British had no intention of diverting the means available for action

103. Bryant, p. 50. Churchill, pp. 279-80. Ehrman, pp. 125-29. Sherwood, p. 773• 62 in: Burma The first meeting of the Combined' Chiefs of Staff was scheduled for 3:00 p.m* on. November 22. This initial planning; session was devoted to preparing an agenda for the proceedings of the conference, and discussing China®s role in the Allied war effort against Japan.: In an atmosphere of" harmony and co-operation the British delegation recommended that the item of Southeast Asia be considered" immediately in order to expedite- the issues of the Far East. They had" accepted the fact that Chinese business was going to consume a major portion of" the conference-, and Sir Alan Brooke was anxious to deal with it as early as possible so the strategists 55could turn to operations in Europe: in order that if possible they should"have fully considered these before meeting the U.S.SIB., representatives®,58"*"1^ The Americans concurred with this proposal and General Marshall suggested that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Admiral Mount bat ten be invited" to the next Combined" Chiefs of Staff meeting to present their views on the situation in the Orient. Then he read a statement written by Genera,! Stilwell describing-ther Generalissimo?s attitude on China8 s position in the Asian War. The memorandum contained a general outline of the policies which were currently underway in China, and

104. UeJS.a 8l Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 302. 105. Ibid.. p. 305- the. projected operations which were being; planned to support the war in. the Pacific* The significant feature of this paper; was Chiang8 s pronounced interest in improving; the combat effectiveness of his army, and" the ambitious intention to employ hi's forces energetically against the Japanese, Based on the: proposals Stilwell had prepared'for the Generalissimo9s view in his conversations with Roosevelt and Churchill, it called for a land campaign in northern Burma and eventual operations to recapture Canton and Hong Kong,, with three American infantry divisions to assist in an offensive operation against Shanghai. As soon as land" communications were established with China most of the American troops in India would be transferred to the Asian Theater. Tactical bombing operations could commence from Chinese airbases by early 19^1, and additional air support could be provided for Allied operations in the vicinity of the South China Sea*' Marshall and King were extremely pleased with the contents of this memorandum and asked the British Chiefs to study it for consideration at their next meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff„J'<^ General Marshall also suggested that the Combined Chiefs should consider the possibility of including; a Chinese military representative in their deliberations. He stated that Chiang had intimated he would appreciate an

106. Ibid.pp. 30^-05, 370-71« Romanus, p. 6l. 64 invitation- for his nation to be represented' in this council* and believed' it would ’’facilitate the development' of good faith- and mutual understanding....65*,107 In the ensuing, discussion on this proposal Admiral King predicted it might lead to the development of a four-power body including the Soviet Union as well as the Republic of China, and it was obvious they could not ’’sit at the same table, since they 1 OP were not engaging the same enemies.63" The British were reluctant to accept either the Russians or Chinese as permanent' members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and suggested they should be asked'to attend” only the meetings which affected their particular areas of operation. This was accepted as the best course of action pending further consideration on the matter. Prior to adjournment" the Combined” Chief's adopted the following agenda: 561. Reaffirm Over-All Objective, Over-All Strategic Concept' and Basic Undertakings| II. Southeast Asia Operations; III. ’Overlord” and the Mediterranean; IW. The War Against Japan; V. Progress Reports.”"1"^ On Tuesday, November 23 the first plenary meeting of the conference was convened"in President Roosevelt”s villa. It was held for the purpose of Informing the Chinese of the

107. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 306= 108. King, p. 509= 109. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 306-07. proposed1- operations for the 19W campaign in Southeast Asi'a^ and hearing; Mountbatt en$ s plans for the Burma offensives Anglo-American strategy was normally formulated by the Combined- Chiefs of Staff in consultation with' the affected1" Theater Commanders „ then presented to the' President' and Prime Minister for official sanction and adoption. In this instance, however, the standard operating'proceedure was reversed. Because of their: desire to bring the: Generalissimo Immediately into the discussions, Roosevelt and Churchill wanted Chiang; Kai-shek' to comment' on the plans for Southeast Asia before: the Combined" Chiefs had the: opportunity to consider them* This gave him the opportunity to approve: the: operation before it was agreed" upon by the Allies, 110 As chairman of the meeting, Roosevelt' welcomed the Chinese delegation to the conference, and asked- Mountbatten to present" his recommendations for the land campaign in northern Burma, The Admiral then proceeded to give a broad survey of the joint Anglo-Sino-Arnerican operation for South east Asia, An. initial assault by Commonwealth troops from India and West Africa would commence in mid.-January, 1944 against the. Arakan front' in Northwest Burma for the purpose of improving, their position in that area. At the same time the 4th: British Indian Corps would open a drive from Imphal,. India to the southeast with the objective of capturing:

110. Churchill, p., 283» Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell*s Command. Problems-., p .1 62. Minthami» Mawlaik, and Sittaung- in Burma advancing as far into the interior as possible. In February Long Hange Penetration Groups would Undertake commando operations behind' the enemies8 lines to support the two British advances in the northwest9 and the Chinese Yunnan Army in the northeast. The 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions would" push.south from Ledo to Bhamo where they would link up with the. Yunnan Force for a united drive on the Japanese strong hold at Lashio in north-central Burma, The 5th Indian Parachute Brigade would be trained for an airdrop into Indaw to seize its strategic airfield', and in mid-March the 26th Indian Division would be flown in to secure and hold this objective. Admiral Mountbatten intended to offset the terrain difficulties of the Burmese mountains and jungles by employing.large scale air supply, A total of approximately 320,000 Allied troops, as opposed" to six Japanese infantry divisions, were scheduled to participate in the Champion operation. They would discharge the most ambitious effort ever contemplated for this theater of the war, and would have a decided advantage of superior manpower, Churchill said he "had high hopes of these operations, the success of which depended on suprise and secrecy and ignorance on the part of the enemy as to the lines of approach and the- points of attack

111., U.S.,, Department of State,, The Conference at Cairo and Tehran, p. 313• 67 Although' the Admiral did not comment on naval operations in the Bay of Bengal, the Prime Minister• mentioned" that elements of the surrendured" Italian Fleet would" augment the British Fleet in the Indian Ocean» This would" establish a formidable naval force comprised of five capital ships* four heavy, cruisers * and twelve auxiliary carriers which he hoped to have operational by the Summer of 1944* The British also planned to develop an "amphibious- 'circus*" in conjunction with the: naval program for the purpose of exploiting future military, success in Southeast' : Asia, and establishing: Allied supremacy in the Bay of Bengal. At the conclusion of Admiral Mountbatten*s presentation, the Prime Minister and" the Generalissimo became involved in a discussion about the plan. Chiang doubted it would"be successful unless the land campaign was co-ordinated with a simultaneous amphibious operation off the coast of Burma. Southeast Asia was a vital bastion in the defensive perimeter of the Japanese Empire, and the enemy would tenaciously fight to maintain his position in Burma. He believed' that once: the Japanese were driven out" of" this area their next stand would be in North China, and finally in Manchuria. Therefore, the Allies should take every measure necessary in assuring, victory. His greatest

