Rms Control and Disarmament. a Quaiteriy Bibliography With

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TITLE :rms Control and Disarmament.A Quaiteriy Bibliography with Abstracts and Annotations. INSTITUTION Arms Control an Disarmament Agency, Washington, F.C. PUB DATE 70 NOTE 126p.; Val. 7,No. 1 AVAITALF ERCM Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402(.7.5)

EDRS PRICE EDRS Price MF-$0.65 HC Not Available Aran EDRS. DESCRIPTORS *Annotated Bibliographies. 4Eoreign Pelations, *National Defense, Nuclear Warfare, *Political Science, World Affairs, *World Protlems IDENTIFIERS -4Arms Control, Disarr,ament

ABSTRACT This bibliogra:::h is compiled from a survey of the literature OP the subject received by the Library of Congress. Only those likely to he available in larger research and public libres in the United States are included. Sources surveyed include books, monographs, publications of governm2nt agencies. and international And national organizations, in addition to approximately 1,:00 periodicals. Each issue contains, English annotations of items published in English, French, and Geran, as well as annotations of items in all languages published in English translation. Entries are chosen under the assunption that arms control and disarmament encompass such related topics as weapons devclopment and basic factors in world politics. The entries are organized into the following categories: (1) the international political environment; (2) the strategic envircnment; (3) institutions ana a.eans for the maintenance cf peace; (4) general analyses of arms control and disarmament; and (5) specific problems and limited mr?asures,. The document is indexed by author and subject. (,ILB)

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Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

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Arms Cont,-ol cf Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature In an important subject area. It Is prepared by the Arms Con- trol and Disarmament 13iblLgraphy Section of the library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in tLe English, Fret.ch, and German languages. as well as abstracts and annotations Of current literature to all languages published In English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volatile, with the ft,rth number containing cumulative author and subject Indexes. To facilitate the t..se of titis bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, locations are shown by call numbers for cataloged Items and by symbols for uncataloged items and materials held by custodial nnits of the i,ibrary. A list of these symbols appears on the next rage. Matters of fact and opinion presented in Arms Control of Dtearmgtnent are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion (toes notonstitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the r.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I.!orniation about the periodicals cited can in most fustances be obtained readily from standard reference works. The bibliography Is complied fr-n2 a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that lc likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries In the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, pablicatIons of national and fidet.natIonal organizations and sodeties, and approximately I,?00 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed In arriving at the Library, the 1.terature c.ited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month In which a number Is sent to press. Entrl.s are chosen under the assunit Gem that arms control and disarmament Is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the repotting of day-to-day events in new The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and 'Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the orticics to it hbli they relate are with the itermIssion of their copyright ov, tiers. sometimes used verbatim or in modiried form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

4 111 Library of Congress Location Symbols Uncatalogec, and Unclailled Materials)

Chl Kor Chinese and Korean Scetion DLC Books in Process Ilebr Hebraic Section Japan Japanese Section Law Library Nr East Near East Section Sell RR Science Reading Room tier Newrpaper and Current Periodical Room StarItin Slavic Room

r; CONTENTS rage Preface iii

I. The international political environment 1 Basic factors in -,vorld politics I Foreign policies 9 Tnnsion areas 23

11. The strategic environment 31 Modern war ...... 31 .Modern weaponry and related tennological developments Defense policies and military strategies of nation: and alliances 38 Consequences of defeoe policies and war aR

If. Institutions and means for the maintenance of peace International law International organization International peace and security force, 72 Other processes, plans, and proposal, 72

IV. General analyses of, and comprehensive approaches to, arms control and dis- armament_ 78 The historical background 78 General analyse- 79 Comprehensive approache- .82

Specific problems and limited meaqures Reduction of the risk of war (command and control of weapons, escalation, accidental war, negotiation, disengagement, neutralization) 84 Conventional arms transfer. 57 Nuclear proliferation 87 Chemical and biological weapon. 91 Strategic arms limitation 92 Regional arrangements 96 Special environments (ocean, seabed,pace, etc.) 90 Violation, inspection, verification, and enforcement of agreements 1(11 Consequences of arms control and disarmament mca - arcs -_ 102 Other problem. and measures 103

Author index 104 Subject index lOR

6 1. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS termine priorities in science and technology, and a clearer understanding of technology's function as an Instrument of foreign policy. 1 Barnett, A. Doak. THE NEW MULTIPOLAR BALANCE IN EAST ASIA: IMPLICATONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY. In American Acadery of Political and Social Sci- Clemens, Walter C. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO IN ence, Philadelphia. A new American posture toward EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: THE 19303 AND THE 19605. Asia Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v.390, World affairs, v. 133, Sept. 1970: 98-105. July 1970) p. 73-66. a1901.w7, v. 133 Hi.AL, v.390 Tne tactics and objectives of Soviet policy to- A new four-power balance is emerging in East ward Eastern Europe in the 1960's can to compared Asia. This is the product of the Sins-Soviet con- to that of France between the two world wars. flict, the reenTgence if Japan, and the trend to- Both nations experienced a fear of Germany and a ward a reduced Unite.' States rdlitary robe it the conqueror's wish to maintain a posttellum status region. fire talanee mill create new problems, but quo. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia new opportunities as 0e11. it will involve in- can to equated with France's thwarting of the cus- creased fluidity, competition, and maneuver. Yet, toms union between Germany and Austria in 1931. in a basic sense, the balance may prove to be rel- Although the present Soviet policy is more dynamic atively stable, becaise dramati realignments than that of Paris between the wars, most of this among the major powers in the region do not seer, dynamism is expressed outside of Europe. Soviet likely 12. the next decade. Hopefully, the balance concern for the status quo in Central Europe is may tend to reduce the dangers .1f local conflicts threatene,.. by German economic expansion, which escalating into confrontations betw,_en majorp ow- would alter the style and conte..t. of East European era. Some developments, such as a Sins-Soviet political life. Consequently the Soviet Union now war, a decision by Japan to "go nuclear, " or in- scolds Austria for its interest in joining the creased big-pow ar confrontation in the Indo-China CommoG Mark-t or obtaining some kind of special area, could upset the balance. However, if these arrangement. In the historical case, the great dangers can be avoided, the new quadrilateral bal- power working for retention of the states quo male ance may over time prove to be an improvement over a larger contribution to the denouement than the the bipolar balance of t.,le past. Virtually every lesser parties whose immediate interests were more country in the region will have to reassess its directly involved. Judgment of the politcal con- situation, interests, and policies, In some re- sequences of the status quo policies of the Soviet The United States should move to implement spects. Union must wait the passage of time. The task for the Guam L'octrine and adjust its policies toward enlightened statesmanship remains the sear'h for China. It should maintain its alliance with Japan "peaceful change that will accommodate and not and tl'e stabiliLy of U.S.-Soviet strategic rela- suppress the fores of human sentiment and of eco- tions, tut it should use what influence it can to n,Amic rationality." prevent a Sino-Scviet war or a decision by Japan to acouire nuclear weapons. (Abstract supplied) 4 Collier, David S., and Kurt Glaser. THE CONDITI,ZS 2 FOR PEACE IN EUROFE; FROBLFNS OF LITEVOE AND SECU- Fasiuk, Victor. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE hill. Washington, Public Affairs Frets COO] NEXT DECADES. Orbis, v.14, spring 1970: 17-42. C.04 p. (Foundation for Fere',7n Affairs series, D839.068, V. 14 no. 13) D643.15774 "based on papers presented at the fifth interna- Frcuses on technology's impact on American so- tional congress on the problems of Eastern Europe, ciety and domestic and foreign policies, the glo- held in Chicago on March 21-24, 1968, under the bal projection of American influence through tech- joint sponsorship if the Foundation for Fc,eign nology, and the implications of nonmilitary tech- Affairs of Chicago and the Studiengesellschaft fur nology for national security in the next 25 years. Fragan Mittel- and Osteuropaischer Partnerschaft Basiut outlines such future technological develop- of Wiesbaden." ments as weather modification, global communica- Includes bibliographical references. tions, and high-speed transportation, all of which can revolutionize man's political and social en- Co.,tents.--pt. 1. Peacemaking in historical vironment. He contends that technology is already perspective: European peace settlements from Vi- producing rapid social, political, and institu- enna to Versailles, by Theodore Schieder.--pt. 2. tional changes and notes that the traditional view Strategic problems of detente and peace! Soviet of technology's effects as long term no longer a;- cencepts of peace and security, by Boris Meissner. plies. He calls for a strengthening of America's Peace attempts in the Far East, by Richard L. Wal- Institutions, a more comprehensive approach to dc- ker. The strategy of detente and peace: detente

7 2 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

as method or goal?, by Kurt L. London.--pt. 3. Nicholas S. Timasheff.--pt. 3. Theorizing about Coexistence and peace through partition?: The international politics: Power politics, by Alan problem of partition, by Jerzy Hauptmann. Fric- James. From balance to deterrence: a theoretical tions and frustrations of frontiers, by William R. analysis, by Arthur Lee Burns. Some problems of Kintner. The case of Korea, by Dae-Sook Suh. Le- international systems research, by Morton A. Kap- gal aspects of political partition, by Frederick lan. Bipolarity, multipolarity, and the future, W. Hess. Economic effects of the division of Ger- by Richard N. Rosecrance.--pt. 4. Applications of many, by Herman Gross. Peace through partition? international political theory: The logical by Gotthold Rhode. The impact of partition: a structure of a policy position, by Robert A. concluding comment, by Jerzy hauptmann.--pt. 4. Levine. Dare we take the social sciences serious- Detente and peace in contemporary perspective: A ly? by Kenneth E. Boulding. German contribution to the strategy of detente and peace, by Theodor Freiherr von and zu Guttenberg. Pulls together essays published during the past Perspective on the Atlantic alliance, by Henry M. 15 years that reflect a variety of approaches to Jackson. The dynamics of a just peace, by Per the study of international relations. Kissinger Haekkerup.--pt. 5. Summary: Detente and its re- and Hammond explore the "impact on a state's for- lation to peace, by Kurt Glaser. eign policy of the type of state that is making the policy or the competing pressures of domestic Aspects of the problem of achieveing temporary problems on scarce resources."McClelland studies detente and permanent peace in Europe. The most the interaction between states in times of crisis, obvious need is to terminate the present hostile and Timasheff develops a proposition concerning division of Europe into Eastern and Western blocs. the factors that lead to war. How interstate re- To this end, the West must make a major effort to lations evolve over time is explained by Burns, communicate the urgency of the peace and security and a number of models of the international system issue "to the new, young, somewhat critical and as at various evolutionary stages are presented by we are told thinking Marxists, as a primary inter- Kaplan. Rosecrance predicts future trends in the est of man, sufficient to override Marxist-Lenin- international system, Levine emphasizes the role ism as an ideology and a tactic." of theory in policymaking, and Boulding probes the application of social science to world problems. 5 Eckhardt, William. COMMUNIST VALUES. Journal of 7 human relations, v. 18, no. 1, 1970: 77e-788. Frankel, Joseph. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CONFLICT Hl.J55, v. 18 AND HARMONY. [London] Allen Lane [1969] 263 p. White's method of value-analysis was applied to JX1395F67 Communist writings in order to develop an opera- Contents.--Preface.--Introductory.--pt. 1. tional definition of this ideology. Economic wel- States and international systems: fare and peaceful coexistence were top Communist States, international systems, and conflict. values, with aggression and authoritarianism also Evolution of the international systems. Modern international sys- valued as means to these ends. Communist mili- tems.--pt. 2. State behaviour: Values, ideolo- tarism, like that of Conservatism and Liberalism, gies and objectives. Power, influence and capa- was defensive in nature as opposed to the offen- bilities. Instruments and techniques of foreign sive nature of Fascist militarism. Communist au- policy. Restraints upon state behaviour.--pt. 3. thoritarianism was directed toward democracy as International issues and prospects: opposed to Fascist denunciation of democracy. Major international issues. Communism was characterized by a high percent of Retrospect and prospects.--In- dex. welfare values as opposed to Fascist lack of concern for the welfare of others. Communism was de- Considers war and peace "as the extremes of the fined as an aggressive and authoritarian form of welfarism. Ways of operationalizing these con- two recurrent modes of social interaction, conflict and harmony." cepts were provided. Previous papers attempted to Frankel develops a model of define political ideologies such as Conservatism, international relations combining different theoretical approaches that stress power politics and Fascism, and Liberalism in terms of the relative peace and cooperation. frequencies of their basic values. In this paper Part 1 analyzes the con- the same attempt was made in relation to Commu- cept of the international system and discusses its major historical forms. Part 2 examines various nism. (Abstract supplied, modified) ideological and material factors that influence state behavior. Part 3 stresses the interaction 6 between states and between the international sys- Edwards, David V., comp. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL tem and individual states. The author concludes ANALYSIS: READINGS. New York, Holt, Rinehart and that "only a world government would be capable of Winston [1970] 452 p. illus. controlling man's destiny." JX1395.E49 Includes bibliographies. 8 Partial contents.--pt. 1. Elements of explana- Frankel, Joseph. NATIONAL INTEREST. New York, tion in international. politics: Domestic struc- Praeger [c1970] 173 p. (Key concepts in politi- ture and foreign policy, by Henry Kissinger. The cal science) JX1395.F72 political order and the burden of external rela- Bibliography: 163-165. tions, by Paul Y. Hammond.--pt. 2. From explanation to theorizing; crisis and war as examples: Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. The meaning of the The actual international crisis, by Charles A. concept:Meanings, history and usages. Analyti- McClelland. The movement from peace to war, by cal distinctions and theories. Theories of na- THE INTERNATIONAL POLITTA I.. ENVIRONMENT 3

tioral interest. Dimensions of national interest: of military officers with diplomatic status to the I. Dimensions of national irterest: II.--pt 2. most friendly or alliei nations wastes the offi- The formulation of national inteicst: The struc- cers' specialized training, and the information ture of decision raking. Images, motivations and they collect duplicates materials easily available values. Dichotomies and cnoicec.--pt. 3. liaison- through diplomatic channels. In all other coun- al interest in perspective: Towards an assesc- tries, the continued presence of the military at- ment.--Notes and references. -- index. taen4, with his historic duties and status, is in full sccoruance ith present circumstances, par- A behavioral examination of the major aopects of ticularly io visw of the ge,leral diplomatic con- the concept of national interest illustrated with frontation the Eastern blot. examples based on present-day usage.

11 9 Ingram, Derek. SINGAPORE 1971: THE COMONWEALTH IN Honeywell, J. A. REVOLUTION. ITS .-CTErTIALITIES THE SEVENTIES. Round table: the Commonwealth AND ITS DEGRADATIONS. Ethics, v.82., July 1970: quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 235-240. 251-265. BILIG, v. 80 AP4.R6, 1970

A prevalent mode of formulating revolutionary The choice of Singapore as the next meeting activity assumss that there is a single revolu- place of the heads of governments of the nations tionary goal, which can be approached by only one of the British Commonwealth recognizes the impor- avenue. T.e consequences of this monistic concept tance of Asia and perhaps presages the advent of are a polarized confrontation of revolutionaries Las Kuan Yew as the outstanding Commonwealt} per- and conservatives, solidification of the opposi- sonality. The proLlem wall be the position tion between revolutionary parties, and the over- takes by India, which in its wors,,ing relations emphasis of the single (-le to which each party is with England seems to have forgotten the other ng- committed.An alternative mode, based on the as- ,iona of the Commonwealth. Since the last convo- sumption that there may be a plurality of legiti- cation of this conference, much solid, unspectacu- mate revolutionary ends and a plurality of ap- lar l+ork has been done in many areas of interest proaches to them, has been developed by Hannah to the Cornonwea,ch nations. The record on such Arendt and Albert Camus. The general characteris- issues as Nigeria, Rhodesia, and immigration is tics of any pluralistic approach to revolutionary mixed. Perhaps no cs'..er international body did action include the distinction between creative better in working towarf peace in Biafra. As for activity and destructive violence, the recognition Rhadesii, it can be said that Commonwealth pres- 'hat any line of revolutionary action is only one sures have been most important in keeping Ian among many possible lines of constructive innova- Smith in isolation. Failure is most conspicuous tion, and the emergence of the desired transforra- in immigration matters, since none of the member tions of man and society within the pattern of countries is sufficiently international minded to revolutionary activity itself. This new way of submit the control of its domestic policies to reviewing the problems of revolutionary action other members of the Commonwealth.The proposed proviees the conceptual tools needed to locate the Commonwealth information program is desirable and sources of power available in a revolutionary sit- will doubtless prove as valuable in iss way as ti.e uatiou: the forces of production, strength of Commonwealth Technical Aid Scheme.What is ur- character, power of collective action, and spirit- gently needed it a bolder commitment to the Com- ual power.The indication that revolutionary in- monwealth from those at the top. novation turns on the conservation and augmenta- tion of these sources of power suggests that there are four general lines of revolutionary action oc- 12 curring simultaneously in any revoluticulary situa- Johnson, Frank J. THE END OF THE FAX AXERIANA. In tion. "74' the more human use of human powers, American Security Council- Washington resort, which is the goal and justification of revolution, July 13, 1910: 1-4. can be achieved only by activities which are them- Ser selves instances of their goal, than the justification of any -:evolutionary action is to be found Although the United States possessed atomic mo- in that activity itself." nopoly in 1945, it attempted to create a stable world oruer independent of U.S. strategi -operi- ority. Not only has the e.art to estab. h Fax 10 Americana failed, but the United States has lost Horn, Ruppert. I:ROUGHTS ON THE REORGANIZATION CF its strategic superiority and is beset by increas- THE MILITARY ATTACHg SERVICE] Geianken zur Reor- ingly serious domestic problems and a lack of will ganisation des M.litfirattach4diensles. Vehrkunde, to fulfill its international responsibilitie?. v. 19, Aug. 1970: 409-410. The United States cannot simply withdraw from the U3.W39,,, v.19 world, however, for nee- isolationism is a philosophy of extinction. The Communistsemzin deter- Studies on the reorganization of the foreign mined to achieve world domination by crushing the ssrvice tring into question the mi in of the U.S. will in a vise of Communist power and inter- military atta:h4 and the general relevance of his nal division. President Nixon's efforts to delay function in this age of "total communications." this process do not alter the fact "that the tide It is ass. -.t1 that this kind of military reprsen- of history has begun to run against us and than tstion abroad is rore important with friendly na- th. day of our world preeminence is over."Only tions than neutral cr hostile nations, but it is P few years ago, the United States could still ex- ne.:essary even in those instances. iwo alterna- ert t" influence by the threat of force, but its tives can to considered. The first, the dispatch anemic no longer take these thr:ats seriously.

(1 4 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Whatever the differences between the Pax Americana 15 and the Pax Romana, there is no certainty that the Maanov, Gerald S. CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOP- former will last even to the end of this century. MENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN EXPLORATION IN THE IN- TERNATIONAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARATIVE THEORY. [Athens] Ohio University, Center for In- 13 ternational Studies, 1969. 22 p. (Papers in in- Lorenz, Konrad. OF KILLING MEMBERS OF ONE'S OWN ternational studies. Southeast Asia series, SPECIES. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, no. 6) JF51.M43 v. 26, Oct. 1970: 2-5, 51-56. TK9145.A84, v. 26 Argues that Western policymakers' practice of monopolizing the right to define and claim the Natural selection often produces species traits status of " modernity" is a major source of con- that are useful in some respects, detrimental in flict between the so-called advanced or developed others. Such is the case with the aggressive in- countries of the West and the developing countries Western notions stinct in man. Intraspecific aggression has of Southeast Asia and elsewhere. played a crucial evolutionary role, but it now of modernity, which originate in currently popular threatens to destroy the species. In nature, in- theories of "modernization" and "political devel- traspecific aggression is regulated by instinctual opment" and which lay claim to objectivity or sci- inhibitory mechanisms--ritualized combat, submis- entific detachment, are merely value-loaded hy- sive gestures, and a general inhibition against potheses of strongly Western bias and doubtful Western lead- killing members of one's own species. The more validity in the non-Western world. powerful the animal, the more powerful the inhi- ers must recognize "that the goals of specific Asian countries will have to be set by their own bitory mechanisms. These mechanisms are present leaders, defined in their terms, and pursued in in man but their effectiveness has been greatly their fashion which may or may not turn out to be reduced by evolution, which in man seems to have favored aggressive over inhibitory instincts; by the same as that of the West." the invention of weapons, which has upset the natural balance between the inhibition against kill- 16 ing one's own kind and the capacity to kill; and Matthews, mobert O. DOMESTIC AND INTER-STATE CON - by the impersonal nature of modern warfare, which FT.ICT IN AFRICA. International journal, v. 25, may deactivate the inhibitions altogether.To re- summer 1970: 459-485. instate the inhibitory mechanisms, personal con- D839.15, v. 25 tacts between potential enemies ought to be intensified. Beyond this, ethology has no advice to Africa offers a ready field for testing the hy- offer, except that man must face the fact of his pothesized link between domestic instability and instincts. Moral goals cannot be achieved with- international conflict. The findings are nega- out insight into the causal structure of human be- tive: instability in the new nations of the con- havior. tinent, whether a consequence of internal attacks on territorial integrity or of challenges to legitimacy, cannot be linked to either intervention- ist or displacement types of conflict on any sig- 14 nificant scale. Exceptions to this finding do ex- Lovell, John P. FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE: ist, but they are few in relation to the great op- STRATEGY, ADAPTATION, DECISION MAKING. New York, portunities. In general it would seem that domes- Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1970] 370 p. tic instability has had a negative or suppressive JX1407.L78 impact on the foreign policy behavior, including Bibliography: p. 355-362. the conflictual behavior, of African states.The assumptions underlying the theory that nations Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. Foundations for tend to "displace" domestic disputes onto real or analysis: Foreign policy analysis. Perspectives imagined enemies abroad need to be reevaluated. for analysis.--pt. 2. Strategic perspectives: Playing the game of international politics.Amer- ican cold-war strategy and tactics.--pt. 3. The 17 perspective of historical dynamics: The nation- Megargee, Edwin I., and Jack E. Hokanson, comps. state and its world environment. Continuity and THE DYNAMICS OF AGGRESSION; INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND change in American foreign policy.--pt. 4. Deci- INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES. New York, Harper & Row sion-making perspectives: The process of making [1970] 271 p. BF575A3M38 1970 foreign-policy decisions. The structure of for- Bibliography: p. 249-260. eign-policy decision making. Decision-making perspectives.--pt. 5. Normative analysis of foreign Partial contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. Theoretical policy: The goals and means of foreign policy. formulations: On aggression, by Konrad Lorenz. The problem of reconciling demands for efficiency Why War?, by Sigmund Freud. Frustration and ag- with the maintenance of democratic values. -- Index. gression, by John Dollard and others. Reinforce- ment patterns and social behavior: aggression, by A study of foreign policy focusing on three ba- Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters.--pt. 2. sic perspectives: strategy, history, and deci- The dynamics of aggression in individuals.--pt. 3. sionmaking. In the first four parts Lovell con- Aggression in social groups: Isolation, power- structs an analytical framework intended to facil- lessness, and violence: a study of attitudes and itate the understanding and explanation of foreign participation in the Watts riot, by H. Edward policy, and in part 5 he applies this framework Ransford. The social psychology of violence, by for purposes of evaluation, prediction, and pre- Hans Toch. The precipitants and underlying condi- scription. tions of race riots, by Stanley Lieberson and Ar- in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 5

nold R. Silverman. Groups in harmony and t,sion, a better safeguard against war than the most pow- by Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif.--pt. 4. erful weapons. Pacifism would be transformed International aggression: Aggressive behavior from a moral ideal to a modern science. within polities, 1948-1962: a cross-national study. The Kennedy experiment, by Amitai itzioni. 20 Morgenthau, Hans J. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1965- Theoretical statements representing four major 1969. In American Academy of Political and So- schools of thought on the causes of aggression, cial Science, Philadelphia. Annals, v. 390, July together with the results of empirical investiga- 1970: 114-119. Hl.A4, v. 390 tions into the behavior of individuals, small groups, and nations. The theorists represented Surveys the literature on international rela- fall into two categories: those who attribute hu- tions from 1965 to 1969. Contributions to inter- man aggression to innate factors, and those who national relations theory and to the study of classify it as learned behavior. The empirical world politics, foreign policy, military policy, studies were chosen not only for their substance communism, the new nations, and international or- but also for the light they throw on methodology. ganization are cited. Overall, there was little change during the period covered: the discipline still has no common focus of intellectual inter- 18 est, nor a common method, and . . is, in conse- Mitchell, C. R. CIVIL STRIFE AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF quence, divided into a multiplicity of different EXTERNAL PARTIES. International studies quarter- approaches and subject matters that have only one ly, v. 14, June 1970: 166-194. quality in common: to understand, either for D839.B2, v. 14 theoretical or practical purposes, phenomena that transcend the boundaries of a particular nation." Examines the process by which external parties Perhaps the only significant trend was the contin- become involved in civil strife between contending uing decline in popularity of systems analysis, groups within another country, resulting in a mix- resulting from its failure to make a significant ing of levels of conflict in such a way as to con- contribution to worthwhile knowledge. fuse issues and goals. The framework of the examination is established by classifying some types 21 and levels of civil strife and the circumstances Neumann, Erich P. CHOW DO THE WEST GERMANS FEEL in which external parties are motivated to inter- ABOUT NATO ID 19692]Die Deutschen und die NATO. vene. This is done by investigating the factors CAllensbach] Verlag fdr Demoskopie [1969] 67 D. working within the disrupted state, the factors (Allensbacher Schriften, 10) within the intervening state, the factors associ- UA646.3.N47 ated with the cross linkages between the domestic Added t.p. in English, text in German and Eng- group and the external party, and the factors in lish. the international scene making for disruption and intervention. Mitchell concludes first that much Presents West German public opinion about NATO formal intervention takes place as the result of in the combined results of surveys conducted bean existing involvement of external socioeconomic, tween 1955 and 1969. The author places the re- religious, ethnic, or political groups in the sys- sults in their historical context and describes tem of the disrupted states. The domestic groups the mentality of a nation that became a NATO mem- participating in violent civil strife seek out ex- ber before it had its own military forces and was ternal allies among those who have already indi- forced into general compulsory military service cated their concern. The second broad hypothesis immediately after it had lost a condemnable war. is that the larger part of "inter-state conflict The German people generally accepted their new behaviour since the end of the Second World War role of safeguarding freedom with understanding has been intimately connected with situations of and loyalty, and the public has become better in- internal strife, in the sense that the internal formed over the years. From the survey results, conflict originally existed apart from any inter- both positive and negative sides of current opin- national connexions." ion on NATO can be assessed. Most people favor continued membership in the Atlantic alliance. Germany is aware of the risks endangering its ex- 19 istence and objects to the American presence in Mitscherlich, Alexander. [WAR AND HUNAN AGGRESSIVE- Europe less than other nations do. Nevertheless NESS] Krieg und menschliche Aggressivitat.Neue the population has some doubts regarding NATO and Rundschau, v. 81, no. 2, 1970: 217-232. questions its ability to provide adequate protec- AP30.H5, v. 81 tion in an emergency. Yet an alliance with the Western powers seems to be the only way to guaran- It has not yet been possible to avoid wars by tee the present form of state and society, and its transforming strong, aggressive, and destructive preservation is favored by the majority of the emotions into passionate activity toward construc- German people. A large section of the population tive goals or by ritualizing frustrations or find- opposes any weakening of the military forces of ing other outlets for them. War's horrors show the alliance; many wish to strengthen them; and the importance of understanding the spiritual only a minority considers them potentially inef- processes that allow aggression to mushroom when fective. an individual suffers from cultural frustrations. Understanding how to live with his aggression is 22 man's only chance for survival. Strengthening the Penrose, Ernest F., Peter Lyon, and Edith Penrose, questioning ego by education to such a degree that eds. NEW ORIENTATIONS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL it can stand up against civilization's propaganda RELATIONS. [London] Cass, 1970. 136 p. and be strong enough to decide for itself would be D843.P473 11 6 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Contents.--Introduction.--Notes on contributors. series is that peace is an intrapolitical, intra- --The great globe itself: continuity and change, societal, and quasi-anthropological problem that by Peter Lyon.--Britain's place in the changing cannot be studied from the viewpoint of the polit- structure of international relations, by E. F. ical scientist alone. The announced object of the Penrose.--Vietnam: the real issues, by Jacques series is to make a beginning on a theory of peace Decornoy.--International economic relations and appropriate to our times. This theory is charac- the large international firm, by Edith Penrose. terized as recognizing existing realities but also as realizing the possibility of changing these re- First of a series "devoted to critical essays on alities in the light of the radical humanism mani- international relations."Lyon reviews the ori- fested today by student unrest and the opposition gins of the present global-states system, identi- of the intellectuals. The realists generally seek fies the more important elements of continuity and to assure and maintain peace through applying the change in this system, and discusses some of the classic means of political power to the new condi- basic problems posed by it. Ernest Penrose exam- tions of the atomic age. The utopians condemn the ines British foreign policy since World War II, realists for seeking a negative peace, a more or focusing on Britain's relations with the superpow- less casual absence of war, and leaving untouched ers on one hand and the Third World on the other. the causes of war. They think a positive peace He concludes that "Britain still has a supremely attainable only through radical, even forced, important role to play in the world as a whole, change of the prevailing power structure.Herbert but that only after a far-reaching critique and Marcuse condemns modern society for making aggres- reorientation of her international policies can sion socially useful, so that it is always avail- she play that role."Decornoy assesses the polit- able for mobilization in the event of war. Hans ical significance of U.S. intervention in what he Speier answers that the goal of politics must be regards as basically a civil war. In Edith Pen- to widen the areas of peace without following the rose's essay, she analyzes, "with particular ref- will-of-the-wisp of eternal peace, and that this erence to the underdeveloped countries, the nature goal can be achieved by correcting injustices of some of the political and economic problems without the use of force. that bedevil the relationship between an international firm and the countries in which it operates." 24 Schmitt, Hans A. EUROPEAN UNION: FROM HITLER TO DE 23 GAULLE. New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. Salzburger Humanismusgesprgch, 4th, 1968. [PEACE IN C1969] 159 p. (An Anvil original, 103) THE NUCLEAR AGE; A CONTROVERSY BETWEEN REALISTS D1060.R316 AND UTOPIANS]Der Friede in nuklearen Zeitalter. Bibliography: p. 155-158 Eine Kontroverse zwischen Realisten u. Utopisten. 4. Salzburger Humanismusgesprgch. Mit Beitr. von Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. European union: Hans J. Morgenthau Cu.a.] hrsg. von Oskar Schatz from Hitler to de Gaulle: The historic roots of [Munchen] Manz C1970] 278 p. the European community. Hitler unites Europe. JC1952.53526 1968 Toward a European union in freedom--the postwar Sponsored by Oesterreichischer Rundfunk. years. First breakthrough--the Schuman plan. The New Contents.--Editor's foreword.--pt. 1. Reports: European Coal and Steel Community at work. Theory and strategy of peace, by Erich Fromm. battles for European union. Charles de Gaulle- - Peace in the nuclear age, by Hans J. Morgenthau. destroyer of Western unity.--pt. 2. Documents.- - The future of war, by Bert R8ling. The limited Index. peace, by Hans Speier. Peace as a form of social life, by Herbert Marcuse. Force against peace, by History of the movement for European union, fo- Ernst Fischer. The peace problem in East-West cusing on the period since the early 1930's. conflict, by Christian Graf von Krockow. Peace Schmitt recounts Hitler's attempt to unite Europe through development: a new view of peace in mod- by force, examines the postwar beginnings of eco- ern Catholicism, by Alexander Schwan. Peace nomic and political cooperation, and assesses the through political revolution: on the controversy prospects for European federation as of the late "theology of revolution" versus technocracy, by 1960's. Hans-Eckehard Bahr. The rights of men and the world peace order; a juristic aspect of the theory and strategy of peace, by Rene Marcie. Manipulat- ed peace propaganda and the true peace: on the 25 psychopathology of force, by Friedrich J. Hacker. Scott, J. P. BIOLOGY ADD HUMAN AGGRESSION. Ameri- Collective aggressiveness and mass complexes, by can journal of orthopsychiatry, v. 40, July 1970: Gaston Bouthoul. Goals and missions of peace re- 568 -576. RA790.A1A5, v. 40 search, by Nicolaus Sombart. The development processes of science and technology and their social and spiritual consequences, by Arnold Buch- Agonistic behavior is defined as a system of related behavior patterns having the common function holz. Anticipation of peace, by Robert Jungk.-- of adaptation to situations of conflict between pt. 2. Main points of discussion: Peace as a members of the same species. challenge. "Realists" versus "Utopians."Peace It is highly probable that biological bases for this kind of behav- through social changes. Peace and democracy. ior do exist for the various species. Possibilities and limits of peace research.--Con- It is equally probable, however, that because of man's elusion, by Gottfried-Karl Kindermann. unique genetic composition no direct analogies Talks describing the sociological dimensions of from any other species to man are justified. (Ab- peace. The assumption common to the talks in this stract supplied)

19 _ 7 THE INTERNATIONALPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Chi- nist Chinese action wasto probe Nationalist intentions while making preemp- nese and American 26 RELATIONS AMONG against the Nationalist- Sen, Chanakya. THE FULCRUM OF ASIA; tive moves and reprisals THE USSR. New York, Sigel concludes that therational- CHINA, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND held islands. this 383 p. policy model would notbe likely to disclose Pegasus C1970] its DS35.S385 pattern by inferringChina's intentions from inferring America's inten- "Prepared under the auspicesof the Research In- actions without also and the East Asian have perceived them. "The stitute on Communist Affairs tions as Peking might conclusions about Chinese University." relationships between Institute, Columbia Straits crises and the Includes bibliographicalreferences. intentions in the Formosa assumptions and methodologyof the 'rational poli- relations in South Asia, need to apply thesociology Examines international cy' model suggest the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the type of analysis. with emphasis on the of knowledge" to this "the most mys- 1960's. The author concludes that tifying drama that isbeing played on the world modernization of the tradi- stage is the drama of 29 INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND Africa, and Latin Ameri- Siverson, Randolph M. tional societies of Asia, THE CASE OF THE SUEZ CRI- the forces of mod- PERCEPTIONS OF INJURY: ca."No one knows exactly how v. 14, June Asian societies, but SIS. International studies quarterly, ernization will affect the D839.B2, v. 14 China, India, and Pakis- the foreign policies of 1970: 157-165. tan, which are enteringthe most difficult and of injury by the modernization, will almost cer- Investigates the perception complex phase of of the nations in- foreign policy decisionmakers tainly be as unstable astheir internal politics, crisis, using as an ex- of uncertain change in volved in an international especially during a period Egypt-Israel conflict over ample the 1956-1957 the global power system. Egyptian and Israeli Suez. Siverson compares the perceptions of injury withthose established for events leading to the out- the participants in the 27 Egyptian and Israe- Epstein, and Stuart P. Tay- break of the First WorldWar. Shortell, James, Seymour injury directed at theUnit- INSTIGATION TO AGGRESSION AS AFUNCTION OF li perceptions of the lor, CAPACITY FOR MASSIVE RE- mediating third party arealso DEGREE OF DEFEAT AND THE ed Nations as the 38, Sept. in the Suez Journal of personality, v. analyzed. Unlike the 1914 situation, TALIATION. injury were still rising BF1.J66, v. 38 crisis perceptions of 1970: 313-328. between Egypt and Israel was "References": p. 327-328. when actual violence previous find- decreasing. The research confirms experiment to test the tend to perceive their Reports the results of an ings that decisionmakers their allies as less frustration-aggression hypothesis anddetermine nations as highly injured, covert aggression of a enemies as operatingin a favorable the effect on overt and so, and their subject's belief that he andother participants in international environment. have "among their repertoire a conflict situation that Cis] far more dev- of punishing responses one The findings sug- 30 astating than all theothers." BOUNDARY CONCEPTS ANDPRACTICES strictly defined--i.e., as Solomon, Robert L. gest that "frustration, World politics, v. 23,Oct. . . --is IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. the thwarting of goal-directedactivity . D839W57, v. 23 inconsequential variable incompari- 1970: 1-23. a relatively attitudes as a source ofin- son to learned social Southeast Asian approaches They also indicate that Analyzes Western and stigation to aggression." through historical examples massive retaliation pro- to territorial issues "the capacity for mutual influence of the localenvi- aggression, but only at the that demonstrate the and interaction of two duces a reduction in and ronment on the development in tension, suspicion, price of an increase distinct ways of thinkingabout boundaries, terri- sensitivity to temporarydefeats." Solomon describes as unre- tory, and sovereignty. gov- alistic the expectationthat Southeast Asian complete control of popu- ernments should attempt the 28 frontier areas in view of MODEL AND THE lation movements in and the re- Sigel, Leon V. THE 'RATIONAL POLICY' absence of Westernboundary concepts International studies The examples FORMOSA STRAITS CRISES. quired administrativecapabilities. quarterly, v. 14, June 1970:121-156. policy is a complicatedset of D839.B2, v. 14 show that boundary ele- interrelated, but notnecessarily consistent, be analyzed in its prop- actions are the conse- ments, each of which most "In some cases, it would be wrongto Tests the assumption that er context. quences of a rational(value-maximizing) decision of boundary policy as if 'she' were a uni- regard specific elements made by the nation-state "as policy in General." examination of Communist representative of national tary actor" through an Chinese actions during theFormosa Strait crises This "rational poli- of 1954-55, 1958, and1962. 31 with the "organi- THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT. cy" model is briefly contrasted Swingle, Paul G., comp. 305 p. (Social zational processes" and"bureaucratic politics" New York, Academic Press,1970. that actions may origi- models, with the reminder psychology series) BF637.N4S94 decisions but through nate not in value-maximizing light of organizational routines andintragovernmental bar- Contents.--Conflict resolution in the is applied to The rational-policy model game theory andbeyond, by Anatol Rapoport.--De- gaining. of toughness, by Otto- infer the intentionsmotivating Peking's actions terminants and consequences outcomes of the crises by means and power, by Bertram H. and to explain the mar J. Bartos.--Conflict The common pattern ofCommu- of these intentions. 13 8 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Raven and Arie W. Kruglanski.--Social power in in- and applied to additional problems (e.g., change terpersonal negotiations, by Charles L. Cruder.-- and stability) to sharpen its usefulness in the Threats and promises, by James T. Tedeschi.--The partial prediction of national behavior. The con- effects of personality in cooperation and concluding section deals with problems amenable to flict, by Kenneth W. Terhune.--Dangerous games, further research. (Abstract supplied) by Paul G. Swingle.--Deterrence games:from academic casebook to military codebook, by Irving Louis Horowitz. 34 Terhgne, Kenneth W., and Joseph M. Firestone. GLO- Offers "an oblique slice through the conflict BAL WAR, LIMITED WAR AND PEACE: HYPOTHESES FROM literature, the major emphasis being on psycholog- THREE EXPERIMENTAL WORLDS. International studies ical gaming and the structure of conflict." quarterly, v. 14, June 1970: 195-218. Swingle calls attention to the newness of conflict D839B2, v. 14 study as an academic discipline. He notes the dangerous pressures placed upon investigators to Presents the results of an intergroup gamingex- extend their findings prematurely from the labora- periment with :he Princeton International Game in tory to the real world and also the criticism that terms of the relevance of these results to politi- formalized treatments of the type used in gaming cal systems theory. The characteristics of three oversimplify and thereby misrepresent actual con- experimental worlds that were initially constitut- flict situations. He is hopeful, nevertheless, ed in similar ways but that develop into rather that "a discursive nomenclature for describing the distinct political types are summarized. The structural dimensions in bargaining situations" types are designated as global war, limited war, and a theory of interpersonal conflict will soon and peace. After a comparison of the behavioral be developed. aspects of these three worlds, the results are re- cast into hypotheses about international political systems. Terhune and Firestone conclude that the 32 major hypotheses generated confirm hypotheses al- SYNERGY: SOME NOTES ON RUTH BENEDICT. Selected by ready extant in international relations theory. Abraham H. Maslow and John J. Honigmann.With an The role of hostility and mistrust is clarified by introduction by Margaret Mead.American anthro- the hypothesis that these psychological variables pologist, v. 72, Apr. 1970: 320-333. are important not as initial causes but as con- GN1.A5, v. 72 tributing factors in conflict escalation. Game theory has demonstrated its special value through Excerpts from 1941 lectures by Ruth Benedict its ability to suggest new ways of concretizing call attention to the correlation between social abstract hypotheses, specifically, hypothesesper- structure and character structure, especially ag- taining to goal configurations as an initialcause gressiveness. Social orders characterized by high of peace or conflict processes. or low synergy, by a syphon or a funnel system of economic distribution, are compared for their dif- 35 ferent capacities to support or humiliate the in- Thiess, Frank. dividual, render him secure or anxious, or to min- EAST AND WEST - -CAN THEY EVER AGREE? Central Europe journal, v. 18, July/Aug. 1970: imize or maximize aggression. Religion, an insti- 235-242. tution in which people apotheosize the cooperation DB200.7.S74, v. 18 or aggression their cultural life arouses, differs History demonstrates that the difference between societies with high and low synergy. (Ab- between stract supplied) East and West is not merely the temporary product of present political complications but the culmination of a multiplicity of historical encounters 33 based on essentially differing concepts of public law and human rights. Terhune, Kenneth W. FROM NATIONAL CHARACTER TO NA- By adopting the Justinian corpus juris the new states of the West assumed TIONAL BEHAVIOR: A REFORMULATION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 14, June 1970: 203-263. the responsibility for ensuring that Christian teaching and legal thought were in agreement. illus. JX1901.J6, v. 14 While the eastern church flourished under the di- National character is rarely considered in theo- rect protection of the nation-state, it was unable ries of international behavior. to influence the juridicial thinking of the royal This monograph despots. takes a new look at the subject to Russia's present alienation from the see if, despite West, for which it is itself not completely the various objections, it may still be useful for re- understanding and predicting national behavior. sponsible, is a reversion to its historical position as a Mongol state. Topics reviewed include the background of national There can be no agreement with the East in character study; concepts of national character; he absence of a common morality. its measurement; and an evaluation of thecon- struct. Core personality, social personality, and 36 "mentality in national products" are discussed as VIOLEME--WORLDWIDE PROBLEM. U.S. news & world re- components. A central problem in reformulating port, v. 69, Sept. 28, 1970: 24-26. the concept of national character is to takeprop- JK1.U65, v. 69 er account of cross-national homogeneity (i.e., not every nation may have a unique character)and Examines the problem of mounting political ter- of international heterogeneity (i.e., themasses rorism in North and South America, Western Europe, and elites of a given nation may display different and Asia. As other expedients fail, dissidents character "profiles"). Examples from the existing turn increasingly to violence, augmenting the tra- literature are provided throughout. In the second ditional terrorist devices of bombing and arson half of the monograph a reformulation is suggested with the newer techniques of diplomatic kidnap-

1 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 9

pings and airliner hijackings. Communism and al- ethnic minorities on Thailand's frontiers. A Jap- lied underground movements assist the terrorists anese presence, in the form of commercial activi- with organizational and technical expertise and ty, at the very least, is growing rapidly--in help to speed the disease across international Thailand and Indonesia, particularly--and will boundaries. grow further. The Chinese presence is more a problem for the eighties than for the seventies, except in countries with Chinese minorities, where 37 any'eties persist and may increase. The Soviet Whetten, Lawrence L. RECENT CHANGES IN EAST EUROPE- pt -sence is also widely expected to grow, both AN APPROACHES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY. World today, militarily and in terms of economic activity over v. 26, July 1970: 277-288. the decade. (Abstract supplied) D410.W63, v. 26

Recent years have witnessed a variety of Commu- 39 nist proposals for the establishment of a European Zbinden, Hans. [WHITHER EUROPE? SPIRITUAL AND PO- collective securitj system. Realizing that their LITICAL PREREQUISITES FOR A VIABLE EUROPEAN COMMU- own freedom of action is dependent upon the NITY] Europa wohin? Geistige and politische Vor- strengthening of East-West detente, the smaller aussetzungen einer lebensfahigen europaischen Ge- Communist regimes--most notably, Rumania--have meinschaft. Bern, Winchen, Francke [1969] 79 p. been particularly active on this question. Commu- D1060.Z34 1969 nist proposals have often lacked consistency, and "Anmerkungen" (bibliographical): p. 73-78. over the years there has been a noticeable evolution in policy. For one thing, the tendency to Contents.--Preface.--From cosmopolitanism back put undue stress on the complexity of the security to nationalism.--Constructive forces in the forma- problem or, conversely, to invoke panaceas, has tion of Europe.--From the cultural to the politi- given way to practical concern with the more con- cal community.--Inducements to political integra- crete aspects of an eventual security conference. tion: German-French understanding as the focus For another, the earlier dogmatic insistence on for crystallization.--The European Economic Commu- the dissolution of military blocs has been nity.--Centralized or federalized Europe?--Condi- dropped, as have the polemics against the United tions of political unification.--Impulse of the States, West Germany, and NATO. The East also young.--And East Europe? The significance of the seems more willing to acknowledge the influence of Slavic world for Europe. -- Community of practical neutrals, has relegated military disengagement to help.--Notes. a lesser place in its security schemes, and now puts more stress on the possibilities of nonmili- Describes the spiritual forces revealed in Euro- tary cooperation. The reasons for these shifts pean history that will permit future European uni- are complex, but, in general, competing national ty in the face of such countervailing forces as priorities and unforeseen developments abroad are nationalism. Zbinden thinks that the integration responsible. So far the West has resisted propos- of Eastern Europe is necessary if Europe is to es- als for multilateral discussion. Clearly the So- cape the desiccating effects of the American tech- viet aim in all this is to consolidate and extend nological spirit. The unification of Europe is its own political position in Europe. The West, part of a larger ideal--the creation of that com- however, is not likely to make political conces- munity of nations that the United Nations merely sions in East Europe except in return for joint "caricatures." Great Power force reductions. Whether a formula for such an exchange can be worked out depends on the outcome of negotiations on the recognition of East Germany and status of Berlin. FOREIGN POLICIES

40 38 Badgley, John H. THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL PRESENCE Wriggins, W. Howard. THE PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN ASIA IN ASIA. InAmerican Academy of Political and OF OUTSIDE POWERS. In American Academy of Polit- Social Science, Philadelphia. A new American pos- ical and Social Science, Philadelphia. A new ture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its An- American posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. nals, v. 390, July 1970) p. 38-47. (Its Annals, v. 390, July 1970) p. 48-62. fil.A4, v. 390 M1.A4, v. 390 The system of states that has evolved since In considering the presence of outside powers in World War II has not resolved the basic political South and Southeast Asia, this discussior covers a problems facing Asia. Furthermore, American ef- spectrum of phenomena included in the often-used forts to sustain, and hopefully stabilize, the but highly ambiguous concept of "presence." It non-Communist regimes have entangled the United examines the major different forms of outside States unnecessarily in the domestic political "presence" in Pakistan, India, Burma, Thailand, processes of several Asian countries. Resurgent Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It then forces of ethnic and local identity increasingly notes the shifting preponderant foreign presence challenge the authority of central governments and in Pakistan, the diminishing American presence in bring into question the efficacy of anti-plural- both Pakistan and India, the rising Soviet mili- ist, nationalistic schemes. The foreseeable fu- tary assistance presence in India, and the lack of ture appears laden with struggles by these classic foreign presence in Burma. There is an expecta- forces, which dominated pre-colonial Asia and now tion that the American presence in Thailand will underlie ideological and nationalist conflicts. decline and growing anxiety there about likely Regional competition between traditional ethnic Vietnam presence in the future, particularly among enemies, as well as between larger Asian powers,

a r 10 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

is reasserting itself, calling into question the and their political representatives are to regain efforts by the superpowers, and the United Na- control over U.S. foreign policy. Au odd coalitions, to play dominant roles in the settlement of tion of dovish liberals and legalist conservatives these conflicts. More certain is a constant sec- has suggested the right approach to this problem ondary role by the United States, due to its tech- by challenging the basic assumptions of the pre- nological superiority, economic abundance, and vailing doctrine of liberal internationalism. The cultural vigor. The kind of American presence in traditional liberal argument in favor of a strong Asia over the next two decades will be signifi- executive--the necessity for expertise and bipar- cantly modified. While military assistance may, tisanship in the conduct of crisis diplothacy-- in many cases, continue, termination of alliances rests on a deep-seated fear of congressional and on mainland Asia may eventually follow the with- popular opposition to an active U.S. role in world drawal from Vietnam. The ma,lor motive for the affairs. The failure of this elitist outlook has American desire to disengage flows from domestic made apparent the need for greater control over pressures. However, the quest for relaxation of the uses of destructive technology and for the tension with China will help account for the new conversion of expertise from executive prerogative American tolerance of political change in Asia. to public resource. The liberals' fascination (Abstract supplied) with executive power led them to equate strength with military involvement and peace with compromise. Congress may be something of an anomaly, 41 but as an open democratic assembly it remains the Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [RENUNCIATION OF FORCE AND THE bane of the managerial, manipulative mentality RENUNCIATION OF GOALS]Gewalt-Verzicht and Ziel- characteristic of liberal internationalism and of- Verzicht. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, July 1970: 389- fers the best hope for a sane foreign policy. Yet 392. D839A885, v. 21 a radical redirection of U.S. foreign policy cannot be effected by imposing legal limitations on Argues that the Soviet purpose in accepting a presidential power, since the executive can ignore renunciation-of-force agreement i to compel West these limitations if he so chooses."If the Con- Germany to abandon its national goals and accept gress is to reclaim its war-making authority, it the status quo. Bechtoldt calls for Soviet renun- must seek to control the war-making machinery and ciation of the enemy-state clause of the United to slow down the process of decision making. The Nations Charter and for security guarantees for challenge then is to develop procedures which in- West Berlin. A formal renunciation of force does sinuate Congress deep into the very fabric of pol- not in itself cause tensions to disappear nor in icy making and, in a sense, force it to accept its any sense relieve West Germany of the threat of constitutional mandate. To do this requires mak- Soviet violence. ing expert opinion a public resource and information a public commodity." 42 Berghes, Ingeborg von. CSPAIN ON THE WAY TO EUROPE] 44 Spanien auf dem Weg nach Europa. Aussenpolitik, Campbell, Alexander. UNBIND YOUR SONS; THE CAPTIVI- v. 21, June 1970: 376-383. TY OF AMERICA IN ASIA. New York, Liveright C1970] D839.A885, v. 21 366 p. maps. DS35.C33

The personnel of the new Spanish cabinet and its Contents.--Asian fetters.--Asia from West to agenda may suggest the shape of Spain's non-Franco East: the bird's eye view.--West Asia: Suez Ca- future. The 1957 embarkation on the aperture pol- nal to Persian Gulf.--Central Asia: Baghdad to icy, the political and economic opening up, and Kashmir.--South Asia: Everest to Irrawaddy.- - the subsequent decisions to plan a 6 percert annu- Southeast Asia: Bangkok to Hanoi.--The China Sea: al rate of increase in the gross national product Malacca to Manila.--Two Chinese islands.--China: marked the beginning of a transition from an agri- red clay?--The two Koreas.--Japan and Okinawa.- - cultural into an industrial state. The liberaliza- People not dominoes.--Index. tion of Spain's economy may be extended to include eventual participation in the European Common Mar- Surveys political and economic developments in ket. The understanding with the Americans over Asia and reviews U.S. Asian policy since World War military bases suggests that although immediate II. Campbell finds the dominant issues for most entry into NATO is not probable, bilateral trea- Asian countries to be not communism or U.S. impe- ties with individual members of the Atlantic Alli- rialism but nationalism and modernization. He ar- ance might effectively bring Spain into Western gues that the U.S. obsession with "international Europe. An agreement with England over Gibraltar communism," which was first articulated in the would be part of the price paid for admission into Truman Doctrine of 1947, has led to a futile but NATO. The exchange of consular personnel with the increasing military involvement in Asian affairs. East bloc and the rumors of approval of Soviet use The United States should drastically reduce its of the strategic island of El Albar6n probably can military commitments in Asia, an area destined to be interpreted as Spain's effort to maintain a bar- experience localized wars and revolutions at least gaining position. to the end of this century regardless of U.S. policy, and concentrate instead on reducing the eco- 43 nomic gap between developed and undeveloped countries. Bresler, Robert J. ILLUSIONS OF CONTROL: THE WAR- MAKING MACHINERY. Nation, v. 211, Aug. 17, 1970: 105-109. AP2.N2, v. 211 45 CHALLENGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA [editorial]United Presidential war-making powers must be disman- Asia, v. 22, May/June 1970: i-ii. tled, not merely limited, if the American people DS1.U55, v. 22

16_ THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 11

The spread of communism in Southeast Asia is a would give the Soviet Union greater leverage in serious challenge that India cannot ignore.While dealing with Eastern Europe, while a failure to "Mao's technique of guerilla fighting is becoming negotiate could produce new tensions in European more and more popular in more and more countries relations. Despite the obstacles, "all parties with more and more discontented people," India is may still find that the best way to deal with Eu- alienating nonalined and alined countries alike by ropean security and arms control problems is its policies of noncommitment and hesitation. through an all-European arrangement with some form This challenge is reinforced by China's growing of super-Power participation." nuclear capability, which the superpowers have failed to counteract. In addition to the growing 47 challenge of Mao's thoughts, the Soviet Union and the United States are competing in a dangerous Clissold, Stephen, COMP. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LAT- game to fill the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean IN AMERICA, 1918-1968; A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY.Lon- left by Great Britain's withdrawal from East of don, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. xx, Suez. India's pleas to keep the area free are pa- 313 P. JX1555.Z7L36 thetic in view of its total incapacity to influ- "Issued under the auspices of the Royal Insti- ence the superpowers. Furl. -r, India's small Navy tute of International Affairs." leaves its vast coastline vulnerable to Pakistani Includes bibliographical references. and Chinese naval action. To meet the Communist challenge India must create a strong central gov- Contains approximately 200 Soviet and Latin ernment that will unify the people and pursue pro- American documents pertaining to the Soviet Un- gressive internal and external policies. ion's relations with Latin America in general as well as with individual Latin American countries, particularly Cuba. Although most of the documents 46 apply to post-World War II relations, about one- Clemens, Walter C. THE SOVIET WORLD FACES WEST: fourth relate to the Comintern period and a few J945 -1970. International affairs (London) v. 46, concern Tsarist contacts. These relationships are July 1970: 475-489. briefly summarized and analyzed in the introduc- JX1.153, v. 46 tion.

The prospects of achieving a European settlement 48 compatible with the interests of peace and the se- Cockram, Gail-Maryse. VORSTER'S FOREIGN POLICY. curity of the involved powers depend upon Soviet Pretoria, Academica, 1970. 222 p. illus. policy in Europe and the normalization of rela- DT779.7.C55 tions between West and East Germany. Soviet poli- Appeared originally as a series of articles in cy is molded by the desire to retain hcgemony in Background. Ser Eastern Europe, contain West German political and economic pressures on the Soviet satellites, and Contents.--Foreword.--Introduction.--South Afri- maintain policy options vis-a-vis Western Europe ca, South-West Africa, and the United Nations.- - while seeking strategic arms limitation agreements South Africa and Israel.--The defence of the Cape with the United States. Although the Soviet Union Sea Route.--South Africa and Latin America.--Immi- recently has expressed a more flexible European gration.--South Africa and gold.--The manufacture policy, based largely on the increased ciodibility of weapons by South Africa.--South Africa and the of its strategic deterrent, it maintains its right neighbouring states.--South Africa and Malawi--The to intervene in Germany to enforce the Potsdam devil's disciple.--Terrorists--the racehorses of principles, refuses to include its medium- and in- the apocalypse.--South Africa and Portugal.--South termediate-range ballistic missiles among the Africa and Rhodesia.--South Africa and the United strategic weapons covered by the strategic arms States of America.--Unfair play--the Olympics.- - limitations talks (SALT), and threatens, by way of Conclusion.-- Notes. the Brezhnev doctrine, renewed military action in Eastern Europe. East Germany, which is the main Examines South Africa's foreign policy, empha- opponent of normalizing relations with West Ger- sizing its relations with its African neighbors, many, "might welcome an all-European security con- Portugal, and the United States. Great Britain's ference, since this would bring them at least withdrawal from East of Suez, particularly its quasi-recognition without the need to make any abandonment of the Simonstown naval base, has concessions to West German influence."The Feder- placed on South Africa the major responsibility al Republic, on the other hand, is seeking to re- for defending the Cape route. Britain has refused move the Oder-Neisse question as an obstacle to to supply the Republic with the necessary arms, improved relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, ships, and aircraft, seriously harming the rela- ensure that the nonproliferation treaty does not tions between the two countries. restrict its commercial opportunities, and secure Soviet and East European recognition of West Ber- lin's ties with West Germany. So far Bonn has 49 achieved considerable rapport with Moscow and War- Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington, D.C. saw but not with Pankow. Whether Russia and its NATIONAL DIPLOMACY, 1965-1970. Washington, 1970. allies seek to maintain the status quo or explore 156 p. E855.C65 the chances for East-West interdepencence, the So- viet Union will continue to assert its control Contents.--Introduction.--Pt. 1. Nixon adminis- over its satellites, deny West German access to tration, 1969-1970: Policy for the 1970's. Re- nuclear weapons, and attempt to curb the arms race view of 1969. Military commitments. Arms sales. with the United States. The SALT talks will play Laos policy. Cambodia. Communist China rela- a large role in Moscow's relations with Eastern tions. Middle East policy. Vietnam.--Pt. 2. Europe and West Germany: a negotiated freeze Johnson administration, 1965-1968: Summary. 1965 1'7 I2 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

chronology. 1966 chronology. 1967 chronology. Essays on the theory and practice of nonvio- 1968 chronology.--Appendix: Text of Nixon state- lence, U.S. foreign policy since World War II, the ments. Index to statement on the 1970's. Vietnam War, and the American peace movement, written during the period 1943-1970. Dellinger A review of U.S. foreign policy under the John- focuses on the problems encountered in attempts to son and Nixon administrations. A major theme is bring about social change by peaceful means, which that international politics and U.S. foreign poli- he believes the United States has compounded by cy have entered a period of transition, the final pursuing counterrevolutionary foreign and domestic outcome of which is still very much in doubt. The policies. Nixon administration apparently accepts most of the traditional postulates of U.S. foreign policy, particularly those relating to U.S. leadership of the free world. At the same time, it seems to en- 52 visage a more passive role for the United States Domes, Jiirgen. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT'S REPERCUS- than that assumed in recent years, the emphasis SIONS IN EUROPE. Central Europe journal, v. 18, now being on caution and a "low profile," charac- Sept. 1970: 307-309. teristics that tend to come to the fore in the DB200.7.S74, v. 18 policy of major powers in periods of transition. On balance, although indications are that the ad- Open warfare between Moscow and Peking is not ministration has "rejected an expansionist and ag- likely in the near future, despite the precarious- gressive role for America," no definite foreign ness of the existing balance of terror. The Sovi- policy has yet emerged. et Union fears being drowned in a gigantic Vietnam despite its overwhelming air and technical superiority, while Peking cannot be confident of the 50 loyalty of the regional military commanders. How- THE VANITY OF POWER; AMERICAN ISO- Cooper, John M. ever, the cleavage between the two Communist pow- LATIONISM AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914-1917. ers explains the urgency of Moscow's effort to en- Westport, Conn., Greenwood Pub. Co. [1969] sure its Western frontiers, even at the price of (Contributions in American history, no. 3) 271 p. accommodation with the United States. Overextend- E766.C6 ed in the Middle East and disturbed by the nation- Includes bibliographical references. alism of its East European allies, the Soviets Contents.--Introduction.--Prelude to an isola- will avoid open war in Europe. In Asia the inter- tionist position.--Formulation of isolationist ests of both superpowers increasingly converge on doctrines.--Support for isolationist policies.- - the containment of Communist China. West German Beginnings of an isolationist coalition.--Coales- efforts to play Peking against Moscow would injure cence of the isolationist position.--Appendix: German economic interests in non-Communist Asia Statistical descriptions of congressional voting and revive memories of the Berlin-Tokyo axis. on preparedness and foreign policy, 1915- 1917. -- West Germany must work for change through meaning- Bibliographical essay.--Index. ful negotiation with both superpowers and with the East European countries. What is required today "Examines the emergence of isolationism as a is the patience to wait until the conditions for distinct political position in the United States such negotiations mature. during the months leading to American intervention in the First World War."Cooper distinguish- es two basic groups of isolationists: idealists, who favored isolationism because they believed 53 this was the best way to further American ideals End, Heinrich. [RENOVATION OF DIPLOMACY.THE FOR- for peace, freedom, and justice; and ultranation- EIGN SERVICE OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC, FOS- alists, who contended that isolationism was in the SIL OR INSTRUMENT ?] Erneuerung der Diplomatie. interests of American power, prestige, and securi- Der Auswgrtige Dienst der Bundespolitik Deutsch- ty. The coalescence of these two groups, which in land, Fossil oder Instrument? [Neuwied] Luchter- many respects were more disparate than isolation- hand [1969] 185 p. (Soziologische Essays) ists and internationals, formed the core of the JX1796.A4E5 pre-war isolationist bloc. Idealists dominated Bibliographical references included in "Anmer- this isolationist coalition prior to World War I kungen": p. 125-152. and during the 1920's and 1930's, just as they later were dominant among those favoring a strong Contents.--Introduction.--Facts.--Definitions internationalist foreign policy. Critics of the and goals of foreign policy.--The duties of the Vietnam War have revived some isolationist argu- foreign service.--"Specialness" as a structural ments, but it is misleading to describe them as characteristic of the foreign service.--Sociologi- isolationists, since virtually no one advocates cal aspects of the foreign service.--"Role pres- complete U.S. withdrawal from all nonhemispheric sure" or the psychological problems of the foreign commitments. service.--Ideological aspects of the foreign service.--Reform.--Appendixes. 51 Dellinger, Dave. REVOLUTIONARY NONVIOLENCE: ES- Presented as a contribution to current discus- SAYS. Indianapolis, Botts-Merrill [1970] xxiii, sion of possible reform of the West German foreign 390 p. E840.D4 service. The description of the tasks and methods of diplomacy is followed by a longer discussion of Contents.--Introduction.--World War II.- -The war the concept held by foreign service personnel of against Vietnam.--Cuba and China.--Violence, non- their own role within society. The author does violence, and the movement.--The Chicago conven- not touch upon possible structural or organization tion and after. reform. 1R THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 13

stand up?--The cold war in history.--A note on 54 sources.--Index. Foreign Policy Association. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORI- Prepared by the editors of the TIES, 1970-1971. Portraits of American political and military Foreign Policy Association. Introd. by Samuel P. 96 p. leaders who were instrumental in formulating U.S. Hayes. [New York] Collier Books C19703 Gardner focus- E855.F6 1970 cold war policy during the 1940's. es on the conditions and attitudes that led "Designed to contribute to a more informed and them to respond as they did to the challenges of increased world responsibilities and the perceived thoughtful dialogue between candidate and constit- uent" during the 1970 elections. Each of the 12 Soviet threat. chapters deals with such key foreign policy issues as Communist China, the Middle East, arms control, 58 Western Europe, Vietnam, and the Soviet bloc; dis- Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Center for cusses current U.S. policy; debates the alterna- Strategic and International Studies.NEW TRENDS tives; and cites a brief bibliography. The appen- IN KREMLIN POLICY. Washington, 1970. 168 p. dix permits the reader to indicate his policy (Its Special Report Series, no. 11, Aug. 1970) preference with respect to the issues. DLC

Contents.--Foreword.--pt. 1. Panel findings.- - Introduction. The 55 pt. 2. The background paper: A rOREIGN POLICY 70R CANADIANS. In Canada. Dept._ final years of the Khrushchev decade. The rise of of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 22, the Soviet military-industrial apparatus complex. The Stalin is- July 1970: 221-224. Changing modes of destalinization. JX351.A3, v. 22 sue in perspective. Why restalinization? The contemporary crisis in foreign policy. New depar- Papers placed on the House of Commons agenda by tures in foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet contro- Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell versy. The triangulation of global power. The Sharp that present "the results of a special re- temptations and risks of strategic superiority. view of foreign policy announced by the Prime Min- Eastern Europe since Czechoslovakia. Soviet poli- ister in May 1968." The papers present a general cy aims in Eastern Europe. Soviet control tight- survey of foreign policy, outlining six policy ened in Eastern Europe. The results of Soviet ef- themes in terms of national interests and objec- forts. Some specific cases. Prospects in Eastern tives, as well as detailed studies of Europe, Lat- Europe.--pt. 3. Individual panelist comments. in America, the United Nations, the Pacific, and international development. They suggest how "the Publishes the findings of two panels--one com- main contours of Canada's external policies . . . posed of European officials and academics, the are being reshaped to meet the challenges and op- other, of their American counterparts--appointed portunities offered by a rapidly-changing world." to make projections of Soviet foreign and military policy for the next decade, together with a background paper used by the panels in making their 56 assessments. Neither panel could reach consensus France. Ambassade. U.S. Service de Presse et d'In - on the prospects for Soviet-American negotiations. formation. FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY; OFFICIAL STATE- Some participants felt that ideological hostility MENTS, SPEECHES, AND COMMUNIQUES JANUARY-JUNE will prevent meaningful talks, others, that the 1968. New York [1968] 184 p. Soviet leadership is realistic enough to bow to DLC the demands of expediency. The American panel, with some dissent, suggest that "restalinization" A compilation of documents, treaties and agree- is the most significant development in Soviet pol- ments, and Ministers, reports pertaining to for- icy since 1964. eign policy. A chronology of the period covered, a subject index, and an index by country are also included. 59 Gurtov, Melvin. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1969. xiv, 120 p. (Rand Cor- 57 Memorandum RM-5910-ISA) Gardner, Lloyd C. ARCHITECTS OF ILLUSION; MEN AND poration. Q180.A1R36, no. 5910 IDEAS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1941-1949. "This research is supported by the Department of Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970. 365 p. Defense under Contract DAHC15 67 C 0158." E813.G27 Bibliographical footnotes. Bibliography: p. 323-350.

