Items-In-Political-Security Council Affairs (PSCA) Analysis - East/West Relations (See List of Items, Appendix No
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UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 23 Date 17/05/2006 Time 3:35:46 PM S-0881-0002-01-00001 Expanded Number S-0881 -0002-01 -00001 Title Items-in-Political-Security Council Affairs (PSCA) Analysis - East/West Relations (see list of items, appendix No. 14) Date Created 10/03/1967 Record Type Archival Item Container s-0881 -0002: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - PSCA Analysis (Political-Security Council Affairs) Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit 'ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION The Secretary- General FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLERJ YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION X POUR INFORMATION Date: FROM: 2k Jfarch 1967 DE: M.A. Director and Deputy to CR. 13 the Under-Sec'y* PSCA. DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND 10 March 1967 SEGPBCTY OOUHGH"' ' . AFFAIRS JTjT :mm Political Affairs Division -* NOTE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS - FEBRUARY NOTE OS EggT-WEST RELATIONS - FEBRUARY 196? General Comments 1. Diplomatic developments in the beginning of February offered some indications that peace negotiations might be arrived at for Vietnam. Military developments, however, in the latter part of the month dampened the earlier optimism and the trend of the war was shown to be towards further escalation. 2. The diplomatic development was in the form of various reports suggesting that the statement by DRV Foreign Minister Trinh to Wilfred Burcbett, an Australian journalist, was a clear indication of DRV readiness for peace negotiations. Mr. Burehett himself in two articles printed in the New York Times during the month gave assurances that the DRV*s call for cessation of bombing and "other acts of war" was its only condition for negotiation. Additional significance was given to this position when Premier Kosygin, who visited the United Kingdom from 6-13 February, reiterated in London the condition reported by Mr. Burchett. There were also reports that US officials and other commentators had been impressed that Mr. Trinh's statement was a departure from the four point conditions laid down earlier by the DRV. 3- In spite of world-wide acceptance of Mr. Trinh's statement as a basis for peace negotiations, US officials expressed doubt about the sincerity of the DRV position. At his news conference of 2 Jebruary, President Johnson repeated his view that no "serious effort11 had been made by the DRV for negotiations. Mr. Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President, took the same position in a statement in Washington on k February, as did Mr. Rusk at a Washington news conference on the 9th. ^. Those hoping for a breakthrough in the impasse on negotiations focussed their attention on the talks held between Prime Minister Wilson and Premier Kosygin in London. There were various reports that Mr. Wilson was in direct telephone contact with President Johnson, and it was hoped that the Soviet contact with the DRV leadership would enhance the chances of a. joint UK-Soviet effort. In a state- ment published in London on 1^ February at the end of Mr. Kosygin*s visit, it was reported that the British aid Soviet Governments would continue their efforts to bring peace to Vietnam. 5- In statements made to the House of Commons on 13 February and on a TV programme on Ik February, Prime Minister Wilson said that he and the Soviet Premier -2- had "been almost successful in bringing about conditions for negotiations. 6. Militarily, US and South Vietnamese troops resumed offensive attacks on 12 February at the end of the 4-day truce which they had accepted for Tet. The next day the United States resumed bombing of North Vietnam at a time when there were speculations that the United States would halt this bombing in compliance with Mr. Trinh's remarks. Although US officials asserted that the resumption of bombing did not put an end to the search for peaceful negotiations, other US military moves suggested to many commentators that the United States was now determined to increase military pressure on the HLF forces in Vietnam. This took the form of a major operation called "Operation Junction City" which was intended to "search and destroy" the headquarters of NLF forces in South Vietnam. 7- The United States also initiated military moves on the demilitarized zone, as well as mining rivers in the southern part of North Vietnam. These actions were condemned by the DRV, NLF, USSR, CPR, Socialist states and other critics of US policy in Vietnam. 8. The month ended on a pessimistic note as it seemed that the present objective of the antagonists was a military solution to the conflict. 9- In US-USSR relations the same situation obtained as for many previous months. President Johnson appealed on 2 February that the Senate consent to the Consular Treaty and to the Congress to pass the East-West Trade Bill. Although there were indications that the United States and the USSR were attempting to improve their relations in various areas, fears were expressed by US officials that a new arms race would emerge if the present military balance were upsett in their view this could occur if Soviet leaders refused to respond to the 27 January letter from President Johnson asking for a moratorium on the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system. The President's letter was discussed in Moscow in talks between Ambassador Thompson and Soviet leaders, including Premier Kosygin. At a London press conference on 9 February, Mr. Kosygin had suggested that the Soviet Union was not opposed to the development of an anti-ballistic missile system since this was primarily for defensive purposes. Pravda however later suggested that the USSR was interested in a moratorium on both offensive and defensive systems. 10. Statements by Soviet military officials during the month gave conflicting assessments of the efficacy of an anti-ballistic missile system in the Soviet Union. None the less, the Chief of the US General Staff, General Wheeler, on Meet the Press -3- on 26 February, openly disagreed with Secretary of Defence McNamara when he called for US development and deployment of such a system. There was expectation by some US officials that agreement would be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on a moratorium on the deployment of an ABM. system. 11. The only incident in US-CPR relations during February was the US-reported accidental overflight of one of its aircraft over Hainan Island; a CFR statement denied that the overflight was accidental. 12. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the FRG in January, Chancellor Kiesinger asserted to the Bundestag on 1 February that this development did not mean renunciation by the FRG of the Hallstein Doctrine in the sense that while it would not apply any longer to Europe, it was fully in force in other areas. A Soviet statement of 8 February condemned the continuance of this Doctrine and the FRG*s claim to sole representation of the German people. In a speech by GDR Politburo member Albert Norden on 5 February he rejected reunification of the GDR with the FRG, a state which he considered monopolistic and fascist — a rejection later reinforced by the new nationality law published by the GDR on 20 February. 13 • In statements made in London, Premier Kosygin condemned what he assessed as a rise of Nazism in West Germany, and he also called upon the FRG to prove its sincerity by accepting present realities in Europe - recognition of the GDR, acceptance of present State boundaries in Europe, and renunciation of nuclear weapons. 14. It was the issue of a non-proliferation treaty which most exacerbated the relationship between the FRG and the Socialist states. As mentioned in last month's Note, West German officials had objected to what they considered the adverse technological effects which a non-proliferation treaty would have on non-nuclear states. During February less emphasis was placed on the technological situation and more on the issue of control machinery to police such an agreement. 1^. The reported agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for inspection of nuclear reactors by the IAEA was opposed by West Germany, Italy and other EURATOM members who would prefer that whatever inspection there was should be carried out by EURATOM. Their major fear was said to be industrial espionage. Despite this, in London on 9 February Mr. Kosygin still said the FRG would have to sign such an agreement. 16. President Johnson in a special message to the EHDC on SI February and Mr. Wilson during his visit to the FHG, gave assurances to non-nuclear powers that they would not suffer by accepting a non-proliferation agreement. -k- 17. A UK White Paper on Defence published on 16 February suggested that European security could be enhanced by an East-West troop withdrawal from Central Europe. The suggestion was made at a time when calls were being made in the US Congress for withdrawals of US troops from Europe, and the Pentagon was said to be contemplating such withdrawals. Opinion in the United Kingdom, particularly among the Labour "backbenchers" in Parliament, called for some troop withdraval from the Army on the Rhine. 18. The Tripartite Conference (the USA, UK and FRG) on offset agreements opened in London on 27 February. It was against the background of West German statements that it would not enter into new offset agreements.