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Title Items-in-Political-Security Council Affairs (PSCA) Analysis - East/West Relations (see list of items, appendix No. 14)

Date Created 10/03/1967

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0881 -0002: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - PSCA Analysis (Political-Security Council Affairs)

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit 'ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION The Secretary- General

FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLERJ YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION X POUR INFORMATION

Date: FROM: 2k Jfarch 1967 DE: M.A. Director and Deputy to CR. 13 the Under-Sec'y* PSCA. DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND 10 March 1967 SEGPBCTY OOUHGH"' ' . AFFAIRS JTjT :mm Political Affairs Division

-* NOTE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS - FEBRUARY NOTE OS EggT-WEST RELATIONS - FEBRUARY 196?

General Comments 1. Diplomatic developments in the beginning of February offered some indications that peace negotiations might be arrived at for Vietnam. Military developments, however, in the latter part of the month dampened the earlier optimism and the trend of the war was shown to be towards further escalation. 2. The diplomatic development was in the form of various reports suggesting that the statement by DRV Foreign Minister Trinh to Wilfred Burcbett, an Australian journalist, was a clear indication of DRV readiness for peace negotiations. Mr. Burehett himself in two articles printed in the New York Times during the month gave assurances that the DRV*s call for cessation of bombing and "other acts of war" was its only condition for negotiation. Additional significance was given to this position when Premier Kosygin, who visited the United Kingdom from 6-13 February, reiterated in London the condition reported by Mr. Burchett. There were also reports that US officials and other commentators had been impressed that Mr. Trinh's statement was a departure from the four point conditions laid down earlier by the DRV. 3- In spite of world-wide acceptance of Mr. Trinh's statement as a basis for peace negotiations, US officials expressed doubt about the sincerity of the DRV position. At his news conference of 2 Jebruary, President Johnson repeated his view that no "serious effort11 had been made by the DRV for negotiations. Mr. Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President, took the same position in a statement in Washington on k February, as did Mr. Rusk at a Washington news conference on the 9th. ^. Those hoping for a breakthrough in the impasse on negotiations focussed their attention on the talks held between Prime Minister Wilson and Premier Kosygin in London. There were various reports that Mr. Wilson was in direct telephone contact with President Johnson, and it was hoped that the Soviet contact with the DRV leadership would enhance the chances of a. joint UK-Soviet effort. In a state- ment published in London on 1^ February at the end of Mr. Kosygin*s visit, it was reported that the British aid Soviet Governments would continue their efforts to bring peace to Vietnam. 5- In statements made to the House of Commons on 13 February and on a TV programme on Ik February, Prime Minister Wilson said that he and the Soviet Premier -2- had "been almost successful in bringing about conditions for negotiations. 6. Militarily, US and South Vietnamese troops resumed offensive attacks on 12 February at the end of the 4-day truce which they had accepted for Tet. The next day the United States resumed bombing of North Vietnam at a time when there were speculations that the United States would halt this bombing in compliance with Mr. Trinh's remarks. Although US officials asserted that the resumption of bombing did not put an end to the search for peaceful negotiations, other US military moves suggested to many commentators that the United States was now determined to increase military pressure on the HLF forces in Vietnam. This took the form of a major operation called "Operation Junction City" which was intended to "search and destroy" the headquarters of NLF forces in South Vietnam. 7- The United States also initiated military moves on the demilitarized zone, as well as mining rivers in the southern part of North Vietnam. These actions were condemned by the DRV, NLF, USSR, CPR, Socialist states and other critics of US policy in Vietnam. 8. The month ended on a pessimistic note as it seemed that the present objective of the antagonists was a military solution to the conflict. 9- In US-USSR relations the same situation obtained as for many previous months. President Johnson appealed on 2 February that the Senate consent to the Consular Treaty and to the Congress to pass the East-West Trade Bill. Although there were indications that the United States and the USSR were attempting to improve their relations in various areas, fears were expressed by US officials that a new arms race would emerge if the present military balance were upsett in their view this could occur if Soviet leaders refused to respond to the 27 January letter from President Johnson asking for a moratorium on the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system. The President's letter was discussed in Moscow in talks between Ambassador Thompson and Soviet leaders, including Premier Kosygin. At a London press conference on 9 February, Mr. Kosygin had suggested that the Soviet Union was not opposed to the development of an anti-ballistic missile system since this was primarily for defensive purposes. Pravda however later suggested that the USSR was interested in a moratorium on both offensive and defensive systems. 10. Statements by Soviet military officials during the month gave conflicting assessments of the efficacy of an anti-ballistic missile system in the Soviet Union. None the less, the Chief of the US General Staff, General Wheeler, on Meet the Press -3- on 26 February, openly disagreed with Secretary of Defence McNamara when he called for US development and deployment of such a system. There was expectation by some US officials that agreement would be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on a moratorium on the deployment of an ABM. system. 11. The only incident in US-CPR relations during February was the US-reported accidental overflight of one of its aircraft over Hainan Island; a CFR statement denied that the overflight was accidental. 12. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the FRG in January, Chancellor Kiesinger asserted to the Bundestag on 1 February that this development did not mean renunciation by the FRG of the Hallstein Doctrine in the sense that while it would not apply any longer to Europe, it was fully in force in other areas. A Soviet statement of 8 February condemned the continuance of this Doctrine and the FRG*s claim to sole representation of the German people. In a speech by GDR Politburo member Albert Norden on 5 February he rejected reunification of the GDR with the FRG, a state which he considered monopolistic and fascist — a rejection later reinforced by the new nationality law published by the GDR on 20 February. 13 • In statements made in London, Premier Kosygin condemned what he assessed as a rise of Nazism in West Germany, and he also called upon the FRG to prove its sincerity by accepting present realities in Europe - recognition of the GDR, acceptance of present State boundaries in Europe, and renunciation of nuclear weapons. 14. It was the issue of a non-proliferation treaty which most exacerbated the relationship between the FRG and the Socialist states. As mentioned in last month's Note, West German officials had objected to what they considered the adverse technological effects which a non-proliferation treaty would have on non-nuclear states. During February less emphasis was placed on the technological situation and more on the issue of control machinery to police such an agreement. 1^. The reported agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for inspection of nuclear reactors by the IAEA was opposed by West Germany, Italy and other EURATOM members who would prefer that whatever inspection there was should be carried out by EURATOM. Their major fear was said to be industrial espionage. Despite this, in London on 9 February Mr. Kosygin still said the FRG would have to sign such an agreement. 16. President Johnson in a special message to the EHDC on SI February and Mr. Wilson during his visit to the FHG, gave assurances to non-nuclear powers that they would not suffer by accepting a non-proliferation agreement. -k- 17. A UK White Paper on Defence published on 16 February suggested that European security could be enhanced by an East-West troop withdrawal from Central Europe. The suggestion was made at a time when calls were being made in the US Congress for withdrawals of US troops from Europe, and the Pentagon was said to be contemplating such withdrawals. Opinion in the United Kingdom, particularly among the Labour "backbenchers" in Parliament, called for some troop withdraval from the Army on the Rhine. 18. The Tripartite Conference (the USA, UK and FRG) on offset agreements opened in London on 27 February. It was against the background of West German statements that it would not enter into new offset agreements. UK officials threatened to make significant withdrawals from their Army on the Rhine unless firm guarantees on offset payments were made. Diplomatic aspects of the war in Vietnam 19. A report appeared in the Hew York Times on 2 February that the DRV, through diplomatic intermediaries, had drawn US attention to the statements made by Foreigi Minister Trinh regarding modalities for peace negotiations on Vietnam. Then in an article appearing in the Hew York Times on 8 February, Mr. Wilfred Burdi ett reaffirmed that the DRV was ready for negotiations.-' Much significance was seen also in Premier Kosygin*s statement—' in London reiterating the conditions set out by Mr. Trinh. In a speech at the Guildhall on 8 Jebruary, Mr. Kosygin said, inter alia; "The first step in this direction must be the unconditional discontinuance of American air raids and all other aggressive acts against the Vietnam Democratic Republic'(VDR). As stated recently by the VDR Foreign Minister, this step is necessary in order to make possible talks between the Vietnam Democratic Republic and the USA. The Soviet Government welcomes this statement and regards it as an important and constructive proposal aimed at ending the war." 20. Although the assumption was that the DRV now only asked cessation of bombing without further insistence on the four points, these points were emphasized in the

I/ Wilfred Burchett, "Hanoi will talk if bombing halts, Burchett says", New York Times, 8 February 1967. 2/ At a news conference on 9 February, Mr. Kosygin again referred to what he called "one new factor in the Vietnam situation" - a reference to the interview with Mr. Trinh who said negotiations would follow if the United States stopped bombing. -5- reply of 13 February which President Ho Chi Minh sent to a letter from Pope President Ho*s letter said in part: M... The US imperialists must put an end to their aggression in Vietnam, end unconditionally and definitively the "bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all American " ?..-. and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National : Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. Only in such conditions can real peace "be restored in Vietnam." 21. Another indication of DRV interest in peace negotiation was seen in an article appearing in Khan Dan on 16 February. A commentator interpreted Mr. Trinh1s statement as a clear offer to negotiate with the single condition of an unqualified cessation of US bombing. Coming after the United States had resumed bombing, it accused the United States of having changed its position when it appeared that negotiations would be imminent.—' 22. It is interesting to note that towards the end of the month Mai Van Bo, I1 the DRV representative in Western Europe, in a conversation with New York imes reporters in Paris on 22 February was reaffirming that the DRV would negotiate if the United States would accept the Trinh conditions. US expresses pessimism about "serious efforts" for peace 23. While the DRV and it s supporters were emphasizing their willingness to negotiate if the United States ceased bombing the DRV, US officials were expressing pessimism.^-/ At a news conference in Washington on 2 February, President Johnson

3/ On 7 February the Pope sent letters to the Presidents of the United States, the DRV and South Viet tarn appealing for an extension of the Tet truce so that negotiations for peaceful settlement might become possible. The text of his letter to the United States appeared in the New York Times on 9 February 1967. US officials were reported to have assessed Ho Chi Minn's reassertion of the four points as indicating that the DRV was not firmly committed to the conditions set forth by Foreign Minister Trinh. k/ Hewsweek of 5 February reported that during Us visit to Paris, Senator Robert Kennedy was informed of the procedures the DRV would follow in settling the war in Vietnam. The US Embassy in Paris had set up meetings for Senator Kennedy with M. Etienne Manac'h, the Director of Asian Affairs in the Foreign Ministry on 31 January. Mr. Kennedy was said to have been accompanied to the meeting by Mr. John Dean, the Paris Embassy expert on Vietnam affairs. Mr. Manac'h was said to have presented a three-stage plan which he considered represented the position of the DRV on peace negotiations. These stages were: (i) bilateral discussion of relations between the United States and the DRV; (ii) discussion regarding future American role in South Vietnam; and (iii) an over-all settlement on Vietnam. 2/ In a TV interview made public on 1 February, Secretary of State Rusk gave some indication that the USA accepted the assessment of DRV willingness to negotiate. He said their willingness to negotiate was due to the developments in China. -6- dampened hopes for negotiations when he reiterated that he had detected no "serious effort" on the part of the DRV to negotiate on the war. While emphasizing US determination to continue the war until a peaceful settlement was reached, he asserted that the United States would go half way to meet -the DRV in arriving at this settlement. The serious tone of his remarks on Vietnam was one of the early indications that the United States was not contemplating any halt to the bombing of North Vietnam for any extended period. He had said the United States would halt bombing if the DRV would take "just almost any step" to justify such a move. However, he added that "they have not taken any yet". 24. The same pessimism was expressed by Mr. Walt Bestow in response to a question on prospects for peace at a meeting in Washington on k February. While conceding that it was "a bad time to discuss any particular negotiating track", he added: "... This is an extremely interesting and delicate phase in what is or might turn out to be a negotiating process. ... Nothing has yet happened that would justify us as saying that we have a serious offer to negotiate." Mr. Rostov's remarks were interpreted by some American correspondents as indicating that peace negotiations were already going on. US calls for reciprocal military measures from the DHV for its halting of bombing 25. Even though the United States expressed doubts about DEV sincerity of intention to negotiate, there was a favourable world-wide response to Mr. Trinh's statement. This response increased pressure on the United States to cease bombing in order to bring about negotiations. It was perhaps to react-'to this increased pressure that the United States set out in clear terms what kinds of response it expected from the DRV in order to bring about cessation of bombing. The first indication of the US conditions was set out in the reply which President Johnson sent on 8 February to Pope Paul's appeal for extension of the Tet truce. George Christian, the White House Press Secretary, said that President Johnson's reply reiterated that no reduction in American military action should be expected unless

§J Max Frankel of the Hew York Times wrote from Washington on 10 February that President Johnson's letter to Pope Paul and Mr. Rusk*s news conference of 9 February were primarily intended to transfer diplomatic pressures by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and others back to the DRV. It is of interest to note that Mr. Rusk gave bis news conference, where he stressed the need for reciprocity, after he had listened to the TV satellite transmission of Premier Kosygin's news conference in London on 9 February. -7- it was "balanced by similar reduction of military activity by the DRV". This was a reference to what Secretary of State Rusk called "the necessity for elementary reciprocity" at his news conference on 9 February. In an opening statement to that conference, Mr. Rusk called for reciprocal military action from the DRV before the United States would end bombing. The significant portion of his statement said: "But for some time now there has been evident a systematic campaign by the Communist side to bring about an unconditional and permanent cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam without any corresponding military action on their side in exchange for the possibility of talks -- talks which are thus far formless and without content. We cannot accept a situation in which men and arms move, without interruption by us, to cross the 17th parallel and attack allied armed forces and Vietnamese civilians in the south. We must know the military consequences of such a military action on our part. They must not expect us to stop our military action by bombing *hile they continue their military action by invasion. No one has been able or willing to give us any information on this subject." 26. There was general surprize at the US insistence on a reciprocal measure. Many commentators recalled that the United States had declared its interest in any kind of indication of North Vietnamese willingness to negotiate in order for the United States to end bombing. Why, it was asked, was the United States now demanding a reciprocal military action? Critics of US policy speculated that the United States was calling for this reciprocal measure because it had no intention of negotiating, knowing full well that the DRV couH not agree to cessation of military commitment to the NLF. These critics were in a sense asserting that the cessation of DRV support to NLF forces in South Vietnam was not commensurate with cessation of US bombing. For example, it was suggested that the United States had not offered to end military support to its own and Allied forces in South Vietnam. 27. In response to this criticism, US officials maintained that the Administration had not changed its position — it had always requested indication of what reciprocal military action the DRV would undertake if the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam. Here it should be emphasized that there is a difference of opinion as to whether the earlier US conditions had been affected by the DRV call for permanent cessation. Mr. Rusk drew attention to the fact that the DRV was not demanding a pause in bombing - which would have made it possible for the United States to agree to something similar to the 37-day pause undertaken early in 1966 - but was calling -8- for a permanent end to the raids.-7L/ 28. The US call for reciprocal military measures was criticized by the DRV and the Soviet Union, as well as "by other Socialist states and Western critics of US policy in Vietnam. At a luncheon given in his honour "by the Assn. of French Diplomatic Press and the Anglo-American Press Association of Paris on 2k February, Prince Norodom Sihanouk said that he was authorized by Mai Van Bo to say that the DRV could not possibly stop helping "its southern brothers who must liberate themselves from the American invasion11. The Prince stated that this was the DRV*s answer to the US call for a reciprocal military gesture to a halting of US bombing. 29. An article by Vikeriby Matveyev in Izvestia did hint that the DRV might offer a reciprocal move if the United States ended the bombing raids. He said: "The ending of American raids on the territory of North Vietnam would give the signal for the reverse process - the limiting of the scope of military operations and, finally, their complete cessation." Wilson-Kosygin negotiations « 30. In conjunction with these reports of DRV readiness for negotiation and the enunciation of the US condition on a reciprocal gesture, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Kosygin held intensive talks on the war. News reports from London indicated that the Prime Minister had had several telephone conversations with President Johnson as part of his attempt with Mr. Kosygin for reaching some agreement to negotiation on Vietnam. The reports said that President Johnson had transmitted to Mr. Wilson the US demand for reciprocal military gestures from the DRV, and that Mr. Kosygin had endeavoured to win the DRV leaders* support for some sort of gesture which would warrant the cessation of US bombing. Since the United States resumed its raids on 13 February, it was evident that the Wilson-Kosygin talks had not been able to bring about their hopes. 51. In a statement issued after Premier Kosygin1s visit, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were declared ready to make every effort for peace negotiation

!/ Many commentators pointed out that the Soviet Union never mentioned the word "permanent" cessation of bombing, and there are doubts about whether Mr. Trinh did call for a. permanent end of bombing. The article published by Mr. Burchett mentioned above did state categorically that the DRV was demanding permanent ending of the raids. In this sense then it is difficult to see how the North Vietnamese position could be taken as one calling only for a pause in the bombing. -9- in Vietnam, and they agreed to maintain contact to this end.—' 32. In further elaboration of the London talks, Mr. Wilson told the House of Commons on Ik Sebruary, and repeated the same day on a TV speech transmitted to the United States, that he and the Soviet Premier had worked very hard to arrange for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. He said, inter alia that; "One single, simple act of trust could have achieved it". He repeated that the machinery to achieve the peace was all prepared and could "be "brought into operation by Ma very very small movement". 33. There is no explanation of what he meant by machinery for settlement, but US officials were reported dissatisfied with the impression Mr. Wilson had given that peace was imminent. 3^. Another point raised concerned the kinds of conditions which Premier Eosygin demanded for DRV military reduction of its troops in the South. No information has been published which would throw light on why the Soviet Premier was willing to transmit to the DRV the US call for reciprocal military measures. Resumption of bombing of the DRV 35. It was reported in Saigon on 13 ^February that US aircraft bad resumed bombing North Vietnam after a pause of nearly six days. Pour hours later President Johnson issued a statement in Washington which gave the reason for this resumption. It said that the United States had hoped the truce periods connected with Christmas, New Year and Tet would have led to some abatement of hostilities and to moves towards peace. The statement went on to say that the DRV had used the truce periods "for major re-supply efforts of their troops in South Vietnam1'.^' The statement

8/ British and American officials found it significant that Premier Kosygin was ~" BOW willing to Join the United Kingdom in the search for negotiation. In the past, Soviet officials, although co-chairmen with the United Kingdom for the Geneva Conference, had been unwilling to join in the search for negotiation, unless specifically requested to do so by the DRV. £/ Prior to the resumption of bombing there were several reports emanating from official US sources that the DRV was dispatching large numbers of men and supplies to the South. Ibr example, Mr. Robert McCloskey indicated on 10 February that the State Department and other interested officials were "seriously concerned" over reports that the DRV was sending increased supplies to its forces in South Vietnam. He recounted that US military men in Saigon had cited reports indicating that during the first two days of the Tet truce, the DRV had shipped more equipment into South Vietnam than "during the whole of January", He said these reports cast doubt on whether the DRV was "genuinely interested in a peaceful settlement" of the war. In a statement to the House of Commons on lk February, Prime Minister Wilson accepted this argument for the resumption of bombing. He asserted: "In particular, the massive southward movement of troops and supplies in the North, on a scale far greater than in the Christmas, or indeed in any previous ceasefire, threatened to -10- then concluded: "... Under these circumstances, in fairness to our own troops and those of our allies, we had no alternative but to resume full-scale hostilities after the ceasefire period. But the door is open and will remain open, and we are prepared at any time to go more than halfway to meet any equitable overture from the other side." 36. Resumption of bombing, according to reports from Washington, had been delayed for abaut h& hours following the resumption of ground and air hostilities within South Vietnam by US and South Vietnamese forces on 12 February, this being the end of the 4-day truce recognized by the US and Allied forces. The NLF forces had proposed a 7-day truce period. It was later disclosed in Washington that President Johnson had delayed resumption of bombing in deference to the efforts of Prime Minister Wilson and Premier Kosygin who were engaged in a search for peaceful settlement. It was only after Mr. Kosygin had left London that the bombing of North Vietnam was resumed; warning that resumption was to proceed was reported to have been communicated to Premier Kosygin by Mr. Wilson. 37- Besumption of US raids was vigorously condemned by the NLF, DRV, USSR, GPR and other opponents of the US position in Vietnam. It was asserted that it only revealed US insincerity in calling for peace talks, and it was also viewed as sabotage of favourable conditions for peace talks. Reasons for the resumption 38. Critics and supporters of the US position agreed that the bombing was resumed for reasons other than those given in official US statements. In the first place, it was felt that President Johnson and his close advisers believed that the bombing was hurting North Vietnam and they thus considered that the military pressure must be continued. They are also said to see a weakening of the

£/ cont. create a severe military unbalance. It also made it harder for the Americans to believe that the North Vietnamese leaders wished to use the truce for an effort to peace rather than for a further effort in war. ..." A spokesman for the NLF forces charged on 9 February that the US and Allied forces had committed several violations of the truce. Opponents aad critics of US policy questioned the reliability of the military figures relating to the number of men and supplies allegedly sent to the South. They noted that conflicting figures had been published in the past about men and supplies "infiltrated" into South Vietnam. They also questioned the justification of US complaint or concern over DRV supplies to the South when the United States itself was engaged in supplying its forces in South Vietnam. Ibr conflicting figures about the size of the "infiltration" to the South, see R.w. Appei Jr., "Vietnam Numbers Game", New York Times, o February 1967. -II-

DRV resolve, evidenced in its willingness to enter into talks. Furthermore, President Johnson is said to be convinced that his "bombing policy is supported by a large number of Americans.•==£/ President Johnson and his advisers are also said to feel that the DHV aid NLF forces are in disarray. Finally, they hope the projected election of a civilian government in South Vietnam will improve the bargaining position of the Allied forces.—' Escalation of the War 39. Although President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson assessed the resumption of bombing as not closing the door to peace talks, military measures initiated by the United States after resumption of bombing cast some doubt on this assessment. Indeed it is now widely asserted by opponents of US/policy that the present US objective is a military solution. 1*0. Two significant military measures were initiated .•==' Firstly, the US Command in Saigon announced on 2k February that on the 21st 195 mm. guns at Camp Carrol - 10 miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) - began firing into the zone and beyond. "This action", the spokesman said, "is designed to supplement air strikes against military targets in the demilitarized zone area, particularly at night and in bad weather",

10 / A Gallup poll taken after the United States recommenced bombing of North Vietnam, the result of which was pifclished in the New York Times on 27 February, showed that out of 1506 persons interviewed, 6l% favoured continuation of the raids on the DRV. , ll/ Max Frankel, "Doubts on Peace Bids", Hew York Times, 10 February 1967. 12/ There were other military moves which suggested that the United States intended to further escalate the war to increase pressure on the DRV« Pentagon sources on 28 Feb. announced that the United States was planning to step up the war against SAM missiles in North Vietnam. They said that to carry out increased attacks, more Shrike missiles would be shipped to the war zone and additional aircraft equipped to carry them over North Vietnam. The Shrikes, which use "enemy" radar as a guide, will be employed to neutralize what some military specialists call "one of the tightest air defences ever installed anywhere". It was also reported on 23 Feb. that the United States had started Operation Junction City, the largest offensive operation of the war, in search of the NLF headquarters said to be near the Cambodian border. In an emergency message sent by the DRV High Command to the ICC on 25 Feb. this military action was condemned as "savage attacks" on the DMZ and on Vinh Ha commune in Vinh Linh area. -12-