Contents.--Preface.--William C. Bullitt: Thomas Speculates on the effects of U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia and selects four problem areas Jefferson in Moscow.--Franklin D. Roosevelt: the China's foreign policy and perils of second-front diplomacy.--Harry S. Tru- for detailed analysis: nuclear growth, Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, from San Francisco to Potsdam.--James F. man: Japan's role in the region, and the problems of Byrnes: collective security through public diplomacy.--Will Clayton, the British loan, and the po- political integration and economic development. Gurtov postulates five elements of U.S. national litical economy of cold war.--George C. Marshall: interest for assessing U.S. policy in the region: traditional policy in post-traditional China.- - security, economic resources, historical-psycho- Bernard M. Baruch: atoms for peace.--Dean Acheson and the "holy .pretense. " -- Lucius D. Clay: Ameri- logical obligations, political-legal commitments, and the promotion of peace and stability. He con- can decisions in Germany.--James V.Forrestal and cludes that the United States has no vital seouri- George F. Kennan: will the real "Mr. X" please 19 14 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

ty interests in Southeast Asia and that a Commu- ience." The dialog begun at Erfurt will continue nist takeover of any single country in the area at Kassel, where the East Germans can be expected would not constitute a serious threat to U.S. se- to press for recognition as a second state in Ger- curity. many with equal rights under international law. The popular demonstrations at Erfurt for Willy 60 Brandt bear witness that the citizen of the Oe man Democratic Republic has not identified himself Hartmann, Frederick H. THE NEW AGE OF AMERICAN FOR- with the Communist world view. EIGN POLICY. [New York] Macmillan [1970] xv, Brandt marked off 399 p. maps. E840.H37 unmistakeably the position of the Federal Republic by saying "we must not make it impossible . . Bibliography: p. 379-388. for the German people to decide in free self-determination, how it wishes to live together." A historical and analytical study of U.S. for- Yet there can be no reason for optimism, because the eign policy emphasizing the need for new perspectives and approaches in keeping with the Nation's Communist all-or-nothing approach continues un- capabilities. Hartmann is particularly concerned changed and "because no freely elected German government can or will yield the fundamental right of that alternative solutions to U.S. problems have self-determination." received scant consideration, which he attributes to a failure to ask the right questions in the right order. He argues that the policy of con- 64 tainment can achieve U.S. strategic objectives Hupka, Herbert. THE PROBLEM OF A NEW GERMAN OSTPOL- only at excessive cost and risk and proposes in ITIK. Central Europe journal, v. 18, Apr. 1970: its place a policy designed to isolate opponents. 115-119. DB200.7S74, v. 18

61 West German policy toward Eastern Europe cannot ignore the hard fact of the division of Germany, Holmes, John W. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: PO- LITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES. Atlantic Community and it must take for granted Bonn's awn continued integration with the West, specifically, member- quarterly, v. 8, fall 1970: 398-416. ship in NATO. Policy toward East Germany cannot D839.A85, v. 8 be considered singly, since that country is itself Weighs the options open to Canada in its rela- inextricably connected with East Europe and Mos- cow. tions with the United States, concentrating on Bonn must also recognize that the Americans have moved from confrontation to negotiation and Canada's future role in NATO, alternative policies in U.S.-Canadian relations, and the question of that the Soviet Union's willingness to talk with the capitalist superpower is shown by the strate- independent Canadian foreign policy. Holmes dis- gic arms limitation talks. cusses as alternative policies for Canada neutral- The present administration of the Federal Republic has followed the ity, close military cooperation, and differentiat- example of its predecessors by offering renuncia- ed military and diplomatic functions. He con- tion-of-force agreements to Moscow, Warsaw, and cludes that "the option of a reasonable indepen- Pankow. To get a dialog going, Bonn has made some dent foreign policy reasonably pursued, within concessions to East Germany in advance. reason, may retain [the] Canadian identity in in- The integrity of the present Polish territories should ternational affairs." be recognized in a treaty on the mutual renunciation of force without anticipating a definite 62 peace settlement. Tho Federal Republic must also Houghton, Neal D. A CASE FOR ESSENTIAL ABANDONMENT recognize the limitations placed on its ability to OF BASIC U.S. COLD WAR OBJECTIVES. Western polit- act in regard to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Un- ical quarterly, v.23, June 1970: 384-411. ion by the Paris treaties of 1954. JA1.W4, v. 23 65 Charges that "essentially all of the basic as- INDONESIA. Asian almanac, v.8, Oct. 10, 1970: sumptions upon which [U.S.] cold war objectives 4207-4209. and policies have rested and developed have been DS1.A4752, v. 8 unsound and unwarranted in fact or reality" and Dr. Adam Malik, Indonesia's Minister for Foreign that "their operational implications have been Affairs, stated in July that his Government was outmoded from their basic inception in the very not opposed to normalizing relations with Commu- nature of the period of history through which the nist China, provided China would agree to cease Houghton looks to whole world is now passing." "hostile acts of subversion" and stop criticizing academics and other intellectuals for the social the Indonesian Government. leadership needed to break out of the cold war He believes that the impasse and establish an alliance with the social danger of massive military aggression in Asia is low as long as the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance re- orders that are emerging to meet the real needs of mains stable. Although China's capacity for mankind. large-scale external military operations will be quite limited in the foreseeable future its evolv- 63 ing nuclear capability might induce a radical and Hupka, Herbert. ERFURTKASSEL; FROM MONOLOGUE TO dogmatic leadership to project novel ideas in re- DIALOGUE. Central Europe journal, v. 18, June lation to Asia in general."However, if China 1970: 199-202. DB200.7.S74, v. 18 achieves a higher level of nuclear development, it will probably adopt a more moderate foreign poli- The Erfurt meeting between the Chancellor of the cy. The most recent manifestation of the ongoing Federal Republic of Germany and the Chairman of reorganization of the Indonesian Armed Forces is the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic the creation of a Central Civic Mission Board, Republic will be historic as an "all-German exper- headed by the Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces 20 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 15

and designed to promote and guide the military in 68 its new sociopolitical roles. President Suharto Johnson, U. Alexis. THE ROLE OF JAPAN AND THE FU- has said that if the Armed Forces fail to dis- TURE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE FAR EAST. In charge their dual task of national defense and American Academy of Political and Social Science, civic action, they would lose their confidence and Philadelphia. A new Ameri,:an posture toward Asia. that of the people, and national development would Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 390, July never be accomplished. Although the military have 1970) p. 63-72. Hl.A4, v. 390 no intention of monopolizing power, they realized that no other organization was capable of dealing American interest and involvement in Asia is not effectively with national problems. The assign- a recent aberration, but a continuing phenomenon ment of military personnel to civil-action duties going back to the days of the China Clippers and will not necessitate the removal of civil servants extending through the period when the United from their posts. States followed a policy of isolation in other areas. Today Japan is the leading nation in Asia, vastly superior economically and technically to 66 other states in the area. Linked to the United States by a Mutual Defense Treaty, Japan has sub- Jha, D. C. PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: AN ANALYTI- stantial armed forces capable of assuring the CAL STUDY. Indian journal of political science, country's immediate conventional defense. v. 31, Apr./June 1970: 113-137. In his State of the Union message, President Nixon JA26.15, v.31 recognized this primacy, stating "Japanese-Ameri- can friendship and cooperation are the linchpin Traces the post-1947 evolution of Pakistan's for peace in the Pacific." Japan is contributing foreign policy. Due to Great Power rivalries in to the development of the free states of Asia Asia in the 1960's, Pakistan was able to establish through increasing economic and technical coopera- "bilateral equations" with Communist China, the tion. We -;:elcome this policy and will not ask Ja- Soviet Union, and the United States with the un- pan to assume security responsibilities inconsis- derstanding "that the nature and complexion of the tent wit.: the felt concerns of the Japanese peo- equation should be such as to promote our mutual ple. Looking at the region as a whole, the ulti- interest without adversely affecting the legitimate ideal is a community of the free states of mate interests of third parties."While this pol- Asia cooperating for their common interests in the icy has enhanced national security considerably, political, economic, and security fields, with Pakistan might be trapped on a "triangular tight- which we are associated only to the degree that rope" in the future. these states desire our association. Japan must play a major role in any such community. (Ab- stract supplied) 67

Johnson, James A. THE NEW GENERATION OF ISOLATION- 69 ISTS. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 136-146. Kapur, Ashok. SOVIET MOVES IN ASIA: D41o.F6, v. 49 TRENDS FOR THE EARLY SEVENTIES. China report, v. 6, May/June 1970: 15-27. D5777.55.C4484, v. 6 The Vietnam War, domestic problems, and doubts over the Nation's international involvements have A detailed conceptual analysis of Soviet policy produced a new generation of isolationists in the in Asia that considers the global ramifications of United States. The new isolationism, basically a the Sino-Soviet dispute. reaction to military interventionism, is not a re- jection of internationalism, as was isolationist sentiment during the interwar period. The sense 70 of world mission characteristic of the 1940's and Karnow, Stanley. LEARNING TO LIVE WITH CHINA. Far 1950's is gone, and with it, the simplistic dis- Eastern economic review, v. 69, July 2, 1970: 27- tinction between "good guys" and "bad guys," the 28, 31-32, 35. liC411.F18, v. 69 "free world" and communism. The idealism of Amer- ican youth now focuses on new kinds of social and Examines traditional and contemporary sources of political problems--pollution, racism, urban de- conflict between the United States and China. cay--because the fear of Communist expansionism is Karnow concludes that their relationshave suf- no longer real. Changes in the technology of war fered from a good deal of misunderstanding and

have shifted attention from fear of foreign con- mistrust built up by both sides largely . . . be- quest to fear of nuclear annihilation. The opti- cause of internal pressures on the respective mism generated during the Kennedy era has given leaderships."S4ice the United States must live way to disillusionment. Although the new isola- with the Chinese, Washington must recognize the tionists have severely criticized many aspects of legitimate Chinese interests in Southeast Asia, American society, particularly defense spending judge the Chinese by their actions rather than and U.S. military involvements, few are pacifists, their words, assess Chinese power more realisti- and most would willingly fight in a conventional cally, and abandon the missionary attitude that it war to defend the United States. They share the can change the Chinese. interventionists' concern for promoting and defending the national interest, but they differ 71 over the components of national interest. Because Kennedy, Edward M. BEGINNING ANEW IN LATIN AMERICA. of their profound distrust of the basic assump- Saturday review, v. 53, Oct. 17, 1970: 18-21. tions of the interventionists, "a new internation- Z1219.525, v. 53 alism based on a peaceful response to human needs is the only effective response that the new gener- The great hopes aroused by the Alliance for ation of isolationists will heed." Progress have been dissipated by the continuation 21 16 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

of an anachronistic foreign policy that prefers ean, since in an air age ships are vulnerable. the stability of repressive military regimes to However, the Soviet Union has gained control of the risk of democratic social change. The social strategic Mediterranean airfields through politi- and political statistics of Latin America are at cal penetration, making direct control of the Bos- least as depressing as they were before the alli- porus and the Dardanelles unnecessary. "In order ance. U.S. military and diplomatic support for to become a Mediterranean power the Russians no oppressive regimes, such as those in Brazil and longer need control of the exit through the Hel- Argentina, has failed to improve conditions in the lespont."Decolonization in French North Africa countries involved and has contributed to a grow- and Libya and the last two Arab defeats by Israel ing anti-Americanism. Basic social change is in- have facilitated the Russian expansion. Moscow evitable in Latin America; the only question is has been inspired b; the age-old ambition to "lib- whether it will come about peacefully or violent- erate" Istanbul as well as by a desire to dominate ly. The United States can contribute to peaceful one of the world's key transportation arteries, change by reaffirming the democratic goals of the control oil resources in the Near East, and secure alliance, withdrawing its military missions and Arab cooperation in the struggle against the West. curtailing military assistance and arms sales, in- The strategy includes acquisition of military creasing economic and technical aid and encourag- bases in North Africa to threaten Southern Europe ing land reform, assuring a more positive role for and separation of Europe from Africa and the Indi- American private investments in Latin America, and an Ocean countries. Further, the Soviet Unicz, improving relations with Cuba. fears that if it does not fill the Mediterranean vacuum created by the withdrawal of the French, British, and Italians, Communist China will. 72 Koch, Thilo. [THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ON THE Y5 CHESSBOARD OF THE SOVIET UNION] Auf dem Schach- ..egvold, Robert. SOVIET POLICY IN WEST AFRICA. brett der Sowjetunion, die DDR. [Hamburg] Wegner Cambridg.±, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970. [19703 142 p. map. 372 p. DT476.5437 DD261.4.K56 Bibliography: p. 349-357. Includes bibliographical references. Contents.--The Soviet response to colon:al Afri- Partial contents.--The German Democratic Repub- ca.- -The first contacts with black Africa.--The lic on the chessboard of the Soviet Union, by era of optimism, 1960.--Africa divided.--Policy in Thilo Koch.--Documentation selected by Michael transition, 1962- 1963. -- Ideological experimenta- Wolf Thomas. tion in Khruschev's last year.--Policy after Khrushchev: Sketches the position of the German Democratic smaller expectations, 1965- 1966. -- The new realism, 1967-1968.--Conclusion.--Note on ,blic within the Council of Mutual Economic As- methodology.--Index. .ance (COMECON) and Warsaw Pact and its general exploitation by the Soviet Union in the world are- A study of Soviet foreign policy in Guinea, na. Documentation is chosen to illustrate the Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, and Sene- thesis that while the relations of East Germany gal, states that together illustrate the full with individual members of the Soviet bloc have spectrum of problems faced by the Soviet Union in varied, Pankow has constantly and directly re- its relations with the new states of black Africa. sponded to Moscow's wishes. Koch calls the German As events in Africa have made it progressively Democratic Republic the queen's pawn in the Soviet more evident that the continent is not prepared Union's great power game. for Socialist revolution, Soviet interest in the area has declined. It now lies on the periphery 73 of Soviet concern, and, unless circumstances change radically, it is likely to retain there. KrOger, Herbert. [INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE] Blgtter far deutsche and internationale Politik, v. 15, June 1970: 565-576. 76 D839H57, v. 15 Lewis, Flora. THE NIXON DOCTRINE. Atlantic monthly, v. 226, Nov. 1970: 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16. On the basis of international law, condemns the AP2.A8, v. 226 proposals advanced by the Bonn government for shaping future East German-West German relation- The Nixon Doctrine is ambiguous even to American ships. Kroger thinks the formal recognition of officials in Asia responsible for its implementa- East Germany is more than a "legalistic formali- tion. The obstacles to stability in non-Communist ty." Peaceful coexistence is not possible in Eu- Asia are enormous and may require longer and more rope while Bonn refuses to recognize its neighbor extensive U.S. support than is implied in adminis- as a subject in international law or negotiate in tration statements emphasizing U.S. withdrawal the spirit of the East German memorandum of Decem- from Asia. Japan is apparently under pressure ber 17, 1969. from the United States to assume an active military and political role in Asia sooner than Tokyo would like. The attempt to replace U.S. pressure 74 on China with the collective pressure of non-Com- Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik von. THE RUSSIANS IN THE munist Asia is misconceived and should be aban- MEDITERRANEAN. National review, v. 22, August 25, doned in favor of a policy that encourages each 1970: 891. AP2.N3545, v. 22 country to seek its own accommodation with China. This can be accomplished only when the United The ever-increasing Soviet naval presence is States terminates its involvement in the Indochina probably not the gravest menace in the Mediterran- War and works for rapprochement with Peking by ar- 22 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 17

ranging for a referendum on Taiwan, which would the Soviet penetration into the Indian Ocean is a undoubtedly result in a statement of preference threat to India's security, especially in view of for independence from either Chinese government. Japanese military activities instigated by the The non-Communist countries of Asia "need an Amer- United States. ican policy which will safeguard their own efforts to develop, rather than a policy of countercoali- tion designed principally to reduce the cost of 80 conflict for America." :'ansfield, Michael J. PERSPECTIVE ON ASIA: THE NEW U.S. DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. Report of Sena- tor Mike Mansfield to the Committee on Foreign Re- 77 lations, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Mackintosh, Malcolm [interview] CLUES TO SOVIET Govt. Print. Off., 1969. 15 p. POLICY. U.S. news & world report, v. 69, Nov. 2, DS518.8.M24 1970: 66-69. JK1.U65, v. 69 At head of title: 91st Congress, 1st Session; Committee print. Warns that the leadership of the Soviet Union looks upon negotiation not as a means to relieve Contents.--Introduction.--The President's new tensions and promote mutual understanding but as a Asian doctrine.--Reactions to the new Asian doc- weapon like any other weapon, to be used to fur- trine.--The new doctrine and Southeast Asian coun- ther the growth of Soviet political, economic, and tries.-- Concluding comments. military power. The Soviet Union is in an expansionist mood; it is much more willing to take Evaluates the Nixon doctrine on the basis of chances now than in the past, and it is prepared conversations with Southeast Asian leaders in Au- to exploit local opportunities to increase its in- gust 1969. Mansfield finds that these leaders no fluence, even at the risk of a confrontation with longer perceive a significant threat of Communist the United States. In the strategic arms limita- aggression in the reg5on, that U.S. interests on tion talks, its goals are to stabilize the stra- the Asian mainland are peripheral, and that conse- tegic balance at near parity, prevent another heat quently the United States should alter its role in the arms race, which it certainly would lose, from that of an Asian power to a Pacific power. and create a "forum for a superpower directorate He reports that U.S. officials in Asia have thus for running the world." far expended little serious effort to comply with the Nixon doctrine and recommends that Washington issue firm directives to achieve compliance. Af- 78 ter reviewing the economic, political, and mili- Madhok, Balraj. BALRAJ MADHOK ON INDIA'S FOREIGN tary situations in the Philippines, Indonesia, POLICY AND NATIONAL AFFAIRS; COLLECTION OF SOME Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, he proposes that the IMPORTANT SPEECHES DELIVERED IN THE LOK SABHA. United States shift its emphasis from bilateral to New Delhi, Bharati Sahitya Sadan [1969]156 p. multilateral economic aid, impose strict curbs on Ds448.1423 further military aid, and encourage nonmilitary Running title: India's foreign policy and na- cooperation among the Asian nations. tional affairs.

Speeches delivered between June 1968 and January 81 1969 in the House of Representatives of the Indian Meissner, Boris. [THE SOVIET UNION AND COLLECTIVE Parliament that include a general survey of for- SECURITY] Sow,jetunion and die kollektive Sicher- eign policy, recommendations for its reorienta- heit. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, July 1970: 393-405. tion, discussions of India's role in the British D839.A885, v. 21 Commonwealth, its attitude toward West and East Germany, its reaction to the Soviet invasion of Reviews the history of Soviet attitudes toward Czechoslovakia, the reorganization of the north- collective security to establish the difference east region, and the Kashmir question. between the aggressive coexistence strategy being implemented today and the older emphasis on equilibrium. Meissner fears that the proposed Europe- 79 an security congress will constitute international Mahajani, Usha. INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: SPLENDID recognition of the division of Germany. When its ISOLATION, ACTIVE INTERVENTION OR DETACHED IN- western front is consolidated, the Soviet Union VOLVEMENT? United Asia, v.22, May/June 1970: can turn to the in,.egration of Eastern Europe and 105-124. DS1.U55, v. 22 then expand in the Third World. Meissner proposes a return to the agenda suggested by Molotov for Advocates "detached involvement" for India in the 1954 security conference. its relations with Southeast Asia, emphasizing that it would inspire India to pursue its legitimate interest in the area, enable it to intervene 82 on its own initiative, and dissuade it from under- Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm. [DISTURBING REALITIES] taking entangling commitments. Mahajani assesses St6rende Realitgten. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Sept. Indian foreign policy in the context of Communist 1970: 441-443. U3.W396, v. 19 China's role in South East Asia, the Kashmir dispute, internal revolution, and regional solidari- The preoccupation of the German Federal Republic ty. He rejects the power-vacuum theory that has with security obscures its understanding of the been popularized in the wake of Great Britain's realities of military policy. The right of self- withdrawal from East of Suez, noting that there is determination, the first of the basic realities of little to substantiate the assumptions that the military policy, is expressed in the Moscow-Bonn Western naval and military presence in Asia and renunciation-of-force treaty. It can become a re- the Indian Ocean are in India's interests or that ality of political policy when the German people, 18 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

not the Government or the Bundeswehr alone, recog- about the possibility of dgtente with the Soviet nize that the right to self-determination merits bloc will soon return to a similar focus. The ex- defense by arms if necessary. An important polit- panding range of common interests in industrial, icomilitary reality is that Soviet policy has long technological, and economic collaboration and Ger- since ceased to be motivated by communism or any man advocacy of British entry into the Common Mar- ideology other than Russian patriotism. Whenever ket are reasons for anticipating increasing Anglo- direct confrontation with the Americans must be German harmony. In the general spectrum of world avoided, it is the Russian tactic to obtain what- politics, Britain and Germany see themselves as ever is possible by negotiations and treaties. members of the same category of medium powers, What else is the meaning of the renunciation-of- with an increasing area of concern in the organi- force pact? The Russians certainly never thought zation of Western Europe and in the development of that West Germany seriously contemplated a mili- the'r relations both with the United States and tary attack. Other realities are Soviet fears of witn Eastern Europe. Britain should take care China, of a two-front war, End of the rising costs that the four-power negotiations on Berlin make of armament, which account fir Soviet interest in concessions to East Germany only at the proper a better economic understanding with Bonn. It is tempo to help Bonn's effort at East-West stabili- possible that by easing the Soviet economic cri- zation. sis, the Germans are in effect helping the Soviets to arm. The great reality that the Soviets cannot 85 overlook is the Atlantic alliance. The Soviet Mourin, Maxime. ETHE SOVIET UNION IN THE FACE OF call for a European security conference, where se- THE NEW JAPANESE POWER] L'U.R.S.S. devant la nou- curity will be considered only from the economic velle puissance japonaise. Revue de defense na - or sociopolitical points of view, is a tactic to tionale, v. 26, June 1970: 935-948. outflank that reality. The Soviets seek safety on D410.R45, v. 26 their western borders, profitable economic relations, and complete military hegemony in Europe Focuses on Soviet-Japanese relations during the with the West's approval, to bridg about an era of past 25 years. Mourin contends that the Soviet "pax sovietica." Union can no longer demand economic collaboration with Tokyo without giving Japan sufficient territorial compensations. Moreover, Moscow is going 83 to find that it will be difficult to consolidate Modelski, George. THE WORLD'S FOREIGN MINISTERS: A its influence or presence in Asia without improv- POLITICAL ELITE. Journal of conflict resolution, ing its political relations with Japan. He con- v. 14, June 1970: 135-175. cludes that Japan will surpass the Soviet Union in JX1901.J6, v. 14 industrial production and that it is beginning to revise its posture in the world, particularly in This is an empirical study of the backgrounds, Asia, and play a greater role in establishing its current experiences, and values of persons holding own security. the role of foreign minister in their respective nations in 1965, with historical comparisons of 86 some aspects. Data are included from a mailed Muskie, Edmund S. MUSKIE'S TIMETABLE: OUT OF INDO- questionnaire with a response of over 15 percent. CHINA IN 18 MONTHS. New York times magazine, July Findings on educational experience, foreign trav- 5, 1970: 8-13. AP2.116575, 1970 el, personal acquaintance with counterparts in other countries, and other attributes are tabulat- President Nixon's policy in Southeast Asia ed and discussed. Taking Morgenthau's suggestions serves only to perpetuate the war in Vietnam and about a "world elite" as a point of departure, the Cambodia and further divide the nation at home. study involves implications about the cohesiveness A military victory is out of the question, and of such an elite and the perceptible changes that the United States should be moving to create con- have occurred within it since the nineteenth cen- ditions conducive to a political settlement. The tury. The decline of "aristocracy" as a criteri- outlook for such a settlement could be improved on, the participation of new and relatively small materially by adopting a fixed timetable for the powers in world affairs, and the technological fa- withdrawal of all U.S. troops within 18 months. cilitation of face-to-face contact among foreign This time frame could be shortened if Hanoi agreed ministers in the twentieth century (especially to a ceasefire, and it would not be followed at since World War II) are discussed as factors in all unless U.S. prisoners of war were returned and present-day international relations. (Abstract the safety of the withdrawal guaranteed. Argu- supplied) ments against a fixed timetable--in particular, those that raise the specter of a bloodbath in the South--do not stand up to analysis. On the other 84 hand the advantages are very real: a fixed sched- Morgan, Roger. THE NEW GERMANY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ule of withdrawal would put control over events BRITISH POLICY; A CASE OF COVERGENCE. Round table; back in the hands of the United States, where it the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: belongs; encourage a better climate in which to 249-255. AP4.R6, 1970 negotiate for the return of U.S. prisoners of war and the safety of U.S. troops during the withdraw- Present Anglo-German relationships are on an ex- al; and greatly improve prospects for a broad po- traordinarily friendly level and seem likely to re- litical settlement. main so for a fairly long period. The Ostpolitik of the Brandt government will achieve what it can 87 in a very short time. Bonn needs a firm basis in Palme, Olof. SWEDEN: NEUTRALITY, NOT SILENCE.Vi- the West more than it needs anything it is likely tal speeches of the day, v. 36, July 15, 1970: to get in the East. British and German judgements 578-580. PN6121.V52, v. 36 94 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 19

Delivered before the National Press Club, Wash- bias that places primary value on the ability of a ington, D.C., June 5, 1970. nation to govern itself. The Russian preoccupation with empire manifests itself as a tendency to Sweden's policy of neutrality is firmly based on absorb neighboring peoples, while America's com- its history and its strategic location in Europe mercial experience predisposes it toward a bal- between East and West. Neutrality must be credi- ance-of-power theory of international relations. ble to be effective, and Sweden's per capita de- Since the Soviet process of industrialization oc- fense expenditures are the world's fourth highest. curred without a corresponding growth of commer- Neutrality does not mean isolation, nor does it cial relations, the belief in compromise that is condemn Sweden to remain silent on major interne- characteristic of American foreign policy is lack- tionpl issues. As a small nation, Sweden regards ing in Soviet policy. cooperation with the great powers as not only a matter of self-interest but also a means of con- 90 tributing to world peace. The smaller nations Reischauer, Edwin O. TRANSPACIFIC RELATIONS. will gradually relinquish mcre of their sovereign- Tok- yo, C. E. Tuttle C1969) 88 p. ty as states move toward greater interdependence, DS33.4.U6R4 but this must come about through voluntary agree- Originally published as one chapter in Agenda ments, not dictation by the superpowers.Sweden For the Nation; Papers on Domestic and Foreign has long played an active role in the United Na- Policy Issues. HN65.A63 tions, disarmament negotiations, and aid to de.el- oping countries, but it professes no special in- Suggests steps the United States should take to sight into the world's problems and is acutely effect a more realistic Asian policy. Reischauer aware of its limited ability to influence the contends that America should terminate the Vietnam course of world events. It may be true that the War as soon as possible by negotiating a complete 1970's portend catastrophe, as some claim, but the American withdrawal, maintain friendly relations decade may also mark the turning point for peace- with Japan, and seek to relax tensions involving ful and constructive change in the developing China. The United States must recognize that once countries and a lessening of world tensions. Al- the Vietnam War is settled, it has no other vital' though Sweden is not without problems, its own interests in Asia and must accept that it has less progress in social reform is evidence that peace- control in Asia than previously. ful social change is possible. He concludes that the United States should adopt a low profile in Asia while at the same time sustaining a broad 88 concern for the future of Asia and Asians. Ameri- Pillai, Kesavakurup R. INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: BA- ca "should approach the problems of Asia in Judo SIC ISSUES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES. Meerut, Meen- style, not trading blow for blow with the forces akshi Prakashan Cc1969J 247 p. of Asia, but so adapting [its] stance as to let DS445.P5 1969 these forces work for Cit]."

Contents.--Background.--The cold war.--Relations 91 with Pakistan.--Foreign aid.--Relations with Riklin, Alois. [MODELS OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY] China.--Other major issues.--Conclusion.--Appendi- Modell einer schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. ces.--Bibliography.--Index. Os- terreichische Zeitschrift far Aussenpolitik, v. 10, no. 2, 1970: 67-77. Examines the attitudes of the major Indian oppo- DB47.043, v. 10 sition parties and their influence on foreign policy. Pillai selects four parties representing Recognizing that Switzerland can influence world broadly based leftist and rightist points of politics only to the extent of its limited means view--the Communist Party of India, the Praja So- and power is a necessary preliminary to construct- cialist Party, the Jana Sangh, and the Swatantra ing models of Swiss foreign policy. Consequently Party--and focuses on events during the period the most realistic model prescribes the closest 1947-1963. He concludes that these parties have possible integration with all efforts toward in- had a significant and positive influence on Indian ternational cooperation while maintaining Swiss foreign policy. neutrality and refraining from the pursuit of an active neutrality policy. Neutrality implicitly 89 forbids entry into a pact system and requires a readiness to resort to arms for its protection. Pipes, Richard. RUSSIA'S MISSION, AMERICA'S DESTI- The areas of action for this model of Swiss for- NY. Encounter, v. 35, Oct. 1970: 3-11. eign policy lie in Europe, the United Nations, in- AP4.E44, v. 35 ternational humanitarian efforts, and the policy of coexistence with the Communist states. In im- Compares the historical determinants of Soviet plementing its coexistence policy, Switzerland and U.S. foreign policies. Pipes challenges the should build up relationships with Eastern Europe view that the current detente in Soviet-U.S. rela- and resume diplomatic relations with all states, tions is the result of the convergence of their including the German Democratic Republic. social and political institutions.Both the Sovi- et Union and the United States spring from Europe- an civilization, but the differences in what each 92 has borrowed are more significant than the simi- Rostov, Walt W. ASIA: TODAY'S POLICY TOMORROW'S larities. The isolationism of the Soviet elite FACT. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Sept. 1, derives from a Manichean division of the world 1970: 682-688. PN6121.V52, v. 36 into Russians and non-Russians, 'while American Delivered at the Naval War College, Newport, isolationist sentiment reflects an individualistic R.I., June 19, 1970. 95 20 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Contends that U.S. withdrawal from Asia would reached tentative agreements with the Soviet Union not be in the interests of either the United and Poland, and there is reason to hope for an im- States or the smaller nations of Asia. Rostow ar- provement in relations with East Germany as well. gues that the costs of U.S. commitments to Asia, Whatever one may think of the East German regime, while substantial, do not significantly affect the it is futile to ignore its existence. Although ability of the United States to deal with its do- West Germany will never recognize East Germany as mestic problems. U.S. withdrawal would encourage a foreign country, it will agree to East German Chinese aggressiveness, threaten Southeast Asia participation in the international community with- with Chinese domination, and increase the proba- in the framework of a modus vivendi that recogniz- bility of a major Asian war. es the unity of the two German states.A primary means of reducing East-West tensions and thereby 93 improving the prospects for political agreements would be mutual balanced force reductions, which Sapin, Burton M., comp. CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FOR- West Germany wholeheartedly supports. EIGN AND MILITARY POLICY. [Glenview, Ill.] On this, as on other questions, West Germany will pursue a Scott, Foresman C1970] 185 p. (Scott, Foresman's American Government readings series) flexible policy that combines persistence with re- E840.S24 alism. Includes bibliographical references. 95 Partial contents.--The United States in world Schneider, Fernand-Thiebaut. [WHERE IS MOSCOW GO- politics.--Military force and foreign policy:The ING?] oa va Moscou?Revue militaire suisse, pressures of military necessity, by Gene M. Lyons. v. 115, June 1970: 253-261. New approaches to defense decision-making, by Wes- U2.R5, v. 115 ley W. Posvar. Post-Vietnam role of the military in foreign policy, by Maxwell D. Taylor. Politi- The Soviet Union's spectacular politicomilitary co-military problems and resources, by John C. advances in the Mediterranean and its potential Ausland.--Politics, publics, the media and the na- opportunities in the Far East opened up by Ameri- tional character.--Formulating and implementing ca's disengagement must not mask Moscow's internal national policy: Planning-Programming-Budgeting, economic and ideological problems. The Russians by the Senate Subcommittee on National Security have broken out of their continental shell, but and International Operations. PPBS and foreign only the future can reveal whether they are going affairs, by Thomas C. Schelling.--Major policy to crumble like statues with feet of clay or problems, foreign policy analysis: The ABM, pro- whether an important part of the world will live liferation and international stability, by Robert under their domination. L. Rothstein. The Atlantic mirage, by Ronald Steel. Containment in Asia reconsidered, by David P. Mozingo. 96 Singh, Bishwanath. FOREIGN POLICY OF COMMUNIST Readings in U.S. foreign and military policy. CHINA. United Asia, v. 22, Jan./Feb. 1970: 16-27. The selections in this volume, intended for use in DS1.U55, v.22 political science courses at the university level, were made with the aim of throwing light on the de- Divides the history of Communist Chinese foreign cisionmaking process and on the relationship be- policy into three periods: ideological militancy, tween foreign and military policy. Sapin deplores 1949-1953; conciliation and diplomacy, 1954-1959; the dearth of first-rate political analysis in in- and extremism and ideological purity, 1960 to the ternational relations but predicts that trends to- present. Singh contends that the Sentinel ABM ward a more self-consciously theoretical orienta- system was authorized to defend the United States tion, a comparative approach, and a concern with against China's growing nuclear capability.He substance as well as structure and process will concludes that the Soviet-American confrontation begin to bear fruit in the very near future. will be replaced by an era of bitter Sino-Soviet disputes, "probably culminating in an armed show- 94 down between the two Communist giants, with the USA leaning on the Russian side." Schmidt, Helmut. GERMANY IN THE ERA OF NEGOTIA- TIONS. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 40-50. D410.F6, v. 49 97 Storry, Richard. OPTIONS FOR JAPAN IN THE 1970S. A new epoch in East-West relations is in the of- World today, v. 26, Aug. 1970: 325-333. fing. Grandiose dreams of achieving a united Eu- W10.w63, v. 26 rope in the immediate future will give way to more pragmatic approaches, while a reduction of ten- Great economic power must eventually lead to the sions will enhance the prospects for cooperation application of power to protect and expand nation- on limited measures. NATO will remain the bulwark al interests, but if there is to be a new kind of of Western security, but continued U.S. participa- patriotism in Japan it will have to derive its tion will be essential to make it effective. West strength from a younger generation of officehold- Germany is firmly committed to the political uni- ers, who have no direct memory of militarism and fication of Europe, but it recognizes that unifi- war and who regard the Constitution as a fact of cation can only come about gradually. Its Ostpol- life. Modern Japanese history suggests that Japan itik is a logical extension of policies enunciated needs a close relationship with a major world pow- as early as 1966, not a radical break with the er, so Japan would only opt for neutralism in the past, and supplements East-West negotiations on 1970's if the United States made it clear that it more general questions, such as the strategic arms was unprepared to fulfill its treaty obligations. limitation talks. West Germany has already The mutual security pact will automatically be ex- THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 21

tended annually so long as the American nuclear Pakistan give very high priorities to economic de- umbrella remains credible. Improved Japanese-So- velopment, in which outside powers also have a viet relations may be restricted to commercial clear stake. Collapse of the development process ties, although an economic rapprochement could be- would have ramifications far beyond the subconti- come the basis for a peace treaty if the dispute nent. Local efforts are, of course, the key to over the northern islands is resolved. Recovering development but foreign assistance is also essen- these islands is a basic, long-term Japanese ob- tial. Present development assistance levels are jective that Tokyo is unlikely to abandon. In the virtually the lowest in the world, per capita. If event of a Sino-Soviet War, Japan would remain not increased, their inadequacy will have conse- neutral but would lean toward China. While Japan quences that cannot fail to enmesh more affluent might conceivably recognize Peking in the 1970's, parts of the world. Thus, such questions as de- it has adopted a "wait and see" attitude for the velopment administration, fiscal policies, debt time being. "Japan will become militarily strong- management, trade policies, and aid levels call er, but it is not easy to see how she could be- for high priority attention. Whether there is come, or wish to become, a military Power during well-based and continuing progress in the subcon- the next ten years." Resurgent nationalism in a tinent through this decade will have much to do new, nonaggressive form will focus on the Japanese with the possibilities of stabilized peace in the race rather than the imperial house. rest of Asia. (Abstract supplied)

100 98 Ulari, Adam B. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION. COMMUNIST Symington, William Stuart. CONGRESS'S RIGHT TO KNOW. DOCTRINE AND SOVIET DIPLOMACY: SOME OBSERVATIONS. New York times magazine, Aug. 9, 1970: 7, 62-65. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 13 p. AP2.N6575, 1970 JX1555.2.5 1970 At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Warns that "executive secrecy surrounding the Committee print. conduct of [U.S.] foreign policy and its associat- "Memorandum prepared at the request of the Sub- ed military operations is . . . endangering not committee on National Security and International only the welfare and prosperity of the United Operations (pursuant to S. Res. 24, 91st Cong.) of States but also, and most significantly, the na- the Committee on Government Operations, United tional security." This policy has all but de- States Senate." prived Congress of its important constitutional prerogatives of independent judgment and control The Soviet leadership continues to regard con- That in the areas of foreign and military policy. flict between capitalism and socialism as inevita- body, with public support, must take the initia- ble in the long run, although it has always tive and, "using appropriate committees in the stressed the possibility of peaceful coexistence . . . increase foreign and military policy fields, in the short run. It persists in viewing the overseeing responsibilities with systematic fact- growing conflict with Communist China as a tempo- finding inquires, both in this country and rary disruption of harmonious relations, since to abroad."Only in this way can the veil of execu- admit the existence of a basic antagonism between tive secrecy, which "has been and is being uti- Communist states would undermine an important ar- lized both to defend the past and to limit the fu- ticle of Communist dogma. The belief once preva- ture," be torn away. lent in the West that Communist expansion necessarily benefits the Soviet Union has been called 99 into question during the past decade, when some of the strongest opposition to Soviet policy has come Talbot, Phillips. THE AMERICAN POSTURE TOWARD INDIA from Communist countries (China, Yugoslavia, Ru- AND PAKISTAN. InAmerican Academy of Political mania, etc.), while some of its staunchest allies and Social Science, Philadelphia. A new American have been non-Communist states, notably the Arab posture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its nations. The Soviet Union's position as leader of Annals, v. 390, July 1970) p. 87-97. the Communist bloc now brings with it as many Nl.A4, v. 390 problems as it once brought benefits. Its negotiating advantage as a totalitarian power has fre- Difficulties abound in India and Pakistan, but quently been squandered in the oversubtle pursuit the twenty-year-old American effort to develop a of specific goals. What the Soviet Union re- constructive posture toward both of these large spects above all in an adversary or ally is indus- South Asian nations remains valid and important trial and military power and social stability. for the coming decade. The problem is to find The current social and political unrest in the equilibrium in conflicting drives for nationalism, West thus tends to reinforce the basic Soviet view security, and development. Deep-running national- that socialism will ultimately triumph in the pro- ism in India and in Pakistan hungers for psycho- longed struggle with capitalism. logical self-sufficiency but also fuels the continuing confrontation between the two countries. This confrontation further affects their respec- 101 tive views of security needs. To add to the com- U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Media Services. COM- plexity of the situation, the rivalries between MITMENTS OF U.S. POWER ABROAD. [Washington, For them are components of their relationships with sale by the Supt. of Does., U.S. Govt. Print. the Soviet Union, with Communist China, and with Off., 1969] 20 p. illus. (Issues in United the United States. The prospective post-Vietnam States foreign policy, no. 3) roles in Asia of China, Japan, the Soviet Union, UA23.A4182 and the United States are of concern in the sub- Department of State publication 8488. General continent; they could, for example, influence In- foreign policy series, 235. dd.'s nuclear policy. Finally, both India and Cover title. 27 22 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Contents.--Introduction.--Wha' is a commitment? cieties of Latin America, which are not always --Scope of U.S. commitments.--History of U.S. com- able to understand the nature of West German impe- mitments.--Executive and legislative roles.--Pros- rialism. Uschner presents his study of the goals pect for commitments.--Words to know.--Appendix. and functions of West German expansionism as a contribution to the democratic forces who fight A general discussion of the scope and nature of for progress and liberty in these underdeveloped American commitments abroad, including a chronolo- countries. gy of U.S. declarations, agreements, and treaties since 1776 and a brief summary of the controversy over executive versus congressional powers in for- 104 eign policy formulation. The booklet concludes Van der Kroef, Justus M. INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY that "the history of the United States has wit- SINCE SUKARNO. Il Politico, v. 35, no. 2, 1970: nessed an accelerating increase in the exercise of 339-353. JA18.P65, v. 35 Presidential power in the area of foreign policy." Significant changes have taken place in Indone- 102 sian foreign policy since the abortive Communist- THE UNITED STATES AND HER ALLIES. Round table; the inspired coup in 1965 and the fall of Sukarno. Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 231 - Once Indonesia's greatest ally, Communist China 234. AP4.R6, 1970 now sees its relations with Djarkarta deteriorated almost to the point of a diplomatic break, Anti- The American Government has said that it will Chinese propaganda was slowed somewhat at the end not renounce the security structure erected in the of 1968 when Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik ex- 25 years since the promulgation of the Truman doc- tended the possibility of diplomatic relations if trine and that the structure should now be self- Peking renounced its subversive activity. Rela- supporting enough to require less effort from a tions with the Soviet Union have been kept on the tax-weary American public. The invitation to the same formally correct level, possibly because of West European countries to take the initiative in Indonesia's huge debt to the Soviet Union. Under- defense and diplomacy within the framework of the lying this, however, are grave Indonesian anxie- NATO alliance should be accepted. However, the ties over the Soviet naval presence in Asian wat- American nuclear presence in Europe continues to ers. The Indonesians have openly opposed the idea be indispensable unless America is prepared to see of a Southeast Asian collective security organiza- the nations of Europe build up their own atomic tion in which the Soviet Union would participate, arsenals. The Guam doctrine leaves a gap the Aus- and they have stressed the necessity of improving tralians should be ready to fill, and the Common- political and economic conditions to ensure stability. wealth certainly can ease some of the American Using the Association of Southeast Asian burden around the world. In the long run the Nations as a forum, Indonesia has taken positions American President must make the choice between that show it seeking a Southeast Asia in which the withdrawing to concentrate on domestic issues and major powers maintain a balance of power but the imperiling world security. "The plaque which Mr. native states assume a suitable role through regional involvement, Truman placed on his desk in the White House remains for his successors: the buck stops there." 105 Varma, Shanti P., and Kashi P. Misra, eds. FOREIGN POLICIES IN SOUTH ASIA. Bombay, Orient Longmans chner, Manfred. LAID POLICY, EXPANSION, GLOBAL Cfor South Asia Studies Centre, University of Ra- STRATEGY: LATIN AMERICA AS THE STAGE FOR WEST jasthan, Jaipur, 19693 403 p. GERMAN NEO- COLONIALISM] Entwicklungspolitik, Ex- JX1569.V36 pansion, Globalstrategie. 13 Lateinamerika als Schau- "The present work is the outcome of a six-day platz d. wesdt. Neokolonialismus. Berlin, Staats- all India Seminar . . . held at Jaipur, under the verlag der DDR, 1969. 204 p. auspices of the South Asia Studies Centre, Univer- HC60.U82 sity of Rajasthan, from 1-6 February 1968." Includes bibliographical references. Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--The oversee underde- Contents.--pt. 1. Foreign policies and politi- veloped countries and the expansionism of the Kie- cal systems.--pt. 2. Determinants of foreign pol- singer-Strauss government.--The place of Latin icies.--pt. 3. Foreign policies in operation.- - America and of the "ABC" Countries in the expan- pt. 4. Role of major powers in South Asia.- - sion plans of West German imperialism.--The neoco- pt. 5. South Asia as a region.--Index.--List of lonial and expansionistic characteristics of West contributors. German economic foreign policy in Latin America.-- List of most important tables. Analyses of the foreign policies of India, Paki- stan, Ceylon, and Nepal. Among other contribu- Analyzes the 1966-1969 Kiesinger-Strauss econom- tors, Wayne Wilcox examines the role of the major ic policy toward South America to establish its world powers in South Asia and N. R. Deshpande fo- role in the global strategy of American imperial- cuses on Chinese policies and strategies. V. V. ism and the expansion of German capitalism. The Ramana Murti explores the possiblity of establish- purpose of West Germany's Latin American policy is ing a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, which he to create for the industrial lords of the Rhine believes would provide greater security than nu- and Ruhr an area in which to create and exploit clear armaments or reliance on the nuclear umbrel- their strategic reserves. At the same time, the la of a superpower. B. M. Kaushik contends that Kiesinger-Strauss policy inaugurated a long-range India should pursue a strategy of nuclear disarma- counterrevolutionary threat to the progressive so- ment since it has no reason to fear a Chinese nu-

9c2 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 23

clear attack and Pakistan is not likely to acquire fruitful; they will probably find it even more ac- nuclear weapons. ceptable. As long as the great powers do not threaten Japan's vital interests, Japan will transform the existing pattern of power in Asia 106 into a more stable and enduring balance. Wagner, Robert Harrison. UNITED STATES POLICY TO- WARD LATIN AMERICA; A STUDY IN DOMESTIC AND INTER- 109 NATIONAL POLITICS. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1970. 246 p. Wooters, Garry J. THE APPROPRIATIONS POWER AS A HF1456.5.L3W34 TOOL OF CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY MAKING. Bos- ton University law review, v. 50, spring 1970: Examines the relationship between U.S. foreign 34-50. LL policy goals in Latin America and the political process in the United States. Wagner argues that The legalistic approach to the problem of main- the U.S. political system reinforces the tenden- taining a healthy balance between the powers of cies for domestic experience to become the basis the President and the Congress with respect to for understanding international politics and for foreign policy fails to recognize that a clear le- domestic groups to become involved in intergovern- gal division in their powers cannot be made and in any event is not self-executing. One major alter- mental communications. He feels these factors have had an ambiguous effect on the resolution of native to the purely legalistic approach is the inter-American conflicts and crises. appropriations power of Congress, the legitimacy of which is confirmed by a review of the framers' intentions. This power is not necessarily affect- 107 ed by previous congressional commitments. While Wallace, Don. THE PRESIDENT'S EXCLUSIVE FOREIGN AF- there are practical problems regarding the imple- FAIRS POWERS OVER FOREIGN AID. Duke law journal, mentation of the appropriations power, the prece- v. 1970, Apr.-June 1970: 293-328, 453-494. dents for its use are well established, and it of- LL fers a precise and simple means by which Congress Bibliographical footnotes. can exercise its authority over foreign policy. The major constitutional question raised by this Examines the constitutionality of congressional use of the appropriations power is whether in cer- restrictions on presidential discretion in the use tain instances it may impinge on the President's of foreign aid appropriations. Wallace distin- authority, although in cases of conflict between guishes between a core area of foreign affairs congressional and presidential powers the consti- powers exclusively under the control of the execu- tutional balance appears to favor Congress. The tive and other areas in which the President and Cooper-Church and Hatfield-McGovern proposals for Congress share certain powers. He reviews the de- limiting presidential authority in the conduct of velopment of the present separation of foreign af- the Indochina War both appear to be a legitimate fairs powers and investigates how these powers exercise of the appropriations power. While the have interacted with respect to foreign aid. He need for forceful congressional action is evident, concludes that although "congressional self-re- however, it is equally important that Congress ex- straint is the key to the proper accommodation of ercise its power with discretion so as not to congressional and executive interests," greater jeopardize confidence in its ability to play a executive self-control will minimize the likeli- more active role in foreign policy. hood of congressional efforts to infringe on executive authority.

108 TENSION AREAS Wayper, C. L. JAPAN AND THE NEW FAR EASTERN PATTERN OF POWER. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 10, summer 1970: 91-95. UG635.G7A1252, v. 10 110 Balasanov, B.PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIA: A SOVIET Although Japan seems destined to play a predomi- POINT OF VIEW. United Asia, v.22, Jan./Feb. nant role in reshaping the Asian power balance, 1970: 9-10. DS1.U55, v. 22 its growing restiveness has been almost overlooked. With its security guaranteed by the alli- Asian states must join together to secure their ance with the United States, Japan has been able economic and political independence from an impe- to maintain a low foreign policy posture and a rialism that "seeks to restore its domination passive role within the alliance, facilitating through new colonial methods." A Soviet proposal minimal defense expenditures and rapid economic to create a collective security system in Asia was growth. The Japanese Government is now confronted rejected by the West even though Asian leaders with the contraction of U.S. power, increased as- stressed the importance and urgency of the propos- sertiveness of Soviet power, evolving Chinese nu- al, which could frustrate the designs of those who clear capability, and rising Japanese nationalism, would disrupt Asia's peace. It has been charged all of which will necessitate greater independence that through this proposal the Soviet Union is of Tokyo's foreign and national-security policies. seeking to fill the vacuum that would result after Japan will become a great military power. Despite Great Britain's withdrawal or that it is a means some conflict over Tokyo's relations with China of establishing a new military alliance. These and the U.S.S.R., Japanese and American interests accusations are unfounded. The only alternative will coincide over the long run. It would there- to the dangerous course of eventa in Asia is a fore be surprising if the Japanese-were to con- collective security system that "would guarantee clude that the U.S.-Japan alliance is no longer fruitful cooperation between the Asian countries 24 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

in the interests of strengthening their indepen- support efforts toward greater cooperation and dence and security, and in the interests of peace unity among Europeans to counter Soviet efforts to in Asia and the whole world." keep Europe divided. For this reason the United States should encourage West European initiatives for negotiation with the Soviet Union and Eastern 111 Europe on a broad range of problems; independent

Black, E. F. MEANWHILE, BACK IN PRAGUE. . . . Far initiatives like West Germany's Ostpolitik have Eastern economic review, v. 69, July 2, 1970: 78- little chance of success without united Western 80. illus. HC411.F18, v. 69 support.

Over the last 5 years, the Soviet Union has made massive military preparations for war with Commu- 113 nist China. The number of regular Russian divi- Buschmann, Martha, and Hans Brender. [QUESTIONS OF sions deployed along the Sino-Soviet border has EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE SECURITY CONFERENCE.] nearly tripled since 1965, and East European sat- Fragen der europaischen Sicherheit und der Sicher- ellites are reportedly committed to deploying heitskonferenz. Blgtter far deutsche und interna- troops in the Far East in the event of war.While tionale Politik, v. 15, June 1970: 554-557. large-scale defensive measures are being undertak- D839B57, v. 15 en in China against the increasing possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack, the full implications of Contends that West Germany should accept the these developments have been deliberately ignored Warsaw Pact countries' call for a European securi- by the United States. The administration seems to ty conference withou:, reservation, in view of the be making every effort to prevent this and other increasing American adventurism shown in the Cam- crucial issues from disrupting the strategic arms bodian attack and in view of the disastrous bur- limitation talks (SALT). Although "no one can dens of the arms race. The proposed conference foretell the fateful repercussions of an Asian would inaugurate the social and economic coopera- continental war," Harrison Salisbury feels that tion necessary if the nations of Europe are to the war will be nuclear, and "even if the US could overcome American dominance of world markets.To escape direct involvement it could not escape the pressure governments into responding to the popu- resulting nuclear fall-out." President Nixon has lar will, a European peoples' conference should said that the United States will maintain a neu- be convened representing all forces acting for tral stance in the dispute, but in such a poten- peace. tially explosive situation "inaction can influence the deadly equation of power as much as action." Dr. Stefan T. Possony, a leading American authority on Sino-Soviet relations, warns that "the Sino- 114 Soviet conflict is becoming increasingly critical" Campbell, John C. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: AN and points out that "the historic avid strategic AMERICAN POLICY. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. factors which underlie this conflict will outlast 1970: 51-69. D410.F6, v. 49 local crises and even basic alterations of international power relationships." Possony believes Even if Israeli leaders are correct in their be- that the Soviets will aim for an agreement at the lief that Israel can meet any foreseeable Arab SALT talks that would guarantee U.S. neutrality in threat by maintaining military superiority, they case of Soviet military operations against China. may be faced with increasing domestic and interna- He suggests also that the Soviet Union's military tional difficulties that will pose equally serious buildup in the Near East is closely related to its threats. The Arabs, on the other hand, incited by preparations for war against China and that the militant Palestinians, persist in the illusion Sino-Soviet dispute dominates both of their poli- that they will eventually defeat Israel. The So- cies in Southeast Asia. viet Union has greatly expanded its influence in the Arab world, but it does not dominate any of the Arab countries nor does it have any reasonable 112 chance of doing so in the future. This does not Brzezinski, Zbigniew. AMERICA AND EUROPE. Foreign mean that the United States can afford to be in- affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 11-30. different toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. "By D41o.F6, v. 49 taking the role of advocate of a fair settlement not tied to either side and obviously not based on The restoration of Europe to its position as a tactical considerations, the United States would major force in world politics should be a primary be presenting to Israel, the Arabs and the Soviet goal of U.S. foreign policy. The stability of Eu- Union an alternative to their present policies." rope's post-World War II division into Soviet and Such a settlement might provide for Arab recogni- American zones is deceptive:it is unpopular tion of Israel; Israeli withdrawal from the occu- among Europeans, it depends on two non-European pied territories; reestablishment of the frontiers powers, and it lacks ideological consensus. In that existed on June 4, 1967, with minor adjust- contrast to the innovative and revolutionary im- ments; U.N. administration of special areas, such pact of U.S. relations with Europe, the Soviet im- as the Gaza strip and East Jerusalem, and the sta- pact has been generally conservative, if not reac- tioning of U.N. peacekeeping forces in demilitar- tionary. Despite intensive industrialization and ized zones on both sides of the frontiers; recog- modernization programs, Eastern Europe remains nition of Israeli rights to use the Suez Canal and scientifically and technologically inferior to the Strait of Tiran; recognition of the Palestini- Western Europe, and the gap is widening.Europe an Arabs' right to nationhood and compensation for can be restored only by the reassociation of its the Palestinian refugees; and international guar- eastern and western halves, which in turn requires antees, including a specific guarantee by the a united Western Europe. The United States must United States to Israel. fl n THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVI1ONMENT 25

115 have as little future significance as the French CHINA AND THE USSR--PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND POWER. gestures to South America or Canada. China report, v. 6, Mar./Apr. 1970: 1-17. DS777.55.C4484, v. 6 "The author of this article is a French special- 118 ist of Sino-Soviet relations whose high functions Germany (Democratic Republic, 1949- ) Staatssekre- oblige him to remain anonymous." tariat far Westdeutsche Fragen. [THE GERMAN DEM- A slightly abridged translation of an article OCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE WEST GERMANS: WHAT DON published in Preuves "in its first issue of 1970." THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC MEAN FOR THE WEST AP2O.P74 GERMAN WORKERS? HOW DID THE NEW WAY BEGIN? WHAT IF? WHAT IS IMPORTANT TODAY?)Die DDR and die Examines the causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute Westdeutschen. Was bedeutet die DDR far die West- and discusses some Western experts' doubts about deutschen Werktgtigen? Womit begann der neue Weg? the very existence of the conflict. Geopolitical Was ware wenn?Worauf kommt es heute an? [n.p., factors seem to render some form of conflict in- 19697] 30 p. DD261.4.A5485 evitable, ideology notwithstanding. While the two At head of title: Antwort aus der DDR. powers may have been on the brink of war in Sep- tember 1969, the outbreak of war in the immediate The Socialist development of the German Demo- future seems very improbable. However, "their cratic Republic has meant the erection of norms rivalry will persist, alternating between tension for progress in all social areas, which exerts an and relative detente." increasingly profound influence on West Germany. After the failure of their efforts through cold war, economic aggression, and political adventur- 116 ism to abort the successful course of socialism, Durbrow, Elbridge. LAOS AND VIETNAM--THE SAME WAR. the West German capitalists and their Bonn politi- In American Security Council. Washington report, cal puppets talk meaninglessly of "reform" and the Apr. 6, 1970: 1-4. Ser "all-German model."The workers and democrats of West Germany will find strong support in the so- "Hanoi's intensified aggression against South cialism of the German Democratic Republic. They Vietnam started in Laos in 1959."Communist sup- must first eradicate the poison of anticommunism port for the puppet Pathet Lao forces in north- from their minds and accept their complete respon- eastern Laos in 1959 served as a convenient diver- sibility for the actions of the Federal Republic. sion for Hanoi's main goal, reactivation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern and southern Laos, which was essential for the "liberation" of South Viet- 119 nam. Massive Soviet aid to the Pathet Lao forces THE GULF; IMPLICATIONS OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. Wash- in late 1960 and early 1961 brought strong pro- ington, Center for Strategic and International tests from President Kennedy and led to negotia- Studies, Georgetown University, 1969. 110 p. tions that culminated in a shaky compromise in map. (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. July 1962. In the meantime, Hanoi continued its Center for Strategic and Internationa). Studies. buildup of forces and supplies in South Vietnam Special report series, no. 8) and consolidated its hold over the Ho Chi Minh DS326.O84 Trail. "There is, therefore, no question about Consists of a background paper and a report of a creating a 'new Vietnam' in Laos: there has al- panel discussion organized by the Center for Stra- ways been just one Vietnamese war, which started tegic and International Studies, Georgetown Uni- in, and continues in, Laos and Cambodia as well as versity. South Vietnam." "Summary" (7 p.) inserted.

Contents.--Preface.--Members of the panel.- - 117 pt. 1. Policy findings and recommendations: In- FRANCE WOOS LIBYANS WITH ARMS AND AID, by a special troduction. Panel policy findings and recommenda- correspondent. Africa report, v. 15, June 1970: tions. Additional comments of individual panel- 20-21. DTA217, v. 15 ists.--pt. 2. The background paper: Description of the Gulf area. Issues and interests. Inter- The sale to Libya of 100 Mirage jet fighters ested parties. Present military balance in and should be seen in the total context of the French around the Gulf. Effects of announcement of Brit- presence there. Fearful of the oppressiveness of ish withdrawal. Possible threats tc peace and Soviet tutelage, the Libyan revolutionaries re- stability in the Gulf. jected the United States and Great Britain as too closely tied to the deposed monarchy and already A panel discussion assessing the strategic sig- too powerful before turning to France.The French nificanceof the Persian Gulf and the dangers of

intention was to use military cooperation as a . the British plan to withdraw militarily from the wedge for entering other realms. Paris and Tripo- area by late 1971. A majority of the panel be- li now are in tacit political agreement to reduce lieves this timetable should be modified. Main- the chance of conflict over the Chad question. taining some British military forces in the Gulf However, positive relations remain fragile, and somewhat longer would allow additional time for the projected Libyan federation with Egypt and the the emergence of local political and military Sudan will not advance French interests.In any structures and the development of intraregional conflict with the Maghreb states, France would cooperation, with the aim of excluding Soviet mil- side against Libya. It is questionable whether itary aid and influence. The long-term solution France has the means or the intentions of making to the region's security problem can be based only major investments in Libya. Without practical on indigenous cooperation within an agreed frame- economic assistance, Franco-Libyan relations may work."British and U.S. naval visits should be - 26 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

continued, and naval visits by other Western pow- 123 ers encouraged. The United States should also Hunter, Robert E. SECURITY IN EUROPE. London, study the possibility of creating a large Indian Elek, 1969. 188 p. (International relations se- Ocean naval task force to counter the potential ries, v. 2) D1058.H85 1969 Soviet naval threat in the region. Sketches the development of the East-West confrontation in Europe and presents strategic fac- 120 tors relevant to European security as they devel- Hart, Parker T. AN AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE MID- oped over the years. Hunter asserts that the DLE EAST. InAmerican Academy of Political and problems of European security were related not to Social Science, Philadelphia. A new American pos- military matters but to those of political organi- ture toward Asia. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its An- zation and stability and economic strength and re- nals, v. 390, July 1970) p. 98-113. covery. After World War II the need for a Euro- Hl.A4, v. 390 pean security system was evident in light of the conflicting interests of the United States and the America is being pressed by two emotionally Soviet Union, but the forms and methods chosen to charged nations to serve their own, not our, na- resolve these disputes stemmed primarily from mis- tional interests, and all our relations with the perceptions. Thus the structure of both NATO and Middle East are being polarized on the Arab-Israe- the precursors of the Warsaw Treaty Organization li issue although that is not the only important were shaped. Paradoxically, the entire fabric of issue there. Our internal politics have often European security, symbolized by the establishment made it difficult to pursue either our own nation- of two opposing blocs, provided both an added im- al interest or even-handed justice. The history petus to the cold war and the first step toward of Palestine is full of missed opportunities for its end. The creation of a status quo engendered more equitable solutions than are available today. "the basis for ending these mutual hostilities The expatriate Palestinian Arabs make any settle- that were founded on a lack of certainty about the ment difficult but no settlement is possible tt..t manner in which political relations on the Conti- excludes the Arabs of Palestine. The Big Powers nent were to be ordered." have been too involved and are too suspect; a settlement can come only through the mediation of lesser powers, preferably from the Northern Tier states. A proposed settlement is outlinc.d. (Ab- stract supplied) 124 Kilmarx, Robert A., and Alvin J. Cottrel.THE USSR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Air Force and space digest, 121 v.53, Aug. 1970: 40-46. illus. Hartmann, Karl. [VATICAN, POLISH BISHOPS, ODER- UG633.A65, v. 53 NEISSE]Vatikan, polnischer Episkopat, Oder- Neisse. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, June 1970: 348-357. Countering the Soviet military buildup in the D839.A885, v. 21 Near East and the Mediterranean "involves higher risks for the United States than at any time or in The West German-Polish talks now underway in any place since World War II."Maj. Gen. E. B. Warsaw and the recent appeal of the Polish episco- LeBailly, Commander of the 16th Air Force, has pacy for Vatican recognition accentuate the impor- said that "land-based airpower is the key to con- tance of a solution to the troublesome question of trolling the Mediterranean and other water-adja- the Oder-Neisse boundary. The Polish Communist cent areas." Although the United States may be regime attempts to use the Vatican's failure to able to maintain short-term air balance in the act before international agreement to split the Near East by providing aircraft to Israel, the people from the Church and the priests from the overall air balance has been lost. NATO still en- bishops. The Polish bishops, who are fully in ac- joys numerical naval superiority in the Mediter- cord with the government on the legitimacy of the ranean, but the balance there would be upset by new boundaries, have been reproved as excessively further Soviet naval and air deployment in the nationalistic by some church authorities. The area. The 16th Air Force cannot effectively coun- Vatican refusal to place the lands in question unter the buildup of Soviet airpower in the Arab der the administrative Jurisdiction of the Polish countries. If the Soviet Union's land-based air Church is popularly ascribed to West German influ- capabilities in the Mediterranean area continue to ence. The position that West Germany takes at the grow, the 6th Fleet will have to divert aircraft Vatican on the Oder-Neisse line may determine the from strike commitments to fleet defense, and it future course of Bonn-Warsaw rapprochement. may be unable to deter future Soviet incursions. "This limits the muscle the US can bring to bear in pressing for a diplomatic settlement."The 122 United States should develop a more comprehensive Hauer, Christian E. CRISIS AND CONSCIENCE IN THE Mediterranean strategy, with a clear statement of MIDDLE EAST. Introd. by Hugh Scott. Chicago, interests and commitments. Greater emphasis Quadrangle Books, 1970. 159 p. illus. should be placed on new linkages with allies and DS119.7.H38 friendly nations, coordinated military exercises, Bibliography: p. 154-155. joint planning, and NATO capabilities in the Medi- terranean. Both the 16th Air Force and 6th Fleet Asserts that a solution to the Middle East cri- should be augmented and modernized. The Govern- sis depends on the Arabs' willingness to recognize ment should state in no uncertain terms that it the existence of Israel and discusses possible so- will not "abandon the Mediterranean to the Soviets lutions and their prospects. and their radical, anti-Western proxies." 90 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMEN" 27

125 that their boundaries with China are settled and Kimche, Jon. THE SECOND ARAB AWAKENING. New York, that negotiations would be a facade for irreden- Holt, Rinehart and Winston C1970] 288 p. maps. tism. When in 1962 India sought to press an im- DS62.8.K54 1970b probable claim to the Aksai Chin territory by force, the Chinese responded by invading several Contents.--Introduction.--The Kaiser's initia- Indian territories. In 1964 Sino-Soviet boundary tive.--The Anglo-French settlement.--Egypt at the negotiations broke down because of mutual hostili- center.--Iraq and Transjordan.--Israel: state or ty and distrust and "Moscow's refusal to submit nation?--Palestine: nation or dispersion?--Chro- the [boundary] question to comprehensive negotia- nology.--Notes.--Bibliography.--Index. tions."Renewed negotiations have been deadlocked by Moscow's contention that China is seeking irre- The Arab nations' emergence from Great Power tu- dentist claims. The Kremlin's motive for misrep- telage during the half century following the end resenting Peking's policy lies in China's steady of Turkish control. Kimche focuses on British growth in power and the Soviet Union's unwilling- diplomacy in the Middle East and on the primary ness to accept a genuine third force in the inter- role of Egypt in the rise of Arab nationalism. He national community. However, China is becoming concludes that the key to a peaceful resolution of just such a force, and "the question is whether the Arab-Israeli conflict is the establishment of the Russians will accept it, or try to break Chi- a state of Palestine on the West Bank. na's power while they still can."