112. Ibida. p. 314. Churchill* p. 284. concern was over the possibility of enemy reinforcements reaching' Burma via, the sea* Chiang insisted, that this could." be avoided by a vigorous amphibious operation in the Bay of” Bengal, which would cut" across the: Japanese supply lines in Rangoon, and seriously threaten their communication system in central Burma = Churchill, however, disagreed with this view. The Japanese were not dependent on the port of Rangoon for supplies and reinforcements since they had" recently constructed" a railroad from Bangkok to Thanbyuzayat in western Siam. This land route" was their primary avenue of logistical support for their troops in northern Burma,. The Prime Minister was convinced that Great Britain®s naval superiority in the Indian Ocean would, prevent the enemy from sending a military expedition to Rangoon through the Stra.its of Malacca,. He further contended that an amphibious operation would.have no decisive affect on the outcome of" a land campaign taking place over "2,000 miles" away in the north. Despite his opposition to an amphibious assault somewhere in the Bay of Bengal, he "wished" to emphasize the great importance he attached to the operations in Southeast Asia, which would be driven forward" with all vigor and dispatch. The debate over the relative value of a co-ordinated" land.-sea, campaign in Southeast Asia set the

113. U..S#, Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and. Tehran, p . 315» tone for future discussions on the strategy of the Southeast Asia Command', Since the British and Chinese were going to furnish the bulk of the manpower necessary for the Champion plan, it was apparent' that they would have to agree on the strategic concept of the campaign in order to facilitate a successful.operation..' In light of this circumstance the United States, would assume the role of moderator in attempting to reconcile the divergent opinions of Churchill and' Chiang Kai-shek.

Military and Political Discussions After the adjournment of the plenary session the Combined Chiefs of Staff invited the" Chinese generals to express their views on Champion at the afternoon meeting' of the Anglo-American council. Prior to the.meeting, however, Chiang informed General Stilwell that he would not attend the discussions and that he did not want any Chinese proposals submitted to the Combined Chiefs until he had an opportunity to confer with President Roosevelt and General

4 -j if Marshall." At the meeting Marshall advised his military colleagues to give thorough and sympathetic- consideration to Chiang®s plan for the Burma operation. He was encouraged by the Generalissimo's active interest in improving and

114. Ibid. ,, pp. 312-15. Leahy, p. 200. Matloff, pp. 3^8-49, Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 62-63. 115. Stilwell, p. 245. employing, his ground forcesg and believed the Republic of China would provide an invaluable contribution to the ultimate victory over the Japanese in Southeast Asla„ The

American Chief of Staff, said he “personally had confidence in the value of Chinese troops provided they were properly led, A116

In continuation of their previous conference on the matter'of China8s role In the over-all strategy against Japan, Sir Alan Brooke recommended that the Allies adopt the following proposals; (l) China8s military assistance in Southeast Asia; (2) promote and support the development of a strong nationalist Army; (3) open up a land route through northern Burma for the logistical .support of China; and (4) initiate tactical boiabing operations against the Japanese

“inner zone11 from bases in China by the Spring of 19^4

Admiral Leahy concurred with Brioke8s suggestion and added that their decision on the military offensives which Chiang

envisioned against Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai, and Formosa would have to be deferred pending the outcome of future

events in the global war. The Combined Chiefs believed that logistical considerations prevented them from accepting any future military commitments in Asia until the immediate

ll6, tJ,So, Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p, 317° 11?o The “Inner zone“ included the Japanese home islands, Manchuria, Korea, lorth China, Japanese Sakhalin, and Formosa, 71 objective of establishing a strong base of operations in China, was accomplished'. Therefore, they agreed to accept the recommendations of Brooke and Leahy, and incorporate into the formulation of Asian strategy only those proposals of" the Generalissimo which called" for action in the immediate future. The Anglo-American staff did not want to exceed" the prevailing concept' of China*s role in the war against Japan. In the perspective of the manpower and material demands of the European and Pacific Theaters, the Allies intended" to temporize their operations in Asia to the current goal of strengthening the military power of the Republic of China. Future offensive action on the Chinese mainland"would' require further examination dependent upon the.success of their present strategy, and" the support and response demonstrated for it by the Nationalist Government„118 Since the Americans had informed the British that they could not provide sufficient' support for a major seaborne assault on Suma.tra in the Netherlands East Indies, the discussion turned to a smaller operation in the Bay of Bengal. Stilwell believed Chiang would be satisfied if the Allies could provide naval security in the Indian Ocean, but Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Chief of the British Naval

118. Morton, .p. 673- U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 317-19» 779-81. Staff, said that '’we should have general control of the Bay of Bengal but he could not absolutely guarantee its complete security.8,-11 1 Q' ■The Generalissimo, according to Mountbatten, wanted" more than just naval security* He desired an amphibious operation synchronized with the land campaign in northern Burma to establish an alrbase for harassing'the Japanese' supply lines from Rangoon and Bangkok to North Burma, The Andaman- Islands provided an excellent strategic advantage in achieving this objective, with the additional result of containing large numbers of" Japanese aircraft in South Burma, Mountbatten stated he could launch Operation Buccaneer almost simultaneously with Operation Champion with the forces presently under his command. In formulating the campaign for Southeast Asia, the Admiral said the "Burma, operations and Buccaneer each had' a considerable effect on jPQ the other and had been planned" and considered together," The Combined Chiefs agreed to consider Buccaneer, but suspended their final judgement on adoption until they had more time to study its relation to prospective operations in

_ 1 91 'Europe and the Pacific,"

119» U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 318. 120. Ibid., p. 320, 121 o Ibid,,, pp. 318-20. Arnold, p. 461. Leighton, pp. 193~91l'« 73 As the Allies drew closer together in co-ordinating. their strategy against the Axis Powers, the United States wanted to establish the necessary deliberative machinery for discussions on future military and political problems which might arise during the course of the ware General Marshall and Admiral King also hoped to avoid a direct confrontation with the Chinese over the issue of their participation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, while endeavoring to maintain the exclusive nature of the Anglo-American council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a memorandum for the creation of the United Chiefs of Staff comprised' of one military representative from each of the four major Allied" Powers; Great Britain, China, Russia, and the United'States*. This organization would provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union and the Republic of China to express their military and political views with the two western powers„ The United'Chiefs would meet only when the situation demanded it, while the Combined Chiefs would continue to function, as the united body for joint Anglo-American military decisions.1?2 The British opposed this idea because they did not want any superior staff ruling on the proceedings of the Combined Chiefs„ They believed the existing structure of

122, U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 320. 74 military collaboration was satisfactory, and the Chinese and Russians could always be invited to participate in discussions which concerned them. General Ismay doubted” the Soviet Union would be willing to risk provoking Japan by sitting at a military council with China, He also questioned the amount of free choice and latitude the Chinese and Russian delegates would have in committing their respective governments to an agreed upon course of action* This would drastically curtail the decision making.power of the staff 1 23 and relegate it to an impotent debating group.“ After studying this matter the Combined Chiefs agreed not to establish the United .Chief's of Staff, or take the initiative in suggesting the creation of a four power military council to either of their two Allies. If the issue was broached by the Chinese or Russians, it would be explained to them that the Combined Chiefs of Staff was the primary agency through which the British and Americans co ordinated their global war effort. They would also be advised" that they could participate in any military discussion which directly affected their specific area of operations,1 zh Led by General Shang Chen, Chief of the Chinese National Military Council, and Major General Claire L,

