JANUARY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 1 The Future of Moqtada al- deaths of several pilgrims. The most in recent months al-Sadr has made significant of these reforms has been the considerable effort to extricate himself Sadr’s New Jaysh al-Mahdi transformation of the Mahdi militia into from unruly elements within his a new cultural-political force. On August movement, a problem ever since the By Babak Rahimi 28, al-Sadr ordered JAM to suspend its escalation of sectarian violence in early armed operations and undergo a major 2006. Although the tactical reasons for on november 27, 2008, the Iraqi parliament shakeup, with considerable changes in the recalibration of JAM are several, approved a new security pact that its organizational apparatus.2 The call one major force behind the recent requires the United States to withdraw came as the name of the armed force changes has been Tehran, particularly its forces by the end of 2011. The was also changed to “Mumahidun” passage of the pact marked the Sadrists’ (“those who pave the path”), coined in “The May 2008 detention greatest political defeat since their reference to the devout followers of the rise to power in 2003. With the failure Hidden Imam, who prepare the way for of al-Sadr in Qom by the to convince other Iraqi lawmakers to the Mahdi’s return.3 reject the security deal, which would IRGC is indicative of have bolstered Moqtada al-Sadr’s The rise of the Mumahidun signals a Tehran’s growing control political influence in the legislative notable transition from a grassroots over the young cleric, with branch, al-Sadr’s uncompromising anti- paramilitary unit, with a decentralized occupation stance has left his movement political and social presence on the the aim to bring the Sadrist without a pragmatic position to gain street level, to a private “special force,” movement under direct popular support ahead of provincial with specific military and political tasks. 1 elections in January 2009. As al-Sadr The former Mahdi Army represented a Iranian control.” and his blackshirt Jaysh al-Mahdi “citizen militia” with a grassroots base, (JAM) militia—once hailed as the most best suited to carry out local security formidable Shi`a military force in post- problems with retaliatory actions on Ba`athist Iraq—confront a stronger perceived foreign threats.4 Akin to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Nuri al-Maliki government, the political groups such as the Badr Organization or (IRGC), that has lately worked hard wing of the movement faces increasing the Pasdaran of Iran, the new elite force to tame and remold JAM into a more challenges with the changing political is now restructuring into becoming a organized military force under Iranian landscape of Iraqi politics. centralized armed force, largely divided supervision. into two operational units: one elite Yet, al-Sadr’s greatest mishap in recent unit of combatants and another unit In many ways, Iran has played a major months has been his inability to prevent of cultural activists, providing public role in al-Sadr’s new militia politics. the decline of his influence in Iraqi services to the community.5 The May 10, 2008 cease-fire between politics. A gradual marginalization al-Sadr and Baghdad was brokered by process began in 2007 when conflict Although the precise socio-cultural Iranians who saw a major danger in over the U.S. presence in the country program of the Mumahidun is still intra-Shi`a conflict, with its apogee in erupted between him and the al-Maliki unknown, the new emphasis on soft the summer of 2007, and sought ways government. This marginalization power could signify a self-promotional to micromanage Shi`a politics inside should not, however, be seen in terms strategy designed to create a restored Iraq in a way to resist U.S. occupation.7 of an eventual annihilation of the military force operating on par with Tehran’s new role as peacemaker movement or its total irrelevance; the Badr Organization, although mainly has been largely led by pragmatic rather, it should be viewed as causing modeled after Hizb Allah of Lebanon.6 hardliners such as Ayatollah Mahmud the possible transformation of the The new strategy also suggests how Hashemi Shahrudi, Ayatollah Ali Akbar movement into something new in the Hashemi Rafsanjani and the IRGC’s course of a transitional phase, through 2 “Shiite Cleric Al-Sadr Suspends Mahdi Militia Opera- Mohsen Rezai and Qasem Soleimani, which al-Sadr could reemerge as a more tions,” Voices of Iraq, August 28, 2008. Al-Sadr’s August who saw the political significance of powerful force with a stronger militant call followed an earlier call on June 13, 2008, when he limiting the activities of the Mahdi presence on the Iraqi scene. announced new plans to reorganize JAM into a “cultural Army from inside Iran, where al-Sadr and religious force,” charged with the responsibility of has been residing since 2007 in order The Mumahidun and al-Sadr’s Challenge to 8 leading an intellectual jihad. See “Sadr Reorganizes Mah- to become an ayatollah. The May 2008 Baghdad di Army,” Herald Tribune, June 13, 2008 and “Al-Sadr: Since late summer 2008, al-Sadr’s New Force to Fight U.S. in Iraq,” CNN, June 13, 2008. 