1 the FIRST TEN MONTH S on 8Th September 1939, in Outlining The
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CHAPTER 1 THE FIRST TEN MONTH S N 8th September 1939, in outlining the most effective means o f OAustralian participation in Empire defence, the United Kingdo m Government postulated that the main weakness of the Allies vis-a-vis Germany was in air strength . The most urgent requirement was stated to be "a steadily increasing supply of pilots, air observers, wireless-telegraph y operators and air gunners " from which "ultimately the Commonwealt h would no doubt wish that complete Australian units (would) come into being and should in turn be amalgamated into an Australian contingent ". This proposal entailed quantitative expansion of an existing arrange- ment by which approximately 20 per cent of pilots of the Royal Air Force were recruited from British communities outside the United King - dom. For some years previously the Royal Australian Air Force ha d trained annually at Point Cook fifty pilots to serve with the R .A.F. and then to revert to the R.A.A.F. Reserve . Other Australians had been received directly into the R .A.F. either on permanent or short-servic e commissions as early as 1920, and in increasing numbers since 1935 . These arrangements had been of great mutual benefit in peacetime but they were not in accord with the innate desire that in war Australians should serve from the outset in organised, compact and easily-identifiabl e national formations . Thus the swift success of the German Army and Air Force in Poland led the Australian Government, now hopeful tha t no immediate crisis threatened in the Pacific, to approve on 20th Septem- ber an Australian air expeditionary force of six squadrons to proceed overseas before the end of the year . l This proposed expeditionary force was a very large contribution i n relation to the trained airmen then available in Australia, and the willing- ness to dispatch it exemplified both the determination of Australia to carr y the fight to the enemy and the appreciation that air fighting would play a prominent part in the forthcoming struggle . Group Captain De La Rue2 was chosen on 9th October to command this force which was considered "the means by which Australia could contribute more effectively than by any other in the same time" . This was admittedly an immediate and short- range policy until more airmen could be trained to form a more powerful Australian contingent, but could ensure from the beginning a significant nucleus around which orderly development would have been possible . Further consideration of the plan, however, revealed not only that it would 1 On 4 Oct 1939 War Cabinet defined the AAEF as : HQ Field Force R.A.A . F 1 (Fighter) Wing 2 (Bomber) Wing 3 (Bomber) Wing 1 Air Store Park HQ HQ HQ 1 M.R .S . 7 Sqn 1 Sqn 16 Sqn HQ Base Area 15 Sqn 8 Sqn 17 Sqn Base Depot 'Air Cmdre H. F . De La Rue, CBE, DFC . (1915-18 : RNAS and comd 223 Sqn RAF .) Comd RAAF Stn Richmond 1937-40 ; AOC Western Area 1940-42 ; Inspr RAAF Admin 1942-46 . Regular air force offr ; of Kew, Vic ; b . Auburn, Vic, 13 Mar 1891 . 2 THE FIRST TEN MONTHS Oct 193 9 absorb an undue proportion of men urgently required to train new recruits, but that from Australian resources six squadrons could not b e equipped with aircraft capable of fighting on equal terms against German types. The aircraft held by existing R.A.A.F. squadrons (Demons, Sea- gulls and Ansons) were obsolescent, while the planned replacements of Wirraway fighters and Hudson bombers would come forward too slowly. These difficulties concerning men and aircraft were increased on 6t h October when the War Cabinet acceded to the request of the British Dominions Office for the retention in England of Sunderland aircraft ordered to equip two R .A.A.F. long-range reconnaissance squadrons . In addition to releasing these aircraft it was further decided to send to Englan d as soon as possible sufficient air and ground crews to form a complete Australian squadron to operate the flying-boats under the control of Coastal Command of the R .A.F. Fresh counter-proposals concerning the development of the Empire 's maximum strength in the air were contained in a Dominions Office cabl e dated 26th October proposing to train annually in oversea Dominion s 20,000 pilots, 20,000 air gunners and 12,000 navigators for service with the R.A .F. This plan represented a tenfold increase in pre-war training figures and could not be achieved in the United Kingdom where weathe r conditions, lack of airfields, wartime restrictions such as blackout an d passive defences, as well as direct enemy interference, all imposed for- midable handicaps . Previous R .A.F. requests for