A DRV Foreign Ministry statement published on 26 February condemned this action. It asserted that it constituted a "new and extremely serious step of war escalation taken by the US imperialists". It also said: "The DRV Foreign Ministry demands that the US Govern- ment respect the temporary demarcation line and the statute of the demilitarized zone, definitively and unconditionally stop its bombings and all other war acts against the DRV, withdraw all troops of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their internal affairs." kl. Even while the firing across the DMZ was being condemned, it was announced in Saigon on 27 February that US Navy planes had laid a "limited number of air- delivered, non-floating" mines in rivers in the southern part of the DRV. These were said to be designed to stop the movement of sampans and junks to the South. The US Defence Department said the mining of rivers for the first time did not represent an escalation of the war. 14-2. At a news conference on 27 February President Johnson also refused to label these military actions as "escalation". He said, however, that they were "far reaching". 4j. Opponents and critics of US policy all agreed that these measures were clear escalation of the war. DRV Radio on 28 February denounced the mining of the rivers as "a new escalation of the war by the US imperialists". It said the incident, which had been protested to the ICC, proved that the United States had been engaged in a "peace hoax". hk. In a speech at a dinner in the Kremlin on 27 February in honour of Emperor Haile Selassie, President Podgorny charged the United States with having rejected peace moves made by DRV Foreign Minister Trinh. He went on to observe: "But the US Government has resumed the bombing. What is more, American troops have started shelling the demilitarized zone, and an order has been issued for the systematic shelling of the DRV coast by US warships. In this way Washington has again shown the entire world the hypocrisy and falseness of its broadly publicized 'peace proposal* and 'quest for peace* in Vietnam." Prospects for peace 45. As noted above, US officials - and this is also true of Prime Minister Wilson - believe that the resumption of bombing combined with the escalation of the war has not closed the door to peace talks. DRV and NLF officials however -13- have concluded that there is no hope for peace talks now. ^6« JUrthermore, a major obstacle to the holding of peace talks is the apparent lack of trust between the United States and the DRV. Because of it, neither side has been able to rely on the avowal of peaceful intentions by the other side. It should be added that the wide divergence in the final political objectives of the two sides is a contributory factor to the lack of progress towards peace negotiation. Vf. It is now generally agreed that only cessation of US bombing will enhance the chances for peace talks. But this is precisely the step that President Johnson is reluctant to take. In the absence of any change in US bombing policy, the prospects for negotiation remain faint. President Johnson's present uncompromising position was revealed in a report of a meeting he had with farm leaders at the White House: he was said to have asserted; "We have reached a point where all the king's horses and all the king's men are not going to move us out of our position." !£/ This statement, along with the determination of the NLP and DRV leaders, deepened the impasse in the search for peace in Vietnam. US-USSR Relations ^8. The most significant factor in US-USSR relations was the strong hope expressed by US officials that Soviet leaders would assist the United States in reaching a peaceful and honourable settlement of the war. These officials and commentators continue to speak of a US-USSR detente. They point to the quiet and unspectacular negotiations in which American and Soviet officials have pursued a whole array of matters - among them a non-proliferation agreement.-^' k$. In an opening statement at his news conference of 2 February, President Johnson appealed for Senate ratification of the US-USSR Consular Treaty. He and his

It was noted that some Western commentators had asserted that the DRV conditions for peace talks - the cessation of US bombing - were still in force in spite of the resumption of the raids. Considerable international interest was shown when it was reported at the end of the month that a DRV mission, headed by Col. Ha Van Law, Chief DRV representative on the ICC, had arrived in Rangoon where U Thant was spending a private vacation. There was speculation tibat a peace move would be discussed Although U Thant did meet Le Tong Sun, the DRV Consul General in Rangoon, no new moves were announced. !§/ White House sources later refused to confirm that the President had used this expression. l6/ See, Max Frankel, "US sees an 'Alliance against major war'11, Hew York Times, 26 Jebruary 1967, p. E.3. -Ik- close advisers have also appealed to Congress to pass the East-West Trade Bill - both measures viewed by US officials as elements in improving US-Soviet relations. 30. But while US officials maintained optimism on the trends in these relations, Soviet leaders remained sceptical of any marked improvement while the Vietnam war continued .—L17f / j^ ixjndon Premier Kosygin condemned US policy in Vietnam. Previous Notes have, however, noted that in spite of the war, US and the USSR are maintaining their minimum contact which their joint responsibility as major Powers demands. 51. American and Soviet officials announced on 1^ February that on the 15th they had signed a treaty which would permit Russian commercial fishing within prescribed areas within the 12-miles zone in the Gulf of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. The Russians were also given permission to conduct loading operations, but not fishing rights, in prescribed zones off Oregon, Washington State and Alaska. 52. The question of a moratorium in the deployment of an ABM system was the topic of discussion between Soviet and American officials. As noted in January, President Johnson sent a special letter to Premier Kosygin on 27 January on this subject. At a news conference in London on 9 February, Premier Kosygin was asked for his views on such a moratorium. Although not directly answering the question, he spoke in general terms about the comparative value and costs of offensive and defensive weapons systems, asserting that: "The antimissile system probably costs more than an offensive weapon. But these questions are unrelated. "You see, there are other ways of solving this problem, more serious ways that would really help mankind. M^ou know that we favor altogether a ban of nuclear weapons and nuclear stockpiles. We are ready to do so not because we have few of them, but probably because we have a lot of them. And we think that mankind has no need for nuclear weapons." l8/ 53. Some interest was shown by US officials in a later commentary by Pravda which interpreted Premier Kosygin1s remarks as indicating willingness to hold talks with the United States on arms reduction, in both offensive and defensive systems. 5*1.. The seriousness of the ABM issue was indicated in a letter of 12 February in which President Johnson transmitted to Congress the 6th Annual Report of the Arms

IT/ See, Raymond H. Anderson, "Moscow says Vietnam is the key", Hew York Times, 26 February 1967, p. E.3- 18/ Some US commentators interpreted Premier Kosygin's remarks as a rejection of President Johnson's appeal for a US-Soviet understanding on a moratorium on an ABM system. However, at a 9 February news conference, Mr. Rusk said he would not take Premier Kosygin*s remarks as his last word on the subject. -15- Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr. Johnson expressed "high" hopes for an agreement to ban the spread of nuclear weapons, but he cautioned that the United States and the USSR vere being drown into another "futile escalation of the atomic arms race" - a reference to the ABM system. 55. On 18 February it was reported that Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson had conferred for over two hours in Moscow with Mr. Kosygin. In Washington on 21 February, Mr. Robert McCloskey disclosed that they had discussed President Johnson*s proposal for a moratorium on deployment of an ABM system. The USSR was said to be showing continuing interest in seeking understanding on strategic missile problems, including both defensive and offensive weapons. US officials concluded that the USSR would prefer to see broad discussions on the moratorium on ABM take up the even more complex question of freeze and/or reduction of offensive missile systems where the United States is reported by American analysts to have a three-to-one lead over the Soviet Union.& 56. Meanwhile US military authorities and their Congressional supporters have urged Congress to initiate an ABM programme. William Beecher of the Hew York Times reported from Washington on 9 February that the Defence Department had announced that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended heavy protection against hostile missiles for fifty of the largest cities in the United States.—2O'/ As noted previously, Defence Secretary McKamara has objected to the production of an ABM system because he believed the estimated cost of to billion dollars would not improve the security of the United States. The Pentagon has made several plans to improve the penetration capability of US offensive weapons .==/ 57• On the programme Meet the Press on 26 February, General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly disagreed with Mr. McNamara when he called for an American ABM system. He said he did not believe His system would set off an expensive arms race, and he asserted that there was no reason to believe

19/ President Johnson announced on 2 March thfc he had received a letter from Premier Kosygin indicating Soviet interest in US-USSR talks on limitation of the arms race in the areas of offensive and defensive weapons. These talks are soon to take place between Ambassador Thompson and Soviet officials. Although President Johnson expressed optimism over Mr. Kosygin's letter, many commentators felt he had announced the contents of the letter as one of a series of moves by the Administration to lessen the impact of a speech,made the same day, in which Senator Kennedy had in the Senate called for cessation of US bombing of the DRV. 20/ William Beecher, "Joint Chiefs urge missile defence", Hew York Times, 10 February 1967. 21/ Hanson W. Baldwin, "Soviet anti-missile system spurs new US weapons", Hew York Times, 5 February 1967. -16- the Soviet Union could afford the resources required to increase its offensive capability to a point where the US system would become ineffective. Finally he said the United States could build an ABM system by means of underground nuclear tests,2£/ without violation of the Limited Test Ban Agreement. 58. Proponents of an American ABM system were encouraged by a report published in the Soviet Union indicating that the USSR had a foolproof ABM system. Statements by General Pavel Balitsky, a Deputy Defence %nister, and by General Pavel Kurochkin, Head of the Frunze Military Academy, were interpreted in the United States as confirmation of the USSR's now having an ABM system which could protect it from nuclear attack. General Kurochkin was quoted as saying in reply to a question: "Detecting missiles in time and destroying them in flight is no problem". 59• Those opposed to an ABM system were also encouraged when Marshall Andrei Grechko, the First Deputy Defence Minister, and Marshall Vasily Chuikore, Head of the Soviet Civil Defence Programme, stated on 22 February that an ABM system could not prevent all "enemy" rockets froa reaching their targets. This has been the position of Mr. McNamara and other American opponents of such a system.-*23^ / 60. Since Soviet-American competition in the deployment of an ABM system would undoubtedly create another spiral in the arms race and worsen relations, it is generally believed that these States will find some accommodation in reducing and/ or freezing their offensive and defensive weapons systems.

22/ This was in contradiction of a statement made by Mr. Goldwater on 26 February, Mr. Goldwater had suggested that the United States must invoke the abrogation clause in the Test Ban Agreement to make it possible for the United States to conduct atmospheric tests for an ABM system. 23V American proponents and opponents of an ABM system differ on two crucial points. They disagree on whether the Soviet Union has deployed an ABM system around Leningrad and Moscow or throughout the Soviet Union. Proponents take the latter view. Those relying on the Soviet ABM system believe it is not similar to the US Nike-X missile but is based on a n atmospheric nuclear blast which could create a blanket through which no missile could penetrate: that is to say, with an ABM system patterned along an atmospheric blast, there is no need for the sophistication of a Nike-X system which must discriminate among decoys in order to neutralize a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, in the case of an atmospheric blanket, even with improved penetration capability of missiles like the project Poseidon, they could still fail to reach their targets. -17- US-CPR Relations 61. There was no major development in US-CPR relations. US officials continued to follow the development of the Great Cultural Revolution in the CPR and there were reports in Washington that official assessments of these developments encouraged US official belief that further military pressure on the DRV would compel it to make further concessions. The reasoning was that the turmoil in the CPR must convince DRV leaders that they could not hope for assistance from China. 62. On 9 February the American Defence Department announced that an unarmed US Navy plane had accidentally flown over Hainan Island. An article in Chiehfeng Chun Pao, the armed forces newspaper, on 11 February denounced as "an out and out lie" the American explanation that its aircraft had accidentally flown over Hainan; the article concluded that the intrusion was linked with American invasion plans against the CPR. A previous monthly Note has mentioned US reports to the effect that President Johnson had forbidden American pilots to fly within 25 to 30 miles of the CPR border. It is not known whether there is a similar zone around Hainan Island. The FRG* a policy towards Eastern Europe 63. Lack of credibility in the FRG's policy to Eastern Europe slowed down the momentum created when the Federal Republic and Romania agreed to establish diplomatic relations on 31 January. The major problem surrounds the demand which Socialist countries are making that the FRO meet certain conditions before the sincerity of its policy is accepted. These conditions are that the FRG recognize the present political realities in Europe, particularly as this concerns present political boundaries,2-t/ that West Germany abandon its claim to be the sole representative of the German people, and finally that it renounce all access to nuclear weapons. 6k. The speculation that the establishment of relations with Romania would amount to the renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine proved unfounded: Chancellor Kiesinger announced in the Bundestag on 1 February that the establishment of relations with Romania did not affect this Doctrine. The FRG had also informed embassies in Bonn on 31 January that it was maintaining the Hallstein Doctrine.-^' At a meeting between Chancellor Kiesinger and the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Tsarapkin, the latter was

Considerable official annoyance was evoked in the FRG when UK Foreign Secretary George Brown said on 13 February, in response to a question relating to the statement in the official declaration at the conclusion of Premier Kosygin*s visit, that recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was implied in the final declaration. However UK officials were quick to assert that Mr. Brown's statement did not amount to a change in British policy on the Oder-Neisse question, and this view was reiterated when Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Brown visited the FRG during February. 25/ It should be noted that while the Hallstein Doctrine has been abandoned in -18- informed that the FRG still considers itself the sole representative of the German people, a view vehemently attacked in a Soviet Government statement dated 8 February. The USSR reiterated that the Federal Republic must recognize the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic. The issue of the Hallstein Doctrine and its connexion with the FRG's policy towards Eastern Europe was reported to have also been the central theme of the Warsaw Pact meeting held in Warsaw from 8-10 February.^/ 65. Although Western reports concluded that the Warsaw Pact meeting failed to arrive at any agreed position on the responsibility of Eastern Europe towards West Germany's Eastern policy, a different conclusion was given in a report read by Guenter Kohrt, GDR State Secretary and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the GDR State Council on l6 February, where it was asserted that the Warsaw conference had arrived at two positions regarding West Germany: (i) it condemned the pretence of the FRG to sole representation of the German people. The report said in part: "There can be no normal relations between European States without reununciation of the claim to sole representation"; (ii) the conference unanimously adopted a statement that recognition of the GDR was a key to peace and international detente.—^ gj/cont'd. regard to Eastern Europe, it is maintained by the FRG in its relations with all non-European countries. 26 / A GDR editorial of 2 February criticized Romania for establishing diplomatic relations with t he FRG without insisting on FRG recognition of the GDR. The East German editorial felt Romania's action was contrary to the Bucharest Declaration on European Security published in July 1966. In an editorial of k February, the Romanian publication Scinteia reacted strongly against this criticism and justified its action by noting that it was made in the spirit of the Bucharest Declaration, in conformity with Romania's desire to have friendly relations with all countries. This difference of opinion betwenn Romania and the GDR, as well as reports that the GDR and Poland were anxious to keep other East European countries from diplomatic relations with the FRG, was said to have prompted the meeting of the Warsaw Pact members. 27/ Several East European countries and the Soviet Union criticized what they considered the revival of Nazism in the FRG. For instance, Premier Kosygin in statements in England criticized the Federal Republic for permitting again the rise of Nazism. -19-

66. It should Toe noted that the FRG explains its refusal to renounce the Hallstein Doctrine on the grounds that abandoning it would jeopardize any chance for the reunification of Germany, as well as weakening its claim to sole representation of the German people. 67. In light of these developments, it would seem that the FRG will not "be successful in extending its relations with Eastern Europe unless it is prepared to make some of the concessions demanded Toy the Socialist countries. The most pressing of these, apart from that relating to the boundaries, is the question of a non- proliferation agreement. 68. It is precisely the reunification of Germany which is in doubt at the moment. Within the past few months statements have been made by GDR and Soviet officials hinting that the reunification of Germany might not be possible at the present time. These hints were strengthened on 5 February by a statement from Herr Albert Korden, a member of the SED Politburo. He recounted the developments within the FRG which indicated that West Germany was both a "revanchist" and a "fascist" state. lu light of these developments, he said: "Since such a situation has developed in the Federal Republic, our position toward West Germany must be crystal clear. There are two German states. The citizens of one have entered the socialist age and are building a society of peoplefs democracy. The other German state is monopoly capitalist in structure and essence. It treats its workers in a high-handed and arbitrary fashion, and is riddled and controlled by old and neo-Nazi elements bent on crossing its borders. Naturally there can be no unification with this state, as our friend and comrade from the Domowina pointed out. The GDR, which is moving tempestuously along the socialist path, will not look back to the past." 28/ The non-proliferation issue 69. The opposition of FEG officials to certain aspects of the draft treaty on non-proliferation, which was discussed in last month's Note, continued in February. But whereas the earlier opposition related to technological effects of such a treaty, much of the opposition during February related to the question of inspection. US-USSR negotiators had agreed on Article 3 of the draft treaty which provided for the

SB/ Underlining ours. On 20 February the GDE adopted a Nationality Bill which dispensed with the legal concept of common German citizenship which existed in both East and West Germany. Under the bill, East Germans will no longer be known as Germans but as citizens of the GDR. This bill was widely interpreted in West Germany as a step by the GDR to prevent the reunification of Germany. For more details of this development and Herr Wehrer's reassertion of his co-federation plan, see Note on European Relations - February 1967 . See also Dietrich Schwarzkopf, "Wehner's einladung zur konffederation". Die Welt, 27 February 1967, and Matthias Walden, "Sind, bleiben die Deutschen eine Nation?", Die Welt, 28 February -20-

inspection of nuclear reactors by the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to ensure compliance with the agreement. The FBG was joined in opposition to the draft treaty Toy Italy and other West European countries. They feared that inspection by the IAEA, which is an agency of the United Nations, would result in industrial espionage. The West European preference was for inspection by EURATOM, the West European atomic agency. The Soviet Union was reported to have objected to any inspection by EURATOM. During his visit to Washington at the beginning of the month, Foreign Minister Willy Brandt discussed with US officials the opposition of the FRG to these aspects of the draft treaty. He was reported to 29 / have been assured by Mr. Busk that the interests of the FRG would be safeguarded .-^ 70. US officials have been alarmed not only by the opposition of European officials to the draft treaty on non-proliferation but also because of the ground-swell of opposition within the FRG. For instance, the prominent scientist Dr. Carl Friedric von Weizsacker, who is a recognized liberal, has outlined certain objections to the treaty similar to those of FRG officials. He agreed that the treaty would amount to creating a new technological supremacy for the nuclear Powers, and went on to suggest a means of inspection alternative to the IAEA or EURATOM. It was the utilization of the so-called "black boxes" idea, i.e. instead of physical inspection of nuclear reactors, "black boxes" would be placed in strategic positions which would reveal any conversion of plutonium to non-peaceful uses.^—' 71• In order to allay the fears expressed by FRG officials and other European leaders, Prime Minister Wilson and President Johnson offered assurances to them. In a message read to the ENDC on 21 February, President Johnson stated inter alia; "I am sure we all agree that a non-proliferation treaty should not contain any provisions that would defeat its major purpose. The treaty must, therefore, cover nuclear explosive devices for peaceful as well as military purposes. The technology is the same. A peaceful nuclear explosive device would, in effect, also be a highly sophisticated weapon.

29/ It is interesting to note that West European leaders have accused the United States of abandoning its alliance obligation by agreeing to a non- proliferation draft with the Soviet Union. In general, West European leaders tended to view the collaboration between the UNited States and the USSR on a non- proliferation treaty as a new form of Soviet-American hegemony. See John W. Finney, "US-European discord", Hew York Times, 16 Feb. 1967, and David Binder, "Nuclear pact draft makes Bonn less eager to rely upon NATO", Hew York Times, 19 Feb. 1967. 30/ For the text of Dr. von WeizsScker's article, see "Automkontrolle nur durch schwarze kasten", Frankfurter Allgemeine geitung, 28 Feb. 19&7- -21-

However, this will not impose any technological penalty on the participating nations. The United States is prepared to make available nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international safeguards. We are prepared to join other nuclear states in a commitment to do this." 72. At the 9 February news conference in London, Premier Kosygin was asked whether he believed the FRG would sign a non-proliferation agreement in light of the objections voiced by FRG officails. He answered in part: "As far as the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, I aiust tell you that, whether it likes it or not, the document must be signed because we will not allow the Federal Republic of Germany to have nuclear weapons. "We will do all we can to prevent it from having them, and we will take measures that will make it impossible for it to have nuclear weapons. We are saying this with all resoluteness." In response to Premier Kosygin*a remarks, Chancellor Kiesinger said in Oberhausen on 11 February that "... If we sign such a treaty, no one will force us to do it except our own opinions and our concepts". 73- The deadlock caused by the opposition from FRG and other European leaders makes it unlikely that a non-proliferation agreement will be concluded very soon. This is contrary to the earlier expectation that such an agreement would soon be signed. Already the US negotiator in the ENDC, Mr. Foster, is travelling throughout Western Europe giving assurances to European leaders that signing a non-proliferation agreement would be in their own interests. However, it has been reported that the Soviet Union will not sign an agreement which contains any understanding by tte United States that a European nuclear force is not prohibited by the treaty. Nor will it consent to an agreement which would rule out inspection by the lAEA.^-i/ HATO affairs and European security 7^. On 16 February the United Kingdom published its White Paper on Defence. In it the suggestion was made that, because of the lessening of tension in Europe, it might be necessary to make some troop withdrawal. The White Paper stated inter alia; "The British Government believes that both the political and military furthering of the detente would best be achieved by mutual reduction of the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers. This measure of arms control, besides giving

Thomas J. Hamilton, "Atom Pact faces a delay as Soviet makes objections", New Yo rk Times, 21 February 1967. -22- both sides greater security, would create a better climate in which to approach the major political problems of the European continent and would liberate resources for the economy. Whether or not this is possible in the immediate future NATO can, for many reasons, take a more confident view of Soviet intentions in 1967 than in 19^9 or 1956. Soviet society has undergone important political and economic changes. China has become a factor which the Soviet Government cannot ignore. And the continuing strength of NATO has had a decisive effect". 5£/ 75 • The UK proposal for troop withdrawal was matched by the continuing call by some Democrats in the US Senate for some major US troop withdrawal from Europe. Reports fromWashington indicated that the State Department was presently opposed to any troop withdrawal from Europe, while the Pentagon was not opposed to withdrawal of at least one or two divisions. Those proposing troop withdrawal have suggested that it should "be by East-West agreement on the withdrawal of forces from Central Europe 3&I 76. However there is no present evidence that an East-West agreement on the withdrawal of forces is imminent. What is more likely, in view of the lessening of tensions, is the withdrawal of some NATO forces from Europe. It is interesting to note that on 1 February the NATO Council tentatively approved a draft, first suggested by the Belgian Foreign Minister, which authorized a study of the requirements of NATO in the present situation in Europe. In light of the consensus among NATO members that there is no more threat to Western Europe, such a study will probably recommend a cutdown in the NATO force levels.

5£/ It should be noted that it has long been the objective of the British Government to withdraw ,some troops from its Army on the Ehine. It has been encounting some difficulty with the FRG in arriving at an agreed amount for off- setting the balance of payments problems. There were reports from West Germany indicating that the Finance Minister, Herr Strauss, was against the renewal of off-set agreements between the FRG and the United Kingdom and the United States. It was these reports which perhaps evoked the threat by UK officials that substantial numbers of troops would be withdrawn from the Army on the Rhine if agreement were not reached in the near future about offset payments. When the Tripartite Conference of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic resumed in London on 27 February, Mr. George Thomson, UK Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, made statements to this effect. Reports circulated in East Germany on 9 February that the Soviet Union was planning the withdrawal of troops from the GDR were not confirmed by Soviet officials. Pentagon officials stated that such rumours of Soviet troop withdrawal have been circulating in Europe for several months: they do not give much credence to them. -23-

Conclusion 77. This Note has examined the whole array of political and military developments which affected the relationships among the major Powers. In relation to the diplomatic developments in Vietnam, it was concluded that the prospects for peace talks were faint. The trend was observed as being towards escalation of the conflict. Continuing US interest in improved relations with the USSR was examined and an assessment made of the chances for a US-Soviet understanding on a moratorium in the deployment of an ABM system. The FRG is encountering difficulties in improving relations with Eastern Europe because its sincerity is doubted. The objections raised by the FRG, Italy and other non-nuclear states in Europe to certain aspects of the draft non-proliferation treaty have delayed agreement on the treaty. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION The Secretary-General

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OF POLZDICAL AND ^ April 1967 SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS Political Affairs Division

Monthly Survey

EAST-WEST RELATIONS MARCH 1967 NOTE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS — MARCH 196?

