The United States and the Cairo Conference: an aspect of American strategy in Asia in World War II Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Hitchcock, William Samuel, 1937- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 29/09/2021 15:04:09 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318004 THE UNITED STATES AND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE; AN ASPECT OF AMERICAN STRATEGY IN: ASIA IN WORLD WAR II "by William Samuel Hitchcock A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF" HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE. UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1 9 6 7 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other Instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown below: H.E. BATEMAN ry p Date Professor of History .PREFACE The selection of this subject was motivated by the desire to acquire a better understanding of the historical events of World Mar II, and insight into the forces which influenced the course of America8s military and political policies in- Asia."' The research for this work was conducted at the Library of the University of Arizona, while the material was organized at the Chicago Public Library, and the Newberry Library in Chicago, Illinois. I gratefully acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Professor Herman E. Bateman for his counsel and guidance, not only in the preparation of this thesis, but also throughout the course of my graduate study at The University of Arizona. My sincere appreciation is also extended to Professor James A. Beatson, and Professor Earl H. Pritchard whose invaluable suggestions have profoundly added to the scholarship of this work. I would also like to extend my eternal gratitude to my parents William and Sophie Hitchcock whose patience and faith made this study possible. TABLE OF CONTENTS' Page S eeeoeeee. es e-tieeee’Seeoeeeeee-oeofreoe eoeo-oeeooooooo.6 "V* 3»3^ X ROD DO.T I ON & «o»6^i«e©aeooee©«o oo« &ooo o«*©©ooo*oooooo«o&«-X CHAPTER. I * PLANNING: THE: CONFERENCE:© + ... ©_____ 9 The Hurley Miselon© © © © © © © © © © © © * © © ^ 9 Military Objectives© .... 21 Political Objectives © © ©..... © © © ©. 33 II © PROCEEDINGS OF" THE. CONFERENCE© ____© © 48 enda©e©©»©eoo©©©»©»©o©»©©o»oo»o»©©©»oo©* ^4^ 8 I n i r i a l S e s s i o jfi s©^©©©©©©©o©©©©©©©©©©©@$©#» 3^ M ilitary and P o litic a l D iscussions © * © © © © ©«69 III e> RjI S ULT S. e * »©-©= © » © © © © » o © » e « o e- © e ® a o o o » » » a e e » o e © © © 6 8 6 Harmony andDiscord© © © © . ©.... © 86 Cone lu kD i on.©©©©©©©©©o©©©©©©©#©©©© ©©»©©©»©*© 10 2 EPILO&JJE.* © © d 6' ©. e e s. © ©*s cj O G' o et © o g' ©• <a- © 6 0 » ©• 0 e e « o © 00© « o o o » o G o a « 1 1 0 JblST OP* !REx^ JiJRElN O-jijS-©©@ ©QO'G©«©eo© «&»©©© G’oeGo©©©©©©.©©©©©^©© 112 iv ABSTRACT In World War II the United States relegated" postwar political objectives: to a secondary position in endeavoring- to achieve an*, immediate ■ and", total military victory over her enemies0; American global strategy was formulated on the premise^ that Germany was the? primary enemyy and' all military decisions were directed to defeating; the Nazi nation: as- soon as possible's' Therefore1; the; European Theater received precedence over the; military and naval effbrts in the; Pacific; Ocean1," while operations in Asia were committed' to last place*' .. ■ • President - Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired’ a strong Asian front to , support , the:; Pacific; campaign and" believed the;Republic of China provided the;means. of’ securing; this goals' Roosevelt also envisaged" China as a postwar Oriental power„ equal in status and stature to the' major: nations of? the; world<= At Cairo, Egypt in. November, 19^3 the; Americans conferred" with'.the leaders; of" China and Great Britain on establishing the: military strategy designed to realize: these aspirations®' Although the-conference- succeeded" in promoting Chian®; Kai-shek8 s prestige and" prepared’ a foundation for a strong China by postwar territorial adjustment si, the; Allies failed to agree; on the: w military policy necessary in implementing;’ the political objectiveso INTRODUCTION' Under the leadership of President Franklin' D. Roosevelt: and Prime Minister; Wins ton: L& S » Churchill the United States of'America and' Great Britain