123. Shrman, p. 335» Ismay, p. 167» 124. Bryant, p. 55« 75 Chennault., Commanding General of the United States Fourteenth Air Force, the Chinese delegation entered the meeting. General Brooke, who was acting chairman, welcomed" them and asked for their views on the Burma campaign; but:, presumably under instructions from the Generalissimo they declined to make any comments or recommendations on Operation Champion. Confronted" by their silence, Brooke became quite perturbed and suggested they return after they had sufficient time to consider the plan for the next meeting. This ”ghastly waste of time” convinced the British Chief of Staff s’that there was little to be hoped" for from Chiang5s China.68 General Stilwell acknowledged this 88Terrible performance,88 and attempted to assist the Chinese by describing, the preparations which were currently being; ma.de 1 26 to conduct their part of the offensive. The X-Force was ready to attack from Ledo, and the Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions were already advancing, into the Hukawng Valley along the Ledo Road in North Burma.""' The Yunnan Force was being strengthened with the addition of 89,000 replacements, and would be prepared to operate from Paoshan, China by

125. Ibid. 126. Stilwell, p. 245. 127. The X-Force was the Chinese Army in India, The men were trained at Ramgarh, India under American supervision. January, 19^'» General Chennault informed the Combined' Chiefs that arrangements were underway to provide air support for the land campaign. He also added that the Chinese Air Force and the Fourteenth Air Force would require a total of 10,000 tons of supplies per month via the Hump to sustain these operations. This was an astronomical figure in light of the fact that the air supply route was currently strained to the limit of its capacity by flying 8 ,200'tons per month into China for both the Army and Air Force, It became apparent that the matter of Hump tonnage was about to join the issue of an amphibious operation as the major problems confronting agreement on the Southeast Asia 1 28 campaign." While the controversy over the requirements for Operation Champion was still in the incipient stage of development. President Roosevelt and Chiang. Eal-shek entered into discussions on the subject of China®s future. Although the United States and Great Britain had .voluntarily relinquished their extraterritorial rights in China, the Generalissimo feared the British might resume their imperialist policies in Canton and Shanghai after the war. He therefore endeavored to receive Roosevelt6 s support in

128. Arnold, p. k6t, Bryant, pp. 5^-55» King, p.: 511 • Leahy, p. 200» Mi Ills, p. 212. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwellbs Command Problems', p. 57• Stilwell, p» 245. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 321-23, 344. preventing, the British from re-establishing themselves in China, and particularly Hong Kong, The President realized it would'not-be an easy matter to persuade Churchill to return a colony which the British had' possessed’ for over a century, yet he recognized" the importance of this issue in relation to the postwar stability,of the Par East, He believed that "no Par Eastern readjustment" could'be stable or lasting unless China got back not only the territory Japan had seized, but" also the land taken from her in preceding generations by other foreign powers, including.Hong Kong*8 9 It would also be inconsistent with China.6 s position as a world leader to have several of her major cities under the direct commercial domination of a foreign power. This, indeed, was a difficult problem for it directly confronted the divergent political interests of America9 s Allies in the Orient , and posed an inherent • threat to the maintenance of harmonious Anglo-American-Sino 1 30 relations, It was Roosevelt9 s plan to convince Churchill that immediately after the war the British should make a "beau geste" and announce the return of Hong Kong to China for the

129, Welles, p. 152. 130. Roosevelt* As He Saw It, pp„ 164, 180. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 323$ 372. sake of fidelity to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, 1 31 After the Nationalist Government acquired Hong Kong Chiang would declare it, and the Manchurian city of Dairen, as free ports open to the commerce of all nations on a basis of economic equality ”without customs 1 02 examinations*”'''^ In return for this support the President- emphasized that Chiang must establish a democratic govern ment including the Chinese Communists ”while the war was still being fought,” and’" that national elections would be conducted 88as soon as possible after the war had been won*”'^"^ He expressed his dissatisfaction about the undemocratic character of the Nationalist regime, and the fact that thousands of Chiang9 s best troops were stationed' 1 3< along the northwest border with Red China. In essence, Roosevelt intended to achieve the dual objectives of a democratic and unified" nation as payment' for America,9 s effort in working for the return of Hong; Kong to China. The Generalissimo agreed to this proposal on the condition that the Soviet Union would recognize Chinese sovereignity over Manchuria, and respect China,9s equality in

131. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and'Tehran, p. 88?. 132. Stidwell, p. 252. 133. Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 164. 134. Ibid., p. 180 135* Ibid-.pp. 164-65$ 204. Sherwood, p. 792. 79 Outer Mongolia. Chians also wanted" Roosevelte s assurance that at the end of the war no British warshipsand only American military vessels, would sail into Chinese port's, The President, gave the-Generalissimo hi's 15personal promise6’ that the. United States would honor- this request, and informed" him,that the matter of’"China’s territorial integrity in:northeastern Asia was on the agenda fbr his discussions with Stsdiir at T e h r a n ^ ^ On the subject of Japanese war settlements",: Roosevelt- and Chiang: expressed their mutual determination ; to fight-until the objective of Japan’s unconditional . surrender was achieved! They agreed' that in the interest of'" Asian peace and security the Japanese Empire would be dissolved' and Japan stripped" of her military capacity- to wage offensive warfare-. Reparations would be paid to China in: the form of ”actual properties” consisting, of railway/ equipment, industrial machinery, and military and'merchant ' ships. All the territory which Japan had forcible a.cquired" from, the Chinese since the nineteenth century would be — --— -r-.... - •••■ . 136, Wiliam Hardy McNei11!! American Britain and" Russia: Their Co-operation, and Conflict! 1991-1946!. Vbl! Ill of" The. War-Time: Series' fbr: 1 9 3 9 - ^ 6 Survey of International . Affairs, ed, Arnold;Jl Toynbee (ll vols,,; London: Oxford!. University Press, 1951-1957), pi 3^7* Hbllihgton:KT,,. Tong! Chianp; Kai-shek (:Taipei!, China: China Publishing Company$, 19531 !■ pl’ 3091' ■ 'Uj».SDepartment of State, United States Relations With China: With Special R’efrerence .to the Period"" 19^9-19^-9. (Washington: U,.SI, Government Printing Office',.. W 9 ) l Pi- 55.81' returned to the Republic of China, and all her possessions in the Pacific Ocean which she had seized since the First World War would be taken over by a United'Nations trusteeship. China would receive Manchuria, including Port Arthur and Dairen, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, and China*s. four northeastern provinces of Anhwei, Hopeh, Kiangsu, and Shantung. Independence would be granted' to Korea after a period of tutelage in self-government and an evolutionary transition to national sovereignity. Although Roosevelt felt that China should assume a major role in the military occupation of Japan, Chiang candidly stated that his government Mwas not equipped to shoulder this considerable responsibility*,83"*"-^ He preferred that the United States exercise her leadership in this task, while China would provide limited assistance according to the needs of the existing situation. The Generalissimo also believed"that any decision on the future status of the Japanese Imperial House should be solely determined' by the Japanese people. 118J