General Comments 1. The war in Viet-Nam continues to overshadow all other developments in East-West relations. Indeed it is largely the adverse effects of the war on these relations and its threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, together with the devastation in Viet-Nam that led many world leaders to reiterate their appeals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The increasing escalation of the war was evidenced by the record number of casualties on "both sides reported during the month. 2. The United States continued to increase the pressure on the DRV "by increasing the targets of its bombing in the North and on the NLF forces in South Viet-Nam. In response, the NLF forces in South Viet-Nam inflicted several surprise attacks on Allied forces. All these developments occurred within the context of the growing determination of the protagonists to pursue the war vigorously. 3. There is increasing evidence that, on both sides, a military solution to the conflict has a higher priority than the search for a peaceful settlement, although there is no apparent sign that either of the protagonists will yield on the battlefield. Some more moves towards a peaceful settlement were either made or announced during the month; among these were three proposals of special significance. „ , , Robert k. Senator/Kennedy in his speech in the Senate on 2 March outlined a 3-point proposal which included one for the cessation of US bombing of the DRV. 5- The DRV Foreign Ministry disclosed on 21 March that President Johnson and President Ho Chi Minn had exchanged letters on the war in Viet-Nam. A letter from President Johnson to President Ho Chi Minh had outlined a proposal by the United States for a DRV commitment to end its "infiltration" into South Viet-Nam as a quid pro quo for US cessation of bombing and a freeze on the troop level of US forces in South Viet-Nam. President Ho Chi Minh*s letter rejected the proposal and reiterated the four points of the DRV as well as the conditions laid down by Foreign Minister Trinh in his news conference last February with the Australian journalist Burchett. -2- «» 6. The third proposal was announced by U Thant at a news conference on 28 March. He stated that on Ik March he had sent an aide me'moire to the parties directly concerned with the war in Viet-Nam, calling for (a) a general standstill truce, (b) preliminary talks, and (c) a re-convening of the Geneva Conference. He stressed that these proposals were a reaffirmation of his original 3-point proposal and were made in the context of the present mood of the protagonists. He reaffirmed his belief that the cessation of US bombing of the DRV remained the key to the convening of a peace conference. 7. The United States continues to reject all calls for the cessation of bombing which are not coupled with a reciprocal military measure from the DRV. Because of the international pressure on the United States for a cessation of bombing, US officials set out during the month to make a vigorous defence of the bombing policy; the speech by President Johnson on 15 March before the Tennessee Legislature was significant in this defence. 8. At the Guam Conference which took placecon 20-21 March, according to US officials, no significant military decision was taken. They emphasized that the major purpose of the conference was to acquaint the new US civilian and diplomatic team in South Viet-Nam with the South Vietnamese leaders and to examine the progress made on the pacification program in South Viet-Nam as well as to review the result of the Constituent Assembly in the drafting of a new Constitution for South Viet-Nam. 9. However, DRV, NLP as well as CPR reports stated that the conference dealt essentially with military matters and was a prelude to further escalation of the war. They drew significance from the fact that the announcement made on 22 March that B-52's would be stationed in Thailand for use against the DRV, was made after the Guam Conference. 10. These diplomatic developments on Viet-Nam during the month did not affect the assessment of the past months that there is a continuing impasse in the search for peaceful settlement of the war. 11. US officials are still showing interest for a US-USSR detente even before the end of the war in Viet-Nam. In this regard President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk urged the Senate to consent to the Soviet-American Consular Agreement (signed on 17 June 196^). The Senate on l6 March consented to the Treaty and President Johnson on 31 March ratified it. US officials are also urging the Congress to approve the East-West trade bill, and Mr. Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg made a plea before the Senate for consent to the Space Treaty approved at the last session of the General Assembly. — '5 —

12. Although Soviet officials still insist that the war in Viet-Nam prevents any improvement in US-USSR relations, they have nonetheless whose interest in working with US officials in drafting a Don-proliferation agreement. President Johnson also announced on 2 March that Premier Kosygin has expressed interest in a US-USSR discussion on a moratorium in the deployment of an ABM and offensive weapons systems. The Soviet Union also is testing US sincerity in its appeal for a Soviet-American detente by requesting whether the Soviet Union would "be allowed to "bid for the hydroelectric turbines needed for increasing the generating capacity of the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington State. 13. The Socialist countries in Europe responded negatively to the FRG's enunciated policy of rapprochement with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They charged that no significant change had been noticed in the policy of Chancellor Kiesinger since the Government refused to accept the present realities in Europe. The FRG was also charged by these countries with using its Eastern policy to isolate the GDR. In a speech made by Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev on 10 March in the Kremlin he accused the FRG of being a threat to the peace in Europe. I!*-. It was widely observed in the FRG that it was to counter any success of the FRG policy in Eastern Europe that several friendship and mutual assistance treaties were signed between members of the Warsaw Pact during the month. On 1 March Poland and Czechoslovakia signed a 20-year:, treaty. On 15 March the GDR and Poland signed another, and on 17 March the GDR and Czechoslovakia also signed a 20-year treaty. The significance of these treaties lies in the fact that they emphasized the importance of the inviolability of the present boundaiies in Europe and the importance of the GDR in the maintenance of peace and security in Europe. 15. The debate on the Non-proliferation Treaty continued within and outside of the ENDC. The major contentions remain those relating to an inspection machinery and nuclear explosive services. Mr. Foster had several consultations with some of the US Nato allies in order to reach a common agreement on some of the difficult questions raised by EURATOM members. Vice-President Humphrey in his current travels in Western Europe is also holding a discussion with US allies regarding the treaty. j 16. Apart from EURATOM members, other non-nuclear states like Sweden, Japan and India have also raised strong reservations concerning some aspects of the draft treaty. Much significance was placed on a statement made by Indian Foreign Minister M. C. Chagla on 22 March which suggested that India might not sign the treaty without adequate guarantees. At the request of the United States, the ENDC recessed on 23 March until 9 May. Some members of the ENDC expressed deep regret at this recess. i -4-

DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR IN VIET-NAM 17- As was noted in last month's Note, there were indications that the war in Viet-Nam would be escalated further. The developments during the month bore out this prognosis. Premier Kosygin drew attention to the escalation of the war in a speech in Moscow on 6 March. He warned that the escalation of the war by the United States would bring corresponding increases in the Socialist aid to the DRV. —' He also denounced what he considered a US rejection of the conditions laid down by Foreign Minister Trinh for the settlement of the war. 18. But in spite of this warning the United -States increased its military pressure on the DRV. It was announced on 10 March tteit the US Airforce for the first time had bombed the Thainguyen iron and steel plant which is ?8 miles north of Hanoi. For some time now the US Military and those in the United States calling for increased bombing pressure had called for the bombing of more significant military targets in the DRV. Among such targets they had named the Thainguyen plant. Thus the announcement of the bombing was seen as further escalation of the war by the United States. -' 19- The increase of pressure on the North coupled with the exacerbation of the

fighting in the South, 27 were further indications of the determination of the protagonists to pursue the war until their political objectives were realized. This grim determination to fight was noted by several of the reports coming from South Viet-Nam and the DRV. The Guam, Conference 20. Because the announcement of the Guam Conference was made at a time when there was further escalation of the war, there was widespread speculation that the meeting between the US Military and Diplomatic officers in Guam would result in further escalation of the war. It was in this sense that international attention

I/ US sources reported that a Soviet diplomat had expressed the following warning to US officials: "We would like to see the war ended by diplomatic means. But if, as it appears, the United States is going to step up its action on the land and in the air, we will escalate our aid to North Viet-Nam step by step. If the United States sends in more planes we will send in more missiles, more rockets, more MIG's. There should be no misunderstanding on this." 2/ There were further reports during the. month that the steel plant was bombed on three other occasions. 5/ The US reports on combat casualties were clear evidence of this increased ~ fighting. On 2J March the US Military announced that 2,092 Americans had been killed, wounded or missing during the previous week. This was V/5 above the past record set during the fighting in the ladrang Valley. The United States also announced that the death toll for the NLF and DRV forces was 2,675. The casualty figures for the following week, which were announced on 30 March, showed increases over the previous week. The US deaths were up at 274 and that for the NLF and DRV at 2,774. -5- was focussed on the Guam Conference which was held on 20-21 March. Prior to the Conference, US officials, "by and large, expeessed optimism in the trend of developments in South Viet-Nam both in the military field and in the pacification program. But at the end of the Conference President Johnson reverted to the earlier position of stressing that the war in Viet-Nam would be a long one. 21. The communique* published on 21 March did not indicate any significant military decision although the CPE, the DRV and Soviet reports suggested that President Johnson had given a free reign to US military commanders in South Viet- Nam to use military force at their disposal for further escalation of the war. —W' President Johnson stressed that military consultations were made; but in a news conference after the end of the Guam Conference, he several times rebuked the reporters for insinuating that important military decisions were taken. Rather he stressed that the discussion during the Conference dealt primarily with the successful drafting of a new Constitution for South Viet-Nam and the review of the pacification

program. 2.1 ge also asserted that one major purpose of the Conference was to introduce the new US Ambassador to South Viet-Nam, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, and his Deputy, Ambassador Locke, as well as Mr. Komer, to the South Vietnamese Chief of State Thieu and Premier Ky. 22. It should be noted, however, that in spite of these assettions by US officials, many commentators believe that some significant military decisions were taken at the Guam Conference. -' Moves towards Peace 23. Because of the continuing danger that the war in Viet-Nam might spread into other areas and involve other great powers inthe conflict, and for humanitarian reasons, continuous attempts are being made by world leaders to offer proposals for

4/ The DRV and CPR have charged Thailand with involvement in the war by permitting B-52 bombers to be stationed in Thailand. Although it has long been reported in the United States and foreign press that US aircraft have been using Thailand as a base for attack on the DRV, it was only officially announced on 22 March that Thailand had placed at the United States1s disposal, bases for the use of B-52 bombers. The military significance of stationing B-52 bombers in Thailand is that the distance is shorter and it will be more difficult for the NLF forces in South Viet-Nam to be alerted. US officials have asserted that in the past Soviet trawlers in the Pacific had been able to warn NLF forces in South Viet-Nam when the B-52 bombers took off from Guam for their long journey to South Viet-Nam. £/ See Notes on Viet-Nam for more details of these aspects. 6J (Please see next page) -6- the solution of the conflict. During the month three such proposals were made. 2k. The first proposal was made "by Senator Robert Kennedy in his speech in the Senate on 2 March. The major premise of his proposal was that President Johnson should test the sincerity of Premier Kosygin and the DRV leaders who had asserted that the cessation of bombing "by the United States and other acts of war would lead to peace negotiations. He proposed that the United States halt its bombing of the DRV and announce that it will be ready to negotiate within a week, but make it clear that the discussion should not be prolonged. Also that the United States should seek agreement that neither side would substantially increase the size of the war in South Viet-Nam by infiltration or reinforcement. 25. He suggested that an international group should be requested to inspect the borders and ports of Viet-Nam and report on any further escalation. He hinted that the United Nations or an international peace-keeping force could gradually replace US forces in Viet-Nam. He also proposed that the conditions should be made for a final settlement which would make it possible for all political elements in South Viet-Nam to pa rticipate in the "choice of leadership and shape their future direction as a people." 26. This 3-point proposal by Senator Kennedy was criticized by US officials and those supporting the Administration policy. It was generally felt that the speech was an element in the continuing competition between President Johnson and Senator Kennedy. The speech itself was almost overshadowed by the various announce- ments and speeches made by President Johnson and Mr. Rusk. In a statement issued by Mr. Rusk on 2 March, he noted that the suggestions made by Senator Kenn.edy-had already been made and rejected by the DRV. 27. In apite of the rejection of the Kennedy proposal by President Johnson, there was a great support within the United States and abroad for his proposals. Although

6/ Some critics in the United States, who shared the view that some important military decisions were taken, have relied on the rhetorical questions raised by Premier Ky in a statement made at the opening of the Guam Conference. He stated, inter alia, "Mr. President, Gentlemen: When will Hanoi be ready to negotiate? How long will we have to wait? How long can Hanoi enjoy the advantage of restricted bombing of military targets? How long can the Vietcong be permitted to take sanctuary in Cambodia, be allowed to regroup and come back at their will? How long can supply trails through Laos be permitted to operate? How long can war materiel be permitted to come into Haiphong Harbor? How long can the North be permitted to infiltrate soldiers and weapons across the demarcation (New York Times. 21 March 1967.) -7- the speech itself did not substantially depart from the basic policy of the United States in Viet-Nam, it was felt that his call for US cessation of bombing had some merit. I/ 28. The second proposal was actually made in February but disclosed by the DRV on 21 March. On this date the DRV Foreign Ministry published a reply by President Ho Chi Minh to a letter sent by President Johnson to him. This exchange of letters was confirmed by the State Department and subsequently the two letters were published by the United States. It then became evident that President Johnson on 2 February had written a letter which was handed to the DRV Embassy in Moscow on 8 February. President Johnson in his letter stated that because of the need for privacy and secrecy in any discussion leading to a meaningful peaceful settlement in Souith Viet-Nam, he had taken the step of writing directly to President Ho Chi Minh in order that bilateral talks could be held between the two countries. His proposal was contained in one key paragraph. It stated: "... I am prepared to move even further toward an ending of hostilities than your Government ha<§ proposed in either public statement or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of United States forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured tnat infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace." 29. President Johnson emphasized the urgency of the letter. He further suggested that his proposal would be "greatly strengthened" if the Military authorities of •& the DRV and the Republic of South Viet-Nam could promptly negotiate an extension,of the Tet truce, finally he suggested that the bilateral discussions between the United States and the DRV could be held in Moscow or any other country such as Burma. 30. The reply of President Ho Chi Minh did not specifically respond to the

?/ As was noted in last month's Note, the fundamental difference of opinion between President Johnson and Senator Kennedy centers around the question as to whether the DRV was calling for a permanent cessation of the US bombing or only for a pause. Senator Kennedy's call for cessation of bombing is based on the reasoning that the DRV was not calling for a permanent halt in bombing. On the other hand, President Johnson and Mr. Rusk had emphasized that the DRV was unequi- vocal in calling for a permanent halt in the bombing. It has been noted already in last month's Note that the evidence available indicated that the DRV was indeed calling for a permanent halt in the bombing. Fbr further discussion of this problem, see James Reston, "On De-Escalating the Johnson-Kennedy War," New York Times, 3 March 1967. -8- proposal of President Johnson. Instead, it outlined what the DRV considered ; committed crimes/by the United States "imperialists" against the Vietnamese people. He also reiterated the four points of the DRV in a section of the letter, which asserted: "The US Government has unleashed the war of aggression in Vietnam. It must cease this aggression. That is the only way to the restoration of peace. The US Government must stop definitively and unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all US and satellite troops, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs." 31. President Ho Chi Minh also reaffirmed that bilateral talks could be held only after the United States had ceased its bombing of the DRV and otter acts of war. Finally he warned that

"The Vietnamese people will never submit to force, they will never accept talks under the threat of bombs." 32. There were several important questions raised concerning disclosure of the letter.': Why^ it was asked, had the DRV decided to disclose the letter of President Ho Chi Minh at the time it did? Some US commentators suggested that the intention was to embarrass President Johnson at a time when he was giving reassurance to the South Vietnamese leaders at the Guam Conference. -' It was also asserted that the letter was disclosed because President Johnson included additional conditions before the United States would cease its bombing. This aspect of the incident was noted by Senator Robert Kennedy when he bitterly criticised President Johnson for having demanded a further requirement that the DRV assure the United States that "infiltration" has ceased. Senator Kennedy assessed this condition as a further indication that President Johnson was not energetically seeking a peaceful settlement,

8/ President Johnson in speeches made at the welcoming ceremony of the South Vietnamese leaders and at the conference, reassured them that there would be no change in the US policy because of the appointment of Ambassador Bunker as a replacement for Ambassador Lodge. Because of the past activities of Ambassador Bunker as a mediator in the peaceful settlement of disputes such as in the case of the West Irian, it was generally believed that his appointment meant that the United States was aiming at an accelerated pace in the peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese war. However, from other published reports it would seem that Ambassador Bunker*s main preoccupation in South Viet-Ham would be to bring about some recon- ciliation between the Military and the civilian groups in order that the elections be held according to schedule. In this sense his activities would^e similar to those he performed in the Dominican Republic. — 9 —

33. The DRV itself asserted that the letter was published in order to "unmask" the "deceitfulness" of the United States offer to hold peace talks. It was further argued that non-disclosure of the letter could encourage US officials to go on insisting that some official contacts are "being maintained between the DRV and the United States.2/ 31*. US officials refused to speculate on the reasons that led President Ho Chi Minh to publish his letter. However, they generally concluded that the release of the letter clearly indicated a hardening of the DRV1s position against negotiation at the present time. The general assessment in Washington was that President Johnson had gained from the publication of the letter. It was noted that President Johnson did not make known his letter to President Ho Chi Minh even at a time when he was under attack, particularly from Senator Kennedy. It was thus concluded by some US commen- tators that President Johnson cared more to protect a diplomatic channel than to make political gains from such publication. This was said to indicate the sincerity of President Johnson in his avowal for a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam war. 35.. The third peace proposal was that announced by Secretary-General U Thant at a news conference in the United Nations on 28 March, He disclosed that on 14 March he had sent an aide-memoire to the parties directly involved in the fighting in Viet- Nam. The aide-memoire suggested that three steps should be followed in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the war. The first step was for a general standstill truce. Following this, there should be preliminary talks. The preliminary talks should take the following form: (1) Direct talks between the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. (2) Direct talks between the two governments mentioned in (l) above, with the participation of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954. (3) Direct talks between the two governments mentioned in (l) above, with the participation of the members of the International Control Commission. (4) Direct talks between the two governments mentioned in (l) above, with the participation of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 195^ and of the members of the International Control Commission.

2/ A meeting of the Praesidium of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front which was held on 2k March in Hanoi hailed the publication of President Ho Chi Minn's letter. The Conference also endorsed the contents of the letter. -10-

Pollowing the preliminary talks ythe Geneva Conference of 195^ should be reconvened. The Secretary-General felt that both the South Vietnamese Government and the National Liberation Front should be participants in this Conference. 36. Throughout his news conference U Thant emphasized that he had not diverted from his original 3-point proposal but was only reformulating them in light of the current mood of the protagonists. In his opening statements to the press conference and in answer to questions from the reporters, he reiterated his belief that the cessation of bombing by the United States was still the key to the convening of a peace conference. At one point he even asseited that peace talks would follow within a few weeks of the cessation of the"; bombing of North Viet-Nam. 37- In spite of these reassertions and reformulations by U Thant, there was a general assessment that his proposals came very close to that of the United States. In particular it was noted that, by calling for a general standstill truce, he had accepted the US demand for a reciprocal military measure from the DRV. The US response to the aide-memoire was further evidence of this general assessment. Immediately after the press conference, the US Mission to the United Nations published a US reply to U Thant*s aide-memoire. The first US reply was an interim one dated 15 March, and was followed by a final reply dated 18 March. In the latter reply, the United States conditionally accepted the aide-memoire. However, it called for prior discussions leading towards the standstill truce. —' It also called for the involvement of the South Vietnamese Government throughout the entire process proposed by the Secretary-General. 38. These requirements by the United States, by and large, meant a rejection of the aide-memoire, precisely because U Thant had carefully avoided involving the South Vietnamese Government in order not to deal with the more disturbing question of involvement of the NLP in the process. Thus to involve the South Vietnamese Government in the entire three stages would mean that the NLF should also be involved. This, the US Government and the South Vietnamese Government are not willing to accept at the moment. Furthermore, U Thant emphasized in his news conference that it would be very difficult to supervise any truce in South Viet-Nam at the^resent time. !£/ It is interesting that the US letter was demanding prior agreement on the standstill truce in light of the statement made by President Johnson in his speech before the Tennessee Legislature on 15 March, at a time when he was well aware of U Thant*s aide-memoire. President Johnson said, "We also stand ready to advance towards a reduction of hostilities without prior agreement. The road to peace could go from deeds to discussions or it could start with discussions and go to deeds. We are ready to take either route. We are ready to move on both of them." -11-

39» The South Vietnamese Government in its reply dated 28 March also gave qualified acceptance to the aide-memoire. It asserted that a military truce could not "be effective without prior agreement on details and control. It thus proposed that the DRV and the South Vietnamese High Command meet to make appropriate arrangements for such a truce. The South Vietnamese Government also stated that it would prefer an immediate convening of the Geneva Conference in preference to the preliminary talks suggested "by the Secretary-General. However, it was flexible on this point. 1*0. It has teen widely reported that the DRV had already rejected the aide-memoire although at his news conference U Thant emphasized that he did not consider a report in the DRV press as indicating rejection of his proposals. The reference here is to a Mhan Dan report on 27 March -which stated that the United Nations had no "business meddling in the South Vietnamese problem and indirectly rejected any intervention Toy the Secretary-General. Towards the end of the month news reports stated that it has been confirmed that the DRV had indeed officially rejected the proposal.—' On the Cessation of Bombing of the DEV hi. In all of the proposals made in the past and also during the month, the crucial question remains that of the cessation of the bombing of the DRV. As has been noted in the past, President Johnson is very reluctant to agree to any cessation of bombing without reciprocal measures from the DRV. This view was reiterated by President Johnson in his speech before the Tennessee Legislature on 15 March. He said: "But reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will «ot reduce its activities unless and until there is some reduction on the other side. To follow any other rule would be to violate the trust that we undertake when we ask a man to risk his life for his country."

11/ The response of the protagonists to the aide-memoire has been assessed by US commentators as having amounted to further diplomatic gains for President Johnson. The DRV rejection of the aide-memoire coupled with the disclosure of President Ho Chi Minn's letter to President Johnson suggested to mapy that the DRV was more "intransigent" than the United States in the search for a peaceful settle- ment. In several US official statements this viewpoint was emphasized. Max Prankel of the New York Times reported on 22 March from Washington that the DRV's responses have led the United States to a policy of applying "more of the same in the war in Viet-Nam". This expression was interpreted by James Reston of the New York Times as forecasting further escalation of the war. Pbr further details, see "Diplomatic Gain for United States" by Hedrick Smith, New York Times, 30 March, and "More of Same", by James Reston, New York Times, 2k March. -12-

42. There would seem to be a divergence of assessment between those calling for the cessation of bombing and US officials. The former have maintained that the cessation of bombing would bring about negotiation leading to a peaceful settlement, furthermore, they have assessed the purpose of the US bombing as intended to reduce or eliminate the "infiltration" of men and supplies from the DRV to South Viet- Nam. The latter, on the other hand, have different views on the question. Again, in a speech before the Tennessee Legislature, President Johnson outlined what he considered the main objective of his bombing policy. He stated: "Since February, 1965, our military operations have included selective bombing of military targets in North Viet-Nam. Our purposes are three: "To back our fighting men by denying our enemy a sanctuary; to exact a penalty against North Viet-Nam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva accords of 19514- and 1962; to limit the flow or to substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and^naterial from North Viet-Nam. All of our intelligence confirms that we have been successful." U3. In a sense, US officials are maintaining that it is not their belief that the bombing of the DRV will bring peace to Viet-Nam, but they hope that the punishment inflicted on the DRV will make the task easier for the attainment of a pacific settlement of the dispute. US officials also seem to disagree that the cessation of bombing will necessarily lead to the abatement of the fighting in South VietrNam. In the program Issues and Answers on 12 March, Mr. Rusk asserted 12/ that the cessation of bombing would be a way to prolong the war. —' kk. In his letter to President Ho Chi Minh, President Johnson appeared to be saying that cessation of US bombing would adversely affect the success of any peace talks. Recalling that the DRV had publicly demanded the unconditional cessation of US bombing of the DRV and other acts of war as a condition for peace talks, President Johnson wrote, inter alia,

12/ in a meeting between senior US diplomats in the Par East with Mr. William P. Bundy and General Westmoreland on 8 March, it was declared that any easing of US and Allied military pressure on Viet-Nam would lengthen the war. In a communiqu^ issued after the meeting at the resort town of Baguio in Manila, it was stated that "any slackening of the collective military effort or of the policies and programs in non-military fields would lengthen the road to a 'stable and honorable peace'". -13- •*.

