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The Nature of His CIA Work, Top-Secret. Who Was John Arthur Paisley, And

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The Nature of His CIA Work, Top-Secret. Who Was John Arthur Paisley, And -CINIAILJS2E21:1131 never discloses complete biographical By Tad Soule data on its officers; various aspects of His 'suicide' was bizarre; the nature of his their careers could provide clues about n the moonlit night of secret operations they may have been Sept. 23, 1978, John Ar- C.I.A. work, top-secret. Who was John Arthur engaged in and thus compromise the thur Paisley vanished agency's "sources and methods." in the waters of Chesa- Paisley, and what actually happened to him? In its public statements, therefore, peake Bay, the silent the C.I.A. portrayed Paisley as a rather kingdom of oysters and A week later, on Oct. 1, a bloated and suggested that death was by suicide, unimportant intelligence officer and crabs. He was a quiet badly decomposed body was found and the C.I.A., to questions posed by re- analyst. Prior to his official retirement 55-year-old man who floating in the bay, a 9-millimeter gun- porters, saw "no reason to disagree." in 1974, Paisley had served as deputy had a passion for soli- shot wound in the back of the head, The Maryland State Police later con- chief of the C.I.A.'s Office of Strategic tary sailing; he was also an expert on weighted diver's belts around the cluded that death was "undetermined" Research, which deals with assess- Soviet nuclear capability who had waist. The next day, the body was iden- after a belated investigation marred by ments of Soviet nuclear forces, and the worked for the Central Intelligence tified by Maryland's Chief Medical Ex- what they called the "contamination" agency emphasized that he was just Agency. Paisley was last seen that aminer as that of John Arthur Paisley. of evidence by C.I.A. security officers, another senior analyst, having nothing morning, crossing a narrow section of Over the next 17 days; however, finger- who were the first to search the boat. to do with clandestine operations. After the bay aboard his sloop Bril lig, a name print identification could not be made Presented with this statement by the further prodding by reporters, C.I.A. he had picked from Lewis Carroll's — neither the C.I.A. nor the Federal Maryland State Police, C.I.A. spokes- spokesmen acknowledged that Paisley "Through the Looking-Glass." The Bureau of Investigation could locate a men said that the agency was not an in- was still a "consultant" to the agency empty boat ran aground under full sail set of Paisley's fingerprints. The hands vestigative one and had not taken part at the time of his disappearance, but the following morning, Its ship-to-shore were severed and sent to the F.B.I., and in any criminal investigation. they insisted that he had had no access radio still crackling. the body was cremated in a C.I.A.-ap- The C.I.A. spokesmen were circum- to highly classified information since proved funeral home outside Washing- spect, too, when it came time to release his retirement. Tad Szulc is a national-security-affairs ton, D.C. information on John Arthur Paisley, As Yet, from information supplied to writer based in Washington, D.C. The Maryland State Police initially a matter of policy, the C.I.A. almost this reporter by extremely authorita- The New York Times Maguzlne/January 7, 1979 13 tive intelligence sources In Washington, another John Arthur Paisley emerges. Paisley refuses to talk to reporters, but Paisley was an unusually Important friends say that she questions both the C.I.A. figure who had been involved in suicide theory and the Identity of the some of the most sensitive agency body found In the bay. She did not see operations since the late 1940's. Until Paisley's body, nor the photographs of Sept. 23, he was privy to highly secret it. Actually, no one who had known Intelligence materials. These are the Paisley in life is reported to have been highlights of "the Paisley connection": shown the body before the cremation. 13Within two years of his official 1974 El retirement, Paisley was brought back by the C.I.A. to coordinate efforts to From the accounts of the Maryland evaluate the Soviet nuclear threat - State Police, the F.B.I., the Coast one of the agency's most secret Guard, the medical examiners, sources projects. From August 1976 on, he had in the intelligence community, and access to the most highly classified in- from people who knew him, it is possi- telligence documents. He had been ble to reconstruct events leading to working on materials related to this what Senate investigators familiar project aboard his sloop at the time of with the case have described as one of his disappearance. the "spookiest" cases ever involving an RWhen it washed ashore, the