Politics and the Soviet Army Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union in the Khrushchev Era, 1953-1964
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Politics and the Soviet Army Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union in the Khrushchev Era, 1953-1964 A dissertation submitted by Joshua C. Andy as part of the requirements for the degree of PhD in Russian and East European Studies. Centre for Russian and East European Studies University of Birmingham July 2011 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Contents Acknowledgements 2-3 Glossary 4-5 Introduction 6-35 Chapter 1 Evolution of Soviet Strategic Thought and Military Doctrine 36-90 Chapter 2 Zhukov and Civil-Military Relations 91-157 Chapter 3 Malinovskii and Civil-Military Relations 158-178 Chapter 4 The Soviet Military at Novocherkassk 179-211 Chapter 5 The Soviet High Command and the Cuban Missile Crisis 212-248 Conclusion 249-259 Appendix A. List of Military Commands and Officers, 1953-1964 260-263 Appendix B. Size of Soviet Army, 1950s - 1960s 264 Appendix C. Publications and Presentations from Thesis 265 Bibliography 266-276 1 Acknowledgements Beginning to write this dissertation over five years ago I had an idea of where I wanted this research to take me. It has been a long process to finally complete this work. I am indebted to several people for their comments, advice, and support, without which, this never would have been seen to fruition. I am truly grateful to everyone who has been there throughout this long journey. Living and working in numerous countries, I cannot ask for better understanding advisors than I have found in Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic. Without their guidance at every stage of this dissertation, it would not have been completed. They provided constructive criticism on each chapter and idea that I had. It was extremely helpful during the past years to be associated with Jeremy and Melanie’s AHRB-funded project on the Khrushchev era. Jeremy and Melanie read countless version of each chapter, providing insightful comments and asking questions, which prompted deeper thought into Khrushchev’s Russia on my part. I am also grateful for the opportunities Jeremy and Melanie provided me to attend conferences as part of the Khrushchev research project. Numerous friends and colleagues have read versions of this dissertation in its entirety or chapters. Those comments and discussions have allowed me to shape this research as a small part of the greater work on Soviet history. I want to thank Timothy Naftali and Hope Harrison for their pointed comments on the role of this work in the greater debate on Cold War diplomacy and politics. Tim read an earlier version of the Zhukov chapter before the 2006 AAASS conference in Washington, DC, and was able to help me shape my thesis within the context of his own work. Although we have yet to meet face to face, I am grateful to Geoff Roberts, at University College Cork, for the countless emails we have exchanged discussing each others work on Marshal Zhukov. Geoff has graciously read several versions of Chapters one and two, as well as the completed final draft. Mark Harrison provided comments to the chapter on Novocherkassk and invaluable advise on source material during the 2007 conference on Khrushchev held at CREES. In the UK, I would like to thank Katya Rogatchevkaya at the British Library for helping me work with their collection of Soviet sources. Nigel Hardware and the staff at the European Resource Centre have always been extremely helpful in locating pertinent sources within their holdings. In the US, I especially want to thank Lora Soroka and the entire staff at the Hoover Institution archives at Stanford University. While researching for his own work at the JFK Presidential Library, Jim Gormly was kind enough to make copies of documents related to Kennedy’s interaction with Khrushchev. Finally, I would like to thank the staff of Washington & Jefferson College’s Grant Library for their help in locating journal articles and monographs through the interlibrary loan program. Robert Dodge and Art Richardson deserve special thanks in my intellectual development along with the development of this project. It was Art who instilled my strong desire to study history, and it was Bob who supported my studies in my undergraduate career. Bob has read countless versions of chapters and the dissertation as a whole. Whether discussing history and 2 this work in Washington, Pennsylvania or in Moscow, Bob has provided his constructive criticism. Bob also knew when I needed a swift kick to the back side to keep motivated to finish this project. I am honoured to call him my friend and colleague today. Along the way in completing this project, fate found me. I will be forever indebted to and thankful for my wife, Brittany. We met and were married in the course of pursuing my PhD. I am still not quite sure if she knew what she was getting into marrying an academic. Despite months apart and trips abroad, Brittany has stood by my and provided unfaltering support to me and my work throughout the last four years. Brittany, thank you. For the past twenty years my father Fred suffered more than any individual should endure while fighting several medical issues. Finally in 2008, after countless surgeries, my father’s medical issues were solved by a tremendous team of doctors at the University of Pittsburgh. My father’s endurance and strong sense of character over the last twenty years has provided a shining example for myself and family to follow. Thank you dad for always being there for me! This work is dedicated to you. Any errors or mistakes in this work are exclusively mine. All views expressed here are my responsibilities and are not associated with individuals or institutions named. 3 Glossary of Russian terms and Abbreviations Aktiv-Communist Party activists CC (TsK)-Central Committee; Tsentral’nyi komitet CPSU (KPSS)-Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Kommunisticheskaya partiya sovetskogo soyuza Edinonachalie-single officer command Gorkom-Communist Party City Committee GRU-Army intelligence services; Glavnoe razvedyvatel’noe upravlenie general’nogo shtaba GPU-Main Political Administration; Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie ICBM-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IRBM-Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile KGB-Committee on State Security; Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti MRBM-Medium Range Ballistic Missile MVD-Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCMD-North Caucasian Military District NEVZ-Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Works NKVD-People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs; Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del Oblast’-province SAC-Strategic Air Command (USA) SAM-Surface-to-air Missile SLBM-Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 4 SRF (RVSN)-Strategic Rocket Forces; Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznecheniya USSR-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Soyuz sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik WTO-Warsaw Treaty Organisation; Warsaw Pact 5 Introduction Structure, organisation, an idea of esprit de corps, and hierarchy characterised the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Throughout the history of the Soviet Union only the Soviet Armed Forces had the potential to rival the CPSU in those qualities and were able to be an organised locus for potential opposition. A sense of professionalism was instilled in the Soviet Armed Forces, not only from those ‘Red Commanders’ of the Revolution and Civil War, but also from those junior, noncommissioned officers who were holdovers from the tsarist regime. The primary focus of this study is on the immediate post-Stalinist era while Nikita Khrushchev was First Secretary of the CPSU. Bridled by Stalin’s hold over strategic and armed forces policy, after his death, the Soviet Armed Forces became an institution that illustrated a strong sense of military professionalism, while at the same time serving the Soviet regime. With a focus on five case studies that occurred during the Khrushchev era 1953-1964, this thesis argues that the military attempted to remain apolitical throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Previous studies of Soviet civil-military relations have focused on the levels of cooperation or competition between the CPSU and the Soviet armed forces. This study argues however, that the ebb and flow of that relationship can be explained by the selection of personalities, or agents, by Khrushchev to posts of military command. Officers were promoted based on several factors. However, Khrushchev increasingly promoted officers to positions of command who he deemed were more personally loyal to him and were willing to put that loyalty above their duty to the Soviet armed forces. Khrushchev chose personal loyalty over an officer’s military professionalism and expertise when appointing them to posts at the Ministry of Defence, 6 the Soviet General Staff, and to the command posts in the branches of the Soviet military and key military districts around the Soviet Union. Historical Background, 1917-1941 The Bolshevik Party strove to create a military distinct from the Russian Imperial army, moreover distinct from the Western traditional model. In 1917, the Bolshevik Party supported the demobilisation of a traditional, standing army; they favoured the reliance for defence on the idea of a popular militia force along territorial lines. Driven by ideology, the decision to forego a standing army was quickly scrapped out of realist necessity. Still embroiled in war against the Germans, until the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, Bolshevik Russia needed a standing army capable of defending the nation.