137. U.S.., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 323* 138. Ibid. p p . 323-25, 864, 869. Louise Hblborn (ed.), War and Peace Aims of the United Nations, Vol. II . (Hostoni World Peace Foundation, 19487",• pp. 833“34. PICA Jones, The Far East During the Mar, Vol. VII of The War-Time Series for 1939-46i Survey of International Affairs, ed. Arnold J *, Toynbee (11 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1951-1957), P* 115. U.S., Department of State, Korea*s Indeuendence, U,,SDept. of State Publication No. 2933 (Washington: U«,S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 1. 81 In. the course of these conversations, Roosevelt:, outlined his solution to the question, of colonialism in Southeast Asia® The President repeatedly: emphasized" his conviction that France should not be permitted to reclaim her domination over Indo-China, He was willing to concede a trusteeship to the French for the purpose of preparing; the people for eventual independence; but maintained that their administration should be directly responsible to a United Nations organization® Ideally,., however, he: believed that Indb-China should" be dealt with in the same manner as Korea, i".e., an international trusteeship for a period of 25 to 30 years® Roosevelt was adamantly opposed" to French imperialism end stated 58that after 100 years of French rule . in. Indochina, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been before®83"1^^ He believed" that Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands should follow .America0s example in the Philippine Islands and educate their colonial people in the responsibilities of democratic self-government for eventual independence® Chiang regarded the trusteeship principle as an “ideal arrangement” and expressed his unqualified support for the President0 s ^proposal„ The Generalissimo also remarked that he “had no designs on French Indo-China and the Chinese did not want that country united with theirs because its people and the country as a whole were

139« U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran® p. 48$® 82 completely, different from their own.s,x^ The two Allied" leaders agreed to work together in achieving independence for Indo-China, and expressed their mutual intention to• restore Thailand®s national sovereignity at the end of the

China's acute financial condition was another subject which entered into their discussions« The Generalissimo considered his nation's economic situation as more critical than her need for military security* It was becoming increasingly "difficult for the Nationalist Government to collect taxes or borrow money from the people because of their growing dissolusionment in the stability of the yuan, the basic monetary unit. To assure themselves of an adequate supply of money the Chinese Treasury pursued"an inflationary policy by issuing 3*5 billion yuan per month, ■which was approximately twice as much as the monthly rate of 194-1. This resulted in the basic devaluation of the yuan from an official exchange rate with the American dollar of" *5 :1.00 to an open market rate of .1 :1 *00, and in terms of 1 Lip gold’ it was .03 si .00." In order to promote the value of his currency and to

140. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (New York: Doubleday and Company, 194-91, p. 237. 14-1. Roosevelt, As He Saw It. pp. 155, 165. Sherwood, p. 777• Stilwell, p. 253* 14-2, U.S., Department of State, United States Relations With China, p. 488. strengthen China’s economy, the Generalissimo requested' a one billion dollar loan from the United States Government, Roosevelt» however, replied that it would be difficult to obtain congressional authorization for the transaction of this sum of money, and suggested a counter offer. He proposed"to buy 50 or 100 million dollars worth of ”Chinese paper dollars on the black market," and hold these notes until the exchange rate declined, then sell them back to the Nationalist Government for the seme price the-American Treasury paid for them. In this manner the President hoped to encourage Chinese confidence in their own currency, Although Henry Morgenthau Jr..,. Secretary of the United States Treasury, agreed that Roosevelt’s plan would" aleviate the onerous affects of inflation, he and Clarence E. Gauss, American Ambassador to the Republic of China, believed that it did not attack the primary source of the problem. They maintained'that inflation was caused by the great disparity between production for war material and essential items of civilian consumption. As long as China remained isolated from the rest of the world this condition would continue to exist. The only way to improve her economy was to get more goods into China. This was directly dependent" on opening,., up land" communications through northern Burma, which, according to Gauss could only be achieved "by 84 successful military operations on an extensive scale Thus s Mountbatten8 s Champion operation assumed added' significance as the means of strengthening. China8s economic as well as military position in the war against Japan® While he was at Cairo the President outlined' the prospect of a bright future for the Republic of China as one of the 58Big Four” powers of the world. It was his belief', to which Chiang readily concurred, that China should assume an equal position with the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States as one of the 81 Four Policemen55 of the international community responsible for handling any emergency threat to world peace and security. Roosevelt informed Chiang.about his postwar plan for the establishment of an international “peace-keeping88 organization devoted to the prevention of war, and Chine,8s assigned" place on the Executive Council as the dominant Asian Power equal in stature to the three Western States. The United Nations would provide the necessary machinery to organize world opinion for concerted action against any form of aggression,

144. U.S., Department of State, United States Relations With China. p.. 491. 145. Ibid.,. , pp. 488-489® U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 804, 845, 86l. U.S.,. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: China 1943 (Washington: U.S* Government Printing Office, 1957)» pp. 179, 181. ) '

85 and’ the "Big Four” would comprise the nucleus of this international body„ Here, the Generalissimo was presented" with the vision of a glorious future for his country. The Republic of China would not only receive all the territory "stolen” from her by Japanese conquest, she would also replace Japan, as the dominant" Oriental nation, and enter the postwar world as a respected global power, ■^° It now remained for the course of future events to determine whether: the Allies could agree on the military strategy required to realize the military and political potential of” China,

146^ Peis, The China Tangle, p. 111» Peis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 253• Samuel I. Rosenman, Victory and the Threshold of Peace: 1944-1945 Volume, Vol. XIII of’ The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt CTTvolsNew York: Harper and Brothers, 1938- 1950), pp. 140-42. RESULTS OP THE CONFEREMCE

Harmony and Discord On November 249 the problem of shortages in landing; eraft was formally introduced by Churchill to Roosevelt and the. Combined Chiefs of Staff = The Prime Minister called for

greater flexibility in the distribution of these vital

vessels to provide the opportunity for increasing the

number of amphibious operations which could be initiated

against Nazi Europe„ Although stressing; his zeal for Overlord, he said wit should not be such a tyrant as to rule out every other activity in the lediterraneano'*^'^ Since the British

lacked sufficient equipment for the invasion of northern Sumatra, and the Americans could not provide adequate

support for the major amphibious...a,ssault in the Bay' of

Bengal, Operation Culverin, he proposed the return of all

landing craft from Southeast Asia to the Mediterranean for 4 H Q an operation in the Aegean Sea,- It was his intention to

