january 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 1

The Future of Moqtada al- deaths of several pilgrims. The most in recent months al-Sadr has made significant of these reforms has been the considerable effort to extricate himself Sadr’s New Jaysh al-Mahdi transformation of the Mahdi militia into from unruly elements within his a new cultural-political force. On August movement, a problem ever since the By Babak Rahimi 28, al-Sadr ordered JAM to suspend its escalation of sectarian violence in early armed operations and undergo a major 2006. Although the tactical reasons for on november 27, 2008, the Iraqi parliament shakeup, with considerable changes in the recalibration of JAM are several, approved a new security pact that its organizational apparatus.2 The call one major force behind the recent requires the United States to withdraw came as the name of the armed force changes has been Tehran, particularly its forces by the end of 2011. The was also changed to “Mumahidun” passage of the pact marked the Sadrists’ (“those who pave the path”), coined in “The May 2008 detention greatest political defeat since their reference to the devout followers of the rise to power in 2003. With the failure Hidden Imam, who prepare the way for of al-Sadr in Qom by the to convince other Iraqi lawmakers to the Mahdi’s return.3 reject the security deal, which would IRGC is indicative of have bolstered Moqtada al-Sadr’s The rise of the Mumahidun signals a Tehran’s growing control political influence in the legislative notable transition from a grassroots over the young cleric, with branch, al-Sadr’s uncompromising anti- paramilitary unit, with a decentralized occupation stance has left his movement political and social presence on the the aim to bring the Sadrist without a pragmatic position to gain street level, to a private “special force,” movement under direct popular support ahead of provincial with specific military and political tasks. 1 elections in January 2009. As al-Sadr The former Mahdi Army represented a Iranian control.” and his blackshirt Jaysh al-Mahdi “citizen militia” with a grassroots base, (JAM) militia—once hailed as the most best suited to carry out local security formidable Shi`a military force in post- problems with retaliatory actions on Ba`athist Iraq—confront a stronger perceived foreign threats.4 Akin to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Nuri al-Maliki government, the political groups such as the Badr Organization or (IRGC), that has lately worked hard wing of the movement faces increasing the Pasdaran of , the new elite force to tame and remold JAM into a more challenges with the changing political is now restructuring into becoming a organized military force under Iranian landscape of Iraqi politics. centralized armed force, largely divided supervision. into two operational units: one elite Yet, al-Sadr’s greatest mishap in recent unit of combatants and another unit In many ways, Iran has played a major months has been his inability to prevent of cultural activists, providing public role in al-Sadr’s new militia politics. the decline of his influence in Iraqi services to the community.5 The May 10, 2008 cease-fire between politics. A gradual marginalization al-Sadr and was brokered by process began in 2007 when conflict Although the precise socio-cultural Iranians who saw a major danger in over the U.S. presence in the country program of the Mumahidun is still intra-Shi`a conflict, with its apogee in erupted between him and the al-Maliki unknown, the new emphasis on soft the summer of 2007, and sought ways government. This marginalization power could signify a self-promotional to micromanage Shi`a politics inside should not, however, be seen in terms strategy designed to create a restored Iraq in a way to resist U.S. occupation.7 of an eventual annihilation of the military force operating on par with Tehran’s new role as peacemaker movement or its total irrelevance; the Badr Organization, although mainly has been largely led by pragmatic rather, it should be viewed as causing modeled after Hizb Allah of Lebanon.6 hardliners such as Ayatollah Mahmud the possible transformation of the The new strategy also suggests how Hashemi Shahrudi, Ayatollah Ali Akbar movement into something new in the Hashemi Rafsanjani and the IRGC’s course of a transitional phase, through 2 “Shiite Cleric Al-Sadr Suspends Mahdi Militia Opera- Mohsen Rezai and Qasem Soleimani, which al-Sadr could reemerge as a more tions,” Voices of Iraq, August 28, 2008. Al-Sadr’s August who saw the political significance of powerful force with a stronger militant call followed an earlier call on June 13, 2008, when he limiting the activities of the Mahdi presence on the Iraqi scene. announced new plans to reorganize JAM into a “cultural Army from inside Iran, where al-Sadr and religious force,” charged with the responsibility of has been residing since 2007 in order The Mumahidun and al-Sadr’s Challenge to 8 leading an intellectual jihad. See “Sadr Reorganizes Mah- to become an ayatollah. The May 2008 Baghdad di Army,” Herald Tribune, June 13, 2008 and “Al-Sadr: Since late summer 2008, al-Sadr’s New Force to Fight U.S. in Iraq,” CNN, June 13, 2008. 