126 129 Litvinoff, Boris. WILL THERE BE A RUSSO-CHINESE Norodom Sihanouk Varman, King of Cambodia. THE FU- WAR? NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, June/July TURE OF CAMBODIA. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 16-18. UA646.F5, v. 15 1970: 1-10. D410.F6, v. 49

Discusses recent speculation by Harrison Salis- "Neither Lon Nol nor President Nixon has left bury and the two Soviet writers Andrei Amalrik Cambodians any alternative to armed struggle and and Serge Tikhvinski over the possibility of war revolution" in their fight to regain their free- between the Soviet Union and Communist China, and dom, dignity, and independence.The Lon Nol group appends the author's own estimate of the situa- seized power by unconstitutional and undemocratic tion. For the immediate future, the dispute be- means and ruthlessly suppressed all opposition. tween the two Communist giants will take the form The Phnom Penh-Saigon-Bangkok-Vientiane axis can- of a war of attrition, waged largely with politi- not win the support of the peoples of Southeast cal weapons but punctuated from time to time by Asia, because it is basically an artificial crea- "hot wars" along the frontier. In 5 or 10 years, tion of the United States imposed against their when the Chinese have achieved a rough equality in will. Communism may appear terrifying to rich nuclear weaponry, the decisive confrontation could bourgeois and feudalists, but to the masses of take place. Political changes on one side or the Asia it appears as a means of deliverance from so- other might head off a military showdown, but this cial injustice and corruption. The Lon Nol coup seems unlikely. d'etat has forced Cambodian nationalists to make common cause with Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnam- ese Communists, while the feudalists and militar- 127 ists in Phnom Penh and Saigon have united in a Maxwell, Neville. CHINA AND INDIA: THE UN-NEGOTI- "marriage of convenience." Increased U.S. armed ATED DISPUTE.China quarterly, no. 43, July/Sept. intervention in Indochina will only make more dif- 1970: 47-80. illus. ficult the establishment of genuinely neutralist DS701.C472, 1970 governments following the war. China has every reason to respect Cambodian and Laotian neutrali- Examines the issues in the Sino-Indian border ty, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has al- dispute through a chronological presentation and ready demonstrated its independence of both China analysis of diplomatic exchanges and official and the Soviet Union. Resistance to the Lon Nol statements. The author attempts to demonstrate regime cannot be crushed. "If they are clearly why the dispute remains unnegotiated. He con- understood, the long-term interests of the United cludes that the Sino-Indian boundary question was States ought to impel its government to respect not submitted to negotiation because the Indian this resistance instead of treating it as hos- Government decided in the early 1950s that to do tile." so would not be in their country's interest; and because it held to that policy in spite of diplomatic deadlock and defeat at arms." 130 OSTPOLITIK. InAustralia. Department of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, 128 v. 41, June 1970: 317-321. Maxwell, Neville, THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. Swiss JX1162.A33, v. 41 review of world affairs, v. 20, July 1970: 7-9. D839.59, v. 20 Examines the events leading up to the Erfurt and Kassel meetings between representatives of the The Communist Chinese are interested not in re- Federal Republic of Germany and the German Demo- storing China's imperial boundaries but in defin- cratic Republic. The policy of the Brandt regime ing their boundaries on the basis of the status in taking the initiative in establishing a dialog quo. Although many of China's neighbors have ne- is sketched, and the main points made at Erfurt gotiated boundary settlements with Peking, India and Kassel are outlined. These talks are report- and the Soviet Union have refused, maintaining edly connected closely with West German talks with

. nor) 28 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Poland and the Soviet Union and the discussion in method for safeguarding New Zealand's interests, Berlin between the ambassadors of the four powers. and Myrdal deplores the U.S. involvement in Viet- nam and its tragic consequences for the basic ideals of Western civilization. 131 THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN ITS VARIOUS DIMENSIONS. 133 Middle East forum, v. 46, no. 1, 1970: 27-60. Peretz, Don. THE PALESTINE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM. DS41 .M45, v. 46 [Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp.] 1969. 74 p. Addresses delivered at the World Conference of ([Rand Corporation. Memorandum] RM-5973-FF) Christians for Palestine in Beirut, May 7-10, 14180.A1R36 no. 5973 1970. "Research program on economic and political problems and prospects of the Middle East, the Contents.--An introductory survey, by Constan- Rand Corporation/Resources for the Future." tine Zurayk.--In historical retrospect, by Bruhan Includes bibliographical references. Dajjani.--The humanitarian aspect, by George Dib. --Some social and economic facts, by George Corm. Contents.--Introduction.--Origin of the problem. --Nature of the problem.--The changing refugee Reports on the Palestine problem. The implica- problem.--The political constant.--Consequences of tions of the problem are summarized by Zurayk, and the Six Day War.--Can the Arab refugee problem be the major events and developments are emphasized solved. in Dajjani's address. Dib presents evidence at- testing to inhuman treatment and suffering in Pal- No discernible progress has been made toward re- estine, while Corm exposes the social and economic solving the problem of Palestinian irredentisi., exploitation behind Israel's religious and politi- probably the most volatile element in the present cal idealism. Near East crisis and almost certain to trigger renewed warfare. "While there is hope of resolving

the economic problems of the Arab countries . . . 132 there seems little possibility of resolving the Peace, Power and Politics in Asia Conference Commit- dilemma created by intensification of Palestine PEACE, POWER, POLITICS IN ASIA; THE BACK- tee. Arab consciousness within the framework of exist- GROUND. [Wellington, 19683 79 p. ing Middle East relationships." Those peace plans DS35.P42 that have attempted to reconcile Palestine Arab Includes bibliographies. irredentism and Israel's existence have not gained Papers compiled as background for the Peace, the support of any government. U.S. and Soviet Power and Politics in Asia Conference, Wellington, policies, however, can strongly influence the de- N.Z., March 30-April 2, 1968. gree to which Near Eastern countries continue to oppose alternatives to the status quo. "Although Contents.--Causes and character of guerrilla and the great powers cannot force the Arabs and the counter-guerrilla warfare in South-east Asia, by Israelis to make peace, they can do much to create William J. Pomeroy.--The course of the war, by an atmosphere in which the benefits of a peaceful Wilfred Burchett.--Vietnam: a crisis of indeci- solution to the Palestine and to the refugee prob- sion, by Robert Shaplen.--Waiting for Ho Chi Minh, lem become the wisest policy for governments in by Adam Roberts.--The start of SEATO, by James A. Joyce.--United States involvement in Vietnam and the area to follow." the rule of law, by William L. Standard.--New Zea- 134 land and the international alliance net, by David McIntyre.--The political and moral isolation of Pledge, Robert. FRANCE AT WAR IN AFRICA. Africa America, by Gunnar Myrdal.--References on Vietnam. report, v. 15, June 1970: 16-19. --Notes on contributors. DT1.A217, v. 15

Analyses of the Vietnam War and its implications The French forces employed in Chad claim that their technical and logistic superiority has dec- for Asian politics and world peace. Pomeroy re- imated most of the large rebel groups. counts the history of post-World War II guerrilla However, whether French intervention has been successful in movements in Indochina, Indonesia, the Philip- the sense of preventing the complete disintegra- pines, and Malaya and assesses Western attempts to tion of President Tombalbaye's army and adminis- suppress these movements through military inter- tration cannot be determined with certainty. Re- vention. Burchett contends that the guerrilla strategy of the South Vietnam National Liberation lations between French forces and the Chadians are Front has been vindicated by the Tet offensive. difficult, since neither side seems to possess the Shaplen dismisses the possibility of a military diplomatic skills necessary for an alliance. Be- cause of its geography, Chad is considered strate- defeat of the Vietnamese Communists and suggests terms for a negotiated peace settlement.Roberts gically important for the maintenance of France's examines diplomatic exchanges between North Viet- presence in Africa, and Paris thinks President nam and the United States and finds the latter's Tombalbaye the best guarantor of this presence. proposals preclude the possibility of a negotiated The ultimate survival of the present regime in Chad, however, will depend on a reform of the ad- end to the war. Joyce discusses the formation of SEATO in the context of the 1954 Geneva conference ministrative structure to recognize the rights of the Moslems of the north. on Indochina and concludes that SEATO is primarily aimed at the isolation and encirclement of China. Standard charges that U.S. intervention in the 135 Vietnam War is a violation of both the U.S. Con- Radovanovi6, Ljubomir. THE BALKANS AND THE MEDITER- stitution and international law. McIntyre ques- RANEAN. Review of international affairs, v. 21, tions whether New Zealand's participation in such June 5, 1970: 18, 23-25. Western alliances as SEATO and ANZUS is the best D839.R4, v. 21 9 4 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 29

The factors historically dominating the develop- Contents.--Preface.--America and the Arabs.--The ment of the Balkans, such as the pressure of for- course of U.S. policy.--The pattern of Arab poli- eign powers or the Macedonian problem, have either cy.- -The Arab-Israeli confrontation, May-June disappeared or been greatly altered. However 1967.--Consequences of the 1967 war.--The problems events today show again the inextricable connec- of Jerusalem and the Suez Canal.--The problem of tion of Balkan security with the events in the en- the Palestinian refugees.--Palestinian resistance. tire region surrounding the Balkan peninsula. --The prospects for peace.--Index. Bloc alinements and the resulting creation of massive military systems have in effect returned the Treats U.S. policy in the Middle East since Balkans to their historic position of vulnerabili- World War II, the decisionmaking processes in the ty to the exigencies of foreign diplomacy. The Arab countries, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and Balkan countries must be especially concerned with its consequences. Sharabi focuses on four key the issues capable of upsetting the balance in the problems that underlie the Middle East crisis: Mediterranean, the most important of which is the the status of Jerusalem, the Suez Canal, the Pal- Middle East crisis. The confrontation of the su- estinian refugees, and the Palestinian resistance perpower naval forces in the Mediterranean gives movements. He concludes that the prospects for justifiable cause for anxiety to all nations in peace are poor because of the irreconcilable the area. If bloc boundaries in the Balkans can- claims of Zionists and Arabs. not be erased, "there is no unbridgeable obstacle to other bridges of understanding and mutual co- 139 operation being built over them." Sievert, Regina, and Helmut Bilstein.CALL-GERMAN CONTACTS; EXPERIENCE WITH PARTY AND GOVERNMENT 136 DIALOGS] Gesamtdeutsche Kontakte; Erfahrungen mit Ramsey, Russell W., comp. SOME KEYS TO THE VIETNAM Parteien- und Regierungsdialog. Opladen, C. W. PUZZLE. Gainesville, 1968. 55 p. (University of Leske, 1969. 162 p. (Analysen, Bd. 1) Florida Libraries. Dept. of Reference and Bib- DD259.4.S52 liography. Bibliographic series, no. 7) Ver6ffentlichung der Akademie ftir Wirtschaft und Z3228.V5R3 Politik, Hamburg. Bibliography: p. 158-162. An annotated bibliography of 174 books pertaining to Vietnam. Ramsey contends that much of the Partial contents.--pt. 1. Analysis. Introduc- division within American society over the war lies tion: all-German contacts--opportunity or danger. in the lack of solid knowledge about Southeast Status of the German question, 1965/1966. Alter- Asia. native conceptions for the intra-German relationship. The decision for the SED-SPD dialog, 1966. 137 Reactions in the Federal Republic: the old road or a reorientation? Reactions in East Germany: Reinhardt, G. Frederick. THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE new road or immobility? A Great Coalition with a 1970'S. Air University review, v. 21, May/June new Ostpolitik?--pt. 2. Supplements and materi- 1970: 41-50. TL501.A5574, v. 21 als. Constitutional provisions and legal regula- Adapted from the author's Sept. 30, 1969, speech tions. The exchange of correspondence. The Ger- in the Thomas D. White lecture series at the Air man policy of the Great coalition. International University. regulations. Basic positions: program points, sketches, and positions taken.--Chronology. Reviews political, military, and economic developments in the Near East during the last decade. Describes the efforts made by the Socialist Uni- The author concludes that the Soviet Union will ty Party of East Germany and the Social Democrats continue to exploit opportunities for expanding of West Germany to undetake a public dialog out- its influence but will avoid a direct confronta- side the conventional frame of intergovernmental tion with the United States. In order to prevent communication. The exchange of speakers was fol- escalation to a "general catastrophe," Moscow will lowed by correspondence between Willi Stoph and agree to participate in efforts to contain the Kiesinger and between the economic ministers of Arab-Israeli conflict. While the growth of the the two Germanys after the formation of the West Soviet fleet has modified the balance of powar in German Great Coalition. The Czech intervention of the Mediterranean, Soviet maritime force there re- August 1968 broke off this unofficial effort at mains far inferior to the Sixth Fleet in strength reconciliation. The authors conclude that "the and firepower. The United States will continue to problems, conflicts, and necessities of decision, work for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dis- as they were first revealed in the project for the pute, while attempting to cultivate better rela- exchange of speakers, remain unaltered even under tions with both conservative and radical Arabs. the changed conditions." At the same time Washington should give renewed attention to Turkey and Iran, and consider augmenting its naval capabilities in the Persian 140 Gulf. "Instability and strife and the confronta- SOVIET-GERMAN TREATY - -DANGEROUS PLOT AGAINST PEOPLE tion of the super powers will continue to prevail OF EUROPE AND THE WORLD. Peking review, v. 13, in that part of the worle for some time to come." Sept. 18, 1970: 12-16. DS701.P42, v. 13 August 22, 1970, editorial from the Albanian 138 newspaper Zeri i Popullit. Sharabi, Hisham B. PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: THE LE- Ser THAL DILEMMA. New York, Pegasus :c1969] 224 p. illus. DS119.7.S458 Charges that Moscow capitulated on the German Bibliographical footnotes. question at the expense of East Germany. Until 30 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

recently the Soviet Union had insisted on full ed. [Bonn, New York, Edition Atlantic-Forum, recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a 1969.] 166 p. illus. prerequisite to any agreement with Bonn. However DD801.035W47 1969 "not a shadow of this promise has remained in the Translation of Das Oder-Neisse-Problem. treaty," although the Soviets claim the agreement Bibliographical footnotes. stipulates that both parties recognize the invio- lability of the border between the Federal Repub- Contents.--Foreword.--Introduction.--The prob- lic and the German Democratic Republic. "All lem.--Why there is no "status quo."--Polish-German these open and backstage deals between Moscow and relations through the centuries.--Poland and Ger- Bonn show that the G.D.R. has been thrown on to many in our time.--How the Oder-Neisse line came the market by the Soviet revisionists." Soviet to be.--The Oder-Neisse problem since 1945.--Pol- claims that this is an important step toward Euro- ish misgivings.--Why all Germans agree.--Bases for pean security are "sheer bluff and deception. solving the problem.--An issue that concerns the

. . . They mean their on security, the security world.--Appendix: "Charter of the German Expel- of tranquility and their plans in Europe so as to lees." concentrate their attention in Asia and other sectors to which aggressive plans are extended." Reviews the problems generated by the establishment of the Oder-Neisse border between Germany and Poland. Wilpert sketches the history of German- 141 Polish relations before and after 1945 and depicts Tatu, Michel. EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE: IT the injustices committed against Germans expelled MIGHT ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE. Atlantic Community from territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. He quarterly, v. 8, fall 1970: 309-312. contends that these problems can be settled only D(339A(35, v. 8 on the basis of negotiations between a reunified Reprinted from the weekly English selection of Germany and an independent Poland. Le Monde. Ser 143 The memorandum drawn up at the Warsaw Pact for- Windsor, Philip. GERMAN REUNIFICATION. London, eign ministers conference held in Budapest, Elek, 1969. 140 p. (International relations se- June 21-22, 1970, contained three concessions with ries) DD257.25.W496 respect to the proposed European security conference: acceptance of U.S. and Canadian participa- Contents.--The nature of the German problem.- - tion; an enlargement of the conference's agenda to The process of division.--The consolidation of the include cultural relations as well as human envi- Federal Republic.--Stalinist policy and East Ger- ronmental problems; and a proposal that foreign many.--The dialectics of the German question.--The troop reductions be discussed by a special body new meaning of reunification.--The attempt at im- designated by the conference. Although most Euro- mobilism. pean governments prefer a series of meetings to a single conference, such recent developments as the Gives a history of "the German problem" since memorandum have restored some substance to the World War II. Windsor emphasizes the need for project. "Barring some new crisis, it is not im- viewing the problems engendered by Germany's divi- possible that a European conference will be con- sion in a historical context that brings to light vened next year." the interaction of various competing interests, both national and international. He argues that "some form of reunification must be brought about 142 if the inextricable connection between the divi- Wilpert, Friedrich von. THE ODER -NEISSE PROBLEM. sion of Europe and the division of Germany is to TOWARDS FAIR PLAY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. 2nd, rev. be broken."

36 II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

MODERN WAR 145 Dupuy, Richard Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy. THE EN- 144 CYLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY: FROM 3500 B.C. TO Carroll, Berenice A. HOW WARS END: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT. New York, Evanston, Harper & Row SOME CURRENT HYPOTHESES. Journal of peace re- [1970] 1406 p. D25.A2D8 search, no. 4, 1969: 295-321. AS9.J6, 1969 History of wars and military affairs. Each of "Part of a larger comparative study of wars end- the 21 chapters deals with a particular period and ing since 1775." includes an essay describing the military trends, Includes summaries in English and Russian. leaders, and weapons, with separate sections discussing the military affairs of different coun- An analysis of the problem of war termination is tries and regions. There is a general index, an presented in this article. A number of hypotheses index of wars, and an index of battles and seiges. put forward to date are examined, including both The authors sketch the first attempts by the descriptive and analytical hypotheses, concerning Church, during the 10th century, to control war the form of war endings, the duration of warfare, and describe control efforts that took place be- and the processes which play a part in bringing tween the world wars and during the cold war. hostilities to an end. Suggestions are offered concerning classification of wars, classification of war endings, and relationships between the two. 146 Among the descriptive hypotheses considered is the Falk, Conrad. [GUERRILLA PSYCHOLOGY] Psychologie widespread notion that "most wars end in peace der Guerillas. Allgemeine schweizerische militar- treaties," which appears to be true of large-scale zeitschrift, v. 136, July 1970: 506-511. international wars in the twentieth century, but U3.A43, v. 136 not true of colonial, civil and revolutionary Bibliography: p. 511-512. struggles. A number of hypotheses concerning "termination points" in warfare are examined, in- Outlines general criteria and characteristics of cluding Klingberg's military indices (battle casu- guerrilla warfare, pointing out the importance of alties and population losses, size of armies, ideology and propaganda as a means of strengthen- etc.); Coser's "markers" (capture of a capital ing the morale of the guerrillas. The author city or charismatic leader, reaching of a bounda- tol:,hes on terrorism, population, and cities. He ry, etc.); and Galtung's views on termination tribes the development of guerrilla activities points. Analytical hypotheses, on how hostilities sr, points to the psychopathology resulting from are brought to an end, are seen to be influenced the impermanence of guerrilla movements. He ana- by at least one of four underlying assumptions: lyzes the dangers resulting from the underestima- (1) that wars end in "victory" or "defeat"; (2) tion of guerrilla units by conventional troops. that war termination is a matter of rational cal- The guerrilla problem has its own characteristics culation by the adversaries; (3) that war endings in every region, and only very basic similarities are determined by laws of history or of mass be- exist. An understanding of guerrilla warfare is havior, to which both of the preceding are more or essential to the comprehension of modern war. less irrelevant; (4) that war endings are deter- Even in this time of sophisticated computer-calcu- mined by past events and present conditions, with lated military planning the quotation from Thucy- little regard for perceptions of the future.In dides holds true: "In human relations right will discussing hypotheses influenced by the first as- only come into play when the distribution of pow- sumption, such as Calahan's assertion that "war is ers is even; but the stronger party will do every- prEased by the victor, but peace is made by the thing possible to prevail, and the wearer party vanquished," a classification of conceptions of will submit." "victory" and "winning" is offered. Under hypotheses of rational calculation, we examine particularly Porsholt's conflict formula and Wright's es- 147 calation formula, and their application and modi- Haas, Michael. THREE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF fication in the context of war termination.De- WAR. International journal of comparative sociol- terministic hypotheses and the influence of past- ogy, v. 11, Mar. 1970: 34-47. mindedness (vs. perceptions of the future) are HM1.154, v. 11 touched upon but not examined. In conclusion, an effort is made to construct a war - termination for- Three theories of the causes of war have domi- mula for heuristic purposes. A set of nine varia- nated recent empirical research. One focuses on bles influencing war termination is proposed, and the psychology of decisionmaking elites, attribut- some relationships between the variables, and ways ing international conflict to psychodynamic ten- of describing them mathematically, are briefly sions and motivations. Research into the origins discussed. The need for further historical re- of World War I and the Cuban missile crisis lend search on war endings is emphasized. (Abstract support to this theory, but whether these consti- supplied, modified) tute special cases is yet to be determined. A

31 37 32 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

second approach, which begins with the Marxist hy- would emphasize concentration in secure bases, pothesis that socioeconomic status determines po- economy of forces to secure maximum effect, and litical attitudes, attributes international con- pacification of important areas. The "perimeter flicts to domestic strife. The aggregate statis- defense concept" advanced by General Gavin is in tical data offered as evidence for this view are complete accord with Clausewitz's precept that very impressive, and the theory promises to be a once the defensive position is impregnable the useful one; nevertheless, the data are incomplete, battle must be abandoned and the enemy compelled and deviant cases still must be accounted for. A to seek a decision in another way. Clausewitz third theory points to structural and aggregate also foresaw that in situations like that in Viet- aspects of state systems and subsystems as the ma- nam peace comes only when the enemy realizes the jor cause of war. This approach shows great prom- improbability or excessive price of success. ise but must be pushed beyond the present stage of insight to systematic empirical testing. The ultimate challenge, of course, is to expose the dy- 150 namic of conflict, whether it be psychological, Sass, Hubertus. CON THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICS societal, or systemic, and, having exposed it, AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR--CLAUSEWITZ'S TOTALITY control it. Each approach has its own prescrip- THINKING] Uber das Verhiiltnis von Politik and tions, but one may generalize: education promotes Kriegfahrung-ganzheitliches Denken bei Clausewitz. rationality and the capacity of individuals to ad- Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 20, June 1970: just to their environment. One such adjustment 309-321. U3.W485, v. 20 could be the avoidance of war. This underlines Originally presented at the Staff Academy of the the need for further research into these complex Bundeswehr during the military-scientific seminar mechanisms of international violence. "Military Leadership Thought in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries--Before, During, and After Clause- witz." 148 Hezlet, Sir Arthur R. AIRCRAFT AND SEA POWER. New War must be considered not as an isolated phe- York, Stein and Day C1970] 370 p. illus. nomenon but as part of a larger political tota_i- VG90.H48 1970b ty. The nature of each war is determined by the Bibliography: p. C3537-355. ends policymakers pursue and the means necessary to attain them. The politicians must learn the Contents.--Preface.--The birth of naval avia- essentials of the conduct of war and the effects tion.--Aircraft at sea in the early part of the of the political goal on it. A war engaged in Great War, 1914-15.--Aircraft in the North Sea and half-heartedly, in which the enemy turns out to be with the fleets, 1914-18.--Aircraft in the defeat stronger than expected, is likely to continue in- of the U-boats and in the narrow seas, 1914-18.- - definitely without achieving its political goal. The period between the wars, 1919-1939.--The Sec- Changes in military science resulting from changes ond World War: Norway to Crete, 1939-41.--Air- in politics clearly demonstrate that war is inex- craft in the attack and defense of trade, 1940-41. tricably connected with politics. Clausewitz fur- --Japanese naval air power in the Pacific, 1941 - ther pointed out that a war fought on behalf of an 42.--Air power over the sea in European waters, ally is rarely more than a business deal unless January-July, 1942.--The great carrier battles of one's awn existence is threatened. The weakness the Pacific in 1942.--Aircraft at sea in European of alliances is that they entail commitments to waters, August, 1942-45.--The victory of naval air war and peace when in fact the commitment must be power in the Pacific, 1944-45.--Air power over the made to peace. Clausewitz offered no panacea for sea since the Second World War, 1945-69.--The fu- the future. ture of aircraft at sea.--Notes.--Index.

A history of naval aviation and an evaluation of 151 its role in seapower. Hezlet foresees an impor- Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. PATTERNS IN IN- tant role for aircraft in maintaining control of TERNATIONAL WARFARE, 1816-1965. InAmerican the seas but believes that land-based aircraft Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadel- will probably replace carrier-based aircraft as phia. Collective violence. Philadelphia, 1970. the best means of achieving this goal. (Its Annals, v. 391, Sept. 1970) p. 145-155. H1.A4, v. 391

149 Patterns in international violence are discov- Ritter von Schramm, Wilhelm. [STEPS TOWARD PEACE IN ered through the quantitative analysis of interna- VIETNAM; THE CLASSIC PHILOSOPHY OF WAR AS DIREC- tional wars which resulted in more than 1,000 bat- TIVE FOR THE PRESENT] Friedensschritte far Viet- tle-connected deaths. Between 1816 and 1965, mem- nam; die klassische Kriegsphilosophie als aktuelle bers of the state system participated in 50 such Direktive.Wehrkunde, v. 19, May 1970: 225-230. interstate wars and 43 such colonial and imperial 03.W396, v. 19 conflicts. Although no secular trends are evident in terms of the frequency, magnitude, severity, Clausewitz, the classic philosopher of war, for- and intensity of these wars, the data suggest a mulated principles that are applicable to the res- twenty-year cycle in the magnitude of systemic olution of the Vietnam problem. He anticipated war. Over two thirds of all of the wars began in situations in which considerations of political either the spring or the autumn. Major powers policy force a "descent" into a state of hostili- have engaged in a disproportionate number of wars ty, characterized by a subsidence of actual con- and have suffered the most battle-connected tact while the antagonists remain a potential deaths. These same powers, however, have won most threat to each other. An American strategy in of their wars. Those on the victorious side have Vietnam derived from Clausewitzian principles often been the initiators of military hostilities.

ACT THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 33

Enduring military friendships and enmities have Contents.--Foreword.--Preface.--A new deterrent. been uncommon over the 150-year period. Further --Characteristics, research objectives.--From an- use of these basic war data should be helpful in tiquity to Napoleon.--Selection of masters: cri- the assault upon the centuries-old problem of the teria.--The nineteenth century.--The birth of mod- causes of war. (Abstract supplied) ern blitzkrieg.--World War II: personalities and engagements.--The blitz failure in the Ardennes.- - The Sinai campaigns. -- Functions of the mobile 152 staff.--The combat environment: fancy and fact.- - Thompson, Sir Robert G. K. REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN Automation of the command function via the mili- WORLD STRATEGY 1945-1969. New York, Taplinger tary-industrial complex.--The air age: the air- Pub. Co. [1970] 171 p. borne concept.--The air age: the airmobile con- HX518.S8T48 cept.--The confrontation deterrent.--Attainment of the blitz capability.--Index. Contents.--Author's note.--Foreword.--Revolu- tionary war.--Russian foreign policy.--The cold Contends that blitzkrieg offers a more effective war.--China and South East Asia.--From co-exis- alternative to nuclear war than does limited war tence to the Sino-Soviet dispute.--Africa and La- of the type being waged in Vietnam. The authors tin America.--Vietnam.--No more Vietnams.--Index. sketch the history of lightning war, focusing on the leadership abilities essential to its success- Contends that the Soviet Union and Communist ful implementation. China have used revolutionary war to reinforce the defense of the Communist bloc and in pursuit of their ultimate goal of world domination. Thompson sees Vietnam as a test case in which the effectiveness of revolutionary war as an instrument of MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED Communist policy will be decided; he urges Western TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS European support for the present long-term, low- cost counterrevolutionary strategy of the United States. 155 [ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE]. Navy, v. 13, July/Aug. 1970: 16-32. VA49.N28, v. 13 153 Wasserstrom, Richard A., pomp. WAR AND MORALITY. Contents.--ASW cutbacks come at a crucial time, Belmont, Calif., Wadsworth [1970] 136 p. (Basic by Larry L. Booda.--Need for air ASW never great- problems in philosophy series) er, by John G. Norris.--USS Spruace promises to U22.W37 revitalize destroyer fleet, by W. J. O'Neill.- - Soviets put high priority on sub-killer subma- Contents.--Introduction.--The moral equivalent rines. of war, by William James.--The morality of oblit- eration bombing, by John C. Ford.--War and murder, Articles on recent developments in the U.S. an- by Elizabeth Anscombe.--Moral judgment in time of tisubmarine warfare (ASW) program. The articles war, by Michael Walzer.--Pacifism:a philosophi- decry U.S. neglect of its ASW capability at a time cal analysis, by Jan Narveson.--On the morality of when the Soviet submarine threat is growing by war: a preliminary inquiry, by Richard Nasser- leaps and bounds. Booda compares Soviet and Amer- strom.--Judgment and opinion, by the International ican submarine forces and describes U.S. research Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany.--Superior orders, and development in sensors and in air and surface nuclear warfare, and the dictates of conscience, craft design and oceanography. Norris discusses by Guenter Lewy.--Selected bibliography. the use of airpower in ASW and O'Neill, new developments in destroyer design and construction. The Essays on the morality of war and specific tech- last article compares Soviet and American programs niques of modern warfare. James, in his famous for the production of attack, or killer, subma- essay, argues that human nature as currently con- rines, a key element in ASW. stituted requires a constructive alternative to war as a means of promoting those virtues now realized primarily through war. Ford contends that the deliberate bombing of civilian population cen- 156 ters is contrary to natural law. Anscombe distin- Barthel, Friedrich. [WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON SOVIET SUR- guishes between the moral and immoral uses of vio- FACE WARSHIPS]Waffensysteme auf sowjetischen lence, Waizer emphasizes the need to recognize Uberwasser-Kriegsschiffen. Soldat and Technik, different degrees of brutalit, in a given war, and v. 13, April 1970: 196-200. illus. Narveson finds the basic tents of pacifism to be U3.S58, v. 13 contradictory and untenable. Wasserstrom examines some of the criteria by which war is judged to be Speculates on the electronic systems of Soviet moral or not, while Lewy questions the morality surface warships. Figure 1 models the entire and legality of the use of nuclear weapons. weapon-ship system; its subordinate weapons, weapons control, and weapons guidance systems are mod- eled in succeeding figures.Similar schematics 154 are constructed for the weapons systems of the Yale, Wesley W., Isaac D. White, and Hasso E. von Kresta, Kashin, and Krupny guided-missile destroy- Manteuffel. ALTERNATIVE TO ARMAGEDDON; THE PEACE ers, the Miraka frigate, the OSA missile boat, and POTENTIAL OF LIGHTNING WAR. New Brunswick, N.J., the helicopter carrier Moskva. Possible fire an- Rutgers University Press [c1970]xvii, 257 p. gles and connections between weapons and weapon- illus. U167.5.L5Y34 control systems are indicated.

e) CI 34 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

157 tional defense if no bargain is struck and the Bex, John E. US DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIMAL DEFENSE system is retained. TECHNOLOGY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, 159 v. 50, Aug. 1970: 70-74. illus. THE CARRIER CONTROVERSY IN BRITAIN, by our Londoa Z6723.U35, v. 50 defense correspondent. International defense re- In the Soviet Union one positive factor in the view, v.3, June 1970: 208-210. illus. development of science and technology is the re- Ser spect accorded science as part of culture and ideology. However, Marxist ideology "contains anti- Examines the controversy over the British deci- scientific components in the form of doctrinaire sion to phase out the Royal Navy's carrier force beliefs and obligatory tenets."The one-party po- sometime in 1972. The Labor Party opposes keep- litical system hinders free creative development, ing the carriers beyond that date; the Conserva- and the lower standard of living "produces in in- tives and the three armed services would like to tellectuals a psychological reaction to anything see a two-carrier force preserved into the 1980's. which might tend to misidentify them with the man- The major use of the carriers would be to deal ual laborer."Americans, on the other hand, have with brushfire wars in the Indian Ocean area and an abundance of mechanical devices available from Southeast Asia. The Harrier, a vertical or short- childhood on, and they can afford materials and take off and landing aircraft, opens some inter- equipment to pursue hobbies or ideas. The great- esting, and still unexplored, possibilities for est potential threat to the development of science naval aviation. and technology in the United States is the existence of anti-intellectual trends in American cul- 160 tural and political life. The continued exploita- ENGINEERING WITH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. Nuclear engi- tion of scientific breakthroughs will eventually neering, v. 15, Apr. 1970: 353-355. increase national security and give America the TK9001.N75, v. 15 opportunity to apply scientific techniques to the study and resolution of social and international Reports on the activities of an international problems. symposium on engineering with nuclear explosives that met at Las Vegas, Nev., Jan. 14-16, 1970, under the sponsorship of the American Nuclear Socie- 158 ty in cooperation with the U.S. Atomic Energy Com- BOONDOGGLE OR BARGAINING CHIP? by our Washington mission. Papers were offered on a wide variety of correspondent. Nature (London) v. 227, Aug. 22, topics relating to the politics, ecology, econom- 1970: 770-772. Ql.N2, v. 227 ics, and technology of nuclear explosives engineering. It would appear from a general survey of The Senate once again has allowed deployment of the papers that "it has been adequately demon- the Safeguard system to proceed as planned.The strated that nuclear explosives can be used to issue this time was not so much whether the system produce large excavations and substantial under- would work as whether it would be needed as a bar- ground caverns but more development work is neces- gaining chip in the strategic arms limitation sary to establish whether the problems of contami- talks. Defenders of Safeguard point to recent ad- nation can be overcome and whether the costs can ditions to the Soviet strategic arsenal, particu- be reduced to levels which make the various appli- larly the SS-9 and multiple warheads, as evidence cations economic." that the need for the system is greater than ever; its opponents argue that an ABM system cannot pos- 161 sibly be effective against this new technology, Foster, John S. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE FU- that the Soviet Union knows this, and that conse- TURE AND THEIR IMPACT ON STRATEGY. Naval War Col- quently its value as a bargaining counter is lege review, v. 23, Sept. 1970: 17-22. close to zero. Given the complexity of the is- Ser sues, one might be tempted to go along with the "A lecture delivered at the Naval War College." military experts, except that these experts seem unable to make up their own minds on exactly what Discusses the interaction between U.S. defense the system is for and how it is supposed to work. research and development (R&D) and national strat- The growing disenchantment in the scientific com- egy; outlines U.S. R&D goals, current programs, munity is not very encouraging either. Much of and improved program-management policies; and as- this skepticism arises over the disquieting find- sesses trends and prospects. Foster, U.S. Direc- ings of the O'Neill report, which recommended that tor of Defense Research and Engineering, asserts the Safeguard system be replaced with a cheaper that the U.S. R&D base is adequate now, but he ex- one using smaller radars and requiring less com- presses alarm about Soviet technological capabili- plex data-processing capabilities. Similar think- ties in 10 or 20 years. IT present trends contin- ing within the Pentagon itself is reflected in the ue, the Soviet Union will soon be spending more on Army's Project Hardsite. Will either Safeguard or R&D than the United States. Even if the Soviet Hardsite be built? Proponents of the system argue threat levels off, the United States will have to that the Soviet Union will be willing to trade restructure its strategic forces to ensure their away its SS-9 for the U.S. ABM; this has been pro- survivability. posed by the United States at the strategic arms limitation talks. But whatever happens, the ad- 162 ministration stands to gain politically: it can IDEAS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN USSR. In claim credit either for the economies that will International Atomic Energy Agency. Bulletin, ensue if the system is scrapped in a tradeoff or v. 12, no. 2, 1970: 11-21. for making an important contribution to the na- QC770.I4955, v. 12 n THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 35

Based on a paper submitted by the Soviet Union are still waiting for implementation. European to the International Atomic Energy Agency for cir- nationalism is clearly still too strong for ac- culation among its members. ceptance of the complete integration of defense and armament. In contrast to a NATO-wide arrange- A survey of Soviet efforts to develop peaceful ment, a solution oriented toward Europe, which applications for nuclear explosives. Soviet re- would be fitted into the NATO context, is the search has concentrated on the use of contained "]east unattractive of all possible solutions." explosions rather than excavation blasts "due to the fact that the Soviet Union adheres strictly to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the At- 165 mosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water."Appli- cations discussed include reservoir and canal con- LaFrenz, Robert L. PROJECT PRE-GONDOLA; EXPLOSIVE struction, mining, intensified exploitation of oil CRATERING IN CLAY SHALE. Military engineer, and gas deposits, and underground storage-cavity v. 62, May/June 1970: 149-153. formation. Other applications mentioned are the TA1.P85, v. 62 construction of railway and highway cuts, the control of overburden pressures in oil and gas depos- Reports on the results of a series of chemical- its, and the formation of storage cavities for bi- explosive cratering tests conducted between 1966 ologically harmful industrial wastes. and 1969 by the Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group near Fort Peck, Montana. The aim of the tests, which simulated nuclear cratering, was "to 163 establish the cratering characteristics of weak Kaye, G. D., and G. R. Lindsey. MIRVS AND THE STRA- and saturated shale, to acquire row-charge crater- TEGIC BALANCE. Nature (London) v. 227, Aug. 15, ing experience, and to demonstrate the feasibility 1970: 696-697. Q1.N2, v. 227 of connecting a row crater to a body of water."

Criticizes some features of a mathematical model proposed by Ian Bellany (see item 1833 in v. 6, no. 4, of this bibliography) for analyzing asym- 166 metries introduced into the strategic balance by Leary, Frank. ULMS: STRATEGIC EMPHASIS SHIFTS SEA- the deployment of multiple independently target- WARD. Space/aeronautics, v. 53, June 1970: 24-33. able feentry vehicles (MIRV). The authors take illus. TL501.A8187, v. 53 exception to Bellany's assumption that n MIRVs would be as effective in retaliation against cit- A detailed description of the capabilities and ies as n single-warhead missiles. They also ques- design of the proposed Undersea Long-Range Mis- tion his contention that for practical purposes sile System (ULMS). The acceptance of the ULMS the parameters characterizing the strategic capa- concept and the elevation of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer bilities of the two superpowers may be treated as to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could identical, offer an alternative model that dis- signal the approaching ascendancy of maritime con- penses with that assumption, and by means of graph- cepts in national strategy. During the past dec- ic displays generated with the model illustrate ade, the fleet ballistic missile systems greatly the strategic implications of various combinations enhanced the credibility and stability of the of MIRV and ABM deployment. The diagrams, besides strategic deterrent; consequently, an increasing indicating that MIRV deployment would be destabi- number of congressional and Government leaders lizing in most circumstances, suggest some of the would like deploy a greater part of the strate- difficulties that would be encountered in maintain- gic nuclear force at sea. Although the Polaris/Po- ing strategic stability in tne course of an arms- seidon fleet could be vulnerable to improved Sovi- reduction program. et antisubmarine warfare capabilities in 5 to 7 years, the Navy predicts that ULMS, which could be operational by the late 1970's, would withstand a 164 counterforce attack. At the White House and in Labohm, H. J. [COOPERATION ON ARMAMENTS WITHIN NATO the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ULMS is AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP]Die Rustungszusammen- deemed vital. If the strategic arms limitation arbeit innerhalb der NATO and die technologische talks fail, ULMS will provide "a credible deter- Wehrkunde, v. 19, Aug. 1910: 400-403. rent for the late 1970's and beyond."Even in "a U3.W396, v. 19 strategic environment constrained by arms limitations, it may carry the major burden of deter- The disparity between the financial and indus- rence." trial capabilities of the United States and those of its European partners in NATO explains the contrast in the levels of technological competence. 167 While the requirements of the European nations do Maeder, H. AIRMOBILE FORCES IN EUROPE. Interna- differ, these differences are not significant tional defense review, v. 3, June 1970: 160-161. enough to justify the duplications of effort that Ser make European military expenditures relatively less productive than the American. In addition to Argues that given adequate air support and ap- the technological lag, Europe is handicapped by propriate tactics, air-mobile forces of the type important managerial inadequacies. The Italian perfected by the United States in Vietnam can be Fanfani plan, originally advanced to bridge these employed effectively in Central Europe. Air-mo- gaps, has become only a way of improving liaison bile forces would reduce the reaction time of the between the military and industry. The proposals defense, increase its mobility and dispersal capa- for a "Euro" group within the NATO framework, ad- bility, and enhance its general effectiveness in vanced in 1969 by British Defense Minister Healey, all types of combat except local defense. 41 36 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

168 tary implications of rocket and missile flight. Marey, Georges. [ROYAL NAVY AND ROYAL AIR FORCE] While political goals and doctrines are tied in Royal Navy-Royal Air Force. Revue militaire gene- with military possibilities and potentialities, rale; general military review, no. 5, May 1970: emphasis is placed on the evolution of the nuclear 705-718. U2.R48, 1970 missile and the concomitant politicomilitary envi- Includes summaries in English and German. ronment. Von Raven asserts that today national policy depends on technology, which almost always Outlines the strength of Great Britain's naval decides the course of action. Modern history is and air forces in terms of weaponry Several being made not by men but by machines which men types of vessels and aircraft are listed, and have made and which dominate the relations between their organization and disposition given. Marey nations. concludes that austere financial measures have repeatedly kept the Air Force from buying ,:xcellent 172 modern aircraft. Seaborg, Glenn T., and Justin L. Bloom.FAST BREED- ER REACTORS. Scientific American, v. 223, Nov. 169 1970: 13-21. illus. MIRV'S AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. Nature (London) T1.55, v. 223 v. 228, Oct. 3, 1970: 53-54. Q1.N2, v. 228 Describes the breeder-reactor concept as well as the design and major characteristics of various Contents.--A letter, by L. Sartori.--A reply, by types of fast-breeder systems, and briefly summa- Ian Bellany. rizes the status of operational or planned fast- breeder reactors in the United States, the Soviet A letter disputing Ian Bellany's claim [see item Union, Western Europe, and Japan. Since fast- 1566, v. 6, no. 4, of this bibliography] that the breeder reactors produce more nuclear fuel than deployment of multiple independently targetable '.hey consume, their ability to use large quanti- reentry vehicles (MIRV'S) could increase the sta- ties of low-grade uranium and thorium ores as a bility of the strategic nuclear balance, together source of low-cost electrical energy possesses with a reply from Bellew. Sartori challenges vast economic potential. Thus the U.S. Atomic En- Bellany's assumption that the number of warheads ergy Commission, the nuclear industry, and public expected to survive a first strike is a good meas- utilities are engaging in a vigorous development ure of stability. He also criticizes Bellany for program in order to have a breeder-reactor gener- not maximizing this value with respect to the to- ating commercial electric power by 1984. The au- tal number of launchers, as he does with respect thors conclude that "breeders will result in a to the number of warheads per missile, and for transition to the massive use of nuclear energy in failing to anticipate recent improvements in war- a new economic and technological framework." head accuracy, which could enable both sides to achieve first-strike capabilities with MIRV. 173 [SOVIET GUNBOATS IN VIENNA] Sowjetkanonenboote in 170 Wien. Soldat und Technik, v. 13, Sept. 1970: 508- Oldfield, Barney. EARTH ORBIT: PEACEFUL OR LETHAL? 509. illus. u3.558, v. 13 NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, June/July 1970: 24-29. uA646.D5, v. 15 Relates the recent visit to Vienna of four units of the Soviet Danube flotilla, the strongest of Discusses the military implications of U.S. and all Warsaw Pact river forces on the Danube, during Soviet satellite technology. Oldfield speculates which a river gunboat was revealed. Photographs that the Soviet Cosmos series of earth satellites and a graph illustrate the characteristics and ca- has included tests of an "interceptor-inspector- pabilities of this armored cutter. destroyer" satellite for use against other space- craft. The United States, by contrast, has can- 174 celled its Manned Orbiting Laboratory, the purpose Swanborough, Gordon. ANGLO-GERMAN COLLABORATION IN of which was to test military space applications. AEROSPACE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Aug./ Sept. 1970: 54-60. illus. 171 uA646.F5, v. 15 Raven, Wolfram von. [THE TWO FACES OF THE MOON: STRATEGY IN SPACE] Die zwei Gesichter des Mondes. Discusses recent examples of cooperation between Strategie im Weltraum. [Salzburg, SN -Verlag, Great Britain and West Germany in the design and Salzburger Nachrichten, 1969] 156 p. illus. production of military and civilian aircraft and (Politik konkret) UG630.R37 aircraft engines. The most important to date are "Quellenhinweise und Bemerkungen": p. 141-150. those involving engines for vertical takeoff and lending aircraft, the MRCA-75 or Panavia 200 proj- Contents.--Preliminary notice.--The vision of ect, and the A 300B airbus. The ability of the Archimedes.--The great horror.--Applied anxiety.- - two countries to cooperate at both private commer- Deterrence without terror.--Peace through reason? cial and government levels has now been proven, --The road to confrontation.--The disturbed equi- and fruitful collaboration can be expected to con- librium.--Is the count correct?--The Soviet sword tinue. of Damocles.--Rockets from the moon?--Sources and notes.--List of persons.--Index. 175 TACTICAL WARFARE. Space/aeronautics, v. 53, Jan. Sketches the reciprocal influences of national 1970: 71-79. illus. policy and space technology, emphasizing the mili- TL5o1.A8187, v. 53 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 37

A detailed examination of U.S. tactical weapons the National Academy of Sciences nor the Congress projects. Current trends in military procurement is equipped to provide the needed guidance. The suggest that the United States will deemphasize National Science Foundation (NSF) shows some prom- close air support and tactical bombing in the ise but lacks the organizational strength and 1970's and will instead concentrate on air superi- self-confidence essential to strong leadership. ority, antisubmarine warfare, and fleet air de- The problem is that "the bureaucracy is not so fense. "The U.S. is washing its hands of wars of much malevolent as weak and even dull."Responsi- liberation and instead preparing for cat-and-mouse bility for basic research ought to be vested in an confrontations with the Soviets on the periphery organization like the NSF, but one managed "with of strategic conflict." the skill and flair of an agency which knows where it is going."

176 Taubinger, L. M. von. [CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARMS.]Die 179 nukleare Rlastung Chinas. Allgemeine Schweize- Vendryes, Georges A. SURVEY OF FRENCH FAST REACTOR rische Milithrzeitschrift, v. 136, Sept. 1970: PROGRAM. Nuclear news, v. 13, Aug. 1970: 51-55. 630, 633-634. U3.A43, v. 136 illus. QC770.N75, v. 13 Substance of remarks made at a session of the Reviews the historical development of China's 16th Annual Meeting of the American Nuclear Soci- nuclear weapons program. During the first phase, ety. 1949-1959, China cooperated closely with the Sovi- et Union, acquiring vast knowledge from the Rus- Surveys results of French work on the design, sians. The break with the Soviet Union occured constructic.n, and operation of fast-breeder reac- in 1960; since then, the Chinese have been work- tors. Since natural uranium reserves are suffi- ing independently and successfully. (The cultural cient to meet requirements of the power industry revolution had little effect on nuclear research.) for some years to come, there is no urgent need The Army has complete control over nuclear and for these reactors. Nevertheless, French experi- missile research, and recent emphasis on the lat- ence indicates that the fast breeder can be made ter indicates that Peking wants not bombs but economically competitive in the near future, and guided missiles. The author analyzes China's they will probably be operating on a large scale present and future nuclear capabilities and con- by the early 1980's. cludes that after the launching of its first satellite China might shift emphasis from ICBM's to space and undertake nuclear-warhead tests there. 180 Such a step would alter the world military situa- Williams, Ralph E. AFTER VIETNAM. In United tion. States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 96, Apr. 1970: 19-25. In.u8, v. 96 177 Terzibaschitsch, Stefan. CSABMIS--A NEW WEAPONS The proposal for the Safeguard ABM system bears SYSTEM] SABMIS--ein neues Waffensystem. Atlan- ominous similarities to the disastrous policies tische Welt, v. 10, June 1970: 4-5. pursued by the United States in the Vietnam War. U3.A8, v. 10 Just as the doctrine of gradualism prevented any decisive action in the Vietnam War despite a mas- Takes a look at the U.S. Navy sea-based antibal- sive commitment of men and materiel, the thin listic missile intercept system (SABMIS) now under Safeguard system may gradually expand in the face study and suggests the possible dimensions, of growing Soviet and Chinese threats without in- speeds, protective armament, electric equipment, creasing U.S. security. The decision to halt the and organization of SABMIS and its potential ad- bombing of North Vietnam and fight the war solely vantages over Safeguard. on the territory of an ally is similar to the decision to build an ABM system on the territory of the United States and thus invite widespread de- 178 struction even if the system works. U.S. land- TUNE WITHOUT A PIPER, by our Washington correspon- based missile systems are superfluous for an as- dent. Nature (London) v. 227, July 11, 1970: 113- sured second-strike capability and may have been 116. Q1.N2, v. 227 the laapetus for the rapid increase in Soviet missile strength. A thin ABM system is inadequate to It has become quite clear that the United States deter a Soviet attack and probably unnecessary to has no policy governing science and technology. deter the Chinese, and the added protection of an Decisions are reached in a tug-of-war between com- expanded ABM system can always be offset by an in- peting Federal agencies or the necessarily crease in enemy offensive forces. "The valid wayward arguments of Congress."The administra- criticism of such attempts to defend our population's current confusion is manifest in its fool- tion and our land-based missile systems is there- ish attempt to abolish graduate traineeships and fore not that they are provocative and dangerous, its bungled effort to mitigate the impact of the as some maintain, but simply that they are costly Mansfield Amendment. Although the latter legisla- and fruitless, and in the end, self defeating." tion did not express hostility to basic research The logical alternative to this futile race be- as such, it did indicate Congressional impatience tween offensive and defensive missile systems is with the notion that "pure research should be a to rely entirely on a sea-based strategic striking kind of by-product of military defense."Where is force and to construct a seaborne ABM system the much- needed leadership in science to be found? (SABMIS), both of which would be more reliable Past failures have undermined the reputation of than land-based systems and would remove the po- the Office of Science and Technology; and neither tential conflict from U.S. territory. A thin 38 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Safeguard system might then be justified to com- The role of the leaders of the Chinese Army has pensate for the relatively insignificant limita- been enhanced by the campaign to whip up an anti- tions of SABMIS. Soviet military psychosis. The military-bureaucratic dictatorship intends to propagandize Mao's "ultra-revolutionary ideas," the essence of which is hatred for the world's Communist and Socialist DEFENSE POLICIES AND MILITARY Parties. At the same time Mac's group is switch- STRATEGIES OF NATIONS ing the entire national economy to a wartime footing while relegating consumer-oriented production AND ALLIANCES to the background. However, recent events indicate that an ever-growing number of military lead- 181 ers find unacceptable the antipopular, anti-So- Alsop, Joseph. READING SOVIET INTENTIONS. New re- cialist policy being imposed. public, v. 163, Oct. 3, 1970: 17-19. AP2.N624, v. 163 184 Arneson, Ruthann, and Don Fowler. STRATEGY: MILI- Assesses the Soviet military buildup on the TARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. Chicago, Na- Sino-Soviet frontier and in the Near East and con- tional Research Analysts C1969] 224 p. cludes that the Soviet Union is preparing for nu- UA23.A72 clear war in both situations. If the Soviet Union attacks China, a surgical nuclear strike would be Contenti.--Introduction.--Strategy: an over- launched to destroy the Chinese nuclear capabili- view.-- Unilateral military intervention.--Multi- ty. Soviet nuclear-ballistic missile units recent- lateral alliances.--Qualifications of sources.- - ly have been deployed along the border in the ex- Bibliography. act positions required for such a strike. Since the Soviet Union is also planning a serious attack A bibliography and selection of quotations for on Israel, it can be assumed they are preparing use by high school students debating the topic for a nuclear war in that theater as well, for "What should be the United States military commit- they must certainly realize that there is a very ment to foreign countries?"The three resolutions high probability that Israel possesses nuclear that form the year's debate topic urge Congress weapons. Alsop's view, "especially since Czecho- to prohibit unilateral U.S. intervention in for- slovakia's invasion, is to assume that prepara- eign countries and call for the withdrawal of the tions reveal intentions. . . . May not the mere United States either from NATO alone or all multi- preparations I have described imply a drastic mu- lateral defense organizations.

tation in Soviet policy? . . In the facts I have set forth, there is certainly a strong smell of long-range military planning, rather than nor- 185 mal civilian policy-making." CTHE ATLANTIC DILEMMA: AGGRESSION AND THE CRISIS OF NATO, 1949-1969] Das Atlantische Dilemma; Aggres- sivitit and Krise der NATO, 1949-1969. CHrsg. vom 182 Deutschen Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte, Berlin. American Surveys (Firm). U.S. SECURITY IN THE MEDI- Autorenkollektiv: Hans Walter Callenius, et al.] TERRANEAN AREA; REPORT FOR THE "AMERICANS FOR Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Deniokratischen Republik, 1969. PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH" GROUP. Washington, 1970. 469 p. 30 L. UA23.A663 JX1393.N67A78 Cover title. Bibliography: p. 411-459.

Contents.--The project team.-- Introduction. -- Contents.--The construction of NATO as the most Threat and response: Summary. The importance of important politico-military instrument of aggres- the Mediterranean area. Analyses of threats to sion and intervention of American imperialism U.S. interests in the Mediterranean. Statements against the Socialist states of Europe.--The in- of concern by key officials and journalists. Sum- corporation of West Germany into NATO (1949-1954). mary and evaluation of findings of recent re- --Attempts at consolidation of NATO and attainment search. The state of research and public informa- of its counterrevolutionary goals (1955- 1957). -- tion. U.S. governmental policies in the Mediter- The failure of the position-of-strength policy ranean.--Project conclusions. (1958-1960/1961).--The overt outbreak of imperial- istic contradictions between the NATO powers Analyzes U.S. interests and policy in the Medi- (1960/1961-1963).--Accentuation of the NATO crisis terranean area in light of the buildup of Soviet (1964-1966).--Character and goals of NATO in con- power and influence there. The report includes an flict with the peace and security of Europe (1966- evaluation of pro- and anti-U.S. sentiment in the 1968).-- Judgment and future projection.--Summary. Mediterranean nations and recommends positive ac- --ResuMe.--Tables and graphics.--Appendixes. tion to improve America's image and strategic position in the area. A "Marxist-Leninist analyss" of the history of NATO from its origins to the present, emphasizing two themes: the danger to European peace repre- 183 sented by this imperialist pact system, and its Andreev, IU. THE ARMY IN MAOIST HANDS. Daily re- continued loss of efficacy in view of the change view; translations from the Soviet press, v. 16, in the balance of power in favor of the Communist June 30, 1970: pt. 1, Citem] 6, 1-5. states and the intensifying internal and external Slav Rm contradictions of imperialism in its present stage Translated from Krasnaia zvezda, June 3, 1970. of development. The aggressive, counterrevolu- Slav Rm tionary concepts and practices of the United 44 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 39

States, West Germany, and the other imperialist Budgetary restrictions may force the United powers in NATO are contrasted with the efforts of States to abandon at least one of the three sepa- the Soviet Union and the Communist world to bring rate deterrents it now maintains as a hedge against peace to Europe. technological breakthroughs. If so, the bomber and sea-based systems will be retained and the 186 land-based Minuteman sacrificed. Should it come Baldwin, Hanson W. STRATEGY FOR TOMORROW. New to a choice, the Air Force would favor its new B-1 York, Harper & Row 01970] 377 p. maps. bomber program over retention of the Minuteman.