"... In view of your public position, such action on our part would inevitably produce worldwide speculation that discussions were under way and would impair the privacy and secrecy of those discussions." Furthermore, he added one more reason why the United States is reluctant to cease the bombing. He stated: "... Secondly, there would inevitably be grave concern on our part whether your Government would make use of such action by us to improve its military position."

i)-5. US officials have also emphasized that those calling for cessation of the bombing did not take sufficiently into account the military and "right-wing" pressure on President Johnson to expand the military targets in the DRV. This is a reference to the call by some critics of the bombing policy that there is too much restriction placed on the US Armed Forces in the bombing of targets in the DRV. These critics would wish that President Johnson authorise bombing of the air fields of North Viet-Nam as well as mining the port of Haiphong. —' k6. In light of the reluctance of President'Johnson and his immediate advisers to implement a step which is considered essential by many world leaders — i.e. the cessation of bombing of the DRV == and the unwillingness of the DRV to contem- plate any negotiations without such a cessation, the prospects remain dim for an early settlement of the war in Viet-Nam. USfeUSSR RELATIONS . lj-7. There were no major developments in US-USSR relations during the month. However, US officials are still maintaining the hope for improved relations between the two countries. —/ Etaphasis was placed on the fact that Soviet and American officials in the ENDC were seriously working on the non-proliferation treaty. The recently-concluded Space Treaty —' was also seen as an indication

15/ The Senate Preparedness Investigation Sub-Committee of the Armed Services Committee, issued a report on 27 March which charged that restriction , placed on American pilots by the Johnson Administration had contributed significantly to the air losses in the DRV. It has been widely reported in the United States that US officials were reluctant to grant asylum to Svetlatai Stalina, the daughter of the late Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, who was reported to have sought asylum in the United States. It was suggested that because US officials were wary of annoying Soviet officials and thereby endangering the hope for improved relations, they had not granted her asylum, US officials, however, have refused to comment on these reports. 15/ (Please see of the Soviet interest in ''improving relations with the United States. US officials also were hoping for the expansion of trade "between the United States and the Socialist countries including the Soviet Union. Such improvement of trade is seen as a contributory factor to the improvement of relations between the US and the USSR/ l£/ k8. It was reported on 30 March that Soviet Embassy officials in Washington had enquired from the US Interior Department whether the Soviet Union would be allowed to bid on a contract to supply hydroelectric turbines and generators which are to be used in the expansion of the generating capacity of the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington State. The Soviet request was widely assessed in the United States as an attempt by the Soviet Union to test the policy of President Johnson; that is, the expansion of trade between the two countries. There has been no official US reaction to this request but published reports suggested that the United States might avoid the issue by restricting the bidding to domestic concerns only. lt-9. The only substantive bilateral discussion, apart from the non-proliferation issue, between the United States and the USSE again surrounds the question of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) System. As was noted in last month's llote, President Johnson announced on 2 March that he had received a. letter from Premier Kosygin indicating interest in US-USSR discussions on the limiting of tb3.arms race — in the area of offensive and defensive weapons. Although US officials were jubilant about this reported Soviet interest, reports emanating from the Soviet Union indicated that Soviet officials were not as sanguine about such talks as US officials. However, it was reported on 23 March that Ambassador Llewelyn Thompson and Soviet Jbreign Minister Gromyko opened talks in Moscow on a moratorium on the deployment of an ABM System, and a freeze or reduction of offensive weapons. Details of the talks were not disclosed.

15/ The US Senate on 16 March consented to the US-USSR Consular Treaty by 66 to 28 votes. This came after supporters of the US Administration succeeded in defeating various "reservations" and "understanding" introduced by Republican members opposed to the Treaty. These reservations and understanding would have led< to renunciation of the Treaty had they been accepted. President Johnson on 31 March ratified the Treaty. l6/ On 2k March President Johnson issued a statement proclaiming 2^-27 May as World Trade Week. He emphasized in the statement his belief that "trade also offers a means of achieving fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations." -15-

50. It must be noted that in spite of the announcement of a US-USSR discussion on an ABM System, those in the United States calling for US deployment of such a system have expressed concern about the talks. 51. Hanson W. Baldwin, the military correspondent of the New York Times reported on 24 March that US Military officials were worried that a protracted US-USSR talks on a moratorium on the deployment of an ABM System would "be beneficial to the Soviet Union. They argued that while talks are going on it will be difficult for the United States to launch an ABM System of its own. They opined that the Soviet Union, in contrast, could go on developing and deploying its ABM System. The same Military officials also believed that the Soviet Union is increasing its offensive capabilities; this, in their view, could soon get to the point where the Soviet Union could cut the US lead in offensive nuclear weapons. 52. This US military concern was reflected in the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Armed Forces Appropriation bill for 1968. It observed, "The copnittee considers that it would be unwise to permit these negotiations to be extended interminably ... and if ... an agreement cannot be concluded within a reasonable period, the committee strongly believes the United States should begin procurement for deployment of an antiballistic missile defense system." 17/ 53 • Apart from this development, US officials are still hoping that the Soviet Union would help in the search for a peaceful settlement of the war in Viet-Ham. However, it must be noted that the expectations of the United States could not be easily realized. According to published reports, it would seem that US officials are hoping that the Soviet Union would use its substantial military and economic assistance to the DRV as a lever to compel the DRV leaders to agree to a peaceful settlement. In a sense, US officials are asking the Soviet Union to do what they did during the India-Pakistan fighting in September 1965 when Britain and the United States withheld military assistance to the two countries, thereby forcing them to search for a peaceful settlement. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would adopt such measures in order to bring the DRV leaders to the conference table. Hot only will this be contrary to its responsibilities within the Socialist camp but also it would expose itself to criticism by the CPR.

IT/ Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Missile Race," The New York Times, 2k March 1967. -16-

5^. Under these conditions it would seem that the United States officials will continue to be frustrated "by what they assessed as the reluctance of the Soviet Union to bring the DRV to the conference table. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continues to reiterate its view that there could be no substantial improvement in relations with the United States until the United States ceases bombing of the DRV and stops its "aggression" in South Viet-Nam. —' EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM 55- The important development under this heading during the month tfas the concerted campaign by some East European countries and the Soviet Union against the Eastern policy of the FRG. As had been noted in the past, FRG officials had declared that it is their intention to improve relations with Eastern Europe and to develop diplomatic relations with these countries in spite of the Hallstein Doctrine. It was also noted in last month's Note that Romania and the FRG had already agreed to establish diplomatic relations. It was also noted that the Warsaw Pact meeting held in February was concerned, inter alia,with the response of other East European countries'to the FRG desire to establish diplomatic relations. 56. It became clear during the month that the GDR was concerned about its isolation. This fear of isolation was reflected in the speech made by Herr Walter Ulbricht on 15 March at a ceremony during the signing of the bilateral treaty between the GDR and Poland. He stated, inter alia, "The ruling forces of the West German Republic are striving to penetrate into the socialist countries, to encircle and isolate the GDR and in the end, to incorporate it in the West German Federal Republic, so as to have a clear road for further action against the other socialist countries." 19 / 57 • In a major election speech on 10 March at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, Party Chairman Leonid I. Brezhnev outlined, inter alia, the Soviet policy objective

18 / in a speech made by Premier Kosygin in Moscow on 6 March, he bitterly criticized the United States1 involvement in Viet -Ham. It has been argued by commentators in the FRG that the technique used by Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR to prevent any success of the FRG Eastern policy was to sign bilateral agreements between them. On 1 March Poland and Czechoslovakia signed a bilateral Friendship Treaty for the duration of 20 years. This was a renewal of an earlier pact signed in 19^7. On 15 March the GDR and Poland signed a Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty and on 17 March the GDR and Czechoslovakia also signed a Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty. All these treaties emphasized that the present European boundaries are inviolable, and stressed the importance of the GDR in the maintenance of peace and security in Europe. FRG officials, in contrast to the West German press, have shown no particular concern for the conclusion of these bilateral treaties. ^For more details on these treaties, see the European Note for March 1967, and the Note on the Foreign Relations of the Socialist States.) -17- in Europe with particular reference to the relations between the Socialist countries and the FRG. On Soviet objectives in Europe he said, "What are the objective's of the European policy of the Soviet Union? First, to consolidate and to strengthen the gains of the peoples achieved as the result of the most cruel war in the history of mankind and of the radical class social changes in Europe which followed it; second, to isolate the forces of imperialist aggression, not to allow the West German militarists and revanchists to unbridle themselves, and above all to prevent them from gaining access to nuclear weapons; third, on that basis to strengthen the security of our Western borders and the borders of the socialist countries allied with us, and to create the conditions for broad and fruitful cooperation in Europe of countries with different social systems." 58. He also spoke warmly of the growing contacts between the Socialist and West European countries. He emphasized, however, that the major obstacle to a lasting peace in Europe was the "revanchist" policy of the FRG. In this context he denied that there has been any change in the present policy of Chaucellor Kiesinger compared to tha^pursued by former Chancellor Erhard. —'' 59- Mr. Brezhnev introduced a new note in his speech when he suggested that countries seeking rapprochement in Europe will have to oppose the policy of the FRG if they intend to coutribute to the detente in Europe. This might be a reference to the policy of France which is aiming for rapprochement with the East but also supporting the reunification policy of the.FRG. The relevant part of Mr. Brezhnev*s speech stated: "We communists believe that to insure European security, good will and appeals for cooperation — or even a readiness to develop such cooperation — between socialist and capital- ist countries of Europe in conformity with the^rinciples of peaceful coexistence do not suffice. An active, irresistible, and persistent struggle against everything which creates a threat to peace in Europe is equally necessary." 60. FRG officials have expressed surprise at what they considered the unwillingness of the Soviet Union and some Socialist countries to accept the good faith of the FRG's new Eastern policy. Speaking at the opening ceremony of the International

20 / For a German assessment of Soviet policy towards the Grand Coalition, see Heinz Schewe, "Kreml: Alles ist eine Frage der Nerven," Die Welt, 31 March 1967. -18-

Crafts Fair in Munich on 9 March, Chancellor Kiesinger asserted that the FRG's policy towards the East was a peaceful one. He denied that the FRG intended to annex the GDR. —2'1 / He stressed that the only goal of the FRG is to bring about reunification which, he said, "means nothing but that we wish to build a path for the will of our compatriots in the other part of Germany, so that they may express this will more clearly and unequivocally from year to year". He then appealed to the Socialist countries to endeavour to understand this peaceful intention of the FRG. 61. Because of the opposition of some of the Socialist countries to the avowed policy of the FRG, it now appears that other Eastern European countries will not, in the immediate future, move to establish relations with the FRG. From the bilateral treaties mentioned above, it could be concluded that Poland and Czechoslovakia will not move to establish relations. However, questions have been raised concern- ing Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. There were reports that in spite of last month*s Warsaw Jbreign Ministers Conference and the urgings of the GDR against the 22 / establishment of diplomatic relations between East European countries and the FRG,—' that Hungary and possibly Bulgaria might in due time agree to the establishment of such relations. 62. Judging from statements made by Chancellor Kiesinger on 7 March and Foreign Minister Brandt on 9 March in West Berlin, it would seem that the FRG is not overly concerned about the lack of progress in the establishment of diplomatic relations with the East. Non-proliferation 63. It is widely conceded that the major interest of the Soviet Union and the East European countries in a non-proliferation treaty is to prevent the FRG from

21/ At a news conference in West Berlin on 9 March, Foreign Minister and Vice- Chancellor Willy Brandt said : "We do not intend to conquer East Germany or to isolate it." He stated that the FRG planned to notify the Soviet Union in a formal statement of its readiness to renounce the use of force against the GDR as well as any Eastern European state. The GDR has called for such a statement in a bilateral FRG-GDR Treaty. 2g/ As has been pointed out in the^past, the GDR has maintained that diplomatic relations with the^FRG and East Europe could be made only when the FRG accepts the sovereignty and independence of the GDR, the present realities in Europe and when it renounces the possession of nuclear weapons. 25/ See Michel Tatu, "Les Hongrois ne renoncent pas 3, e"tablir des relations normales avec 1'Allemagne de 1'Ouest," Le Monde, 11 March 1967. -19- getting any access to nuclear weapons. Thus the fact that FRG officials have joined Italy, Japan, Sweden and other non-nuclear states in raising some reserva- tions concerning certain elements of the treaty has further deepened the suspicions against the intentions of the FRG. As was noted in last month's Note, public and official opinion in the^RG has objected to two major aspects of the draft non- proliferation treaty; one concerning the technological effects of such a treaty, and the other the question of an inspection machinery. 64. These questions were dealt with during the month at the ENDC in Geneva and in bilateral talks between the United States and its European allies. Mr. Poster, the Head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, visited several West European capitals during the month to explain the US position on the non-proliferation treaty as well as to listen to the attitudes of these Governments to thtudrgft treaty. Towards the end of the month, Vice-President Humphrey also had occasion to deal with the same problem in his visits to the FRG, Italy and other European countries. 65. It was announced by Chancellor Kiesinger during the month that the United States had taken fully into account the reservations made by the FRG. Perhaps it was to meet the concerns of theFRG and others who had raised certain questions that Mr. Poster in thqmeeting of the ENDC on 21 March —'spelled out the US proposal on nuclear explosive services. In his speech Mr. Poster proposed a five-point plan to provide services if and when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives become technically and economically feasible: (1) that nuclear weapons states should make available to other states nuclear explosive services for peaceful applications if this is not contrary to the Limited Test Ban Agreement. This service can consist of performing "the desired nuclear detonation under appropriate international observation, with the nuclear device remaining under the custody and control of the state performing the services"; (2) that the nuclear explosive services could be provided through the aegis of the IAEA or any alternative international mechanism which could assess priority, feasibility and safety; (3) that the cost to the non-nuclear states for peaceful purposes detonations by nuclear states would be kept as low as possible. In particular, it would exclude the cost of research and development;

2kI The ENDC on 23 March began a 6-week recess which was requested by the US delegation. This was to give the United States sufficient time to consult with the Allies about changes in the provisions of the draft treaty. -20-

there should be full consultations among nuclear and non-nuclear parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty about any amendments of that Treaty required in order to carry out feasible projects; and (5) the conditions and procedures for international collaboration in accomplishing peaceful nuclear explosive project would be developed in full consultationnwith the non-nuclear states. 66. There have been reports in the American and German press —'tha25 / t President Johnson had sent a letter to Chancellor Kiesinger assuring him that the non- proliferation treaty would not in any way prohibit any future establishment of a European nuclear force if and when European federation is established. —' 67. There have also been reports that the United States is canvassing among its allies a plan whereby EURATOM would on a three years interim basis carry out the inspection requirements of a non-proliferation treaty with supervision by IAEA. At the conclusion of this interim period the IAEA will take over the inspection of nuclear installations in EURATOM states. It has been reported that Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are willing to support this US plan. However, Italy and the FRG have not yet consented. France, the sixth member of EURATOM, is not expected to sign the non-proliferation agreement. 68. Those who are familiar with nuclear reactor technology are of the opinion that the objections raised by the FRG and Italy concerning "industrial espionage" are unfounded. Since the FRG, for example, could not publicly declare its opposition to such a treaty, such a device is said to have been adopted. Further- more, it has been noted that the FRG had endeavored to link its concern about the non-proliferation treaty with other non-nuclear states. 69. It now seems that the major objections to the non-proliferation treaty will come not so much from the FRG and Italy as from countries like Japan and India.

25/ Die Welt, 31 March 1967; New York Times, JO March 1967. 26/ There have also been published reports that there is a current understanding between the US and the USSR on the interpretation of the treaty as regards a future European nuclear force. It is stated that there is a tacit agreement between the two countries to give varying interpretation about the European force. The United States would maintain that the treaty does not bar a European nuclear force, while the Soviet Union would publicly declare that it has done so. A fear has been expressed that the announcement of the US letter to Chancellor Kiesinger would compel the Soviet Union to hesitate about agreeing to the non-proliferation agreement. -21-

India is said to have a strong case since it is the only country that has a legitimate concern in seeking a nuclear weapons program. The legitimate concern is said to "be its fear of the nuclear potential of the CPR. It is in this sense that importance was attached to a statement made "by Foreign Minister M. C. Chagla in the Indian Parliament on 27 March. He asserted;:that India would sign a non- proliferation treaty only after she is satisfied that her security is guaranteed against nuclear attacks or nuclear "blackmail. —'-27' / Conclusion 70. This Note has examined the diplomatic aspect of the war in Viet-Ham. It was noted that although it is still asserted that the cessation of US "bombing of the DHV is the key to the convening of a peace conference, US officials "believe that they could not order a cessation of "bombing without reciprocal military measures from the DRV. Because of this impasse the prospects for peace in Viet-Nam remain dim. No major developments in US-USSR relations was noted, although the interest of the United States for improvement in these relations was noted. The debate over a non-proliferation agreement was discussed and the US proposals for nuclear explosive services and inspection machinery were examined.

2J_/ During the month, FRG officials insisted that it is to their interests that a non-proliferation treaty be signed since at the present time they are the only state that has renounced themanufacture of nuclear weapons on their soil. Thus they feel that a non-proliferation treaty would remove this discriminatory element in the area of nuclear weapons. OFFICIAL DOCUMEKTATIOH

POLAND 1. B'cast of Treatt "between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Polish Peoples Republic on friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid. Prague Radio, 2 March 19&7. FBIS - USSR and E. Europe Ho. kk, o March 1967.

UNITED STATES 2. Excerpts from texts of Rusk Statement and Johnson Letter. New York Times, 5 March 1967.

3- Statement by Secretary of : State Rusk before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate on the Outer Space Treaty. Dept. of State Press Release, 7 March, Wo. U6. U. Press communique" on the Chief of Mission conference at Baguio, Philippines, Dept. of State Press Release No. ^9> 7 March 1967. 5. Text of President Johnson's Nashville Address on US Role in Vietnamese War, 15 March 1967. New York Times, 16 March 1967. 6. Remarks by President Johnson at Guam, 20 March 1967. New York Times, 20 March 1967. 7. Transcript of President Johnsonts news conference on the Guam Parley, 21 March 1967. Hew York Times, 22 March 1967. 8. Text of a joint communique' issued at the end of a conference between United States and South Vietnamese officials in Guam, 21 March 1967. New York Times, 21 March 1967. 9- Statement by President Johnson at the United States-South Vietnamese conference in Guam, 20 March 1967. New York Times, 21 March 1967. <** 10. Text of President Johnson*s letter to Ho Chi Minh dated 2 February 1967. New York Times, 21 March 1967. 11. Aide-Me*moire (interim reply) to the UN Secretary-General from the United States, 15 March 1967. US Mission to the UN, Press Release USU1-30, 28 March 1967. -2- UHITED STATES contfd

12. Aide-Memoire to the UN Secretary-General from the United States, 18 March 1967. US Mission to the UN Press Release USUW-31, 28 March 1967.

USSR

13. Excerpts from a speech of the USSR Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin at a meeting with electors in Moscow on 6 March 1967. USSR Mission to the UN Press Release No. 14, 9 March 1967.

14. B'cast of Leonid Brezhnev 10 March election speech at Kremlin Palace of Congresses — live. Moscow Domestic Service Radio, 10 March 1967. FBIS - USSR and East Europe, 13 March 1967, No. 49.

F.R.G.

15« Nuchterne und besonnene deutsche Politik. Bundeskanzler Dr. h.c. Kurt Georg Kiesinger hielt zur Erb'ffnung der XIX, Internationalem Handwerksmesse am 9 Marz 1967 in Mlinchen Rede. Bulletin Hr. 26/S.205, 14 March 1967.

16. Aktive Ostpolitik der neuen Bundesregierung. Der Bundesminister des Auswartigen, Dr. h. c. Willy Brandt, gab am 9 Marz 1967 in Berlin eine Pressekonferenz. Bulletin Mr. 26/S. 208, Ik March 1967. 17« Politik der Friedenssicherung und Entspannung. Der Bundesminister des Auswartigen, Dr. h. c. Willy Brandt, gab der "Allgemeinen Zeitung Mainz" am 10 Marz 1967 Interview. Bulletin Hr. 27/S.213, 15 March 1967.

18. Aktive AuBen- und Innenpolitik. Bundeskanzler Dr. h. c. Kurt Georg Kiesinger gab dem Deutschen Eernsehen flir die Sendung "Report" am 17 Ma'rz 1967 Interview. Bulletin Nr. 29/S. 233, 21 Marz 1967.

19- Ordnung der Beziehungen zu den anderen Volkern. Bundeskanzler Dr. h. c. Kurt Georg Kiesinger gab dem Nachrichtenmagazin "Der Zpiegel" vom 20 Marz 1967 Interview. Bulletin Nr. 30/S.245, 23 March 1967.

G.D.R.

20. Text of speech by Walter Ulbricht after the signature of the Treaty between the GDR and Poland. ADN Radio, 15 March 1967. BBC Summary of B'casts, Eastern Europe, 17 March 1967. 21. Text of report of the Treaty between Poland and the GDR signed in Warsaw on 15 March. ADN Radio, 15 March 1967. BBC Summary of B'casts Eastern Europe, 17 March 1967. -3-

G.D.R. cont'd

22. Text of Treaty between Czechoslovakia and the GDR signed in Prague on 17 March. ADN Radio, 17 March 1967. BBC Summary of B* casts Eastern Europe, 20 March 1967.

D.R.V.

23. Text of President Ho Chi MinhSslletter of 15 February 1967 in reply" to President Johnson's letter of 2 February 1967. New York Times, 21 March 1967.

2k> Ho's reply to Johnson hailed by Conference. Hanoi VMA International Service, 25 March 1967. Daily FBIS No. 59, 27 March 1967.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET-NAM

25. Remarks by Premier Nguyen Cao Ky at Guam, 20 March 1967. New York Times, 20 March 1967.

26. Text of the aide-memoire sent by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations Secretary-General on20 March 1967. Republic of Viet Nam Permanent Observer to the UN Press Release, 29 March 1967^

UHCTED NAT3DNS 27. Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General U Thant held at Headquarters on 28 March 1967. UN Press Release SG/SM/68g, 28 March 1967. 28. Text of aide-memoire of Ik March from Secretary-General to Parties concerned in Viet-Nam conflict. UN Press Release SG/SM/683, 28 March 1967. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO. i The Secretary-General

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Date: FROM: DE: 23 May 1967 CR. 13 (11-64) DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ^ May 1967 SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS JJ:pmm Political Affairs Division

MONTHLY SURVEYS

EAST-WEST RELATIONS — APRIL 196? EAST-WEST RELATIONS — APRIL

General Comments 1. The diplomatic moves to bring about a peaceful settlement of the war in :Viet-Nam were complicated further by the new escalations initiated by the United States. During the month it became apparent that the United States was carrying out a policy of attrition against the DRV. US planes bombed new military, industrial and communications targets, among which were the MIG Bases in the DRV which were bombed for the first time. The prospects for a future peaceful settlement are presently clouded by reports of military build-up on both sides near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). According to US military reports, three DRV Divisions are presently in and around the Northern Sector of the DMZ. In order to counter this reported DRV build-up, US military officials have moved troop reinforcements to the I Corps Area. There is speculation that the United States will send more troops to Viet-Warn. 2. General Westmoreland, Commander of the US Forces in Viet-Nam, on 2*4- April in Hew York and on 28 April before a Joint Session of Congress, implied that further escalation of the war should not be ruled out. He forecast particularly bitter fighting in the DMZ. The Seato Ministerial Meeting which met for three days (18-20 April) in Washington, and the Allied Meeting on 20-21 April, which also met in Washington, dealt with the war in Viet-Warn and gave endorsement to the US policy there. 3. Canadian External Minister, Paul Martin, on 11 April made a four-point proposal calling for some physical disengagement in the DMZ and outlined steps towards a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. In response to the Canadian proposal, the State Department on 19 April proposed a ten-mile disengagement in theDMZ by the DRV and the US-South Vietnamese forces. These proposals were rejected both by the DRV and the NLF. h-. In spite of the prospect for more escalation in Viet-Ham, some slight hopes were expressed for further peace probes because of the forthcoming truce in Viet-Nam. The South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry on 8 April proposed a truce for Buddha's birthday on 23 May. The United States on the same day endorsed the -2- proposal and announced that the United States would suspend its bombing of the DRV on 23 May. Without any reference to the South Vietnamese proposal, the NLF Eadio on 27 April announced that the NLF forces would observe a two-day truce for Buddha*s "birthday. Those hoping for a peaceful settlement have suggested that the parties agree to an extension of the truce. 5. US-USSR relations continue to be influenced by the war in Viet-Ham. In speeches made by Chairman Brezhnev at the^Seventh Congress of the SED on 18 April, and at the Karlovy Vary Conference on 25 April, he condemned the US policy in Viet-TJam. When it became known that the United States was now bombing Haiphong and the MIG Bases in the DRV, fears were expressed that this might lead to a US-USSR confrontation. However, US officials pointed out that no bombing has been made on the Haiphong port facilities where the chances of hitting Soviet vessels are always present. 6. Wo change was noted in US-CPR relations. The CPR during the month charged that US planes had flown over its territory. The bombing of the MIG Bases also raised the prospect of transferring the MIG*s to Chinese bases in Southern China. Such a transfer has been assessed as making it likely for a US-CPR confrontation. However, US officials still maintain that there seems to be no evidence of a possible CPR intervention in the war. T- Although the relaxation of tensions in Europe continues, both the Socialist countries and some of the Western allies continue to assert that a threat to the peace exists in Europe. In speeches made by Chairman Brezhnev and Herr Ulbricht at the Seventh SED Congress, it was stated that the FRG and the United States military presence in Europe constituted a threat to European peace and security. The United States and the FRG on the other hand maintain that there could be no substantial troop withdrawal from Europe because of the Soviet threat to Europe which still exists. Although not directly connected to any measures for the maintenance of European security, the United States and the UK were planning on the withdrawal of some brigades from their bases in theFRG. 8. On the non-proliferation Treaty, consultations among the Western allies continued during the month. Mr. William Foster and Vice-President Humphrey, in visits to Western Europe, consulted with the Allies on various aspects of the draft treaty - in particular, provisions for unhampered civilian use of nuclear energy and the US proposal for a three-year interim period during which EURATOM, with some supervisory role for the IAEA, could police the inspection machinery of the Treaty. Furthermore, they conferred on the situation of any future European federation with regard to nuclear weapons. The mission of theFRG disarmament -3- expert, Herr Schnippenkotter, to Washington, during the month, was reported in the press to have ended in failure. However, when the question was discussed within the FRG Cabinet and the North Atlantic Council, no attempt was made by the FRG to veto the Treaty. At the completion of consultation between the United States and its allies, Mr. Foster met with Russian disarmament expert Mr. Roschin in Geneva to examine the new US proposals covering Article 3 of the draft treaty. It was reported later that the Soviet Union had expressed opposition to this proposal. It was also reported that the Soviet Union would like to know what kinds of assurances were given by President Johnson to Chancellor Kiesinger during his visit to Bonn .an the occasion of the funeral of Dr. Adenauer. DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR IN VIET-NAM 9. The escalation of the war in Viet-Nam pushed to the background the diplomatic moves to bring about a peaceful settlement of the war there. To many observers it seemfed that the United States had abandoned for the present time any search for peaceful negotiation, and was now relying on a policy of attrition as a means to end the war. This assumption was strengthened during the speaking tour of General Westmoreland in the United States. In his speech before the 1,500 newspaper executives and others at the annual luncheon of the Associated Press at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel on 24 April, General Westmoreland called for a unity of purpose in the United States in order to bring about a military victory of the US forces. He also predicted bitter fighting ahead and said the war would be a long one. In his speech before a Joint Session of Congreee on 28 April, he also spoke of the difficulty of the fighting in Viet-Nam but predicted confidently that the United States would prevail. Congressional critics of the Administration policy expressed the view that the mission of General Westmoreland in the United States was calculated to prepare the American people for further escalation of the war. —'