forget about an immediate water-borne assault in Southeast

Asia and concentrate all available resources against

147, U,S», Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p, 333® -

148, Culverin was the code name for the invasion of northern Sumatra, Germany* Churchill wanted/to attack the island, of. Rhodes in the eastern Mediterranean, and.’ advocated a program directed' at securing, a b6.se of operations for an eventual invasion of” the Balkan Peninsula* Successful action in this area could be exploited' by opening, the Dardanelles for Allied shipping; to Russia, and encouraging partisan forces in southeastern Europe to' accelerate their efforts against the Germans* Overlord9 s demands for landing craft would restrict other operations; therefore if they planned to Invade northwestern Europe in the spring, the Allies would only have enough amphibious equipment for either an assault in the Mediterranean or the Bay of Bengal, but not both simultaneously * The Prime Minister believed the surest way to guarantee the success of' Overlord was to weaken Germany9 s defenses by peripheral action in southern Europe* Consequently, he argued for the postponement of Culverln and Buccaneer in favor of extending Allied operations•in the Mediterranean* In summary, he called for an over-all plan directed at capturing Rome, Italy in January, Rhodes in February and intensifying assistance to Josip Bros Tito and his Yugoslav National Army of Liberation; then the; spring Invasion of northern Europe* The Prime Minister preferred to defer a major campaign against Japan until their primary enemy, Nazi 88 Germany.g was defeated. The Chinese view on the -Southeast Asian campaign was formally presented’ at the afternoon meeting of the Combined' Chiefs of Staff on November 24® They not only continued to adhere to their original request for a naval assault off the coast of Burma, but also introduced’ a critical assessment of the land campaign. General Marshall, who earlier in the day had attended a luncheon meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, informed'his military colleagues that the Generalissimo opposed Champion in its existing form. The Chinese leader felt that if' the plan was executed, as it was written, it : would entail a risk of heavy casualities and the grave t possibility of defeat. He insisted on the adoption of two strategic points before he would give his consent to the operation. First', the Allies must initiate a co-ordinated land and sea campaign, and suggested an amphibious assault" 85against the Andaman ■ Islands ' Second', the plan should be revised to incorporate the capture of Mandalay as the initial stage of the ultimate objective of securing all of Burma including Rangoon. Marshall emphasized the General issimo 9 s,extreme concern for an amphibious operation in the

1^9• Churchill, p. 295« Ehrman, p. 166. Leighton, p. 19^. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 330-33$ ^09-11. 150. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran. p. 338, 89 Bay of Bengal, and stated his '"fear with regard to the present' plan was that it would enable the Japanese "to attack and'defeat in detail the various columns, particularly the Chinese Thus, in direct contrast to Churchill6s views, Chiang advocated a major land-sea operation directed af the immediate liberation of Burma with a more than adequate force to guarantee victory41 42 The issue became more pronounced'when the Chinese delegation entered’ the meeting and General Shang expressed his opinion about Champion, He was particularly concerned’ about the number of 19purely British units” which would participate in the campaign, and how they would’be employed. Without any mention of the amphibious operation, Mountbatten reiterated' his plan for the offensive in northern Burma. The Admiral interpreted' Shang8s inquiry into the number of British forces in the area as- van innuendo about the fighting ability of"Commonwealth troops, and asked the Chinese general for an explanation."J 43 Shang replied that he did not intend to criticize the skill of their soldiers, but only wanted to be informed of all aspects of the situation. He then proceeded to state the Generalissimo9s

151* Ibid.p. 74* - 152s Homanus and Sunderland, St 1 Iwell1 s Comrnand Problems. p. 63. 153® StiIwell, p* 245. UJ3*., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 342-43. attitude on the entire operation® In confirmation., of Marshall*s previous statements* 8hang Chen told' the: Combined Chiefs that Chians; wanted.' a naval assault synchronized with the" land campaign, and an' • enlarged" objective of seizing: Mandalay and all of central . Burma*. Before he concluded, he said the Generalissimo insisted that the Allies maintain a monthly average of 10,000 tons: per month of" supplies to China, and nothing; should interfere with this amount:. General-CHennault' restated that the combined monthly equipment' requirements for the Chinese:and American air forces were 10,000 tons, and General Stilwell said Chlang had instructed him to • 1 Kb inform the Allied staff that these needs should be met® ' When. Chiang,5 s demands were disclosed", Marshall was prompted" to admonish the. Chinese and remind them that the. reason, for mounting Champion was to open, a direct supply route to China for the purpose of strengthening;her armed" forces. He wanted the Chinese to understand fully that they could either have Increased' 'airlift tonnage, or the northern. Burma offensive; but they could not have both operations The Americans as well as the British expected" the Chinese to accept their responsibilities in the land campaign, for. unless northern Burma was opened there could be.no increase, in.. supplies to China at this time since: no further aircraft

•15^* U.G.,* Department of State, The Conferences, at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 3^2-44,. - 91 or equipment could be provided' from the United States due to commitments elsewhere to meet serious shortagesThe Republic of China would have to assume an active part in the Allies8 endeavor to help the Chinese help themselves. General Stilwell wrote that it was a "grand speech for. the G~mo to hear It appeared that the Chinese themselves were making; Marshall’s position as an advocate of Champion extremely difficult. At the conclusion of the meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff requested Mountbatten to confer with the Generalissimo and explain all the details of Champion to him with reference to the Hump airlift."Vfj 4*7 The following; day Mountbatten reported the results of his conversation, with Chlang to the Combined Chiefs. The Admiral had informed him that his demands for an expanded operation in Central Burma, and. 10,000 tons of monthly supplies would entail the diversion of 535 transport aircraft from Europe and the Pacific to India. The Chinese leader agreed to rescind this request when it was explained that the Allies could not provide the additional aircraft; but. emphasized his resolve for an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal. Chiang; agreed to accept Champion on two conditions: (l) that the British Navy acquire and. maintain

155* Ibid., p. 343. " 156. Stilwell, p. 246. 157. Ibid., p. 255. Matloff, p. 350. naval supremacy In the Indian Ocean? and (2) they initiate an amphibious operation in conjunction with the land

Campaign« Mountbatten was concerned about the Chinese desire to enlarge Champion beyond the logistical and personnel capacity of his command, and when Chiang acceded in • accepting the facts of a reduced airlift he was certain *’that the Generalissimo would give the campaign his enthusiastic support« = » Operation Buccaneer was already on the planning boards as the naval phase of Champion* and the Admiral believed this plan would satisfy Chiang9s insistence for an amphibious operation -when the President and Prime Minister deemed it advisable to Inform him about it*159

Due to the serious nature of Chiang9 s demands and the importance of China®s participation in the campaign, the

Combined Chiefs prepared, a memorandum which they felt should receive thes Generalissimo9s written endorsement to insure his assent to Championo The paper stated that all parties would agree to adopt Mountbatten9s original plan without any increases in airlift tonnage or tactical objectives,.and the matter of an amphibious operation would be deferred until the Anglo-American staff had am opportunity to consider it in

158o Leighton, p0 19#*

159o Bomanus and Sunderland, Stilwell9s Command Problems« p c 63, 93 respect', to' commitments in other war theaters. In the meantime the Allied planners would continue their prepara tions for mounting^ an amphibious operation in Southeast' Asia 68should approval be subsequently given Chiang Kai-shek was not satisfied with the amount of airlift tonnage reaching;China and he informed Arnold, Somervell, and Stilwell that he wanted the Southeast Asia Command completely divorced"from operations of the Air Transport Command6 The Generalissimo refused to acknowledge. any connection between airlift traffic and the Burma campaign, and staunchly maintained that the two operations should" be regarded as separate, items« The American generals explained that the Allies were taking every possible measure in trying to establish a monthly figure of 10,000 tons of cargo; but argued against separating Champion from the airlift to China. They asserted' that the Hump wan the only means of supplying China, and the forces would need this support to sustain their ground" operations. The campaign was being fought to open a direct land route for the benefit of China, and without this campaign it would" be impossible to develop any large scale program for China, Chiang, however, "could see nothing but his own requirements,..."" ~ After further discussion on the subject the Generalissimo accepted