UA23.B265 1970 . The Navy, of course, has long championed the ad- "Written under the auspices of The Center for vantages of a sea-based over a land-based deter- Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown rent and is now pressing for the adoption of its University, Washington, D.C." Underwater Long-Range Missile System (ULMS). ULMS Bibliographical references included in "Notes": might cost as much as $20 billion, however, and p. 347-365. expansion of the present Polaris-Poseidon fleet by 10 boats has been proposed as a less expensive, Examines U.S security problems in the coming but also somewhat less effective, alternative. decades and outlines U.S. strategic options. "It Appointment of an admiral as Chairman of the Joint should be obvious, without argument, that the de- Chiefs of Staff is one herald of change, but this mands on the U.S. economy, the U.S. taxpayer and need not mean that a new policy will be of parti- the U.S. patience in the decades ahead are too cular benefit to the Navy. Decisions will be great to support a global policy of intervention." strongly influenced by the outcome of the strate- Baldwin concludes that active political, economic, gic arms limitation talks, where consideration is and military participation in the international certain to be given to proposals to shift the community and regional alliances and groupings in strategic deterrent of both sides to sea-based defense of vital interests will present America's systems in order to minimize fears of a first only reasonable policy alternative in the latter strike. half of the 20th century. A "reasonable internationalism" or balance-of-power policy necessitates 189 a flexible political and diplomatic posture, since Beste, Hans D. [SECURITY POLICY -- MILITARY POLICY- - regional alliances and groupings change constant- DEFENSE POLICY: CONCEPT AND CONTENT IN THE 70'S] ly, as do threats. Such a policy need not exclude SicherheitspolitikMilitgrpolitikVerteidigungs- the United Nations, but it cannot rely on it for politik: Begriff and Inhalt in den 70er Jahren. security and stability. To implement this new Wehrkunde, v. 19, July 1970: 349-354. world role, the United States must have the capac- U3.W396, v. 19 ity to achieve oceanic control. "There is no doubt that an oceanic or maritime strategy, mod- The concepts of security policy, military poli- ernized technologically and modified regionally to cy, and defense policy have meaning only when they meet special needs, is best suited to U.S. capa- are related to German national interests. While bilities, exploits our strengths rather than our the situation in Europe seems satisfactory from weaknesses, is more likely to secure the American Bonn's viewpoint at the moment, the long-term future and preserve the American dream, is achiev- global threat continues. American optimism about able at less cost, reduces political and psycho- the outcome of tLe strategic arms limitation talks logical frictions, and is far more flexible polit- is contradicted by the facts of Soviet advances in ically and militarily and psychologically than is sea-based missiles and Soviet penetration in the a continental strategy." Mediterranean and the Third World. The slogan "The Russians are not coming: if they were they 187 would have come a long time ago" is fallacious. Barclay, C. N. [THE DEFENSE POLICY OF GREAT BRIT- The Soviets have successfully narrowed the room AIN--TODAY, YESTERDAY, AND IN THE FUTURE]Die for maneuver left to the West without their risk- Verteidigungspolitik Grossbritanniens--heute, ing war. American discussions with the Soviets trailer and in Zukunft.Wehrkunde, v. 19, May have usually worked out to the disadvantage of the 1970: 238-243. U3.W396, v. 19 United States. The exact nature of NATO's nuclear threshold should be made clear. The damage caused Characterizes the 1970 White Book of the British by a nuclear attack on Russia would be no worse Defense Ministry as displaying pride in the train- than that created by a conventional war in thickly ing and armament of troops it believes are unex- settled Germany. Deterrence as a strategy can be celled in Western Europe. Budget expenditures, replaced by a balance of interests only when there the experience in North Ireland, and the order of is confidence in both parties. The goodwill of battle are briefly summarized, and the failure to one of the parties should not be exploited as recruit a volunteer army is analyzed. Barclay re- weakness by the other. Peace research may be use- jects most criticism of Denis Healey's conduct of ful, if it is conducted with trust in, and partic- the Defense Ministry as unrealistic in view of ipation by, the military. Great Britain's limited finances and its inability to dictate NATO planning. He thinks that a Con- 190 servative Party electoral victory, "thought possi- Brown, Neville. BRITISH ARMS AND STRATEGY 1970-80. ble by many," will mean some kind of English pres- London, Royal United Service Institution, 1969. ence East of Suez. 73 P. UA647.B87

188 Contents.--The new context for policy.--Obliga- Beecher, William. U.SMOVES TOWARD NEW STRATEGY AS tions outside Europe.--Britain in Europe.--Instru- ADMIRAL MOORER BECOMES JCS CHAIRMAN. Navy, v. 13, ments of strategic deterrence.--Local war forces. June 1970: 13-16. The economic outlays.--Britain's European fu- VA49.N28, v. 13 ture. 4F 40 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Surveys British defense policies and programs 193 within the fra.,=wnrk of Britain's role in Europe Clark, Gregory. AT THE WHIM OF THE SHISEI. Far and special relaticnship with the United States, Eastern economic review, v.69, July 23, 1970: 23- local war forces, and the superpower arms race. 26. HC411.F18, v. 69 Brown is not optimistic about the world of 1980 in view of the turmoil and crises of the present in- Critics who warn of resurgent Japanese militar- ternational situation. He advocates a strategi- ism claim it is the direction, not the substance, cally independent and economically competitive of Japan's policies that causes apprehension. Al- Western Europe in which Great Britain is a full though Japan has repeatedly renounced nuclear member. weapons and war and has a relatively small number of men under arms, the very existence of the self- defense force is inconsistent with the Japanese Constitution, and Government statements concern- 191 ing the renunciation of nuclear weapons have high- Byrd, Harry F. THE OUTLOOK IN THE SENATE FOR ADVICE ly ambiguous overtones. Many members of the rul- AND CONSENT. Naval War College review, v. 23, ing Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), including the Oct. 1970: 4-10. Ser defense chief, Yasuhiro Nakasone, would like to "An address delivered at the Naval War College." revise the Constitution; they opposed the signing of the nuclear nonproliferaticn treaty. For some Summarizes the pros and cons of increasing the critical observers this ambiguity is not as alarm- number of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and ing as the open totalitarianism and militarism of discusses the Okinawa question from a purely mili- Japan's extreme right-wing organizations.While tary point of view. Many Senators believe that numerically inferior to the left, the extreme the United States is overcommitted globally, and right possibly has more influential personal links while the author does not favor an American policy with the LDP.However, it may not be appropriate of intervention--particularly unilateral interven- to judge Japanese behavior by Western standards. tion--or a "world policeman" role, he maintains Only through the framework of Japanese thought can that the United States has serious international the chances of military resurgence be assessed. responsibilities. "In this imperfect world of vi- In actual fact, there is overwhelming evidence olence," the United States needs strong defenses, against the argument that militarism is reviving and no part of those defenses is more important in Japan. than naval raer. Keeping the sea lanes of the world open "is vital to our very survival," and a 194 modern carrier force is essential if the United Clarkson, Albert G. UNITED STATES NATO FORCE LEV- States is to hold the balance of power at sea. MS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Furthermore, as long as the United States main- Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Aug. tains its military commitments in Asia, it must 1970: 38-44. illus. continue to have unrestricted use of its Okinawa Z6723.U35, v. 50 bases. An amendment rec ntly adopted by the Sen- ate by a vote of 63 to L. leclared that the Presi- The French withdrawal, reduced U.S. force levels dent should seek the advice and consent of the in Vietnam, and the buildup of Soviet strategic Senate before entering an agreement nhanging the power could influence the Nixon administration to status of Okinawa. Since the Senate-ratified maintain or increase U.S. conventional NATO forc- Treaty of Peace with Japan determined the present es. The extent of Soviet troop deployment into status of Okinawa, the Senate should be consulted Eastern Europe and West Germany's role in Europe on any changes in that treaty. During the past 25 vis-a-vis Soviet-American relations will also in- years the Senate has too often relinquished its fluence any decision regarding U.S. troops in Eu- responsibilities in foreign affairs. Congress rope. Militating against troop increases are the must assert itself in the field of foreign policy, encouraging facts that the Soviet Union would have though it should not interfere in military tac- to enjoy a three-to-one conventional superiority tics. in Europe to achieve aconventional military victory; that it is improbable that NATO could be defeated by a surprise attack; and that the Russians 192 "could place little confidence in the loyalty and Cameron, Robert. OPTIONS MAKE GOOD PROPOGANDA BUT cohesiveness of other Warsaw Pact forces in a war POOR DEFENSE FOR NATO. NATO's fifteen nations, against the West." The question of appropriate v. 15, June/July 1970: 20-23. U.S. force levels in NATO revolves around chang- UA646.F5, v. 15 ing strategic and tactical concepts and economic problems. Whatever the final outcome, more atten- Indicts the doctrine of flexible response and tion should ".-'e paid to training and preparing NATO NATO strategy and defense policy in general for forces. failing to provide the West with a credible deterrent in Europe. The Western allies simply will 195 not furnish the conventional forces required for Coye, Beth F., and others. AN EVALUATION OF U.S. a flexible response strategy. Consequently there NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. Naval War is no realistic alternative to greater reliance on College review, v. 23, Oct. 1970: 34-52. map. a credible nuclear posture. Promotion of more Eu- Ser ropeans to top military commands, reorganization A "group research project completed in the of the military command structure, and adoption of School of Naval Warfare." a strategy that relies explicitly on the use of nuclear weapons to control the battlefield would Examines U.S. policy and strategic options in do much to impr.7e NATO's deterrent capability. the Indian Ocean area in light of the Soviet naval 4S THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 41

presence there and the British withdrawal from 198 East of Suez. The study concludes that "a low Delden, Rembert van. CA CONCEPT OF THE ARMED FORCES profile course of action comes closest to meeting TO COMBAT RISING COSTS: THOUGHTS ON ELIMINATING U.S. objectives in the Indian Ocean area."The THIS DILEMMA OF THE BUNDESWEHR]Wehrkonzeption im United States should continue its economic and Widerstreit zur Kostensteigerung; Gedanken zur Be- military assistance programs, encourage a continu- hebung dieses Dilemmas bei der Bundeswehr. Wehr- ation of bilateral and multilateral allied naval kunde, v. 19, July 1970: 340-342. training exercises, establish air, communications, U3.W396, v. 19 and satellite-tracking facilities in the British Indian Ocean Territory to fulfill support and in- In view of the current inflation of costs, telligence requirements and to establish an alter- changes in the operations/ structure of the German nate base for the U.S. Navy's Middle East Force Navy should be considered. The cruisers now in now based at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, modern- service are still the backbone of the fleet, but ize the Force at its present strength, and conduct they are badly located for tactical purposes. naval show-of-force operations as required. "If While England's reluctance to see a German Navy in the Soviet presence or threat increases, addition- its waters is understandable, the NATO command al elements could be employed to counter this." must deploy it there. The Soviets will not attempt to break out of the Baltic Sea without first occupying the Danish ds. To maintain lines of communication wit G.,.7e t Britain in the face of 196 any Soviet action, v ssels,larger and faster than mine sweepers or mis ile bo is are necessary. The UNIVERSAL SERVICE: Davis, Vincent. AN ALTERNATIVE multipurpose Fregatt 70 t e will probably cost TO THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED SERVICES. Naval War almost as much on compleon as a cruiser, but now College review, v. 23, Oct. 1970: 19-33. seems the better answer. The submarine and anti- Ser submarine programs must be continued at an cost. If the Fregatte-70 program proves too expensive, In view of general dissatisfaction with con- the alternative of fixed missile sites along scription and congressional and military opposi- coastal areas should be examined. The "Monitore," tion to the all-volunteer concept, proposes the slow rocket ships armed only with antiaircraft ar- implementation of a universal service system (USS) tillery that are used by the Russians, should per- as an alternative method of fulfilling U.S. man- haps be imitated. Helicopter carriers )f the type power requirements and outlines possible objec- used by the U.S. Coast Guard could reinforce the tions and obstacles to the idea. Under this sys- naval air arm. The unification of the branches tem all citizens between the ages of 18 and 20 and services should be implemented. would have to Serve the Government in either a military or nonmilitary domestic or international capacity. The author emphasizes the need for a 199 periodic and comprehensive national den Toom, W. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND FLEXIBLE RE- survey as the basis for a comprehensi national SPONSE. NATO letter, v. 18, Mar. 1970: 4-11. manpower policy and the need for a via le national D845.2.A44,y. 18 youth policy. Since an overwhelming Ilmllority would prefer nonmilitary to military programs, The relationship between detrrence and crisis differential incentives and inducements would be management, on the one hand, and- -flexible re- devised to make the "military corps" more attrac- sponse, on the other, is a close one. Crisis man- tive. The universal service systems seems to be agement is the use of political, military, and one of the most effective ways to satisfy massive other means to prevent the escalation of crisis and urgent U.S. manpower needs and "to help once into armed conflict or to prevent armed conflict again to instill the idea of service to the Ameri- from escalating to higher levels of violence. The can society within the broader context of service role of military force in this process is to im- to humanity." pose risks in such a way as to encourage restraint and the choice of political alternatives to further violence. Flexible response is the military dimension of crisis management, and its purpose 197 is to give policymakers a maximum range of choice Debra, Michel. [THE PRINCIPLES OF OUR DEFENSE POLI- among military methods and means. The key word is CY] Les principes de notre politique de defense. flexibility, and this strategy should not be.mis- Revue de defense 'ationale, v. 26, Aug./Sept. taken for a doctrine of defense in depth, for a 1970: 1245-1258. D410.R45, v. 26 renunciation of the early use of nuclear weapons, or for any other fixed plan. Four conditions mist Statement made before the Institute des Hautes be satisfied if the strategy is to succeed:the Etudes de Defense Nationale on June 25, 1970, that armed forces must be of great diversity and in a outlines the future requirements and priorities of high state of combat readiness; means must exist French foreign and defense policies. Debra empha- for the rapid implementation of political and mil- sizes decisionmaking freedom, establishing friend- itary decisions; adequate reserves and a system of ly relations with the superpowers, working toward mobilization must be available; and forces in be- managiag tension in areas in which France is di- ing must possess good tactical and strategic mo- rectly involved, and preserving peace'and defend- bility and be ready for immediate commitment to ing liberty. He concludes that defense policy battle. Forces available to NATO must visibly should be formulated to enable France to safeguard satisfy these conditions. Deterrent effect is its nuclear retaliatory power, intervene outside seldom enhanced by secrecy or concealment; success Europe, and Strengthen defense - related scientific of the strategy may well depend on the demonstra- and industrial capabilities. tion of military preparedness and determination. 42 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

200 assesses the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance, and out- Elser, Gerhard. UNITED STATES ARMY 1969. Wehr- lines specific options to preserve the survivabil- kunde, v. 19, June 1970: 305-311. ity of existing deterrent systems, particularly U3.W396, v. 19 ICBM's. While Foster points out that the present In German. basing of the Minuteman force "may have a relatively short life," he concludes "that, in the im- A tripartite discussion of U.S. military prob- mediate future, the deterrence capabilities of our lems: a situation report on the American forces present systems will not be significantly im- in Vietnam, the American experience in limited paired, but that sometime in the 1970s the risk warfare, and the tasks of the next ten years. will begin to rise--unless there are some chang- Part 1 comments on the rate of American withdraw- es," and these will occur when needed. als from Vietnam, the defense implications of the Nixon Doctrine, Safeguard versus the SS-9, the 203 American order of battle, and the massacre of the Foster, John S. THE GROWING SOVIET THREAT: A SO- civilian population at My Lai. The principles BERING PICTURE. Air Force and space digest, and concepts of limited war, supply and provision, v.53, Nov. 1910: 77-81. illus. mobile infantry and armor, and air cavalry and air UG633.A65, v. 53 assault forces are then described. The tasks of the future are Vietnamization (defined as helping Assesses the Soviet Union's current strategic those who help themselves), reduction in expendi- nuclear and conventional capabilities and projects tures, and restoration of the American image. the Soviet military threat to 1975.Although there is still approximate strategic parity be- 201 tween the United States and the Soviet Union in EXTENSION OF JAPAN-US SECURITY TREATY. Asian alma- numbers of offensive weapons, no parity exists in nac, v. 8, July 25, 1970: 4073-4079. strategic defensive systems. The Russians have an DS1.A4752, v. 8 operational ABM system, while the United States does not. Foster, U.S. Director of Defense Re- Contents.--Text of government statement.--LDP search and Engineering, summarizes: "In the stra- statement.--Views of opposition political parties. tegic area, we will face a greater threat in num- --Protest by Okinawans.--Comments and reactions.- - bers of improved strategic offensive missiles--in- Press comment.--Defence programme.--Japan-US talks cluding missile submarines operating off our on future of Okinawa. shores--and also an improved Soviet defensive network, intended to intercept our retaliating mis- Prime Minister Sato recently stated that Japan siles and bombers."He points out that the Soviet would adhere to a nonnuclear policy, retain the Union has been improving its antisubmarine warfare present Constitution, and maintain the security techniques and technology, but he does not foresee treaty for at least 2 or 3 more years (though not any specific breakthroughs that might pose a seri- indefinitely). He emphasized that Japan would not ous threat to the American submarine missile repeat history and become an economic-military force. He concludes thatthe greater the dispar- power. Yasuhiro Nakasone, director general of the ity in quality and quantity of arms between the defense agency, announced that future defense United States and the Soviet Union, the greater plans would bolster air and maritime defense capa- that risk Lof war3 will be--since all the foresee- bilities and streamline the defense organization. able disparities will not be in our favor." Research should be conducted to attain self-sufficiency in the production of military equipment; 204 however, it will take 10-15 years to achieve this Frye, Alton. DEFENSE POLICY AND THE NEW AMERICAN goal. Nakasone suggested that a gradual increase POLITICS. Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 8, Aug. in military spending over the next 5 years would 1970: 26, 28, 30, 32, 34-35, 82. be necessary to develop such a capability and re- TL5O1.A688A25, v. 8 portedly favors extending the period of the defense buildup, largely because of immense funding Mounting domestic disapproval of the military requirements. The Liberal-Democratic Party's se- establishment in general, and defense spending in curity research council has recommended that na- particular, will eventually bring about drastic tional security policies be revised, giving prior- changes in U.S. national security policies.This ity to self-defense rather than the security trea- criticism will continue, since congressmen now ty, which will be supplementary, and reducing find that it "strikes a very responsive chord in Japan's dependence on U.S. forces. They feel that their constituencies."However, without responsi- military expansion must not take place at the ex- ble leadership for wide public discussion of these pense of the economy. The council opposes the de- issues, such tendencies could degenerate into ill- fense agency's fourth defense program (1972-76), considered reprisals against the military estab- which sets annual defense expenditures at 1 per- lishment, endangering U.S. national security over cent of GNP and advocates reorganizing the Na- the long run. Congressmen "need to be disabused tional Defense Council along the lines of the U.S. of the myth that the defense budget has grown National Security Council. wildly in recent years." In fact, the percentage of gross national product going to the defense 202 sector has remained fairly constant at about 9 Foster, John S. OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. As- percent over the last 15 years, and the Council of tronautics & aeronautics, v. 8, Aug. 1970: 27, 29, Economic Advisers estimates that defense spending 31, 33. TL5O1.A688A25, v. 8 will decline to about 6.3 percent of GNP by 1972 Although this does not imply that efforts to trim Discusses some of the basic problems and consid- the military budget should be abandoned, critics erations in deterrent postures and relationships, who hope to find easy targets for reductions will 48 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 13

be disappointed. There are no simple, standing is required for the continued existence of a pow- rules for evaluating defense budgeting or deter- erful collective force. One hazard of U.S. mili- mining how much the United States should allocate tary cutbacks could be an erosion of West European to national security, but the responsibility to confidence in NATO's defense potential that would examine the budget continuously and in detail can- eventually result in a deterioration of NATO's not be avoided. While U.S. overseas defense com- military strength and "solidarity."Reductions mitments must be reduced further, an extensive could also "encourage a potential aggressor to American withdrawal from Europe, for instance, adopt a more adventuresome policy and posture would not necessarily induce the allies there to which, for the moment, is not attractive to him- - assume a more equitable share of the costs of com- faced with what NATO puts before him." mon defense. Instead, some countries might opt for nuclear deterrents--a development that would certainly undermine American efforts to prevent 207 the spread of nuclear weapons. The most crucial Griffiths, Eldon, and Michael Niblock. TOWARDS NU- factor affecting U.S. national security policies CLEAR ENTENTE: THE CASE FOR ANGLO-FRENCH NUCLEAR is the state of Soviet-American strategic rela- CO-OPERATION. [London] Conservative Political tions. If the superpowers can agree to base the Center C1970] 19 p. strategic balance on the concept of mutual deter- UA646.G74 rence, then a number of substantial strategic arms agreements may be possible, but without a mutual Presents the case for an Anglo-French nuclear acceptance of that doctrine the strategic arms deterrent force. The authors assert that a'nucle- limitation talks will fail. It would be a mistake ar alliance with France would be more economical to concentrate on the risks of verification and for British nuclear industries, serve the French implementation of arms control, for the risks of as a ticket of readmission to NATO, and widen the the present situation may be even greater. Anglo-American agreement on nuclear weapons technology to include France. They conclude that the best way of establishing a strong European pillar 205 in the alliance is through Anglo-French collabora- Giese, Fritz E. CTHE INTERNATIONAL NAVAL SITUATION tion within the context of a reformed NATO struc- IN THE 1970'S]Die internationale Flottenlage in ture. den siebziger Jahren. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Aug. 1970: 404-409. U3.W396, v. 19 208 The international balance of naval strength has Hirschfeld, Oswald. [GERMAN SECURITY AND THE EAST- altered fundementally in the past decade. Al- ERN POLICY]Die Sicherheitsfrage der BRD and die though the number of nations maintaining naval Ostpolitik. Wehr and Wirtschaft, v. 6, June 1970: forces has almost doubled, there are two acknowl- 322-324. U3.W38, v. 6 edged superpowers, the United States and,the Sovi- et Union. While the United States remains the peals with the situation which e erges from the greater sea power, the Soviets have created a na- resolutions passed by NATO in Reykjavik and Rome val instrument whose capabilities are very impres- and from their consequences insofar as these are sive, even if exaggerated by the popular press. reflected in the German White Paper on Defence. The presence of the six-warship ESKADRA in the Though the Federal Government's policies towards Mediterranean and the imminent acquisition of bas- Eastern hUrope coincide with international efforts es in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and the Sudan demon- to strengthen the peace, they threaten to become strate that the Soviet Union has broken out of the the subject of bitter controversies on the home confines imposed by geography on Tsarist Russia. front. The overall defence budget, which calls A country-by-country count indicates that the sea- for certain shifts in emphasis, will undoubtedly power of the Western nations in the NATO alliance create some difficulty in reorganizing and equip- is superior to that of the Warsaw Pact countries ping the Bundeswehr. The projected increase in and that the rest of the world lags far behind expenditure on the personnel side of the Bundes- both. While the West remains superior to the East wehr must obviously have its repercussions on the on the seas, its commitments are so much more equipment side, in a stretching or redistribution widespread that its present superiority must be of the funds earmarked for research, development maintained at all costs if the security of the and procurement. Defence Ministry sources report free world is not to be threatened. that the decisions which will be required are to be prepared during the parliamentary recess and will then be discussed by the Bundestag immediate- 206 ly after it reconvenes in the autumn. (Abstract Goodpaster, Andrew J. STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES OF supplied, modified) ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE. Naval War College review, v. 23, Oct. 1970: 11-18. Ser "An address presented at the Naval War College." 209 IS U.S. FORFEITING THE ARMS RACE TO RUSSIA? U.S. Traces the evolution of the Soviet military news & world report, v. 69, Oct. 19, 1970: 21-24. threat, assesses Soviet and NATO capabilities, and JK1.U65, v, 69 outlines NATO strategy. Goodpaster asserts that NATO is vital to the security of the United States Top strategists in the U.S. Department of De- as well as to other member nations, that a large fense view current U.S. defense policy es conced- collective force is essential to NATO's viability, ing strategic superiority to the Soviet Union; if and that a sizeable American deployment in Europe present policy trends continue, "there will be AA_ 44 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

only one superpower left in the world five years systems, and concludes that Peking will probably from now--Russia." By 1975 the Soviet Union will develop a small number of ICBM's supplemented by have matched or exceeded the United States in most tactical nuclear weapons or IRBM's. "Given the categories of modern armaments--strategic mis- fiscal, technical, political, moral, and succes- siles, aircraft, surface ships and submarines, sion problems, plus the volatility of Chinese po- troops under arms, and tanks--and will also be litics, we are more likely to witness a slow and spending more on military research. The United somewhat haphazard progress rather than a 'Great States will see its allies turning toward accommo- Leap Forward' in China's impressive, but uneven, dation with the Soy.. Union and find itself faced military growth." with the necessity of keeping its threatened nuclear deterrent on a hair-trigger alert. Vitia- 213 tion of the national will in the controversy over Kim, Yong-jun. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1970'S. Vietnam is the major cause of this incipient de- Korea journal, v. 105, May 1970: 8-10. mise of national power. DS901.K7, v. 105 A translation of a paper presented to a seminar 210 held on March 28, 1970, by the Korean Association Ishibashi, Masatsugu. JAPAN'S DECISION IN 1970 AND of International Relations under the sponsorship UNARMED NEUTRALITY. Contemporary Japan, v. 29, of the Hankook Ilbo. Mar. 1970: 217-227. DS801.J6, v. 29 The continuing Sino-Soviet dispute and the possibility of improved U.S.-China relations may ren- Japan must choose between two diametrically op- der increasingly unlikely a successful North Kore- posed national security policies: military alli- an large-scale invasion of South Korea. Instead, ance with the United States, which would mean sub- Pyongyang would conduct a guerrilla war in the ordination of Japanese to U.S. interests and re- south. South Korea's dependence on American mili- vival of imperialist tendencies; and unarmed neu- tary and economic assistance will decline as the trality, which would contribute to world peace as United States gradually withdraws in accordance well as Japanese security. The decision hinges on with Washington's new policy of noninvolvement in whether Japan agrees to extend the U.S.-Japan se- regional conflicts. The new American policy, mo- curity treaty, with or without revision, and on tivated in part by a desire for improved relations the conditions attached to Okinawa's reversion to with Peking, will eventually lead to an indepen- Japanese sovereignty. The results of preliminary dent South Korean military posture. The United negotiations on these questions indicate that the State:. is prepared to extend its nuclear shield to Japanese Government contemplates a military alli- nations engaged in a total war in which either ance with the United States that provides for a China or the Soviet Union intervenes, but any war more active Japanese military and political role short of that will be considered the concern of in the Far East. The Socialist Party of Japan un- those involved, to be settled collectively. While equivocally supports a policy of unarmed neutrali- Japan's military strength may affect the balance ty, the only means of realizing the ideals of de- of power in Northeast As_a, that nation is not ex- mocracy and pacifism embodied in Japan's constitu- pected to make positive contributions to an Asian tion and of insuring genuine and lasting security. anti-Communist defense system or assume U.S. military commitments. Since the basic goal of Japan's 211 military buildup is to protect its economic interests, Japan is not likely to jeopardize its access Kapur, Ashok. PEACE AND POWER IN INDIA'S NUCLEAR to Chinese and North Korean markets by establish- POLICY. Asian survey, v. 10, Sept. 1970: 779-788. ing a military alliance with the Republic of Korea. DS1.A492, v. 10 Japan will promote South Korean security both through increased economic cooperation with Seoul Analyzes the growth of strategic thought in In- and through political and economic relations with dia, emphasizing the post-1962 conceptual changes the Communist countries, which could restrain in Indian defense policy, their relationship to their adventurism. Given the de-Americanization shifts in the international system, and their im- program in South Korea and the uncertainty of col- plications for Indian strategy. Kapur notes that lective security arrangements, South Korea "should the improvement of Soviet-American relations dur- not hasten to seek military cooperation with Japan ing the late 1950's and the early 1960's was less for mutual security. Rather, the fundamental ap- the result of Nehru's diplomacy than the rise of proach is to strengthen basic ties which bind the Communist China to nuclear-power status. Today, United States and the Republic of Korea together however, India can play a prominent power role in in the joint security treaty." Asian affairs so long as it maintains a nuclear option. 214 Knorr, Klaus E. MILITARY POWER AND POTENTIAL. Lex- 212 ington, Mass., Heath Lexington Books C1970] Kim, Samuel S. COMMUNIST CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILI- 150 p. (Studies in international development and TY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, economics) UA10.K52 Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Oct. Includes bibliographical references. 1970: 35-46. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 50 Delineates the concept of national military potential, focusing on economic and technological Reassesses China's progress toward a nuclear- capacity, ldministrative capabilities, and politi- weapons capability in light of past predictions cal foundations of military power, and including and the disruptive impact of the cultural revolu- a brief introductory discussion on the nature, tion, lists potential Chinese strategic delivery components, and functions of military power. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 4.

215 219 Kreker, Hans-Justus. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MEDI- LIN PIAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, by the editor. TERRANEAN. In U.S. Command and General Staff Current scene, v. 8, Aug. 1, 1970: 1-14. College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, DS701.C9, v. 8 v.50, Aug. 1970: 21-26. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 50 Traces the ascendancy of Lin Piao and the triumph of politics over weaponry in the People's Sketches the development and growth of the So- Liberation Army (PLA), focusing on Lin's role in viet Mediterranean fleet. Since the 1967 Arab- the cultural revolution. While the involvement in Israeli War the Soviet fleet has grown at an the cultural revolution may constitute the most alarming rate: at the beginning of 1968 the fleet significant recent modification of military policy consisted of 40 vessels; by October it had in- and strategy, Lin Piao has been able to maintain creased to 100 ships, including 25 helicopters, 4 basic continuity in military policy. "Now that cruisers, 8 guided-missile destroyers, and 10 sub- Lin has weathered the Cultural Revolution upheav-

marines. Kreker maintains that the Soviet fleet als within the PLA leadership, . . . and has in this area "is not only a mil.ry threat, but placed close associates in key military positions, it also can be used as a politi weapon which he is probably in a stronger position than ever might cause NATO considerable embarrassment if em- before to ensure that future military policy is ployed at the right time at the right point." guided by his version of the proper mix of political and military considerations."

216 220 Kursener, J. CTHE AMERICAN ARMY IN EUROPE] Die US London. Institute for Strategic Studies. THE MILI- Army in Europa. Schweizer Soldat, v. 45, May TARY BALANCE, 1970-1971. London C1970] 126 p. 1970: 13-16. illus. UA15L65, 1970-71. U3.323, v. 45 Contents.--Countries and principal pacts: The Describes the mission, opposing forces, adminis- United States and the Soviet Union.The European trative subordination, composition, zone of com- balance. The Middle East and the Mediterranean. munications, combat readiness, reinforcements, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Asia and Australasia. Latin supply of the United States Army Europe. Kiirsner America.--Regional balances: The military balance points out that the costs of an equivalent of the between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.The military American Army in Europe stationed in the United balance between the Soviet Union and China.--Ta- States itself would be very much higher. bles: Estimates of comparative strategic strengths. Major nuclear delivery vehicles. De- fense expenditures and national economies. Com- parisons of military manpower. Current interna- 217 tional defense production projects.Major identi- Lehners, Richard. CTHE ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN EN- fied arms agreements, July 1969-June 197:.--Appen- SURING PEACE] Zivile Verteidigung als Funktion dix: Fissile material. der Friedensicherung. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Apr. 1970: 169-171. U3.W396, v. 19 Annual review of the world's major military forces. New features of this year's review are Condemns the present West German imbalance be- wider coverage of African countries and new sec- tween expenditures on civil defense and on the tions on Latin America, regional military bal- armed forces. A civil defense system on a scale ances, international defense production projects, comparable to that of Sweden or Switzerland would and fissile material. allay the fears created by West Germany's "forward position" in NATO strategy. Lehners suggests a 20 to 1 ratio of military to civil defense expendi- 221 tures instead of the present 50 to 1 to make clear Mackintosh, Malcolm. SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICY. the defensive nature of West German armament. World today, v. 26, July 1970: 269-276. D410.W63, v. 26

To deter war, to win those wars that are not de- 218 terred, and to conduct political relations from a LETTER FROM LONDON, by our correspondent. NATO's position of strength are the major aims of Soviet fifteen nations, v. 15, Aug./Sept. 1970: 12-16. strategic policy. The specific form this policy illus. UA646.F5, v. 15 takes is powerfully shaped by Russian national traditions, Soviet geography, the dual capacity of Speculates on the shape of British defense poli- the Soviet political system, and modern strategic- cy under the new Conservative Party"edministra- weapons technology. First place in Soviet plan- tion. The most interesting question at the moment ning is given to the strategic confrontation with is how Prime Minister Heath, whose chief preoccu- the United States. Strategic defense is the area pation is with British solvency, intends to fi- of greatest concern, but offensive forces are not nance a defense program that is expected to in- therefore neglected. The Soviet Union does not clude maintenance of a presence East of Suez, re- consider a first-strike capability a practical tention of a carrier force, revitalization and ex- goal, but it would like to attain superiority in pansion of the Territorial and Army Volunteer Re- missile forces over the United States if it can do serve, and a general strengthening of all the ser- so without provoking a new arms race. Second pri- vices. ority goes to the confrontation in Europe. Soviet 46 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

probing operations in peacetime are highly unlike- will be made to place East-West relationships on ly. The aim is rather to maintain a force capable a basis of mutual acceptance by softening the ri- of waging and winning a general war at any level gidity of the military balance of power. However, of weapons employment, nuclear or conventional. Western Europe must cling to its American ally and Third in the scale of priorities is the confronta- continue to reinforce its own conventional forces. tion with China. The Soviet Union is unlikely to American abandonment of Europe is unthinkable, resort to large-scale military operations to re- since it would be tantamount to abdication as a solve its dispute with China, but threats of force world power, but the nature and dimensions of the will continue to be used politically. Last prior- future American presence in Europe are uncertain. ity goes to the use of military forces to support West Germany is doing its share already, and in- Soviet diplomacy in peacetime.Maritime forces creased German representation in NATO would mean a are expected to play a major role in this respect. lasting Soviet propaganda victory. The ations These peacetime political activities are a "bo- not directly threatened by the Warsaw Pact seem nus," however. The chief concerns are the substan- reluctant to arm against a threat that may not be tial challenges to the security of the Soviet directly imminent. Perhaps the answer is to sub- homeland that originate in the United States, sidize American troops while qualitatively Western Europe, and China. strengthening the European contribution to NATO. Simultaneous reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would ease the American situation but might 222 not be acceptable to the Soviet Union because of the threat to its troops in the satellite coun- McNulty, James F. SOVIET SEAPOWER: RIPPLE OR TIDAL tries. Reduction must not affect the overall sym- WAVE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapo- metry of the present military equilibrium. As lis. Proceedings, v. 96, July 1970: 18-25. illus. Vl.U8, v. 96 many NATO countries as possible should physically take up a front-line position. Soviet calls for a general security conference conceal pressure to The Soviet Navy is challenging Western maritime abandon East Germany and accept the Brezhnev doc- supremacy. A permanent Russian presence in the The strategic arms limitation talks and Eastern Mediterranean is taken for granted, while trine. the Baltic Sea has become the almost private do- the Moscow-Bonn renunciation-of-force agreement show the efficacy of approaching European security main of Communist naval forces, and the growing frequency of Soviet naval visits in the Indian by small steps. Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf indicate that this pattern will continue. The Soviet maritime thrust has its roots in the frustration ex- 224 perienced by Russian leaders when Western naval Mendl, Wolf. DETERRENCE AND PERSUASION; FRENCH NU- power was employed to counter Soviet moves in CLEAR ARMAMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL POLICY, Greece, Lebanon, and Cuba. Moscow realized that 1945-1969. New York, Praeger [1970] 256 p. "if the doctrine of 'peaceful coexistence' were to UA700.M45 1970 function as the keystone of Russian Communist policy, then the supporting arches of that policy Contents.--Preface.--Introduction.--French nu- would have to be restructured to include all fac- clear policy in the context of French foreign pol- ets of Russian national power."The Soviet naval icy.--French nuclear policy as a function of de- challenge is aimed at weakening the political, fence policy.--The civil and military development psychological, and economic force of the free of the French atomic energy programme.--The domes- world. Challenging the Soviets in turn would take tic political environment.--Conclusion.--Appendix. the shape of a multinational effort based upon the --Bibliographical note.--Index. existing regional alliance systems among the maritime nations of the Western world. Some of the Exmaines the role of nuclear armament in French alliances would establish information centers to foreign and domestic policy since 1945. Mendl ar- collect data on Soviet political, military, and gues that while the development of an indepeudent commercial ventures; diplomatic initiatives might nuclear force may partly reflect De Gaulle's idio- provide a direct liaison among these alliances syncracies, it also reflects basic French objec- with the objective of creating multinational tives that will outlast De Gaulle. The book was cruising squadrons. Long-range plans to counter completed just prior to De Gaulle's resignation. the Soviet naval threat should include the modernization of Western navies as well as steps to increase the efficiency of commercial operations. The Soviet maritime challenge may be of little 225 THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN ALLIANCE. consequence, but "if the early 'sea ripple' grows, Mettler, Eric. unchecked, to a wavt of tidal proportions, even Swiss review of world affairs, v. 20, Aug. 1970: D839.S9, v. 20 the firmest shore-rooted structure cannot long 10-11. stand against it." Some U.S. senators and generals want Tokyo to share the defense burden in the Far East, and interest groups inside Japan are demanding a larger 223 navy to protect the commercial seaways. Japanese Mahncke, Dieter. CTHE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND EUROPE- industry would like to increase arms production AN SECURITY] Atlantische Allianz and europiiische for profits as well as its technological spin-off. Sicherheit. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 50, Apr. The business sector also strongly resisted Japan's 1970: 29-35. AP32.S47, v. 50 signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, because of its fear that Japan might be driven out The configuration of the Atlantic alliance will of industrial leadership. In addition, some im- remain unaltered in the next decade, but efforts portant Japanese are saying that a world power can 5 9 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 47

be independent only if it possesses a nuclear de- ident Nixon will interpret the security treaty be- terrent. Japan's absorption of Western technology tween the United States, Australia, and New Zea- and political forms and the renewal of the U.S. - land in regard to nuclear threats is not settled. Japanese security treaty will not prevent Japan Millar contends that as long as the NPT perpetu- "from trying to regain independence in every re- ates the present nuclear oligopoly and reduces the spect and to go its own way in the foreseeable fu- foreign policy options of most governments, Aus- ture."Whether Tokyo can replace the aversion to tralia should not completely forfeit its nuclear- everything military with a more tempered under- weapon option. He concludes that Great Britain's standing for Japan's legitimate defense require- withdrawal from the area East of Suez will foster ments, or whether chauvinism will displace the a closer relationship between Australia and the current fanatic pacifism "remains hidden in the United States, which, together with Australia's mysterious depths of the Japanese soul." growing economic strength, will become the corner- stone of Australian security.

226 MILITARY SPENDING REPORT. Congressional record 228 [daily ed.J 91st Congress, 2d session, v. 116, Miler, Thomas B. SOVIET POLICIES SOUTH AND EAST OF July 31, 1970: S12559-S12566. SUEZ. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 70-80. J11.R52, v. 116 D410.F6, v. 49 A summary of the 1970 Military Spending Report submitted by the Military Spending Committee of Whatever Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL); may be, the modest but growing Soviet naval pres- inserted into the Record by Senator Mark O. Hat- ence there represents a shift in policy. Through field, Chairman, MCPL Military Spending Committee. the judicious use of these forces, Moscow could exert significant political influence, particular- Examines the utility and necessity of new stra- ly since competition from Western navies appears tegic and tactical weapons systems requested in to be decreasing. The Soviet Union has become a the Defense Department's proposed Fiscal Year 1971 major supplier of India's Navy and Air Force and budget. The report also pinpoints problems re- has provided sufficient military aid to Pakistan garding overseas troop deployments and the impact to retain some diplomatic leverage there. Its in- of defense spending on the economy. While the re- fluence in Indonesia has declined sharply since port recommends substantial reductions in spending Sukarno's overthrow, but it has negotiated favor- for land-based strategic systems, including a can- able trade and other agreements with Malaysia and cellation of the Minuteman III program, it makes a Singapore, at the eastern end of the Indian Ocean, strong case for the Underwater Long-Range Missile and with Mauritius and Mozambique, at the western System (ULMS). "We should proceed with ULMS as end. It has not yet sought to replace British part of a decision to make a sea-based nuclear with Soviet naval power in the Persian Gulf, but missile system the first line of deterrence." In it has clearly sought to bolster its position in order to accomplish this shift in emphasis, the the Arab countries. In sum, "the Soviet Union has concept of "strategic mix," which has created ex- built itself a modest capacity for long-range in- cessive redundancy of strategic systems, may have tervention, but would be quite incapable for many to be redefined. "When viewed as a successor to years of major operations far from home. . . land-based missiles and their requisite defense South and East of Suez, the 'engthening Soviet in- systems the ULMS seems cost-effective." The Com- fluence is more shadow thz substance, but the mittee concludes that "significant reductions can shadows give warning of more substance to come." be made without in any way weakening our national security." 229 Miller, J. D. B. AUSTRALIA IN VIETNAM: NECESSARY 227 INSURANCE OR BURNT FINGERS? Round table; the Com- Millar, Thomas B. AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE. C2d ed. monwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 295-302. Melbourne? Melbourne University Press C19693 AP4.R6, 1970 229 p. illus. UA870.M5 Bibliography: p. 215-217. In military terms the Australian intervention in Vietnam is probably to be accounted a success, Contents.--Preface to the second edition.--Ac- Its justification lay in Australia's doctrine of

knowledgments.--Introduction.--The defence heri- forward defense, which assumes that Australiwis .) age.--Strategic considerations and national in- wars will and must be fought elsewhere, but,,wity terests.--Forward defence and regional commit- the aid of a senior partner, Britain or the United ments.--Threats and sensitivities.--Australia and States. The Americans have accepted Australian the war in Viet Nam.--Australia's defence organi- aid as proof of friendship, and the Asian govern- zation and capacity.--Australia and nuclear weap- ments have either approved or failed to voice dis- ons.--Defence of the Australian environment.--Some approval. The catastrophe of the Vietnam war, conclusions and proposals.--Appendices.--Index. from the Australian point of view, is that Ameri- can public opinion may prevent the United States Traces the historical background of Australia's from playing the senior partner role in Asia in defense policy and examines specific current fac- the future. The great problem now is bringing the ets: the size and disposition of defenses, admin- doctrine of forward defense up to date. The pro- istrative departments, and nuclear weapons policy. jected British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singa- Australia has not signed the nonproliferation pore means that there will be no senior partner treaty (NPT) because of its involvement in indus- there; the Guam doctrine leaves uncertain how fu- trial nuclear activities and because the way Pres- ture insurgency in Laos or Thailand will be met. 3 48 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

230 Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean and the loss Mitchell, Donald W. THE SOVIET NAVAL CHALLENGE. of American bases in Libya. Orbis, v. 14, spring 1970: 129-153. D839.068, v. 14 233 Asserts that the Russians are developing an of- Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. CWHATtS NEW AT fensive maritime strategy and attempting to chal- NATO ?] A l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau?Revue mili- lenge U.S. naval supremacy in response to U.S. in- taire suisse, v. 115, Aug. 1970: 345-351. volvement in the Vietnam War and cutbacks in U.S. U2.R5, v. 115 military research and development.Mitchell describes the growth of the Soviet submarine fleet, Describes NATO's structure through an organiza- progress in the three related fields of oceanogra- tion cnart. Montfort is primarily cor-erned about phy, fishing, and commerce, and the Soviet naval France's attitude toward the alliance in the event presence in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, of a military operation. He concludes that de- and the Far East. He concludes that "the acquisi- spite NATO's impeccable organization, the lack of tion of the present level of naval strength has conventional arms and troops will lead to a nucle- been one of the greatest achievements of the twen- ar war in Europe and will result in Western "ca- tieth century." pitulation without war."

231 Monaghan, Henry P. PRESIDENTIAL WAR-MAKING. Boston 234 University law review, v. 50, spring 1970: 19-33. Muller, Johannes. [A QUARTER CENTURY OF THE AMERI- LL CAN AIR FORCES IN EUROPE] 25 Jahre amerikanische Luftstreikrafte in Europa. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Aug. Many critics of the Vietnam War have unjustly 1970: 421-424. illus. challenged not only the wisdom of U.S policy but U3.W396, v. 19 also the constitutional power of the President to conduct such a war. The words of the Constitution A history of the American Air Force in Europe alone are not sufficient to determine the limits (USAFE), stressing the transition in doctrine from of the President's powers in the area of foreign massive retaliation to flexible response, as well policy. Presidential power has grown enormously, as the changes in technology. In addition ib exe- especially during this century, while congression- cuting the military will of the United States, al power has steadily declined. The so-called USAFE is charged with contributing to the NATO de- separation of powers is in fact a sharing of pow- terrent, and, in the event deterrence fails, will ers by separate institutions whose relative power fight side-by-side with the NATO allies. The is determined by the capacity of each to act ef- structure, organization, weapons systems, and in- fectively in foreign affairs. U.S. presidents frastructure of the USAFE are outlined. Mgller have frequently committed military forces without concludes that USAFE has successfully fulfilled congressional authorization; limitations on this its mission, and he expresses the hope for its practice have almost always been political rather continued presence in Europe "as long as our secu- than legal. While no one questions the Presi- rity requires." dent's power to act in an emergency without prior congressional approval, various legal theorists have proposed specific conditions under which such 235 approval would be constitutionally required. Nau, Ludwig. [CHANGES IN MISSION AND STRUCTURE OF These proposals are ambiguous in what they demand. THE BUNDESWEHR: THE REVISION OF STRATEGIC CON- They fail to reckon with the firmly established CEPTS.]Auftrags- and Strukturwandel der Bundes - practice of presidential war-making and lack a re- wehr/Die Aenderung des strategischen Konzepts. alistic model of the separation of powers. How- Frankfurter Hefte, v. 25, May 1970: 326-332. ever unwise it may be, the Vietnam War is not an AP3O.F555, v. 25 unconstitutional use of presidential power. Con- gress has the power to repudiate the war if it so Traces the parallel relationship between the de- decides. velopment of NATO military doctrine from massive retaliation to flexible response and the changes 232 in the structure of the West German Armed Forces. The ratio of NATO to Warsaw Pact divisions indi- Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW AT NATO ?] A l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau?Revue mili- cates the dangers inherent in the German mission taire suisse, v. 115, June 1970: 249-252. today. Nau suggests that the West Gelman forces are limited by geography and armament to defensive U2.R5, v. 115 action while reserves are brought up.He con- Reports on NATO's current activities and prob- cludes that the May 1970 White Book will effect no lems. Montfort discusses Joseph Coffey's article essential changes in the organization of the Ger- man Air Force and Navy. "The United States and the Defense of Western Eu- rope" (cited as item 1101 in v. 6, no. 3, of this bibliography), which advocates the use of nuclear weapons to counter the Soviet threat to Western 236 Europe. Other topics are the NATO exercise "Arc- NAVAL REVIEW 1970. Edited by Frank Uhlig and Jan tic Express;" a "white paper" published last Feb- Snouck-Hurgronje. Annapolis, United States Naval ruary contending that Great Britain is the great- Institute C1970] (Its Proceedings, v. 96, May est military power in Western Europe; and the need 1970) 568 p. illus. for U.S. bases to remain in Spain in light of the Vl.U8, v. 96 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Partial contents.--Naval and maritime events, North Atlantic Council, and the structure of NATO. 1 July 1968-31 December 1969, by D. L. Strole and Statistics, appendices, a chronology, and an al- W. E. Dutcher.--Essays: The Indian Ocean as seen phabetical index are included. by an Indian, by A. P. S. Bindra. The development of Navy strategic offensive anddefensive systems, by Dominic A. Paolucci. Developments and problems 239 in carrier-based fighter aircraft, by C. O. Holm- Paice, Anthony. A DEFENSE FOR BRITAIN. London, quist.--Sea power; a commentary: Patterns V Published by the Liberal Publication Department American sea power, 1945-1956; their portents for for the Unservile State Group C1969] 24 p. (Un- the seventies, by John D. Hayes.--Maritime infor- servile state papers, no. 15) mation: The 1970 defense budget and defense pro- UA647.P25 gram for fiscal years 1970-1947; a statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford. Supple- Proposes a new foreign and defense policy for mental statements before Congress by Secretary of Great Britain. The country can no longer afford Defense Melvin R. Laird. Summary of major naval, to ignore the economic and political realities maritime, and military forces. that sharply limit its options in foreign affairs. Decisionmakers need to recognize that Britain is Essays on current naval and maritime history, unable to stand alone and that no defense policy naval research and development, Marine Corps and is good if it undermines economic strength at home Navy combat operations in Vietnam, carrier opera- or abroad. British policy ought to be directed tions, geopolitical aspects of maritime transpor- toward the maintenance of peace in Europe and "the tation, and the future of American sea power, to- creation of integrated European forces controlled gether with a selection of official statements and by a supranational Political Community which may other information pertinent to this general survey include East European states." Paice offers spe- of the naval and maritime posture of the United cific recommendations on nuclear and conventional States in 1970. force levels and on steps that might be taken to promote the ultimate goal of an integrated Europe- an political community. 237 Norman, Lloyd. THE CHIEFS: PARTNERSHIP GOES OUT WHEN 'PURPLE SUITS' GO ON. Army, v. 20, May 1970: 36-43. U1.A893, v. 20 240 POSSIBILITY OF STRENGTHENING CIVIL DEFENCE IN WEST- The onceractious Joint Chiefs of Staff seem to ERN GERMANY. International civil defence, v. 17, have achiev a harmonization of views. Whether May 1970: 1-4. UA926.I488, v. 17 this reflects eater maturity or a deliberate Translated from Ziviler BevOlkerungsschutz, closing of ranks to meet the challenge from civil- no. 4, 1970. UA929.G3Z5 ian strategists, it is a fact of primary significance, because this body of men exercises enormous Outlines West Germany's official position on influence over U.S. foreign and military policy. civil defense. The government recognizes civil Surprisingly, over the years the quality of this defense as an essential part of the total defense influence has been anything but hawkish. It is picture but regrets that it will be unable to in- true that the Chiefs were perhaps the most influ- crease civil defense funds at least until 1972. ential advocates of the policy of containing Com- Nevertheless Bonn intends to maximize the effec- munist aggression, but their councils have always tiveness of civil defense through available re- been marked by moderation and restraint. The in- sources and presents a list of proposals to this fluence of the Chiefs seems to have reached its end. peak under President Johnson. The present administration is moving faster on troop withdrawals from Vietnam and slower in the development of strategic missiles and aircraft than the Chiefs 241 WAR HATES THOSE WHO HESITATE. would like. It also overlooked their views in Possony, Stefan T. Washington report, -not retaining a stockpile of biological weapons InAmerican Security Council. for its deterrent effect. The Chiefs now advise May 18, 1970: 1-4. Ser extreme caution in the strategic arms limitation The U.S. intervention in Cambodia was overdue. talks. They are likely to get their way on the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, Laos and Cambodia have long been the main supply ABM, and the underwater long-range missile system, routes and staging areas for Hanoi's forces and but only by the sacrifice of troops, aircraft, and are essential to their efforts to overthrow the Destruction of the ships. How effective are the Chiefs?The secrecy government of South Vietnam. surrounding their activity makes it very difficult North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia has se- to judge. One thing is certain, however: there verely hurt the enemy, but additional measures are necessary if the United States is to deal a is nothing sinister about their influence. decisive blow. The port of Sihanoukville must be closed to the enemy, guerrilla operations must be 238 mounted to follow up the present offensive, U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Information Ser- air supremacy must be maintained over Laos and re- vice. NATO FACTS AND FIGURES. Brussels, NATO In- established over North Vietnam, the flow of sup- formation Service C1969] 354 p. illus. plies through Laos must be halted and an oil em- UA646.3.A559 bargo imposed on North Vietnam, and Vietnamization must be supplemented by Asianization of the war. A factbook describing the origins and subsequent The main struggles of the Vietnam War continue to evolution of the alliance, the activities of the be fought in the United States, where the Nixon 50 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

administration must make a greater effort to in- thus defined also attempts tc exploit the senti- form the U.S. public of tine necessity for strong ment of love for the soil. Love of the fatherland measures to win. and the feeling of unity with its soil are merged into fear and hate of its putative enemies. In theory the contradiction between nationalism and 242 internationalism is resolved by the concept of Rau, Erwin M. RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC SEA: 1920- "patriotic internationalism," although it is significant that the East German Army still styles 1970. Naval War College review, v. 23, Sept. itself a national rather than a Communist army. 1970: 23-30. Ser The number of deserters and the findings of socio- Historical survey of Soviet policy in the Baltic logical investigations show that it is questionable that the authorities have succeeded in incul- Sea area, including a brief summary of current cating a deep and convinced patriotism into the military capabilities and strategy."Throughout its history the Soviet Government has consistently National Peoples Army of East Germany. attempted to increase its influence and control in the Baltic. In recent years these efforts have been paralleled by the growth of the Soviet mari- 245 time establishment, a large part of which must Rhee, T. C. JAPAN: "SAME BED, DIFFERENT DREAMS." utilize the Baltic for overhaul and logistical Interplay, v. 3, Aug. 1970: 4-10. support." Rau concludes that the Soviet Union has Ser the capability to seize and hold the exits of the Baltic, making it feasible to exclude enemy war- Although Japan is currently peace-minded, its ships entirely. In the event of a general war economic power and renascent nationalism may even- Warsaw Pact naval forces could move between the tually be harnessed to underpin a powerful diplo- Great Baltic shipyards and the North Sea and the matic and military role in Asia and the world. A Atlantic, where they would intercept Western mari- firm foundation for an expanded military effort time traffic and U.S. aircraft carriers and sub- already exists. Although Japan allocates only 1 marines far from the Soviet Union's vulnerable percent of its GNP to the defense sector, military flank on the Baltic. The West must be alert to expenditures have been quite substantial in real the possibility of a limited Soviet amphibious as- terms and could exceed those of Communist China by sault in the Baltic. 1975. The proposed national budget for fiscal year 1970 contains a request for a 17.7 percent increase in military spending, the sharpest rise 243 since 1945. Japan is also investing heavily in Ray, Dennis M. PLA IN THE SADDLE. India quarterly, long-range research and development projects un- v. 26, Jan./Mar. 1970: 20-29. dertaken by major Zaibatsu combines. "One could D410.144, v.26 well wonder why the pragmatic Japanese business circles would commit so much of their efforts to Concludes that the military is reemerging as a weapon systems development and research if there dominant political force in China. Although the is no agreement on the future trend of Japan's rise of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) began military policy." A rapid transformation of Japa- early, its political power and nonmilitary roles nese attitudes is generating support for rearma- were greatly enhanced by the cultural revolution. ment, and an alarming number of Japanese now favor Further involvement in political activities will, massive rearmament. A recent poll of Japanese however, adversely affect the PLA's military capa- public opinion showed that 81 percent of the popu- bilities. The PLA must either relinquish some of lation favor an independent national defense pos- its nonmilitary functions or gradually be civil- ture while 45 percent would approve nuclear weap- ianized, as it was following the civil war. While ons acquisition. Japan has signed the nuclear there exists no viable political counterweight to nonproliferation treaty, but in view of its numer- the PLA, this does not necessarily augur a return ous objections, ratification seems highly uncer- to "warlordism" or monolithic military dictator- tain. The United States hopes Japan will play a ship, although either could emerge. "Whether suc- complementary role in maintaining the balance of cession to Mao Tse-tung will lead to stability power in Asia, but "even supposing Japan's nominal would depend on the ability of PLA to accommodate cooperation, Tokyo's aims would not be to foster the various units of its own and the many segments an Asian political climate likely to lead to har- of China's mammoth and complex society." mony with American goals."A number of serious Japanese-American commercial disagreements already exist, and there are widespread signs of anti- Americanism in Japan. 244 Rehm, Walter. [THE SOLDIER OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLES ARMY AND HIS FATHERLAND] Der NVA-Soldat and sein Vaterland. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Sept. 1970: 444-449. 246 U3.4i396, v. 19 Rippon, Geoffrey. SOUTH AFRICA AND NAVAL STRATEGY: THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA. Round table; the In the training given the East German soldier Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July 1970: 303 - the fatherland is defined as not only the land of 309. AP4.R6, 1970 his birth but also the social relationships under which he lives. From the Marxist point of view, Argues that in the event of another major con- "only where the working class rules does the true ventional war the sea nxtte around South Africa fatherland exist." The training designed to in- will be of vital importance. The route is under- still an emotional attachment to the fatherland stood to include also the Portuguese territories fl THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 51

of Mozambique and Angola, lying along the coast Sept. 29, 1970: 19. to the immediate north of South Africa on the east D839.C87, v. 22 coast, and South West Africa, on the west coast. Translated from Izvestiia, Aug. 29, 1970. Rippon urges that NATO include the South Atlantic Slav Rm in its area of responsibility to support South Af- rica "in her action as a bastion against the Many reputable American newspapers report that spread of Communism in Africa and her commanding Washington is operating on the concept that "only geographi:al position on two Oceans."For this the acceleration of the arms race by the United purpose tic Conservative Party must ensure that States can ensure the limitation of the arms Great Britain provide South Africa the arms neces- race." This concept is a reversion to the famil- sary to defend the Cape route. iar "position of strength" fallacy and is based on the assumption that only the United States can support a costly arms race. However, soberminded 247 U.S. political circles realize that the arms race Roherty, James M. DECISIONS OF ROBERT S. MCNAMARA; has damaged not only the American foreign policy A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. position but its domestic economy as well. In im- Coral Gables, Fla., University of Miami Press plementing this faulty concept, the United States [1970] 223 p. UA23.R64 will succeed only in hurting itself. "Notes": p. 183-211.

Contents.--Generalists and functionalists: James V. Forrestal. Robert A. Lovett. Thomas S. 250 Gates. The Eisenhower-Rockefeller schema: Salitter, Michael. CTHE SOVIET MARITIME FLEET AS AN Charles E. Wilson. Neil H. McElroy. Two role INSTRUMENT OF POLICY] Die sowjetische Marine als concepts.--The new management: Active management. politisches Instrument. Wehrkunde, v. 19, May The economic criterion. The programming function. 1970: 243-247. U3.W396, v. 19 Cost-effectiveness analyses. Civilians and military.--A manned bomber: A technological plateau. The role in Soviet international policy assigned Assured destruction and damage limitation.The to the maritime fleet can be defined in terms of systems inventory. Dialogue on AMSA.--A nuclear three areas: oceanography, maritime commerce, and carrier: Ttotical doctrine. Strategic doctrine. bases. Soviet oceanographic contributions to the The case of CVA-b7.--Epilogue.--Appendix. International Geophysical Year were impressive both qualitatively and quantitatively. Ostensibly Describes Secretary McNamara's role in the for- scientific in design, these studies actually deal mulation of tactical and strategic doctrines dur- with problems that may be decisive in the conduct ing the 1960's. Roherty analyzes the problems of of sea-based missile warfare. Soviet expenditures the manned bomber and the nuclear carrier to clar- on research and education in oceanography far ex- ify the connections between McNamara's decisions ceed those of the United States. Although the ex- and the conceptual scheme that produced them. He pansion of the Soviet merchant fleet leaves it in argues that "the ascendancy of management and the sixth place in tonnage terms, the ships are new decline of policy, the elaboration of structure and well equipped. Future expansion will free the and technique, and the faltering of innovation and Soviet Union from dependence on foreign carriers, bargaining mark the McNamara years." give it entrance into the shipping cartels, and advertise its presence in the Third World. Of 248 course, many Soviet ships will then be transport- ing military supplies for subversion movements. Ryan, John D. THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE - -PROBLEMS The Israeli-Arab conflict has given the Soviet AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 1970'S. NATO's fifteen na- Union ad hoc bases throughout the Mediterranean. tions, v. 15, Aug./Sept. 1970: 18-26. illus. Russia now has set the stage to show how well it UA646.F5, v. 15 has learned to use naval power to influence political events. Discusses the impact of recent U.S. cutbacks in defense spending. Ryan, who is Air Force Chief of Staff, claims that "the degree of retrenchment already has been substantial, and CAir Force] combat 251 capability has been reduced." The cutbacks have Schmidt, Helmut. [FOR AN ARMY OF PEACE] FUT eine forced the Air Force to reduce military and civil- Armee des Friedens. Monet, v. 2b0, May 1970: 16- ian personnel levels, aircraft inventories, and 19. AP30.M56, v. 260 aircraft procurement rates, and have brought about a slowdown in the replacement of Minuteman II with German youth realizes that military service Minuteman III, a decline in manned bomber and air means service for peace. The confidence and natu- defense capabilities, and difficulties with the ralness with which the German military serves the tactical airlift force. Despite budget reduc- Western alliance guarantees its peaceful intentions, the Air Force has succeeded to some extent tions. Weakening NATO would defeat the purpose of in modernizing its aging air fleet, but further the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the stra- cutbacks, particularly in research and develop- tegic arms limitation talks. The military also ment, could have a serious impact on U.S. security wishes to protect the great social progress in the 1970's. achieved by the liberal regime. The soldiers have to understand that their task is not aggression and destruction but protection. 249 Germany and its allies must create a military balance that in turn Sagatelian, M. OUR COMMENTARY: FAULTY CONCEPT. will guarantee a political balance, so that "no Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22, foreign -eel can be Imposed on Germany."Public 57 52 AR\IS CONTROLF.:DISARMAMENT

discussion is welcomed; for it provides an incen- five comm.:al:des and a questionnaire survey on the tive for soldiers to think. Mutual confidence work of local civil defense directors in three among the German citizens in uniform and in civil- states in the Middle West and ecncluded that opti- ian clothes can be established only if biased par- m-ct Psrtieioation cannot be achieved using volun- ty polemics are avoided. teers, because civil defense has lost its nrestige and credibility among the middte class. She study showed that community leaders were more inclined 252 to support a local civil defense program than a federal one; that apathy prevails toward a shelter Schneider, Fernand-Thiebsut. (RUSSIA'S MOVE TOWARD program; and that when nonsnecialists had the re- SEA AND WORLD POWER] Russlands Grit" zur See- and sponsi'...ility for planning civil defense programs, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschan, Weltmache- difficulties arose in their collaboration with the v. 20, Jnne 1970: 301-318. established town authorities. The group recom- W....47485, v. 20 mended the appointment of full-time civil defense directors and the establishment of full-tire coor- A continuous drive toward sea and world power dinators in areas that could not afford civ;i1 ne- has cnanacterizei Russia's military and foreign tense directors. policy since 1945. The Warsaw Fact and the Coun- cil for Mutual Economic Assistance strengthen So- viet power in Middle Europe, but not to the extent 254 of -eking it a world power. In Africa and Latin Schltze, Waiter. (FRANCE AND THE PPL3LE7 OF A UAL- America Russia has not beer able to gain a firm ANCiD FCROE REDUC'I'10:iIii EAST AND WEST] Frank-- footing. The nuclear potential of ,he Soviet Uni- retch and das Problem riser ausgevagenen Trunpen- on and Warsaw Fact co.:ntries outweighs that of the verminderung it Ost and Wes:. Eurcpa-Archie, United States and NATO. The Sev_et Navy is second v. 25, July 10, 1970: 469-578. in size, but first from the point o. view of re- 1639.F.66, v. 25 cency of construction. Access to the warm seas is essentiul, sinne superiority in land and nuclear Describes the development of post-1967 French weapons nay b2 misleading. especially in light of military policy, focuring or. Pompidou's attempts the recently achieved success of the Americans to ensure France's 71plcmatic indenendence within with lasers, which in the future will be sole the framework of superpower rivalry.The author destroy not only aircraft but also tanks and mis- evaluates the French military situation from a chins. To assure access, the Soviets have been military-technical point of view, noting the spe- building up their Navy. The Russian fleet sail, cial attention given to mutual balanced force re- on all oceans, and the Mediterranean is coming ductions since 1969, outlining the prostects for a more and more under the supenision of the Sovi- unilateral American w000p reduction ill western Eu- ets. In 1968 Admiral 0orshkov stated that "sooner rope or simultaneous and balanced force reductions or late, the United States must understand that of NATO and the Warsaw Fact. 'Cie strategic arms they no longer rule the waves."In America, Ad- limitation talks (SALT) are seen as an attempt to miral Mocrer adnitted that "America was losing its take Europe out of a military confrontation and to maritime supremacy to the Soviet Union." This su- valance terror. The technical-financial situation premacy is Moscow's only means to world power. At seers to demand a force reduction.From a politi- present, Soviet policies seem to focus on Asia and cal standpoint, mutual balanced force reductions Latin America. America has ne be outweighed, Chi- would play Sr. important role in the 'last -Wast re- na contained, and a ceginning made in infJuencing lationship. Yet France opposes reductions. the developing countries. Russia rules the old Schtze concludes that the new policies in Europe "World Island" and anpar.ntly is in the process of are carried out without the constracti.re coopera- becoming stronger than the Innited States. Still tion of France. IN the absence of a long-terl there is sore uncertainty regarding the most re- concept, France maintains its status quo. It de- cent technological innovations, which call into fensive attitude seems a paradox, since the al:ie., question the suprema,y of the Soviet Union and are inte.esed in a settlement with the Soviet therefore limit strategic possibiliti. ion and the .arsaw Fact countries. Mutual bal- the ashes of the Czech spring of freed'° the anced force reductions cannot be isolated f-cm light of liberalism Ldght still glo," while even these efforts. Faris will have to consider its in the Soviet Union the elite contest the regime. chances of blocking European trends in vie.. of So- The Snviet economy is not up to the revire.r.ents viet calls for a security conference and a German of world politics. Only the future can show settlement and the Soviet desire for arms c,ntroi whether the Soviet Union will he the first world in Enrope. Moreover, France's isolatica within power Cr even Ame:ics's equal. the West vill present obstacle, to its in.luenoing trends.

253 Sch'Itzsack, Udo. INQUIRIES RinARDINC, THE ROLE CF ;55 vni_7:;:,:i3 IN THE CIVIL DEFENCE SERVICE:5 OF THE :.ca:ears, Rolcr C. :1AnN]nl THE ".O:AL-FCR:E C.Er7 U.S.A, International ciil deferce, v. 17, Apr. T'r:E 1970'S. Air Force and ,pace 1270: 1-6. UA926.I4o8, v. 17 v.53, 1970: 68-71. illus. TransItned from Zivilschutz, v. 12, Deo. 1969. "a',633.A65, v- 53 Ser Outlines tie tactical And strategic venison re- Reviews a study of the role of civil d,fense vireaents on the U.S. Air Force in light of tuig- volunteers and voluntary organizations. A group etsly constraints and the 6rc4ing Soviet tIreat. of sn,iologists a; Correll University conducted a While planned recuct,ons in certain defense onta ccmpa. utive field study at the municipal level in lays are dependent to a considerable degree a THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 53

"firm" understanding with the Soviet Union, the chiefs of state. Mao consistently has maintained United States has no intention of implementing u that China would fight a defensive war against premature or exaggerated reduction in military U.S. irperialisn on Chinese soil, Mao's political strength. In order to maintain a credible deter- and ideological doctrine is aggressive and revolt:- rent in the absence of an arse control agrecrent, tionaJ'y, but his military doctrine is defensive the United States must .-ndernize its strategic and pragmatic. The Chinese Armed Forces are forces, because quantitative and qualitative im- structured, armed, and trained in accordance with provements in Soviet strategic capabilities could this doctrine, which recognizes the tremendous de- significantly reduce the effectiveness of U,S, fersive advantage inherent in Chi.']a's open spaces land and sea based missiles. Although the United and enormous population. 3o the ott.er hand, the States is upgrading its strategic capabilities, offensive capabilities of the Chinese Army have their effectiveness will vary with the length of always been neglected, and its atomic armament time it takes to counter new Soviet capabilities, cannot approach the American or Soviet level at and it is therefore unwise to base the deterrent any time in the rear future. A Soviet surprise on missiles alone. A dispersed manned bomber attack on the Chinese atomic installations will force is also essential, not in itself win a war, and it night lead into endless guerrilla warfare. If the Soviets do not reinforce the troops stationed at the Ussuri with

256, atomic weapons, it will seen most probable that Moscow does not contemplate large-scale hostili- Sights, A. P. GRADUATED PRESSURE IN THEORY AND ties. PF5'CTICE. ;in United States Naval Institute, An- na=olis. Proceedings, v. 96, duly 1970: 40 -45. illus. VI.U8, v. 96 258 Whether the military escalation, strategy em- S-15k, Erich. EFOWER DEMONSTRATIONS OF :HE SOVIET ployed in Vietnam was a success or failure is un- 1A7Y 01 ALL WORLD SEAS]Machtiemonstration der certain. It did not lead to world war III, but suwjetischen Seestreitkrgfte auf alien Weltreeren. neither did it force a settlement of the war. It Allgemeine Schwedzerische Militgrzeitschrift, appears that the United States "expected a big re- v. 136, Sept. 1970: turn from a small investment and got instead a 53.513, v. 136 small return from a big investment." Policjrokers incorrectly assumed that graduated military pres- Evaluates the characteristics and goals of the sure would produce a corresponding increase in r.oviet Navy's extensive exercise "Ocean." just as pressure on the enemy tc surrender or negotiate at the Army's "Duna" maneuver, the parties were and that the United States would continue increas- divided into "north," consisting cf the North Sea ing its ,,orbirg until it a!hieveu Ste objective. and Baltic fleet, and "south," consisting of the Military escalation failed to end the war at a low black Sea and Pacific fleet. These exercises, the level of violence because the North Vietnamese continuing growth of the Soviet merchant fleet, learned new Ways to limit the effects of bombing, the Soviets' enormous fishing fleet and extensive faced neither a land invasion nor a naval block- oceanographic research program, and the constant ale, and knew it was highly unlikely that the strengthening of the four Soviet naval fleets in- United States would use nuclear weapons against a e,,capably prove that the Soviet Union has ceased nonnuclear country in a limited var. Although a t) be a land power only and that Soviet maritime bold and massive strike against North Vietr.wi expansion throughout the world has as its air. the would have held more !rumise of military rl:CCS, r.-hiev,r,ent of military superiority over the 'Vest. it probably Is an iohac,.,1.1/,tle alternative now. The civilian leaders who for military policy viii likely choose a middle course between the extremes of nuclear holocaust and preemptive surren- ;=',) der. Military and naval strategists mms4 devise a Son, Cl7ae-sok. LIPLOYSCY IN IHE 1970'S: C:tALLEN3E workable compromise between the political prefer- CF DE-AMERICANIZAT1ON POLICY, Korea journal, ence fcr caution and the military need for bold- v. 135, May 1970: 4-7. ness and shock, but "the task will be challenging D6901.K7, v. 105 to say the least." a translation of a paper presented to a seminar held on March 21, 1970, the Korean Association of International Relations under the sponsorship 257 of the Hankook Ilbo, Salk, Erich. [TIM: COMMlilIST CRE.ESE PEOPLES LII,ER- AAIOli ARMY) Die rotchinesische Volksbefreiungs- South Korea still depends on J.B. military as- armee. Wearkunde, v. 19, Sept. 1970: 451-456. sistance, but President Nixon's foreign policy U3.W396, v.19 will reduce U.S. treaty commitments and troop deployments in Korea. "Though the United States the question as to which of the encircling pow- professes t, keep all its treaty commitments, U.S. ers China will attackthe United States in South- milita,y intervention is excluded in principle in east Asia or the Soviet Union in the aorta -- cannot a c:nventfonal war or guerrilla warfare, except be answered with complete certainty. Howeve- it for an incident where a nuclear power threatens car be assumed that lninese military d,otrine the freedoo of a nation." Inntead of seeking new echoes Chinese political doctrine and that both guarantees through revision cf the South Korean- remain as th.%: were formulated by Mao in the U.S,defensetreaty, it would be more sian'aceouo 1931's. In Mac's view, war IS not the continua- to negotiate a military assistance agreement. .o tion of politico ty other means, but another fern strengthen the South Korean Armed Forces anti o of politics, and s: roust be conducted only ty Secure the continued presence of American trc 5 54 ARMS CONTRC!. & DISARMAMENT

Although the U.S.-Japanese understanding regarding ing edges, but not a way out." However, the pos- Japan's role in Asia ray contribute to regional sibility of procrastination and failure at the economic coop-:ration, direct military intervention SALT talks exists, so while President Nixon be- or indirect military assistance by Japan are out lieves that decisions on advanced strategic weap- of the question. A collective security system onry can ba postponed for 1 year without adversely will not function without Japanese participation, affecting the U.S. deterrent in the late 19'0's, Lit because of domestic political pressures, wide- he is prepared to deploy new strategic weapons spread anti-Japanese sentiment in Asia, and a syster:s if mutual sees limitations prove elusive. sire for improved relations with China, Japan is unlikely to enter into such an arrangement. The RepT)lic of Korea will confront serious diplomatic and military :roblens in the 1970's; solving them 263 successfuny may afford new opportunities for Sutrahmanyam, K. INDIA'S PROBLEMS OF SECURITY. South Korea. Jaipur, Dept. of Political Science, 'University of Rajasthan 119693 3, 33, 2 P. D5480.84.S835 260 Discusses issues directly related to India's sc- Speidel, Hans. (THE DEFENSE OF arROPE] La defense arity and analyzes potential conventional, guer- de l'Europe. Rance militaira generale; general rilla, and nuclear warfare threats from China and military review, nz.7,July 1970: 159-186. Pakistan. Subrahmanyam asserts that India's de- U2.R48, 1970 feat by China in 1962 was caused by a lack of psy- Inclucs summaries in English and German. chological preparai,,, for war. Ee notes that had there been "vigorous professional debates and had Reviews NATO's military strategy in light of the there been adequate feed-tack from the defence de- Soviet threat. Speidel contends that while the cision.- making structure to ether opinion-forming Russians have become militarily stronger and are institutions of the country," India could have re- projecting their purer on a global scale, strained alized that China's capacity to strike was limited relaticnships between the United States and Europe and reacted with greater calm and courage. The have diluted the alliance's cohesion. He consid- euthor rules out another Chinese or Pakistani in- ers loyalty to the alliance, avoidance of unilat- vasion, as well as guerrilla warfare in India in eral troop reductions, protection of the southern the next decade, and contends that an alliance be- and northern flanks, and a U.S. nuclear guarantee tween India and Japan or Australia is neither nec- toward NATO territory essential requirements of essary nor feasible. Luropean security.