3-/ General Westmoreland evoked much criticism when in his New York speech he declared that the "enemy" in Viet-Nam had gained support in the United States and abroad which "gives him hope that he can win politically that which he cannot accomplish militarily." He also deplored what he considered unpatriotic protest. These views had previously been expressed by other US officials, particularly President Johnson and Dean Rusk. But coming from General Westmoreland, it was taken as an attempt by the Administration to use the prestige of the General to "muzzle" all criticism of the war. General Westmoreland showed his awareness of the criticism, when in his Congressional speech, he refrained from repeating his charge. However, he asserted that the Achilles heel of the United States in Viet-Nam is the resolve of the American Government and people. For a further analysis of the role of General Westmoreland in the domestic debate, see Max Frankel, "Johnson and the General", New York Times, 29 April 1967. -k-

10. Support for US policy in Viet-Nam and the need for resolve were expressed in tvo Foreign Ministers1 meetings in Washington daring the month. At the end of the three-day Seato Ministerial Meeting on 20 April, the final communique" endorsed US policy in Viet-Nam. It charged that the DRV had violated the terms of the 195U and 1962 Geneva Agreements. It also supported the US assertion that reciprocity is an essential element of any acceptable proposal for reduction of fighting. The communique* was assessed as tougher in tone than any previous Seato communique* on Viet-Nam. Britain was reported to have favoured a milder tone. Those nations with troops in Viet-Nam met separately after the Seato meeting to discuss the trend of the war in Viet-Nam. The final communique" at the end of the meeting on 21 April stressed the determination of the Allies to continue the war as "firmly and as long as may be necessary," to defeat "the communist aggression". They also pledged "to pursue any avenue which could lead to a secure and just peace". —' France did not participate in the Seato Conference and Pakistan did not sign the final communique*. 11. The new escalations of the war in Viet-Warn were in the form of (a) strikes against targets in Haiphong for the first time on 20 April, (b) strikes at MIG Bases for the first time on 24 April, and (c) attempts to cut off the only rail and road approach from the CPR to Hanoi. The US bombing near Haiphong and the MIG Bases at Hoalac and Kep raised the question as towhether the Administration had now allowed the Military to go ahead in search of wider targets in the DRV. In the recent past, President Johnson was reported to be against bombing of the MIG Bases and the port facilities in Haiphong for fear of extending the war. —' 12. From other published reports it was disclosed that President Johnson had agreed in March to the bombing of the new targets. Although US officials refused to regard the bombing of new targets as a form of escalation, it was generally assessed that this constitutes forms of escalation. The DRV, NLF,uCPR and USSR in official statements condemned the expansion of th e war, and asserted that these new escalations revealed the "hypocrisy" and "dishonesty" of the US Administration in the call for a peaceful settlement.

2/ it was agreed in principle at this meeting to set up a psychological warfare study group to help to win greater acceptance for the war in Viet-Nam. 5/ As recently as 3 April Secretary of Defence MnNamara was expressing caution concerning the bombing of these targets. At a news conference on that date in Washington, he rejected the appeals by some members of Congress for US bombing of the MIG Bases. He said then that the situation could change. However, he also asserted th±t the American casualties would be greater if the target list were expanded to include MIG Bases. -5-

13. One lingering doubt remains as to whether the United States by these new measures has now exhausted its escalation possibilities. It is generally felt that any further increase pf targets, such as the bombing of dams, might trigger the intervention of the CPR in the war and thus bring about a widening of the war, i Military Build-up in the DMZ 1^. The future developments of the war in Viet-Nam and the prospects for settlement are clouded by reports concerning the military build-up by both sides near the DMZ. During the month US Military and diplomatic spokesmen alleged that three DRV Divisions were just north of the DMZ. These officials speculated that the intention of the DRV Division is to strike at the I Corp Area of South Viet-Nam in order to achieve a psychological victory over the US and South Viet- namese forces in the area—' To counter this move, the US Military Command in Saigon authorised the shifts of troops from the II and III Corps Areas to bolster the forces near the DMZ. —' 15. Towards the end of the month there was a general assessment that bitter fighting is ahead in the DMZ. In this context it is significant that the US Military reported on 30 April that US planes had destroyed a SAM site 10 miles north of the DMZ. No previous announcements had been made of SAM sites> south of the DRV, although there was full knowledge of SAM sites around Hanoi and Haiphong. In the view of the US Military, the emplacement of SAM sites near the DMZ suggested that the DRV was hoping to bring down B-52*s as a form of "propaganda coup". 16. The reported aggressiveness of DRV troops around the DMZ had evoked strong statements from the United States. In a briefing by State Department officials on 29 April, it was stated that the United States would respond quickly and meaningfully to any DRV attempt to attack through the DMZ at the I Corps Area. One official was quoted as sayfng, "if they want to play rough, we can play rough too." It was also asserted that any major attack by the DRV could change the nature of the conflict from a guerrilla war to a conventional one.

^/ The I Corps Area comprises five Northern Provinces: Quangtri, Thuathien, Quanguam, Quangtin and Quangugai. 2/ The United States sent 3,000 additional troops into the I Corps Area on 1? April. This action brought to 7,500 the number of Army, personnel in the five Provinces. These shifts were said to have weakened US forces in other areas in South Viet-Nam. It is in this context that there were urgent appeals by the US Military for the dispatch of more troops to South Viet-Nam. The MiLitary was said to be looking for a force level of 500,000 to 600,000 men by the end of the year. For more details on the implications of the Military shifts, see Hanson W. Baldwin, "Viet Troop:: Shifts," New York Times. 20 April 1967. -6-

Some Disengagement Proposals 17- It is in light of these developments around the DMZ that one can "better analyze the proposals of Canada and the United States. The Canadian proposal was made by External Minister Paul Martin on 11 April in the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons. The following are brief summaries of the proposal: 1. Some degree of physical disengagement possibly in the DMZ between Korth Viet-Nam and South Viet-Mam; also cessation of all forms of hostilities in the DMZ. 2. A freeze in the course of military events at the present level. 3. Cessation of all ground, air and sea hostilities. U. A return to the 195*1- Geneva Provisions, including withdrawal of forces to either side of the 17th parallel, repatriation of prisoners of war and dismantling of military bases. 18. It was later reported that Canada had sent a special envoy to deliver the proposals to the DRV leaders. This is a reference to Mr. Ormond Dyer, the new Canadian representative in the ICC; he is supposed to discuss the terms of the proposal with DRV officials when he arrives in Hanoi. In response to the Canadian proposal, the State Department on 19 April announced that the United States had proposed that each side pull back its military forces ten miles from the DMZ as a first step towards peace talks. The DMZ is six miles deep - three on each side of the 17th parallel. The US proposal would in effect widen it to a combat-free zone of 26 miles. 19. It was noted in the statement that the United States would be ready to cooperate fully with the International Control Commission and to grant it complete access to monitor and to supervise the withdrawal, and the continued inspection of the southern part of the DMZ and the additional demilitarized area, provided the DRV would grant the ICC equivalent cooperation and access to this territory. It was also stated that the ICC would be asked to satisfy itself that the "Worth Vietnamese troops" have in fact been withdrawn to a line ten miles north of the DMZ and thattfcfe 'DRV was not using the Zone to support military activities. The State Department in making the proposal public, said acceptance by the. DRV would be a "constructive step" that would move towards meeting President Johnson's demands for "just almost any step" by the DRV to justify a halt in the US bombing. -7-

The DRV and HLF Responses to These Proposals 20. Before outlining the DRV response it should be noted that the major objective of the Canadian and US proposal would be in keeping with long-term US objectives. Acceptance by theDRV of these proposals would amount to acceptance of a previous US call for DBV guarantees that it would not send men and supplies to South Viet-Ham. In a sense, the proposals were variations of previous US proposals aiming at the cessation of all support by iheoDRV to the NLF forces. 21. The DRV Foreign Ministry on 21 April issued a statement which rejected the US proposal for the widening of the DMZ. The United States was charged with the continuous and systematic "sabotage" of the 195^ Geneva Agreements. It was also asserted that the United States "... has cut off all movements of the people north and south of the provisional military demarcation line, has illegally sent armed forces into the demilitarized zone, suppressed and terror- ized the people in the south, and embarked on provocations against the people in the north." 6/ The statement continued by saying that "The US proposal for a widening of the demilitarized zone by 10 miles on either side is precisely a trick aimed at camouflaging the US war escalation and violation of the whole of the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam and the statute of the demilitarized zone, and at the same time, setting up a vast no-manrs land perpetually partitioning Vietnam." The DRV had not, by the end of the month, responded officially to the Canadian proposal, although press reports in the DRV had reacted negatively to it. The Commission for External Relations of the NLFSV Central Committee issued on 23 April a statement which rejected the US proposal. Some Hopes for Peace Probes 22. Although the escalation of the war and the threat of bitter fighting in the DMZ make it unlikely that a peaceful settlement of the war will be imminent, some commentators have expressed interest in the truce already agreed on for May. South Viet-Nam*s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on 8 April declaring that South Viet-Ham was ready to observe a 2^-hour truce on 2J May 1967, effective from 0000 hours to 21+00 hours Saigon Time. The statement appealed to

6/ It is interesting to note that the DRV was asserting that it has a legitimate right to send men, if not supplies, through the DMZ. This idea was also reiterated in a Khan Dan report of 22 April. It stated, inter alia, that the United States "... prevented the movement of the people between the two parts of the DMZ, continuously introduced military personnel into the area to take photo- graphs and draw up maps. They have also introduced military forces into the zone to terrorize the population in its southern part, opened provocative fire on the northern part, shot dead and abducted many Worth Vietnamese" living on the demarca- tion river and the sea area belonging to the DMZ." • -8- the NLF forces to heed the proposal to "allow all Buddhist followers to celebrate the festival." It was further emphasized in the statement that all precautions •would "be taken by the armed forces of Viet-Ham and their allies to ensure that the "enemy will not undertake any substantial efforts to re-settle their troops." The South Vietnamese Government also stated that it would be prepared to meet with officials of the DRV to discuss its proposed truce. 23. In endorsing the South Vietnamese proposal on the same day, the United States announced tuat it would halt the bombing of the DRV on 23 May. The Pentagon issued a statement warning that bombing would be resumed during the period, if the DRV used the truce to carry out major resupply of its forces. This statement was in line with previous US policy to resume bombing when it considered it necessary to prevent what it regarded as movement of men and supplies from the DRV to South Viet-Nam. 24. Without any reference to the truce statement of the South Vietnamese Government, the NLF Radio announced on 27 April that the NLF3V Central Committee Presidium had agreed "to cease military attacks for two days on the occasion of the birthday of Buddha which falls on the 15th day of the 4th Lunar month of the Dinh Min year, that is on 23 May 1^67..." 'eL^i. • Some world leaders have appealed to both parties to extend the truce period in order to lay the groundwork for a peaceful settlement of the war. However, it seems unlikely that this appeal will be heeded. For instance, the United States and South Vietnamese governments had already indicated that they would not follow a two-day truce period as proposed by the NLF for fear that it might be used for a major resupply of the NLF forces. It should be noted nevertheless that the South Vietnamese Government had stated that it would be prepared to meet with DRV officials to discuss the question of a truce. The immediate prospect, however, is for continued bitter fighting in the war.7 /—' US-USSR RELATIONS 26. The war in Viet-Nam still makes it difficult for the United States and the USSR to engage in any active diplomatic dialogue on a wide range of international and bilateral issues. However, US and USSR officials continue to cooperate in the search for a non-proliferation agreement. Soviet officials unceasingly condemn

T/ For an interesting article on the mistakes made during the previous truce periods and the necessity for careful planning in the forthcoming truce, see Robert Kleiman, "Making the Next Vietnam Pause Work," New York Times, 1 May 1967. -9- the US presence in Viet-Nam. The new escalations initiated by the United States during the month were also condemned by Soviet officials. In his speech at the 7th Congress of the SED of the GDR on 18 April, Chairman Brezhnev criticized what he called the "piratical war of the American imperialists against the people of Vietnam..." He went on to appeal for socialist unity on Viet-Nam by asserting "... it must be said that the aid to Vietnam would be more effective, and the hour of the failure of the imperial- ist aggressive venture would come much sooner were there a broad unity of action of all socialist countries, including China, in planning and rendering aid to the embattled Vietnamese people. I want to state once again from this platform that the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, consistently keeping to principles of internationalism, are ready as always for such unity of action in the broadest plane." 8/ 27. On the question of Laos, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko issued a statement on 24 April in his capacity as co-chairman of the 1962 Geneva Conference. In this statement, he asserted that the United States was aggravating the political situa- tion in Laos. The United States was charged with supporting one political group in Laos against another by rendering direct military, economic and financial help."to the "right wing" group. The United States was said to be committing acts of direct armed aggression on Laotian territory. Mr. Gromyko also stated that the United States was ignoring the neutral status of Laos by its use of the territory "for continuation of its aggression against Viet-Nam." Finally, an appeal was made to the United States when it was stated "... the Soviet co-chairman urges the United States government to go back to the road of strict and exact observance of the provisions of the 1962 Geneva Agreements and with this end in view immediately to stop the bombings of Laotian territory, the use of Laotian airspace for the continuation of aggression in Vietnam, to recall the American military and paramilitary personnel from Laos."

8/ This criticism by Chairman Brezhnev of the CPR for failure to cooperate in a common socialist assistance to the DRV appears to cast some doubts on a report of a USSR-CPR agreement on the transfer of Soviet military and economic aid through the CPR to the DRV. It was reported on 11 April that US officials, who were citing reports from countries with good diplomatic contacts in the USSR and CPR, had said that the Soviet Union and the CPR had apparently worked out an understanding to speed the flow of Soviet military supplies to the DRV. The nature of the agreement was said to be one by which DRV officials would take control of Soviet military and economic assistance when they reach the northern Chinese border with the SovietUnion and see that they are transported through the CPR. It is possible, however, that Chairman Brezhnev's criticism goes beyond such working arrangements and might be dealing with a more comprehensive joint action in support of the DRV. For a further discussion on this question, see Harrison E. Salisbury, "Will Russia and China Pull Together for Hanoi?", Mew York Times, l6 April 1967. -10-

9/ 28. At the Karlovy Vary Conference ~~ of European communist and worker parties on questions of security in Europe — 2k-26 April -- Chairman Brezhnev on 2k April said that the military presence of the United States in Europe encouraged West German "militarism" and increased the threat to peace in Europe. He went on to call for the dismantling of military blocs in Europe and the removal of Nato troops there. —' 29. In keeping with the stated intention of the United States to improve relations with the Soviet Union even while the war is being waged in Viet-Nam, US officials made no public attempt to reply to Soviet charges and criticism. Instead US officials were reported to believe that the Soviet Union had indeed toned down its criticism of US involvement in Viet-Nam. Furthermore, many Western commentators found it significant that US officials did not move to make a cold war propaganda campaign when Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva arrived in the United States on 21 April. US officials were scrupulous in not interpreting the presence of Mrs. Alliluyeva in the United States in cold war terms. —'

9/ For more details on this Conference,which was held in Czechoslovakia, see Note on the relations among Socialist countries. 10/ During the month, the tripartite conference of the United States, the UK and the FRG continued in London. At this conference, and that of the Nato nuclear planning group which met in Washington, the question of troop withdrawals from the FRG was discussed. Because of the balance of payment difficulties, both the United States and the UK announced plans to withdraw some of their troops from the FRG. However, it was not certain as to whether reciprocal measures would be required of the Soviet Union. ll/ The initial caution was made public in a letter sent by Mr. George F. Kennan to the New York Times which was published on 15 April. In his letter, he advised Americans "to rise above the outworn reflexes and concepts of the *cold war1, to recognize that a new era is dawning and that there are situations to which these stock reactions are simply not applicable; to accept a person as a human being in herself and not just as a sort of extension of her paternity; and to concede to her the sort of fair chance that millions of other people, displaced by handicap or misfortune, have been accorded by our society in earlier periods of our history." -11-

30. The US bombing of MIG Bases —/ in the DRV and power plants near Haiphong invoked some fears that such action would result in a US-USSR confrontation. US officials in the past have stressed that any "bombing of the port facilities of Haiphong may result in the destruction of Soviet vessels. On this ground, the US is said to be against bombing the port facilities at the present time. 31. Some reports from Washington have stated that the US Military might even welcome such a confrontation with the Soviet Union in the belief that it would be comparatively easier to have a settlement when the threat of a Great Power conflict becomes imminent. — / US-CPR RELATIONS 32. The bombing of the MIG Bases in the DRV also raised the question of possible CPR involvement in the war in Viet-Ham. It has long been felt among US and Western commentators that any bombing of the MIG Bases would result in transferring the MIG's to Southern China. Such a move could result in a CPR-US confrontation if US pilots follow the policy of "hot pursuit11. When US Military officials were questioned about the possible result after the announcement of the first bombing of MIG Bases, they were said to have replied that the removal of MIG's to Southern China would be disadvantageous to the DRV since they would need more reaction time to engage with US planes over the DRV. In this way, the possibility of a US-CPR confrontation was played down. In the meantime, US officials publicly continue to down grade the possibility of CPR intervention in the war. However, it must be noted that other reports emanating from Washington have suggested that the United States might welcome a CPR intervention in order that the United States might neutralize it. The rapid escalation of the war in the DRV Ik/ was said to be partly intended for such purpose. —' 33- Those who are skeptical about US official confidence that the CPR would not intervene in the war, have noted that the present Secretary of State Mr. Rusk was among key officials who during the Korean War assured President Truman that the CPR would not enter the war. The implication of this observation is that

12/ It has been reported in the US press that the bombing of two of the six principal airfields in the DRV is not significant in the sense that the most important MIG Bases - that is those on which the more advanced MIG-21D's are stationed (Phucyen) - was not bombed. It would seem that the selection of the two MIG Bases, that is Hoalac and Kep, was predicated on the fact that they were away from population centers. Phucyen and some of the other MIG Bases are very near population centers. 13/ For an analysis which reflected this viewpoint, see the interesting article by Max Frankel entitled "How Long Will it Last?", Hew York Times Magazine, 30 April 1967, p. 92. I**-/ (Please see next page) -12-

Mr. Rusk might "be a second time in error. During the month the CPR made several charges that US planes had.flown over its territory. These flights •were said to be a prelude to US attacks on the CPE. However, US Military sources denied that US planes had flown over the CPR. They noted that US pilots have "been ordered not to fly within 25 miles of the CPR-DRV border. —' THE FRG MD SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 31*. Although the relaxation of tensions in Europe continues, Eastern and Western officials still talk about the potential threats to the peace in Europe. For example, Chairman Brezhnev and Herr Ulbricht in the 7th Party Congress of the SED and Chairman Brezhnev at the Karlovy Vary Conference accused the FRG and therUS Military presence in Europe of being a threat to the peace in Europe. Some members of the Western Alliance, particularly the United States and the FRG, have argued against a substantial -withdrawal of troops from the FRG on the grounds that the Soviet Military presence in the GDR and other East European countries constitutes a threat to the peace in Europe. During the month, FRG officials reiterated their stated commitment to improve relations with all countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 35 • On the initiative of the SPD a letter was sent by Chancellor Kiesinger on 12 April to the SED Party Congress. The letter contained a l6-point proposal towards the relaxation of tension in a divided Germany. An open SPD letter of the same date to the SED Congress also called for a dialogue between the SED and the SPD. In response to these two letters, Herr Ulbricht was reported to have proposed that talks be held between Chancellor Kiesinger and Prime Minister Stoph of the GDR. It was not readily known whether the FRG would accept this proposal since their acceptance would amount to some form of recognition of the sovereignty of the GDR. —/

IV In an article by Hanson W. Baldwon, military correspondent of the New York Times, he hinted that the stationing of B-52's in Thailand might have some strategic importance vis-a-vis the CPR. See Hanson W. Baldwin, "Strategic Importance is Seen in Shift of 8-52*3," Mew York Times, 8 April. Also see article by Max Frankel, "How Long Will it Last?", Hew York Times, 30 March 1967, p. 92. 15/ For more details on the CPR charges against the United States, see the Hote on CPR relations. l6/ For further details concerning exchanges between the East and West Germanics, see the monthly Note on Europe. -13-

36. In other official statements made by FRG officials, it was asserted that the charges of revanchism made against the FRG by Soviet and GDR officials were contrary to its policy. Foreign Minister Brandt, in statements made in London and also in the Bundestag, expressed the hope that the FRG would be able to establish diplomatic relations with other East European countries. The develop- ments of the month, however, would suggest that the FRG would have little chance of success in achieving its Eastern policy until it could accept the demands of the Socialist countries that it recognize the present realities in Europe, including the acceptance of present international boundaries and the recognition of the GDR. MON-PROLIFERATIOK 37. The Socialist countries have also demanded that the FRG renounce for all times any access to nuclear weapons. It is in this sense that they have criticized the FRG for placing what they considered obstacles to a non-proliferation agreement. As was noted in previous Notes, the FRG, Italy and some other non-nuclear States have raised certain objections to certain aspects of the draft treaty - in particular, concerning the free development of civilian nuclear applications. The FRG, Italy and the EURATOM Commission in particular have objected to Article 3 of the draft treaty which provided for some IAEA participation in the applications of cont'rols on EURATOM territory. 38. During his trip to Western Europe, Vice-President Humphrey discussed with FRG and other European leaders the US draft treaty. Later, Mr. William Foster, and President Johnson in his visit to the FRG on the occasion of the funeral of Dr. Adenauer, spoke with FRG officials, among them Chancellor Kiesinger, on the non-proliferation draft treaty. It was reported that during the discussion between President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger the former assured the latter that the Atlantic Alliance was more important to the United States than a non-prolifera- tion treaty. The assurance was given in order to abate West German concern over an article written in 1965 in Foreign Affairs by Mr. William C. Foster. In the article, Mr. Foster had written that a non-proliferation treaty was worth pursuing even at the expense of eroding the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Johnson also promised 17/ consultations with FRG leaders. —'

IT/ The talk between President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger was held on 24 April. At the conclusion of the talks it was widely reported that President Johnson had pledged to have frequent consultations with FRG officials on a wide range of issues. This was to meet FRG charges that the United States had neglected its allies in favour of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on a non-proliferation treaty. -14-

39- At an earlier FRG Cabinet meeting on 20 April, the report of the visit of [ Herr Schnippenkotter was discussed. It had been reported that Herr Schnippenkotter was unsuccessful in his trip to Washington to effect some changes in the US draft. At the conclusion of the Cabinet discussion, it was reported that the FRG delegate to the Nato Council had been instructed not to object to the US draft treaty as presented to the Hato Council. When the Council subsequently met to discuss the draft treaty, all the Nato members were reported to have given the "green light" to the US delegate to go ahead with his bilateral discussion with the Soviet delegate, subject to continued review in Nato during subsequent negotiations in the ,ENDC. However, it was noted that the FRG was maintaining 187 its reservation concerning, inter alia, the inspection machinery of the treaty.— 40. At the Foreign Ministers Meeting of EURATOM members on 10 April, the question of non-proliferation was also discussed. It was reported that a concensus was peached at the meeting on a three-year interim proposal of the United States for inspection by EURATOM. ^-' Both the FRG and Italy were reported to be opposed to the idea of "automatic application" of IAEA controls at the end of the interim period. The FRG was said to be in favour of a fixed term for the treaty lasting for 5 years, at the end of which time4;hey would have to make a further decision as to whether they would adhere to the treaty. Italy was said to be in favour of a one-year fixed-term treaty. —' 41. John W. Finney of the New York Times wrote from Washington on 28 April that the Soviet Union had objected to the new US draft proposal on Article 3- It was subsequently disclosed that the Soviet Union was anxious to find out what kinds of commitments and understanding were reached between President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger. —' From published reports, it was stated that some form of understanding had been reached between the United States and the FRG. The Soviet Union was also reported to be against any inspection by EURATOM in place of the IAEA.

l8/ The FRG on 7'April sent notes to the Foreign Ministries of the 17 participants in the ENDC and France, outlining its views on the non-proliferation treaty. Very little was said about Article 3- However, the Note urged that the treaty be coupled with "authentic disarmament'measures by the Great Powers." This need for some disarmament measures was reiterated by Foreign Minister Willy Brandt when he spoke on the non-proliferation treaty before the Bundestag on 27 April. l9/, 20/, 21/. (Please see Next page). -15-

^2. It was reported in the Hew York Times on 14 April that Mr. L. K. Jha, Staff -Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, had told US and USSR officials that India could not afford a non-proliferation treaty without some guarantees backed by the two Great Powers against nuclear attack or blackmail by the CPR. Mr. Jha had conferred with officials in the Soviet Union and the United States during the month. Thus it would seem that there are difficult negotiating periods ahead before a non-proliferation treaty can be signed. However, participants of the EHDC have expressed confidence that the common interest in reaching such an agreement will make it possible for a final draft to be accepted even though it might take some time.