16.0.' U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran. p.' 430. l6l, Arnold,,p. 464, 94- the fact that the Allies were exerting a major effort to increase tonnage, "but refused" to admit any relationship 1 62 between airlift traffic and Champion." Oh the evening of November 25, President Roosevelt held a private meeting with the Generalissimo to discuss the military situation in the China-Burma-India Theater. During the course of their conversation Chiang refused to accept any of the points of the Combined Chiefs5 memorandum, and appealed to Roosevelt for something tangible to take back to China to bolster his nation®s morale* The President- then promised" that the Allies would undertake an amphibious operation in the Bay of "Bengal."I 63 He also gave Chiang the assurance that although an .American Army Corps "was out of" the question,88 the United States would train and equip ninety Chinese infantry divisions. In reference to Hump tonnage, Roosevelt was noneoimaltal, though he made it clear that the Allies would exert a maximum effort in maintaining, the highest supply rate possible. In his determination to promote China5 s value to the Allied' cause, Roosevelt endeavored to achieve a

lo2. Stilwell, pp. 24-6--47. U.S., Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 35^-55• 163. Churchill, p. 179. Leahy, p. 201. U.S.,. Department of State, United" States Relations With China. p. 551. 16^, King, p. 511. Stilwell, p. 24-6". successful conclusion1" to the conference which would' be favorable to the, Chinese, Despite Churchill’ s announced'' opposition to a sea-borne assault' in Southeast Asia, the President accepted'’ Chiang$ s demand for the amphibious operation, and it now appeared- that a major campaign in northern Burma was immimentt The military operation" designed' to open a main supply.artery to China for her • development' as a major power; in fact was now on the verge of realization,' Chiang;Kai-shek approved" of Champion because of" Roosevelt6s assurance that -there would be an amphibious operation; but'it remained" to see how the British would'react to this decision.. The Combined Chiefs of Staff conducted their final meeting of" the conference on the. afternoon of" November' 26'V This session was almost exclusively devoted' to discussing" a British proposal to abandon Buccaneer, and. 59became almost acrimonious at times « ” ^ The issue revolved' around" the limited supply.of'landing craft, and"particularly the "utilization of" 27- LSTe"s» General Brooke and the British.

l65. Peis, The China Tangle, o* 122. Leighton, p. 19s . l66» Leahy,, p. 202'* 1-6?# U*S<,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed;' . Forces: and" Committee on: Foreign Relations, Hearings". Military Situation" in" the Far 'Eas.tr. 82d' Cong> ,,, 1st. Sess p p 551-52* LST: is naval abbreviation for Landing Ship tank* Chiefs of Staff were chagrined over the Allies6 efforts to 58pander sufficiently to Chiang to affect possible operations in the Aegean against our primary enemy«6 8 Brooke maintained that operations in the Mediterranean and the Bay of Bengal scheduled for the spring of could only be conducted at the expense of postponing Overlords Two. amphibious operations would drain the major invasion of its landing craft, while one campaign could be initiated without depleting Overlord of this equipment. He believed'an attack on Rhodes would divert German forces from western Europe and strengthen Overlord8 s chances of success, Sir Charles Portal, Chief Marsha.ll of the Royal Air Force, added that Russia8s attitude might be a decisive factor if they requested the establishment of a western front against Germany* This would definitely result in.the postponement of Buccaneer* It was apparent that the British felt" they were being forced into supporting,, an operation which they regarded as unessential to the land campaign in Burma, and' pernicious to the main effort in Europe * Therefore, they refused" to be. pressured into accepting a plan which they believed was strategically unsound, The Americans.realized that these operations, would

• l68„ Bryant, p, 5^* 169, Churchill, pp, 321-22, Ehrman, p, 167* McNeill, pp. 346-4?* 97 impose a serious, strain on the limited supply of landing; craft t and General Marshall Mquite understood61 that if Buccaneer and Rhodes, were conducted Overlord would have to be delayed*"1 70 - Earlier t in the., conference Roosevelt had dispatched a message to James FI Byrnes Director, of. the . Office of War Mobilization,, asking., if by placing, an. emergency priority on. construction,. 61 the present" schedules: for production and completion, of landing; craft can be increased during9’ the first five months of 1944*^^^ On November 25 Byrnes replied that substantial increases could not be made until April and May when 15 and 28 additional assault ships., could be produced respectively. Roosevelt, therefore, instructed his military staff not to divert any amphibious vessels from Overlord. He was determined to initiate the invasion of western Europe as soon. a,s possible. If one of the secondary operations had' to be dropped to assure landing craft for Overlord, the Americans unamiously agreed that it would be Rhodes

170. U#S.e.Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 196. 171» Ibid... p. 380. 172. Ibid.... pp. 395-97• Leighton, p» 196®- George E. Howry,. Landing Craft and, the War Production Board April 194*2 to May 1944. War Production Board Board Special Study No*.. 11,. Civilian Production Administration Historical Reports, on. War Administration:. (Washington: U*S. Government Printing Office, 1946), pp»: 30-32* Donald M*, Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy (New Yorks Hareourt Brace and Company, 1946), p. 25,7. 98 The Joint Chief's of" Staff were confident- of Roosevelt9 s support for Buccaneer and expressed, their desire to conduct the assault- on the Andaman Islands* Marshall said !5they had.' gone far to meet the British Chiefs of Staff views but the postponement of Buccaneer they could not- acceptv"^/^ He reasoned that the operation was vital to America,9 s effort in the Pacific and. since the Chinese had accepted" the plan,, and the Allied forces were available, the campaign should be conducted* Ad'mifcal Ring asserted that the amphibious operation was an integral part of the land campaign, and strongly opposed the reallocation, of landing craft to the Mediterranean®' Admiral Leahy stated that they could not rescind the President’s promise to Chiang, and. any decision to cancel Buccaneer could only be madJe by their. Commanders- In-Chief, Rbosevelt and. Churchill^ t The results of the final meeting, were inconclusive, neither side would relinquish its demands, and’ as the British and American delegations prepared to depart for Tehran and their talks with the Russians, the ultimate decision on Buccaneer9s fate remained a moot issue. Before the Combined Chiefs.adjourned they agreed that the American Joint Chiefs "could, not accept the abandonment of the Buccaneer operation; also if further discussion.should show

173* U*S , Department of State,. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 365*' 17^., Leahy, pf 202. Matloff, pp* 351-52, ' 99 the postponement' of" Buccaneer to "be desirable, this would" need to be taken up with the President: and the Prime Min- i'ster*”"^^ Before the Chinese left for Chungking, Chiang Kai- shek , who was unaware of the Anglo-American' split, ordered Stllwell to remain at Cairo to argue for an expanded operation into central Burma and Mandalay, and" 10,000 tons of monthly airlift supplies divorced from the land campaign* The Generalissimo had reversed himself on every point which he had" previously agreed to with Roosevelt* In summarizing the results of the Cairo Conference, General Stilwell wrote that the discussions left more unresolved issues than concrete decisions» It appeared that America9s hopes for conducting.Buccaneer and the campaign to open up northern Burma were destined to oblivion in the face of British 1 75' intransigence and Chinese stubborness»' The one fact which all three Allies were able to harmoniously agree upon was the language of the declaration of the conference* On the afternoon of November 26', Chiang Churchill, and Roosevelt worked on drafting the contents of" the Cairo Declaration, The final text of the communiqa.e read