7 The March 30 cease-fire, when al-Sadr ordered his political-military movement has 3 “Faalyat-e Artesh-e Al-Mahdi be Halat-e Taliq Dar militia to lay down their arms, was also brokered in Iran undergone numerous changes in its Amad,” Fars News Agency, August 29, 2008. by the head of the IRGC’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani. activities. Major reforms can be traced 4 Karim Porzabid, “Moqtada-ie Javan be Donbale Mar- For more, see Marisa Cochrane, “The Battle for Basra,” back to the August 2007 freeze on the jaeyat: Goftego ba Shaikh Youssef Naseri az Azay-e Jary- Institute for the Study of War, June 23, 2008, p. 9. activities of JAM due to the outbreak an-e Sadr,” Shahrvand Emrooz, December 30, 2007. 8 Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Iran Leans on Shiite Leader of violence in Karbala that led to the 5 Amit R. Paley and Saad Sarahan, “Powerful Iraq Cleric Muqtada Sadr,” Newsmax.com, April 15, 2008. It is also Recalibrates Strategy,” Washington Post, June 15, 2008. important to recognize the role of Grand Ayatollah Ali 1 Tina Susman, “Iraqi Accord Shows Muqtada Sadr’s Di- 6 Bill Roggio and Daveed Gartenstein, “Sadr’s Special al-Sistani, Shi`a Iraq’s leading cleric based in Najaf, who minished Clout,” , December 2, 2008. Groups,” The Long War Journal, June 10, 2008. has successfully brought al-Sadr under his wings since january 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 1 detention of al-Sadr in Qom by the troops stationed in the country. Due to influence over Moqtada al-Sadr. First, IRGC is indicative of Tehran’s growing their different policies (and ideological in cities such as Basra, Karbala and control over the young cleric, with the stances) toward Washington, in spring southern towns like Diwaniyya, al- aim to bring the Sadrist movement 2007 the Sadrists broke away from Sadr’s public support has deteriorated under direct Iranian control.9 While al-Maliki’s government and formed significantly because of his failure al-Sadr’s current political activities in an anti-establishment Shi`a bloc in “to appoint qualified people to Qom remain unknown, Tehran has also parliament. important positions in the province and shown signs of curtailing its military Baghdad.”13 Al-Maliki’s push into Basra support for the Shi`a militia, most likely As Baghdad’s campaign against militia and public works efforts to rebuild the due to the election of Barack Obama, activities achieved major military success slums of Sadr City has been the second who has said he favors a diplomatic with Operation Peace in Sadr City and contributing factor to the decline of approach with Iran.10 Messenger of Peace, which considerably al-Sadr’s influence in JAM’s main eliminated armed operations in Maysan stronghold.14 Al-Maliki Versus al-Sadr Province, the Sadrists took significant With the March 2008 Knights Assault losses. Maysan Province, for example, The third cause of decline can be Campaign in Basra, al-Maliki’s Iraqi was a key passage point for Mahdi Army attributed to U.S. efforts to incite security forces were able to claim a supplies coming from Iran. Al-Maliki’s further fragmentation within JAM by major victory against al-Sadr’s militia success in getting the security pact reaching out to the “moderates” in rule in the most strategically significant passed by the parliament marked the the al-Sadr camp, and hence isolating port city in the country. With the help final stage in an orchestrated effort to the “radicals.” This strategy has also of Tehran’s new al-Sadr strategy, al- marginalize al-Sadr. This effort has left led to a decrease in the armed groups’ Maliki was able to flex his muscles the two Shi`a politicians of two diverse organizational capabilities.15 The split and take over Basra from militia rule political backgrounds—one an exile in Sadrist leadership, accordingly, and, accordingly, focus his attention leader (al-Maliki) and another a native matches Iran’s success in bringing the on Baghdad’s Sadr City, al-Sadr’s dissident (al-Sadr) during the Ba`athist movement under the supervision of stronghold in the capital. Accordingly, era—at the verge of a new Shi`a power the IRGC. While remaining under the the Basra campaign created a conflict struggle. influence of Tehran, al-Sadr has not between al-Sadr and al-Maliki, an only seen his popularity fade away and alliance of convenience which began The Decline of al-Sadr? his status as a nationalist leader of an to deteriorate since early 2007 and With the ascendance of