Brillig intelligence operation. carried sophisticated communications John Arthur Paisley's final drama equipment designed for secret trans- began in the late afternoon of Saturday, missions. Sept. 21 a warm autumn day. He had riDurIng the 1960's, Paisley helped to sailed aboard the sloop Brillig that debrief Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, the morning from a mooring on Solomons most senior K.G.B. defector in the Island, at the mouth of the Patuxent United States. Paisley and Nosenko River, to Hooper Islands on the Eastern later became friends, and the C.I.A. Shore of Chesapeake Bay — a short and officer frequently visited Nosenko in easy easterly crossing — with friend or his North Carolina hideout. friends unknown. The mooring belongs flPaisley's widow, Maryann, was em- to Col. Norman Wilson, a retired Air ployed for a year in 1974 in one of the Force officer who had served in a top- most sensitive divisions of the C.I.A.: secret post In the Defense Intelligence the office handling funds for foreign Agency and had been Paisley's friend clandestine operations. Her immediate Paisley's mentor: James Jesus Angleton, former C.I.A. counterintell'gence chief. for about 10 years. superior was Katherine Hart, wife of an chaired by SeriatOr I lich According to Colonel Wilson, some- agency officer who had dealt exten- --toto the present crises itit Iran time during the day he was told by ana, had hoped to come up with a report and Nicaragua, despite clear signals. sively with Nosenko. before Thanksgiving, but it has run into someone (whom he will not identify) IIPaisley was a contributor to the top- In November, in a most unusual that Paisley wanted to be called on the such difficulties trying to learn the move, President Carter reprimanded secret manual on the operations of the truth about the events that it is unlikely radio. Colonel Wilson contacted the United States KH-11 spy-in-the-sky Adm. Stanfield Turner, the Director of Brillig, as he recalls, between 5 P.M. to come up with conclusions, if any, be- Central Intelligence, for these short- satellite, the most sophisticated in this fore mid-January. and 6 P.M., and Paisley advised him comings. This further damaged morale generation of orbiters, targeted on The investigation could hardly have "he would be in after dark," asking Soviet strategic deployments. This was in the agency, which has not fully that the dock lights be left on. This was come at a worse time. Cracks In inter- recovered from the Congressional in- the manual sold in Athens about a year nal security have been bedeviling the the last anyone heard from Paisley. ago to the K.G.B., the Soviet secret po- vestigations of its past scandals, or the At 10:30 A.M. the next day, Sunday, agency in recent years, what with mys- recent massive firings of its clandes- lice, by William P. Kampiles, a young terious disappearances, thefts of top- Sept. 24, the Coast Guard station at St. C.I.A. officer who last November was tine-services officers. Inigoes on Chesapeake Bay was noti- secret documents and talk of a Soviet Not least among the C.I.A.'s prob- convicted on espionage charges. "mole" — a deep-cover operative in a fied by telephone by a state park ranger The Senate Select Committee on In- lems is Paisley's widow, whose loyalty that two separate pleasure craft had in- high-level position — having pene- to the agency seems to be flagging. telligence, concerned about the possi- trated the American intelligence com- formed him of sighting a vessel under ble political and other implications of Having first worked closely with C.I.A. full sail aground at Point Lookout, munity. In addition, the C.I.A.'s ability security officers after Paisley's disap- the Paisley affair, has launched a quiet to collect and effectively evaluate vital where the Potomac River runs into the but energetic investigation to deter- pearance, she recently retained Ber- bay. The ranger had driven to Point foreign intelligence is now under at- nard Fensterwald, a well-known Wash- mine what exactly happened that Sep- tack. Policy-making officials in many Lookout. He had ascertained that no- tember night on Chesapeake Bay, and ington attorney, to help her find out parts of the Administration are un- what happened to her husband. Mrs. in the days thereafter. The committee, happy with the agency's assessment of Soviet missilery, and the C.I.A. failed tereatler, was assassinated Paisley was called in when Committee on Assassinations Nosenko was back in the news connection between the theft by terrorists. Paisley had a de- the C.I.A. began the lengthy in September — he was sub- the day • before Paisley was of the manual and Paisley's gree in electrical engineering and laborious process of de- jected to three years of brutal killed.
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