261 264 Stone, Isidor F.MLMO TO THE AP EDITORS: E0'4 LAIRD Sullivan, Robert R. THE ARCI:ITECTURE OF WESTERN SE- LIED. New York review of books, v. 114, June 4, CURITY IN TEE PERSIAN GULF. Orbis, v. 14, spring 1970: 14-20. AP2.5655, v. 14 1970: 71-91. 0839.068, v. 14

Contends that Secretary of Defense Laird and Crest Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf other Pentagon officials deliberately misrepre- can have three possible consequences: The Soviet sented and exaggerated Soviet missile strength in Union may replace the British as the imperial aran April 20, 1970, speech to the editors cf the biter of the area; the regional power balance may AJsociated Press and in subsequent statements. break down into a war between Iran and Saudi Ara- Stone challenges Laird's assertion that during the bia involving the superpowers; or "the British past 5 years the United States has been in neutral presence (may] be continued or replaced by a West- gear and the Soviet Union in high gear in the de- ern imperial presence." If t,re British withdraw, ployment of strategic offensive missiles, and he the united States should restrict itself to main- concludes, through an analysis of Laird's figures, taining aregionaldiplomatic presence tacked up that the United States continues to maintain a cfanextraregional military posture. In this way clear superiority both in types of missiles de- it will be able to mediate the balance of tower ployed and in research and development of new mis- between Iran and Saudi Are01 and ensure the steady siles. supply of oil by keeping the peace. The military will keepthe areaopen "in case force is needed to uphold what diplomacy bas wrought."The United States must be willing to intervene in "unfolding 262 power vacuums" early, quickly, and diploma'lually L;TRATEGIC WARFARE. Spa:e/aeronautics, v.53, Jan. and "accept theimperialmanate being thrust upon 1970: 59-69. illus. Lit]." Isolationism may engender later reinvolve- :L501.0187, v.53 rent at a mush higher cost and a breakdown o" the dctestic social order. Assesses U.S. strategic weapons projects in light of the mounting Soviet threat. Impending parity between the United States and Soviet Uricn has had o destabilizing effect or, the arms race 265 and produced strong Incentives for success at the Terzitaschitsch, Stefan. CSABICS--AN1'.lSTRATEGIC strategic arms limitation talks (SALT }. "both. COMPONENT OF THE 01:ED STATES71 SABMIS--eine American and Russian arms experts are growing con- neat strategische Komponente ter Tereinigten Gtaa- vinced of the sufficiency of weapons at present tend wervissenschafuich,2 Rundschau, v. 20, June levelsandapparently are searching for negotiat- 1970: 322-324. t3$435, v.20 n THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 55

The purpose of the sea-based antiballistic mis- Concentrates on problem areas in the organiza- sile system (ScEMIS) study i to determine how far tion and management of the Defense Department and the United States Navy can defend against Chinese offers specific recommendations to effect substan- and Russian missiles with a still-to-be-determined tial improvements. The panel felt the updated number of missile units and to prove that SAEMIS 1967 National Security Act vas still basically could efficiently complement the land-based Safe - sound. Some substantive change is needed, but gur.rd system, if not replace it.Since SARMIS "many of the deficiencies evident ir the operation units will transport )10 to 60 antiballistic mis- of the Department could be remedied by more faith- siles, some of their characteristics can be de- ful application of the concepts on which the Act duced. Their weight is expected to be between is premised." 20,000 and 30,000 tons, and their length approximately 220 m,(660 ft.) They will be fast and maneuverable. One of many advantages SABMIS has 268 over Safeguard is that the former provides protec- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. tion "at the garden door" and not "at the front Subcommittee on Europe. UNITED STATES RELATIONS door," giving the administration more decision WITS EUROPE IN TEE DECADE OF THE 1970'S. Hear- time. Sea-based missile systems are also cheaper ings, 91st Congress, second session. Washington, and more durable. Despite these and other advan- U.S. Govt. Print, Off., 1970. 468 p. tages, the Navy has declared that it offers SABRCS KF27.F642 1970 not to replace but to complement Safe.Tiard, perhaps in deference to the other services. Decis- Testimony from officials and scholars on the ionmakers in the United States often do not think U.S. contribution to European security in the in maritime terms and the last word on this stra- 1970's. The effects of a proposed reduction in tegic component has not been spoken yet, but the U.S. troop strength in Europe, progress in East- possibilities for its realization still exist. West detente, and Soviet proposals for en all-Eu- ropean security conference are the primary concerns of the subcommittee.CeL. Andrew J. Good- pester, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Prof. Marshall D. 266 Shulman, Frof. George F. Kennan, as' Prof. :big- Ulsemer, Edgar E. THE ICBM'S REAAIN THE BULWARK OF niew Przezinski were among those wit testified. OUR DETERRENCE. Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Nov. 1970: 38-42. illus. UG633.A6:, v.53 269 U.S. Dept. of the Army. NI:CLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO; Focuses on the U.S. Air Force's proposed 'Hard- ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE. Washington, point" ABM program and briely reviews several 450 p. illus. other programs currently under consideration by 1970. z6724.A9u1175 the Defense Department for ensuring the prelaunch Cover title. survival of US, land-based 1UHM's. The "Earl- "DA Pam 50-1.' point" defense system, as envisioned military planners would back up the Safeguard ABM system Contents.--NATO at the twenty-year nark. - -The and would incorporate available off-the-shelf Atlantic alliance: an overview, West European hardware, While the Soviet Union's existing SS -9 security and national aspirations.--East-West force could destroy approximately 450 U.S. Minute- strategic balance: influencing factors.--Arms man missiles, this would not impair the U.S. capa- control, disarmament, and nuclear proliferation city to inflict unacceptable damage in a retalia- (some selected and pertinent documents). -- Soiree tory strike. If the present rate of SS-9 deploy- materials for further research and reference.- ments continues, however, the Soviet Union could Map index. achieve a 1i:cc-strike capability vis-a-vis the United State, in a relatively short time. A com- A bibliographic survey containing 900 entries bined Hardpoint-Safeguard defense system, which selected from periodicals, books, studies, and could be comparable to a conventional area and documents published between 1965 and October 1969. point air defense system, could effectively defend The materials cited explore many or the problems against a massive attack on U.S. ICBM's. confronting NATO as well as the broader aspects of Western European security, arms control, the NATO-Warsaw Treaty Organization strategic bal- 267 ance, and the Communist Chinese nuclear threat. U.S. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. REPORT TO TEE Appendixes contain background notes and maps on PRESIDENT AND THE SECRET3Y OF DEFENSE ON THE DE- NATO member countries, organization charts, texts PARTMENT OF DEFENSE. [Washington] Dept. of De- of treaties and relevant statistical data. fense (for sale by the Lupt. of Does., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1970. 237 p. films. ua23.3./.419 270 U.S. President's Commission on an All - Volunteer Conterts,--Letter to the President,-- preface. -- Armed Force. THE REPORT OF THE PRES1DEWS C.DE Executive eammary.--Scckground and introduction.- - MISSION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEEP ARMED FORCE. (New Organization.-- Management of material resources.-- York] Collier Hooks 5c1970] 215 F. Management and procedures.--Management of person- UB323A5 1970 nel resources.- -Other nanageu:ent considerations. Cdmmonly known as the Gates report. Conf'lcts of interest.--Individual statements of panel el.mbers.--Consolidated lists of recommenda- Contents.--Intrcd...Iction.--Protecting the free tions.-.Appendices (to be vanished separately). society.--Tbe debate.--Conscription is c.,ax.-- 56 ARMS CONTROL C DISARMAN1ENT

Military personnel requirements.--Compensation and 59. UG633.1,65, V. management of military personnel.--Officer pro- 53 "Reprinted . from The Wall Street Journal." curement and retertion.--Recruitment.--Consorip- tion of physicians.--Reserves.--The standby draft. Reviews recent Soviet military activities in the --Budgetary implications.--Objections to an all- Indian Ocean, Southern Asia, and East Africa and volunteer force.--Conscription in America.--Recent concludes that this southward thrust is part of a foreign experience with voluntarism.--Alternatives global plan to counteract Communist Chinese and to an all-volunteer force.--Appendix A. Budget American influence. Although the Soviet Union is expenditures for all-volunteer forces.--Appendix building up its maritime capability and has the B: Military and civilian compensation. -- Appendix nucleus of an Indian Ocean fleet, it will have to C: Review of the 1966 Dept. of Defense draft become a first-rate naval power before it can study.--Index. achieve its global goals. Examines the feasibility and desirability of an all-volunteer armed force. The commission unani- 273 mously recommends that steps be taken promptly to Wallace, J. F. RATIONAL CIVIL EMERGENCY MEASURES establish an all-volunteer force, the first and PROGRAM. InCanada, Emergency Measures Organiza- indispensable step being the institution of equit- tion. EMO national digest, v. 10, Apr./May i970: able pay for men serving their first term in the 1-4, 8. cA926.c295, v. IC Armed Forces. It argues that although tut all-vol- "Address delivered to the Mayors-Elected Cffl- unteer force will require a net budgetary increase cials Conference (French; in February 1970 at the of from $1.5 Lillion to $4.6 billion annually, de- Canadian Emergency Measures College, Arnprior, On- pending on the size of the force, the actual coot tario." will be lower than for the present nixed force te- (.ause of hidden costs not reflected in tle budget. Outlines the key elements of a civil defense The commission foresees no significant uniesirable program designed to eneble Canadians survive social effects or impairment of military effec- and recover from any war emergency. Wa=.1ace. tiveness as a consequence of establishing an all_ stresses public protection and the maintenance of volunteer force. news, public utility, and societal services and concludes that despite the East-West detente the 271 nuclear threat is real, necessitating civil onga- UNITt STATES INTERVENTION IN LAMBODIA: LEGAL ANAL- nizationr that can red.ice the consequences of an YSES OF THE EVENT AND ITS DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS. attack. Boston University law review, v. 50, spring 1970: 1-168. LL 274 Bibliographical footnotes. Special issue. Walton, Richard J. BEYOVD DIPLOMACY; A BACX0ROUND PrOK ON AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION, Introd. by James Storrow, Jr. Partial contents.--Introduction: Toward a jur- New York, Parents' Maga- isprudence of peace? by Fred P. Graham.--Presi- zine Press f1970/ xviii, 270 p. reps. (Back- ground series) dential vs. congressional wax making powers: The var-making powers: the intentions cf the framer, in the Jieht of parliamentary history, by Francis Contents.--Introduction.--Author's preface.- - L. Coolidge, Jr., and Joel David Sharrow. Presi- Author's note.--The Mexican War.--That "splendid dential war-making, by Henry P. Monaghan. The ap- little war".--Dollar diplomacy. -- Intervention propriations power as a tool of congressional for- Lebanon. - -Again the Dominican Republic.--Epilogue. eign policy making, by Garry J. Wooters. Histori- --Docnents.--Bibliographic an: reference notes,- - cal and structural limitations on congressional Index, utilities to make foreign policy, by Jason A. Rosenberg, Philip Weinberg, and William X. Pinz- History of U.S. military interventions in Mexico, ler. The Supreme Court. as arbi.rator in the con- Central America, Cuba, Faiti, the Dominican Reltlh- flict between presidential and congressional war- lic, the Philippines, and Lebanon.Walton chal- making powers, by Kenneth F. Maclver, Jr., Bever- lenges the conve,itionsl view that the United ly M. Wolff, and Leonard Bruce Locke.--Interna- States vss basically an isolationist country prior tional law and U.S. intervention in Cambodia: to World War II and questions the necessity and United States recognition policy and Cambodia, by wisdom 00 these interventions, which he attributes William Sprague Barnes. Self-defense and Cambo- primarily to a pervasive belief in Manifest Destiny dia, a critical appraisal, by John C. Bender. A wider meaning of "illegality." by Banks McDowell, Pamela Taylor, and Elizabeth Gemmill. 275 Whetten, Lawrence L. SIPAIElIC PARITY IN ThE MIDDLE Reviews the history and current status of presi- FAST. InU.S. Command and General Staff College, dential and congressional war powers, particularly Fort Leavenworth. Vilita-y review, v.50, Sept. as they relate to the Indochina War. The authors 1971: 24-31, Z6723.U35, v.50 consider the legal and political implications cf the growth of presidential paver in the field of The history cf Soviet pod icy in the Near fast foreign policy and propose various methods of re- shows that ''one of the chief reasons for Soviet asserting congressional authority in this area. diplomatic failures from 1955 to 1965 in the Mid- dle Fast was the lack of sufficient military power 272 to reinforce its political influence." However, the Soviet Union now Las au embryonic overseas Vicker, Pay. RUSSIA LOOE3 BEYOND ThE MIDDLE EAST. strategy, based on floating naval bases and lnnd- Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Oct. 58- based asrpower, that has fundamentally charged the

(12 THE STRATEGIC E=NVIRONVENT 57

balance of power and potential political aline- action and reaction of the military and politics. ments in the region. It must be erelited with Tte Bundesvehr is an Instrument of political power sufficient forces permanently in the theater to whose skillful use requires understanding of its neutralize key Western capital ships and airbases specific nodes of employment. through massive preemptive nuclear strikes by ship and air-launched, medium. -range missiles." Al- though the West can no longer act with impunity, 278 it still has overwhelming conventional military WILD AMBITION COMPLETELY EXPOSeD. By "Rennin eibao" superiority. The Soviet military buildup in the commenuator. Peking review, v. 13, Oct. 30, 1970: Sear East, though, when coupled with strategic nu- 29-30. DS701.T42. v. 13 clear parity, produces "the highest level of see- metrical East -West deterrence since he advent of Charges that policies outlined in a recent the nuclear era." While the Soviets may have suc- speech by Yasuhiro .Nakasone, Director General of ceeded in reducing Western options in the area, the Japanese Defense Agency, on the "future they have not been able to convert their advantage course" of Japan have revealed "Japanese militar- into positive political influence Persistent ism's rabid designs."To the commentator, Naka- Great Power rivalries and continuing political in- sone's speech indicates that Japan will carry out stability require that long-term measures be con- "arms expansion and war p.sparations on a larger sidered to ensure Great Power interests and ful- scale to meet the demand of Japan's monopoly capi- fill regional security requirements. New defense tal for expansion abroad"; it also "gave away the arrangements should be established iv. the area. ambitious attempt cf the Japanese reactionaries to "Ad hoc political coalitions . . . appear from the carry out nuc:ear armament." The author suggests Western side the most feasible solution." that Japan will use enriched uranium produced under the guise of peaceful purposes to manufacture nuclear weapons. In fact, while reiterating its 278 policy of nonnuclear armament in its recently published white paper cn national defense, the Japa- CWHITE BOOK 1970: ON THE SECURITY OF THE CEMAN RE- nese Government asserted that it would not be un- PUBLIC AND THE STATUS OF THE BUSDESWEHR) Weiss- constitutional for Japan to possess snail defen- buch 1970. Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik sive nuclear weapons."What Nakasone called Ja- Deutschland and zur Lage der Bendeswehr. Wehr- pan's 'future course' is the embarkation once Runde, v. 19, June 1970: 285-290. again on the Japanese militarist road of aggres- U3.W396, v. 19 sion and expansion by relying on U.S. imperialism, the road of serving as U.S. imperialism's gendarme Extracts from the first enseter of the 1970 in Asia in an attempt to dominate Asia through White Book of the German Federal Feeedhlic on peace military adventure, the dangerous road of plunging in freedom, the international nolitical landscape, the Japanese nation once again i.to an abyss of talanced reduction of NATO and Warsaw Fact forces, :misery." Ostpolitik and detente, the criteria of a security policy, and the North Atlantic alliance as the base of West German defense policy. The strategic arms limitation talks are described as posing no 279 danger to the interests of Western Europe. Their Zaior, Heinrich. [MILITARY EDUCATICN 11 ISRAEL] success will have important consequences for other Wehrerzieeeng in Israel. arms control and disarmament measures with which Wehrkunde, v. 19, Apr. 1970: 191-193. 13.14e9e, v. 19 West Germany is specifically concerned. The security criteria include eeinteeence of the eartner- In Israel ro social distinction is made between ehip with Pmerics, effective military defense the civilian and the soldier, sad no one refuses with less actual armament, and readiness to nego- to enter military service. tiate with the Soviet Union and East Europe. Military education begins with the chill's forced recognition of the necessity of national defense. lexaminatiens given the recruit are designed to seek out his potee- 277 tie', the aimed forces reinforce this potential WienhEfer, Elmer. IThE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLI- by educating him to their needs. because the re- TICS AND THE MllITABY IN GERMANY)Das Verheltnis cruit Is frequently an immigrant, the armed force, von Folitik and Militirwesen in Deutschland. instill knowledge of Hebrew and in other ways set Wehrkunde, v. 19, A.dg. 1970: 393-399. es a national school. Officers are selected for U3 W395, v. 19 leadership, personal authority, initiative, and decisiorraking ability. Bibliographical footnotes.

The distrust of the military engendered be the recent events of German history is urderstandable. 80 Unfortunately it is expressed by allocating to the Zopps, Ciro Y. SOVIET SHIPS IN IFE MEDITERRASEA7: military a sociopolitical position like that of ;CID THE U.S.-SeeIEY CONFRONTATION IN IYE MIDDLE the vestal and railroad services. Toe Germans EAST. Orbis, v. 14 sirin, 1970: 109 -123. must recognize that the silitary lector in society Le839.0£8, v. 14 has its own needs and dynanies, if it is to work in fruitful reciprocal titian with politics, which Soviet interest in the Mediterreeean date. back of course always has the decisier,raeing responsi to the 15th century. Then, as now, the Soviet Un- bility. The civilian authorities responsible fcr ion sought to control the straits and increase its planning the role of the military in future ever- political influence in the Arab world. Today, in ell state policy must understand the dialectic of addition to these objectives, Russia is corcerred 58 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

with gaining strategic naval mobility in the area, curement--"who rakes the decisions and how, where and the immediate consequence is a challenge to the money goes and who tries to control it, and U.S. naval supremacy. For the last 10 years Mos- how companies get those Fat Government Contracts." cow has teen developing ships and t'chniques that He argues that the mac, in besting the Soviet would allow it to project its power on a global Union in the competitions to deploy long-range scale. The theme that Soviet seapower has ex- strategic weapons systems in the 1350's and early tended its reach to remote areas of the world's 1960's and advanced electronic and space systems oceans, to cruise and patrol whenever the defense in the later hf,,of the 1960's, was winning world of the national interest requires it, reflect: a wars III and IV, and he suggests that all Ame-i- role for the Soviet navy without precedent." The cans should te thaniful for "the integrity, devo- Soviet Mediterranean presence complicates the de- tion, selflOness.jand tremendous collective fense of NATO's southern flank, inhibits U.S. mil- abilities of Noye,in MIC--the Lonely Warriors itary initiative in the area, and increases the who provide the P.:,tective cover for (the United chances of a local conflict's escalating. It ex- States] and for much of the free world." tends Moscow's political influence among the Arab SAtes, and is allowing the Soviet Union to become the leading external power in the Near East. 283 Whether a naval balance of power leading to mutual Berkower, Lary F. THE MILITARY INFLUENCE UPON deterrence can be achieved before another Middle FREUD'S LYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY.American journal of East war or Cyprus crisis breaks out remains to be psychiatry, v. 127, Aug. 1970; 167-174. seen. RC321.A52, v. 127

A previously disregarded but consequential in- CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE fluence upon the conceptual model or dynamic psychiatry as evolved by Freud is that of military POLICES AND WAR science. Thus many fundamental terms bear obvious military connotations, including conflict, defense, repression, alliances, and resistance. 261 Freud repeatedly exploited the rich metaphorical Atkinson, James D. THE URGENCY OF ABM. In Ameri- possibilities of the military analogy as he de- can Security Council. Washington report, June 1, ,Acted psychology in terms of conflicts of forces, 1970; 1-11, Ser emphasizing the onslaught of instinctual impulses and the defensive oierations of the ego to ward The time for complacency over constructing an them off. (Abstract supplied) ABM system is past. From November 1969 to April 1970 the Soviet Union test-fired twice as many strategic missiles as the United States, and dur- 284 ing the past 5 years it radically increased its Blake, Joseph A. '2N5 ORGANIZATION AS INSTRUMENT OF missile strength. During the same period, the VIOLENCE: THE MILITARY CASE.Sociological quar- United States made no basic changes in its strate- terly, v. 11, summer 1970: 331-350. gic missile forces and actually reduced its mega- ami.s69, v. 11 tonnage by 40 percent. The Soviet Union has test- "References": p. 348-350. ed a depressed-trajectory ICBM and a fractional orbital bombardment system, increased the rusher Proprietors of a society, in order to gain their of submarine-launched ballistic missiles from 25 ends, frequently resort to the use of force and to over 200, and deployed an ABM system around vio'ence. An important tool is the organization Moscow, while the U.S. Safeguari system will not of violence. Massive violence is instituted by be operational before 1974. The growing Chinese these organizations anZ at the behest of the soci- threat can no longer be taken lightly in view of etal proprietors as a means of goal attainment. the recent leunching of China's first satellite. Ore of the consequences of this massive violence To counter the Soviet and Chinese threats, the is th disruption of the experience of everyday United States should move forward vigorously with life and the imposition of another experience upon both land -tared and sea-based ABM systems, of the actor. The organization, as a result of its which the latter would constitute a valuable sup- own action, createproblems which must be solved plement to the proposed Safrguard system. The in order that action may be continued. The organ- cost undoubtedly will be high, but no price is too ization must sake combat action meaningful by mak- great when the lives cf Americans are at stake. ing It relevant; it must devise strategies for successfully moving individuals from one retlit7 to the other; it must define the parameters of the most relevant action, i.e., violence; it must so- 282 cialize men into violence; it must devise strate- Baumgartner, John S. THE LONELY WARRIORS; CASE FOR gies to constrain, charnel, and direct the actions THE MILITABY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. Los Angeles. of .eh socialized into violence; it must, in Nash Pub. 01970] 237 y. illus. short, construct a social reality designed to cope C110.14138 with the exigencies of the battle-moment. A dis- Bibliography: p. 231-232. cvssion of some of the factors relevant to the success or failure oe this project has been the Defents the record of America's integrated subject of this paper. (Abstract supplied) structure of Government agencies, private corpora- tions, and universities--its military - industrial complex (M1C)--in providing security for the Unit- 285 el States and the rest of tie free world. Baia- Policy, Fillip M. HEBBICILES lo VIETNAM: AAAS garteer focuses on the mechanics of defense pro- SILTY RUNS INTO A MILITARY ROADBLOCK. Science,

111 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 59

v. 170, Oct. 2, 1970: 42-45. 288 v.170 Carter, Luther J. ABM: SENATE APPROVM I.D(FANSION, RUT HOPE SEEN FOR ARMS CURB. Science, v. 169. Reports the problems faced by the American Asso- Aug. 28, 1970: 844-845. ciation for the Advancement of Science team sent q1.s35, v. 169 to Vietnam this past summer to conduct a preliminary survey of the impact of defoliation there. The Senate's vote on the ABM last year suggested The team, headed by Harvard biologist Matthew S. that it was adopting a tougher and more skeptical Meselson, was unable to gain access to classified attitude toward military requests for ne;. weapons; military records on U.S. spray missions, and was this year's decision could indicate that the Sen- at a considerable disadvantage. A recent congres- ate "has gone back to assuming that the Joint sional decision suggests that Meselton's pilot Chiefs of Staff always knows best."During the study may be followed by a more comprehensive De- 1970 ARM debatt, the administration contended that fense Department-funded National Academy of Sci- an expanded system would give U.S. negotiators a ences investigation into the short- and long-term vital bargaining chip in the strategic arms limi- ecological and physiological effects of military tation talks (SALT), and although historical evi- use of herbicides in South Vietnam. Meselson dence does not clearly support this kind of argu- states that "the Vietnamese scientific community ment, it may have been decisive. Few senators has become 'deeply concerned' over the impact her- challenged the President's judgment. However, the bicides will have on future economic development Senate restricted ABM's to defending U.S. offen- and on health levels in their country" and, on the sive-missile sites, and some observers have conclu- basis of visual observations, that "there has been ded that the Senate does restrain American weapons a severe bamboo invasion of some defoliatedhardwooc policy to some extent.The Armed Services Commit- forests and [that] his ground explorations in the tee struck from the House-approved administration denuded mangrove swamps have confirmed previous proposal a $10 million authorization for advanced aerial obseevations that there has been little or preparation at four "area defense" sites, assert- no regeneration." Meselson's report, due late ing that the existing situation did not justify this year, "will probe * y not cum., to firm conclu- preparations for a costly area-defense system sions as to the impact of the herbicides but will against a potential Chinese nuclear capability. 'state the limits of likely effects end say that Jeremy J. Stone, executive director of the Federa- such-and-such an effort is required to find out tion of American Scientists (FAS) and an anti-ABM what the actual magnitude of the effect is.'" lobbyist, believes that strong senatorial opposition to the ABM over the past year and a half has influenced the SALT talks. This year's debate suggests that the Senate will not go back to rub- 286 ber stamping Defense Department requests for new SCAPEGOAT rOli A NEW ISOLATION- Brownfeld, Allan C. strategic weapons. Stone Las said that "people Washington ISM. In American Security Council. are getting angry about losing (on arms control report, Aug. 10, 1570: 1-4. issues)," and FAS feels "the climate is favorable Ser to an expanded lobbying effort." The group is establishing committees to study a wide range of "The recent assault upon the role ,cf the mili- arms control issues. While Stone may be more op- tary in American life together with the mounting timistic than is Justified, "nevertheless, when opposition to President Nixon's proposed ABM sys- the senate emerged last year from the ABM strug- tem, may be only the early warning signals of a gle, it appears to have crossed some kind of While no one claims new isolationism il America." threshold and to have adopted a more independent that t:.e military is beyond reproach, its critics view of sins- procurement questions." have invoked a new devil theory of history in which the military is the scapegoat. America's European allies are increasingly concerned that the United States will overreact to the unpopu'ar 289 war in Vietnam by sharply reducing its forces in ClarkReasey. ON VIOLENCE, PEACE AND THE RULE OF Those who recognize that a new period of Europe. LAW. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Oct. 1970: 31-39. isolationism vould increase rather than lessen 1410.F6, v. 49 world tensions must act now to prevent a rapid expansion of Communist power and influence. The rapid change in modern society has rendered traditional approaches to international relations misleading, if not irrelevant. "Violence as a way of solving problems mist be relegated to the past. 187 It can no longer suc- PROTECTIVE /.GENTS MOD- It is no longer tolerable. Carr, C. Jellef, and others. The once romantic ideal of peace has become IFYING BIOLOCICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION, Environ- ceed. If the nuclear powers cannot mental health, v. 21, July 1970: E8-98. essential realism." Rc963.A22, v. 21 agree to effectively limit weapons of mass destruction, unilateral deescalation of the arms race may provide the impetus for peace. But the A survey of radioprotective slants that might United States cannot expect the rule of law to prove useful "in protecting man against single or prevail in international relations until it is short-term, low -level sublethal radiation noses." prepared to adhere strictly to its own csnstitu- The research focus to date has been on the devel- tional processes regarding force and to recognize opment of compounds to protect against single or short-term, whole-body, lethal irradiation, and when its use of force violates basic humanitarian Vietnam is only the must glaring ex- little has been done to test the efficacy of these principles. ample of the inadequacy of violence as a means of compounds in protecting against low-level expo- furthering American ideals. Violence In Vietnam su.es. f,5 60 )..ARNiS CONTROL & DISARMANIL NT

must be ended, not perpetuated by Vietnamization, 293 an ignoble end in itself. Fears of a bloodbath or Gilbert, Charles. AY.ERICAN FirtAnciG OF WORLD WAR a US. loss of face must not deter prompt and pos- I. Westport, Conn., Greenw)od Pub. Corp. fc197C] itive action to replace military aid with massive xix, 259 p. (Contributions cr. economics and eco- civil aid to rehabilitate and develop Vietnam. nomic history, no. 1) EJ25,.054

Contents.--Freface,--Basic problems in war fi- 290 nance.--The effect of the outbreak of the war on the American economy.--Prosperous neutrality.- -Pte Ezerenari, F. B. C., and J. R. Prescott. AUTUTCIAL PEAK IN 109CD FALLOUT IN PRECIPITATIOa AT CAIGAR:, eve of war finance.--Taxation and war finance.- - War expenditures and revenues.--D:_-ferse revenue CANADA. Journal of geophysical research, v. 75, Sept. 20, 1970: 5271-5275. and the war revenue act of 1917The war revenue QC811.J6, v. 75 act of 1918.--The Liberty and Victory Loans.-- Trea.s.ury certificates of indebtedness.--War sav- After the the...7monuclear explosion of July 9, ings certificates.--Conversions, redemptions, and 1962, at 400 km over Johnston Island (17Th, 169%) retirements of the Liberty and victory Loans.--The in which some109Cd was specially produced, mea- effects of the war loan program on the banking surements were made at the University cf Calgary system. 1-Econ,)mic effects of war fi:ance.--Evalua- tion of World War I finance,--Biblicgraphy.--In- to determine the concentration of 104Cd in precip- dex. itation since early 1964. The results showed a late summer to fall peak as well as the well-known string maximum in radioactive fallout. Profiles AnalyLes the problems involved in financing a rumor war in a den.ocratic, capitalist country and cf total B activity in Calgary precipitation also indicated late summer to fall increases during preser,ls a history of the specific methods em- cessation of nucleus' testing in 1963 and 1964. ployed by the U.S. Government to finance World Per I. (Abstract supplied) Gilbert concludes ly comparing America's financing of the war with that of other belligerents, with the financing of other major U-S. wars, and with the theoretical standards of war-financing procedures. 291 Fleckenstein, Bernard. [TEE 1969 1,.ARLY REFaT OF THE DEPUTY FOR DEFENSE] Der Jahresbericht 1969 des Wehrbeauftragten. Wehrkunde, v. .9, June 1970: 290-293. U3.W396, v. 19 GAteridge, William. A CD:=N',..TALTli MILITARY 21:1.- '/VRE? SOLDIERS IN TEE ,IRITS.Ti MOULD. Round Describes the 1969 report of the Bundestag depu- table; the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 239, July ty charged with representing the parliamentary in- 1970: 327-3r. A24.R6, 1970 terest in the supervision of the German Arred Forces, a functionary described as "the social and The assumption of political power by African of- societal conscience of the Bundeswehr." This re- ficer: has focused attention on the European mili- port gees beyond the specifics of an annual report tary traditions to which these o:ficers have been to consideration of possible future developments exposed. However, generalizations must be made of the Bundeswehr in a highly developed industrial with caution, since training and the professional country with a dynamic social structure. Particu- ethos interact with local social and political lar attention is given to seeking out effective conditions. While military training in a foreign methods of controlling the conflicts irerent in country profoundly affects those undergoiig it, the unique social situation represented by the time question. is how they interpret the manifesta- armed forces. tions cf the teaching cult..re. Variations in political behavior of African rflitary forces are sufficient to place in question the attribution cf all military behavior to the preconditioning of 292 army educatirn. The influence of what may be Fredenthal, Peter C.OTRONTIUX 90 CO:;CENTRATIS terred a "Commonwealth military culture" sterming IN SURFACE AIR: NORTH AMERICA VERSUS ATLANTIC from Britain itself in the relative ease of OCEAN FR021 1966 10 1969. Journal of geophysical communication arc understanding in situations in- research, v. 75, July 20, 1970: 4089-4096. volving international cooperation and the absten- QC811.j6, v.75 tion from guerrilla activities cr subversion of other states by soldiers trained in the British Strontium 90 in surface air has been reassured tradition. continually for three years, Fobruary 1966 to Jan- uary 1969, et four Riort]. Atlantic Ocean weather stations to compare fallout processes over the ocean with those over land. Fetween 35*N and 295 55.N, concentrations over land were an average 1.1 0- rhard. E3tF.:95 1N TEE times greater than those over the ocean. The rel- CT THE SGLDIER INTO fOCIE:Yl Cu einigen IrrC:mern ative concentration varied with both season and Ater die Integration des Sollaten in der 5ezells- latitude, teing greater in the north and during chart. Wehrhunde, v. 19, il'ry 197D: 2(1-. the summer. This variation seems to correlate 03,21396. v.19 better with monsoonal netcorological processes than with the suggested process of aerosol scav- The concept that the soldier ought to be indis- enging by ocean spray. ( Abstract supplied) tinglishable from the society h. protects should

- THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT dl

net be termed 'integration." To place the soldier protection against Chinese, not Soviet, attacks. in the statistical middle of a pluralistic society If the Government can rely on a second-strike ca- is to demilitarize him. True integration is pability deter the Soviets, why not assume that achieved when the soldier feels he belongs fully China, too, can be deterred from a first strike? to the society he protects. The rdlitary man is The American nuclear umbrella over Japan and :nlia integrated also in the sense that he has the right is necessary not because of an altruistic desire to have his professional interests represented tc to protect them. or because of resporqibilities as- the makers of state policy. The effort for inte- sumed under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty gratica must seek the optim,:m of societal identi- but because these gu,.rantees could avert the nu- fication and combat efficiency. clearization of India and Japan. However, as American cities become vulnerable to Chinese ICBM's, the credibility of America's nuclear guar- 296 antee will diminish. Japan and India would find "the temptation to provide for their own nuclear hOl, William C, andCarsten M. Haaland. :N ThE security will undoubtedly cow in direct propeq.- 3ILADCW OF GROUJD ZEP,0. :n Canada. Emergency ea- tion to the retraction of our deterrent." a..res Organization. E,10 national digest, v. 10, If the lizited States fails to deploy u limited area ABM Apr./May 1970: 16-15. system, its cities will eventually be vulnerable UA926.C295, v. 10 to Chinese missiles, unleashing "a nuclear anarchy tl'at will inevitably engulf us in .atastropte." By implementirE7 basic civil defense measures the fatalities and injuries from a Luclear blast can be reduced, ani the postattack recovery of a nation can be ensured. Hardened shelters can pro- 259 vide protection for people located 1,50C feet from Kennedy, Edward M. SENATtR KENNEDY 17.3 the origin of a 1-megaton detonation, while at a EALT TO ARMS PJ,CE. Congressional. record Cdaily ed.: Plat distance of '2 miles a person can survive without Congress, 21 session, v. 116, May 23, 1070, 57997- the benefit of a special structure providing he 57999. J11.R52. v.116 ducks "immediately into the shadowofsomething, Text of a speech delivered at the Messach,.]setts any..hing--a car, a building, or even a utility Institute of Technology, Xay 1970. pole." The most uncertain hazard of the blast is radioactive fallout; a city shelter or even an im- the Ninon administration is undermining tee provised lean-to can offer protection. strategic arms limitation talks ;SALT) by insist- ing on immediate deployment of the AEI and M1RV. Secretary of Defense Laird's contention that fail- 297 ure to deploy these veapoLs jeopardize U.S. Holmes, R. RADIATION PROTECTION CONGRESS. Nuclear security is simply untrue -- Polaris submarines engineering, v. 15, July/Aug. 1970: 62C -C'2. alone, which the Secretary himself proclaims to be TK9001.N75, v.15 invulnerable, provide a more than adequate second- strike capability. The vulnerability of missile- Reports on activities of the Second Internation- site radars rakes questionable whether Safeguard al Radiation Protection Association Congress, could protect Min.:Leman missiles. Even assuming which net at Brighton, England,14943-5, 1970. it would work, Safeguard is an unnecessarily ex- Its principal business was the presentation of pensive method for asuring a second-strike capa- more than 300 scientific papers relating to bility. In any event, the radioactive fallout protection of man and his environment from the po- from a successful ABM defense would kill a large tential hazards of ionizing radiation. These pa- portion of America's population within a genlra pers will be published at a later date, The Cer.- Lion. An anti-Chinese ABM system is not necessary gress gave "the satisfactory impression, that a to rake U.S. Asian commitments credible, as Secre- conscientious and nor. - complacent professionwas tary Laird contr-is, and it is sheer parochialism, not likely to omit by default or negligence any to pretend that .he Chinese are so i,.rational that factors likely to hazard the public" and ought to they would risk the total destruction of China by have convinced "critics (particularly, those in attacking the United States. President Nixon's the United States) that the potential hazards of prediction that Safeguard would be "virtually In- radiation are under constant and pro:essional sur- fallible" against a Chinese stta:k is wholly unre- veillance and that little benefit will be gained alistic. Moreover the deploymen of the thousands by recourse to the distorting influences of poli- of ABM interceptors necessary for a credible anti- tics and law." Chinese system would s.ixely compel the Russians to increase their strategic forces. Deployment of V2RV in the middle of the SALT talks is provoce- tive and unnecessary for the Nation's security. 293 If ro agreement is reached with the Soviet Union Karter, Phillip. IFTERHENCE, THE ABM, AND STABILITY and it becomes necessary to deploy MIRV's at a lat- I? ASIA. Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Oct. er date, this can be done on her notice, ,.At- 19701 60-61. U0633.A65, v. 53 ever the outcome of the :Al: talks, the Nixon administration is pursuing an un'..dre stretegic-ars The deployment of new Soviet offensive and de- policy by premat..rely escalating the arms race ani fensive missile systIms erodes America's capacity increasing tensions with the 1:oviet ',Jhion. De- to inflict unacceptable cla...agein a retaliatory ployment of MIRV's by the Un:ted States will seri- attack and heightens the necessity for precaution- ously upset the strategic balance and pro'-ably ary U.S. antiballistic missile (ARO deployment to lead the Soviet Union to resort to a lanch-on- bolster the American deterrent.Yet the adminis- warning system, thus increasing the possibility tration's argument in favor of Safeguard stressed accidental nuclear var. Congress must enforce a

117 _ 62 ARMS CONTilOL & DISARMAMENT

freeze on deployment of the ABM ant MiRV by cut- of the Corgeessiona:' !Record and cited els,-anere ting off funds for these weaoons. this issue). by the organization Members of Con- gress for Peace Through Law. Lapp conclu,les ,hat by z:yoing in on Defense Department program-cost 300 estimates, the study °pereorms a most valuable gilmarx, Robert A. ABM O,1,111,V IN THE CONTEX': OF ,e,vice for the Congress as it attempts to draw S.LT. Vital speeches of the day, 36, July 15, together the nursastrings on the aefense b,:dget," 197,.: 602-604. FN6121.Vf2, v. 36 An of'shoot of this bipartisan congressional study Delivered at the 3eorgetown Unicrsity Annual has been the oration of an "invisible college u: Alumni Seminar, Georgetown University, Washington, lefense knowledge" on Capitol Dill that v.11 pro- D.C., June 12, 1970. uninformei congressmen with reliable inf.rma- tion on new weapons projects requested by the Pen- If opponents of lUrther advances in military tagon. technology have their way, the Unite' States may soon find itself is a precarious st1,4egic position. Imagine the following scenario in 1y78: The Soviet Union has greatly expandei its subma- 303 rine fleet and equipped it with long-range mis- Lifton, Fcaert Jay. FALSE G07. Atlantic monthly, siles, while the United States retains (TI; 41 226, Oct. 1970: 101-106, 109-110. aging submarines. Soviet progrean on MIFV and Abi,!, AP2.AS, v. 226 has lees substantial, while the United States lonT ego halted MIE7 deployment, ant Congress can,,elled Man's experience of sy:abolic tnmortality in the further development of the ABM system. Agreements fate of inevitable biological death is expressed on strategic arms limitation were ii,,aed reg)tiat- through identification with one's children or ed, but blind faith on the part of the United group or belief in an afterlife, through human in- States and the Soviet Union's closed society en- venUons and creations, through immersio.1 in na- abled the latter to improve its strategic position ture, and through psycnta trs,,scendence, all of despite these agreements. U.S. expenditures no which affect men's everyday life, consciously or military research and deelopment, which began to riot. The possibility of nuclear war raises the decline even before the strategic arms limitation prospect of severing all forms of symbolic immor- talks, at the very time that Soviet exnendil,ures tality. "Nuclear - sae " -- "the passionate embrace of were increasing, have resulted in Soviet superior- nuclear weapons as a solution to our anxieties" i.y in military technology. That such a scenario offers an cpperent means of restoring this lost is not unreali,tic is evidenced by the currert im- sense of immortality. :t is a secular, apocalyp- pact of defense 1udget cts and of 1,iversity tic religion that has von many converts since the turmoil on basic research and de,,lopment. If first atomic bomb was exploded at Alamogordo it this trend continues, the United States may soon July 1945. One particularly baneful consequence lack the scientific-technological base to compete of nyclearism ha: been the phenomen-r. psychic effectively with the Soviet Union in strategic numbing, a defense mechanism by which one becomes armaments. tayehologically desensitized to humus:, s-ffering and even to the death of the species. Y,Aclearism thus leads to a peculiarly acute gap between the capacity for technological violence and more: in- 301 dignation. The nuclear deity must be desacralized Kreus, Melvin. C50VIET PATRIoTISM AS A MMTAFt and the necessary psychological boundaries between F,.:IOR) Der sovetische Patriotisrus els milit4r- man and his destructive tools reestablished. ischer Faktor. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Sept. 1970: 449- 450. U3.W36, v. 19

The training given in Soviet paramilitary 3oL youth groups and in the organizations prepariLi; LIVEFING UP FOR AN OLYMPIAN DEFEAT, by our Washing- reserve officers emphasites political indoctrina- ton correspondent. Nature (London) v. 227, tion. In addition to its exploitation of the :rust Aug. 1, 1970: 433-634, modern and complex military technology, this 0.-2, v. 227 training is also characterized by its increasing concern wi%'1 the use of military symbo.s. Mili- Reports on testimony taken ty the U.S. House of tary traditions like martial music, honor guards, Representatives Subcommittee on science, Research and el.-1.rate uniforms, once rejected as remnants and Development in its investigation of U.S. sci- of the old regime, are now aggressively promoted. ence policy. The Mansfield Amendment, which has The Soviet military press preaches international- restricted mission-oriented agency support for re- ism abroad and rationalism within its frontiers. search to matters directly relevant to agency The potential conflict between these two concepts needs, has had a shattering impact upon American in a Sino-Soviet disputm, for example, will quick- science. There was general agreement among those ly be resolved in favor c-7 nationalism. testifying that the U.S. scientific edifice, "thoug proud and massive, is not built according to coherent principle."Dismay at the cancella- 302 tion of important research projects by the U.S. Lapp, Ralph E. CU:TM THE FENTAGON TOWN 10 SUF. Atr Force, at the present spate of irrational at- New republic, v. 163, Aug. 22/29, 1970: 16-20. tacks on science one technology, and at the pros- AP2.N624, v. 163 pect of a too-rigid separation of the mission-oriented agencies, particularly the Department of De- A critique of this year's Report on Military tense, from basic research programs was also Epring (summarized in he July 31, 1970 issue voiced.

13 THE STRATEG:CENVIRONMENT 63

305 naps. W.35,.s7m5 Miksehe, Ferdinand 0. L':HE NEED FOR SIMPLIFICATION3 Cover title. Vereinfacung tut rot. Weltr and Wirtschaft, v. 6, Includes bibiicgraphicel references, June 1970: 335-336. U3.W35, v. 6 Partial contents.--introduction.--lhe arms beild-u2.--The international arms embarv.--South Teckles the vicious circle presented by the Africa's armed power.--Western hell' for South Af- growing cost of veapu.n systems, their nigh suseee- rica's militarisation.--Internal arms production tibility to failure due to their extreme sensitiv- - -South Africa's nuclear potential.--South Afri- ity, rising upkeep and operating costs and the re- ca's role in Africa.--The white alliante.--Feetu- sulting inability to equip either the regular or eal's African var.NATO weepons.-- Xeighborirg Af- the reserve units adequately. Although this analy- rican states.--Evolving entente releteo:ships.-- sis of the siteatien is entirely realistic, it The British stake in South Africa.- -South Africa's lead: to some curiots conclusions.The solution military calculation;.--Hemispheric power.--SATO. lies in simplifying not cnly the actual systens, South Africa's military posture.--South Africa's but also the presen', forms of organization, com- Monrce doctrine.--Western re,ognitien for regional mand structures and evipment (and tailoring the power?--Regioral intervention in African states?- - latter to fit the mission). (Abst.act supplied, Conclusion. -- Appendix. mclified) Seen in the absence of a formal military agreement, the major Western powers could be easily drawn into the South African conflict, As their 306 ties ith South Africa grow, Western gorernmehts THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COW...EX AND UNITED STATES wit become increasingly reluctant to back inter- POREIZ POLICY. Edited by Omer L. Carey. [Pull- national sanctions against Sout!, Africa and might man] Washington State University Press Cc19691 eventually intervene directly to preserve the sta- 66 F. HC110.D4M5 tus quo there. "The outbreak of widespread vio- Earlier versions of four of the five papers were lence inside South Africa will further unite the presented at the 11.'.h Annual Institute of World coloured world against South Africa and these Gov- Affairs, Washington State University, Pullman, ernments wrich render it aid and comfortwith all Wesh., March 20-21, 1969. the grave implicatons of a global racial confron- Bibliographical fuotrotes. tation which can only spell disaster ;.4manity as a whole." Contents.--The defense establishment: vested interests and the public interest, by Samuel P. Huntington.--The military-industrial complex and 308 the industrial stets, by Walter Adams.- -The mili- Moot, Robert C. SECURITY ON A BUSIES. CYlnance, tary-industrial complex: an economic analysis, by v. 55, July/Aug. 1970: 48-61. Murray L. Weidenbaum.--The UF1,067, v.55 complex: 1969, by Ralph E. Lapp.--Politics, policy and the military- industrial complex, by Patrick Outlines Department of Defense (D03) planning M. Morgan, and budgetary procedures, including the Plene:ng- Programing-Budgeting System and the Five-Yar De- Analyses of the role of the military-industrial fense Program. Moot sees five major chances in complex in U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Hun- these procedures since Secretary Laird assumed of- tington reviews the emergence of the military-in- fice: the introduction of Rational Secu:ity Coun- dustrial complex as a vested interest in U.S. so- cil advice at key points, an emphasis on economic -icty and expresses concern that antimilitarism realism at an earlier stage of the planning proc- nay encourage the trend toward greeter internal ess, greater involvement by the Joint Chiefs of cohesiveness and concentration of power, thereby Staff, more responsibility for analytical input by adversely affecting the quality of the defense the services, and lengthening of the planning cy- sector. Adams argues "that industrial concentra- cle by about four months. he notes that Federal tion is not the inevitable outgrowth of economic spending for domestic programs has risen faster and technical forces" but rather "is often the re- than defense spending during the past decade, but sult of unwise, man-made, discriminatory, privi- since defense spending accounts for two-thirds of lege-creating governmental action." Weidenbaum the controllable portion of the budget it has nec- examines the relationship between the military and essarily borne the brunt of anti-inflationary bud- private sectors of the ecrnomy and proposes mea- get cuts. Present DOD estimates call for reduc- sures to reduce the possible harmfel effects of tions of $6.9 billion and 1,3 million rilitary and this relationship. Lapp emphasizes the importance civilian personnel by June 1971, and more emphasis of the military-industrial complex in U.S. poli- is being placed on fiscal efficiency than in the tics and concludes that reform of the military past. must originate with Congress, not the President. Morgan finds that the military-industrial complex is not unique to the United States and seeks to 309 place its long-term effects in historical perspec- L%, AAAS 10 FE,'GRT ON VIETNAM DEFOLIATICN, by our tive, Washington correspondent.Nature (London) v. 228, Oct. 10, 1970: 108-109. Q1.42, v. 228

3.7 Reports on a proposed study by the National Minty, ACedul S. StUTA AFRICA'S DEFENCE SIRATEGY. Academy of Sciences (NAS) of the "danger inherent Lonien, Anti - Apartheid Movement 119t91 36 p. in the use of herbicides" and on the preliminary nq 64 ARMS CONTROL S: DISARMAMENT

res..Its of a sirdlar study undertak.- .by the Ar. r- forests. Ihey conclude that the massive use of ic.on AsJo,iation for the A.yancene-_t of Scie ehe,ic,1 -weapons in Vietnam ha: bud severe ecolog- (AAA::). Meth gronps have attetpted mea..nre the ia,,,1 con,eq enues desk costive tn. both human life e"fects of :J. S. doliation and cr,p-ii tr-..,tion and tae enironment. The U.S. militarj, which Ic Ircgraes in Vietnam, where the Tow...rfu_ convinced that defoliation is an effect1e CGIL- picloram. cacodylic acid, ant ter-uerrilla w,apon and such has restrieted 2,1+,5.: have teen in Use or. an unpreceie,,ted une ,lv through lack of personnel and equir,ent., kale for several years. The IAA. stuiy, r:' t,,J ?ex.), well expan, its use in future wars. This S.1]':-.S of which are to be made public at the Asso- focus on military effetiveness ignores the encr- ciation's annual meetin,, in December, has been moos social and ecological eonseT:ences of chemi- hami.ered by the reP.Isal of Defence Derartent cal warfare, which nave intenSified ficials to release &ey inforelaton relating to the anitatny toward the 1.5nited States, Anc,rican sci- Vietnam prcuum, ',Mould :A..: Te confronted with entists have an obligation to Vietnames, scien- sicdlar restictions, it too soy have difficulty tists to investr..e and publicize thoroughly the in producing a meaningful study. long-term effects of the c.ilitar, uses of horbi- cides.

Na,hu,,ius, Klaus. [DEFENSE AID THE SnME INFLUENCES OF THE MAINTENAIXF OF COME4T FORCE:3 0:: raokera, David [interview] Y.1LITABY :Y:- THE NATIONAL ECONOMY]MilicEr wed Wirtschaft; FACT ON HUS'INT.;;S. U.S. news I world report, v. t-9, Einige EinflGsse der .interhaltang von Streitkr,ift- Aug. 3, l010114-48. en auf die Volkswirtschaft einos Lances. Wehr- JK1.Ut5, v. 19 Italie, v.19, Sept. 1970: 476-480. t3.W396, v. 19 To-ches upon varicau aspects of defense crenfilg in the United Staten, The probable effect:, of a Expenditures on armaments make up a very signif- termination of the Vietnam, 'der, the draft ai cre- icant port of the national income of most coun- ation of an ail-volunteer Army, converion of de- tries and so can be used to curb .:Mlation, price fense industries to peaceful uses, the place of the pump during depression, deteruine the rate c defense contracts in the civilian economy, the growth of the gross national product, end even in- control of waste and inefficiency, and the role of fluence forei,r1 relation:, In addition, arms ex- the Defense Deportment in civilian education aid penditures can influence the national economy in research and development are some of the topics indirect ways. For example, installations like discussed. Deputy Secretary of Defense Facksrd airports or harbors originally designed for mili- secs little probability of a cutback in U.S.de- tary use nay have value for the civilian economy. fence spending over the next few years onlesl. the The scale of military purchasing is so large that Nation is willing to adopt a "Foet:ess America" private !ndustry often benefits from prior mili- strategy, which would permit antstanticl savings tary purchases in "decreasing cost industries." from the reduction of conventfonal forces. Ind..stry also benefits from the technical training given the conscript during his service. On the other hand, conscription takes a large body of po- 313 tentially highly productive workers cut of the la- Farenti, Michael. THE ANTI-C.TuMNPST IMPtiLSE. . w bor market. The NATO countries coordinate arma- York, Random House [1969] 333 p. meLt research and development co that an exchange E163.7.F2 197".' of international "know-hov" takes plcce. Military Includes Hibliogi aphical references. expenditures in research end development, even though they rake up a very small part of the mili- Contents.--Introduction. --Th_. conflicting .7cm- tary budget, have a very special influence en the &men Comrunist.- kuerica the vir- national economy in revealing new materials and toos.--Anti-cormontsm as an American way of lift. new management techniques. This spinoff is en im- liberal and conservative ort,-olnz:.--Virtue portant fcctor in determining the increase of the fawns the world,- -The holy erLsaie: :one of technological component of the notional product. origin.--Sacred doctrine ani self-fulfilling Conversion of research and development to a peace- prophecy.--The yellow demon I.--Tht yellow demon time basis will not necessarily destroy but II.--Vietnam: who? vhy2--Sevolution and counl.cr- the appropriate manner of thin conversion remains revolution.--Frofit, pres'ige, and self-preser7a- to le demonstrated. tien.--Monal imperialism.--The tragic succes, -- The martial state.--Civil defense; kill a neigh- tor.--The devil moves east. 311 Orions, Gordon H., aid Egberi W. Pfeiffer. POS:,07',I- A critique of the effects of anticom-dnism on CAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR IN V.FTNAM. Science, American domestic and foreign policies. farc:ti v. 168, May 1, 1970: 544-5511. illus. examines1.1.e origins and 4e,eloptenl of U,S. anti- 41.S38, v. 166 oormunism, lutes has become the or,.,odox political Biblicgraphlr'l footnote... outlook o liberals and cJnnervatives alike. He contends ',hat Americans have grossly e:aggerated Assesses the of defollocion, crop do- and misunderstood the alleged Conmunist threat and strucion, B-52 'bombing, other military activ- raenalized "any number of he:nous actionc, in or- ities on the ecology of Vietnot Th? authors de- der s u,unter thz 'zer.a:e'; thereby they rerlc- scribe variotzs types of defoliants, their methods tfr't, eater 1.nan miseries and :angers than the of application, and their effects on target areas one they allegedly seek eralica,e and they be- ranging from mangrove and rubber trees to urland vole the very n',11 they profess to contat."

(1 THE STRATEGIC ENSIRONMENT 65

314 rich of men and money, and the inter,:,a1 organiza- Proxmire, W- iliam. RE-e:Fa 1-20.1 WASTELAND; AMERT- tion of the armed forces in relation to their mis- OA'S MILITARY-INTRIAL CO:ePLEX. Foreword by sion. Because public opinion is the eltil.;,te de- Paul H. Douglas. New York, Praeger C1970] xv, termieaht of military morale and the will to na- 213 p. illus. 11C110.:4P76 tional self-defense, society mast reconcile its of individual laterty with the imperative re- Contents.--Preface. --The poser of the Fertagnn. quirements of management and administration. line --Patriots in trouble.--blank che,k for the mili- lability or' the pluralistic society will be deter- tary, -- Budget review: ask not the reason why.- - mined by whether or not it planes the cemmon in- Congress: pushc-rer for the Pentagon.- -:',en in the terest first and establishes the order of prioitty milicary-industrial complex; Fart, one: civilians of its goals. in the Pentagon.- -Men in the military-industrial complex; part two: officers in industry, - -How tall is the adversary7--Future megeoneage: so- tion and reection.--Bringing the 4litary budget Fmith, Robert B. REBELLION AND Ea-P.7-.1',.TfSN AND THE under control.--Appeneix.--Ineex. VITe.INAM WAR. InAmerican Aeadem:, of Political and Social Science, Philadeleeia. Collective vio- Criticizes wasteful and excessive defense spend- lence. 1970. (its Annals, v. 391, ing in the 'United States. Proxmire contends that Sept. 197J)r). 156-167. etTeetive controls ovei. ecfrese spzndieg, which Rl.A4, v.391 neither time bureau of the budget nor Congress has thus far exercised, would increase rather than de- Aspects of the doelstic swial costs of the crease the Nation's security. he recommends var- Vietnam war ere st,esies by ..,latang differences in ious procedural, institetional, and substantive attitude about the war to tolerance for rebellion changes to improve the efficiency of defense and support for regressions. Attitudes about the spending and insure civilian control of the mili- war define three. social ypes: the aisariected tary. doves stronl:ty appose the war; the harassed hawks are ntrongly cor,sitnei t- it; send the silent majority is in te The doves are more con- 315 cerned about uolcestie problems, take a more liter- Rehm, Walter. [KARL JASPOS AND TEE MILITArq] Karl al position on civil rights and social welfare. Jaspers und its Militir. Wehrvissenschaftliche and hay.: greatl tolerance for rebellion. Sur- Rundschau, v. 20, June 1970: 347-356. prisingly, the eilent majority is almost as toler- In.W485, v. ant as the doves. Both are considerably more tolerant tnan the hawks. Four test factors also af- Considers Jaspers' ideas on "soldiernood."Jas- fect tolerance for rebellion. These are: atti- pers recognized the reality of violence, assert:ng ies favorable to civil rights, membership in an that believers in absolute eo-violence are boune etlnie minority, high socio-economic status, and to fall into violent hands. Although the re.ldier being less than forty years of age.These test increasingly becomes a techndc5an and fights no' rectors also specify the original relationship be- for his country but fee humnrity. the old there's- tween attitude about the war and tolerance. The teristics, such as loy_ity and self-laerifice, re- overall effects cn tolerance of being a dove is main important. Curren'ly, soldiers tens to Coro increased whenever a category of a test facto, their own political opinions, anti some think that predisposes toward tolerance. 'Whenever a catego- since they hots the rea:s of destructesn, they ry predisposes toward repression, the dunes are might very veil dis.bey the politician's orders to less tolerant and are similar to the silent major- destroy. Jaspers h mself caetioned teet we may ity. Abstract supplied) not rely cn this '-fantastic idea." Neestive - pects notwithstanding, Jaspers believed in the necessity for a Gerrar army. he was very 315 concerned with the soldier as a "moral human be- Welch, Claude E., come. SOLDIER AND. STATE IN AFhl- ing" and his diff:c0ty In accepting 'the absurd' CA: A CO:TARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY INTEnVEN- ty that he mist prepare for war in order to pre- 7105 AND POLITICAL CHANGE. Evanston, Northwestern. vent it." This has been spoken of as un almost University Press, 1970. 320 p. passive interpretation of the soldier's l:,"e work, UA855.W45 1970 but as a view that truly make. his efforts wortn- Bibliography: p. 302-309. while are moral. Contenta.--IntrcaLctioe.--The sots End irplica- Coes of military intervention, by ,laude E. Welch.- -The military and politics: Dahomey and 316 Upper Volta, by W. A. E. Skeinik.--Congo-Kinshasa: Schilling, JUrgen. CTRE POLITICAL MISSION THE General Mobutu and two political generations, by BUNDESVEHR)Der politische Auftrag der 2undes- Jean-Claude Willame.--Antis b.:1 politics in Ghana, wehr. Wehrkund., v. 19, Apr. 190: 179-184. by Jon Kraus.--The Algerian Army in politics, by 0.W396. V.19 I. William Zartman.--The te:,itary and political change in Africa, by P!:rre L. Van Den Berghe.-- Justifies recent complaints by military spokes- Appendixes: Armed strength and defense expendi- men that Gel-nary has imposed a miss! n ue,on the tures of African ste,.-c in 1966. V:,ulence and Psndeswehr w'.thout recognizing all the consequen- military involement in Airllan politics from in- ces of that mission or providing the means for dertnierce through 1968. -- Glossary cf acronyms. cerrying it out. Schilling criticizes the present ambiguity of the military mission and public fail- Articles on the causes of .military involvement ure to accept its consequences, ti,e scanty provi- in African politics and on the impact of military 71 66 , RMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

rule in particular African states. Attempts by Contents.--'ntroduction. Prologue: Eisenhow- the civilian .Leadership to intervene in the inter- er's other warning. The arms race and 1. nal affairs of the military, togethel- with the Toward a balance of terror: The race begins: nu- general weakness of the civilian regimes :hem- clear oespons and overkill. The bother bonanza. selves, are the major causes of intervention. The The elusive nuclear airplane. Rockets and mis- military becomes "imbued with the sense of an siles. Sputnik. Missile-gap mania. The McNamara identity separate from that of the civilian gov- era.--pt. 2. Unbalancing the balance of terror: ernment" and feels it has "a unigae duty to safe- AIRY: the multiple menance. The defers: delu- guard the national interest undermined by the pol- sion. Other lessons from the ABM debate. The ul- iticians in on-trod."The new military regimes timate absurdity. - -A glossary of acronyms.--Index. are still too untried and the state of political analysis toe primitive to predict .he nxt.vre An account of the strategic arms race since course of Afiican politics. World War II, focusing on the major events in the development of U.S. strategic weapons and the aq- th,r's rol, in these events. York 7sintains "that excessive prudence and technological hard-sell 319 led to unnecessary overreaction in case after 4illiams, P. M., J.%. McGowan. and M. Stuiver. case." In ,art 2 he discusses four technological BOMB CARBON-14 IN LIZP SEA ORGANISMS. Nature innovations of the 1965's (..m,roverent it the re- (London) v.227. July 25, 1970: 375-376. liability and accuracy of strategic missiles 1.,o (4.'.42, v. 227 the develcpment of hERV's and ABM's) that ha prouuced "a situation which is at once wondrously Results of a study in which "incorporation of absurd ac.d. exceedingl,, dangerous, and which no

. . cabon-14 into marine phytoplaAkton through one, neither the most sanguine wearos'3 fancier nor Photosynthesis, and so into zooplanktun and higher the mos': cerebral strategic analyst, ever intend- trophic levels in the food chain, used to ed." The ultimate absurdity of this is twofoli:: oeteraine toe ux of organic -lazboz, from the eu- the security of brth superpowers has decielsed de- photic zone (0-100 m) into the deep sua and into spite massiv, increases in defense expend:Aures, the bottom sediments."The carton-14 found in Itr- and the power of decision for the use of these face seawater in a product of the extensive nuclear weapons "it in the process of passing from state.: weapons tests conducted in 1961 and 1962. men and polticians to lover -level officials and technicians and, eventually, to machines." Pri- mary responsibility for the rate and scale of the arms race lies with the United States, rot because

22=r2 it is less sensitive to the dangers, but because York, Herbert F. PACE TO OBLIVION; A PARTIA.TANT'S it is wealtnier and more powerful and possesses a VIEW OF THE ARMS RACE. New York, Simon and .:chus- more dynamic scie:tlfic and technological capaci- ter [1970) 256 p. UA23.Y67 1970 ty.

