The Battle of Britain and the German Blockade
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CHAPTER 2 THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN AND THE GERMAN BLOCKADE mid-June 1940 it was necessary for both protagonists to review thei r I Nstrategy for the future conduct of a war, which, with the imminent with- drawal of France, had become a struggle between a purely maritime natio n and a purely continental power . The issues were abundantly clear an d were stated by Mr Churchill on 18th June : What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over . I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin . The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us . Hitler knows that he will have to break us in thi s island or lose the war . Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty, and s o bear ourselves that if the British Commonwealth and Empire lasts for a thousan d years men will still say, "This was their finest hour." Thus, while the United Kingdom, now almost stripped of military forces fully equipped to fight a modern war, had to shelter behind se a power and its extension air power until strong enough to renew the struggle, Germany had two main strategic plans from which to choose . As an immediate project in keeping with the avowed German policy o f "short wars", military invasion and conquest was the obvious path, bu t Admiral Raeder and other influential Germans advocated a long-rang e plan of blockade and bombardment. Preparations for these two complementary offensives began early i n July as soon as Hitler 's hopes of a negotiated peace had been shattered by a scornful refusal to compromise . During the succeeding months, while the struggle grew fiercer, Germany still attempted to employ the shadow of threats instead of the reality of action by psychological warfare directed against Britain and neutral countries. On 11th July Hitler proposed to make an intimidatory speech in the Reichstag in order that "the contents would become known to the British public" accompanied by a carefully- timed air attack on Liverpool. These were to emphasise the uselessness of further resistance. Inspired statements and broadcasts continued to pres s the same point . On 6th August, for instance, General Lander, a forme r head of the German Coastal Air Forces, declared that "England mus t collapse under the rapidly-increasing shortage of shipping and transport brought about by war on British shipping and attacks on British harbour s . the British Isles reduced to their own resources can no longer live ." Despite this propaganda campaign, however, it soon became obvious that the decision must be reached on a military and not a political plane . Bearing in mind the comparatively short campaigning period still left in 1940 (for any cross-Channel invasion in winter would have been hazardous from natural causes alone) Germany had three months to trai n an expeditionary force, collect a fleet of transports and solve suppl y problems. The absolute prerequisite, however, was that both the British 34 THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN July-Sept 1940 navy and the air force should be utterly crushed and deprived of base s from which they could interfere with the invasion fleet . Raeder was under no illusion that his naval units or even his U-boats could do much in this regard and the whole task devolved on the Luftwaffe. Thus, on 2nd July, from newly-acquired bases in France, German aircraft bega n to attack shipping in the English Channel . The size of the formations so employed increased until on 10th July l some seventy aircraft were used against convoys off Dover and Margate . Attacks against convoys and south-coast towns continued on an increasing scale until 7th August i n an attempt to test and weaken the R.A.F. defences. Then came a ten-day all-out effort to overwhelm Fighter Command by sheer weight of numbers. The heavy battles of this second phase were not decisive and after a brie f lull the Luftwaffe began on 24th August to bomb airfields and the oute r defences of London in preparation for a full-scale day and night assault against the capital which began on 7th September and lasted for thre e weeks. Thereafter mass daylight attacks by German long-range bomber s were abandoned and the final stage of the Battle of Britain was marked by high-flying fighter-bomber activity by day and concentrated night- bombing with London still the main objective . When the issue was joined early in July Fighter Command dispose d fifty-two operational squadrons, all but three of which had been heavily engaged in previous battles . To meet the onslaught from an estimate d 1,800 German bombers and dive bombers backed by 1,200 fighters, the R.A.F. could provide No . 11 Group in the south-east with only twelve squadrons of Hurricanes and six of Spitfires . 2 This force of fewer than 220 aircraft could on occasion be reinforced by units from adjacen t fighter groups (Nos. 10 and 12) if not themselves under attack—but a s the weeks passed the necessity to keep No. 11 Group at maximum strength caused progressive dilution and weakness in all other areas. That this small but highly-trained force was not indeed swept from the sky a s Goering intended was due partly to the superiority of the English eight- gun fighters and the incalculable advantage of an efficient radar-reporting and controlled-interception scheme ; partly to the inspired high endeavour with which the R.A.F. pilots faced their task; and partly to faulty German tactics which tied their own fighters too closely to their bombers and thu s deprived them of initiative in combat . Even though Fighter Command wa s sorely weakened when the Luftwaffe abandoned its assault at the end of October, it had nevertheless won a victory as decisive as Trafalgar, fo r the German High Command, realising that the prerequisite of ai r supremacy had not been gained, had already halted preparations for th e invasion of England.3 r This date is generally regarded as marking the commencement of the "Battle of Britain" proper . 2 A sqn normally held 18 aircraft and 26 pilots on strength but operated as a fighting unit wit h 12 aircraft. Thus all subsequent reference to a "sqn" in the air will indicate 12 fighters . • Gen Keitel, Chief of Combined Services Headquarters, issued a top secret memorandum on 1 2 Oct : "The Fuehrer has decided that from now on until the spring, preparations for `Sea Lion ' shall be continued solely for the purpose of maintaining military and political pressure on England . ." " Sea Lion" was the German code name for the invasion of the United Kingdom. July-Sept THE GERMAN ASSAULT 35 Any brief analysis must necessarily over-simplify a struggle of suc h epic proportions as was the Battle of Britain . Some thirty Australians wh o had survived the hurly-burly of May and June fought in Fighter Comman d during these vital months of constant readiness for action. Australian records which have been preserved are skeletal, patchy and unsatisfactory , but do give some glimpse of the tumult in the clouds, although the detail s of much that was worthily and nobly done have passed from human know- ledge because the men did not live to tell the tale . Ten Australians were killed and one became a prisoner, and it is worth noting that the distinc- tion subsequently earned by those who survived gives, no less than thei r deeds, the measure of the loss to the R .A.F. of those who did not. This group, though a minute portion of "The Few" extolled in the Prime Minister's stirring tribute, were scattered among many squadrons, but di d achieve much.4 Flight Lieutenant Sheen rejoined No . 72 Squadron the n based in Northumberland on 29th July and was thus well based whe n on 15th August in addition to day-long raids along the south coast, the Germans sent a two-pronged attack just before noon against Sunderlan d and Driffield. This was a rash tactical move for the area was well out of range of the Me-109 so that the bombers were supported only by twin- engined Me-110's. Sheen himself destroyed two of the attackers—a Ju-8 8 and an Me-110—in a particularly outstanding victory in which more tha n thirty enemy aircraft were shot down .5 He wrote subsequently "I remember vaguely lots of aircraft blowing up and people baling out all over the sky and bombs dropping into the sea ." This German force had been sent from Norway and Denmark to turn the flank of the mai n Fighter Command defences, but the disastrous experiment was not repeated. No. 72 moved south to Biggin Hill at the end of August an d Sheen led a flight in the heavy engagements around London, shootin g down three enemy aircraft and was himself obliged to bale out twic e in three days. On the second occasion he was wounded and his Spitfir e had plunged down from 25,000 to 800 feet before he could disengage himself from it . Flight Lieutenant Olive also gave a vivid account of German attacks against fighter airfields : "They came over and bombed our base. On one occasion we were lined up ready to take off when th e Jerries came into view behind us, diving to the attack . Our only chance lay in getting into the air quickly. Instead of each section taking off in turn, we all opened our throttles and raced across the aerodrome in a terrific scramble .