7 The March 30 cease-fire, when al-Sadr ordered his political-military movement has 3 “Faalyat-e Artesh-e Al-Mahdi be Halat-e Taliq Dar militia to lay down their arms, was also brokered in Iran undergone numerous changes in its Amad,” Fars News Agency, August 29, 2008. by the head of the IRGC’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani. activities. Major reforms can be traced 4 Karim Porzabid, “Moqtada-ie Javan be Donbale Mar- For more, see Marisa Cochrane, “The Battle for Basra,” back to the August 2007 freeze on the jaeyat: Goftego ba Shaikh Youssef Naseri az Azay-e Jary- Institute for the Study of War, June 23, 2008, p. 9. activities of JAM due to the outbreak an-e Sadr,” Shahrvand Emrooz, December 30, 2007. 8 Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Iran Leans on Shiite Leader of violence in Karbala that led to the 5 Amit R. Paley and Saad Sarahan, “Powerful Iraq Cleric Muqtada Sadr,” Newsmax.com, April 15, 2008. It is also Recalibrates Strategy,” Washington Post, June 15, 2008. important to recognize the role of Grand Ayatollah Ali 1 Tina Susman, “Iraqi Accord Shows Muqtada Sadr’s Di- 6 Bill Roggio and Daveed Gartenstein, “Sadr’s Special al-Sistani, Shi`a Iraq’s leading cleric based in Najaf, who minished Clout,” Los Angeles Times, December 2, 2008. Groups,” The Long War Journal, June 10, 2008. has successfully brought al-Sadr under his wings since JANUARY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 1 detention of al-Sadr in Qom by the troops stationed in the country. Due to influence over Moqtada al-Sadr. First, IRGC is indicative of Tehran’s growing their different policies (and ideological in cities such as Basra, Karbala and control over the young cleric, with the stances) toward Washington, in spring southern towns like Diwaniyya, al- aim to bring the Sadrist movement 2007 the Sadrists broke away from Sadr’s public support has deteriorated under direct Iranian control.9 While al-Maliki’s government and formed significantly because of his failure al-Sadr’s current political activities in an anti-establishment Shi`a bloc in “to appoint qualified people to Qom remain unknown, Tehran has also parliament. important positions in the province and shown signs of curtailing its military Baghdad.”13 Al-Maliki’s push into Basra support for the Shi`a militia, most likely As Baghdad’s campaign against militia and public works efforts to rebuild the due to the election of Barack Obama, activities achieved major military success slums of Sadr City has been the second who has said he favors a diplomatic with Operation Peace in Sadr City and contributing factor to the decline of approach with Iran.10 Messenger of Peace, which considerably al-Sadr’s influence in JAM’s main eliminated armed operations in Maysan stronghold.14 Al-Maliki Versus al-Sadr Province, the Sadrists took significant With the March 2008 Knights Assault losses. Maysan Province, for example, The third cause of decline can be Campaign in Basra, al-Maliki’s Iraqi was a key passage point for Mahdi Army attributed to U.S. efforts to incite security forces were able to claim a supplies coming from Iran. Al-Maliki’s further fragmentation within JAM by major victory against al-Sadr’s militia success in getting the security pact reaching out to the “moderates” in rule in the most strategically significant passed by the parliament marked the the al-Sadr camp, and hence isolating port city in the country. With the help final stage in an orchestrated effort to the “radicals.” This strategy has also of Tehran’s new al-Sadr strategy, al- marginalize al-Sadr. This effort has left led to a decrease in the armed groups’ Maliki was able to flex his muscles the two Shi`a politicians of two diverse organizational capabilities.15 The split and take over Basra from militia rule political backgrounds—one an exile in Sadrist leadership, accordingly, and, accordingly, focus his attention leader (al-Maliki) and another a native matches Iran’s success in bringing the on Baghdad’s Sadr City, al-Sadr’s dissident (al-Sadr) during the Ba`athist movement under the supervision of stronghold in the capital. Accordingly, era—at the verge of a new Shi`a power the IRGC. While remaining under the the Basra campaign created a conflict struggle. influence of Tehran, al-Sadr has not between al-Sadr and al-Maliki, an only seen his popularity fade away and alliance of convenience which began The Decline of al-Sadr? his status as a nationalist leader of an to deteriorate since early 2007 and With the ascendance of al-Maliki, al- indigenous Iraqi movement jeopardized, continues to be a source of major Sadr’s political and military clout has but he has also lost direct control of his political tension to this day.11 diminished considerably, especially in followers inside the country.