72 III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

INTERNATIONAL LAW of sel:-defense. Wh "reas the concept of self-defense requires that the threat of an attack be im- 321 minent, particularly in the case of preemptive ac- Anard, :Ism P. STUDIES TN INTERNITIONAL AXUD1CA- tion on the territory of a neutral state, Presi- TTON. [Delhi) Vikas Publications 119691 298 p. lent Nixon indicated that the purpose of interven- JX1952.A69 tion vas to forestall possiole future attacks af- Includes bibliographical references. ter U.S. combat troopn arc withdrawn from Vietnam. The United States did not exhaust alternative mea- Contents.--The United States and the World sures of de' ing with the threat even though such Court. - -India and the World Court. Attitude of alternatives appear to have been available. The the 'new' Asian-African countries towards the in- stated limitations on the Cambodian operations ternational Court of Justice.--The International were in accord with the principle of proportional- Court of Justice and impartiality between nations. ity sa required by the concept of self-defense, --International status of South-West Africa.--The but the actual scope of these operations bas ex- International Court of Justice and the development ceeded what can reasonably be justified in the of in'ernationtl law.--The role of individual and name -f this concept. having previously invohed dissenting opinion in international adjudication. the right of collective self-defense as the basis --The Kutch award. -- Execution of international ju- of the Cambodian operations, it woild at test be diciol awards: experience since 19I5.--Index. inconsistent to now claim other grounds, while "to assert that self-defense need not be Lased on the A collection of the author's articles on the requirements of necessity and proportionality role of international adjudication in the settle- would be to establish a pronedent destructive of ment of disputes. International law has vast, un- requirements that have only too recently evolved exploited potentialities and is "definitely one of to control the discretionary use of force by the vonisi-g approaches to peace." states."

324 312 Berman, Harold J. LAW AS IN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE IN Baroch, Charles T. THE SOVIET DOCTRINE OF SOVER- U.S -SOVIET RELATIOBS. Stanford law review, EIGN1, ifHE SO-CALLED BREZHNEV DOCTRINE).CChica- v. 22, May 1970: 943-962. gol American Bar Association, Standing Committee LL on Education about Communism and its Contrast with Liberty under Law fc19701 25 p. Traditional perspectives on international rein- TX4041.B365 tionn need to be supplemented by a more dynamic perspective of a developing world order, of chal- Contents.--Introauctiod.--The Czechoslovak test lenge and response. Such a perspective would em- case.--Marxist-Leninist concept of state, law and phasize the common destiny of mankind and the need sovereignty. -- Marxist - Leninist concept of cover- for common standards of conflict resolution.A eisalty and As impact on international law.--Con- comparison of Soviet and American approaches to clvoton.--Notes. international law elucidates the problems involved in creating internationally binding lega: institu- Argues that the Soviet doctrine of limited sov- tions. Soviet international legal theory differs ereignty /1..,s long been an integral concept of So- from American in nix basic respects: its emphasii viet international legal theory.The so-called on the right of each nation to decide which prin- Brezhnev doctrine is thus only its most recent ap- ciples it will accept and its regard for treaties plication. Baroch reviews the origins of the con- at virtually the exclusive source of international cept and its function in the Marxist - Leninist vied law, its straightforward equation of international of society. legal principles with Soviet foreign policy interests, its treatment of economic issues as state concerns, its preference for principles that con- form to 'fermis% social philosophy, its distinction 323 between the nature of law in capitalist and So- Bender, John C. SELF-DEFENSE A.:3) CAMBODIA: A CRIT- cialist Society, ant its view of law as an educa- ICAL APPRAISAL, Boston University lay review, tional tool. The two countries are parties to v. 50, Spring 1970: 130-139. various bilateral and ;multilateral treaties and LL participate together in international organizations and conventions, but the number of such con- Not all the reasons given by the Nixon admini- tacts could and should be much greater in view of stration for U.S. intervention in Cambodia are their status as world powers. Both would benefit consistent with the international legal concept by expanded cultural and trade relations. The

67 73 68 ARMS CONTROL Sc DISARMAMENT

differences in Soviet and American nonce:As ce la, A. W. .54.jthnff; Durham, N.C., Rule of Law Press, preclude the imediate establishment o' universal 1970. xx, 5144 p. JX15552.5 1970c legal standards, but an important step toward this Bibliography: p. 523-533. end can be taken by promoting coopenation on all levels, including various forms of legal coopera- Contents.--Soviet science of international law: tion. its history and basic doctrines.--The state and the modern community of rations.-- Jurisdiction. -- 325 Population.-- Organs of international relations.- - Falk, Richard A. THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTE0ATI39AI International ornanizations and the Soviet Union. SOCIETY. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University --Soviet lay of treaties .--Disputes.--Propaganda Press, 1970. xvi, 678 p. --the permissible means of ,truggle.--Internatinn- JK3110.F337 al law and the Soviet Union.- -List of selected treacles. -- Index. Includes bibliographical references.

contents --Introduction.--Acknowleignents.-- A study cf the Soviet theory and practice of in- pt. 1. An orientation toward the politi, 1 set- ternational lass. Grzybovski stresses the role of ting of the international legal order: ps and Soviet diplomacy in shaping the Soviet doctrine of biases in contempor ry theories of international International law. law. The relevance of political context to the nature and functiwning of international law: an n7 intermediate view. ;lee not-n cn the consequences Jenks, Clarence W. A NEW WORLD OF LAW?A STUDY OF of revolutionary activity for the quality of in- THE CFEATiVE IYAGINATION iN INTERNATIONAL LAW. ternational order.--pt. 2. Expanding horizons of Aarlow, Longmans, 1969. 311 p, authority in the international legal order: Con- CX3225.J45 frontation diplomacy: Indon-sia's campaign to Bibliography: p. [303A-326. crush Malaysia. An argument to expand the traditional sources of international law- -with special Argues for a fresh apprcech to the study and reference to the facts of the South West Africa practice of international law that will increase cases. On the qiesi-legislative competence of the its effectiveness in a world 'undergoing rapid so- General Assembly. The authority of the United Na- cial and technological change. The tasks of the tions to Control nonmembers. Unilateral claims to creative imagination arc to restate the basic use outer space and the development of world legal goals of international law in terms relevant to order. An explanation of the extraterritorial ex- contemporary problems, to insure the continued tension of American antetrust regulation.--pt. 3. growth of international law and institutions, and Making international law effective in national and to suggest the best means of achiening a lawful international arenas:Some thoughts on idFntify and peaceful world order. ing and solving the problem of compliance with international law. On treaty interpretation and the New Haven approach: achievements and prospects. 328 The South West Africa cases: an appraisal. The Kearney, Richard D., and Robert Dalton. THE IREATY Sabbatino litigation and after: the complexity of ON TREATIES. American journal of international the Supreme Court decision and the simplicity of law, v. 64, July 1970: 495-561. the legislative epilogue. Domestic courts, '-ter- JX1.A6, v. 64 naticnal law, and foreign acts of states: ex,cu- tive prerogatives and judicial imperatives.- - Describes the Vienna Convention on tie Law of pt. 4. A plea for systematic procedures of in- Treaties BS the "first essential elem,,nt cf infra- quiry: Some new approaches to the study of inter- structure that has been worked out in the enormous national law. Wolfgang Friedmann. Morton A. Kap- task of codifying international new pursuant to lan and Nicholas de'. KatzernAch. Kenneth S. Article 13 of the United Nations Charter."The Carleton. The recently independent states: a order of discussion is conclusion and entry into framework for systematic inquiry.--pt. 5. force of treaties; observance, application, and Strengthening the international legal order: Set- interpretation of treaties; mmtnimtnt and codifi- tling ocean fishing conflicts: the limits of "law cation of treaties; invalidity, termination, and reform" in a horizontal legal order. The pros- suspension of the operation of treaties; settle- pects for world order: models of the future. The ment of disputes; miscellaneous provisions; and quest foe world order and the Vietnam War; a sec- depositaries, notifications, corrections, and reg- ond American dilemma. Observations on political istration. Kean y and Dalton conclude that the loyalty at a time of world crisis.-- Appendices. -- treaty has provided the mechanism to adjust the Index conflicting demands between the Torces of stability end change "by codifying the doctrines of lus Analyzes "the jurisprudential and sociopolitical cogens and rebus sic stantibus" and strengthened foundations of modern international law," focusing the customary law rule by reaaseWrg the princi- on the distintive features of the international ple of pacts aunt servanda. legal order that has evolved since World War 1. Falk emphasizes the need for a dynamic theory of 329 International law that retains some degr of au- Kblestov, 0. N. NEW FEATUFEIS IN THE DEVELCF?1ENT OF tonomy without losing its relevance to the conduct THE lAW OF TREATIES. Daily review: translations of international relations. from the Soviet press, v. 16, July 3, 1970: supplement, Citeml 1, 1-12. 326 Slav Rm Grzybowssi, Kazimiera. SOVIET PLIBLIC INTERNATIONAL Translation from Sovetskoe gotudarstvo LAW; Lk:TRINES AND DIFLOMArC FRkCTICE. Leyden, no.5, 1970. Slav Rm INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OFPEACE 69

Aspects of international law specifically exam- val warfare, of restraints on the oossession or ined at the diplomatic conferences on the law of n'e, in various cont,>xts, of particular weapons treaties held in Vienna in 1968 and 1969 included systems. From a survey of the historical experi- treaties and third parties, the inPalidity of a ence with efforts to abolish or limit armaments treaty conflictihg with a peremptory norm of in- and an exavination of particular issues relating ternational law (jus cogena), the do2trine of the to na,a1 weapons systems and the use of chemical, fundamental change in circumstances (rebus sic biological, or nuclear weapons in general and lim- stantibus), and the procedures for terminating ited war contexts, Mallison concludes that such re- treaties. In elaborating the first problem the straints as have existed have resulted from a delegations agreed that the freedom of action of weighing of considerations of humanity against nonsigaatory third parties cl;.d not exclude the ob- military necessity, with the latter given prepon- servance of areaty forced upon a statc commit- derant oo:,sideratioN, the general criterion being Ling en act of aggression and did not effect the that a weapon "must not cause a destruction of most-favored-nation device. The listing of spe- values which is disproportionate the military eifio instances in which treaties might legally be advantage gained through its use." The record so terminated excludes boundary disputes. Tie So- far is rot w,ry encouraging, but it may not be cialist countries and the Third World split o.) the relevant to an age of mass-destruction vsspons attehipt to require obligatory jaridication by the when the impetus for arms control is so much International Court of Justice and otter suprana- greater. tional agencies ou the termination of a treaty. The compromise propositions worked nut by Nigeria and Ghana in the Convention on the Law of Treaties 3.22 "can in no soy e-lance its authority and the sta- Mallison, William T. STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL bility of international treaties, although repre- WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN GENERAL AND LIM:TED WARE. Washirgton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 230 p. sEntativQs of the Western countries . . sedu- Lo.isly tried to prove the opposite." U.S. Naval War College. International law studies, v.53) J11295.04, v. 58 CNAVPEPS 15031." 330 Slbliogrephical footnotes. Kriger-Sprengel, Friedhelm. ILNITATIONS ON SOVER- EIGNTY IN THE FRIENDSHIP TREATIES OF nit SOVIET Contents . --Foreword.--Frefate.--Short forms of UNION WITH THE SOCIALIST STATES: Souverfinitgta- references cited.--Submarine warfare and interna- beschrgnkungen in Freundsehaftsvertrigen der Sow- tional law. -- Claims concerning lawfu' combatants. jetunion mit dem sozialistischen Staaten. Wehr- --Claims concerning lawful areas of operation: kunde, v. 19, July 1970: 3E3-319. submarine operational areas.--Olaims concerning U3.W396, v. 19 lawful objects and methods of belligerent attack. --Claims concerning lawful weepans of belligerent The recognition of West Germany's complete sov- attack.--Appendix A. The London Naval treaty of ereignty (including the abrogation of the enemy- 1930.--Appendix B. Document Donitz-10D.--Appendix state clauees of the United Nations Charter) that C. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the is implied by the renunciation-of-force a-esty Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-Wrecked Mem- would not be transferable to East Germany in the bers of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949.- - Soviet practice of international law. As a con- Index.- -Table of cases. stituent member of the Socialist camp, the Pankow regime is subject to certain limitations that are A study ol' the legal restraints on submarine exceptions to customary international relations warfare as well as related issues raised by other but that the United Na,tons has recognized in types of naval warfare, arms control and disarma- practice. The May6, 1970,Czech-Sovict treaty, men. efforts, chemical, biological, and nuclear with its broadly expanded definition of mutual as- weapons technology, and general and limited war. sistance and 60Jovledgment of tie Brezhnev doc- A major aim of the study is to convince naval ,f- trine, illustrates these deviations. Examination ficers and international lawyers of the effective- of Soviet treaties with Czechoslovakia, Rumania, ness of law in minimizing the impact of interna- Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, Chinn, Mongolia., Per- tional violence and of the compatibili.y of legal sia, and Afghanistan confirms the existence of a restraints with military efficiency. ;he need rcr trend toward development of a speci"ically Social- more comprehensive measures including, ultimately, ist international ley. Rumania will probably be effectively sanctioned disarmament is also recog- the next country pressured to sign a treaty of nized. "friendship, cooperation, and assistance," expressing the Soviet Union's understanding of these 333 terms in the relationships of members of the So- Phillips, Crie L., and Ebe-hard P. Deutsch. PIT- cialist bloc. FALLS OF THE GE1iCC1DE CONVENTION. American Par Association journal, v. 56, July 1970: 641-646. 331 LL Mallison, WU-Am T. CLAEIiS CONCERNING LAWFUL WEAP- ONS OF BELLIGERENT ATTACK. In his Studies in the "Wholehearted concurrence in the lofty ideals law of nasal warfare: submarines in general and that engender promotion of r,ral issues should not limited wars. Washington, U.3. Govt. Print. Off., be permitted to sstatitute the ephemeral tissue of 1966. (U.S. Naval War College. International 1514 those ideals for the enduring fiber of constitu- series, V. 58) p. 151-169. tional limitations."The United States has joined :X1295.114, V. 68 in deaouncing genocide but has so far wisely re- frained from becouing party to a contention that An examination, undertalen as one phase of a would transfer jurisdiction in genocide cases to study of the legal restraints on submarine and na- the United Nations or some other international

'7 5 70 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

body. The Genocide Convention permits trial even and activities. The World Peace Through Law Cen- when there is no allegation of government ter stands in the forefront those actively city. Its languar;e in exceedingly vague, and po- seeking a more lawful world. litical genocide was excl;ded as the result of a ore -sided compromise between Communist and Western countries. Some supporters of the convention ar- INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION gue that a genocide case involving a U.S. citizen could only be tried in a U.S. court and that in 33b any event there is little likelihood thr.t ar international tribunal for genocide cases will be AUSTRALIA AND THE IAEA. In Australia. lept. of Ex- established. The convention explicitly calls for ternal Affairs. Current notes on international mandatory extradition, however and some U.S. of- affairs, v. 41, Mar. 1970: 104-al3. ficials have themselves recommended that en inter- ..ix1]52.A33, v. 41 national penal tribunal be created. The trial of a U.S. citizer by an international court would de- Discusses current issues confronting the Inter- prive him of several constitutionally guaranteed national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a: they ai- feet Australian interests. rights. Attaching speci,'ic reservations to rati- These issues include fication of the conveution would be futile, since the govening machinery of the Agency and moves the convention itself overrides the effect cf such fur its revi.uion; the expansion of nuclear power reservations. The Genocide Convention cannot de- resources; the wider dissemination of nuclear ter genocide where it is most likely to occur, and technology; the proposed international service to it would jeopardize basic freedoms cf Americans if provide nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; the United States were to ratify it. and the IAEA's safeguards system and its responsibilities under Article III of the nonproliferation treaty. The Australian Government's view is that 332: the IAEA should nut become the central authority Ramundo, Bernard A. CZECtoocOVAKIA AND THE LAW OF in the provision of peaceful nuclear explosions, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE-LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION IN though it might legitimately consult on proce- THE SOVIET NATIONAL INTEREST. Stanford law re- dures. view, v. 22, May 1970: 963-976. 71 337 Borgese, Elizabeth M. LAST DAYS OF YEE SUPERPOWERS. The contradictory nature of the Soviet law of Center Tagazine, v.3, July 1970: 2-7. peaceful coexistence was clearly revealed by the See Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and subsequent legal ratioTilizations of that act. The law Examines the question of United Nations reform of peaceful coexistence rests on two fundamental and Char'er revision. Borgese pints out that the principles: peaceful coexistence, which applies United Nations already has been changed in several to relations between Socialist and capitalist fundamental ways since its founding in 1945, and states, and Socialist internationalism, which os- she finds in one of these rbanses, the new voting tensib'y governs relations between Socialist over of the Third World in the General Assembly, states. In sharp contrast to the Soviet emphasis mason to believe that "the widespread :kepticism since 1956 on the objectivity of law, the inter- about the U N may not be really justi- vention in Czechoslovakia, which was justified as fied."She suggests, nevertheless, that the aims en act of "fraternal assistance," demonstrated the for which the organization was founded -- peace, de- subordination of Soviet law to Soviet national in- velopment, sovereignty, property, and huwan terest. The Bre7Inev doctrin. seriously compro- rights--need to be reappraised, and _he rakes her mised such basic international legal principles as own contribution thereto. She concludes by point- national sovereignty, nonintervention, and self- ing out that the seabed and high seas raise the determination, and thereby dimmed the prospects whole gamut of problems faced by the international for international law and order. community, and thus constitute a fielu is which to develop a rev, future-oriented rrganization 335 Rhyne, Charles S. TEL GROWING "LAW FULLNESS" OF THE 338 WORLD OOMMUNITY: INTERNATIONAL LAW.Vital Cobb, Roger W., and Charles Elder, INTWIAlicHAL speeches of the day, Y. 36, Oct. 1, 1970: 761 764. 00k74UNITY; A REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STUDY. .nw York, PN6121.V52, v. 36 Holt, Rinehart and Winston 11970] 160 p. (Cases Delivered before the 2d World Meeting urn Medical in international politico) Law, Washington, D.C., Aug. 16, 1970. JY1950.C62 Bibliography: p. 143-152. The most important indications that a peaceful world order may someday become a reality are the Contents.--pt. 1. Integration theory al com- ever-growing number of international legal insti- munity development: Community formation In the tutions and the tremendous growth in the body of international system, Approaches to the study of iuternatiotal lay. %.'he trend is evident in such community integration. The components of integra- fields as international communications and trade tion theory.--pt. 2. The retire of the empirical and in the expand.d role of international agencies studies: Hese:Koch design and date acquisition.- - and courts. A prim.ry means of encouraging this pt. 3. Empirical findings: Mutual relevance and trend would be to strengthen the International the impact of geophysical properties. Unit prop- Court of Justice, which, for want of cases, lies erties and mutual relevance. Systems properties dormant. This c-old be achieved by making the and mutual relevance.--pt. 4. Review and conclu- court more accessible, reducing the cost of using sions: Two levels of community; a rea,praisal..... it, and increasing the scope of its jurisdiction Author index.--Subject index. "0. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE DE PEACE 71

Considers the sources of integration theory at that would protect civilians from indiscriminate the nation-state level, provides a model for in- warfare and prohibit the use of weapons Lf mass ic- terrelating existing studies on community develop- structior. ment, foc.dnes on several levels of nation -slate alinements, and develops a set of propositions 34.? that can be subjected to empirical verification. Eharmn, 0. N. The authors hope that "more precise research de- AFRO-ASYIN GPOU? IN TI:E Allaha- tad, Chaitanya Pub. Souse C19697 signs will become prevalent in the fatare,sc chat 411 p. speculations ahout trends in regional or world JX1977.2.A1S5 commarities can be scrutinized in the light ofen- pdrical inquiry." Contents.--Introduction.--Evolution of the Afro- Asian group in the UN.--The Suez question.- -The 339 Hungarian question.--The Lebanese question.--The Congo question.--Decolonizaiion.-.Racial discrimi- Ciovannetti, Alberto. THE UNITED RATIONS' SILVER nation in South Africa.--Reorganization of the ANNIVERSARY. Thought, v./5, sume,er 1970: 165- principal IN organs. -- Concluding observetions.-- 198. AF2.7333, v.45 Appendices.--Bibliography.--Index. Reviews the achievements and failures of the Reviews the formation of tl. Afro - Asian group in United Nations and assesses its future prospectu. the United Nation, and its role in problems cfwar Giovannetti finds that the system of collective and peace, colonialism, and racism during theper- security on which the United Nations is based has io 1955-1963. :Therm, rotes the diversity of at- been ineffective because of the conflict between titudes among Afro-Asians stresses their corn national sovereignty and communal diplomacy. U.N. mon interest in achieving national aotonomy via-a- zfforts at peacekeeping have foundered, largely as vis the major powers and in maintainingimpartial- the result of inadequately defined peacekeeping ity in the Fast-Wes.: ideological conflict. :vies, while its role in disarmament hasteen lim- iteo primarily to that of a public forum. The 313 United Nations can tenets more effective only if Thant, the present balance of terror gives THE li.IVERCALICi OF THE U.S.: GraNt; THE way to a C4ARTER A CHANCE. strengthening of international authority. Vital speeches c' the Jay, v. 36, Aug. 15, 16701 652-655.

2.40 F116121.752, v. 36 Delivered in San Francisco, June 26, 1970. evenia', Wilhelm. EGERANY. AND THE UNITED NATIc113] Deutschland and die Vereinten Nationen. Europa The mood of uncertainty and anxiety that charac- Archie, v. 25, May 25, 1970: 339-346. terizes the 25th arrive -nary of the United Na- D839E86, v. 25 tions' founding contrasts with the cautious olti- The altission of both the Federal German Repub- mism of only15years ago. lic and the German Democratic Republic to the Like many other institutions, the United Nations faces a crisis of con- United Nations is inextricably connected with the fidence. New approaches and priorities are essen- problem of the international status of East Ger- many. tial if it is to regain the confidence of the Fac.:{705 admission would in effect force world and realize the ideals embodied in its char- Born to recognize that East Germany has allthe ter. attributes of a sovereign state. Collective responsibility most rpla-e power 7n the same wv, politics as the tasis o' world order, for no na- the enemy-state clauses of the United Nation:. tion has the Rover to rule the world or solve its Cha^ter would disappear when the Soviet Union ac- problems alone. Yenbership in the United Settlers cepted the admission of West Germany to the world must be rale oniversal by bringing in ths People's organization. The admission of both Germanys to Peptlic of Cnina and the divided nations. The the United Nations would not end the authority of the victorious four powers, however. major powers rust resolve the Middle East conflict The Western within the context of the U.N. Charter. powers can recognize East Germany only after care- Ideologi- cal ey.clusivism most be abandoned in favor of fully providing for the security of Berlin. more Cer- tolnront approaches to social charge. tainly the appearance on the world stage of two Economic Germanys will complicate Bonn's foreign policy, aid rust to internationalized and thus rem mel from the realm of power politic-,, Finally, the but nullification of tie Hallstein doctrineis necessa,y. problems generated by a mushrooming teconology In the long run, this realisticrecog- nition of the sentence of two Germanys may aid must to diagnosed tv,a dealt with collectively. their reunification. 314

311 Toulemonde, Bernard. fad5Cf.):ii;37 anprurE TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS) Mirinanoff, Jean. THE RED CROSS AND d1OLOG7CAL AND L'attitude de is Pe CHEMICAL. WEAPONS. publig.Le populaire de C,tire a l'egard de l'Organi- International review of the Pet sation des Nations Unies. Cross, no. 111, June 1970: 351-315. Faris, Documentation frarv.ise, 1968. 54 p. HV560.155, 1970 (Notes et etude; docuten- taires, no. 34971 D411.F67 no. 3497 Bibliography: p. 50. Reviews the role of the Red Cross and other international organizations in the prohibition of Divides the history of Communist China's rela- chemical and biological weapons. Mirimanoff notes the controversies over the types of chemictl tions with the United Nations into four stages: the arms offensive, 19.?-1953 the offensive agents excluded by the 1975 Geneva Protocol and of discusses some of the protocol's limitations. charm. 1954-1957; rete.ntnent, 1957-1963;and gen- The eral attack, 1i63 to the preoent. Red Cross supports A. broad interpretation of Toulemonde con- the cludes that China has avoided completely severing protocol and urges the adoption of new agreements contacts with the thited Nations despite Feking's 72 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

verbal condemnations of the organization in recent sions turn around the Terms of Reference, organi- years. The appendix lists documents e-.changed be- zational structures, equipment, and no on, re- tween China and the United Nations. quired by Peacekeeping Forces if they are to fulfill the rdssions assigned to them. (Abstract supplied) INTERNATIONAL PEACE '4T AND SECURITY FORCES THE ROLE OF FORCE IN INTEFlAT:ONAL ORDER AND UNITED NATIONS PEACE- KEEPING: REPORT OF A CONFERENCE AT 345 DITCHLEV PARK, 16-19 MAY 1969, by Aaan James, con- Groom, John. CTHE PEACEKEEPING ACTIONS OF THE UNIT - ference rapporteur. Enstone ((JacI, Ditchley FD NATIONS) Die friedenserhaltenaen Aktionen der Foundation, 1969. 31 p. (DitA)ey paper no. 20) Vereinten Nationen. Schweizer Monatshefte, v.5, JX1981.1,7R57 Avg. 1970: 403-413. AP32.S47, v. 5 Considers the ro.e of force in maintaining international order and the significant changes Last Although other international or regional organi- gave taken place in recent decades concerning the zations concern themselves with peacekeeping, it place of force as an instrument of national poli- is a task mainly for the United lations, which can cy. James reviews the part the superpowers and fulfill it successfully only if the countries in regional organizations play in stabilizing the conflict agree to accept the U.N. solution and if world order and the proposals that could allow the the world body takes into account the desires for United Nations to contribute to this objective. social change that caused the conflict. Can the Some conference members conclude tne United Na- United Nations maintain an existing government? tions presents as obstacle to the attainment of a Peacekeeping actions represent intervention, and safer international order, one in which states will cause many problems thereby. Therefore better be denied the right to use force. They advocate peacekeeping procedures must be found for the four the establishment of a superior arrangement. cases in which it is most relevant: conventional wars tetween states; armed disputes between the Great Powers; decolonization conflicts; and post- colonial crises within a state. A peacekeeping OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, force could play a significant role when detente AND PROPOSALS is aeached in the East-West conflict, for example, in overseeing agreements on arms limitations. All 348 too often only a peacekeeping force is organized Burton, John. MEDIATION RECONSIDERED. InMacdon- when a crisis occurs. Its task is limited to ald, Norman, and others. Diaarmazen'z now. Thr.:e avoiding escalation, in hopes of "freezing" the lectures given at a one-day Conference on Disarma- conflict.A U.N. mediator is needed as well. The ment he.d jointly by the U.N. Association and the task of the peacekeeping force must be clearly de- Friends Peace evi International Relations Coredt- lineated: smother the conflict, play the role of tee at Friends House N.W.1 in November 1968, a Jury, freeze the conflict, legalize it, help one London, Friends Peace & International Relations of the litigating parties (usually the status-quo Committee 119691 p. 6-10. party), fulfill the duties of a counsel- govern- .7)(1974.M324 meat, keep third parties out of the conflict, or internationalize the conflict. The impression Discusses the inadequacies in traditional meth- that the United Nations is a party to the con- ods of resolving conflicts and calls for a greater flict, nmong other political and financial prob- allocation of resources for researching social and lems, encumbers its peacekeeping activities.What political problems. Garton deprecates third-pa-ty is needed is a standing peace-army, able to solve intervention, arbitration, conciliation, media- conflicts as soon as they arise. tion, and good offices as methods of solving international disputes. He maintains that disputes 346 cen no longer ce referred to courts for a judicial Hill, R. J. 03MPAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS OF UN AND settlement, because they result from perceived re SIMILAR PEACEKEEPING FORCES. Ottawa, Dept. of Na- lationships. An approach resembling that used in tional Defence, Directorate of Strategic 4e:ea family or industrial counselling could prove ef- tionel Research, Operational Research Division, fective in the resolution of these disputes. 1968. 39, (12) t. illus. (ORD report, no. 68/R5) trA600.O28 no. 68/R5 349 Includes bibliographical references. Carroll, Berenice A., ed. PEACE RESEARCH IN HIS- TORY. Jaurnal of peace research, no. 4, 1969. The purpose of this paper is to examine the com- p. 288-400. AS9.J6, 1969 mand and control problems experienced by Peace- A special issue. keeping Forces, in the hope that investigation may Includes summaries in English and Russian. lead to eventual improvements in performance. There are several different kinds of Peacekeeping Contmts.--Introduction: history and peace re- Force: some provide useful machinery for the con- search, by 'Berenice A. Carroll.--Haar wars end: an trol of international disputes; but several have analysis of some current hypotheses, by Berenice suffered from serious command and control prob- A. Carroll.--The Peace of Moles, by Herald F. lems. The histories of the Forces are considered Legon. -- Ending the var of tae Sicilian Vespers, by in some detail, to help delineate a number of J. Lee Schneidman.--Ending the American Revolu- problem areas and so provide guidance on the vari- tion7 lessone for our time, by Richard B. Morris. ous improvements which are necessary. The discus- --Portsmouth 1905: peace or truce? by J. A. INSTITUTIONS AND AlEANS FOR THE MAIN TENANCE OF PEACE 73

White.--Victory in modern wee. by Raymond ciscipli.,e of ietereatienal relations, for no sub- O'Connor. - -The conference on peace research in eect is ES cruciae. Scientists speak of enegetive history: a memoir, by F. Hilary Conrey.--Recent peace," wherein war does not occur but ceeeer forms ieveloemerts in the teaching of peace reF.:,arch and of economic and political violence continue to be ielated areas in North America, hr Sandi E. used, sae "positive :,mace," where justice is ap- Cooper.- -Pool; rotes. plied without violence and conflicts can be solved by compremises. Paradoxical -y, itis easier to Draws historical analogies to examine the prob- determine erd work toward the prereqeisities of lem of war tereination. Gerroll's introduction positive peace, especially en tee social - political deecriees the value of historical study in the level. Aitnoofi. the "eilitents" are wrong in de- achievement and mainteeance of peace and cetlines raeding social justice at the expense of peace, methods of inquiry into the relationenip between they ccrrectly poiet out that lasting peace cannot histcrical study and social policy formulation. be aceieeel without it. Social justice run be ep- preached through increasing economic aid to devel- 350 oping countries, solving racial prctlems, anal die- Corbett, Iercy E. FROM INTERNATIONAL TO WORLD Ltd. trihutine mere justly. Bethlehem, Fa., Dept. of Internationel Relations, Lehigh University, 1969. 40 p. (Lehigh Univer- 353 sity. Dept cf Irternetional Relations.Research Drinan, Robert e. YIeTNAM AND ARNA'FDDDN; Pekes, monograph nc. _) ee3110.C6F73 WAR AND TeE CHRISei.e CONSCIENCE. New Ycrk, eheed and sari C1eI07 210 p. Surveys the roles of international business and 4736.2.De the eeverneental and intergovernmental agencies of Includes bibliographical references. foreign aid, technical assistance, ani economic develepeent in an integration process that night Contents.--Forewori.--Vatican Ii and war. --Tec one day culminate in effective world community un- knericen hierarchy and Veetesei: 1965.--The Are-i- der a corm on law. Ccrbett warns that the achieve- can hierarchy on war sod peace 1e63.--Pecee in ment of a world order will require eiffieult po- Terris: the morality cf war.--Did the just star litical deeleicas. He advocates a worldwide ede- theory die at the birth of the atonic agr?--Unre- catiored campaign to convince the peoples of the solved problems: tyranniciee and revolution.- - international community that effective centraliza- American Protestants and the moraliq of war -- tion is indispenrable to maintaining peace and se- Vatican III and war.--Jedaism and the morality of curiey. war. -- Hunger, poverty, and war.--Does America rake war against communism or on behalf of capitalism? 351 --American unilateralism, the United Nations, and Czaja, Herbert. eSerefLEMENT WITH EAFTLFIN EUROPE; verld federalism.--America's lawlessness In the APPROACH TO ACHIEVING EUROPEAN PEACE] Ausgleich conduct of the Vietnam War.--Is pacifie'n the only nit Osteuropa; Versuch miner europgischen Erie- option left fur Christians? -- Appendices. densordnung. Stuttgart, eeevald [19693 64 p. ED259.2.C9 Contends that fftee existence of nuclear arms and the possession by the United States and by Russia Contents. -- Introduction. -- Present Christian duty of fantastically destructive biological and chemi- toward peace.--The bases for achieving peace with cal weapons make the possibility of a 'just' war our direct eastern neighborr.--The road toward a so remote that the Church could and should condemn viable settlement. -- Prerequisites for a settle- war as morally objectionable." Dilnan finds the rent.--Tasks of the present. -- Christian hope in a statementr of Catholic theologians on the morality difficult situation. of war, particularly the Vietnam War, unsatisfac- tory and evasive, and urges that a new eceren'eal Argues that if freedom is to survive, Germarg council of e!shops and lay leaders be convened to will have to cooperate with its neighbors eeonomi- clarify this problem. Recognizing the improLabil- rally, scientifically, and culturally.Pepe Pius ity of a bilateral disarmament aereement between XII and Pope John XXIII stressed the importance of the United Statec and the SoeietJr ien, he advo- human rights eni the commonweal as means to over- cates unilateral disarmament ty the United States cone the differences between nations. Nov, when and reliance on passive resistance and militant cult:deal achievements end technological innova- nonviolence as alternative methods of defense. tion:, are juxtaposed vith power struggles, dehe- zekeization, and horrible ears, it is more impor- 354 tant then ever that all people, especially Chris- Fanning, Huge, DEFENCE A"D DEVELOINEVT. London, tiens, work toward a practical art letting peace. Royal United Service Institution, 1910. 34 p. UE725.GTE3 352 Czemplel, Ernst 0. [PEACE PEACE RESEARCH) Discusses various civic-action programs through Friede and Friedensforschung. Vorgergr ,v.9, which the military can contribute to promoting Mar. 1970: 109-110. peace in developing countries. Henning argues AP30.V52,v, 9 that both civilnar.s me the military benefit from civic-action projects, not only through improved ...th the help of Gustav Heinemann the Federal rdlitery-civilian relations but also by preventing Republic of Germany has finally discovered peace the discontent that breeds violence He coneluiee research, although for years it has been wide- that Frit An's Arced Forces should aceuire a sereal in other countries, and the International greater capacity for civic action because it scull Society for react Pesearch is a respected orgeni- eegreee the forces' morale and add to the nation's cation. Peace research eneomeesses the entire stock of skillei ranpever. fl 74 ARMS CON't ROL & DISARNIANIENT

355 search" should mean research on peace, tut usually Hul,on, Sir Edward. EVROPE AND THE :IDDLE EAS?. mean the study of the factors threatening peace. European review, v.20, summer 1971, 1C-11. Psychologists say that aggression, like the drive AP4.E78, v. 20 for power, is innate in man and in gro,lping, of men, and that tensions must be endured and over- The proposal of Moroccan Foreign Minister Abdel- come. A peace achieved through fear of nuclear hadi Boutaleb "for the creation cf a multi-confes- weapons is no more unworthy of ran than his abdi- sional state in Palestine, comprising Jews, Arab cation, in the delusion of utopian pacificism, of Muslims and Aral, Christians," mty provide an op- the right of self-realization cr his refusal to port,_nity for uripe to play an active role in a pledge himself to fulfilling his obligations. Middle East peat settlement. Europe's experience When the soldier learns to accept that the only in creating an economic community out of recently peace possible in this world is to be wen on a warring states is obviously relevant to the needs field of tensions, he has taken the first step to- of the Middle East states, and Europe possesses ward peace. "In peace here and today the spiritu- the requisite financial and technical resources to al and social battles are fought that will de-

assist development in the region. Israelis and cide . . if peace is won or lost and war is tc. Arabs alike increasingly recognize tic futility cf 'rreak out." their present policies. *What is needed is a Eu- ropean initieLie to convene a conference to dis- cuss the formation of a Middle East Community." 358 Toe conference would draft a constitution for the O'Connor, Raymond G. VICTORY IN MODERN WAR. Jour- new Palestinian state and devise a plan for the nal of peace research, no. L, 1969: 367-384. new community. Whatever the outcome of such a AS9.J6, i °69 ccnfere:ce, Europe would gain in self-confidence Includes summaries in English and Russian. by acting as a political entity in the Middle Fast. In this article "victory" is defined as the cessation of armed conflict under conditions satisfactory to at least one of the combatants in terms )C of stated objectives. Drawing on examples of wars Macdonald, Norman. WHY MAI IS A KILLER. In Mac- from the American Revolution to the present day, donald, Norman, and others. Disarmament now. the author demonstrates how the nature and conduct Three lectures given at a one -day Conference on of the war can modify the original objectives, and Disarmament held jointly by the U.N. Association provides examples 140ere military victory insofar and the Friends Peace and Internatio.:al as the surrender or annihilation cf the enemy

Committee at Friends House U.W. 1 in November forces was not achieved but the political aims 1968. London, Friends Peace & Into-national Rela- were realized. Coalition warfare and diplomacy tions Committee [1969]p. 1-5. can be affected by the diverse goals of allies, JX1974.M324 Which may lead to hash or mild treatment of the defeated. Wars have been concluded in a number of Nan is the only mammal who kills va:t numbers of different ways, ant victory hes taken nary forms. his Lyn kind, and ":,ost of tne ki111mis done by While armed fc,ce usually determines the outcome, men in full possession of their nocr.al faculties." other factors often influence the decision to end Today ran has the capability to dest,oy civiliza- horilities and alter the terms of settlement. tion with weapons cf mass destruction. However Among these factors are a change in the government there.re reassuring indications that the role of of one of the belligerents, negotiations during weapons in settling International disputes is de- the course of hostilities, domestic considera- clining: international arbitration machinery has tions, coalition or "proxy" ally developm,nts, and been established in the la ,t half century, and, the role of outside agencies. The stales Involved since the Cuban missile crisis, the superpowers ray transcend local issues, and a multilateral ap- arc beginning to recognize the futility of nuclear proach may induce the antagonists to accept a ,..o- war. But ti,t danger remains. Rumen behavior must lution that would be impossible in the context of be influenced positively, and man must free him- bilateral negotiations. The Geneva Conference of self from his bonds with weapons. To achieve this 1951 and the United Nations interventions in the goal, an elected ethical council or forum to every Arab-Israeli wars are examples of the way in which university and medical school to cansider relevant outside agencies can make compromise or a renunci- ethical problems and a U.N. committee to Investi- ation of an initiator's intentions more palatable. gate the causes of war should be created. The Major powers have accepted "proxy defeats" under time has come to control weapons. The fate of fu- these circumstances. The prevalence of "limited ture generations "rests crucially on the decisions wars" in recent times--wars which are restricted we -low make or fail to make." in aims, hostilities, and the cormi'ment of re- soucces by at least one side -- places a premium on the exercise cf total control over all the elements leading to victory. E,A while the means 357 must be correlated with the end, there is no way Metrsch, Joachim von. CTHE SOLDIER AND PEACE ;',E- cf ensuring tnat the cost will be ..:ommensurate SLUM] Soldat and Eriedmsforschung. Wehrkunic, with the gain, for the opponent may place a higher v. 19, June 1970: 293-296. value on the issue. Victory in modern we.:has U3.W3:16. v. 19 seldom teen viewed in exclusively military terms, nor has it always consisted of an alteration in The German soldier. who is charged by his coun- the status quo ante. The term should be urler- try's Constitution with maintaining and prtserwing stood in its nistorical setting and deprived of peace, rust tc vitally interested in peace re- its absolute, restrictive connotations. (Abstract search. Taken literally, the words "pe:c. re- suppli.d)

11 INSTITUTIONS ANt) MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OFPEACE 75

379 framework. pt. 2. The settlement of disputes.- - Fault, Fritz. CA WORLD FREE FROM EliNGER--A PREREQ- Abbreviations.- - Dotes. -- Index. UISITE FOR PEACE= Eire Welt 1lei von Hunger-- Voraussetzung far den Fr3eden. Nee Folitik, Describes and analyzes the commercial relations v. 15, June 20, 1970: 12-15. between East and West and their impact on East- v.15 West relations in general. Pisan assumes that separate capitalist ard Communist economic sy_tems Food production increases by 1 or 2 percent per will continue to c,ist, but with any luck they year, whereas population increases by at least 2 will tend to move toward constructive cooperation percent annually. The great population growth and competition. he proposes "an internationally takes place Sr. those countries least able to feed sponsored but Independent system. of regulation: a their people. Narrow-mindedness and apathy also code of fair practices mitigating the disatili.des contribute to the food shortage. Even countries of Western and Eastern entreprises alike and oper- 7ike Japan, where a yield takeoff has occurred, ating to safeguard the general structure of world give nc grounds for optimism, because possible im- trade as it strains to accommodate the growing provements in soil condition and fertility are phenomenon of total state commerce."Such a code limiteu. Nat,re cannot be forced without disturb- would provide for the normalization of Western ing the icel balance in the long run. Cur- policy and the adaptation of Eastern practices; rently, 10 T...-.ent of the total terrestrial sur- facilitate Western scones to Eastern markets and face is bei", used intensively for agrieultu:.e, market data; protect legal rights, mIcluding pat- and more than 35 percent is potentially usable. ants and copyrights; establish simplified and Intensive work on soil biodynanies will help rake binding contractual procedures and means of set- more agricultural land available even in zones of tling disputes through litigation and arbitration; climatic extremes. Hunger can be banished or al- and encourage intergovernmental cooperation. leviated only if policymakers commit themselves and their governments to fighting hunger instead 362 of planni',_ for war and destruction. Radovanovi6, Ljubomir. BLOCS AND EUETEAN SECURITY. Review of international affairs, v. 21, June 20, 1970: 22-25. D839 R4, v.21 360 Fickus, Robert, and Robert Woito. SO END WA?: AN Describes the origin and early history of the INTRODUCTION TO SEE IDEAS, BOOKS, ORGANIZATIONS, proposed European Security Conference up to the WORK, THAT CAN HELP. [Berkeley, Calif., World Nay 1970 meeting of the NATO Council in Bone. Without War ":ouncil, 1970] 261 p. Radovanovi6 considers the final communique of the 26464.Z9P5 1970 Rone meeting unique in its direct approach to the Includes bibliographies, neutral and nonalined countries and in its rejec- tion of the concept of the conference as merely an Contents.--Our intention: a note to the read- interbloc meeting. er --pt. 1. The ideas: War: strategies and causes, Disarmament: problems and approaches. World development and world community. Interna- 363 tional organization and world law, The Uni:ed Rumpf, Helmut. EFEACE RESEARCH ;'-SD THE 0.:NCEIT CF States and international relations. The Communist lEACF] Friedensforschung 4nd Friedensbeeriff. nations and international relations. Area stud- Aussenpolitik, v.2.A, June 1970: 329-337. ies, crisis problems and issues. Moral, reli- b83A885, v. 21 gious, philosophical and ethical thought on war. Conscientious objection and the draft. Social The subject components of the new study called change: the nonviolent approach. Political peace research, conflict theory, decisionmaking, .,roccases and the peace effort. Peace research.- - arms control and disarmament, foreign affairs, na- pt. 2. A context for action: Contexts for con- tionalism, and negotiation technique among others, sidering war/peace problems. A context for work manifest that i's purpose is the broad-based in- to end war.--pt. 3. Resources for action.. -- Index. vestigation of international behavior. While it carries on the tradition of the Utopian dreamers Annonsted bibliography on the problems of war of eternal peace, peace research also attempts to and peace, with introductory eussys to each chap- meet today's heightened dangers by applying all ter that co-sider th,s courses of action most like- the methods of modern science. In that study, the ly to end war. A list of organizations working to word peace means order as well as quiet, and ac- end war is included. The authors offer n politi- cord as well as justice; consequently it implies a cal and moral framework for evaluating various ap- contractually regulated relatiorslip as much as proaches to peace and conclude with a series of narmony or nonviolence. The ever-present ccntra- recormWations for those actively seeking an end diction between justice and order has forced the to war. recognition of the possibility of a just war, difficult as that concept is to define. Peace research assumes that the just di=tribution of prop- 361 erty or raw materials is not possible and gives Sanuel. COEXISTENCE AND 0:MMOE; '7.1IDELINES most priority to expelling the use of force from FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. New York, the international system The peace concept cen- McGraw-Hill Book Co. L19701 xv, 553 p. tral to the United Nations Charter does not call DLC for universal harmony but for the readiness to seek peace through prescribed juridical proce- Contents.--Iutrodtetion.--Dook 1. p, 1. The dures. History refutes those who think to find tconomic and political context. pt. 2. The com- peace in the institution of a world state. The mercial setting.--Book 2. ,t. 1. The legal Fan RccanIca and Fax Britannica as veil as today's 76 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Fax Sovietise are mo.e accurately described as The concept of the army as a means of heroic pacification than peace. The political concept conquest has evolved into attributing to it the that is the goal of peace research should not be a role of preventing or limiting wars. Its next material ordering of society, with its inevitable trans formation must be as an instrument of peace. tendency to become frozen, but the establishment Not only has war become too great a threat, but of accepter procedures to resolve international also the changing society]. attitudes demonstrate and domestic problems. that the time is tire for a change of personality. Peace research should be undertaken by social sci- 364 entists, and politicians and military leaders must heed them. Schneidman, J. Lee. ENDING THE WAR OF THE SICILIAN Change the Department of the Army into VESPERS. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1969: a Department of Peacc and charge it with active peace research, and its aggressive image would be 335-348. AS9.J6, 1969 "An earlier version of this paper was read at changed, and it could commas- the respect of all a meeting of the Metropolitan Conference on His- the Swiss people. Since the Ned Cross was born in tory and Political Science and the C,Jiference on Switzerland, this nation would be an appropriate Peace Research on 4 May 1968 at Marymount Manhat- cradle for a peace research institute that could tan College." span the world. Includes summaries in English and Russian. 367 Schneidman's paper treats the case of a war in Unnithan, Thottamon K. K. N., and Yogendra Singh. which major hostilities ended within two years, SOCIOLOGY OF NON - VIOLENCE AND PEACE: SOME BEHAVI- and the final settlement approximated conditions OURAL AND ATTITUDINAL DIMENSIONS; A STUDY OF established within the first year, but where hos- ELITES, NON - ELITES, AND STUDENTS, AND INSTITUTION- tilities were nevertheless prolonged or resumed in AL SITUATIONS IN INDIA, AND OF ELITES IN NEPAL AND desultory fashion for two decades. Schneidman CEYLON. New Delhi, Researcn Council Cultural provides much useful information on the role of Studies, India International Centre; [exclusively military developments, domestic and external pres- distributed by Munshiram Manoharlull 1969. x, sures or the various parties, their conflicting 188, xiv p. KM278.U65 objectives, face-saving, etc. He discusses ex- "The study was sponsored by the Unesco under its plicitly various peace proposals, an abortive Major Project IV for the Mutual Appreciation of peace treaty in the course of the war, and the Eastern and Western Cultural Values." conditions under which the war finally did end. Includes bibliographical references. (Abstract supplied) Contents. -- Deface.- -The approach.--Meaning and 365 perception of ,on-violence.--The value system of Singh, Nagendra. RECENT TRENDS IN THE DEVELOM1T non-violence an, peace.--Social structure of a OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANISATION PROMOTING non-violent society.--Behavioral dimensions of INTER-STA7E CO-OPERATION AND WORLD PEACE. Delhi, non-violence and peace.--Social policy and non- S. Chand, 1969. xvi, 244 p. (University of Gene- violence.--Images about nun-violent nations and va inaugural Nehru lecture, 1) nonviolence in internstions'. relationships.--At- JX1951.S55 titudinal and behaviors, dimensions sf the sociol- Includes bibliographical references. ogy of non-violence and peace.-- Appendix: ques- tionnaires. Contents.--The NekrAl approach.--The first welcome trmd: end of colonialism and the expansion An empirical cross - cultural investigation of the of the world family of natimr.--Full faith in In- social foundations of nonviolence, defined as "a ternational organisations as the ultimate solution normative system governing the total gamut sf FO- of all ills and consequent multiplication of in- chil relationships of man wherein progressively ter-governmental organs in he international sys- the role of coercive power is replaced by r- tem of today.--The welcome urge for formulation of tive compatibility of volitions, motive. new laws and revision of old ones.--The great urge forms and systems of actions in the life to regulate new fields of inter-state activity.- - tions of individuals, groups and societit 'Humanitarianism' predominates.--The awakening of native, normative, structural-behavioral, the masses and the sanction of world public opin- icy dimensions of the phencr..a are in-esti,:a. ion.-- Conclusion. -- Appendices. and the findings are applied to determining wh er a nonviolent social order, at national or in- Maintains that a strong tide in international ternational levels, is feasible. The authors are affairs flows toward the development of more ef- optimistic about the emergence o:the required fective international law and world order. Singh value-consensus, but they stress that this and links this trend to the postwar "liberation of hc- other of their conch.iions are tentative and call Lanity and the grant of freedom and 'nderendence for further research. to states yoked :0 colonialism." He claims it will ttnefit developed and developing states alike and is supported with "great zeal all earnestness" 368 by the majority of the members of the internati:1- Wienand, Karl. MACE RESEARCH AND ITA:E al community. Zur Friedensforschung und Friedensrolitik. Ne.cs Gosellschaft, v. 17, Juil:,/Aug. 1970: 163-1.65. 366 H5.N36, v.17 Stud', Alfred. CfiN ARMY MR PEACE] Armee flir den Frieden. Allgemeine schveizerische Militgrzeit- Feace -e,earche'rs and politicians agree that schrift, v. 136, A.T. 1970: 563-564. peace res'arch should be conducted on an interdis- U3.A43, V. 136 ciplinary and international level. Since German INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE "7

ileac. research is still in the beginning stage, methodological conflict. Moreover, politicians available data from abroad should be used. Is cal help make funds available. de,inition peace has been universally adopted, thus allowing peace researchers to work objective- 369 ly. The causes for domestic political conflicts "Wolfe, Bertram D. RT.ISSIA AND THE U.S.A.: A ChAL- must be found to give policymakers insight into LENGE TO THE CONVERGENCE THEORY. Quest, no. 66, social and political change and the tools to over- July/Sept. 1970: 54-62. cure and prevent international crises. Peace re- AP6.6,4, 1970 search must not be limited to one institute or univerd.ty, e'en though differences among them Criticizes the convergence theory and its most have s. far prevented establishing an organization recent exponent, John Kenneth Galbraith.Wolfe to promote peace research. The German public must asserts that the theory does not stand up to his- be made aware of the importance of such research, torical scrutiny or an analysis of American and and social scientists must coordinate the relevant Russian social and political systems. He con. elements in their individual fields. However, eludes that each country "will continue to move care must be taken that peace research does not towards its own future under the influence of its become a fad. Politicians can contribute by cam- own heritage, its traditic-is, and its institu- oaigning cn peace platforms.Their experience tions, which will be both conserved and altered will enable them to reconcile different views end more by the actions of men than by the weight of prevent peace research from degenerating into things."

R3 IV. GENERAL ANALYSES OF, AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES TO, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND tion.--The "our-i.ower treaty.--Chira: nine -poser treaty.--China: Shantung and sovereignty.--The Senate and the treaties.--In 3'D essay. -- Index. Ansberry, William F. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARKAMENT: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? Berkeley, McOutchan Pub. A history of the U.S. role in the Washington Corp. [1969] 110 p. Conference on the Limitation of Arme:cents, "the JX197L.A74 only s..lccessfu...arms limitation conference in mod- Includes bibliographical references. ern history." On the basis of his examination, Buckley concludes that disarmaeent and politics '.7cntents.--Prelace.--Introduction and back- are inextricably If heed, "that those woo believe ground.--The pest-World War I period: the League that world peace can to secured through disarms. of Nations.--The post-World War II period: the sent alone, without making political arrangements United Nations.--The partial nuclear test ben concurrently, are ignoring reality."'rte alleeed treaty: an example of limited success.--Non-pro- fail-re of this conference was in fact a failure liferation: a second example of the partial ap- to e.pplemene and reinforce agreements ietended to proach to arms control.--The arms control and dis- be only temporary. armament picture today.

Analyzes past arms control efforts and problems, 3'3 proposed solutions to these problems, the reasons Burns, Richard Dean, and Seymoer L. Chapin. NEAR for the failure to reach a comprehensive agree- EASTERN NAVAL LIY.ITA,lZ PACTS, 1931-1911. East ment, and successful methods, past or future. European au-rterly, 14ar. 1970: 72-b7. Historically, arms control negotiations have D.91.E33, 19T._ failed to produce a comprehensive agreement be- Fart of a broader study entitled "Lisarmament in cause of the failure to understand "that the long Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Lisarmament range national security goals of the world states arsArms Control Agreements between World Wars, will, to different degrees, be in conflict."Ans- 1919-1939" for the United States Arms Control and berry decries general and complete disarmament ef- 'Disarmament Agency. forts and contends that the only way to reech an JX1974.173 agreement lies in promoting limited arms control mess eres. Describes the conditions leading to the naval limitation pmts between Turkey and Greece ir. 19e7e 371 and betwe,n Turkey and the 'cr.c7iet 75105 ir 1930. The sigrificance of these accords lies in thes, ?..enesen, lusts'. [TEE S7A77.53 N,JCLEAR AIC,D02-NT limiting armaments instead of rel:sing CT scrap- AFTER 25 YEA.P.S) Der Stand der Ndklearrastong each ping thee and in tteir producing stability, not 25 Jahren. Aussen;olitiV., v. 21, July 1970: olC- parity. The parties' sincere desire for peace, 430. 239-4535, v. 21 along with domestic eecnomic pressures, the recoe- nition cf chaegieg concepts of warfare, and the Historical resin of efforts toward disareseeet. relative simplicity of these agre.-sets fscilitat- Tables show the te.hnical development of nuclear ed their formulation. weapons and contrast the cestrectioh capabilities cf the strategic weapons of '.9149 and 1970. The rocket vehicle is discussed apart from nuclear warheads. Beneach thinks the str-.1.eeic arms lied- 374 tatien talks will have positive r?eults in slowing Cook, Blanche W. rIBLIY,PAPHY 9 44 PEACE Fie.,EARc:',i IN the arms race between the supereowere. H.:STORY. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Ce1 .:=01 72 F. (Bibliography and reference series, no. 11) Et464.119C7

Buckley, Thomas H. WE UNITED STATES AND Thy: WAe_ Contents. -- ?'reface, by Charles A. Parker.--1n- INGTN CONFEEENCI, 1921-1922. Knoxville, Univer- treductior, by Blanche Wiesen Cook.--Xannseripe sity of Tennessee te19701 p. sources. -- Bibliographical ails and crga-Tuitions E.785.18 providing material for the peace researcher.-- Bibliographical footnotes. Je,-nals cf peace research and related sub2eees. --Cherch history and religious pacifier- --Werk: or Contents.- -The politics o' th. limitation of pseifise, and nen-e'iolence.--Works arms.--The eAlantic contest. -- waning straight the cn arbitration, ineernat!onaliEn and world law.- - way.--The American plan. - -The speech.--The Pacific Histories of peace crganizaticns.--Autcle:gry- contest.--Facific fortifications. -Ares lieits- p.ies, eeeoirs ael biographical seelice cf leaiers

78 84 GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES -9

in the movements for peace.- -The politics and 371 propaganda of peace and war.--ee,teeporary peace- etoee, Isidor F. THEATRE OF DEWS:Mi. New York re- keeping operations and studies in d isarmament. -- vier of 'cooks, v. 1L, Lpr. 23, 1970: 17-16, 18-21+. Works on Vietnam: a selected list. AP2.1f655, v. 14

P. bibliography for "students in all areas of the The Baruch plan for the international control of social sciences and humanities inters,tei in anti- atomic energy was the first of several missed op- militarism, non-violence, and the pel:tics and dy- 1,e-tun:ties to control nuclear arms in the postwar namics cf war and peace." The citations are period. What was originally an idealistic proc,L- largely American, bet a limited number of other al for a world seperstate was revised until it a:- worksir. English and in several foreign languages peared to Soviet leaders as a plan for American are ineluded. The bibliography foe..se3 on materi- domination of the Soviet economy and the world, A als written from. a historical perspective; socio- second opportunity occurred on Nay 10, 1955, wham logical and psychological literature on conflict the Soviet Union, in a dramatic reversal of previ- m=anagement and human aggression has, with some ex- ous policy, agreed to permit extensive interna- ceptions, teen emitted. tional inspection of its military facilities. The United States, which had long insisted on on-site inspection as a precondition for nuclear disarma- 375 ment, reacted coolly to this proposal, and Presi- ION THE NON7BOLIFERATION TREATY; SPEECHES AHD DEC- dent Eisenhower even suggested that inspection LARATIONS, iDCLUDING DOCte,ENTS ON THE GENEVA CNN- might be inimical to national security. A third FERENCE, ON "NE NeFPROLIFRATION TREATY, AND ON opportunity came with President Kennedy's inaugur- lEE ECROPEAN SECURITY SYSTIND Zum Atomsperrver- ation, but unfortunately he "tried to ride two trag; Reden end Erklgrungen scwie Dokumente zur horses at once in two opposite directions, rearma- Genfer Konferenc, sum :mV- Vertrag and -sue euro- oent and disarmaIent." Sympathetic historians, p4ischen Sicherungssystem. [Verantwertlich fOr such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., have attempted to Auswahl and Cbersetzungen der Texee; Arnold Hart- exceerate Kennedy of responsibility for stepping tung. Berlin) Berlin Verlag [1969] :28 p. up the arms edce, but the record clearly show.; J11974,719 that Kennedy rot only failed to heed hiseehower's Iecludes the text of the nonprolieratioe treaty farewell warning regarding the military-industriel in German and English. complex '-ut greatly expanded a number of strategic Bibliographical footnotes. weapons programs as well.

Statements by Willy Brandt and Swidbert Schnip- penkoetter and documents on the Geneva conference 378 cf non-nuclear-w:apon states, the nonproliferation STRATEGIC SURVEY, 1969. London, Institute for Stra- treaty, the U.N. security system, and the European tegic Studies [1970] 114 p. illus. security system. Jr. hls introduction, Arnold U162.577, 1969 Hartteng points out the world political importance of arms control. An appendix contains Protocol 3 Contents . -- perspective. -- Notes: Arms sod arms to the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic control.War and conflict. International securi- Treaty, dated October 23, 1954, which deals with t;,; arrangements. Low level violence.--Chronolo- arms control and defines nuclear, biological, and gies. chemical weapons. Chronological semmary and general review of the principal events and trends cf strategic impor- 376 tance during 1969. A new section on selected is- Stone, Isidor F. A CENTURY OF FUTILITY. New York sues of special significance, namely, the strate- review of books, v. 14, Apr. 9, 1970: 30 -33. gic arms limitation talks, chemical and biological AP2.r.655, v. 14 weapons, control of arms on the seabed, the nen- proliferatice treaty, the Vietnam, Ara'5-Israeli, Despite a century and a half of agitation for and El Salvador-Honduras wars, the Nigerian civil disarmament, the issues remain the cane; the only war, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the U.S.-Japanese changes have been in the danger and cost of the security treey, aerial piracy, and student vio- arms race and the replacement of Great Britain by lence, has be. added. More attention is paid to the United States as the leading world power and sub- and supra-national social and economic devel- arms producer. Aemarent politics in 19th-century opments on the assumption that "the inadequacies Britain employed the sane scare tactics that the of the international economic systems, the aspira- Pentagon and arcs producers use teJay to Justify tions of the young or the frustrations of the massive defense budgets. The "cries of pre-World poor" are important determinants of the strategic War I disarmament conferences that began at the situation. Hague in 1699 failed to significantly limit or reduce arms, and postwar efforts were still more futile. Disareament negotiations dragged on fete:- rinably, ailing to German cynicism over the fail- GENERAL ANALYSES ure of the other Great Fcers to fulfill solemn premises to disarm, and thereby contributing to the 375 rise of Hitler and the Nazis. A similar failure Allen, Gary. DUARMUENT: THEY'RE IReND7INe by the United States and the Soviet Union to take iI'ACE OF :HE GRAVE. American opinion., v. 13, ,wre seriously their pledge to pursue disarmanent ego- 1970: 1-15. AP2.04732, v. 13 tiations in good faith, which was irciulci as Ar- ticle VI of the nonproliferation treaty against Despite the facts that treaty beaeirg is stan- their will, might well lea! to a third world war, dard Soviet policy and disan-aent is a proelaleed a 80 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

instrument of Communist conquest, President Nixon tively insignificant arms control agreements and

has given top priority to the strategic Eins limi- no disarmament, . . . Is it not time that efforts tation talks (SILT ?. According to the Senate In- to achieve really significant nuclear disarmament ternal Security Subcommittee, "acceptance of any are revived?"

precipitate program of disarmament . . . would constitute for the West a strategic defeat of eno:mous magnitude." "Liberals" claim the Commu- 382 nis's will not use disarmament treaties to achieve Calder, Nigel.ThE FUTURE CF MANKIND. In Mac- world conquest; Walt Rostov and the Disarmament donald, Norman, and others.Disarmament now! Lobby contend that if the United States were to Three lectures given at a one-day Conference on cut down on arms, the Communists would do like- Disarmament held jointly by the U.N. Association wise. However, while the United States has dis- and the Frieuis Peace and International Relations armed unilaterally and announced that all strate- Committee at Friends House N.W.1 in November gic systems are negotiable at the SALT talks, the 1968. London, Friends Peace & Intarnational Rela- Soviets have implemented an all-ont military tions Committee [1969] p. 11-15. buildup. The Disarmament Lobby and the Left JX1974.M324 squeal about the prodigious cost of the "arms race" and "misguided priorities," but only 7 per- Previously, man was able to spend several gener- cent of the 1970 U.S. military budget was allocat- ations adapting to new technologies. Today, how- ed to strategic weapons, while the Soviets have ever, new technologies are proliferating beyond increased rdlitary expenditures ty 15 percent an- manta ability to adjust to them. Scientists are nually. "We must have a nuclear capacity to de- not to blame. In the innocence of the built-in fend America that is superior beyond question" ethicalsystemof science, "what matters is not keeping sight of the fact that America's "chief the utility of the knowledge but whether the danger comes from the policies of disarmament and knowledge in sound and interesting, and sheds new sunder being hatched in New York and Washing- light cn nature in the widest sense, including ton." man." Scientists have, in fact, played a major role in popularizing the problems involved in population growth, conservation, and world poverty. 380 The basic problem with respect to the growth of ARPS CONTROL AND DISAMAAPLNT. In Australia. Dept. science and knowledge lies in harnessing science of External Affairs. Current notes on interna- to nationalistic purposes. The assumption of sci- tional affairs, v. 41, May 1970: 253-266. entific responsibility by society would alleviate JX1162.A33, v. 41 the problem of properly applying scientific knowledge. In addition, a "Futures Research" program, Reviews developments in arms control and disar- in which everyone would participate, should be es- mament in the 1960's and examines the prospects tablished to provide "a means of bringing into for the 1970's. International instruments dis- public discussion the issues that arise from the cussed include the Antarctic Treaty, the partial uses to be made of science."Despite the ad, 'rse test ban treaty, the outer space treaty, the Trea- implications of the new technologies there is a ty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin growing realization that old political modes are America, the nonproliferation treaty, and the outdated, and "a lot of this is going to spill drift treaty for arms control on the seabed. The over into the military and disarmament field." Australian point of view Cr. the strategic arms limitation talks, chemical and biological warfare, and conventional armaments is indicated. The article concludes that "there may now be forces et 383 work that offer some prospect of positive develop- California. University. University at Los Angeles. ments in the field of arms control in th pa's Security Studies Project. AT-12 CONTROL SPECIAL ahead." STUDIES PR0CRAM. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Con- trol and Disarmament Agency. Los Angeles, 1968. 10 v. DLC 381 "ACDA/WEC-12b." Barnaby, .' -ark. DISARMAMENT PROSPECTS IN THE 70'S. Humanist, v. 85, Sept. 1970: 262-264. Contents.--v. 1. Summary report.--n. 2. The BL27CO.N78, v. 85 argument against proceeding with thc BM D. fn. aspect of strategy, politicsandarms control, by The need for disarmament is greater than ever, Bernard irodie.--v. 3. The IAEAasa political but the prospects fo. concrete progress during the system: implications for arms control, by Law- coming decade are poor. The Conference of the rence Scheinman.--v. 4. The denucloeri cationof Committee on Disarmament has achieved only limited Latin America: implications for arms control, by successandhas totally failed to achieve its main Lynn H. 5. The reporting of interna- gcal of nuclear diaarmament. The nonproliferation tional arms transfers, by Lynn M. Miller.--v.5. treaty IS a more ambitious and important attempt Art.%races end war initiation: the effect of at arms control, but its cnances for long-term strategic choices, by Michael D. Intriligator.-- success depend on the unlikely prospect of agree- v.T. Trends in international polarity: implica- ment by the superpow,rs to limit and significantly tions for arms control, by Jerome Carr' I reduce the number of strategic weapons. There has Laurie Wiseberg. - -v.8. A statisn-ical is of been renewed interest in banning chemical and bio- some international con:rontstion.: imp. ..,Lions logical weapons, but the British- proposed tan un- for arms control, by JamesB.ManQueen.--v.9. fortunately excludes nonlethal chemicaa agents. Peacekeeping and peace observation: the Canadian The focus on arms control rather than disarmament case, by John C. Rise.--v. 10. Technology, poli- in recent years has resulted in "a number of rela- tics, anl proliferation, by Ciro E. Zoppo. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES 81

Studies on arms control and disarmament issues 386 of both specific and general natures, prepared by Kissinger, Henry A., and Bernard Brodie. BUREAUCRA- faculty and students from a variety of disci- CY, POLITICS, AND STRATEGY.Los Angeles, Univer- plines. sity of California, 1968. 60 p. (Security studies paper no. 17) UA23.K487

Contents. -- Foreword. -- Bureaucracy and policy 384 making: the effect of insiders and outsiders on Clark, Joseph S. ASIA AND THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD the poliny procrrs, by Henry A. Kissinger.--Chang- ORDER, In American Academy of Political and So- ing attitudes torards war, by Bernard Broeie.-- c-1 Science, Philadelphia. A new American pos- Technology, politics, and strategy, by Bernard t,e toward Asia. Philadelphia, 197C. (Its An- Brode.--Ending a war: is the Korean lesson valid als, v. 390, July 1970) p. 27-37. for Vietnam? by Bernard Brodie.--Theories on the H1.A4, v. 390 causes of war, by Bernard Brodie.

