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CBC Nir Oct 11.Indd LIBYA AND THE FALL OF GADHAFI Introduction Although a few short months ago it contribution on the sea and in the air. Focus seemed impossible, Moammar Gadhafi In the next six months life in Libya In a remarkable eight-month series of has effectively been removed from was turned upside down. Rebels who battles, rebel forces power in Libya. opposed the Libyan government built have taken control For 42 years he ruled Libya with an an armed force from scratch. Libyan of almost all of Libya iron fist, and his people responded with forces, which put up a brutal fight, were away from long-time fear. The rest of the world disapproved eventually overrun by the rebels. And dictator Moammar of his personal excesses, condemned his Gadhafi himself went into hiding. Gadhafi. This News in brutal dictatorship, and tolerated him as At the time this story went to print, Review story looks at how this unlikely turn an important opponent of radical Islamic Gadhafi had still not been found, and of events came to be, organizations. almost all of Libya was in the hands Canada’s role in these The people of Libya—increasingly of the rebels. A National Transitional events, and what a disenchanted with his performance— Council was in charge and was preparing post-Gadhafi Libya took to the streets in protest in early to appoint an interim government, may look like. 2011. The Libyan government responded arrange multi-party elections, and write a with violence, and by the end of new constitution. Further Research February 2011, casualties had climbed to As this new chapter in Libyan history Keep up to date on over 1 000 people. The violent response unfolds, a number of questions remain. developments in the by government forces caused further What will the new Libya look like? How battle for control of outrage in the country, and before long, a will the main factions in the country— Libya at www.cbc.ca/ revolution was underway. secular and Islamic, urban and tribal— news. As unrest spread throughout the come together to decide how the new country, international demands increased Libyan government and Libyan society that Gadhafi discontinue attacks against should be structured? How should his citizens. His failure to heed that former officials of the Gadhafi regime be advice led to a United Nations Security treated? And what should be done about Council resolution that, in effect, Gadhafi when he is finally located? closed Libyan air space to Gadhafi’s Despite these unknowns, most Libyans air force and offered protection to look ahead to the dawn of a new age Libyan civilians. NATO undertook the and the chance to create something leadership of an international mission few of them have ever experienced—a to enforce the resolution. Canada was democracy. part of this mission, making a significant To Consider 1. Why are some observers saying that the defeat of Gadhafi was not only a victory for the Libyan rebels but also for international diplomacy? 2. If Canada were facing a similar crisis, would you want an international body like NATO or the UN to intervene? Or would you rather that Canadians solve the problem by themselves? 3. Are there lessons from the Libyan experience that might be applied internationally to future conflicts? CBC News in Review • October 2011 • Page 30 LIBYA AND THE FALL OF GADHAFI Video Review Further Research Pre-viewing Discussion On the NATO website The army that defeated the professional forces of Moammar Gadhafi consisted (www.natochannel.tv) largely of young, inexperienced volunteers with a cause. Can you imagine you can find several circumstances under which you would be willing to take similar action? What videos dealing with kind of fighting force do you think you and your fellow volunteers would make? NATO’s activities in Compare your fictional force with the real one that appears in the video. Libya and around the world. One in Viewing Questions particular—Libya: In As you watch the video, answer the questions in the spaces provided. Qhadhafi’s Prison— provides a graphic 1. How long did Moammar Gadhafi rule Libya? illustration of why most Libyans are so pleased to be free of 2. What natural resource makes Libya one of the wealthiest countries in Moammar Gadhafi. North Africa? 3. What are some of the ways that you saw protestors suffer in the video? 4. What actions did the United Nations Security Council authorize UN members to take against the Libyan government? 5. What challenges did the rebels face in the early days of their opposition to Libyan forces? 6. What military contribution did Canada make to the UN-authorized mission? 7. What role does a NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) airplane play in the battle for Libya? CBC News in Review • October 2011 • Page 31 8. When did rebel forces finally take Tripoli? 9. What is the estimated cost to date of the Canadian mission to Libya? 10. What is necessary for the mission in Libya to be complete? Post-viewing Discussion 1. During the video, Prime Minister Stephen Harper makes the following statement: “Libyans have waited a long time to be free of the barbarity, repression, and violence of the Gadhafi regime. And the Libyan people must now chart their own democratic course.” What is the message the Prime Minister seems to be sending to other nations interested in the make-up of any future Libyan government? What implications might it have for Canadian policy toward other fledgling governments, such as that of Iraq or Afghanistan? 2. What difficulties might the new Libyan government face if it is unable to capture or kill Moammar Gadhafi? 3. What responsibilities do you believe NATO and the other nations responding to the United Nations resolution will continue to have toward Libya once the mission is concluded? CBC News in Review • October 2011 • Page 32 LIBYA AND THE FALL OF GADHAFI The Fall of Gadhafi Did you know . Focus for Reading The United States was This section outlines the sequence of events that resulted in the fall of the first country to act Moammar Gadhafi. As you read through this section, construct a timeline of the following the passage major events in the 2011 Libyan rebellion. of the UN resolution to intervene in Libya. Of all the North African regime collapses third war would be unpopular both at The U.S. air force in 2011, none has been more spectacular home and abroad. The U.S. relinquished quickly bombed Libyan than the fall of Moammar Gadhafi. control on March 31. air force compounds Until the demonstrations against the Some non-NATO nations also joined on the ground, nearly government began in February 2011, the no-fly coalition, including Qatar, eliminating the Libyan Gadhafi was believed to have Libya very the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and air force. much under his thumb. It was only as his Sweden. The support of several Arab reprisals against demonstrators became nations was especially welcomed by more vicious, and resistance to his rule NATO. It demonstrated to the rest of began to spread throughout eastern parts the world that this was an action against of the country, that the rest of the world a brutal dictator, not against a Muslim became aware that that control might be nation. very shaky. The success of the mission was mixed. The United Nations was quick to Initially the results were spectacular. Air condemn his actions and demand strikes and cruise missiles forced the that he cease military action against Libyan army to withdraw 600 kilometres his own citizens. His refusal to do from the coastal highway, with the so led to the UN Security Council’s rebels in hot pursuit. But it quickly adoption of Resolution 173. The became apparent that NATO could only resolution “authorized Member States, accomplish so much with the weaponry acting nationally or through regional it had available. Fighter planes are useful organizations or arrangements, to take all for striking large groups of soldiers and necessary measures to protect civilians equipment when out in the open. They under threat of attack in the country, are far less useful for precision targeting including Benghazi, while excluding a of smaller groups in tighter quarters. foreign occupation force of any form Gadhafi’s forces quickly adopted new on any part of Libyan territory” (www. tactics. Like the rebels, they began to un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200. use civilian rather than military vehicles, doc.htm). The resolution passed with 10 and it became harder to distinguish one votes in favour and five abstentions. side from another from the air. They also positioned more of their weapons NATO Steps In and equipment near civilian populations. On March 24, NATO announced that NATO’s air strikes continued, but with it would assume responsibility for extreme caution. Many sorties were enforcing the no-fly zone, allowing flown without any bombing taking place. the United States to maintain a much lower profile in the conflict. The U.S. The Rebel Army was already heavily involved in armed Facing Gadhafi’s professional army conflicts in two other Muslim countries: were the rebel forces so poignantly Iraq and Afghanistan. Leadership in a described in the video—mostly poorly CBC News in Review • October 2011 • Page 33 armed and poorly trained young people warrant for Gadhafi for crimes against led by defectors from the regular army. humanity. Human rights advocates were Their lack of training showed as initial thrilled. But those trying to convince successes were followed by rapid him to step down realized that he would setbacks and the loss of territorial gains.
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