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Conflict Bulletin: Borno State The Fund for Peace Conflict Bulletin: Borno State May 2014 However, according to data aggregated on Yusuf in Maiduguri in 2002. In the latter half the P4P Web Map, violence was merely of 2009, deadly clashes between JAS and displaced from the urban center to more Nigerian security forces killed hundreds. rural parts of the state. Subsequent to this spike in fatalities, however, insurgent activity in the state Borno state is home to approximately 4.2 decreased significantly, with no reported million people (2006 census). The incidents attributed to them in the first half population is mostly Muslim and ethnically of 2010. In October 2010, a reported attack Kanuri, Bura, and a few nomadic Shuwa attributed to Boko Haram left the Borno Arabs. It is the second-largest producer of State Chairman of ANPP dead. In December maize in Nigeria. Farmers also grow millet, of that year, multiple attacks on churches rice, wheat, and cotton. Its location at the were also blamed on members of the border of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon group. makes it strategic for trade in and out of the country. Kashim Shettima, from the All In 2011, incidents involving Boko Haram and orno State, the location of the April Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), has governed their consequent fatalities rose steadily, 2014 abduction of nearly 300 school Borno since winning the April 2011 beginning with the murder of a leading girls, is at the heart of what has been gubernatorial elections. ANPP candidate and his entourage in called the “Boko Haram” insurgency. Maiduguri in January. Throughout the year, The insurgency, perpetrated by a This bulletin provides a brief snapshot of Boko Haram was blamed for an increasing militant group called Jamā ʻat Ahl as-Sunnah the trends and patterns of conflict risk amount of attacks on churches, moderate lid-da ʻwa wal-Jihād (JAS), began in 2009 as a factors at the State and LGA levels from clerics, local political figures, and police mass uprising against police in the states of 2009 to 2013, drawing on data available on while shootouts between suspected Boko Bauchi, Yobe, and Borno in which hundreds the P4P Digital Platform for Multi- Haram members and the police and JTF died. Violence de-escalated rapidly after Stakeholder Engagement (www.p4p- were common. In April 2011, local and insurgent leader Muhammed Yusuf was nigerdelta.org). The trend line below draws general elections also appeared to spark a captured and killed. However, in 2011, the from Nigeria Watch data. The heat maps string of violent attacks on polling centers death toll began once again to rise and kept and summaries draw on data collected by and voter registration events. Also of note in rising for the next three years. In May 2013, FFP’s UNLocK, the Council on Foreign 2011, the use of suicide bombers became President Goodluck Jonathan declared a Relations’ NST, WANEP Nigeria, and ACLED, increasingly prevalent, particularly in the state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and integrated on the P4P platform. last quarter of the year when they were Adamawa to contain the violence. To date, used in at least five incidents, although the initiative has had mixed results. many were intercepted prior to detonation. Violence in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, LGA Level Summary Violence by police, in the course of counter- which had been the most severely affected insurgency operations throughout 2011, Local Government Area (LGA) in terms of Maiduguri also reportedly claimed the lives of dozens the number of incidents and fatalities, of civilians. appears to have decreased dramatically. JAS was originally founded by Mohammed The graphics above are Heat Maps (screenshot) of Conflict Risk in Borno State — www.p4p-nigerdelta.org. Conflict Bulletin: Borno State Incidents of Violence in Borno* (JTF). Beginning in June 2013, the Nigerian insurgents in air and land attacks on military operating in Maidurguri has been suspected Boko Haram holdouts. Civilian 40 supported by civilian vigilantes, the “Civilian casualties were also reported but not 35 JTF” (CJTF). These are made up of youths confirmed. 30 from the city armed with machetes, axes, 25 bows and arrows, clubs, swords, and Biu 20 daggers operating under the supervision of 15 JTF sector commanders. In November 2013, Biu was the fourth most violent LGA on a 10 the Nigerian government extended the state per capita basis, with insurgents frequently 5 of emergency for an additional six months. targeting religious communities. In 2011, a 0 Muslim cleric was murdered in his home Bama while a church was reportedly attacked during Sunday mass in June 2012, killing two Bama saw little violence from 2009 through Maiduguri LGA and injuring hundreds. In August 2012, the end of 2011. Throughout 2012, Other Borno LGAs there were attacks at mosques that killed at however, police checkpoints at the border least two individuals. In July 2013, 13 were * Using Nigeria Watch data (www.nigeriawatch.org) formatted to with Cameroon sustained violent attacks, handcuffed and burnt to death in a church the P4P Web Map platform (www.p4p-nigerdelta.org) particularly around the city of Banki in April while in August eight people, including and November. In response, the police and teachers and clerics, were killed in an attack. In 2012, violence continued unabated, with JTF raided many of the militant’s training Raids by the JTF and youth vigilante groups weekly reports of deadly clashes between camps while suspected insurgents raided were carried out in response, reportedly police, JTF and suspected Boko Haram military facilities, police stations and killing insurgents but also causing deaths militants killing and injuring scores of prisons. One attack in May 2013 reportedly and injuries to civilians. people. claimed the lives of 22 policemen, 14 prison officers, two soldiers, 13 insurgents, three Gwoza Throughout the year, attacks on both children and one woman. In October, at universities and primary schools were least 18 women and children were After the state of emergency was declared attributed to Boko Haram. In April, a UN reportedly killed when a suspect believed to in 2013, there appeared to be a steady report cited that up to 7,000 children had be a member of Boko Haram attacked a escalation in violence in Gwoza LGA, on the been affected by the attacks in the past village with IEDs and petroleum bombs, border of Cameroon. Villages inhabited by year, in a state where primary enrollment, which detonated and quickly burned homes minorities were targeted by suspected at merely 28%, significantly lags behind the and shops to the ground. Violence insurgents, killing worshipers and torching rest of Nigeria. Violence remained steady continued on a near weekly basis churches and houses. The military raided throughout 2012 and the beginning of 2013, throughout November and December 2013, suspected strongholds in May and exploding in April with a clash between including ambushes on buses and weddings employed airstrikes in November. Boko Haram and the JTF, which reportedly that reportedly killed more than 40 civilians. killed around two hundred people, principally civilians. Almost one month later, Other LGAs on May 14 President Goodluck Jonathan Kaga declared a state of emergency in Borno, as Throughout 2012 in Konduga LGA, there well as Yobe and Adamawa states. were attacks reported on Kaga LGA was also impacted by violence telecommunication towers and multiple throughout 2013. In May, two clerics were The military response to the Boko Haram assassinations of clerics, village heads and reportedly killed while attacks on the town attacks that accompanied the state of traditional rulers. The Nigerian military, with of Mainok by Boko Haram insurgents emergency actually began a few days prior assistance from youth vigilantes, responded reportedly killed up to 23 civilians in July. to the declaration, when the government with raids on multiple suspected militant Attacks on police stations and LGA officials sent 2,000 troops along with heavy military camps in May, June and July 2013, killing occurred throughout the year as well and equipment, including fighter jets, to insurgents and recovering arms. There clashes between militants and vigilante Maidurugi to reinforce the 3,600 personnel were also the reported use of air strikes on groups also rose steadily. In October 2013, a already there and other major towns in the suspected camps. military offensive reportedly killed dozens of Northeast as part of the Joint Task Force Note regarding terminology: it is not always clear when an incident of violence is perpetrated by members of JAS, or factions sympathetic to JAS’s ideology and objectives. The generic name “Boko Haram” has come to be used by the public to describe Islamist insurgency in the region, broadly speaking. www. fund for peace .org 2 The Fund for Peace Conflict Bulletin: Borno State attacked telecommunication offices and rapid and dramatic increase even as the government buildings throughout the latter total number of incidents across the state half of 2012. In October 2013, militants has remained fairly constant. reportedly shot several people at a mosque while in November, multiple villages were These figures suggest that while the attacked, killing dozens resulting in a series offensive may have been a military success of retaliations by various vigilante groups. in Maiduguri, there has since been a In April 2013, in Kukawa LGA, a huge clash spiraling cycle of violence throughout the between suspected Boko Haram insurgents state that has yet to be contained. and the JTF reportedly left close to 200 dead, with 2000 homes, 62 cars and 284 The mobilization of civilian vigilante groups motorcycles destroyed. is to be expected in the face of such a blistering and near-constant onslaught of insurgent violence. The raids and pitched Conclusion battles that have resulted, however, Before State of Emergency (2013 Q1) continuously put civilians in the crossfire.
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