esta,blished'one? of" the: greatest military coalitions in history;' Allied' with the: Union ofT Soviet Socialist Republics, in Europe, and:' the Republic of China1, in Asia), the two western democracies fought a global conflict against the: Axis Powers of Nazi Germany and'Imperial Japan, .Through this network of alliances American strategists faced the military and’ political realities of the: Second World War,1 In Januanyv 1942 Churchill and Roosevelt: met with their military leaders in Washington", D«C, to confer on global strategy and' establish the administrative machinery to co-ordinate their war effort. This was the first of a series of wartime Anglo-American conferences in which the Allies collaborated on the direction of their operations. Here they agreed’ to concentrate:their forces against thein primary enemy, Germany, and adopted a defensive;; strategy in the. Pacific Ocean against Japan, They also established the. Combined Chiefs of Staff as the top-level military agency for co-ordinating: the activity of their individual planning; staffs,' This organization, was comprised of the members of the: American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the:British Chiefs of Staff e Each nation*, provided7 a permanent representative of junior officers to continuously confer in Washington for the; purpose- of exchanging; information and maintaining; continuity between major sessions when* the senior: members wouUdl meet to decide on: global strategy. The: Allied" leaders- also agreed to accept: General- issimo Chiang: Kai-shek as Supreme Allied' Commander of " the?. China Theater,' This area included1 China and1 99such parts* of; Thailand: and Indochina as might be occupied by what were? now: called the United: Nations«.11 As Supreme Commanders Chiang; was recognized’ as autonomous * in this theater of: operations 8 responsible to nobody but: himself:’. Thus, any projected Allied action in Southeast Asia would" have to be: based! on separates and. independent: commands of strategic responsibility,*2 In March further guidelines for facilitating more: efficient operations were established. The Allies agreed"to a triple division of global areas of strategic responsibility. The United States was vested with direction 1 , Gordon.A, Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, Vol. II of The European Theater of Operations: United States Army in World" War II, ed, Kent R, Greenfield (98 volsV; Washington: U,S, Government Printing-Office; 19A6- )9 pp. 6-8 , 2 . Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell9s Mission to China. Vol, I of China: Burma: India Theater: United States Army in World War II, ed; Kent R. Greenfield'% 98^'1^oIs7~; Washington: U.S, Government Printing: Office, 1,946- ), p. 62. 3 of:' the war in ther Pacific: and Far East 8 including China0 Great Britain was given military responsibility from Singapore to the Middle Easta The war against Germany in Europe and the Atlantic Ocean was acknowledged as a joint efforts and both nations would exercise co-ordinated" control in this areal The President: and Prime Minister adopted this policy with the mutual understanding: that any large - scale- operations designed to seizes the initiative in a particular theater would" require joint: agreement through the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of StaffI As commander of an autonomous theater the Americans realized that achieving; Chiang6 s co-operation in accepting their strategic concept of operations against Japan would have to be acquired" 3 through diplomacy. By October, 19^3 the soundness in the basic concept of global strategy had been demonstrated. The decision to first defeat Germany led to the early crystalization of tactical operations in the European war with military and" naval success in the Atlantic Ocean and the- Mediterranean Theater. The submarine menace in the- North Atlantic was neutralized, while-British and" American forces had" expelled" Axis troops from North Africa. After the conquest of Sicily and the invasion of southern Italy, the Allies had forced" the capitulation of the Italian government. Although operations in Italy were meeting stiff German resistance, 3® Ibid.'.. pp. 86-87. the Americans were anxiously/ preparing- for the direct invasion of northwestern Europe, Tactical "bombardment against vital