Three critical unsolved problems, Asian as well Seminars, lectures, conference papers, and news- as global, confront the world: peace, population, .,,aper articles dealing with strategy, politics, and pollution. Non-violence, economic develop- and the study of war. Kissinger contends that a ment, and social justice are needed to solve these large and complex bureaucracy, in which "more time problems, which are global in their scope. World is devoted to running its internal management than order is a workable system of war prevention con- in divining the purpose which it is suppose to ceived on a global basis. International institu- serve," is the major obstacle to changing foreign tions capable of keeping the peace are required to policy. He argues that decisions are not made un- achieve it. There are six major Asian countries or til they appear as administrative issues, that areas capable of affecting developmerv;s in Asia: congenital insecurity is created when executives Japan, mainland China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, "have to make decisions on a range of issues in and the Middle Eat complex. Of these, only Japan, which they may not give man, hours to the same Israel, and possibly Indonesia are capable of crea- problems that their experts have spent years tive ection in the sense used by Arnold J. Toyn- studying" and that, as policymakers, business en:- bee. In many Asian areas, hate between tdjacent ecutives often become prisoners of the bureaucrat), countries is so great that constructive moves for because of their inexperience within the Govern- peace are unlikely. Thus, Asia desperately needs ment. In his first essay, Brodie maintains that world order but is not likely to contribute such certain attitudes toward war have gone out of toward its achievement. World order, if it comes, style, noting that neither national glory nor the will result from widespread disarmarent of the conquest of foreign territories is important for super- and middle-sized powers, the growth concur- statesmen trying to decide for or against war. In rently of an international peace force, and the "Technology, Politics, and Strategy" (previously creation of international institutions with power cited s item 152 in v. 6, ro. 1, of this bibliog- to prevent violence and administer ,justice. Lead- raphy) he argues that systems analysis has failed ership must come from the Soviet Union and the to clarify the strategic and political implica- United Stales, hopefully through the United Na- tions of technological advancement in weapons de- tions, or from amplification of the treaties of sign since World War II and that the strategic General and Complete Disernament filed by the questions solvable quantitatively are less impor- United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva in tant than the questions that can be answered by 1962. China can be disregarded for the time being intuition and bias. In his last two essays, as a :Alper tiger. Ire Soviet Union is Lore likely B.odie compares the Korean and Vietnam Wars and to con,rib to to wor:.. order than :he United considers the causal theories of war. States, which ',as become a militaristic ration since the end of World War II. The Germanization 387 of the United States springs from a powerful and Kolkovica, Roman, and others. THE SOVIET UNION AND highly respected elite corps of military of'icers ARMS CONTROL: ASUPERPOWER DILEMMA. Baltimore, who manipulate the youth of the nation through con- London, Johns qoplins Press Ic19701 212 p. scription. Much of this is due to the unnecessary involvement of the United States on the land mass of Asia. Withdrawal of Anerican forces from Asia Examines the domestic and ,xternal factors thet is the place to start in ,he search for world or- shape Moscow's arms control policy: political, der. (Abstract supp'ied) economic, and military stresses inside Russia as well 4s the pressures imposed on it by Communist China ..red by the United States and Europe. The authors analyze the hawk-clove debate withinthe 385 Searle:. Union and forecast the realities on which DISARRAMLNT. Pax et iitertas, v.35, Apr./Jne Soviet-American negotiations must be based if an 1970: 13-14. Ser arms control agreement is to be achieved and deterrence brought into equilibrium. Tao sections discussing the Latin American nuclear-free zone and the s':ategic arms limitation :R8 talks (SALT). Gertrude Baer prais a the Treaty of Khn, A. G. ACTIVE DISARRANZ'IT CONSULTATIONS IN Tlatelolcc, noting that "it should become an exam- KATO. NATO letter, v. 18, Mar. 1970: 20-23. ple to all regions which art equally, or even more. D845.2.ALL, r. 18 endangered by var. Phoebe Cusden stresses SALT'L importance while expressing pessimism about curb- NATO has moved closer to the possitglity of some ing the arms race. major arms control or disarmament agreements in

s):7 82 ARMS CONTROL & DISARNIAMLNT

the :970's. Valuable discussions within the alli- 391 ance took place during :969 on balanced force re- Nordic Conference on Peace Research, 3d, Lund, 1568. ductions, the seabed and ocean floor, and chemical REPORT. [Edited by Silken Wiberg. Lund] 1968. and biological weapons. Seabed issues emerged as 76 p. JX1930.N65 1968c a matter cf immediate concern. In conjunction At head of title: Seminar for Peace and Con- with an. April 1969 pledge to "pursue . . ef'orto flict Research. and studies in the field of disarmament and practical arms control, including balanced force re- Contents.--Program.. Participants. -- Opening ductions and the in'tatives already undertaken speech by the director cf SIPHI, Robert Neild, ab- for the renunciation of the use of force," the al- stract.-- Plenary lecture by the director of IPPIO, lirnce is now keeping a watchful eye on disarma- Johan. Galtung, abstract.-Abstracts of papers pre- ment discussions already underway in other inter- sented.--Plenary detate on goals and means of national forums, such as the Committee on Disarma- peace research. -- Debate on future activities.- - ment and the strategic a.-r.s limitation t-lks, un Messages from the conference. consideration by the United Nations of related matters, and on the disarmament studies undertaken Summarizes the major speeches, debates, and pa- by the alliance itself. So far the response from pers presented at the conference, which focused on the ether side ha:'lot been encouraging, and prog- the methodology of peace research and the analysis ress is bound to be slaw. The alliance is not of interstate relations. discouraged, however, and will continue to lay the groundwork for future agreements. Arcs control, and, r!entually, disarmament are certain to play a 392 significant part in the future of mankind. Rapoport, Anatol. CAN PEACE RESEARCH BE APPLIED? journal of conflict resolution, v. 14, June 1970: 271-286. JX1901.J6, v. 14 38: institutionalized science has come into being in Macdonald, Norman, John Burton, and Nigel Calder. industrial societies where "progress" is identi- DISAWAMENT NOW. THREE LE:TURES GIVEN AT A ONE- fied with increasing menipulative contiol over the DAY CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HELD JOINTLY BY THE environment. Traditionally the applied science U.N. ASSOCIATION AND THE FRIEODS PEACE AND INTiR- involved in this institutionalization has included NATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE AT FETEFE HOUSE N.W. industrial, military, and medical technology. The 1 IN NOVEMBER 1968. London, Friends Peace & In- success of these technologies seems tc have en- ternational Relations Committee 119692 15 p. couraged the addition of a fourth area: JX1974.M324 the "behavioral sciences."However, for applied science, the distirction between ta.dcrstanding and control Three essays on maintaining peace. Norman '4c- is crucial; and even if "the answer" to a human donald discusses war causation and proposes two problem is knowr, the problem will remain unsolved methods of helping man understand the reasons for unless institutions 'se created through which the his aggression, while John Burton describes the solution can be implemented. The author argues inadequacies of traditional methods of resolving that all applied science implies an institutional conflicts. The future of mankind in relation to structure; therefore, in hopes for the application its weapons - producing environment is considered by of peace research, the first question is what in -- Nigel Calder. niltutions are available for it or can reasonably be expected to be created- Only a very limited technology of 'arms control" car be implemented at 390 present. Other aspects of peace research can Midgaard, Knut. ARMS RACES, ARMS CONTROL, AND DIS- only--at best--be fed into public information. An ARMI.MENT. C.:operation and conflict, no.1, 19'10: extended analogy between peace research and crimi- 20-51. Ser nology is used to uage a fusion of knowledge-seek- "First published in Norwegian, in the journal ingandsocial action at the present juncture. Interrasjonal Folitikk, No- 4-5, 1969." (Abstract supplied) D839.I46, 1969

Proposes the use of mathematical models for analyzing the interaction of the strategic armaments policies of two nuclear powers. Midgaard bases COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES his preliminary inquiry on the simplifying assumption "that the states are known to be aware of each other's armaments and armament requirements 393 as well as other cultural variables" and then Leonard, James F. U.S. REVIEWS POSITION CS G-NERAL brings the model into closer approximation with AND OGXPLETE DISARMAMENT. In U.S. Dept. of reality by introducing additional complications. State. Department of State bulletin, v. 63, The model is applied to the analysis of policy Aug. 17, 1970; 198-203. statements by the Johnson and Nixon administra- JX232.A33, v. 6; tions and independent analysts concerning the de- Statement "male before the Conference of the ployment of a U.S. ABM system and ate effect on Committee cn Disarmament at Geneva nn June 23," the arms race and disarmament negotiations. Mid- 1970. geard concludes by defending strategic models against their detractors, who, arguing from the Outlines the U-S. positic.i on efforts to achieve standpoint of organization th-ory and social ps)- generaland complete disarmament (C,:D) and on arras chology, claim these models are too simple to rep- control and disarmament issues generally. It is ,Tsent complex political ra.2ities. the view of the United States that arms control

!IQ GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES 83

to be achieved, outlines the role tat .don- and disarmament is "a complex of effort at many levels, of efforts that attempt to deal, at times trol must play in the attainment of those conditions, and calls attention to some of the specific simultaneously, with the many individ-al but in- armaments problems to which disarmament negotia- terreleted aspects ,f the whole range of arms and bi- security issues," and, consequently, that "prog- tors ought to address themselves--chemicad end ological weapons, the emplacement of weapons of ress toward GCD cannot be made in a vacuumbut mass destruction on the seabed, underground nucle- will have to be accompanied by concrete progress ar weapons testing, and the production offission- toward a peaceful world." Leonard notes the con- able materials for weapons use. ditions that must be satisfied If world peace is

89 V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR happened. Though mankind has been in constant tattle, the nuclear powers have deliberately pre- (COMMAND AND CONTROL OF vented the day-by-day fighting from escalating WEAPONS, ESCALATION, ACCIDENTAL into general nuclear war. Tte existence of nucle- WAR. NEGOTIATION, DISENGAGEMENT, ar weapons has, in fact, precluded large-scale ware. "These supposed scions of hell . have NEUTRALIZATION) turned out to be the guardian angels of peace." A small nation is more likely to emeaoy neelear 394 weapons than a large oee, tut small-nation use Ballwin, Frank. A "KOREAN SOLUTION" FCR VIETNAM? probably would eot trigler a big war. War would New repu'elic, v. 163, July 1O, 1970: 19-21. te closer if one of the largest nations achieved P?2.1:62e, v. 163 near-absolute superiorit7. bet this is unlikely, and relative superiority is insufficient. For The Nixon administration is pursuing a "Korean the great nations, nuclear armament is a 'neces- solution" -Lcthe Vietnam War, based on a reduced sary condition' of survival, but the 'sufficient residual force of U.S. troupe that will enable conditions' include effective ese of the old-fash- South Vietnam to develop a stable government capa- icned methods." Fax Atomica could last several ble of defending itself egairst North Vietnam. more decades. This analogy with South Korea's experiel2e, however, fails on sevr.al counts. South Koroe, whose only common border :s with North Korea, has tene- 396 fited from its relative isolation and the stabili- Cadoux, J. E. [THE DILE,2eA CF EUHOPHAN NI:C] EAR ty of ncrtheas Asia. South Vietnem has a long STRATEGY1 L'impasse des strategies nucleaires eu- common border with Laos and Cambodia, both of ropeennes. Revue rdlitaire generale; general mil- vhich are estroiled in what will probably be long itary review, no 5, May 1970, 630-651,. and bitter civil wars. South Korea's sparse ter- up.n45, rain and severe winters make infiltration and Includes a German translation and a summary in guerrilla warfare extremely difficult, while South English. Vietnam's Dense jungles and tropical oe moderate climate favor both operations in all seasons. West Eureeean unification lies beyond the polit- South Korea has successfully- limited infiltration ical horizon, but it could comprehend a West Euro- by a heavily fortified demilitarized zone and well pean deterrence system incorperateng British snd patrolled coastline, while South Vietnam would te French nuclear capabilities without viclating tne hard pressed to restrict North Vietnamese infil- principle of nendissemiration of nuclear veaeons. tration even to present levels, which are far Under such a system a threatened We European higher than North Korean infiltration has ever country would acquire the right to use nuclear teen. There is no significant indigenous support weapons through a "permissive link" mechanism con- in South Korea for a North Korean invasion or trolled by a central European authority. Deter- guerrilla effort, weereas in South Vietnam the mining the release threshold o' the reply would be peasantry has given widespread support to 'ceth the eividei into two phases: access to nuclear weap- Vietcong, vhich was able to stand on its cwn prior on: and the decision to use 'hem. The machinery to massive U.S. intervention, and to the North of deterrence must avoid en2erteinty about the Vietnamese. Despite South Korea's impressive conditions under vhich reprisals will take place, progress since 1953, it still regards the presence and the potential aggressor should be fully aware of U.S. trips essential to its defense, and the of those conditions. Because deterrence strate- stationing of these troops alone has cost the gies engender ever more destructive plans and cap- United States around $1 billion a year. The costs abilities, conventional strategies, based on care- for South Vietnam would be incomparably higher bilities that would be genuinely useable in the with less chance of success. "lhe Korean experi- field, must te employed as a safety valve. ence indicates that there is no 'Karen Solution' foe Indochina, only an American soletiJni swift and irrevocable curtailment of American involve- 397 rent." CCOSIXAND AND CONTIM. IN THE 19105) Armed Forces management, v. 16, July le73: 1S-47. illus. 395 UB153.A6e, v. 16 Burnham, James. FAX ATONICA. National review, Entire issue devoted to command and control, v. 22, July 14, 1970: 729. AF2.113545, v. 22 Contents.--White House: presidential irtereEt is the key.--Industry viewpoint: a crisis at Scientists, whiz kids, statesmen, and poets have ham'.. --DOD: a ceme2ricatiens overhael is overdue. warned teat unless necleer weapons Are shared CT --Air Force: coping with a new dimension in ignc- eliminated the world will end, yet this hes not rance.--Arry: on to the setoeated tattlefiell.--

:Si) SFicIFEC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES 85

Navy: modernization will be evolutionary.--9u- LATION IN VIPINAM WAS REVERSED.New York, D. vines: improved data systems have 'eeen enlisted. McKay Co. 119691 245 p. --NATO: can satellites meld patchwork communica- 11557.56386 tions? Bibliographical references inclided in "Notes" (p. 241-242). Foc..ses on the President's role in command and control, the budgetary problems affecting the mod- Contents.--Roots cf intervention.- Concurrent ernization of commanications, and reorganization events.--Full-throated war. Bombing Lorth in the ranagement of U.S. telecommunications syz- dcutt.--The tens. strains of January.--The Tet offeesive.--The beginnings of reappraisal.--Clifford resolves his do.11its.--The President at bay. -- Epilogue. 398 Greene, Fred. THE. CASE FOR AND ,GAINSP MILITARY Checnicles the events leading up to President WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM AND KORLA. In American Johnson's March 31, 1968, decision to deescalate Academy of Political and Socia. Science, Philadel- U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.Eoopes, the phia. A new American posture toward Asia. Phila- former Under Secretary of the Air Force, reviews delphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 390, July 1970) the increasing doubts that he and other military p. 1-17. El.A4, v. 390 and civilian officials had regarding U.S. Loney in Vietnam and describes in detail tee high -level The pros and cons of rapid military withdrawal decisionmaking process during the weeke irmealate- from Vietnam are both strong, but in public debate ly preceding the decision to deescalate. 1:e ad- are not mut.:ally respohsive. The case against ra- dresses himself to three basic questions: ",iow pid withdrawal from Vietnam rests on the presumed Vietnam came to represent the outer limits of fea- danger of the precedent of broken United States sible American intervention, how the woreirg of commitments, the blew to the viability of oivided the democratic process finally forced the Pre::i- states elsewhere, the increase in the prestige of dent to abandon a policy of escalation, and why China, the domino theory, the encouragement of the particular events of March 1968 signaled the other ware of liberation. The case for withdraw- end of an era." In the epilogue he criticizes al, based on a notion of the demise of the mono- President Nixon's policy of Vieteamizaticn, which lithic, unalterably aggressive nature of world he regards as inherently contradictory, and urges communism, argues that Southeast Asia is rot of complete U.S. withdraw31 from Vietnam by a fixed vital interest to us, that Hanoi's actions are, if date as the only acceptable alternative available not justified, understandable, and that Communist to the United States. governments in Southeast Asia are neither partied- larly dangerous to us nor anathema to their popu- 401 laces. Vietnamization has many advantages for us, Ikle, Fred C. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION; AMERICAN but, given a weak government, runs the risk of a SHORTCOMINGS 1N NEGOTIATING WITH ODY.MTIIST POWERS. failure, endangering American, troops. Troop,: Memorandum prepared at the request of the Subcom- should be withdrawn from South Korea, both for its mittee on National Security and International Op- good and our own. (Abstract supplied) erations (pursuant to S. Res. 311, 91st Cong.) of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Sen- ate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1910. 399 17 p. JN1428.C73135 Heitger, Marian, Gmorg Frader, and Manfred Scheich. Cover title. [AUSTRIA - -ITS NEUTRALITY AND ITS DEFENSE) Ceter- At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d cession. reichseine Neutralitit and ihre Schutz. Hrsg. Committee print. von Georg Frader. Welke, Wien) Wedl [19691, "Printed for the use of the Committee e.e. Govern- 95 P. DB99.2.H4 ment Operations." Bibliographical footnotes. Describes American shortcomings in negotiating Contents.--The citizen in the republic, by Mari- with Communist powers. Ikle cautions against pay- an Heitger.--The neutrality of Austriamission ing excessive attentic to ephemeral Communist and obligation, by Manfred Scheich.--Foundations rhetoric, getting lost in tactical detail, giving and aspects of Austrian defense, by Georg Prater. in to semantic infiltration, and treating Soviet evaluations as unchangeable. He suggests that im- Offered as a contribution to intensifying the provement in the manegement of negotiations can be Austrian citizen's consciousness of his civic re- achieved by raising the level of discourse about sponsibilities. Heitger expounds the moral obli- interagency coordination. He further suggests gations of the citizens of a democratic republic, that the State Department and the Arms Control and emphasizing the necessity for increased effort in Disarmament Agency should not avoid discussing the civic education. Scheich examines the effects of limitation or discontinuance of a military activi- Austrian neutrality on the goals ari operation of ty simply because it is termed "vital." its foreign policy. Since "the readiness of the neutral state to defend itself is the greatest cf its obligations toward neutrality," realer outlines the fl.niamentals of Austrian rdlitary poli- :cy, Charles Turner. HOW CUI.C"ENIE:l NE0-.11Ai. San- cy. ta Monica, Calif., Fidelis Publishers ic19701 178 p. 05921.7.56 1970

LSel. Describes Communist Chinese and Ncrth Korean ne- Hoopes, Townseei. THE LIMITS OF iNIERVENT:C.N; AN gotiating techniques at Che Kcrean Armistice an- INSIDE ACCOUN7 CF HCW 1FE 21:-.N211 POLICY O.E.rcA- ference (1951-1953) end summarizes lessons learned.

(11 Si ARMS CONTROL S.. DIS &KM &MEAL-

"It is onj through the imminenthreut of appal- 1;69. 101 p. (System Development Corporation. )..tion of our military power that the Communists Technical memorandum. TM series. 47i-2304/106/.:,1 can be compelled to negotic.te serimsi,ly for the 25637.1425 alleviation of the basic issues between their world an ours. We must be pretarec to accept the This is the eighth and final Repomt for the 'sr.- risk of war if we nooe to avoid war." Line Computer Studies of Bargaining and Negotia- tion Behavior Project. iris report describes the progress on EDC's contract DAHC15-67-C-15217 with 403 the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Le- partnent of Defense, which has been under way Leitenberg, Milton. SO FAR, 00 GOOD. Envlronment, since July 1, 1967. This research program was de- v. 12, July /Aug. 1970: 26-35. illus. signed to lead to a set of empirically derived UP/67.533, v. propositions on bargaining and conflict resolution behavior, and on processes that occur in situa- With increases in the number of deployed nuclear tions where the parties involved have both common weapons and their vulnerability to surprise attack and conflicting interests--that is, where they are (and consequent need for fast response), seriots mutually dependert in the rursuit of otherwise an- danger o' accidents involving nucl,ar weapons ex- tagonistic goals. Of particular concern were ists. liucleaz weapons "might be detonated in the those issues and strategies in bargaining that ap- aftermath of accidents whic)-, produce unusual phys- pear to be relevant, actually or potentially, in ical stress or energy inputs to the weapon." political-military confrontations, particularly There were 33 major accidents prior to March 1-5,6, limited conflicts. This progrsm involved five and 50 lesser incidents involved in maintenance, routes of development, and particularly the inter- transportation, or modernization of nuclear weam- action, and mutes' support a, ong then: 11) The de- ens. There is reasrm) to believe that the total sign and use of internstion simulation methodolo- number in even higher: some accidents have not gyboth manual and computer-based--for studies of been officially recorded, and it is unlikely that IR theory and policy issues. The effort in this there have teen no accidents involved in carrier area wss a distinct departure from our previous or land bases fighter aircraft, antisubmarine war- work but a logical extension of it--of computer fare aircraft, or other taJtical naval and land and research methodologies to complex, multi-per- weapons. son, international relations games. We attempted to break through some of the methodological limitations that currently threaten the viability of 4:4 such games for use as tools in both theory-build- Roberts, Adam. TEE FOG OF CRISIS: TPE 1964 y'Kil ing and policy study; (2) The development of soft- I6CIDENTS. World today, v.26, May 197o: ware support for the computer -Lased laboratory; (3) The development of computer systems for data 209-217. DilO.W63, v.26 management and analysis; (4) Gn-line computer ex- Events surrounding the August 1964 naval ini- periments in bargaining and negotiation; (5) De- dents in the Gulf of Tonkin deserve careful atten- sign c.nd plans for a ne.. ARPA supported Center for tion from students of crisis management. Serious Computer-based Behavioral Studies. This final re- questions have teen raised about the veracity of port, covering a period of two years, reviews the the information made available by the U.S. Govern- progress of this work. (Abstract supplied, modi- ment during the crisis and about the appropriate- fied) ness of U.S. responses. The nature cl the mission being pursued by the d..stroyer Maddox and the truth about the incidents that occured at sea, especially during the second encounter, have become Walton, Richard E. INTER,ERSONAL REACW.ANINS; CCN- ratters of controversy. Official characterization PRONTATIONS AND THIK-PARTY CONSULTATION. Read- of the Maddox missi,n as a "routine" patrol ens ing, Mass., Addison-Wesley (1969) 151 p. (Organ- certainly disingenuous; the circumstance: im which ization development) the patrol took place made it anything but roi- HP6518.8.W26 tine. 'Weshf-gton was also at fault in exaggera- Bibliographical footnotes. ting the clashes t.',erselves, and in the ;sickness of its response. ..ne crisis should serge as a re- Offers three case studies that s..ip.ply "some of minder that the technology cf detection and com- the empirical basis for constructing a adOdle- munications is subject to error, thst intergovern- range theory of a form of sociotherapy."Walton mental differences in political juigment and in- proposes a diagnostic model that identifies some terese can disrupt rrisis coordination and con- features of a conflict cycle and postulates the trol, that third parties (in this case, South advantages and the risks of direct confrontations, Vietnan) ten have a catalytic effect on the course noting that well-managed ones could "allow for the of a crisis, and that contingency planning often exchange of essential information fend) increase functions as self-fulfilling 'prophecy. "The /re- the authenticity of the relationship." lie de- cise role of these factors in the TohYin crisis Is scribes the strategic functions, tactical choices, debatable, tot the potential of east o" them for and opttalm positionel attributes of a third party rischief is not." to a dispose.

L').5

Ehure, Gerold H., and R. J. Meeker. ON-LINE COXPUT- Wilke, Dieter G. ECtilri-AlININT AND lFLITFALIZATIC,N; S.UDIES CF PARGAI5)N3 AND NEGOTIATif.i7 BF:RAVI:F. THOUGHTS ON THE VEST'S VIA POLICY, E1FE:IA7LY RE- 'Santa Mtnica, Calif., System Levelcpment Corp., GARDING INZ,OCHINA, 1951 -196-LI Eft:An-mune. nd

c19 SPECIFIC PROBLEMS ,aNil LIMITED NIFASURES S7

Neutralisierung. Sur westl,mhen Asienpclitik in- J-J9 ter besunderer lieriicksichtiung Indochinas, 1954- Galluis, Pierre M. FREIWH M:LITARY AERONAUTICS MAKE 1964. CFr ib.rg in Br.] Bertelsmann-Univer- BID FOR WORLD MARKETS. NATO's fifteen nations, sitgtsverlag 119693 :09 p. 1,1aterialien des v. 15, Aug./Sept. 197:-,: 28-34, 36. illus. Arnold-Bergstraesser-:nstituts UA646.E5, v. 15 schaftliche Forschl.ng, Id. 22) DS518.6.W53 Inquires into the reasons for French commercial Bibliography: p.1ti -109. success in tr export of military aircraft, missiles, and su,.)rting equi.,,ment. French export Contents.--Introduction.--pt. '... Historical sales in military aviation more than doubled in bamkgroInd: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers cash value between 1960 and 1970. This remarkable during the Pacific war. The way to the first In- record is the culmination of a number of commer- dochina war --pt. 2. The policy of containment. cial, technoloe sal, and politicomilitaxy factors, Value and historical standpoint of the policy of of which the FrescS aviation industry has taken containment, The application of the policy o: particularly astute advantage.Whether in the containment in Asia,--pt. 3. The policy of neu- coming decade Frence sill be able to defend the tralization: The concept of neutralization, Pre- enviable export position it has won cannot be de- -equisites for a neutralization policy now. As- termined; the French Government recently has made pects of the Laotian neutralization. several irp...tant technical and industrial decisions that could seriously hamper French aviation Comprehensive and systematic analysis of the in the years ahead. history of and Western policy toward the second Indochina war, using as a framework the c,:nceptr "containment" and "neutralization." Neutraliza- tion is defined as an active policy on the part of Minter, William. ALLIES IN ENYIR2,, PART IT the Great Powers designed to impose neutrality MILITARY INVOLVElaENT. Africa todey, v. 17, July/ where it does not actually exist, with rules bind- Aug. 1970: 28-32. DT1.A22, v. 17 ing even during peacetime, in order to create a buffer zone. The West's Southeast Asia policy A brief and critical summary cf U.S. - Portuguese tends toward guaranteeing neutrality there, re- military relations, with particular reference to sulting in a modified form of the classic multipo- the nature and scope of military assistance pro- lar balance. Part one analyzes the interests of grams since 1949 and Portugal's use of American the Great Powers in Asie during World War II and and NATO military weapons and equipment in count- surveys the origins of the first Indochina war. erinsurgency operations in Africa. U.S. military Part two deals with containment policy as mani- aid to Portugal has been quite limited compared fested in Asia. The differing expectations of the with the missive quantities given to such coun- parties to the Southeast Asia treaty are dis- tries as Taiwan and Vietnam. During the 1950's, cussed; whether such alliances, threatened with the amount given Portugal was less than that given being overtaken by dynamic political development, to other Western European countries, but while can survive is questionable. Part three describes such programs are being phased out elsewhere in the policy of neutralization as applied in South- Western Europe, military assistance to Portugal east Asia. has continued despite its growing involvement in three colonial wars. "American identification with Portugal is solidified by 'business as usual' contacts, and the close working relationships fos- tered by American aid." CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION THE P.Y.,1,1N3 W7..?LD 7-PALE IN B.siness week, nu. Xv 23, 1970: 111-116, 115. illos. HY5001.:89, 1970 .11 Analyzes current trends in the International Prunner, Dominique, CTRS NUCLEAR N.NIFJ11E-zPATLJN arms business, fo..:usi-g on recent American, Sovi- MEATY AND SW:TZERLAND'S SICURiTY] Le trait; de et, French, aid British transactions. Altho.gA NO non-proliferation ri,cleaire et la se:irlte de ka natin will overtake the United States as the Suisse. Revue militaire suisse, L.115, June world's largest arms supplie: in the irmed.ate fu- 1,,)70: 775-280. U2.R5, v. 115 ture, sew arms deals reflect Increasing ormpeti- tion from fi'..ssia, France, and Pritain. Existing The nonproliferation treaty has not halted the relationships in the international arms business arms race nor diminished the probability that nu- are expected to change in the 1970's, Numerous clea weapons would be used in a European con- Western European cooperative armament projects and flict. Although Switzerland has no intention of a rising demand for more licensing agreements will acquiring nuclear weapons, the treaty will be val- reiuce sales to the industrialized rations, ant id for 25 years, and it is impossible to foresee military aid programs will level off. Increased the needs of Switzerland's security after 2.`, or 20 advanced- weapons sales to the underdeveloped coun- years. Ratification should be considered only af- tries and higher Third World defense expenditures ter the superpowers have agreed to stop the arms will offset this trend. A !.{Per's market could race. No one could believe that its efusal to evolve over the text decade, with the emergence zf ratify menaces world peace, and Sw,tze.land risks more supplier natiors like Japan. nothing ty waiting. 9 SS ARMS CONTROL DISARMAMENT

412 views the achievements of the past decade in arms Cassuto, HIROjalIn'3 JARAI. U,C,Se control and disarmament, eotIne that where the W-rld today, v. 26, A.L. 1970: 313-316. latter relates to peace and security "the edifice 1141,).W63, v.26 of the United Nations always remains at least in the 1..ickground of all our endeavors in this Outline=_ japan's burgeoning nuclear energy pro field"; Alfonso Garc'a Robles surveys Latin Ameri- 'can against a tackgraund of rapidly rising demand can disarmament efforts, esopi asizing toe Treaty for electricity. Despite strong anti-nuclear- for the Probicition of Nuclear Veapons in Latin weapon attitudes and poiicier in Japan, "same Aneriea and its immediate antecedents; and E. L. doutts ray linger, both at home and abroad, as to M. burns sketches the disposition of Canada's whether the plutonium automatically produced by Armed Forces as well as its role in disarmament. the growing national capacity of the nuclear power The feasibility of disarmament in Latin America station network might not be diverted from the in- and the economics of arms control and military extended channel of economic development and expan- penditures both worldwide and with respect to Lat- sion to military uses." in America are discussed by Robert Alexander and Archibald Alexander. In part two, Garcia Roble; 413 considers toe origin, purposes, and scope of the Latin American nonproliferation treaty and con- Deshingkar, G. D. CHINA'S EARTH SATELLITE: THE cludes by quoting a statement of U Thant praising CASE FIR INDIAN BOMB.China report, v. O, Nay/ the treaty as "an important milestone in the long June 1970! 21-33. DS777.55.C4114, v. 6 and difficult search for disarmament."

The military implications of ehioa's space shoo alsim.,ee some Indian political leaders, who now ar- 415 gie :or an accelerated nuclear weapons program to Ehrlich, Thomas. lIE 1.01IPRDLIFERAT1'ON TRFA1Y AND counter the "Chinese threat." For 2 or 3 years PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVs. Virginia law Chira has bad IREV's capablL of reaching almost review, v.56, May 1910: 587-601. all of India's strategic targets, but Peking has LL not threatened India or any other nation. If Chi- Bibliographical footnotes. na's nuclear weapons were intended to support a policy of territorial aggrandizement, it would contends that "the future use of nuclear explo- have actively pursued its territorial claims. sives for peaceful purposes will depend in large Hovever, China "has not taken any step which can measure epor the international arrangements for be construed as territorial expansion."Although arms control that are developed urder (the nonpro- its burgeoning nucletx weapons capability will de- liferation] treaty" {SIFT) and that "the success of ter a Soviet or U.S. preemptive strike, this does the treaty in checking the proliferation of rudle- not mean that China wuemI launch a nuclear attack srweapons in contingent, in substantial part, on against India. China has pledged no first use of those peaceful-uses arrangements." Ehrlich notes nuclear weapons, and the po.sibility of joint re- the importance, in some cases exaggerated, that taliatory action by the superpowers will continue nary nonnuclear - weapon states attach to NP2 pro- to deter a Chinese attack, on such nonnuclear na- visions regarding the peaceful usea of nuclear en- tions is India. "If the Chinese are 'irrational' ergy, and he examines sore of the pretaer.s in- enough to attack India at the risk of total self- volved in the transfer of nuclear information arc destruction, .0 amcent of Indian retaliatory ca- explosives. The non-nuclear-weapen states, Inslusie pacity will ever deter them." In dezelueing a de- ing the crucial threshold states, will ratify the fPnsive re-clear arsenal, the Chinese are motivated I;FT only if they are assured of reaping the bene- primarIli by a desire for increased political lev- fits of peacefed nuclear explosives. Since it is erage and prestige. The Indian Ministry of De- in the in,erests of the nuclear powers that the fense has recognized the validity of these argd- een-neclear-vespon states ratify the treaty, and rents and has recently questioned the crelleility since toe non-nuclear-weapon states insist on sub- of the Chinese nuclear threat. Yet other r,arons stantive arms control agreements by tne 54erv.,.- exist for a nation to want nuclear weapons. ledia ers as a preconiition for ratification, arms ,,"-5- will racer to aeceptei as a great pawer until it :r02 and pease:d1 uses of nuclear explosivesrein- aspires them. ',heir domestic and .nteenatienal force rather than ,-elude ease, other. costs are high, tut their intangitle advantages weigh heavy. 416 Fecel, Z., and Al/an NAnight. 411. C:A- 71iNS, P12 IRIIIkEPAll1e. Australiancanter DIFARNAMFNT IN "i7 ,k WESTERN WrdP...D: CIJNFERENCE FKl- a. L2, Max. 1J70: C/hDINGS IN CELFUSPATIGN OF THE 23PD AIINIVERCARY OF 3.:5).A)5. v.6z IHE NATION'S, fAIT'l/Illit 21, 1965. Edited by Henry C. Herge. /isle Brunswick, N.:., Rutgers Uni- Altheog, Australia's aeroensesent that it Wjj.i versity I1969) 3' p. {Rutgers University, New sign tne :oclear toneroliferatic treaty repre- Prunswick, N.J. Lagr, American Institute. Occa- sented a viclury ever the "Loeb potty," it wan sional publications, no. 1) /euged with 1.al'ficaticns concerning ratifica- J1195 4.1153 tion that were influenced in part by Australia's Conference sponsored by the Latin Americen In- "speeial" nucleer relationship with France. The stitute, Rutgers University. goveroment's reservationa imply that Australia ir- Includes bibliographical refeeenees. tenis to retain the optien or developing nuclear vsapcns becasse it telieves that the alliance with Focuses en ruclear nonproliferaticn in lstin 'he United States is unrelistIe. Cuth A p.eliey, A.-erica. In the first part, Willies Fes'er re- hoverer, would upset U.j.-Austrslian relations and

1 SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND L'MITLil MEASU :2ES 89

weaken the alliance that is the foundation of Aus- .surveys India's military capabilities and strat- tralian foreign policy. The construction of a nu- egy and considers arguments fcr and against ac- clear reactor fcr potential military use would be quiring nuclear weapons. Although a crash program difficult, since Australia is already subjected to to achieve nuclear parity with Communist China an international inspection system and other obli- would be an economic disaster for India, a small gations emodied in the nonproliferation treaty un- raclear force, based on the burgeoning nuclear der preexisting agreements. Although the develop- power program, would provide a miniaal, credible ment of a limited nuclear - weapons capability is deterrent in the 1970's. "By subordinating an in- economically feasible. it would be of questionable escapable military requirement to economic devel- etrateaic value. "A case made an military grounds opment (India) shall be broadening her industrial fcr Australian possession of nuclear weapons Cis] and technological capacities which will allow her implausible."Australia should ratify the treaty, greater freedom to enter the more costly sophisti- because further proliferation of nuclear weapons cated fields of the nuclear spectrum if found nec- will heighten international instability. The essary in the latter se.enties." prospect of a nuclear force would have an unfavcr- able effect on Australia's relations with Indone- sia, China, and the Soviet Union, and Australian ratification might significantly influence "the 419 continuation of Japan's peaceful posture." Mukerjee, Dilip. ITIHING FOR THE aaME. Far Eastern economic review, v. 69, July 9, 1970: 83-85. HC411.F18, v. 69 417 Briefly outlines the Indian Atomic Energy Ccm- Ericsson, Ulf. TEE NON-CONTROVERSIAL USE OF NUCLEAR FaFLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL a-7RPOSES. Cooperation and missiaras (AEC) 10-year plan, which calls for a substantial acceleration of nualar and space pro- conflict, no.1, 1970: 1-19. Ser grams. The new program req-..ets funds for the de- Adapted from "a paper written at the raauest of velopment of an experimental fast-breeder reactor with French and, possibly, Soviet assitan2e, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to uranium- enrichment technology, and a delivery sys- serve as a background paper for the 1968 Geneva tem capable of orbiting 1,200 -hg. payloads. The Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, as document A/Conf 15/Doc 3 of July, 1968 and document AEC would draw on its experience in foreign-supplied experimental reactors, which are presumably A/Conf 35 /Dec 3 Coo 1 cf 27 August, 1968," covered ty safeguards, to build its own reactors Speculates on problems likely to arise in at- for military purposes. tempts to develop and use nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. Ericsson examines the most ime- aortant limitations on the use of nuclear explo- 4aa siv2s; international arrangements for the provi- NUCLEAR LEVilCBMENT. Asian almanac, v. 3, Sept. 26, sion of nuclear explosives and related services; 1970: 4182-4184. Dsi.A4752 v. 8 the conduct of nuclear explosives operations, problems peculiar to development and production. Daring a pant: debate held this spring by the nuclear-weapons testing, and the study of nuclear- nongove..s,:ntal Indian Parliamentary and Scientif- explosives effects; the problem of accommodating ic Committee, Irlia's top scientists. economists, the development and application of nuclear explo- and defense specialists ccncludel that s nuclear- sives with the test ban and nonproliferation trea- weapons program was "technically feasible, politi- ties; and the dangers of misuse. Peaceful nuclear cally desirable ana strategically inescapable" and explosives programs are ual,kaly to be used to urged the government to abandon its policy ca de circumvent the partial test tan ti-sty. The trea- velopirg nuclear energy only for peaceful pur- ty imposes needless and potentially harmful re- poses. In Faeliament on May 20, 1970, a Congress strictions on the development of nuclear explo- Party renter advised the gov-rnm,nt to p,iblish a sives for peaceful purposes and should be sr.er,ded. white paper to clarify Ito6.7.b.it7,1oJs nuclear poli- An unlimited test ban treaty would rake it diffi- cy, accusing it cf failing miFeratay to rake the cult to reconcile the desire for a foolproof safe- natio.) defense conscious. The Ge-ern ment guards system with the requirements of a vigorous as stated repeatedly that it has no +atentien of development program. The benefits of peaceful nu- changing its peaceful nuclear policy. Frine Min- clear explosive applications will have to to ister Indira Gandhi assartel that "strengthening weighed against the danger of limited improvements our industrial and ecenoric Lase" was more impor- in weapons technology. tant than deeeloaing nuclear weapons and eel-he-- sized that such weapons were strategiaally unnecessary. In March, however, when asked if InToos 418 nuclear policy might change in the fetare, the /caul, Fay'. INDIA'S STRATEGIC SFECMCM. lUlahabad, Minister for Defense replied that "if the situa- Chanikye. Fut. House (196?) 223 p. tion changes, we can decide what other action wa UAeLD.K28 should take," In late May India's Atonic Fr.ergy Bibliography. p. 223. Car-mission presented an accelerated 10-year racle- mx-eaera and space plan, which included a prapcs- Contents. -- Psychological barriers.- The global al to design and con=struct a large prototype fast - balance of power. - -The vacuum of power in the In- breeder reactor, develop gas-centrifuge technolc- dian Ocean.--Vigil in the north.- -The spectrum of gy, and build multistage solid -fuel delivery sys- conflict. - -The organisation for deferae.--Strate- tems capable of orbiting 1,201-kg. payloads. In aic planning.--The nuclear dilemma.--Strategic response to mountiag d-,nestic precear,c for a r._- doctrine. clear -arcs pregnie full Virg China's space 95 90 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

the gavernment establishes, a study group under th, creases the danger that nuclear weapons -will he Cabinet's committee on scirnce and technology to introduced into the Middle East. Chinese, French, examine the technical and economic feasibility cf and South African intransigence contribute materi- India's producing n.clear weapons. ally to the difficulty of controlling nuclear proliferation. LC1 quester, Seorge JAPAN AND :HE NJCLEAR NDH-TE)- 1,1FERATION TREATY. Asian survey, v. Sept. col.Auryi, v.ii C:dester, George H. SWEDEN AND THE NUCLEAR NCN-IRC- Iti'EFATICN TREATY. Cooperation end conflict, Among the Japanese objections to ratifying the no. 1, 1971; 52-64. nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) are that the Ser international safeguards system will be prohibi- tively expensive, may disr.:pt those indostriea to Sweden, which a short 12 years agowasseriously which it is applied, and will offer opportunities debating whether to acquire nuclear wefpons, today for industrial espionage. They object to treaty considers itself a staunch champion of nonprolif- provisions that seek to impose international in- eration. The changeover was due in par: to 'level - spection on wow: a nation has produced or will urneocs in the military field that cast dor'cts cn the military value of any Swedish nuclear weapons produce for itself. Further, the Japanese see the NTT as manifesting the world eomztnity's '.iew of program, and in part to the impact or Swedish pat- Jepan as a "permanently second-class loser of lic opinion of Sweden's admission to menbership in the disarmament committee at leneva. t,'crli War II," Even if :aped rejects the NIT, T A firm na- Kvo may act opt for nuclear weapons proluccien, tional commitment to nonproliferation did not pre- but imaginative Japanese strategists nay devise vent Sweden from playing a leading role in the scenarios for their use ad, more importan:ly, fight to amend the superpower draft of the nonpro- "the sheer glamour of handling such weapon; will liferation treaty and acquiring thereby a re;uta- have ,n apl,?al of its own for many military pro- tier. as an "NEF-rocalcitrent," but in the end su- fessionals." Any real desire for nuclear weapon, ierpower inflexibility left the Swedes with little choice tat to ratify the document at it stool. willtecontingent on America's Southeast Asian Today there is little domestic oppt ition to the. policy. 'f toe United States withdraws from all of Southeast Asia, "it will te difficult for Jere- treaty. licwever, disputes ray arise out of Swe- hese (or Australians) to accept asourances that dish research on protection from nuclear weapons America is committed to their defense as ever," effects, which to some degree overlaps research on makirg nuclear weapons more accertalle in lager. nuclear W',II:07,7 themselves, cr over Irterpreta- -he NPT, if ratified, would prevent ...tic. ..iors of treaty restrictions or, the sale ,f nuclear equipment to nonsignatories such as InCda. Mee:while the Swedish nuclear option ha: certainly not atroihled, nor will it do so ureter the treaty; Guester, ;gorge H. PARIS, PRE7CRIA, FEEINS . . . the rest damege the treaty can do iv add three ERCLIFERATICN? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, months to the tine it wo:ld take for :l.fA,N Oct. 19TD: manufacture its first nuclear weapon. In certain 7K9.11,5,A54, v. circumstances- -a lo'eiet invasion of Finland, th= disintegration of NAdC, and its rerlasement vita a The refusal ty France and Comnanist Shine, tc,h Nordic security structore, West -ernan at:tehticl. nuclear powers, and the Union of South Africa, a from the treaty with indications that it intrid: rajer supplier of araniftl, to sign the eon; rolif- to acquire nuclear weapon: - -': w:: right te forced eration treaty could have unfortunate conseq.,enc- to withdraw from the treaty. Fairing .tese con- es. France has promised to abide 'y the terms of tihgrnoies, Sweien is not likely to 'orcake the the treaty, tut there iv nd c.rtaint,y that it will treaty, even if the great powers fell to rove to- interpret those terra as restrictiv.mly as the sig- ward their cwn nuclear disarmament. natory states. fouth Africa. which is able to assist ether states attain nuclear status or to achieve it itself, has rade no such It is not likely to exercise either of is: !"..1-ti74.7, William and Sam SA-merlin, lEE hdwever, except in very specific ciro..mitance.s, Ar.-Pk1CA'F CElNA'S ti:i because there are too many edanteges to postpon- ifWiR...... ,n.icn.iiatchinANDeen. ing a decision. i. :e Communist Chinese have indi- 3:9 1C.2 cated cn occasion that they would no. Lc tioerre to Fitliegraphy: f. Filing nuclear weepera to Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, or other countries, should they re- Co..miters ahi bit contributi:ns to,ni- qfect then. However itis not clear that these na's ,.,:leer-wespons program, foes irg en lsirn countries want nuclear weapons, and there are Fool Erue-;hr 's career at the llasoach.:etts Ifs:ill!, reasons for teliewing that the Chinese themselves of lemhhology and California institate of Techne.1- are less willing than indicated by their tublic egw. l-re ,1.1.7.5 explain that he eni rt',7r- Chi- statements to contrltute to the spread cf nuclear nese scientists tesame ilscouraged 3%1 even weapds. It roust be remenbered that the Chinese frighte-el ty the intensive unti-Commtnict etmt- still attach i,rintry importance to grarrrilla rove- sphere in the finIted states in the early lr,,rlr's rents en' that in foreign, policy they are anything and returned to Chins, where thy roce rapid to tut adventurist. Nevertheless the possibility cf key posit:ft; is Chine's targeoning nuclear -wen ;- Chinese all cannot be discounted altogether, and cos ;rzpra.7.. :nine moit likely would eoent.ally ouch Cepends on the tehavior of Israel and India. 'rave devel..pei ro.clear weapons alone, :he "astmn- Xcrecoer, Chine, by the very fact or its refasirg- i:hing Eji" tekirg's entry inter the ttclea- to commit itself openly to romproliferatien, in- c,...t, ',twee:err, wad tee result of all from the SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES 91

United States and the Soviet Union. "In the case briefly considered, the AEC concluded that the of the Americans, the help was unintentional. project would cause unacceptable interference with . . . In the case of the Russians, the help was scheduled nuclear tests and m' .ht fuel public

political ,xpediency. . . . Both the Russians and criticism of th, Commission's -going underground the American3 would 1,ave reason to regret deeply nuclear test programs. While tee Army's statement having extended such help." on environmental impact minimized the hazards of dumping at sea, the Council on Environmental Qual- 425 ity, in criticizing the Army's statement, con- Stone, Isidor F. THE TEST BAN COMEDY. New York re- tends that it "left a number of questions unan- view of becks, v. 14, May 7, 1970: 14-22. swered and that no firm prediction about the ef- AP2.N655, v. 14 fects of the dumping were in order."

A critique of the Kennedy administration's nego- 428 tiation of the limited nuclear test ban treaty of CZNEVA PROTOCOL ON GASES AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE 1963. Stone contends that the Kennedy administra- RESUBMITTED TO THE SENATE. In U.S. De-t. of tion assured the continuation of U.S. military su- State. Department of State bulletin, v. 63, periority by driving a hard bargain with the So- Sept. 7, 1970: 273-275. viet Union but wasted an opportunity to achieve :X232.A33, v. 63 significant progress toward arms control and disarmament. Tr.e administration won the support of A message from the President to the Senate of the U.S. military by persuading them that the the United States requesting advice and consent treaty would strengthen rather than weaken the to ratification of the Protocol for the Prohibi- Nation's strategic position and by assuring a con- tion of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poizono.,s tinuation of the arms race and as increase in de- or Other Geses, and of Bacteriological Methods of fense spending. Warfare, signed at Geneva in 1925, together with a report from the Secretary of State that "sets forth the ',,nderstandings and the proposed reserva- CHEMICAL AND ti.)n of the United States with respect to the Pro- tocol." The President notes that "the United BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS States has renounced the first-une cf lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons" and "any use of 426 biological and toxin weapons," that its "biologi- Bogdanov, Oleg 1. FOB AN EiFECTIVT, BAN ON CHEMICAL cal and toxin programs will be confined to re- AND BACTEnI01,GICAi., WESPONL. Daily review; trans- search for defensive puipose., strictly defined," lations from the Soviet press, v. 16, July 16, and that it "will seek fur.h,r agreement on effec- 1970: supplemeet, [item] 1, 1-10. tive arms-control measur,-, the field of biolog- Slav Am ical and chemical warfare.'lie Secretary's re- Translation from Sovetslot_gosudarstvo i prawn, port recommends adoption of a reservation that no. 6, 1970. Slav Fr. states that the "Protocol shall cease to he bind-

ing . . . with respect to the use in war of as- Reviews the history of efforts to ban the use or phyxiating, poisonous cr other gases, and of all biological and chemical weapons (CBW), treatirg analogous liquids, materials or devices, in regard U.S. use of chemicals in 7ietnan, pre-195 prohi- to ae eeeny State if such State GT any of its al- bitions on chemical and biological we,-,-:, and lies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down the makirg of the Geneva Protocol, the U.S. posi- in the Protocol." The repel'also notes .hat tion on it, and the development of the :SiXG'.1 ni- the D.E. view, the Frotoor ,es rot prohibit see ministration's reservation of the use of tear gas, use of riot - control age' .h :ral herbicides, antiriot gases, and herbicides from its applica- smoke, f1,7e, and nap[-'. tics. Bcgdanov believes that recognizing any exception to the Geneva Protocol Opsus ther; ate to theapplicatior of the entire C'o'n' ars,nal, sine Goldhaber, foruel Z. CBW: 1NTEPA:,ENCY CON111JCS in1.he test of conflict there is no eo7sitility of .'TALL Al,MINISTEATIC,N ACTION. Science, v. 169, ascertaining the due proportionality of retalia- July 31, 1970: 451.-456. tion. The British proposal for separating ch,mi- QI.S35, v.)69 cal and biological weapons is held anbiguo,,s and danlerous. The final section discusses the Fi7lEt President Nixon's November 1969 announcement on proposal calling foe the destruction of present chemical and biological weapons (cew) "vv hai).el stocks and an end to their ranufacture. as a major policy decision that voald generate positive Initiatives toward world puce," but it now seem: teat his action ray not have teen as 4L7 far-reacl.ing as it first appeared. Altloegh the Carter, Luther S. NEBVE GAS DI.710:AL: POW :HE AFC White House has stated uroquivocally that all fu- RWUSED 70 :AXE AWf 0,7 THE HOOK. Science, ture biological warfare research %Quid be defen- v. 169. Kept. 25, 1970: 1296-12.:,a. sive in nature area 7-e:letely unclassifie-, the QI.S35. v.169 Pentagon maintains that research on. U.S. vulnerability to specific germs will recain secret. Descrites the controversy over the U.S. Army's Matthew S. Meselson, a Harvard 1.ology professor, request the Atomic E-,ergy :onn1ssien (AB:) has said that "secret research might pm zit the destroy dangerous stools cf Army gas in under- biological warfare establishment to larger quietly greund nuclear explosions. .01thc.20 this relic,' until public opinion lets it flourish once acain." would have lees safer ani more pi-edictal-le than Nixon pledged to submP, the Geneva Protocol to the deep-sea disposal sore otter ee',ois thct were Senate for ratification, but eemlins stalled in 9 7 92 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

the Executive Branch due, in part, to sharp inter- 432 agency conflict over tear gas and defoliarts. The EON THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISING A PROHIBITION OF BI- White House contends that these agents are noc OLOGICAL AND CHE14IC,'1. WEAPONS1 Zur Frage der covered by the protocol. In its recent report on Uberwachung eines Verbots der B- und C-Waffen. CBW, the House Subcommittee on National Security Eatastrophenmedizin, no. 2, Apr./June 1970: 26-30. Policy and Scientific Developments recommended InWehrmedizil und Wehrpharmazie, v. 0, no. c/6, that the question of tear gas and defoliants be 1970. Ser left open and suggested that after ratification Statement of the German Federal Republic to the ths United States "should seek agreement with the Geneva disarmament conference, Feb 17, 1970. otaer parties on a uniform interpretation of the scope of the protocol." Significant non-Govern- Describes West Germany's control over the pro- ment groups believe the Urited States should in- duction of bacteriological and chemical weapons in terpret the protocol as encompassing tear gas and connection with their prohibition, Germany's ex- herbicides. "If Nixon does not declassify defen- perience since the 1954 renunciation of these sive biological warfare research, and if he in- weapons, and the submission to West European Union sists on a reservation to the protocol instead of supervision. This contribution of the German Gov- leaving the tear gas issue open, he may lose much ernment can possibly be related with East Ger- of the positive response than he received from his ,r,any's allegations that the Federal Republic is original CBW announcement." prod47ir.g such weapons.

430 STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION Lederberg, Joshua. A BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS RACE. IN- TERNATIONAL COOPERATION. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Oct. 1, 1970; 740-743. 433 FN6121.V52, v. 36 Renckiser, Nikolas. [WHAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR Delivered at the Conference of the Committee on SALT71 Welche Chance far SALT? Die Zukunft no. Disarmament, Geneva, Aug. 5, 1970. 9/10. H5.ZO5, 197C

Biological warfare poses a threat to men of all The chances are slim that the strategic arms nationalities and political peicuasions. The his- limitation talks (SALT) will open a new era ending tory of the spread of bubonic plague in Europe il- the absurdity of the arms race. The problems to lustrates the difficulty of confining an epidemic be solved are rot only technical but political as to a specific locality. Viruses undergo ". con- w^11. The world political equilibrium is one of stant evolution, giving rise to !ew and possibly balance of terror and overkill, which can only be more resistant diseases. The present moment is alleviated. Yet it is more desirable than ever to favorable ;or an International agreement banning cut the financial costs of the arms race. Period- all biological weapons since no ration has yet ic contact between those who control nuclear weap- staked its security on their use. It is important ons is heartening, as is the attempt to calculate to move toward this goal at once, however, for a and freeze the arms race, but ultimately China scientific breakthrough in biological warfare may must contribute. sharply escalate this deadly race at any time. Increased international cooperation in health ,ro- 434 grams would improve the chances for an effective Brown, Ne-I11:. THE ADVERSE PARTNERSHIP- -THE US AND ban on biological weapons and render clandestine P! 3T;. LEARN 'Dl TALK. New Middle East, no. 23, research more difficult. Aug. 1970: 17-21. DS63.1.N43, 1970

Reviews the emergence of strategic balance and 431 dkente between the United States and 7eol.ard, James F. CONTROL OF CR%MICAL All BIOD)GI- ins Soviet Union and assesses the effects of these CAL W-,-:AFON.3 In U.S. Dept. of State. Department de.'elopments on local and regional disputes, par- cf State bulletin, v.63, Sept. 21, 1970: 330-331. ticularly the Arab-Israeli conf)ict. JX232.A33, v. 63 Frown notes the threat posed by MIRV's and ABM's to the pres- Statement "rade before the Conference cf the ent stability in the strategic arms race and dis- Corrittee on Disarmament at Geneva or Aug. 27." cusses the attempt to deal with this threat at the 1970. strategic arms :imitation talks (FAIT). Ee warns that the initial optimism over SALT may give way Outlinos U.S. views on several aspects of the to cynicism or despair if, as is likely, the talks problem of controlling chemical and biological do not lead to any fundamental change in the stra- weapons. Leonard states the U.S. view "that there tegic arms race. are intrinsic differences between biological and chemical weapons which Justify their separate treatment," and rebuts Soviet ob.le^tions to this 435, thesis. He expresses U.S. support for the United Cantrell, Burton N. KIICONCEIrONS CONCERNING NU- Kingdom draft convention to prohibit the de-eloc- CLEAR `.TAPONS. Christian century, v. 37, Oct. 14, rent, production, and stockpiling of biological 1970: 1219 -1220.20. BRl.C45, v. 67 weapons, and U.S. opposition to a Socialist draft ,cnvention to control both types of weapons. The American misconceltlins about nuclear weapons control of chemical weapons can be acomplishel might hinder public support for a strategic arms only on the basis of side- ranging and intensive limitation agreement between the United States ant :tulles of all aspects of the prot:eml; meanwhile, the Soviet Union, At least three technical mis- there is no reason to delay adoption .f a conven- tonceptions are c=m-,only h'li: that s:ze cf tion to prohibit tdological agents. weaion's warhead is the crucial factor in jolging SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES 93

its value, when in fact the accuracy of the deliv- Tallifying taese."He advocates a unilateral U.S. ery system is such more important; that the aftater moratorium against deployment cf the ABM, the mal- rather than the quality of missiles is deeisie; tiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, and that lana-based mass-ilea are more important. the fractional cabital bombardment system, or any 'haa sea-based missiles. An even more basic min- other new missile system. To meet the challenge canaeptiaa is the generalized belief in the possi- of the next decade, the ccaa.ral of an increasing bility o' "winning" a nuclear exchange. "Arlo use number cf independent nuclear sastams, correct cf Nucleic weapons '.'ould be self-defeating and fu- strategic corrects will have to to rethought. tile." Finally, acceptance of the legit:ma:y of nuclear weapons erodes man's spirit. "Any scheme for limiting nuclear weapons which does not work [THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS for their eventual elimination is adacanceivei." :jene:'3te,Marc. (SALT)] Les conversations cur la limitation4e5 acmes strat4giques (SALT). Revue rid 1 ital reggr."6- rale; general military review, no. 6, June 1970: Caalfont, Alun. SLOWING IOWN THE XL:351LE HA" E. New 3-25. j2.H48, 1970 statesman, v.80, Aug. 28, 1970; 231-232. Includes sur'nsaries in English and German. APIaN64, v.80 Report from the fourth Internatioaal Symposium on Ams Control organized ty the Foreign Policy The ABM and the multiple independently target- Institute of the University of Pennsylvania and ahle reen; 'y vehicle (MIRV) are the primary causes held in Philadelphia, Oct. 17-19, 1969. of "a crazy, ruinously expensive and self-Ferpetu- atiag [nucleax arms] spiral."The significance of Discusses, among ether things, nuclear bombs, tae strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) lies in satellite reconnaissance glad surveillance, the toe superpowers' recognition of the appalling im- ABM, multiple independently targetable reentry ve- alications of an accelerating spiral. :he rest hicles, manned aircraft, the partial nuclear test likely outcome cf SALi will be an accord to halt ban treaty, and the arms race. Geneste notes that the deplayaent of ABM's. No chance exists for an the United States has had to reinforce the elec- aareemeat on MaBV's, since it would reauire ands- tronic equipment of its rev missiles because it ceptatly intrusive inspection. iaireaver, Xlaa signed the test bar, treaty before testing high- testing is so far advanced that it is hardly worth megaton supeessmbs, which "neatralize the or3inary stapadag. An agreement to limit the nambers of electronic equipment . . . of current missiles and delivery systems--a move that would alleviate warheads by ionization."He corcludes that ABM Anerican fears of the Russian 12 -9--is most like- deployment would facilitate disarmament and that ly. "It should be possible for the super-lowers relief of the arms race is tied to an efficient to reach agreement by the spring" of 1971. European defense system.

1437 L4I Clemens, Walte- C. TI'S ECOLOGY OF WEAPOaaY. Ba,le- Hermaes, David. ESALT--A [PEAT EOPHl SALT--Eine tin of tae aliciic scientists, v. 26, Sept. 1970: grosse Hoffaang. Die Zakunft, no. 9/10, 1970: 11- 17 -31. 7K9145.Aa4, v. 2a 12. 15.185, 1970

Chargas military technolcgy, the interaction be- At the opening or the strategic arms limitation tween and among ratios.- states, and the "warrior talks (SALT) both powers exraessed favorable atti- class" with being the manor factors contributing tates. Although the problems are extremely cam- to the arms race, Clemens outlines the current plicatca, no time should to lost, because the ex- internaticral situation and arms ccnoral efforts p,aditres of the arms raze are gigantic and, more in terms of these factors. He conclalec that irportaatly, because China has become a serious aside from technical solutions that stress re- competitor. Within 3 years Faking ray be able to search aria development :astead of a:tag/ w,a;an: strike American ar.d Russian targets. Once the two delaoyaeat and the eatrassian of aara a..apnas sareraavers have reached agreement, they must per- .7staa aecisian to careful analy.a th,_ ess,Gti.a Caias to Jain them. As a first step, China fa -:tor in cantraillra military tecni, a :7 'is 'ae should he invited into the United Natio:a under caaracace of an iafarnel, alert an: ca.c,rnra cit- tee condition that it sign the nonproliferation izeray, williagan,:atle to ara,,a, work for treaty. European integration, mast strive toward its telie's." economic. scientific, technological, and cultural caoperat on. A united Earape could show the world the way to a tetter future. Austria, the site of Feld, Seinsra T. THE a'atad HISTORY aF the aA1.7 talks, urges that the Iateraa%icaal Atom- laallelin of tie atozio scientists, v. t1, Sept. 'c Fnergy Agency, also Lased in Vieaaa, be charged 1970: 22-26. ra9145.A84, v. ;76 with ccordinsting verification procelures reached ty the talks. Traces postwar erns cantrol and da-araaraat efforts and contends tatt the nararo.'airi.tiori treaty, the partial nuclear test tan treaty, and the 141 strategic errs limitation talks bean little 1aFra Ralph F. S1.4: CaIaS SAFE;aARD. New re- -.ore than stopgaps that will to aatiistaaced ty v. 163, Aaa. 15, 1970: 14-17. raw technological alve is in the 197a's. Feld AP2.14:24, v. l63 warns that neither cc rpoer will divest itself of its ctsolete weapons systems "tat rather will The female Armed Services Caamittee has pared continue to eaplay them as insuraiae saairat fail- tack the aafeguard tatitallistie missile (khal) are ef the lelsais ani Fastiaan sat-ariae systena, prcgraa, abandoning the 12-site area-defese sys- researching furiously all the all le an rear.: cf tem :a favor of ii-site deplayaett protecting a 94 ARM.; CONTROL & DISARM AM ENT

portion of the Minuteman force against the poten- 1,1,3 tial first-strike capability of the Soviet Union's Lewis,RichardS. SALT fir VIENNA:THE 'ArALIZ OF THE SS-9 missiles. Although Senator Stennis, chairmen POWERS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, of the Committee, and Defense Secretary Laird Sept. 1970: 19-21. illus. maintain that terminal defense is essential for TK9145.A84, v. 26 national survival, Stennis and other proponents of the PR4 admit they are Justifying it primarily as The strategic arms liaitatioa talks (SALT) will a bargaining chip in the strategic arms limitation culminate in a limitation agreement despite ABM talk:, (SALT). Stennis emphasized thi- point by deployment, the testing of multiple independently warring that "a vote it the Senate aeainet the ABM targetable reentry vehicles (MIRY), tha Soviet re- means sudden death at this sitting, at least, of fusal to accept on-site inspection, and the threat the SALT talks in Vienna."However, in view of posed by Communist China's growing nealcar capa- the Committee's decision, it is difficult to un- bility. U.S. officials regard MERV and ABM de- derstand how Safeguard has any chip value at all. ployment as bargaining chips at the table despite The bargaining power of Phase II has to be refuted the contention that they make limitation lese to further deployments of the SS.9, but reports on amenable to negotiations. In the U.a. view, it the SALT talks do not suggest that this type of was understood by both sides that because of the deal is in the offing. of a strategic arms limi- long lead-time required for missile system devel- tation agreement restricted AEM's to rival nation- opment they would continue programs until an al command centers, a possibility discussed by agreement was reached. Verification of a limita- Henry Kissinger, the United States would nave to tion agreement is no longer an Obstacle, for it diamantle ABM sites protecting Minuteman missiles, can be carried out by satellites, radar, and field but "that's hardly a bargain that Fresideat intelligence, thus eliminating the need for en- could go for.' Cr. John Foster, Director of De- site inspection. The superpowers have agreed that fense Research and lengineering, has estimated a the time hae come for an arms control agreement. two- or three-to-one cost advantage for the U.S. SALT con be the instrument to dispel the mutual defense over the Soviet offense, but he miscalcu- fears and saspicions that have up to now prevented lated unit costs on both sides. Even assuming a an accord. one-fcr-one kn. ratio, the Suviets would have an eleven-to-one cost advantage. In its recent authorization report, the Senate Armed Services Com- 444 mittee backs Foster's argument without, however, Perle, Richard. ARMS CONTIVL CRITERIA. In U.S. providing cost figures to back its position. if Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaven- the bargaining -chip argument is genuine, then one worth. Military review, 1. 50, Oct. 1970: 32-93. must ask: "How zany bargaining chips do we need?" illus. Z6123.1135, v. 50 The chip value of new U.S. strategic weapons sys- "Condensed from the original, published ie the tems must impress the Soviet negotiators. "The Westinghouse Advanced Studies Group Monograeh Ser- Soviets may be pardoned if they view Minateean III ies, Waltham, Massachusetts, April 1970, under the and P seidon as prime pieces on the strategic title 'Criteria for the Evaluation of Arms Control chess be d and ABM as simply pawns." Options.'"