al-Maliki, al- indigenous Iraqi movement jeopardized, continues to be a source of major Sadr’s political and military clout has but he has also lost direct control of his political tension to this day.11 diminished considerably, especially in followers inside the country. provincial towns where he was earlier The current state of antagonism expected to sweep into power in the Future Perils and Promises between al-Maliki and al-Sadr was 2009 elections. In Basra, for instance, Al-Sadr is now playing a waiting game. hardly predictable in 2006, when where JAM suffered a major defeat in As the leader of a major socio-political the two Shi`a leaders formed a loose the spring, Sadrist politicians have yet movement, the young cleric understands political alliance, primarily motivated to declare their intention to run for the that both militarily and politically for political gain in parliament. In fact, provincial elections. This is mainly due he is vulnerable to political forces it was in 2006 when the 30-member to a sense of unease many Sadrists feel, in the Shi`a bloc backed by Iran and Sadrist bloc in parliament provided largely due to a sharp decline in their the United States. Yet, he also knows the boost needed to help al-Maliki leader’s popularity since the outbreak that neither Baghdad nor Tehran nor become prime minister. Although on of violence in spring and, possibly, Washington can defeat his movement, the ideological level both al-Maliki and because of al-Sadr’s staunch opposition primarily because of the passionate al-Sadr shared a similar sense of Iraqi to federalism, a relatively popular support he still enjoys, at times even nationalism, backed by a vision of a concept among Shi`a in Basra.12 cult-like devotion, among the Shi`a strong centralized state, they differed population in Baghdad’s disadvantaged significantly on how to deal with U.S. There are four major causes for the neighborhoods and provincial towns in Sadrists’ decline in recent months: the southern regions. The street is his a 2004 agreement with the Paul Bremer government, corruption, enhanced security in the base, and populism is his ideological which later led to the consolidation of the Sadrists as a le- country, Washington’s change of marker. gitimate political force in Iraq’s electoral process in 2005. strategy with the Sadrists and Tehran’s For a study of al-Sadr’s rise to power, see Nicolas Pelham, 13 Riyadh Sari, “Al-Qadisiyah Gears Up for Elections,” A New Muslim Order: The Shia and The Middle East Sectar- 12 Saleem al-Wazzan, “Basra’s Dominant Parties Expect Niqash, December 11, 2008. ian Crisis (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), pp. 147-156. to Maintain Power,” Niqash, December 16, 2008. For 14 Howard Lafranchi, “U.S. Hopes to Counter Mahdi 9 “Edea-ie Bazdasht-e Khaneghi Moqtada dar Qom tava- now, as analyst Reidar Visser argues, Sadrists appear to Army’s Clout in Baghdad: American Forces in Iraq An- sot-e Sepah!” Tabnak, May 17, 2008. adopt multiple strategies, as many Sadrist candidates are nounced Monday Ambitious Public-Works Plans to 10 For Iran’s decline of military activity in Iraq, see Anne running under different names for the Basra governor- Win Support in Sadr City,” The Christian Science Monitor, Gearan, “US General: Iran Backs Off Worst Bombs in ates. For more, see Reidar Visser, “The Candidate Lists April 15, 2008. Iraq,” , December 12, 2008. Are Out: Basra More Fragmented, Sadrists Pursuing 15 Gareth Porter, “Unable to Defeat Mahdi Army, U.S. 11 Mark Kukis, “A Maliki-Sadr Breakup?” Time, January Several Strategies?” www.historiae.org, December 22, Hopes to Divide It,” International Press Service News 11, 2007. 2008. Agency, December 11, 2008. january 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 1

Al-Sadr also realizes, however, that his troops beyond 2011. This would prolong (Sadrist or otherwise) and look beyond support could rapidly corrode away if a U.S. stay in Iraq for an unforeseeable ethnic and sectarian politics as a way of he is unable to prove himself and his future and, in return, increase al-Sadr’s managing politics. military-political organization as a position as a legitimate anti-occupation viable alternative to the Maliki-Hakim politician. The resurrection of JAM also depends Shi`a faction in power. For now, the on how the new U.S. administration primary predicament al-Sadr faces is In many ways, therefore, al-Sadr is still deals with Tehran and its controversial the ability to reinvent himself as an a major player on the Iraqi political nuclear program before the agreed anti-occupation notable. While facing scene. As a shrewd student of politics, withdrawal date of 2011, and whether the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal in the yet-to-be ayatollah could still break it can find a diplomatic way, especially 2011, al-Sadr would need to