training facilities in Canada had not been granted, but at informal talks between the Dominions' High Commissioners this had for some time been agreed as theoreticall y desirable because Canada would be free from direct conflict, was con- veniently situated from a transport viewpoint, and possessed, in additio n to her own virile secondary industries, access to the tremendous material potential of the United States of America . Accordingly, within a week o f the declaration of war, Mr Bruce, 3 the Australian High Commissione r in London, was authorised by his colleagues to discuss this project wit h the R.A.F., which accepted wholeheartedly the High Commissioners' plan. The Australian War Cabinet endorsed the proposal in principle on 5th October and agreed to send an air mission comprising the Minister fo r Air (Mr Fairbairn4 ), Wing Commander Jones, 5 Mr C. V. Kellway and Mr R. E. Elford to confer at Ottawa with representatives of the Unite d Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand . Mainly for financial reasons Aus- tralia decided that seven-ninths of her quota of airmen should be fully trained entirely within her own resources and the remainder should receive partial training before being sent to Canada . The initially simple plan thus split into a modified scheme of linked training organisations in Canada , 5 Rt Hon Viscount Bruce, CH, MC . (Lt Worces Regt 1915 ; Capt Royal Fus 1916-17 .) Prim e Minister of Aust 1923-29 ; High Commnr in London 1933-45 ; b . Melbourne, 15 Apr 1883 . ' Hon J . V. Fairbairn (RFC 1916-17) . Min for Air 1940 and Civil Aviation 1939-40. Grazier; of Derrinallum, Vic ; b . Wadhurst, Surrey, Eng, 28 Jul 1897 . Killed in aircraft accident 13 Aug 1940. 6 Air Marshal Sir George Jones, KBE, CB, DFC . (1st AIF : 9 LH Regt 1915 ; 4 Sqn AFC 1916-19. ) Asst Chief of Air Staff 1939-40 ; Dir of Training RAAF 1940-42 ; Chief of Air Staff RAAF 1942-52 . Regular air force offr; of Melbourne ; b . Rushworth, Vic, 11 Nov 1896 . Dec-Apr OTTAWA CONFERENCE 3 Australia and New Zealand, and four-party and two-party contracts, col- lectively known as the Riversdale Agreements, came into force on 17t h December 1939 and were to continue in the first instance until 31st March 1943. Once the full organisation was in being, the total Australian con- tribution would be about 10,000 aircrew every year and of these 3,10 0 pilots, 2,000 observers and 3,300 gunners were to be trained wholly in Australia while eighty pilots (from elementary flying schools), forty-two air observers and seventy-two air gunners (both from initial training schools) were to proceed every month for advanced training in Canada.° From the inception of the Ottawa talks it was clear that Australia must choose between the national policy of an expeditionary air force and th e coordinated scheme for feeding what would become virtually an Empire air force. On 20th October the plan for the expeditionary force was post- poned and it was later abandoned so that the men and resources ear - marked for it could be re-aligned to the huge training task which Australi a had undertaken . This was a correct military decision, for although initial concentration on training inevitably restricted R .A.A.F. effort overseas , yet finally the numerical contribution of Australia in the air was substan- tially larger than could have been effected otherwise. Even so it was only by the absorption of suitable civilian facilities and the full use of R .A.A.F. resources that Australia was ready to commence her share of the giganti c cooperative air training plan in April 1940 when the first ground instruc- tion schools opened, to be followed a month later by elementary flyin g courses . Thus although it would appear that the actual participation o f the R.A.A.F. in air operations during the first nine months of the war wa s very limited, in actuality the very great concerted effort being made at tha t time in the sphere of training was the necessary forerunner of parity with and supremacy over the enemy in the air. It was perhaps hard to convince individuals keen to get to grips with a tangible opponent that this long - range policy of expansion was indeed pre-eminent, but to all those who i n the original circumstances would have gone overseas with the expeditionary force, Australia owes a great debt . Their services as instructors at tha t time were of more lasting value than they would have been had the y left Australia . The grand and apparently simple concept of the Empire Air Trainin g Scheme was so enthusiastically received in all quarters that many of it s practical difficulties remained hidden during the strenuous months devote d to establishing schools in Canada, Australia and New Zealand .