19/ For details see last month's East-West Note. 20 / The FRG and Italy have complained that inspection by IAEA might involve industrial espionage. In an interview in Geneva on 1? April, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, Director-General of the IAEA, expressed confidence that the IAEA could expand its inspection system if requested by the non-proliferation treaty to check on compliance. He also noted that none of the countries which IAEA had inspected had ever charged it with leaking industrial secrets. 21/ At the beginning of the month, Mr. Sergey Zykov of Izvestiya commented on 1 April on a news report published at the end of March in the Hew York Times regarding certain understanding between the US and the USSR on a future European nuclear force. He stated that "if Washington has really given guarantees to Bonn that the nufilear non-proliferation treaty would not prevent it from becoming a party to a 'European nuclear force1, this is a clear violation of the meaning and aims of the contemplated treaty." Mr. Zykov concluded by noting, "It is legitimate to pose the question how the United States is going to remove these obstacles? It is quite obvious that by succumbing to Bonn's blackmail and granting the demands of the West German revanchists, Washington, far from paving the way to the cone lusion of the treaty, on the contrary, may erect fresh obstacles in this road." OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION

CANADA 1. Text'of a statement delivered by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa, the Hon. Paul Martin, on 11 April 1967, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Canadian Mission to the United Nations Press Release No. 9, 12 April 1967. 2. Advance text of second of three lectures delivered on 27 April by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Paul Martin, in the first Jacob Blaustein Lectures series at Columbia University, being given 26-28 April 1967, under the general title, "Canadian Identity and the Search for World Peace." Canadian Mission to the United Nations Press Release No.13, 27 April 1967.

UNITED STATES 3- Opening statement of the Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, before the Twelfth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 18 April 1967, Department of State Press Release No.90, 18 April 1967. k. Text of the statement issued by the State Department on 19 April in response to Canadals peace proposal for Vietnam, New York Times, 20 April 1967.

5. Excerpts from communique of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, New York Times, 21 April 1967. 6. Address by the Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Under-Secretary of State before the Foreign Policy Association, in the Hotel Americana, New York City on 21 April 1967, Dept. of State Press Release No.93 (Revised), 21 April 1967. ,• 7. Text of an address by Gen. William C. Westmoreland at the annual luncheon on 2k April 1967 of The Associated Press at the Waldorf- Astoria Hotel, New York Times, 25 April 1967.

8. Transcript of Gen. William C. Westmoreland's address to the joint session of Congress on 28 April 1967, as recorded by the New York Times, through the facilities of ABC News, New York Times, 29 April 1967. USSR 9- Text of 2k April speech by Leonid Brezhnev at the conference of communist and workers parties of Europe discussing problems of European security in Karlovy Vary, FBIS (USSR and Eastern Europe), 25 April 1967. 10. Communique* of the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties, USSR Mission to the United Nations Press Release No.25, 27 April 1967. FRG 11. Deutsch-amerikanische Zusammenarbeit in atlantischer Partner schaft, Bulletin, Nr.35/S.285, 7 April 1967. 12. Partnerschaft zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und einera sich einigenden Europa, Bulletin, Nr. 35/S.285, T April 1967. 13. Beitrag zu einem dauerhaften und gerechten Frieden, Bulletin, Nr .35/3. 285 7 April 1967.

Ik. Address by Chancellor Kiesinger before the Bundestag on 12 April 1967, News, from the German Embassy, Washington, B.C., Vol. XI, No.U, 19 April

15. Letter of the Social Democratic Party. (This open letter included a copy of the Government declaration^ 12 April on internal-German relations and appealed, "for comprehensive discussion" of the proposals for a detente contained in the declaration.) News, from the German Embassy, Washington, B.C., Vol. XI, Wo. 4, 19 April 1967. GDR 16. Text of report of Herr Ulbricht*s speech to the Congress on 17 April 1967, FBIS (Europe), 19 April 1967. DRV 17. "Foreign Ministry Condemns new War Escalation", Hanoi VWA International Service, 26 April 1967, FBIS (Daily Report), 26 April 1967.

SOUTH VIETNAM 18. "South Vietnam appeals to North Vietnam and Vietcong to Observe Truce During Buddha Birthday Festival", statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Vietnam, 8 April 1967, Republic of Vietnam Office of the Permanent Observer to the United Nations Press Release dated 10 April 1967.

19. "South Vietnam Premier's Reply to Prime Minister of Ceylon on Peace Proposal", 12 April 1967, Republic of Vietnam Office of the Permanent Observer to the United Nations Press Release dated 18 April 1967. 20. "NFLSV Denounces Proposal for Widening DMZ", statement issued on 2J April by the Commission for External Relations of the NFLSV Central Committee, Hanoi VNA International Service, 2q- April 1967* FBIS (Daily Report), 2U April 1967. 21. Communique* of the South Vietnam National Liberation F-'ont Central Committee Presidium, Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 27 April 1967, FBIS (Daily Report), 28 April 1967. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION C: The Secretary-General

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22 June 196? CR. 13 (11-64) DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AMD 19 June 1967 SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS JJ:fg Political Affairs Division

MONTHLY SURVEYS

EASTVHEST RELATIONS (May 1967) EAST-WEST RELATIONS (May 1967)

General Comments 1. The current Middle Eastern crisis, along with the continued war in Viet-Nam, cast a disturbing shadow over the future trend in East-West relations. Although the Middle Eastern crisis is primarily a dispute between the Arab States and Israel, concerns have been expressed that the support shown by the United States for Israel and the Soviet Union for the Arabs might result in a US-USSR confrontation. 2. During the month there was a marked paucity of diplomatic moves to bring about a peaceful settlement of the war in Viet-Nam. All of the protag- onists in the conflict reiterated their known positions and all reaffirmed their determination to strive until their objectives are realized. 3. A major military development, which in Itself complicated any diplomatic effort, was the announcement on 19 May that the United States and South Vietnamese forces had entered the Southern Sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This move suggested to many commentators that the likelihood of a US invasion of the DMZ, in spite of US commitments to the contrary, was now more likely. However, US officials reiteracted that there was no plan to cross the Ben Hai River. By the end of the month, the United States and South Viet- namese forces were reported to have been withdrawn from the DMZ. This move into the DMZ was strongly condemned by the DRV, the NLF, the CEB, and the Soviet Union. lu These military moves and the bitter fighting that occurred during .of the month south/and within the DMZ, as well as in the Central Highlands, could have influenced U Thant, when on 10 and 11 May he again reiterated his concern that the war in Viet-Nam might spread into other areas and possibly result in war involving the US, CPR, and USSR. The Secretary-General asserted that the war in Viet-Ham might be the Initial phase of a third World War. He also reiterated his conviction that the most important factor to bring about peaceful settlement of the war in Viet-Nam was the cessation of US bombing of the DRV. 5. During the month, there were also suggestions by Senator Mike Mansfield and other US officials that there might still be a possibility to involve the United Nations in a settlement of the Viet-Nam war. However, there are others who still believe that it would be unfortunate to involve the United Nations in this settlement at the present time. - 2 -

6. US-USSR relations appear to "be entering a new phase in the Middle Eastern crisis. Because of their opposing supports for the Arab States and Israel, it has been stated that the confrontation between the Arab States and Israel may further complicate US-USSR relations. The war in Viet-Nam still remains the major deterrent to any marked improvement in US-USSR relations, but the desire of both powers to prevent any marked rupture in their relations was clearly evidenced in two incidents which occurred in the Sea of Japan. On 10 and 11 May, US newspaper reports indicated that the US destroyer "Walker" was scraped by Soviet destroyers during a joint US-Japanese naval operation. Both the US and USSR made diplomatic protests accusing each other of precipitating the incident. There were further discussions within the United States on the state of the US-USSR consultations on the necessity for a moratorium of an anti- ballistic missile system (ABM). In a news conference on 18 May, Secretary of Defense McWamara suggested that the United States might consider pro- ducing and deploying a limited ABM system to counter a "light attack" emanating from the CPR. T. There was no major development in US-CPR relations. Considerable attention was given to a series of reports which appeared in the Chicago

Daily News On the basis of interviews by Simon Malley of Jeune Afrique with CPR leaders stating the conditions set by the CPR for intervention in the war. Although US officials reaffirmed their convictions that the CPR would not intervene in the war, some State Department officials emphasized that the United States would have to use everything it had if the CPR should elect to intervene in the conflict. 8. There was no discernible improvement in the FRG's relations with the Socialist countries in Europe, although some significance could be seen in the fact that the FRG conceded that it received, and that it would answer, letters sent by GDR officials to their counterparts in the FRG. 9. The Socialist countries continued to criticize the FRG for refusing to accept the status quo in Europe. However, Chancellor Kiesinger on 1 May in West Berlin and on 8 May in Hamburg spoke at great length on the FRG's desire to improve relations with the Socialist countries. These views were also expressed by other FRG officials. - 5 - 10. There were some developments within NATO that might eventually affect European security. On 2 May the US, UK and FRG announced that agreement had been reached for redeployment of US and UK forces in Germany. There were suggestions that the Soviet Union would be asked to make some reciprocal move by withdrawing some of its troops from Western Germany. The NATO Council on 9 May finally agreed to endorse the change of strategy of NATO from one of "massive retaliation" to one of "forcible response", 11. The ENDC resumed its discussion of the draft non-proliferation treaty on 18 May, However, by the end of the month no progress had been made in reconciling the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States on certain aspects of the draft.

DIPLOMATIC ASPECT OF THE WAR IN VIET-NAM 12. As was mentioned in last month's Note, the escalation of the war complicated all diplomatic efforts to resolve the Vietnamese war by peaceful means. During the current month, the bitter fighting in and south of the DMZ, as well as the fighting for the strategic hills in the I Corps area along with the fighting in the Central Highlands, completely overshadowed diplomatic moves to resolve the conflict. There were Jiardly any major proposals during the month to move the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. However, this does not diminish the private and quiet efforts that are con- stantly being made to end the war in a peaceful settlement. 13* A major military move which had some diplomatic effect was the decision taken by the United States and South Vlet-Nam to enter the Southern Sector of the DMZ for the first time. It was reported in Saigon on 18 May that US Marines and South Vietnamese forces had entered the DMZ in order to drive out DRV forces that were said to have occupied the Southern Sector of the DMZ. As was noted in last month's Note, US reports had indicated that three DRV divisions were in and around the DMZ. In spite of the fact that the US official view was that the intrusion into the Southern Sector of the DMZ was intended primarily to drive out the DRV forces and destroy their artillery emplacements, serious questions were raised both in the United States and abroad about the political and diplomatic effect of such a move. 14. There were some commentators both in the United States and in other countries that suggested that the United States was planning on the invasion of the DRV in spite of US commitments to the contrary. With the US and South Viet- names forces near the Ben Hal River, which is said by US official sources to be

I/ For all detailed accounts of military moves and other developments in Viet-Nam, see the monthly paper for Viet-Nam. - k - the northern boundary between South Viet-Nam and the DRV, it was felt that the United States, in hot pursuit, might easily invade the DRV. However, because of the sensitivity of any invasion of the DRV by the United States, US officials, immediately following the announcement ofthe move into the DMZ, emphasized that there was no intention to invade the DRV. This commitment was reaffirmed on 21 May when General Earle G. Wheeler, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the television programme "Issues and Answers", said that US military commanders in Viet-Nam were under strict instructions not to invade the DRV even when engaged in hot pursuit of DRV forces. He went on to assert that General Westmoreland "is not going across the Ben Hai River, which is the boundary between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam". It was later reported in the US press that US Marines, having attained their objectives, had withdrawn from the Southern Sector of the DMZ. 15. The US move into the DMZ was strongly criticized by the DRV, NLP, CPR, USSR, and other Socialist countries as well as critics of US involvement in Viet- Nam. The general view of those criticizing the US military move was expressed in a DRV statement which was issued on 21 May. The statement criticized the US move into the DMZ as "a new, extremely serious act of war expansion". It also stated that the move was "in the overall scheme of the US imperialists to undermine the Demilitarized Zone and prosecute the war of aggression in Viet- Nam". The statement went on to demand that the United States "put an immediate end to its aggressive war in Viet-Nam, stop unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and strictly respect the national rights of the Vietnamese people as recognized by the 195^ Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam".-' U Thant Renewed Calls for Cessation of Bombing 16. The question of the cessation of US bombing of North Viet-Nam and the need to negotiate in the spirit of the 195^ Geneva Agreements were major themes in speeches made by U Thant during the month. In an appearance before the Speakers* Research Committee on 10 May, U Thant reiterated his appeal to Hie United States "to take a calculated risk, and halt the bombing of the DRV". He expounded on this view the following day at a luncheon of/United Nations Correspondents Association. During that time, he read out a statement which reviewed the developments since his three-point proposal contained in an aide memoire of Ik March and his news conference of 28 March. He noted that since

2/ The Soviet Union continued its criticism of US involvement in Viet-Nam when on 1 May in Moscow new Soviet Defence Minister Marshall Andrei Grechko bitterly criticized what he considered "the US military imperialist war in Viet-Nam". - 5 - his aide memoire had not been fully and unconditionally accepted by all sides, it should be regarded that his proposals were no longer under consideration. This could mean that U Thant was withdrawing these proposals. He went further to reaffirm his convictions that the first obstacle to talks remained the con- tinued air bombardment of North Viet-Nam. Taking note of the views suggesting that peaceful negotiations might be difficult, he expressed his convictions that talks conducted in the spirit of the Geneva Agreements would pave the way for a settlement. 17. In a later 'question and answer* period following his official statement, U Thant made some remarks which caused some considerable•concern. He asserted in response to a question that there existed the possibility of a CPR and Soviet intervention in Viet-Nam. He first made the important observ- ation that the present war in Viet-Nam is localized only because of the restraint of the DRV leaders. However, he noted: "I am really concerned about the potentialities of this war, knowing as I do the moods not only of the parties primarily involved, but also of the parties not directly Involved at present. This is why I say that, if the present trend continues, a direct confrontation between Washington and Peking is inevitable and that I am even afraid that we may be witnessing today the initial phase? of World War III, In this context, I must say that the mutual defence pact between Moscow and Peking is still in force." 2/ 18. In his appeal for a cessation of US bombing of the DRV, U Thant remarked, quoting from a statement made by Defense Secretary McNamara before a Congressional Committee, that the bombing had not significantly affected the ability of the DRV to send men and supplies to South Viet-Nam. The implication was that the bombing of North Viet-Nam, although it may have very limited effect, is not an absolute military necessity. 19. As in the past, US officials did not publicly criticize U Thant for his statements which contradicted known US views and positions, although several reports indicated that President Johnson and his close advisers remain very critical of the Secretary-General. Following his statement on 11 Hay, Ambassador Goldberg issued a statement which expressed the differing assessments of the United States and the Secretary-General on the trends and effects of the war. j5/ ' The concern evoked by this statement may have resulted from too literal reading of U Thant's remarks. Some commentators believe that U Thant was speaking with some knowledge of the intentions of the CPR. Thus, it was felt that his statement might be an accurate prediction of the future. - 6 - Ambassador Goldberg agreed that talks should be conducted in the spirit of the Geneva Agreements in order to end the conflict in Viet-Nam. Ho new positions were evident in this statement. On another occasion, Mr. Goldberg, speaking at a regional Foreign Policy Conference at the Pick-Congress Hotel in Chicago on 12 May, outlined what is required of the DRV before the United States would end its bombing of the DRY. The following were reported to be the five questions asked of the DRV: "1. What would we talk about and how soon? "2. Would the talks embrace our proposals as well as those of Hanoi? "3. Would the purpose of the talks be an honorable negotiated settlement and not a mere surrender of our side? "b» How would Hanoi reciprocate militarily to our action in ceasing the bombing? "5. What assurances would there be that neither side would derive any military advantage from the other's de-escalation?" US State Department officials later emphasized that these questions were not intended as a hardening of the US position.-' Question of the Role of the United Nations 20. After a long pause, the question of the role of the United Nations in ending the war in Viet-Nam gained some prominence during the month. In speeches made in the Senate on 15 and 18 May, Senate leader Mike Mansfield asserted that the UN Security Council, on the basis of the appeal made by the United States in January 1966, should take action to bring the opposing sides to a peace confer- ence. He went on to add that the UN action was needed "now, before it is too late - for the Organization and for peace". Much significance was given to Senator Mansfield's views, when on 18 May Mr. Rusk, after appearing at a closed session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that a new approach to the United Nations was a possibility. He added that this approach had been discussed within the Administration, but that he could not go into the timing or details of such a move. At a news conference on the same day, President Johnson, in response to a question, stated that steps were being taken to bring the conflict before the United Nations, although he did not indicate what form the move would take.

k/ A minor controversy arose at the beginning of the month when the New York Times on 9 May published a report by John M. Hightower of the Associated Press. The report of Mr. Hightower, which was said to reflect the official US position, Indicated that President Johnson had prevented US bombers (Continued on next page) - 7-

21. In spite of these moves to involve the United Nations in the war, the DRV and the NLF still opposed a UN role in Viet-Nam. Although not opposing a UN role in Viet-Nam, British Foreign Secretary George Brown appeared to be in agreement with U Thant when, in a speech to the United Nations Association in London on 8 May, he observed that involvement of the United Nations in the Vietnamese war might not be advisable at the present time. Prospects of Peaceful Settlement 22. It was noted in last month's Note that hopes have been expressed that the truce for Buddha's birthday should be extended in order to lay the foundation for a peaceful settlement of the war. However, none of the protagonists showed any interest in extending the truce. There were reports during the truce from both sides indicating that the other had violated the truce. At the conclusion of the US and South Vietnamese 2^-hour truce on 2k May, the allied forces resumed normal operations. 23. Since US officials have long argued that critics of US policy in Viet- Nam are, by their criticism, prolonging the war instead of ending it, 16 Senators who have been constant critics of US policy issued a statement on 17 May outlining their views on the present sentiment in the United States concerning the war in Viet-Nam. The statement was intended to be an open letter to the DRV leadership and it sought to convince them that there are many more US citizens in support of the US position in Viet-Nam than those criticizing the war. Taking full account of the official US view that the DRV leadership is exaggerating the hostility of the American people to the war, the statement observed: "The conflict now appears to have reached an acute phase. At this critical Juncture, it would be tragic indeed if there were any misconceptions in Hanoi about the realities of the political situ- ation in the United States. We believe it essential to a realistic quest for peace that the nature of the dissent in this country, prevailing among those who have criticized our Government's policy in Viet-Nam, be accurately understood and assessed by the Government of North Viet-Nam.1' £/ 4/* (Continued) from hitting Hanoi from mid-December to late April In order to make it possible for talks to open between the DRV and the US. Mr. Hightower went on to relate contacts between Ambassador Cabot Lodge and Polish diplomat Mr. Lewandowski in Saigon on the modalities for a peaceful settlement. The conclusion of Mr. Hightower's report was that North Viet-Nam frustrated all efforts for peace talks. The US version of the talks between US and Polish officers were contra- dicted by other Communist reports which asserted that it was the "deliberate" bombing of Hanoi by the US on 13 December 1966 that actually frustrated all efforts for a peaceful settlement at a time when the DRV was willing to enter into negotiations. £/ (Please see next page) - 8 -

2kt The statement further appealed for a peaceful settlement of the war in Viet-Nam. There were reports that President Johnson and his immediate advisers were pleased by the statement issued by the 16 Senators, believing that it would convince the DRV that the American people are behind his policy. It has long been argued in US official circles that vhen the DRV leadership believed that there was no overwhelming opposition to the US policy in Viet- Nam, it might then be Inclined to enter into peaceful negotiations. However, those who are familiar with the DRV leadership noted that there is no illusion in the DRV about the extent of the opposition to the US policy in Viet-Nam. It is their view that the opposition within the United States plays only a. minor role in the determination of the DRV leadership to continue the prose- cution of the war. In spite of these conflicting assessments, there was no evidence by the end of the month of any immediate prospect for ending the war in Viet-Nam by peaceful negotiations.

US-USSR RELATIONS 25. The Middle Eastern crisis—^ has introduced further complications in the search for an active rapprochement. Although the dispute in the Middle East is essentially between the Arab States on the one hand and Israel on the other, the US and USSR have become involved because each had supported one side against the other. The United States has taken the leading role among the Western Powers to criticize the imposition of a blockade by the UAR against Israeli shipping and ships carrying strategic goods to Israel through the Strait of Tiran. The United States, along with the British Government, has supported the Israeli claim that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway and should be guaranteed for free passage.