175* U*S,, Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pv 365* 176* Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell9 s Command" Problems« pV 65* 100 as follows s THe. several military -mssions tiaTe agreed'" upon' ftiture military7 operations against Japan!*' The three great Allies expressed" their resolve to Tiring; unrelenting; pressure against' their "brutal enemies "by sea,,- land" and alre: This pressure7 is already rising;.® The three great Allies, are fighting; this war to restrain, and punish the aggression, of Japan* They covet no gain fbr themselves.and have no thought of territorial expansion* It is their, purpose that Japan, shall Tie stripped of all the Island's: in the. Pacific which she has seized1 or occupied” since the beginning; of the.. First Morld' War in: and' that all the territories Japan has st'olen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria,, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be returned to the Republic o f China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed; The. aforesaid, three grea.t powers, mindful of" the. enslavement:, of. the people of Korea., are determined that in. due course Korea shall become free and independent® ' With these objects in view"the - three Allies , in harmony, with those of the United'Nations at war with Japan, will continue to perservere in. the serious and prolonged.' operations necessary ^ to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan,"1‘ The statement was concise and to the point® The Allies announced their determination to fight until they had" secured7 Japan6s unconditional surrender. The Japanese Empire would be dissolved' and Japan, herself would" be reduced" to an insular nation, while the Republic of China would be .placed" Ini %ipb:Sit:ion to, assume, the leadership, of the Asian: c.ormnuHityV Retribution.would be taken on Japan, and-" China... would: be compensated1 for her: yea.rs of 1 suffering, and

177* U1&®.,, Department: of State®,. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran®, cpf 448-49® 101 hardship. Although all three leaders participated ih: the joint authorship of the document, the original draft was initiated by the Americans, scrutinized by the British, and readily accepted by the Chinese, The Allies did'not dispute, or attempt to place a price on China8 s territorial claims. The political affirmations stated in.the declaration, were ' supported" by Churchill and. Roosevelt- 9$in a spirit" of i 78 historical justice,.88* The Cairo Declaration was based" on the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and it provided the. world, as well as China, with a reaffirmation of the objectives which the Allies were fighting to attain. Military matters consumed, a major portion of the conference but at S,airo the Allies demonstrated their concern for the postwar peace and. expressed their willingness to consider 1 7Q political issues," Because of security precautions and the fact that Roosevelt" wanted Stalin to read the document before if was published,, the Cairo Declaration was not announced until December i . When it was publicized the. declaration served to invigorate China® s morale, and "Chiang5 s stature in world public opinion reached" its all-time high,,9'10^

178, Peis, The China Tangle, p. 109. 179« Tong.,, p. 309® Chiang Kai-shek, Before Final Victory (New York: Chinese News Service, 1944), pp. 48-50• Smith, p. 93. ' Snell, p.*. 194,

180. Tong,, p. 309« 102

Conclusion. Roosevelt succeeded" in. sustaining; China* s will to resist" through the reward of a proud and respected' future, and in view of the Allies public assertions,, a place as an equal in the council- of the great world powers« Politically, the conference had a successful conclusion for the Generalissimo and his nation*. So far as America8s military objectives were concerned, the only. concrete gain was made on the matter of airbuses* Churchill and Chiang agreed to the establishment of B-29 airfields in India and China, and scheduling of’ tactical bombing operations against Japan for June I9W . Construction of five B-29 airfields in the vicinity of C'hengtu aikd four in. the area of. Calcutta, would' commence in January, 19^4- for completion in the spring. General Arnold was satisfied over this result foi; it meant that the war would be carried directly to the heart of the Japanese Empire, Now, the Allies would not have to wait until their Pacific advances had secured1 the Mariana Islands of Guam, Saipan, and Tinian in order to conduct a sustained air campaign. 181 Military strategy, however, was unresolved. The

181, Arnold, pp. 476, 477, 479« U.S.Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 187, 377» 103 Cairo Conference adjourned' without' a firm decision on a Southeast Asian campaign. Although Roosevelt was unaware of Chians's last minute reversal on adopting Mounthatten's plans he proceeded to Tehran with the impression that the United States would meet China's demand's 69with measures that 18? were more than mere words•"' In determining,a plan to break the Japanese blockade of China, the Allies had to consider the military requirements which would be necessary to. conduct the operation, and the availability of these precious resources in respect to other commitments in the global war. The Americans and British were committed to exert their main effort against Germany, and concurred on the primacy of Overlord. Their disagreement , however, was based” on the timing of the invasion of northwestern Europe, and the objectives of" secondary operations. Churchill and his staff maintained that Overlord'should be conducted after the Allies had sufficiently weakened Germany's resistance. Therefore, they advocated extending operations to the eastern Mediterranean and attacking Europe through her "soft uhder-belly.,3 Rhodes was the key to this strategic concept, and the British strongly favored an amphibious assault on the island. Here the Allies could establish a base of operations to gain control of the Dardanelles,, and

182. Sherwood, p. 744, ' ' 1 0 !4 lau.noK an Invasion ofr the Balkan Peninsula, This would' force the Germans to divert troops from western Europes and'reduce the : strength of' their defenses in France»„ When this was accomplished the Allies could'execute Overlord with added." assurance of success',’ Converselythe Americans wanted' a direct invasion' of’ Europe initiated” as soon, as possiTole* They did not” relish, the prospect of becoming: involved in the difficult' terrain- of southeastern Europe-, and particularly the volatile political affairs of that region. The Joint Chiefs were aware of similar problems which beset Allied forces in Italy and did not-want to pursue a policy they felt would’ prolong the war, There was a growing:impression within the minds of the American staff'that British strategy in the southeastern Mediterranean was politically motivated, and' directed, at reasserting: their inf luence in this part o f the world,: ■ . , Roosevelt and his staff wanted to achieve an early; victory over the Axis Powers, and their strategic decisions ■ were based on the attainment of this overriding: objective,: They were determined: that nothing-* should interfere with the spring, invasion of northwestern. Europe, If, however, sufficient resources could be provided".for a secondary operation, the Americans favored” a campaign which.-would assist: their military effort against Japan:,' The prospect o f strengthening; China5 s armed: forces and developing a ■ 1 0 5 ’ f'brmidaMe Aslan... froiiti' in support of"’: the: Pacific Theater, greatly appealed’ to. the Americans., They realized, that the only way in achieving' this goal was opening up a land'route in northern Burma to supply the Republic of' China, with' large quantities of' aide Thuss the Nationalist Government1" would not only be in a position:to effectively prosecute the war, but; would also' have a powerful nucleus, to. assume its. role as a major, world power,. The key to America * s. strategy wa.s northern Burma, The problem was securing British and. Chinese approval to a plan, directed at China9s liberation from her. Japanese encirclement'. The United States adopted. . Mount bat t eft * s plan for a campaign,, in. Southeast Asia.., but Churchill and • Chlang Kai-shek had ideas of'" their own,^^ The comprehensive plan.for. the Southeast Asian, offensive was called Champion and it was composed of a land" campaign in northern Burma, and a sea-borne assault against the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, Tarzan. was the code expression for the land operation and Buccaneer represented the name of the amphibious operation. Champion: called upon-China and Great Britain to provide the bulk of the military forces, to conduct the campaign. Southeast Asia, was primarily a British and Chinese area of strategic, responsibility; therefore, it was imperative that America® s.