redefine his away from the Tehran-Qom nexus, with the pragmatic conservatives close political leadership in a post-occupation reconstitute his militia into a more to Ayatollah Khameini, to convince Iran period. Since much of his success in organized force in southern regions to curb al-Sadr’s military activities for recent years has evolved around the and, under the right circumstances, years to come. rhetoric of nationalist resistance, emerge as a prevailing national figure. however, the question remains as to Through the “cultural” wing of his new Dr. Babak Rahimi, who earned his bachelor’s what will happen to al-Sadr’s political organization, al-Sadr can also exert degree at UCSD, received a Ph.D. from the power when U.S. troops actually leave power on the street and neighborhood European University Institute, Florence, Iraq in 2011. levels. Like Hizb Allah or Hamas, he Italy, in October 2004. He has also studied could muster considerable support from at the University of Nottingham, where he The answer to this question is two- the disfranchised and unruly youth, obtained a master’s degree in Ancient and fold. First, al-Sadr’s future success will vying with Shi`a factions such as Dawa Medieval Philosophy, and London School largely be shaped by how successfully and the Islamic Supreme Council in of Economics and Political Science, where he restructures his fractured militia Iraq (ISCI) for territorial and political he was a Visiting Fellow at the Department and expands his popular support control over the southern regions. of Anthropology, 2000-2001. Dr. Rahimi on the street level into a thriving has been the recipient of fellowships from political movement, participating (and An alternative to the intra-Shi`a power the national endowment for the Humanities succeeding) in the electoral process struggle is the unlikely alliance between and Jean Monnet Fellowship at the European (independent from Tehran). It is al-Sadr and al-Maliki’s Dawa Party University Institute, and was a Senior Fellow important to note that such a scenario or Sunni anti-federalist factions. This at the United States Institute of Peace, is highly unpredictable in light of al- would allow al-Sadr to gain momentum in Washington, D.C., where he conducted Sadr’s apparent diminishing political the provincial or national elections and, research on the institutional contribution of popularity ahead of provincial elections while forming coalitions with smaller Shi’i political organizations in the creation in January 2009. parties and militias (such as Fadila), of a vibrant civil society in post-Ba`athist stir political or even military conflicts Iraq. His current research project is on the Second, the future of al-Sadr as a political with Kurdish or certain Shi`a federalist religious cultural life of the Iranian port-city leader will also depend on Baghdad’s factions (such as the ISCI).16 There is of Busher, southern Iran. He is currently an capability to implement the U.S.-Iraq also the possible coalition between al- Assistant Professor of Iranian and Islamic “status of forces” agreement on both Sadr and the anti-Maliki Dawa faction, Studies at University of California, San legal and perceptual levels. If al-Maliki led by former Prime Minister Ibrahim Diego. shows Iraq’s competing factions that he Jafari, in a way to counter-balance the is able to carry through the agreement Maliki-Hakim hegemony and forming a (i.e., the withdrawal of U.S. troops in new (anti-American) Shi`a nationalist 2011) without the outbreak of violence, front.17 and continues to appear as the head of a sovereign nation independent from The above scenarios, however, largely the United States, al-Sadr’s popularity depend on how Baghdad maintains could diminish further. If, however, an the fledgling political process, local Iraq-U.S. security deal is undermined security and economic prospects, which by numerous amendments to the treaty have been slowly achieved since the made by al-Maliki or by various Shi`a surge. There is also the implementation factions in power pressuring him to of transparent elections, the July do so, then al-Sadr could make the referendum over the security deal and case that the approved security pact successful constitutional negotiations, has been merely a Washington ploy to especially over the Kirkuk question. If make its stay in Iraq permanent. This Baghdad prevails, al-Maliki can claim would further legitimize his movement a decisive victory over the militias as an anti-establishment force. There is certainly a likelihood for this scenario, as 16 For a possible Sadr-Maliki alliance, see Saleem al- the threat of breakaway Sunni insurgent Wazzan, “Basra’s Dominant Parties Expect to Maintain groups and al-Qa`ida could force Power,” Niqash, December 16, 2008. Baghdad to seek out the support of U.S. 17 Sari, “Al-Qadisiyah Gears Up for Elections.”