£/ The New York Times published on 17 May a latest report of the Louis Harris Poll, which indicated that k5% of those polled said they favoured "total military victory", while 4l$ thought that both sides should withdraw under United Nations supervision. It was also reported then that this was the first time the number favouring military victory exceeded those calling for a supervised withdrawal. Because of this support for escalation, the view has been expressed that the 16 Senators who agreed on the statement were dis- turbed about their own political standing in the various States. Thus, it was concluded that the major purpose of the statement was to repair whatever damage might have been done by the criticism of the said Senators. 6/ For details on the crisis which erupted in the Middle East during the ~ month, see Note for the month on Relations between Middle Eastern States and Arab States of North Africa. - 9 -

26. There Taave "been other reports suggesting that the United States and other Western Powers are working on plane to challenge the blockade of the Gulf by the UAR. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, although it had not clearly indicated its views regarding the status of the Gulf of Aqaba, has nevertheless indicated its support for the UAH and the Arab States. In the Security Council debates on the Middle East crisis, Ambassadors Goldberg and Fedorenko exchanged acrimonious statements regarding the intention of each other in the Middle Eastern crisis. Concern has also been expressed by Western commentators concerning the reported dispatch of Soviet war ships through the Bosporus to the Mediterranean, Some Western reports have seen augmentation of the Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean as an indication that the Soviet Union is preparing to come to the defense of the UAR and other Arab States in the event that the United States and other Western Powers should attempt to break the UAR embargo.-'-?'/ 27. There are Indications, however, that both the Soviet Union and the United States are equally concerned about the dangers of an armed conflict in the Middle East. There are even indications that the Soviet Union is working behind the scenes to bring about a solution to the crisis. Although the Soviet Union is reported to have turned down the French proposal for a four-power con- sultation to prevent an armed clash in the Middle East, there are other reports indicating that the Soviet Union would be willing to have four-power talks at a lower level, possibly in the United Nations, But whatever efforts the Soviet Union might make towards a resolution of the conflict, it is clear that the Soviet Union would support the maintenance of the present status quo, that is to say, those situations already brought about by the withdrawal of. UHEF and the institution of a blockade by the UAR. 28. The Soviet Union had already condemned Israel for being the source of tension in the Middle East and had called on the United States to use its influ- ence to bring about some restraint in the behaviour of the Israeli officials.

J/ Since the Soviet Union made a request to the Turkish Government for the passage of its war ships before President Nasser instituted the blockade, it has been argued that the Soviet Union's augmentation of its vessels in the fcfediterranean is not intended as a support for the UAR embargo. However, it is possible to determine that the purpose of the Soviet destroyers is to prevent, by tfeelrmere presence, the breaching of the blockade by the Western Powers. Nevertheless, it should, be noted that US officials have generally dis- regarded the reports of the augmentation of the Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean. - 10 - The United States, on the other hand, believes that the source of the conflict is the UAR and thus in turn has called on the Soviet Union to use its influence to get President Nasser to agree to the lifting of the blockade to the Israeli shipping. 29. The danger that lies ahead is that attempts by the Western Powers to forcibly lift the Egyptian blockade might evoke a response from the Soviet Union which might unintentionally lead to a military confrontation between the US and the USSR. It should be emphasized, however, that Soviet and American officials are well aware of the dangers of such a confrontation and would do all in their power to avert it. 30. The doldrum in US-USSR relationships which is a direct result of the war in Viet-Nam makes it difficult for the US and USSR to cooperate actively in resolving the crisis in the Middle East and, as the war continues, Soviet officials emphasize that they would continue to give military aid to the DRV in proportion to the escalation ordered by the United States.—' Naval Collision in the Sea of Japan Jl. An incident which was linked to the war in Viet-Nam was that reported on 10 and 11 May. The reports indicated that the American destroyer "Walker" was scraped twice within two days, by Soviet destroyers, in the Sea of Japan. The US destroyers were holding joint naval operations with Japanese forces. These incidents were initially viewed as an attempt by the Soviet Union to challenge the US fleet in the Pacific, more so because the naval operations were being con- ducted very close to Soviet territory. However, it later developed that there were conflicting interpretations of the incident. The US State Department on 11 May called on Mr. Yuri N, Chernyakov, Charge d1Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, to request the Soviet Union to take prompt steps to halt "harassment of American naval vessels". US Ambassador Thompson in Moscow also lodged a complaint to the Soviet Government. 32. The Soviet version was contained in a Radio Moscow broadcast on 11 May. It accused US war ships of precipitating the collision and denounced the provoca- tive manoeuvres in the Sea of Japan. The Soviet Union also made an official 8/ At a time when the US and South Vietnamese forces entered the Southern Sector of the DMZ, there were reports suggesting that the Soviet Union had sent to the DRV long-range strategic missiles that can use conventional weapons with ranges for targets in Saigon and the Seventh Fleet. It was argued in some US military circles that if the USSR should furnish offensive weapons to the HMV that could become a threat to the US Seventh Fleet, then the chances of a US-USSR con- frontation in Viet-Nam would become greater. However, no confirmation has yet been received on this report of Soviet offensive aid to the DRV. - 11 - protest when Ambassador Thompson was called Into the Soviet Foreign Ministry and was told that the US destroyer "Walker" was at fault. It was pointed out that it was not mere accident that the destroyer "Walker" was the same destroyer which on two separate occasions collided with Soviet destroyers.'9"/ 33. Following the exchange of protests and charges, the US State Department issued a statement on 13 May indicating that the incidents were closed. It was the view of US official sources, upon reviewing the incidents, that there was no direct evidence of attempts by the Soviet Union to "harass" US war ships in the Sea of Japan. However, the incidents demonstrated the dangers of a possible confrontation between the US and USSR in the tense situation surrounding the war in Viet-Nam. 3*U What is of special significance, however, is the fact that in spite of the war in Viet-Nam, US and USSR officials continue to work in various other areas to maintain some form of contact and not to allow the war in Viet-Nam to prevent all forms of diplomatic contact between the US and the USSR. It was in this sense that US officials were pleased when it was reported that the Soviet Union on 19 May had ratified the Outer Space Treaty.—' Anti-Missile Defense Debate 35. The lack of progress in the US-USSR discussion on the desirability of a moratorium in the deployment of an ABM system was indicated at a news conference in the Pentagon on 18 May given by Defense Secretary Robert S, McNamara. He noted that very little progress has been made in convincing the Soviet Union that dis- cussions should be held on limiting the deployment of offensive ballistic missiles.

£/ Some US naval officials had explained the incident by noting that in the past Soviet vessels have manoeuvred very close to US vessels during manoeuvres. Under previous instructions, US naval captains were told to do all they could to avoid a collision with Soviet vessels* However, it was noted that new instructions had been given which freed the US naval officials from exercising much restraint in order to avoid a collision. It was concluded that Soviet naval offi- cials were perhaps not aware of the new instructions given to captains of US destroyers. 1O/ A possible setback was given to the US intentions to expand East-West trade when the Interior Department of the United States recommended that the Soviet Union be eliminated from competing on three new electric generator units for the Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River, The Interior Department was reported to have claimed that security reasons could not permit the Soviet Union to provide these generators in which the USSR is said to be much advanced. However, the final decision will have to be made by President Johnson as to whether the Soviet Union and other foreign business groups can compete for the electric gener- ator units* - 12 - However, he expressed the hope that talks would be held in the not-too-distant future. The need for a strategic missile parity "between the Soviet Union and the United States had been criticized by a segment of the US military estab- lishment. They have argued in favour of a US lead of four-to-one ratio in strategic missiles. They have also disagreed with the thesis of Mr, McNamara that a US ABM system intended to intercept Soviet strategic defensive weapons would not be successful. 36. In this regard, Mr. McNamara in his news conference made a distinction between two types of nuclear attacks. He said that one could be a "heavy attack" of the type the Soviet Union is capable of launching; the other he termed a "light attack" that the CPR may be able to launch within a decade. On the question of whether an ABM system should be produced and deployed, he said "I think it is fair to say that we are capable of designing and producing and deploying a system to protect populations against light attacks. In my opinion, we are not capable of designing, pro- ducing and deploying systems to protect populations against heavy attacks." ll/ 37» Hanson W. Baldwin,—12'/ military correspondent of the Hew York Times. reported on 21 May that top military officials in the Pentagon were unhappy about the Pentagon reluctance to agree to the production and deployment of an ABM system. Thus, military officials are said to have been concerned that no progress is being made in the diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union for a moratorium on the deployment of an ABM system. General Earle G, Wheeler, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has openly in a Congressional testimony disagreed with the McNamara assessment of an ABM system against Soviet offensive nuclear missiles. In particular, he has argued that an ABM system could not create a destabilizing effect on the present nuclear balance between the US and

ll/ It is interesting to note that, in response to a question, Mr. McNamara stated that India could decide to deploy an ABM system capable of count- ering a potential attack from the CPE. This is the first time that a US official has suggested that one way of giving guarantees to India, if it should agree to sign a non-proliferation agreement, would be for India to have its own system. An ABM system against light attack would cost about $^ billion or $5 billion. 12/ Article by Hanson W. Baldwin, "Military Concern on Lack of Missile Defense Grows". The Hew York Times. 21 May 19&7. 13_/ John W. Finney reported in the New York Times on 10 May that Pentagon officials, in a testimony before a Congressional Committee, had con- firmed that the US was developing a missile system that would use tremendous bursts of X-Ray from a nuclear explosion to destroy incoming nuclear warheads. (Continued on next page) - 15 - US-CER RELATIONS 58, The question of the possible CPR intervention in the war in Viet-Nam came up for discussion again during the month. As was noted above, U Thant felt that such intervention is very possible. Similar to the Secretary- General's view was a report which appeared in a series of articles in the Chicago Daily Hews. These articles were written on the basis of interviews conducted by Simon Malley, a correspondent of Jeune Afrique. with Chou En-lai Ik/ and other Chinese leaders. — ' Chou En-lai was quoted as saying that the CPR would send its armies into Viet-Nam if the DRV was threatened with invasion or in the event of a "sell-out peace". 39. By and large, the series of articles did not reveal more than was already known about the conditions under which the CPR would intervene in the war in Viet-Nam. This was the position taken by US officials, who stated that they had read all of the articles of Mr. Malley and could see no new developments in them. 1(0« Because of the little concern shown by US officials to the articles, US State Department officials on 2J May, in a briefing at the State Department for newspaper editors and broadcasters, declared that if the CPR were to inter- vene in the war in Viet-Nam, the United States would have to take action against the CPR with everything it has. These vague references to "everything it has" was later interpreted as meaning only the use of conventional means .-^ 41. Besides these developments, there was not much that affected US-CFR relations during the month, although the CPR continues to charge that US planes

3J5/ (Continued) This was the first time that Pentagon officials had publicly given credence to the feasibility of an X-Ray nuclear blast as a form of an ABM. The view had long been published in official military journals, but in the past they have been considered as impractical. Article by John W. Finney, "US Flans X-Ray Defense Against Missile Warheads", New York Times. 10 May 1967, For a comparison between the US and USSR efforts on ABM defenses, see article by Lt. Col. Jozsef Bojesuk, "The Anti-Missile - A Contribution by Our Military Expert". Budapest, Nepszabadsag, 30 April 1967. It should be noted that the CPR had denied that. Mr. Simon Malley held any interview with Chou En-lai and other CPR leaders. However, this denial has been generally discounted in the Western press on the reasoning that the denial was based on the fact that the Chinese officials were not aware that the interviews were to be published in an American newspaper. 15/ The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, appeared on h May before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and declared that the US "is not contemplating any nuclear ultimatum to the DRV", are violating its territory. The general view among US officials is that because of the political turmoil within the CPR, the CPR cannot contemplate intervention in the war in Viet-Nam. However, there are other commentators who "believe otherwise.—

THE FRG AMD THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN EUROPE U2. There were no improvements in FRG relations with the Socialist countries in Europe, although Foreign Minister Willy Brandt on his return from the Common Market Meeting in Rome expressed the view that the FRG's relations with the Soviet Union would improve in the future. The Socialist countries still demand that the FRG accept the status quo in Europe, that is, recognize present international boundaries including the one between the FRG and GDR. k3t However, it is the refusal of the FRG to accept the status quo in Europe that inhibits any improvement in FRG-Socialist relations. During the Way Day celebration in West Berlin, Chancellor Kiesinger dealt with this question of the status quo and the FRG's claim of sole representation of the German people. He said that although the FRG wished to improve its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it could not accept the status quo. He went on to appeal for a reunification of Germany. On the question of Germany's claim to sole representation, he said that this is not only the right of the Federal Republic of Germany, but also a duty. He further stated that the FRG's major concern is to lighten what he called the burden of the people living in the GDR. This same view of improving the living conditions of the people in the GDR was given in the speech by Chancellor Kiesinger on 8 May in Hamburg. In that speech, he also rejected the acceptance of the status quo in Europe. kk» The FRG's insistence on rejecting the status quo and its reiteration of sole representation were interpreted in the Socialist countries as a clear sign of what was considered the revanchist policy of the FRG, When British Foreign Secretary Brown visited the Soviet Union during the month, he pleaded with the Soviet leaders to believe in the sincerity of the FRG's avowed desire to improve relations with the Socialist countries in Europe.

l6/ For more developments on CFR attitude to the US, see this montlfe Note, People's Republic of China. - 15 - ^5* The sign that the FRG might Toe relaxing its policy towards the GDR was seen when Chancellor Kiesinger and two other FRG officials received letters from GDR officials. The most significant was that sent by Premier Willy Stoph of the GDR on 11 May to Chancellor Kiesinger. This letter called for several measures for the relaxation of tension in Europe. These included the following: the establishment of normal relations between the two German States; renunci- ation by the two German States concerning the use of force in their mutual relations; the recognition of the frontiers now existing in Europe, particularly the frontier between the two German States; the reduction of arms expenditure in the two German States by half in each case; the renunciation by the two German States of possession, control or share in control over nuclear weapons in any form, and the readiness by $hem to participate in a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. k6» The FRG on 11 May formed a committee to examine the three letters from the GDR and to prepare a reply to them. The acceptance of such an official letter from the GDR, although similar letters had been received before, was widely considered as the relaxation of the FRG^s position with respect to the sovereignty of the GDR, It may be emphasized, however, that ERG officials have stressed that the receipt of such letters Sid not amount in any way to the ERG|s official recognition of the

NATO DEVELOPMENT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY Vr. The Tripartite Committee between the US, UK, and FRG, which opened in October 1966, came to an end on 28 April 1967 in London. This Committee was set up mainly to deal with the balance of payment problems experienced by both the US and the UK and to consider the offset agreements that these two countries have with the FRG. The Committee was also given the task of re-examining the state of NATO forces in Germany. As a result of these talks, it was reported on 2 May that agreement had been reached between the parties for US and UK troop deployment in the FRG. It was disclosed that the United States would withdraw 55,000 military personnel from the ERG before 1 January 1968. It is interesting to note that the official statements published by the FRG and the United States refer to "deploy- ment of troops" rather than "troop withdrawal". The term ''deployment" is used because the troops that will be removed from the FRG irill still remain in the United States as part of the US troops committed to NATO. The same will be true of the 5,000 UK troops withdrawn from the British army on the Rhine.

17/ For more developments on GDR-FRG relations, see the Note on European Relations for the month. - 16 -

48. The interest that was shown by the announcement of the NATO troop deployment concerns primarily the suggestion first made by Foreign Secretary Brown on 17 May that the Soviet Union might be requested to undertake reciprocal troop withdrawal from Europe, Mr. Brown went on to add that if the Soviet Union should decide to withdraw some of its troops from Europe, then NATO might consider further troop withdrawal. It was thus felt that the limited deployment of US and UK troops might be the initial step of an East-West agreement on the thinning of forces in Europe, However, by the time Foreign Secretary Brown arrived in Europe, the Middle Eastern crisis had overshadowed many other problems, and his discussionsin Moscow were reported to have dealt primarily with that crisis. It should also be noted that there are circles within NATO and the United States that have raised serious concern over the withdrawal of UK and US troops from Germany, It is felt that such troop withdrawals might only help to weaken the NATO forces and thus expose NATO countries to probing attacks. Similar views were expressed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Earle G. Wheeler, Jr,, was quoted on 3 May as having told the House Military Appropriation Society that "there is no military justification of any reduction of military forces in Central Europe", k9» The chances for an East-West agreement on troop withdrawal in Europe would appear slim at the moment. It is quite evident that the US and UK troops are being redeployed from the FRG, not because of any long-range plan to improve European security, but rather because of balance of payment problems and the present war in Viet-Nam. Since these factors are well known, it is unlikely that Soviet officials would contemplate any reciprocal troop withdrawal just because the US and UK had undertaken to redeploy some of their troops from the FRG, 50, The 14 Defense Ministers of NATO, who met on 9 May in Paris, agreed to accept as the new NATO strategy the US concept of "flexible response". Up till this time, NATO still had as its official strategy the concept of "massive retali- ation" which former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles enunciated when the Eisenhower Administration came into power in 1952. However, the concept of "massive retaliation" was abandoned by the Kennedy Administration in 19&L; but France, who was then a member of the Military Committee of NATO, had objected to the change from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response". Now that France is no longer a member of the Military Integrated Command, there was an easy agreement - 17 - to change this official NATO strategy. The Ministers also agreed that there was a growing relaxation of tension in Europe, although they stated that tension in the flank of Europe remains* This is a reference to Turkey and Greece.

NON-PROLEFERATXON 51. The ENDC resumed its discussion on the draft treaty on non-proliferation on 18 May. Prior to the opening of the meeting, the US and USSR chief delegates met to consider the changes made by the United States to the draft treaty, particularly the section relating to the inspection machinery, Because of the Soviet insistence that all inspection be done by the IAEA, no progress was made in the talks by the end of the month. The FRG, Italy and other EURATOM members are still insisting that EURATOM should be given the task of guaranteeing com- pliance with the treaty, 52. Last month's Note already dealt with the crucial issues raised by some of the non-nuclear States regarding the draft treaty. There vereno new developments on these points. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER 7 POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

I attach herewith, for your information, a note on "Recent Events and East-West Relations in Europe", which has "been prepared by the Political Affairs Division.

Date: FROM: T.3.69 DE: „

CR. 13 (11-64) L. Kutakov ,.-£- 1569 Political Affairs Divisisa JOGSTtpmrn EVEK35 AMD BASOV4ZBST BELATICISS SM EUROS

The e^asfes i& CseehoslovsMa as& g0*»21 Aagust 1968 <#©r© widely assessed

a geaeml belief that Bast-West tssasicss were iesssssissg ia e^eai a gesssrsl assessssat that th@r@ ma a. t&as@ntu& for

is& Eus^pe -afoieh eoald sot ©asiSy be r@^@yssSa T&&F® t?®?©

a bitter sad blesody was* was "bsisag ^ssaged in Scawtia T£^taiast te^&pa eajogrlssg a period of sate with sicae of the aeute iBt©rsatl«mal erf.s©s t-Smt

This E-sducti.^ of teasieas ia Europe IMSS the Isssis of yet motfees? ealiJEstims SKS^ ¥©stmi Sas^ssga l@®d'@rs feegjan toTO!@ ©tSs ® the Sovisfe UsELcm tsss sao logger a "fcfcswat" to W@st@s?i Sursgseo Gaulle -Bas tlie-first'ssjor Westesa leades? to s^ tliat the Soviet

BO loages? s "Ssreat". It ^®s h®9 too9 t^so eausaeiatsd -Khe ide "be g4ifes^$^ b^wsea Sast asiS ifest £a S«2«s>® is spit© of ideological tfeos® fS?«s8 th® soelsHst coaatH,©3 ia 2feet®a?a Sissf-aps •s©^© ©odels foa?

mialy respoaslbl® for th® w«@'s®l«ati^ that veaa* cm la to tte e^®ate la Caedio^lewmkls. Th® Sbrsig ia th© fcnceftromt iss exiling foa? P@O St was sis© vitSdlat the this Slssm tSsat MTOS at the JSLaisterial JSeefeing ia R^y^a^ik 1968, both 8g2?s®d to pjrtffisot© d<§fcjsa,t@ and to a^ctiat© tdth th© Soviet oa satual ss&a "bsl^aeea fore© ^ed'uetiojas in Eus?qg®0 Shere -Kas eirea a that believed that "beataise of th® djHteg&i isa S-wropg th© feo allissas® -e-

« tfcat aa-e fl^bols of the division In Europs - should fo©disbanded , The tsoastttuia £ ox» dffc^te In SiKrops t*as so strossg that the leaders of the 3"@deral Hepiiblie of Geraaeagr (FS&) swrsd to fomulate aa Eastern that %as predicated xipoa the 2spra^«®Kt of ralaticsss befo?aaa the

sad Eastssrn Eus»cp§9 ©visa if it seawt the e&aado&iseat of ths Sallsfeela 1Ehe FMJ leaders wssa* a stssg© Jtotfega* tstoaa the

Xa ecmt&aafc to sro f^rlier positiosi9 tSi© FIS eg^ed to t3i® ps^positlon

cswld 08052*9 if at sl!9 osaly

pietrore is& Suira>p® pgloy to tSi® iss Csaehoslof^a&is -uas a g@a@ml belief that poi3yeeafcg4sis Jsa

ia Euceope. Iia eoats^sfe to 'to SaeiHtate ©sete^s of ®39ds . esfpsswaissg sl^iflesjsfel^ t^tls ¥@stem Msiseesssa wig^ssasly for tiie Easier