183., I'latloff , p»; 359« ' U,EL , Department of State,- Tine Cnnferemces at .Cairo and Tehran, p. 364. . 106' two Alli.es agree to the provisions of: Tarzan. and Bucc.aneer The Generalissimo, wanting to get as much help from: his Allies' as tie' could", insisted on a major operation aimed' at capturing; central Burma, and the. major city of Mandalay*. He also demanded that before he would" give his assent., to'the: plan the British must agree., to conduct an. amphibious' assault in: the Bay of Bengal »■ His final argument was centered" on the. fact that no matter how great" the logistical demands: become: to sustain the land campaign there must be no interference with Chinaes. airlift supply.. These demands , were enormous., in respect to the overall Allied war effort,, and Marshall informed the Chinese., that they would have to moderate their: re.qig.est to accepting; either am. increased figure in Hump, tonnage or. Champion for it was entirely out of the question to provide both. - In. its original form., the plan was demised" for: the purpose, of opening: land communications through northern:. Burma with China.. Before the approach of . the spring monsoon this objective was the only, practical, one in light of the... rugged terrain,, and military, resources available to the Allies.. Although Roosevelt assured Chiang: that an. amphibious, operation.would take place simultaneously with the land campaign,.. the Generalissimo reversed his previous, agreement to accept Champion: in.-its existing, form,, and ordered" St 11 well to remain at Cairo to obtain: increased tonnage and!. a more ^ ambitious:- operation, in central-'Burma* Churchill and his staf f expressed strong.. diss.en'E to -Buccaneer and according to-. King,.*, "at no time in previous, or later conferences had the British shown such determined opposition to an American proposalUnlike the. Americans, the British did not: have any. great faith in the future military., or political value of the Republic of China*; Their strategy, in: Southeast Asia was. directed south from. India, to the. Malay Peninsula,, not east into China» Ostensibly the debate over the adoption of.Buccaneer was based" on the limited supply o f amphibious, landing, craft; bas#.cally8, however,, the argument revolved around the issue, of China's., value as. an ally*. As. long., as "the British were, not: asked, to exert a major; effort toward" China they gave tac.it', approval to America's Asian, strategy. Now,, however,., they were being, pressured., into takingjan active role in: this policy and the Issue had reached,a climax; The Prime Minister. clearly, stated" {?;that he. .specifically refused the,,. - ' . Generalissimo8s request that we should.undertake an. amphibious. operation simultaneously with the land' operations, in; BurmaAmerican and British views on the: value of. .China were clearly evident at Cairo and" their, divergent- attitudes, resulted in an. inconclusive termination to the

iw.: KinR,,; pi 52-4- 1851' Churchill, p* 280, 108 dlsc.ussl'ons on. military strategy In. the Far East.. The Public, ass-ertlons: stated" Tn the- Cairo Declaration, demonstrated, that the Allies had" harmoniously

agreed" oil the political matters. of-'unQondlttonal surrender, and postwar territorial settlements:. This, however, covered." the fact that no conclusive agreement was reached" on

military Issues... The expressions of" China6 s future as- a. world power were not substantiated with a .military policy directed" at realizing:;; this objective. Ho concrete program . was established to direct the formation of' China6s future,, and her postwar appearance would be determined" by the course of world" events«" America5 s. Asian strategy was not" reinforced with any, substantial military, action.: It wa.s obvious that Southeast Asia, would be relegated, to*a. secondary front" against the Japanese. The United States had a powerful "navy,, and the Pacific Ocean afforded the best approach to Japan.,,, as well as direct logistical support from North America for her forces." By reason.; of geography, and naval strength it' was natural to pursue this course of action.: Although junior staff officers, were beginning;, to discount: China's value as an active ally in Asia., the President; and. the Joint Chiefs of" Staff maintained their, faith in the: potential, value, of'. China as a. ■ formidable partner in the war against Japan. They wanted to buildlChina into a world power and the Asian Theater into an active 109 front; to support their advance through the Pacific„ However, neither they or their Allies were willing to expend sufficient forces in.. Southeast Asia to expedite this goal through major military action. The primary consideration which dominated Americans military decisions in the Second World. War was the achievement of.the earliest possible victory over her enemies. If the United States diverted men and. material from the Pacific and. European Theaters for a major campaign in Southeast Asia, it was apparent that this would weaken the primary effort for an early victory. Consequently • America’s political and. military strategy in Asia was. dependent on the co-operation of’ China and. Great Britain, whose forces accounted for the largest percentage of Allied.” troops in this area. At Cairo this co-operation was neither demonstrated, or accomplished and the United.” States8 Asian policy was left to follow a course of opportunistic action and. not a concrete program as the foundation for the future. EPILOGUE

O n .N'ovemBer 30 Chiangvreversed' til'mself 'again and decided, to adopt Champion'In it's original - fbrm,. Including*, the amphibious operation» Events at Tehran*,-however, were talcrng;; place* which would profoundly affect America* s Far Eastern strategy against Japatty The Russians expressed" two momentous views regarding their attitude and intsntions in the global war," The first related" to their strategy in Europe where they sided' with the United States5 demands for an early date for Overlord* They wanted a western front opened as soon as possible and did not want any secondary operation which might delay the maijor invasion of " Europe*.. This ruled" out the possibility of an operation in the eastern Mediterranean, and' Stalin and Roosevelt vetoed" Churchill’s plans, for the amphibious assault on Rhodes, The second" decision was Stalin’s promise to declare war against Japan as soon as Germany, was defeated*. When the British and American staffs returned to Cairo the debate, over Buccaneer was still very much all vet. Churchill and his party absolutely refused" to participate in: the operation, and the fact that the Soviet Union intended to join in the fight against Japan strengthened their: resolve, to abandon Buccaneer.. They argued* that Russia would" be a far greater ally than China in Asia,., and this could" be

■ 110 Ill achieved;' without the expense of a full-scale amphibious, operation in Southeast Asia. The discussions had"reached" an impasse and the threat that the conference might adjourn on a discordant^note was evidentt For the sake of Allied harmony, and the fact that Mountbatten required an additional 58>000 men to conduct Buccaneer motivated the President to rescind' his decision on the amphibious operation. The significance of the Tehran Conference ?ias the decision for the immediate execution of Overlord and Russians promise to enter the Asian war. The Soviet Union., was militarily stronger than.China and this guarantee created the prospect of accelerating;, the defeat' of . Japan, Russia gradually replaced'the Republic of China as America6s hope for a formidable ally against Japan. LIST OF" REFERENCES.

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