The History of CIA's Office of Strategic Research, 1967-81

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The History of CIA's Office of Strategic Research, 1967-81 The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesing- er’s desire to create within CIA an organization that could “think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems.” The Center, compris- ing both professional historians and experienced practitioners, at- tempts to document lessons learned from past activities, explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and stimu- late serious debate on current and future intelligence challenges. To support these efforts, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence and books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctri- nal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum. Comments and questions may be addressed to: Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Copies of this study are available through the US Government Printing Office (GPO) Bookstore: https://bookstore.gpo.gov ISBN: 978-1-929667-31-4 The History of CIA’s Office of Strategic Research, 1967–81 Robert Vickers CIA History Staff August 2019 Contents Organizational Acronyms and Abbreviations ������������������������������������������vii Executive Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ix Introduction ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ix The Backstory: OSR’s Antecedents ������������������������������������������������������ x Chapter Summaries �������������������������������������������������������������������������� xvi OSR Directors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� xxiv Endnotes ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xxxiii Chapter One: 1953–61 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������1 Soviet Strategic Surprise ����������������������������������������������������������������������2 The Bomber Gap ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3 The Missile Gap ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7 Endnotes ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 14 Chapter Two: 1961–67 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17 The Cuban Missile Crisis ������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 Expanded Mandate ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21 Creation of the DS&T ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 22 Controversial National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) ���������������������� 23 The ABM Controversy ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 25 The Soviet Ground Forces Issue �������������������������������������������������������� 26 DoD Customers ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29 Vance-McCone Agreement ���������������������������������������������������������������� 30 Raborn Era ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31 Helms Becomes DCI �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33 Endnotes ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 36 Chapter Three: 1967–71 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 37 OSR’s Initial Organization ����������������������������������������������������������������� 38 1968 Annual Report ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 41 Bruce Clarke’s Leadership Style ��������������������������������������������������������� 43 1969 Annual Report ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 44 1970 Annual Report ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 Endnotes ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 53 Chapter Four: 1971–73 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 55 A New Estimative Format ������������������������������������������������������������������ 55 OSR’s Expansion �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 56 1971 Annual Report ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 58 1972 Highlights ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 64 Schlesinger Era ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 68 1973 Annual Report ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 69 Clarke’s Departure and Other Changes��������������������������������������������� 74 Endnotes ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 76 Chapter Five: 1973–75 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 77 Knoche’s Team ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 77 The Yom Kippur War ������������������������������������������������������������������������� 81 Colby’s Changes ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 82 Key Developments in OSR ����������������������������������������������������������������� 84 1974 Annual Report ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 86 White House Shakeup ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 92 Endnotes ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 93 Chapter Six: 1975–76 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 95 Lehman and His Team ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 95 Firth and His Team ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 96 Soviet Defense Spending Estimates ��������������������������������������������������� 98 A Team/B Team �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 100 The B-Team Outcome ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 106 Endnotes ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 108 Chapter Seven: 1976–79 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 111 Graybeal Becomes D/OSR ��������������������������������������������������������������� 112 Turner’s Agenda ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 113 Graybeal’s Reorganization �������������������������������������������������������������� 114 Leadership Changes ������������������������������������������������������������������������� 116 SALT Support ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 117 Soviet Military Estimates ����������������������������������������������������������������� 118 MBFR Support ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 121 New Focus on the Middle East �������������������������������������������������������� 124 OSR’s China and Asian Branches ���������������������������������������������������� 125 Endnotes ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 127 Chapter Eight: 1979–81 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 129 Clarke Becomes D/NFAC ���������������������������������������������������������������� 129 Huffstutler as D/OSR ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 131 Carter Administration Crises ���������������������������������������������������������� 132 SALT II Hopes ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 134 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan ������������������������������������������������������� 137 Soviet Strategic Forces NIEs ������������������������������������������������������������ 138 Stoertz Retires ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 141 Gorman and Net Assessments ��������������������������������������������������������� 141 OSR’s Accomplishments ������������������������������������������������������������������ 143 Turner’s Legacy �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 146 Endnotes ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 147 Chapter Nine: 1981 and Beyond ������������������������������������������������������������� 149 Casey’s Agenda ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 150 OSR Reorganization ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 152 Military Intelligence Research and Production ������������������������������ 156 DI Reorganization ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 157 SOVA ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 158 Gates Becomes D/NFAC ������������������������������������������������������������������ 159 Clarke’s Legacy of Leadership����������������������������������������������������������
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