^ss|>onseai) to^t^ jeveBtt^s/JLg^ gggch.qslcrga.ls'ia,:,,, it*Hie ^H, ; While the ep&sfes i?> CgeeSsoslewalsia dM isot «c®j>loffcely'«iS»ssige all forgoing -ae^Lop^a-fc^j t&sjr did "pj-cdtsse a ^asfeed e'a^ag© ia 1Sie of tii© Susreip^a p«xi@rg0 Eo»®i?iaa»fr O.t gfesaM IMS aot^d that ther© tj@?@ tsao plmaes'to tfea rsastlcsa in the Wast to tli© '@?ai%8: thfe fi?je& pbas® set i l^j^liat^Ly affesp the eventSsi ss& th© g®ecsid plmss fes^^a csaly has iicst yet sum its fizll '"eooree. &a fterfe p in attitudes gjjd ^eihavio? $att@£&s,, The ehaa^ss to attitude f the 0o~mll@d Soviet j, seholars €&& inters tSiat 5aad Issaa th@ g«sa®2ial acssssesssrfe ttet tbe So^i

fte 't© &aes*s®s©

sis© ^asssad tSsat sssgr to tfost 2a Jsi tfe© the tisat th® Atlantis to

ehosild eatenfl to to' sts^sitfeBg tSiarfe tit© to la is • BfiSO

,i the sit« to the ei'eots ia

ItoiSi to to tfes «? It violently esitieisssl misat they eoasi«3@2?ed a ratioaalizstiaa by the Soviet Union of the aetioa of the ¥assa^ Pact countries in CseenoSiovalsls. Shis is a sefeseaee to t&3 so-e&llea Brssaaev Castries that eaiwciated the grciaeigle of limited sovereignty for aesbers o£ the "gocialist CoiaasottHeslth1111. She Soviet Union sted the majority of its Bassaw Baet allies te?3 a different sespoase t9 the event© in CSseehoelovs&i®. The socialist countries assented that th@ He stern raponse to ths events TSBS a clear vindication of the!? own psior kaswlffidge that the Weetssa cotmtsieSp particularly the IBS and the ^S^, ioteQ^ed to promote eownt

ths Bastion in the seeoaS gihaeej whieh Isegan &tt®% tfe*1* inaugura- tion of PresiSetst Hlaon in ^enusffy 1^9, anQ is not yet Goapletsd,, is beginning to sisSify ths ffesponses io the fisst ghase* fao ma^sr factors have affoetecl the attittsflea aad behavioi? in the seeocS phase „ 2n spite of the esasicterabl® debate ic some official and con-sfficlsl cirelss ia B?aa«e an whether- B?aQC@ ehouJja Goatinue he? policy of g4tei^£g Psfesi^eat e!e feiall® gave susffieieat indication that, in apite of the ©vents in Czechoslovakia, he Intended to pursus his ignolicy of ©f &§ of t It

tesstoei^fefe t® a l^slt its

the

ia spits of th@ it BM a.: ©igs^i t* aa assfe ^

to c£ss^e the h© ssaht to to ZM^T tfc&t ©l!t«s ISsat ^e t&silsecL that ia w& K-eii^^&tlcsi mthu$i@@feie rssrgK&aaj© of the 2$i3?0 to E&ea&dmi Hisses^s iat®sat-ioE to

of the *® 1st e-ssiaas At IfelS

la gagt-issalas1,, "43©^ af Its interest to eatsr iats stsmtegie ©OTS talks with

a?' to Ifefe HM t© 5 113 * ISE / ssfl -£h©

-feJiS

of Alll&nce cgse ssfe l&s fecgissisg of tfes

to feeilitst© tfas

this to F<^tass£?f to flis^sss tha

%& -agrsed to -7-

tnembsre attended. Efeanee then maimed that she ^ouLS not attead any meet legs of the WIEf until the cosyeet p^oceSurss uere followed wittiin the Organisation, Subsequently, fiance attended e meeting of th© Assembly of the OTJ in Pasts "but continued to "boycott all Hjaetitsge of th© Couaeilo It taae while European diplomats -wsss pon^eying th® divisive Affects of this incide&t f^ Eiasopeats unity and co~spes?at ism' vithio. the

in faris. Accor-ding to & British versions Pyssident de Saulle eaelaiag psopsaals at that meetings He wa eaifi to have that the SI58 be aban^oaea in favos of a losses fsee-tyafie aj?ea ^hieh incslude %bs IK* H© vmq al.3© quoted as saying that withisa the enlarged groiipn these shoulS fee a SireetsKeate ajaSe up of Eeaneej, the IK, th® I?B Italy* Ei2 was further quoted as olaassving that with a cJizrectosat® »f th© fouj? powers there w^uM be ao aee^ for MfO. 'Shis Hattejf posit ian -yas by the Bsitish as iiapJ^isag an anti-teeffieaa apg^oaeh to the problems of SusopSo AgaiGj aeeo»§ing to the British vessioa^ the IK @9vesnmeistj cos- CQi'aed that a trap had fossa set £os it, acS uawilling to holS talks with France on theae psoposals vithout consulting Tilth its otfees lusogeaia allies^ infomee! them of the said confident i&l proposals made by Psesi^eat £e ^ialle0 She flench ves-sioa differs from that of the British. £h® Es?each Govenament has denied that ths said pioposala were aads. I^seGh officials have asserted that the pu^poste^ psoposale wexe s mistatespretatisa of Sc €aull©?s vis^s by Mbassadoa? Sasses*. 5he lireoeh ©oveasment has also the US o£ a breach of gsstocol in disclosing a «3a£i<3ential esrchange without first ioJomLiag the ISsnGh €bvevaiffieat« It has been suggested that the Sosmes &£f&ls ffisy have further damages Weatem Siascspeaa unity » Within ths socialist covmt?ies these is some evidence that the situation has uot yet been normalized. JisagiBg f^om the Soviet press, oofflaal- iaation has not yet beeo achieved ia Csecfeoslovfifeia. ^fhere has also been some indication that Romania asaS Yugoslavia asre seluetant tt> aceept the of limited sovereigaty £03? soelalist states within the Socialist la fact; there are continuing Western reports that a&araaia ia objecting to Warsaw Pact maneuvers in A series of isade iss Feteiasy 1969 bgr ^e UK's ©Is© sloudgd tfe© pietes .is to s^el'©^ pgales? la Susap® th&fe es of SflS?0. la a sfefegssisfc ia

tSj© ccsa^pfc of flesibl© He ©they EfiSO* H© 300 te 100 S to 1 1m S to -I Is© isa s^. of a ca taetisal to a «aH csa 2S&S0 ©111©© to istasld to US 3 to la to

of ISftSJO Is sfeSH ©rasp tMsfc is asfi St is in Sfey of ctf t&e waft £tat© ©f tl&a S^d-ss®! © tfefc

to tb® IMoa tssMitioaal to ths BBS tfe© e-^sssiiSi2@i!Si@t ta ¥©3fe Bas91ss f Isssi th© to tfe© ^ES ®iS tls© ttesa ^©g of gacisHst is

all psotests to It tfcs£& FBS ®f fieials still look to Beat Esspllsa future reunified

is 110 ttet

of S%®® assd fear ^si35.tatf^g s^sd ®jsa 2©^3. "femE^e betwe«e tbe ttee j3P6itts iSi© PE^^SS^ oslsis ^^^is 11; m& to tSae sfoates that atteottoa ^as <3siBi«B» fbe psssasl eestain l@gislatf on

$fe@ of In any ^»ey result in the heightening of tensions sine® on three previous occasions - la 195V 1959* »a3 136^ » the Federal Assembly met In West Berlin without any serious eonf^ontatioa. la the face of what was consides-ed a thseat to West Berlin, Prime Sinister Hilsoa flew to the city on 13 JW>»»iy 1969 to renew the 8K°8 support £03? the defence of the «?ity> &M President toon also -seat to Ifest Berlin an 2? Febtfuasy and »eaffilmed the US commitment to the defence of the city. In 02de» to svest a flaag«s?oua conflict over West Berlin, attempts we?e being made to prevent a confrontation. The possibility of such a confroata tion was suggested by Western sffieials ^?hen it «as 3?epo£t«d in Moseow sn 21 Bebyuais'y that Soviet troops la the ©S asia the fosses of the $B! voaia conduct maneuvers withiti the fsaaieaork of the Warsaw Fact at ths beglaaing sc? Starch 19^9« ^he mensavesa, accosting to tfes sepost« would take olaea in the central and W28ts2?n regions of the GEE uMss the oommancl of Marshal Ivan I, Y&kubovsky. Shis maneuver t-jaa widely interpreted in the West as irsesessing the possibility of "hamssment5* lay Soviet aaa QBE fos-ees in the laflfl routes through the @DEt»

The Search fosf a Pcaeefu^^lation^f theiTiiC&Pi6is With tension increasing ove? Wsst Bs^lie,, ve?ioue attempts we?9 made to sesolve the developing csXsia peacefully« It was report^ OQ S4 ^bruafy that Soviet &Bks0£E*10r SsarapfelR lte€ iset with Chancellor Eiesiager ira Stuttgas-t on 23 ^bruary« It aas also ^evealeS that jim&essaior ^sasapisin offered to medistiE between the M* acd the ©UB la os^e? to eyrasige fo? travel pssmits so that West $arline3?s eaulS visit with tfeeis relatives is last Bezlin dusiog the Haste? periofi if thefefede3fal Assembly is shifted Sxsm West Ssfflin. Other gepoirta indicated that on 21 Fsbsuasy fers IJlbricht had written a l«tt€^ to ibseign Minister Hilly BvanSt in bis capacity as Sead of the SPD, sn a similar proposal,

Ohancellox Siesiuser end the goveroiag Ifejor of West Berlin^ Sesj? Scb.utE5 interest la the proposal, but insisted that the convening sf the &ss«ES>ly, in Wset Berlla coulS be shifted only if a loag-tesm tjsavsl asrangemeat between I^et and Meat Berlin could be made possible» IB o£

Dp, Michael Kshl, to bold tslks0 Sovie^o^, sino« these •uaa no csanaon on the duration of a tsavel-pemit agreement, negotiations bsoke off on 27 l&bru&xy. With the failure to find a peaceful solution to the egisis* the oewly aleeted Pxeside&t of the FS3 £ura<3

TOS s&fel -3xs t&© dswSIop&sg ead

tfeat the Sovisfe Mbassa&a? is tfea GHS9 Ms*

the SDEt Porsiga Ml&Isr&sr,, HfeHS* ¥iffls«s>3 sssfi p£©s@it©S Ms tsitfe sot® seeusea the* 5138 of

said to to t©3 p tfeaa a aot© ftetfeer s&atsd t^sat tlse cs? ,t3iig Fea-i^Bs^ss? Ags^sneiat is fep^li^ls to ¥@sfe B^iia* Sii© ®etic® ^as also s&3d to ^ressil®at®a "by t&® f^S" ©mip&tlea that '

to stsacS§r, la ftmetims it ea of to -eut ^Jics-fc tfes Sffit^iO d Wtesfc Ba^lis th® t&3slca to -fesmef ®y its of the tSss?s© to tfe© to t&i S^ to p th© saote to

Soviet t&£ca would fos* tSs® aafst^r

¥est -Isrlis?, dispute ca 2 SlareSi tfet ths Sanios Savl«t Ctontrolles at the is Bsrlte M4 -12- foeen requested t® aa&ouaee that the safety QA the aij? cos.t?i^ors esialS nst fee guaranteed. Shis was t?i£ety interpreted in the West as a possible mo've by the Soviet Uaion and the &8B to Interfere *?ith the three aiu corridors.

Agaittj the ?ISff US and Masses reaffirmed their -sonajitment to safeguard the security of West Berlin as$ reitesated theis position that the Soviet tfoioa

•Houia foe he!3 yeaponsilsle fos the safety of the ais CDS?gidoss0 IK the sssatj^ time, the IffKJ leaders ea^sieS on theis? pl^as to eoavene the ffeSesal Asssssbly in West ^srlia on % March. la spite of fesief iatereuptleas of soad tsaffie ttooagh the

a s&at© «f s^safliissss lifeat Bss-lis?. aaS.

' be moat slot to ©2& i&s to s©3sfe f©tr Cfei® hsps tfeat

Fact must forees

of tfes is- to tlss

xtj be polities!

sj^aosssc® the p^cdueSien of 7» These same Allied powers shsuld furt&es? co-opsrate to the revival of ^asisaj and faecisia in the and the othsa? Western. powers have thei? swn different prescrip tion for peace In Europe s 1« ^he Soviet Sfnioa should -a it 1$ saw all Its forces Poland, Eungaxy and the 2. She Soviet feioa raust xespect ths psineipls la gast@2;a She Soviet tlhlon ana the GBB ahsuld pesmit the (Sesrmaa pesple to ©spsess themselves on the question of the seuni^ieatioa of in "peace anfl Soviet Union must ®w3 its "threat" to Western lurops. of eourse, Sosa not share this position, With these aiasetsically sppossS prescript iosas £ss? peace in lusopej it is not susfpfflsing that ®£t®s almost ti-jenty-foa3f years aince the esd of ths

Second Vox Id Was?, lurope still ao©s not ea^sy lasting peace. It is? however f possible that if aa acute crisie sver Bsrlis eouiS BOM be averted r an era of negotiation, enunciated by Pses!«!eKt Bixoa, BBJ? bring peace ts Stoops. the SQS hopeful factor ia the present situation 10 the belief eiBOsg leacless that the Soviet lea^e^s ass so ansious fyg M,B"WBE talks on the limitation of offeueive and defeaigiv® strategic weapons systems, that they would not psssait a sesioas esiais to develop oves Berlin. .4 ESSSS balaased viey might be a hops that all tfee pasties eoacerneS «ill do all that is necessary to prevent the worsening of l^,8t-¥est relations* 'ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: The Secretary-General FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONSHSIOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

I am forwarding herewith, for your information, an Assessment Note on East-West Detente in Europe - XXV General Assembly, General Debate and Commemorative Session, which has been prepared by the Political Affairs Division.

Date: 30.11.70 L.Kutakov CR. 13 (11-64) g^gpmg OF B3MgIOAL.MD 2 Bovenfcer 1970

Political Affairs Division

DEBATE ASD COSS93M)MTnE SESSIOI

S35T

Copy 2Jo./. The general debate at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly revealed a further evolution in last-West detente in Europe. In the light of Secretary-General U Thant's assessment that Europe is a political capital of the world, delegations stressed that improvement in the relationships among European states across the barriers created by the Gold War may contribute ts a more successful approach to the important international problems confronting mankind in different continents. Speaking from the African point of view, the Minister of foreign Affairs and Special Envoy of the President of the Sepublie of liger said: "Too many ties bind the t^o continents separated only by a narrow basin, for Africa - restored and devoted completely to the struggle for its xfell-being - to remain indifferent to the immense dissipation of energies and wisdom which has been engendered by: the quarrels between the t^o Star opes." JL/ Considered of great importance was the fact that this evolution has begun to yield some concrete results that might prepare the ground for "United Surope" free of opposing military blocs. ggeaty Jiet^een^the|IKSSR and the Federal Republic^af^Germany All the representatives who spoke about East-West cooperation in Europe agreed that the most significant single event that gave real impetus to the process of normalizing inter-state relations on the continent was the Treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. This Treaty was welcomed by all Socialist countries and many countries from Western Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The Polish representative underlined that the USSH-FBS Treaty is of "momentous importance for the process of normalization of relations between socialist countries and the Federal Republic of Germany, as -well as for the stabilization of peace in Europe." —'

I/ A/FV.1873, p. 11 2/ It ^as assessed by Western European countries as Btan element of detente, understanding and cooperation8' (lfteance),2/ ma good omen for the dialogue which is "being established between the two parts of Europe"' (Italy),—' ""only a first step, although an important one"* (letherlande), — 'Man important step forwardf (Turkey ) ^ Asian countries considered it as "an important mile- stone in the history of international relations 1ft post-war Europe and as a concrete step towards reducing tension on that continent" (Indonesia ),-*••' as a "positive development" (india),^/ "another welcome factor™ (Burma).-' Thailand stated that this Treaty mhas cleared the atmosphere of Europe of the immediate threats of conflict and has brought along uith it cleaner air, an air of detente and peaceful co-exist sncea' j^om Africa, Sierra Leone, Togo and (Madagascar) Il7 Madagascar welcomed it Mas a hope*"/ Sierra Leone said that the Treaty whas lessened international tensions considerably but has not completely eliminated them^'H/ Latin American countries mentioned it as "'a positive step™ (Bolivia }c Brazil said that from among the three highly significant events in the inter- national relations for the past year, the "conclusion of th^fsema Treaty of 12 August 1970 w rates second as:

m ..0an important milestone in the history of international relations and a concrete step towards at long last breaking the bonds which hold us to 19^5, thus superseding the post -war concept. It cannot be denied that the significance of this agreement transcends the scope of bilateral relations involving the two signatories. It affects European politics as a whole, and even the overall pattern of international relations. Its impact upon the United Rations is. equally significant; it would not be far-fetched to point out that it is tantamount to a supersession of Articles 55, and 107 of the Charter, lere is additional evidence that the \forld has not stood still during the last twenty-five years, and that the structure of inter- national life does not cease to evolve." 15/

3/ p, U8 5/ A/P?01857, Po 32 5/ A/PV.1856, p. 56 §/ p. 1*7 77 8/ A/fcV.1858, p. 36 9/ A/fcV.l853, P- 22 A/PVol8U6, pp. 33-55 .1851, p. 21 t*« ^t*"1

The M| gBS" a; Heggt iat JOBS TS ith Other Socialist {Coaatsiea The FRG°s negotiations with its neighbors to the East was considered by the British Foreign Minister as a. "key to constructive co-existence in Europe.19 —/ The OS ^representative said: 6!We have welcomed the efforts of the FederaL-.Bepublie .._;, of Germany to normalize relations with' its Eastern neighbors."-^-' Ganeerning the round of negotiations that are a about to begin between the Bsderal Republic of Germany and the Geraan Democratic Sepuiblie., Poland and Czechoslovakia^ the debates revealed that conditions are ripe for a fruitful startc ^Czechoslovakia," indicated Foreign Minister Jan Marko, "is ready to start negotiations with its Westesm neighbor - the federal Ifepublie of Germany - negotiations which could eliminate obstacles preventing the normal development of relations between the two states.™ l6/ European Seeurity^Conference Beferences to European security in general and/European Security Conference in pssticular eonfiEjaed the Secretary-Genera l"s assessment that these are seal perspectives for convening a conference on European security in the near future, probably in 1970. Even Spain said that she "'is in favor of participat- ing in /such/ a conference.85 ^ France^ -aho previously expressed definite reservations, showed more flexibility on this problem after the visit to Moscow of Premier Pompidou. The Minister fos? Foreign Affairs and Special Envoy of the President of the French Republic said: "'...we look favorably upon & Pan-Suropean Conference OB Security and other matters, -with the participation of the United States and Canada,- provided it is properly prepared for.* Sbur-Pawer^Negotiations on Berlin Sato countries drew the attention of the Assembly to the fact that any further progress in the European detente depends on the outcome of the four- Power negotiations on Berlin. "Berlin/* stressed the British Foreign Minister* sH)ill be the touch-stone of the will of the peoples of Europe to achieve detente between East and West."

p. 5 .1881, p. 21 IT/ A^V.1867, p. 31 Answering such conditions, the foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia

cannot eoaeeal ou3? concern over the faet that at the current session voices were heard Tshieh anee again made the convocation of a European conference conditional upon the achievement of progress in other fields. Such gre-eoaditlons delay Its convening and prevent a commoa solution of questions which have little chance of being solved without such a conference," l8/ The Two^Qemanigs and the JJnlted.^t ions The problem of admission to the United Nations of the German Democrat ie Bepublie and the Ptederal Bspublie of Germany received more attention at this session than at previous sessions. Two developments safe worthy sf note. Jlpst, the possibility of no2ma libation of yelatisras of the Ifederal Bepublie of Geraany with socialist countries, iheltyaing the German Beasocratie EepufaliCj makes more urgent the necessity fotf the United Nations and other international organisations to consider the admission of the t^jo states to membership, Second, the extension of the Chinese People8s Itepufelle relations ^ith capitalist count sies incseases the pressure upon the United Sat ions to coaeretise the principle of universality of the Organization. The position expressed by the President of Zambia may be considered as typical -5 of the trend that is developing at the Ohited Nations. "It is necessary to include nations ^hieh are now being excluded fzom membership of the wos?M body as it ie the protector of the rights of all peoples and nations regardless of s&ee, coloff^ creed or ideology." After insisting upon the "restoration of the lawful rights ef the People's Eepublic of Shine at the United nations," President Kaunda added: °5A reformed United Hat ions shou3j3 also offer admission to divided States like Germamy, Korea aad Vietnam*" Tunisia spoke about the FBO and "other countries which are not represented here*81 i2/ The Socialist countries demanded the admission of the two Geroanies immediately and simultaneously, "The siiaultaneous admission of the German Democratic Republic and the ^federal Kepublie of Gesmaij?. to the United Batioas,"

p. 2? said the ftoainisn ifb^eign Minister* wis a long-overdue necessity f 02? European Prl/ and international cooperation."^ poiand added that "'until both German States entes? the united latioas, */e should without any fui'tbei5 delay ensure to the Gezasan Stesaocs'atie Bspublie the right of haviag aa observer at the United latioas* a right which is ROW Being sajojecl by the Federal Republic of

countries did not express say position, with the exception of Fs?anee and Iceland who accepted the ultimate inevitability of two '<$ei!ffian States represented at the United nations? but considered that this could not be effected immediately* The Foreign Miniates? of France* referring to the non-aggression treaty between the Federal gepiiblic of Germany aaa the Soviet Union," stated that "It brings us close? to the day when 'the whole Surops0 that MTo Georges Pompidou spoke about at the Hague Conference will be present in this Assembly. Let us not say that we are still fas' from this* Let us rather say that we are less far." jgS/ fhe Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland expressed the following peeitions raiast OeKiaany has expressed its ^?ish to gaia admittance to the United Stetioas, either as a full Member o? as an observer* However^ I think that it is the opinioa of many government 8 in Europe that the time has not arrived to start considering this quest ion* now that direct talks have begun between the two German Stated FoF-the tissa being It will be better and more conducive to the lessening of tension to wait snd see ^feat \rfill possibly be the result of these talfes, if they continue , as we hope they will do." An analysis of these positions, when compared with those that expressed at previous sessions of the General Assembly suggests that, if the process of European detente proceeds apaee^ the ti*o German States might become membess of the United nations at the nest, 26th, session of the General

, P. 6l , p. k2 1J/ A/PV.1842, p. 1|8 l, p. 6 ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TOi The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLERJ YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

I am forwarding herewith, for your information, an Assessment Note: XXV General Assembly, General Debate and Commemorative Session - Views on Western European Questions, This Note has been prepared by the Political Affairs Unit.

Date: 30.11.70 DE: L.Kutakov CR. 13 (11-64) OF k Moroa'bss' 1910 CdgiCn, Bolitlcal Affairs

XXV ASSB4BLY AKD

VISHS 08? EOROEBAH IP *Ehq Question of Soufctegrft

Both the Austrian and Italian representatives in the general debate pointed to the progress that bed "been achieved through dissect negotiations sine® the resolutions adopted "by the General' AsssafiWy in i960 and 1961 and egxeed with the Seesefca^r-GenssBl that the contacts between Austria and Italy on Southern 'SgFol eoo £m£,t^sl osssg»3&s of recourse to tl@ p^ooedu^s for solviag eontirafversies provided for in Article 33 o£ the Osarbero The announced in the Barlia&eat on 3 BsesEfee? 1969 that it to viden the legislative and ©dainistKitiwe Jusdadictioa of the Bwwinee of BolsssaOp aad t&e Austrian Gewssaaaeat in tims statad in ito Haticesals^t on 15 Deoeaber 1969 thatj, on«^ tte aseasuses outlined MS testa esssled out, it will <9onsid®p &s settled the eontro^re^ -5d,tSi It&ly eenees^ting tits of the f&fi& Ags^esaesst of 19%6o la Austria had feeen concluded end %%s 'being i®pl

2« The Igiah Questioq

Both the FirfLffie Minister of XmtexusP mid the Prime mnieter of the United Kingdosr gefteyired in their speeches made in the eeu^ss of the ce2@bxation of <- s the tweaty-fifth anniversary to the problem of Hortbsra Xa^lmfio Beth speeches TOSS elsBKaeteriised by thsir ^odemticm mid the deals® to deal coastraetimly •with the proble&o The Ertae fSnister of Inland underlined ths fund, of goodwill between the two countries "derived frcea a surer sad cteeper understanding of each other reached through ^uiet diplcssacy esd psrscamL eoswersationo*1 He also reSesred to t5» fast th&t the Minister for Exfcesml Affaire of fr&Laad Imd approached tt@ Uuited K&tlcms last year OB behalf of the Irlah to order to estprsss serious ecae©m in a critical situsticmc. Bsttain at that ties S^d s?esponded, sad t©2to betws^a ths tvo govensaents isese takii^ £K£B& J-StMstsi- Hsath stated that thg crucial di^ieloas la Itorthera were not religioua or political "but 1t^ftaaen those who l&liare tJmt ecsastructive

is the caly basis for peace9 justice and progress eisd those who the first opportunity for the gun @n& tiia

Eastern Ittropoaa Itegioaal

of Ifestesa European ^psakss^ alluded to the Shiropean Esoneaie Tfee r&preseatativee of Fmnee, %oth during the 25th«grear it sod la the gemml del^t^ ard«looking«n £83giis3, the ©act Italy all echoed the hops that the Cossrualty -will he enlarged end eoneoa.idQ.ted0 Bsl^ti^ letsted f ontaxd to ths estafeliah^sat of links between 3- the Casa®3Si-l3f awl State Seoneaigr eoaarteleso Spaia ©Siphssised its " ©sd eeogs&tttlaied itg&lf on -the lissks it established wltfa 1&e JSSC through an accord of ^itetofcer 1970s. Sesse epesteeps,, however5 alluded to

tfes esdertees of the Cosisuisi-tsr my drafts* Thuss Obadj, vhiGfo is

to t£ie C&munity l^r ^i© "Monads Ags«^^ntsp hoped to tibtain aid sad

of spgg&erao 5te lsthdrl@££ds$ fooKe^erj referasd ^pllcit3y to of Kft.f 0 ©ssd fisaJjlsd ea& tte tfeg'SEs? S^ct coiaatslea to join ia rsgloaal azTau^issats on disassastent idtli BATO<, The j^apreseateti1^ of Bslgluss 5 i^eat e^en ftupthar i^sn he eaisid&2@£ spsgicsml ©afBw&ssBS&b& to be ttoe basis of aseurity es?m^^^sts -which tlien can lie avrppl^sisatcd lay s uadsr -^ticle 52 of the A aote of eeutiost oa 3Pe^osmli^ i@3 toJeeSiSd Tsy of the IBaitod KlogdosKingdoms ^sh-sSio stated tJmtthat,s although he tftfaas woaMag for a ¥idar Europeaa ^isltys he ffgjected the id^i of luifop® as & closed

U p" he simtedj, "had its dsaggrs as «all as its attractions,, has ©a ebsolut© dutgr to sftasd s&oro x^giraml interests and

A wasfiber of African countries sueh as Togo, 17' tte Ifeople's Eepublie of OoagOp oud Guinea i^ppoached KATO's snilitesy aid to Etartugel end the use in Africa l^r P&rtugal of this