442 An arms lie:tation agreement that seeks to main- Lendvai, Paul. [SMALL EOPES--GFEAT DA110kY9S1 Kleine tain the strategic balance should aim at control- Hoffnungen--grosse Gefahren. Die eekenft, no. 9/ ling potentially destabilizing technologies and at 10, May 1970: 10-11. promoting technologies that cont ibete to stabili- H5.Z85, 1970 ty. Technologiee in the first category include improvements in missile aecuracy and the periec- The current strategic arms limitation talks lion of phased-array radars and, in the second, (SALT) might be the mast difficult and potentially nodearsubmarines, early warning systems, and most dangerous negotiations between the two super- hardened missile silos. The degree to which: a.- powers. Conflicts arise from technical, politi- :arcedtechnologies are destabilizing can be tied cal, and economic factors. Nuclear- strategic par- to the requirements for dynamic stability, which ity must be maintained without one of the two ac- is "a function of the rate at which the conditions quiring a first-strike capability. The dynamic:, leadieg to static stability car be changed."Be- of technical development, however, seem to esca e caete technological innoations are always taking ratione' control. A coaertnensive agreement to place, there is the danger that ar agreement that freeze the balance is hardly possible. The tea'. freezes the strategic balance and prohibits tee that can be expected is a quantitative limitation intralaztion of rev weapons systems will contrib- on offensive and defensive weapons if effective ute to dynamic instability. :n view of this preb- control procedures can te agreed upon. Western leo, on accord will have to include an option to Europe could still be threatened by the 700 Soviet negotiate, cansisting of pros.'ions that will ei- medium -range missiles.A disproportionate ABM ther confer advantages on neither party ordis- system directed against third-country attacks tributepotential advantages to bat; it will ex- could also endanger the Soviet-kterecan relation- clude those technologies that are critical ele- ship. Even though the Soviets feel the financial ment: in the strategic balance. Further, teehnel- burden of the arms race, suspicion of their peace- ogles and systems that are ccestraired under an loving nature is rot out of line, considering agreement will have to be highly visible and seb- their tremeudeus military buildup. In the United eect tonationalinspection ani "erificatior. States, at least criticism may be voiced, and pol- High visibility systems, however, are aecooing in- iticians can te influeecad by public opinion. Ac- creasingly volnerable and ETA, to less stabilizing c'dental or irational war cannot te ruled out, than low visibility aystems, such as mobile mis- and even a aolerate limitation of nissiles yeald siles, vtich should. be "usefully ceestrateei only be a step in the right direction. their potential impact an the strategic balance SPLC I I-IC PROM EMS AND LIMITED1IEASL1RES 95

is slight."An arms control agreement that pro- production, would almost confirm the view that vides for advancements in technology has less neither party is anxious to make anything of the chance of being violated or abrogated, see it will SALT talks. It may have b_e the achieveeent of contribute to dynamic stability despite continuing aegwash to have convinced :hem that the situation defense-related technological imeroveeents. is rot nearly as bad as they think.

447 ee7 Pitman, George R. ATVS PACES AND STABLE DETERRENCE. Kuehl, Lothar. CTERRGR AND DISARMAMENT. SALT AND Los Angeles, University of California, 1969. ECKIEe Abschreckung uni Abriistur.g. SALT and Eu- 66 p. ;University of California. Security stud- ropa. Monae, v. 22, July 19701 19-2r.. ies paper no. 18) Aee0.M56, v. 22

Cantents.--Inttoduction.--Strategic objectives In Europe the strategic arms limitation talks and deterrence. -- Dynamics of a nuclear exchange.- - ISALT) are seen mainly as a means of perfecting An example of strategic response in a technologi- and justifying 'ne hierarchy of the two alliances cal arms race.--Stability and instability in stra- and the nuclear protectorates of both powers, and tegic ems races.--Destabilizing factors in toe their establishment in an arms control agreement. balance of strategic armaments.-- Ballistic missile lee bilateral nature of the talks reinforces the defense and strategic stability.--Conclusions and status of the two countries as the only importane some policy implications.--Appendices: Strategic nuclear power until mina joins them, and, there- force requirements. The selection of weapons for fore, their primacy in security politics, Never- a deterrent force. thicas SALT is viewed positively by most European countries, becaese it stabilizes the strategic Develops an analytical mole., of the arms race equilibrium and reduces the risks of nuclear var. and applies it to a determination of the condi- They hope the talks eventually will lead to a suc- tions most likely to promote a steale balance in cessful mutual balanced force reduction, which is strategic armaments. It is essential to stability of ;articular interest to the Federal Republic of that both advaeseries adopt assured destrectioe Germany. etill, the West German Government has rather than fret- strike, damage-limiting strate- come reservations regaruing Europe's security. gic postures. Even if this condition is met, how- Since nuclear weapons cost likely will not be ever, fears arising cut of the unceetainties of used, the stabilization of the conventional bal- technological innovation and enemy intentions ray ance of power is de-irabie. The German NATO am- be too great to cope with unless steps are taken bassador, Wilhelm Greve, has made several sugges- to establish better communications between the ad- tions as to how negative results fran SALT can be versaries on matters relating to strategic objec- avoided. In :Aga; of tone absurd techricel demands tives, weapons capabilities, and deployment plans. the Soviet Union allegedly made in Helsinki, the question arises whether the Soviets are using SALT to weaken NAT.). Europeans have no influence cn the relationship between, the two superpowers, PucwAsH w!,e71.1 Ill WEIGHT IN SALT, by our saecial which are at the same time partners in the preven- correspondent. Nature (London) v. 227 eept. 19, tion of war and rivals for pewee in the area of 1970: 1185-1186. Q1.12, v. 227 sophisticated weaconry. If the talks do lead to cocperetive arms control, Europe ill enjoy secu- The chief value of the most recent conference cf rity in which it hee no direct sey, bet for which the Puevash movement may he the opportunity it af- it has constantly sacrificed its praetica2 eeeer- forded for conversations between the U.S. and So- eignty sei independence. viet representatives.The Soviet participants quite obviously were poorly inferred on strategic matters; the discussions may have. enhanced the

strategic arcs limitetion talks (f,V...7) by may deg eeheare, 'ins, ileaeRL Tee' tieeeeil:,IThe. ill: clear to the Russian conferees the fell inelies- esr nose n aeehsedleneen tians of the r. ear erns race. It is evident, ie Sceeeizer Y.eneteeefte, e. any case, that v.th the U.S.-Soviet erre talks ee- ATr. 197J: kP32.547, v. 5. dervay, the laegvash get-togethers taee more to contribute to disarmament than ever. area atteepts Teeeeical de.elopeents tame weakened the rs- by Porte to divert the energies of :de movement in sired-Jestraction er scceni-,t rike concele that the direction of other issues, suchts envirerr.ee- formerly forced the reperpcvers to keep the ;cane. tel pelution, should not be encouraged. The dim The changes are qualitative: in the act Of de- cessicn of disarmament questions was greatly in- s-ptems like Sefee_cri tare, on fluenced by the realization that upcceleg cfeensiee character, end the multiple meets in missile accuracy doom land -Lased missiles tareetab:e reentry vehicles (MIRV) can, be: sly to rapid obsolescence and throw the reasparesilility ba equate] with a simple nenerical iecres:Te in the for maintaining the strategic talence almoet cc,- eeeter be ee_9 or Minuteman miseiee. tirely on sea-based weapons sys:ea. It folicvs recensissance-proof vehicle, is the technical that cue goal of the U.S.- Soviet talks must be to treaktaroeeh so long ia:sred. The incres5e in. cf- treed off technological threats to the invulnera- fersive capability !tre;re,e;:c; r.ullifics the bility of the s.itearine. The conferees had little AF.M's hardened silos. ice world lives in fear of to cefer in the way of suggestions as to how to a superpower yielding to the folly of a seririre halt the deployment of multiple inieperdently tar - attack, to which its adersery can rally ceee.. by getable reentry ethic/as ;Mieel:. a much more Fe:l- releasing all Its rjssil:. is total nuclear 'ear. ees escalation than AM deployment. The U.S. IQ- ele:e eeeicl ilEateseent is irposFille, the two clsi::n to accelerate Mika' deployment, clecel fol- e,:st agree to curtail missile eectecl- loved ty the Soviet Union's reeeeet ion cf E:7-; --eY, danger Coins. 101 96 ARN1S CONTROL & DI SARMANI1 T

119 REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS Smart, Ian. TrE STPATEG:C ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. World today, v. 26. July 1970: 296-305. 451 1410.263; v. 26 Barclay, G. StC. COMMONWEALTH OR 1150IE. [St. Lucia, Australia] University of Queensland Press It is clear that "the process by which nuclear [1970) 210 p. (The Commonwealth: problems and weapons are acquired has escaped from the re- perspectives) HC2b1.25.G7B35 straints of objective ratienaity and has taken on "Distributedby International Scholarly Bock a momentum of its own."The sheer size of the op- Services, Inc.,Great Britain, Europe, North Amer- posing forces has created a situation that is dan- ica." gerous enough, but recent technological Bibliography: P. 203-206. independently targetable reentry vehicles, ABM, increases in missile accuracy- - "DescribeCs: and interpretCs1 the changing atti- threaten to overturn the strategic balance alto- tudes adopted by the British governments since the gether, and deterrence along with it. hence the second world war to the phenomenon of Western Eu- impetus to begin the strategic arms limitation ropean integration, and the reactions to these talks (SALT) con.es less from financial or politi- changes by the governments of other nations of the cal concerns than from a simple fear of the unpre- British Commonwealth."Barclay concludes that dictable. Hence also, it is rot errs limitaticns Great Britain is unlikely to be admitted to Europe as such, but rather the maintenance, the consoli- so long as it continues to challenge French or dation, and, if necessary, the reconstruction of German predominance there. deterrence" that will be the primary object of these negotiations. Agreement re :robably wilt

take a concrete form, and this m, ; limitations on specific weapons systems; the difficulty is to work out a plan that will encompass both offensive and defensive systems and be equally attractive 452 to both superpowers, whose security reeds are by Bender, Peter. C6 x SECURITY. CONCERT! AND HOPE IN no means identical. Actually the talks may have EASTERN EUROPE] 6 x Sicherheit. Sorgen urd Hoff- a largely educational value, in which case a for - nungen in Osteuropa. Merkur, v. 24, Sept. 1970: cal #1reement would not be essential. If, through 797-806. AP30.M43, V.24 an exchange of ire'oremtion about intentions, the Last chapter of 6 x licherheit.BefCrchtungen talks succeed in reducing by even 20 percent the in Osteuropa, to be published by Kierenhauer need statesmen feel to resort to "worst-case cal- Witsch. ;dlation," surely one of the most malevolent influences on armaments decisions, th .'.a major Each of the six Warsaw pact states has its own breakthrough will have been achieved. It is well security problem and its own way of solving it. to keep in mind that deterrence "is a delicate Their common fears are based on the acknowledgment psychological plant" and can survive only with ie- that the struggle for power between the two blocs formed and intelligent cultivation. represents a danger, that local wars might lead to an escalated military conflict, that changes such as those in Czechoslovakia in 1968 might lead to an East-West confrontation, and that a similar development in East Germany, combined with nationalist trends in West Germany, harbors an explosive 45,0 threat. All six countries have found a more or tNITED JTAT1S AND THE SOVIET UNION C3NCL,UDE PHASE CF less satisfrotory corpromise between inGernation- STRAJIEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. In U.S. rept. alistic duty and national trends, demonstrating of State. Department of State bulletin, v.63, that the main threat to security is not Sr. Fast - Aug. 31, 1970: 245-246. West war but the danger of an ideological "softer.- .11.=32.A33, v. 63 ing up" in the East, entailing Soviet intervention Today security in Europe is much more a re... Statenents male by U,S. Artassador Gerard C. litical than a military question. Arms control Smith and Soviet reputy Foreign Minister V. S. and disarmament plans do not thereby become suier- Ceeenov on August 14, 1970, at the ceremonial fleet-a, but they can only he realized and useful closin, of the second phase of the U.S.-Soviet if they are part of a policy that is aware of the strategic arms limitation talks, together with the true security problems. For East Germany, securi- text of the communique released at the close of ty in DArope virtually means recognition as a the talks. The communique reports that is the state; for Poland, recognition of the Oder- Neieee discus.ions "a vide range of questions dealing border; for Czechoslovakia and Runjary, more in- with the problem of limiting strategic offensive ternal rreeiom of m-- venent; for F...,msnia, more in- and defensive armaments was thoroughly consid- depm.dence from Moscow; and for Bulgaria, the neu- ered," that "the exchange was useful for both tralization of the Balkan and Mediterranean. To sides and made it possible to increase the degree find a suitable solution to the international of mutual understanding on a nueber of aspects of class struggle ticscow operates on the principle of the ratters discussed," and that both delegations asmuch unity as possible in the Fast Sr.] as much are determined "to purs,e the negetiati,..ns with cooperation as ne-esse:y with the West. Its al- the aim of limiting strategic arm,nents." Ambas- lies, other than Last ;ermany, would rather have sador Smith affirms that "irportant }regress has the priorities the other way around, but they are teen made" in the talks, Aelassador Semenev, that not strong enough politically 'Cr economical] to "substantial and useful work vas accomrlisbri" in do away with Moscow's protection without comieg Sr ateesphere that vas "eusineseli),e, calm, and under Western infl.ence. Ideological differencc: frank.'' between them and the Soviet Union stem to a large SPI CIFIC PROl3LEMS ,1IND LIMITED MEASLIR 97

extent from economic differences. If the latter fade, the former will diminish, and the Soviet's 7,rass, [GERMANYIVO STATEN --UNE NATION?1 fear of losing its allies would thereby be ne- Deutschland--zwei Stanten--eire Nation? Nese Ge- duced. More security must be create: by coopera- sellschaft, v. 1T, July/Aug. 1970: 164-503. ticn, and more cooperation must be made possible E5.136, v.IT by more security. Arms control and disarmament present the stepping stones for cooperation, All through German history the concepts "mother the problems of Iuropean security cannot he country" and "nation" have teen difficult to de- solved, only gradually rendered meaningless. fine. This was one reason the masses were so willing to accept Hitler's mystifying definitions. The current concept of two German states witnin 1,53 Blce'eerg, Jaakko. IFINLANDAND TEE Elfle)EAN SECUFI- the German nation must take into account not only TY CDNEEHENCE1Finn land and die curopAische Sich- the territorial and political differences, but erheitskonferens. Moderne Welt, v.11, no. 2, alro the incompatibility of the two social re :.li- 1970: 199-202. 1839.1458, v. 11 ties. Yet to regard East and West Germany as two separate countries doubles the dangers cf Vietnam- Finland's increased foreign policy activity is icing Germany, A more promising solution would be highlighted by its proposal for a European securi- for the two German states to give the idea "na- ty conference. Finland stresses its neutrality tion" a new content. The two states rust accept and its good relations with all. participants, in- the consequences of recent history, cooper rte in cluding the two Gerrt.rys. The proposal allows bringing about a Hey of detente inEqzol.,.,give neutrality for both Germanys and calls for the ex- concrete meaning to the concept of peaceful coex- clusion of such Eastern or Western preliminary istence, and work gradually toward disarming both conditions as fermal recognition of East Germany. blocs; they rust develop the new science of peace The proposal is very flexible in foeeseeing con- research, possibly with Berlin as the center; and sultation among governments and p-eparatory meet- they should mutually undertake aid to developing ings as forerunners of the real security confer- countries, setting an example for other divided ence. This leaves the field wide open for either nations. Willy Brardt's "concrete utopia" meet to a total solution to the tensions between East and taken seriously. Realpolitik, often a synonym for West and a final Wend War II peace treaty guar- shortsightedness, should offer room for utopian anteeing the security of Europe, or for partial perspectives and allow for the resolution of con- solutions, for example, a renunciation of force flicts and irrationalities. The United States and and increased economic, technical, and scientific the Soviet Union are no longer politically, ideo- cooperation. L permanent regional peace order in logically, or morally able to police the werld. accordance with Chapter VIII of the U.U. Charter If they could not deal with the problem of China, is also envisionc,d. Since the initiation of West there is no reason to expect them. to hannle Ger- German bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Uni- many any letter; and Germany has often eiosgh been on, Poland, and East Germany, theFederalFepublic the bone of their irrational contention and the Warsaw Piet countries have scaled down their pressure for a conference, because the nego- 455 tiations already signal a detente in the heart of Harker, lens. IP)SIECTS EUP01EAN SECURITY. Europe. Nevertheless the Finnish initiative re- rains important for the development of European Central Europe :curnal, v. 15, Sept. 1970: 31C- LE2D0.7.S74, v.18 cooperation and a permanent Institutional organi- 315. zation to resort to, she.li internaticnal develop- The ,noxpeessed purposeof Soviet security pro- mentruninto a dead--ni:treet. pceals during the test decade has teen the and legitimization of the status quo. NATC) efforts in the same period have been directel De La rahntiere, :.tuart TOWARDS DJFCTE. to thera^cisalof the causes of tension. Since darmorvisworth, Penguin, 1970. 332 security is always relative, any new E,rolcan HC,=51.138 curity system proposed by the Soviets should not lull West Germany into unrealistic confidence. Ctntents.--Economic revival in Europe.--Ecnnemic Frezhnev doctrine, the soviet failure to re- and ronetary co-operatio in Hurope.--Structure of spond to the proposal for a mstual lalnnced rei:2- inlustry.--The technological gap.--The common eg- tion of forces, sal. rest of all, Soviet insirt- riculturel policy.--Main industries (steel, ch'ni- cnce en the enemy-state clauses cf the lInited ra- eels, rotor).- -The common transport policy.--1.I.0 tions Charter conlusively /rove that the Fuscian trading relations with non-member countries.--Le- purpose remains the reinforcerent of the statss fence cf the West.--The future of NATO.--The po- q uo without the lessening of tensions. litical organization of Europe.--The EEC.tow it works.- -List of atbreviations.--Index. 15I Ilecusses the prospects for economic and politi- Hakovirta, Hart 4.16.;TER11 INTF51-A:11_,N A1.7.1Fl!iIilz,H cal unity in Etcope and describes the institutions NitITFAIITY. Cooperation and conflict, no. 2, test suited to achieving unification, re La Ma- :97D: Ser hotiere contends that a European defense organization can exist only within the framework of a po- Examines someconceptualand methodolcgical dif- litically united furopeerd,.:velwith a supragov- ficulties encountered in investigating the impact ernment. He concludes that the worst solution to cf WesternEuropeanintegration on Finnish neu- would be for the European teci,onic trality. lhcse remarks, a continuation of an ear- Coer.,nity to assdne the role cf a European gov- lier study or Finnish security ratters (see item ernment under the EEC's present rules. 1113, v. I, no.3, of this tillicgra;hyl, are 98 ARNIS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

largely concerned with the problems of operation- 1,6o alizing the concept "neutrality" and devising a NEW STAGE IN PREPARATION FOR ALL-EUROPEAN CONFER - theoretical model and empirical tests of the link- NICE. International affairs (Moscow) no. 9, Sept. age between Europe's burgeoning integration and 1970: 3-6. 0839.1465, 1970 Finland's standing as an East-West neutral. The constructive proposals advanced at Budapest by the Socialist countries to facilitate the con- 458 vocation of an all-European security conference call for the establishment of a permanent diplo- Koh, T. T. B. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION CONCERN- matic mechanism for questions of security and co- ING SOUTHEAST ASIA. In American Academy of Po- operation in Europe, the reduction of foreign litical and Social Science, Philadelphia.A new armed forces on the territory of European states, American posture toward Asie. Philadelphia, 1970. and tne development of cultural matters, including (Its Annals, v. 390, July 1970) p. 18-26. problems of man's environment. The realism of the HI.Ale, v. 390 Budapest proposals has been praised by government circles in many western states. Naturally, the Following conventional usage, Southeast Asia is opponents of dkente and European cooperation seek defined as the region consisting of Burma, Thai- to delay the convocation of the conference by land, Laos, Cambodia, North and South Vietnam, the linking it, without justification, to the Middle Philippines, Malaysi.a, Singapore and Indonesia. East crisis and the so-called German question. At present there is no organization to which all Their purpose in raising these questions is to Southeast Asian nations belong. Regional economic bring about a deadlock in the preparation of the collaboration is being obstructed or impeded by conference or, ultimately, to discredit it. nationalism, national eeonomic policies of autar- chy, industrialization based on import substitu- tion, and an unripened sense of regional identity. 46! In view of the seriousness of the obstacles, re- Peit zner, Alsr.ar. [EASTERN EUROPE AN: gional bodies such as ASEAN should devote them- ILL ICY FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN PRA-. h. selves to the promotion of practical projects and ur,d die deutsche Friedenspolitik, na not aim for grandiose schemes which are beyond nissen in Frag. [Munich, Verlag Die Br': their present capacities to realize. Collabora- 31 p. (Schriftenrcihe der Seliger-G, tion between two or three countries in the region DD259.4.R4 should be encouraged. Encouraging progress is be- Bibliography: p. 29. ing made in the fields of education and training, which is not only important in itself but also Contents.--Military ] builds confidence for other forms of regional col- velopment stage.--The role of the laboration. A plea is :Aide for greater support The dangerous bacillus.--The Bohemia:, from the developed countries, particularly from Decisiveness or opportunism.--The the major powers, for regional projects. Such line. -- Self- d:termination and self-r- support should, ideally, be accorded high priority Ostpolitik possibilities. in the aid policies of the developed oountries. The colleboration between ASEAN eh:: ECAFE (Econom- The Soviet invasion in C'echoslo-. . ic Carmission for Asia and the Far East) is also that communism faces many probler,, seen as important, and could provide a valuable question of the effects of an active impetus to the growth of regionalism in Southeast politik and of eventsir. Eastern an! Asia. (Atstract supplied) rope. Yesterday's political ideas a: norms can no longer fulfill current ,c,; needs. West Germany's ,.atpolitik 459 essential changes; th', politics of 1, a t- IlIcht, Herbert. [ALBANIA: FIRST STEPS TOWARD IN- based not on international agreemer ROPE. RECONCILIATION BETWEEN BELGRADE AND TIRANA] eat political pos.ittlities, Albanien: Erste Schritte nach Europa. Auss6hnung 'Ginty without sacrificing the goal. zwischen Belgrad and Tirana. Europ4ische Begeg- become a nesting place for people in w nong, v. 10, Sept. 1970: 22-23 social justice, freedom, and liberty ,:e AP30.E78, v. 10 place, and hational borders will loo, ir Vince. For the first time Albania, in its efforts to find a better relationship with its neighbors, is coning out of its self-imposed isolation from both 46.'2 East and West. Its desire for security, stabili- Vrnant, Jacques. EliiE NEW TkhATI ty, national identity, territorial integrity, end trait6 de MCiQC,'J. political self-assertion have accelerated its ten- I.CrAle, v..6, Oct.197 0: dency to think and act realistically. Yugosla- via's interest in improved relation& with Altahla seems based on economic considerations, as evi- Ine **eat ,..;frman-S,vict ren,n:iat: denced ty its work toward trade cooperation with agreement marks the b.,ginring of ar Albania. These tendencies are important not cf relations between West and Fast 7 40 for Ooth countries but also for the consolidation could bring about a new situatd.:n of the Balkans. Albania rAy gradually to finding clue to the developrent of interblo, its way to Europe, and a small but important po- the sstsequent mutual tai arced o NA'D' litical and strategic unit nay be teginning to ari Warsaw Fact forces. Ine sp,t1::7

grew. These important changes most be ,eighed ty of Soviet - German relations, together t7..? Maio-ow. progress of the strategic arms limi'a', 'alks 164_ SPECIFIC PROBE EMS AND EIMITEEe MEASURES 99

and the relative con*.ergence of Soviet and Ameri- coastal states for continental margins beyond the can efforts in the Middle East, are creating an 2jo_meter isobaolh, and creates and outlines the atmosphere in hurope that right contribute to the powers and duties of an international seabed re- realization of a European cooperation system. source authority. Such a system, in and by itself, would rot harm NATO solidarity. Europe's future lies in cooperation between rot only the Western states but all L65 Euroieans, West and East alike. Bells, Richard. THE WERGLNCE OF A CORPORATE SOVF77- EIONTY FOR THE OCEAN SEAS. In facem in maribus: 463 ocean enterprises; a surrlary of the prospects, and Windelen, Heinrich. REUNIFICATION OR RECOGNITION. hazards, of man's impending commercial exploita- Central E.:rope journal, v. 18, Apr. 1970, 120-123. tion of the underseas. A special report on the DE200.7.S7L. v. 18 preliminary conference he.d in preparation for the Pacem in maribus convocation at Valletta, Malta, The Brandt regime is exploring the possibilities June 28 -July 3, 1970. Edited by Elaine H. Burnell of a European supranational system to include the and Piers von Sisson. Santa Barbara, Calif., Cen- East European states through exchanges of declare- ter for the Study of Democratic Institutions, tio.is renouncing the use of force. However West 1970- (A Center occasional paper.) p. Germans should be reminded that accepting the sta- GC2. P33 tus quo does not overcome existing tensions, but merely leaves them for the next generation.The Corporate sovereignty for the ocean seas offers answer to the challenge from the East is the close a more practicable means of regularizing the ex- cooperation of the European nations in partnership plbration and development of ocean resources than with America. While the Federal Republic has either the extension of national sovereignty or shown its villiogooss to negotiate without prior the establishment of an international political conditions, there are good reasons to doubt that regime. Cho modern corporation is a dynami, and Ulbricht wants recognition at the cost of losing adaptable institution that has proven itself pecu- East Germany's special relationshp with the Euro- liarly s...itable for economic development. The pean Economic Community. Negotiations in a new corporation envisioned would be mixed, with both Ostpolitik will be frustrating and probably fruit- government and private part?. potion. Its main less; Ulbricht is not prepared to make any serious purposes would be to promote he systematic ex- concessions, and he is certain to find an excuse ploration of the ocean and ocean floe:. for peace- to Justify the retraction or the few concesoions ful purposes, to ensvre the rational and nonde- he does rake. structive use of ocean resources, and to conserve the ecological balance between man and nature. If these goals could be achieved by a regime respon- SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS (OCEAN, sive to international political bodies--for example, the United Nations - -well and good, but given SEABED, SPACE, ETC.) the present system of ration- states, each. with its own special interests, this appears unlikely. A 464 regime responsive to transnational economic bodies DRAFT U N. CCAINTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED might overcome many of the obstacles that stand in AREA U.S. WO4KINO PAPER SUBMITTED TO U.N. SEA- the way of alternative volutions, although even BEDS COINITTEE In U.S. Dept. 0: State. Depart. this possibility is by no means assured. merit of State bulletin, v. 63, Aug. 24, 197C: 209- 218. JX232.A33, v. 63 166 Statements of August 3, 1970, by Dept. of State Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson and Christopher H. Friedheim, Robert L. UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE ON Phillips, U.S. representative to the U.N. Commit- OCEAN RESOURCES. Denver, University of Denver tee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the f19691 38 p. (Social Science Foundation and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits o- National Juris- Graduate School of International Studies, Univer- diction, together with a summary of the U.S. draft sity of Denver. Monograph series in world af- convention on the international seated area pre- fairs, v. 6., monograph no. 3) pared by Ns. Stevenson. JX10419.F75 Bibliographical footnotes. Outlines the objectives and chief provisions of the U.S. draft convention on the seabed. The U.S. Focuses on four models that "provide the intel- proposal, which is designed to "save over two- lectual substructure for sore specific schemes for thirds of the earth's surface from national con- dealing with allocation of the oc,ans": normative flict and rivalry, protect it from pollution, and nationalism, functional rationalism, functional put it to use for the benefit of all," vould put internationalism, and normative internationalism. "narrow limits on national sovereign rights with He concludes that the actual management of ocean respect to the seated" and establish "a pragmatic resource; will fall to the national and interna- division of revenues ard administration I.. the tional fUnctionalists, particularly with respect area beyond national jurisdiction."Among Other to the problems of the seated and fisheries con- things, it reserves the seated beyond the 200 - trol. meter isobath exclusively to peaceful purposes, ensures that revenues from seabed resources will be applied to the needs of developing countries, =.6T provides for safeguards to human life and the Ma- Grisel, Etienne. THE LATERAL BOUNDARIES OF THE OA- rine environment, regulates the exploitatinn of 7INENTAL SKELF AND ThE ZUDGEX'NT OF THE INTERNA- seabed resources, establishes trusteeships among TIONAL 00,..,BT OF JUSTICE 1P ThE NORTH SEA CCNTINEN- 105 100 ..N.RMS CONT ROL & OSA MIAMI-AT

TAL SHELF OASES. American journal of internation- object cf many debates. The Conference of the al law, v. 64, July 1970: 562-393. Committee on Disarmament tackled this question Jx1.A6, v. 64 shortly after the signing of the nonproliferation treaty, and in October 1969 the superpoiers agreed Examines paragraph 2, Article 6 of the 1958 Con- to prohibit nuclear arms beyond the 12-mile limit. vention on the Continental Shelf, focusing on However the ambiguities and gaps of the draft three issues: the role attributed to agreement, treaty created some rucervations among the princi- the application in concrete cases of the "principal maritime states, and the amendments accepted ple cf equidistance" and the flexibility of this I: the United States and the Soviet Union in April rule and the meaning of the words "special cir- 1970 have not dissipated all the prejudices. The cumstances." The methods of determining lateral scope of this treaty will depend in large measure shelf boundaries for states that are not parties on the concessions that will be made during the to the Convention on the Continental Shelf are gen- ultimate phase of the negotiations, but it will be eralized as taking either the division of the for all practical purposes a treaty comparable to shelf or the drawing of tile boundary lines as the the outer space and nonproliferation treaties and starting point. The rules laid down by the Inter- in no way an effective contributi-n to the disarm- national Court of Justice in the North See Conti- ament process. (Translation of supplied abstract) nental Shelf cases are "firmly approved." 470 463 Ecers, Albert 1]1E DEBATE ON THE LEGAL REGIME FOR lupta, V. P. ME INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE GULF THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF OCEAN RESOURC- CF AQABA. Indian journal of political science, ES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE FIRST DECADE, 1960- v.11, Jan./Mar. 1970: 82-88. 1970. n.p., Law of the Sea Institute, University JA26.15, v. 31 of Rhode Island, 1970. 43 R. (University of Rhode Island. Law of the Sea Institute. Special publi- The Arab argument for declaring the Gulf of Aqa- cation no. 1) CL ba strictly Arab is based on the narrovness of the Cover title. gulf and its alleged historic status as a mare claus,um. The territorial status of rivers, bays, Bibliography of articles, books, reports, pa- lakes, canals, gulfs, and straits surrounded by pers, and conference proceedings on the legal prob- several states is unclear. Such enclosed waters lems of exploring and exploiting the ocean and may belong to the riparian states, although other seabed, arranged chronologically by year ani al- writers have suggested that they should be consid- phabetically within each year. ered international waters. As a rule, all gulfs end bays enclosed by more tneu, one littoral state ill are nonterritorial, regardless of how narrow their Kolodkin, A. L. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES entrances may be. They are considered parts of OF STATES ON THE USE OF THE SEA-BED. Daily re- the open sea except for internal marginal belts view; translations from the Soviet press, v. 16, and can never be appropriated. The extent of the July 16, 1970: supplement, [item] 2, 1-9. territorial sea and the international status of Slav Rum bays and straits should be determines by the Translated from Sovetskoe gosudarstvo 1 pravo, coastal states concerned, with the general inter- no. 6, 1970. Slav fin est prevailing over that of individue. states. So accord exists between the Arab littoral states Describes the various schools of thought on the providing for either joint control of the Gulf of status in international law of the seabed: the Aqaba cr its apportionment, which leaves the gulf opposed positions on whether the seabed is sub- open to :he shipping of all littoral btates and ject to the sane legal regime as the high sea, the the question of jurisdiction insettled. 7,e 1958 "national lake" theory, and the reoentIy advanced Geneva convention on territorial seas established concept that the seated is the "common heritage of Israel's right of innocent passage through the the human race." Kolodkin reject= the common-her- Strait of Ti ran to its port of Filet. Although itage concept as stemming from the common-property Egypt claims the strait, it has not asserted its concept of civil law and hence inapplicable in in- claim over the gulf, thereby recognizing the re- ternational public law. Consequently the propos- spective rights of the other three riparian states als of the American Organization to Study the Or- and, in turn, acknowledging Israel's right of nav- ganization of Peace, of the Brazilian delegation igation. Sense, political consideratjons govern tc the United Nations Seabed Committee, and of the Arab interpretation of Israel's maritime those individuals who wish to establish a suprana- rights in the Gulf. In keeping with practice and tional apparatus as trustee for the seated are the law of rations, the United Nations or the four dismissel as untenable and unrealistic. Tie Sovi- littoral states should internaticnalize the Gulf et delegation to the Seabed Co!u.mittee "as already of Aqaba. ex;ressed the reed for more exact definition of the beds of seas and oceans beyor ithe limits of the national j'.171FliCiOn Cr CCS,tqi state; Klein, !ane. IT MILS:ABU' 1..E OF THE S.F.A1.0 AND and has formally denounced the aczdisitior, sf L'utilitation mS1lt mire ins fonis property rights in any part of the seabed. Kolod- raeins et le d4sarmenent. Politique gtrangere, kin rejects thezg,zment of the existence of a le- v.35, no. 4, 1970: 405-415. gal vacuum, which was advanced by adherents of the Jx3.16, v.35 common-heritage cause. Re suggests that a stated legal regime be drawn on the be..7iis of the recog- Since Yalta raised the question in the Ilnit.ed nized principles of the freedom of the seas for Nations of the peaceful uses of the seabed, CIe all, without discrimination, under the provisitons regulation of armaments in this area has been the of the U.N. Charter.

1 fl 1: SPECIFIC PROBLENIS AND EMU ED MEASURES 10I

euclearizetion of the seated. "What is now to be KolDsuv, Y. St.P.E URGENT PROBLEraS OF SPACE LAW. In- expected is a 'rapprochement' between toe USSR and terneticnal affairs (Moscow) no. 9, Sept. 1970: the US Draft Treaties follow:tie mutual conces- 2i -25. 1839.1165, 1970 sions, the drafting of a Joint Draft Treaty, and an appeal to all world States to sign and ratify 'carmen is on the "truly important" problems oc- this Treaty." earring in the actual practice of space exploration, which reqeire solution on the basis of international law; the responsibility of states for VIOLATION, INSPECTION, possible damages caused ty space objects; the development of space communications and television; VERIFICATION. AND prospecting for natural resou-ces via satellite; ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS the registration of space objects; End the distinction between airspace and outer space. Par- 1,75 ticipants ,t the eighth session of the Legal 5eb- c..upta, Dipak, seal J5rgen Seetzen. PCONTRCL MEASURES committee of the tester Space Comittee of the IN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY] Kontrolleassnahmen in der United Nations agreed that the questions raised by Keentecheik. Aussenpolitik, 7. 21, June 1970: 338- the Polish and Argenti.lian proposals should be 347. 1839.5585, v. 21 placed on the agenda as "the utilisation of outer space and celestial bodies, including the various The entry into force of the nonproliferation implications cf space communicEtions."Kolosov treaty confronts the non - nuclear- weapon states in- concludes ti-at cooperation between states in this terested in peaceful development and exploitation field can develop only on the basis of "the exist- of atomic energy with the problem of setting ep ing universally recognised principles and stane- leternational inspection and control mechaniere. anis cf international law, including the Charter The magnitude of the problem is indicated ty tte of the United Nations." prediction that by the end of the century 70 to percent of the electrical power of the highly in- 1,13 eistrialized states will be provided by nuclear Ciu, Pien- chong. DON'T FORGET THE INNER SPACE. power plants. The essential task is to safeguard 55 0's fifteen nations, v. 15, June/Jule 1970: 30- the legitimate economic interests of national in- 36. UA646.F5, v. 15 duetties ty foreelating inspeetion and verification methods that do not go beyond assuring mondi- Argues for a more vigorous U.S. effort tr ex- version of fissionable material and res7a7t pro- ploit the vast potentialities of the oceans and prietary and comeercia" rights. The ter,- ap- seated. his explores the military, economic, po- proaches to inspection and control sketched Ilere litical, and scientific oromisc of this "inner are believed to be no more expensive or cumbersoza space" sod concludes that the race tc possess it than internal seceriee methods now in use. ray be decisive for the future of the world, determining "which nations or group of nations will rise and which will decliee."He recommend, that 476 the United States support an international ap- ir.PARING teUR THZ DELJGE. Nature (London) v. 227, proach to the explo,tation of these resource,. As Aug. 22, 1970: 761-762. a first step it eight jean with other Rations in Q1.112, v. 227 an international or regional program of oceanic survey and research. There Ls little indication i. the anneal report or 1971 budget and program of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that itis aware of 1.7s hew great its responsibilities arc going to be en- Itulantzas, Nicholas M. THE YR9BLEM OF "FFACFYUL der the nonprolieration sceaty. It should be itliPeSieS" Rf74ISITF7. Nederlands j.sristenbled, clear to all concerned that "anything like a full no. 10, 1973: ;65-259. blown inspection ofthe[treaty] would require the Li mobilization of a small army of inspect..,rs."Ap- perently the agency is depending on the Ccremittee As it pertains to outer space and the seeeed, on Safeguards to come up with a workable arrange- the term "peaceful purposes" is ambiguous.A re- ment, tut, given thepoliticaland fiearcial diffi- alistic solution is to eutatitute the "non-armed" culties involved, there is no ground for cptirdsm. interpretation for the "nonmilitary" cne. pieties Hence it is worth recalling that the treaty guishing letween offensive and defensive veapone more a statee-nt of goad intentions than a guaran- or identifying all the prohibited activities and tee of nonproliferation. A too-Weral interpre- t'estallatioes nrly coeplicate:. the 1.:setinn. tation of what the treaty requires in tee way of ar-red military persnen,1 .ei equi;rent are 'tire:t iesloctions ray force the IAEA to attempt core ine-else-1 in space and l'e nen-are 1 in- itc&r. possibly accomplish. That w:.:]d be t,-;retation V93 92'Jr,1 in ArticleL,;araeraph 2 tal '-e trraty, ii ^moues eor 1A]A. of U.S 1947 _meter ep ace treaty. ri-!YZ ;n:tinnc. interpretIe,2 ;ca.:erul tk,s os allei I.Drtance in light of the prope:,-.3 tdatcd treaty. Tee russians have -ailed fur a comp-Lote drefliter- teCi eU &S. Nuclear reel - izatlen of the rented that would Sre.:lule all the nrtrieg, v.le, Sept. 1970: 729 -72,7. undersea devices the OnSted states ores to tra X A9D91.N75, v. 15 foreign setrarites, while the keericans eaee ar- gued that "'peaceful' Seclude, ee1itary non-weal- Fepures on ratters disc.ssed at the nuclear one devices fled equipment" and laser only th, de- safeguards syrposium held in Karleriee, Germany, n7 102 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

July 6-10, 1970, under the sponsorship of the In- Soviet Unioi- As a consequence of the,:e viiatiy ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Acco:.nt- increased capabilities, each of the two superpow- ability, containment, and inspection measures, the ers enters the strategic arms limitation talks legal stricture of the IAEA safeguards system, the fully informed of the composition of the other results of IAEA experiments in which safeguards side's strategic arsenal. The capabilities were applied to actual nuclear facilities in sev- should make it possible "to limit armament costs-- eral countries, criteria for the design of nuclear arid thereby reduce arms budget: -- without fear that insailations to facilitate the application of a 'cheater' will develop a massive superiority ant safeguards, the results of U.S. tests cf these subject the ether to nuclear 'blackmail.'" criteria, and new surveillance and assay instro- mentation were the major items discussed. The length and complexity of the fuel cycle, together J,50 with the inevitable political complications, make :;zaras, Robert F. the whole business of applying nuclear safeguards NO PLACE I') HIDE. NAl'O's fifteen nations, v. a matter 02 extraordinary difficulty. 15, Aug./Sept. 1970: 76-80 Devising a illus. system that will detect violations and yet not in- UA646.P5, v.15 trude upon normal plant operations is the major chall er.ge. Surveys current U.S. capabilities in the field of serial reconnaissance and looks at future developments. Although surveillance technology has 478 made great strides in racent years, "the best news Herbert. VERIFICATION OF NLCI,EAR ARMS in the reconnaissance business is that none of the 71M1TATIONS: AN ANK,ISIS. Bulletin of the atomic experts one an end to further sophistication." scienti ts, v. 26, Oct. 17:0: 6-11. Major breakthroughs can be expected is the detec- ils:9145.A84, v. 26 tion of submerged objects in the oceans and the transmission of massive quantities of data from Verification procedures fur arms control agree- air to ground by rapid electronic mesas. ments fall into two categories: "national" procedures, which do not require activity within the boundaries of ether states, and on-site inspec- tions, which do. In judging the efficacy of the CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL former, it must be remembered that these same procedures are relied upon for strategic planning, AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES where the intelligerce requirements are often more L51 stringent than would be necessary to verify an arcs control agreement; that the risks inherent in Berkowitz, Marvin. THE C9NVERSICN OF MILITARY-ORI- a given verification system must be weighed ENTED RESEARCH AND DEVFDCPMENT 70 CIVILIAN USES. agai oat the risk of having no arms control agree- Lev York, Fraeger 119701xxix, 649 p. illus. ment at all; that giver the large size of the op- (Conversion of industry from a military to civil- posing forces, a violation would have to be very ian economy) HC11).D4a46 great to be significant; and that surveillance Praeger special studies in U.S. economic and so- technology has improved ,mstly in recent years. cial development. Verification capabilities vary with the stage in Includes tibliograythical references. the developmena cycle of the weapon system under scrutiny: research and development and production Contents.--Framework for the conversion of mili- world be difficult to monitor, testing and deploy- tary research.--Fesources committed tc the re- ment, relatively easy. Verification capabilities search and development industry.--The impact cf also vary with the particular weapons system: an researci, and development. -- Economic impact of a agreement restricting deployment of fixed-site, cut in military expenditures on research and de- land-based ballistic missiles, ballistic-missile velopment.-- Technology transfer process--irplica- submarines. or ABM's would be relatively easy to tions for conversion.--Steps toward conversion- - verify, while ea, agreement restricting multiple from inside and outside the defense system.--The independently targeted reentry vehicles (M1Rv) conversion of military RID to civilian needs.-- would be almost impossible to monitor in any but Conclusions.--Appendixes. the testing stage. A total ban on mobile land- based missiles could be verified with comparative Problems in the conversion of military research ease, tut * partial ban would cause problems. Fi- and development to socially more desirable civil- nally, it would be easier to verify a broad freeze ian uses. The study concludes that the conversion on both offensive and defensive strategic systems of military research and development programs can- than one on a single weapon. If missile launch- rot be achieved on any considerable scale inde,en- ers, NM's, and AN.t's were all frozen 91 cur-ent dent of a general conversion of the ri.itary es- levels, a ration would have to commit violations tablislcent. Systems analysis, planning-Ir.:gram- in two of the three prohibited areas before secu- ing-budgeting, and preplanning technia:rs are rity was jeopardized. available row for applications In the civil sector, tut any large c!"..17, cr snit u;- 4, 'he generation of a greater tense of political isgenc v. Research and Cevelopment must be subor- TaiE fit RACE IN it GKY. U.S. news I world report, dinated to social goals and to formal ncchanisms v. 6?, Oct. 12, 1970: 211-j6. for translating intentions into action. A strong .7P(1.1565, v. 69 federal commitment to support research into the unmet needs of society "will be necessary before Discusses the technical capabilities and strate- private firms, labor anions, and academic INStit,- gic implications of the new intelligence- gathering tiCns will commit their own rescurces to these techniques being used by the United State: and the tasks." SPECIFIC PRELIM_ FMS AND LIMITED MEASURI S 103

452 meat of engineering and scientific personnel, by Mack-Forlist, Daniel M., and Arthur Newman. THE Lloyd J. Dumas. Civilian professional training CONVERSION OF SHIPBUILDING FROM MILITARY TO CIVIL- options for defense industry engineers, by Maurice IAN MARKETS. New York, Praeger (19701 211 p. J. Ward, Financial support for displaces defense illus. (Praeger Special Studies in U.S. Economic workers, by John J. Walsh.--Appendixes. and Social Development) VM23.M23 1970 In,2stigates the problems involved in converting from a defense-oriented economy to a civilian Partial contents.--pt. 1. The shipbuilding in- economy. The effects of defense spending on par- dustry, by Daniel Mack-Forlist: Introduction. ticular segments of the economy and on regions of The state of the shipbuilding industry. Histori- the country are examined, and various proposals cal background. Technology in U.G. shipbuilding. intended to facilitate the conversion from defense Structure of the industry. Earnings, costs, and to civilian employment are considered. productivity. Shipyards in the national economy. Competitive potential. Diversification potential. Time factors and some general considerations. Conclusions and recommendations. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

Recommends steps to protect the shipbuilding in- 4b4 dustry from the effects of drastic cuts in defense Larock, Victor. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ARMA- spending and to establish it as a viable civilian MENTS RACE. Review of international affairs, industry capable of competing in domestic and for- v. 21, June 5, 1970; 16-18. eign markets. Mack-Forlist recommends the ap- D839.E4, v. 21 pointment of a board to investigate thoroughly the problems of the industry, a limitation on subsi- Repeats the proposal made in 1957 by the author, dized designs, the creation of an operations-anal- Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the ysis committee, and the initiation of standardiza- the United Nations General Assembly prepare an infor- tion studies. He also proposes "an industry- mation caLpaign on the meaning for mankind of the labor-government study of the labor-displacement arms race. The Secretary General of the United problems arising from reduction in defense spend- Nations would he responsible for disseminating ing, ship automation, and shipyard cost reduc- this infor:ation to the populations of the U.N. tion." mcmber states. Execution of the information campaign would be entrusted to the local political 453 authorities under start supervision of U.N. Melman, Seymour, ed. THE DFFENE'E ECONOMY; CONVER- representatives. SION OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS TO CIVILIAN NEEDS. New York, Fraeger C19701 xxix, 528 p. (Conversion of industry from a military to civil- 4b5 ian economy) hC110.D14M39 Michener, James A. 'WHA? TO DO ABOUT TEE PALESTINI- Praeger special studies in U.S. economic and so- AN RITUGEES7' New York times magazine, Sept. 27, cial development. 1970: 22-25, 111., 116-121, 123, 126, 130. Bibliography; p. 469-518. Al2.56575, 1970

Contents. -- Preface. - -pt. 1. The conversion cf Surveys the situation of the Ialestinian refu- industries:Characteristics of the industrial ,es--their origins, numbers, living conditions, conversion problem, by Seymour Melman. Economic expectations, prospects.-and suggests a so- effects of military activity on states and coun- lution to their dispute with Isree'. Michener erties, 1950-GO, by Demosthenes Menegaki.z. Ecric goes that disputes over historical responsibility effects of military procurement in :.ew Jersey, by for the present situation or the leg:1 rights of John F. Gorgol. The impact of military spending the parties involved are irrelevant: 'the present on manufacturing in he Nev York -- to Alfrel condition of the refugees is an affront to human- J. Wood. A network model of the c. ion proc- ity and must be rectified. He proposes that Is- ess, by James E. Baird. A case st an organ- rael, in exchange for an Arab guarantee of its ization's conversion from defer Wan in- peace and security and a cessation of Palestinian dustry, by Moses H. Harary. ,ptions of terrorism, accept repatriation of those refugees the airframe industry, by Marvin Terwitz and who wish to return and grant financial compensa- Seymour Heiman. Conversion of th,-, marketing function to those dispossessed. The oil-rich Arab tion, by C. R. Hydberg. Lead time in hospital states and the other countries of the world would construction, by Sidney Elkind.--pt. 2. Conver- have 1,71 obligation to make a financial contribu- sion of occupations: Re-education sni re-employ- tion to this settlement.

100 AUTHOR INDEX [Numbers refer to entries.]

A Eoffey, Philip V., 265 Coolidge, Francis L., 271 Bogdanov, Oleg V., 426 Cooper, John M., 50 Adams, Walter, 306 Booda, Larry L., 155 Corbe..t, Percy E., 350 Alexander, Archibald, 414 Borgese, Elizabeth H., 337 Corm, George, 131 Alexander, Robert J., 414 Boulding, KesrAh E., 6 Cottrell, J., 124 Allen, Gary, 379 Eouthoul, Gaston, 23 Coye, Beth F., 195 Alscp, Jos.ph, 181 Brandt, Willy, 375 Corder,, Phoebe E., 385 American Surveys (Firm), 182 brender, Hans, 113 Czaja, Herbert, 351 Anand, Ram F., 321 Bresler, Robert J., 43 Czempiel, Eros: 0., 352 Andreev, IU., 183 Brodie, Bernard, 333, 386 Anslerry, William F., 370 Brown, Neville, 190, 434 An.5combe, Elizabeth, 153 Brownfield, Allan. C., 286 Appadorai, A., 105 F runner, Dominique, 411 D,jjani, Burhan, 131 Arneson, Ruthann, 184 Erzezinski, Zbigniew, 112 Dalton, Robert E., 328 Atal, Yogesh, 105 Buchholz, Arnold, 23 Davis, Vincent, 196 Atkinson, James D., 281 Buckley, Thomas H., 372 Debre, Michel, 197 Ausland, John C., 93 Burchett, Wilfred, 132 Decornoy, Jacques, 22 Ayoob, Mohammed, 102 Burnell, Elaine F., 465 De La Mahotire, Stuart R., Burnham, James, 395 154 B Burns, Argun L., 6 Delden, Rembert van, 135 Burrs, E. L. M., 414 Dellinger, Dave, 51 Badgley, Jeoln H., LO Burrs, Hicnard Dean, 30 den Toom, W., 199 Baer, Gertrude, 385 Burton, John, 348, 389 Deshingkar, G. D., 413 Bahr, Hans-Eckehard, 23 Buschmann, Martha, 113 Baird, Jame; E., 483 Deshpande, N. R., 105 Byrd, Harry F., 191 Deutsch, Eberhard P., 333 8,1asanov, B., 110 Dib, George, 131 Baldwin, Fank, 394 C Dollard, Jotr, 17 Baldwin, Hanson W., 166 Domes, Jarzen, 52 Bardura, Albert, 17 Cadoux, J. F., 396 Doob, Leonard W., 17 Bardyopadhyaya, J., 105 Calder, Nigel, 382, 389 Drinan, Robert F., 353 Barclay, C. N., 187 California. University. Uni- Dumas, Lloyd J., 483 Barclay, G. St.J., 451 versity at Ios Angeles. Se- Dupuy, Fichard Ernest, 145 Bar.laby, Frank. 381 curity Studies Project, 3.33 Oupuy, Trevor S., 145 Barnes, William S., 271 Callenius, Hans Walter, 185 Dvrtrow, Elbridge, 116 Barnett, A. Doak, 1 Cameron, Robert, 192 Putt, V. P., 105 Baroch, Charles T., 322 Campbell, Alexander, 44 Barthel, Friedrich, 156 Campbell, John C., 114 Bart^s, Ottoman J., 31 Cantrell, Burton N., 435 Basiuk, Victor, 2 Carey, Omer L., 306 Eckhardt, William, 5 Eaumzartner, John S., 282 Carr, C, Jellef, 287 Edwards, David V., 6 Bechtoldt, Heinrich, 41 Carter, Luther J., 288, 427 bells, Richard, 465 Beecher, William, 188 Cassuto, Aldo, 412 Ehrlich, Thomas, 115 Bellany, Ian, 169 Chalfont, Alln, 436 Elder, Charles, 338 Benckiser, Nikolas, 433 Chapin, Seymour L., 373 Elkind, Sidney, 153 Bender, John C., 271, 323 Chauhan, R. S., 105 Elsee, Gerhard, 200 Bender, Peter, 452 Clark, Gregory, 193 Encel, S., 2'6 Benedict, Ruth, 32 Clark, Joseph S., 384 End, Heinrich, 53 Benesch, ..,stav, 371 Clark, Ramsey, 289 Berghes, Ingeborg von, 12 Epstein, Seym0,J.r, 27 Clarkson, Albert G., 194 Ericsson, Ulf, 417 Berkower, Lary B., 283 Clemens, Welter C., 3, 46, Berkowitz. Marvin, 451, 433 Etzioni, Amitai, 17 357, 437 Fzemenari, F. R. C., 290 Berman, Harold J., 324 Clifford, Clark M., 236 Peste, Hans D., 159 Clissold, Steihen, 17 Bea, Jan E., 157 Cobb, Pr ger W., 338 Bilstein, Helmut,139 C'2okram, Gail-Maryse, 45 Bindra, A. P. S., Falk, Conrad, 1.6 236 Collier, David S., 4 Black, E. F., 111 Falk, Richard A., 325 Colin, Peter W., 387 Feld, Bernard T., 438 Blake, Joseph A., 254 Congressional Quarterly Ser- Firestone, Joseph M., 34 Blomberg, Jaakko, 453 vice, Washington, D.C., 10 Fischer, Ernst, 23 Bloom, Justin L., 172 Cock, Blanche W., 374 Fleckenstein, Bernard, 291

104 110 AUTHOR INE EX 105

Ford, John C., 153 Hau7r, Christian. F. 122 Kcers, Albert W., 470 Foreign Policy Association, 54 Hauptmann, Jerzy, 4 Loh, T. 7. B., 458 Foster, John 3., 161, 202-203 -fayes, John D., 236 Kolkowicz, Foman, 387 Foster, William C., 41'4 (ayes, Saml:el P., 54 Kolodkin, A. L., 471 Fowler Don, 184 2eidmenn, Eberhard, 185 Kolosov, 1., L72

Fran. . A,r.tassade. U.C. Ser- Heitger, Marian, 399 Kraus, Jon, 318 vice de tresse et d'Infur- Herge, Heary C., 114 {rats, Melvin, 331 mation, 56 Hermges, David, 440 Kreker, Hans-Justus, 2:5 Frankel, Joseph, 7-8 Hess, Fredricck W., 4 Krcckow, Christian Graf von, Freud, Sigmund, 17 Hewavitharana, B., 205 23 Freudenthal, Peter C., 292 Hezlet, Sir Arthur R., 148 Kr6ger, Herbert, 73 Friedheim, Robert L., 466 Hill, R. J., 346 Kr:iger-Spare ngel, Friedhelm, Fromm, Erich, 23 Hirschfeld, Oswald, 205 330 Frye, Alton, 204 Hckanson, Jack E., 17 Kruglanski, Arie W., 31 Holmes, John 1%, 61 Kiihn, A. G., 388 G Holmes, R., 297 Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik von. 74 Holmquist, C. 0., 236 KGrsener, J., 216 Gallagher, Matthew P., 33 ",- Honeywell, J. A., 9 Gallois, Fberre M., 4,09 lionignann, John J., 32 L Galtung, Johan, 391 Hopes, Townsend, 400 Garcia Robles, Alfonso, 414 Horn, Ruppert, 10 Latohn, H. J., 164 Gardner, Lloyd C., 57 Horowitz, Irving L., 31 LaFrenz, Robert L., 165 Garris, Jerome, 383 Houghton, Neal D., 62 Laird, Melvin R., ,'36 Gernill, Elizabeth, 271 Holton, Sir Edward, 355 LaYhi, M. V., '.05 Geneste, Marc, 439 Hurter, Robert E. ,123 LP.mbeth, Benj-4in S., 357 Georgetown University, Wash- Huntington, Samuel 1%, 306 Lapp, Ralph K., 302, 306, 441 ington, D.C. Center for Hupka, Herbert, 63-64 Larock, Victor, 134 Strategic and International Leary, Frank, 166 Studies, 58 Lederberg, Joshua, 430 Germany (Democratic RepAdc, Legvold, Robert, 75 1949- ) Steatssekretariat Ik16, Fred C., 401 Lehners, Blohar ,1' fe7r Westdeutsche Fragen, 118 Ingram, Derek, 11 Leitenberg, Giese, Fritz E., 235 Intriligator, Michael D., 383 Lendvai, Paul, 442 Gilbert, Charles, 293 :shibashi, Mqsa:suu, Leonard, Janes F., 393, 431 Giovannetti, Alberto, 339 Levine, Potert A., 6 Glaser, Kurt, 4 Lcwis, Flora, 76 Goldhaber, Samuel Z., 429 Lewis, Richard S., 443 Goodpaster, Andrew 1., 206 Jackson, Henry M., 4 Levy, Guenter, 153 Gorgol, John F., 483 James, Alan, 347 Lieberson, Stanley, 17 Giaham, Fred F., 271 Janes, William, 153 Lifton, Pctert Jay, 303 Grass, Giinter, 455 Jenks, Clarence W., 327 Lindsey, G. R., 163 Greene, Fred, 398 Jha, D. C., 66 Litvinoff, Boris, 126 Griffiths, Eldon, 207 Johnson, Frank J., 12 Locke, Leonard B., 271 Grisel, Etienne, 467 Johnson, James A., (7 London, Kurt L. 4 Groom, John, 345 Johnson, U. Alexis, 68 London. Institute for Strate- Gross, Herman, 4 Joy, Charles Turner, 402 gic Studies, 220 Gruder, Charles L..,31 Joyce, James A,, 132 Lorenz, Konrad, 13, 17 Grzyoowski, Kazimierz, 326 Jungle, Reett, 23 Lovell, John P., Gupta, Difale, 475 1.,cht, Herbert, 459 Gupta, Sisir, 105 K Lyon, 'eter, 22, 105 Gupta, V. P., 468 Lyons, Gene X., 93 Gurtoy, Melvin, 59 Kaplan, Morton A., C GuYLenburg, Theodor Freiherr Kapur, Ashok, 69, 211 von ILA zu, 4 Farber, Fhillip, 298 G%tteridge, William, 294 Karnow, Stanley, 70 M., 3., :05 Haul, Ravi, 118 M62,Clel!and, Charles A., 6 Kallshi, H. M., 105 McDonald, Norman, 356, 339 Kaye, G. D., 163 McD.:well, Banks, 271 Haaland, Carsten M., 296 Kearney, Richard D., 328 McGowan, J. A., _:1.9 Haas, Gerhard, 295 Kennedy, Edward M., 71, 299 ',IcIntyre, David, 13d

Michael, 147 Kewenig, Wilhelm, 340 Kenneth F., 2 -(1 Hacker, Friedrich J., 23 Hhlestc, 0. r. MaA-Pcrlist, Dariel X., Hacker, Jens, 15.6 Kilmarx, R_.tcrt A., 124, 310 Maloe,17, Ti, Eak,virts, Harto, 157 3ri.1T1 3., 212 116 Hall, William C., 296 Ki7, Yong-jun, 213 Jo cr r. 2,-2 Hallett, Edward R., 195 Kimche, Jtr, 125 Ma teen, James B., 373 Ha%moni, Pa./1 Y., 6 Kirdermann, (;ottfriel-Larl, 23 Widh,sk, Zalraj, 78 Harming, Hugh, 354 Kintner, William R., 4 Meier, H., 167 Harary, Moses H., 483 Kissingei, Henry A., 6, 386 Maekkerup, Fer, hart, Parker T.,120 Klein, Jean, 169 Maharani, Usha, Ti Hartmann, Frederick H., Knorr, Klaus F., 214 Mat,esh.4:ri, B. L., 105 Hartmann, Ka.-1 121 Koch, Milo, 72 Y2,ncke, Dieter, 123

Hsrttung, Arnold, 375 Koddkals, S . 105 Y,llison. 7., 331-332 1 i 1 106 ARMS CONTROL & DISARM AMENr

Mansfield, Michael J., 80 Norodom, Sihanouk Varman, King fldYlin, Alois, 91 Manteulfel, Basso E. von, 154 of Cambodia, 129 Nippon, Geoffrey, 246 Marcie, Rene, 23 Norris, John G., 155 Ritter von Schramm, Wilhelm, Marcuse, Herbert, 23 North Atlantic Treaty Creani- 149 Marey, Ceorges, 168 zation. Information Service, Roberts, Adam, 132, 404 Martin, Donald V., 195 238 ?Sling, Bert, 23 Maryanov, Gerald S., 15 Rogers, William P., 428 Maslow, Abraham H., 32 0 Roherty, James M., 247 Mathur, P. C., ''15 Rose, Leo E., 105 Matthews, Robert 0., 268 Oldfield, Barney, 170 Rosecrance, Richard N., 6 Maxwell, Neville, 127-128 O'Neill, W. J., 155 Rosenberg, Jison A., 271 Mead, Margaret, 32 Orians, Gordon H., 311 Rostov, Walt W., 92 Meeker, R. J., 405 Rothstein, Robert L., 93 Megargee, Edwin I., 17 P Ruehl, Lothar, 447 Meissner, Doris, 4, 81 Rwpf, Helmut, 363 Melman, Seymour, 483 Packard, David, 312 Rappel, Edith, 185 Ma-,bers of Congress for Peace Pelee, Anthony, 239 Ryan, John D., 248 Through Law, 226 Palme, Olcf, 87 Ryan, William L., 424 Mendl, Wolf, 224 Paolucci, Dominic A., 236 Rydberg, C. 483 Menegakis, Demosthenes, 483 Farenti, Michael, 313 Mettler, Eric, 225 Pauli, Fritz, 1459 S Metzsch, Joachim von, 357 Peace, Power and Politics in Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm, 82 1..aia Conference Committee, Sagatelyan, M., ?.49 Miehener, James A., 465 132 Salitter, Michael, 250 Midgaard, Knut, 417 Penrose, Edith, 22 Salzburger Huranismusge- Miksuhe, Ferdinand 0., 305 Penrose, Ernest F., 22 sprach, 4th (1968), 23 Millar, Thomas B., 227-228 Peretz, Don, 170 Sapin, Burton M., 93 Miller, J. D. B., 229 Eerie, Richard, 444 Sartori, L., 169 Miller, Lynn H., 383 Ffeiffer, Egbert W., 311 Sass, Hubertus, 150 Miller, Neal E., 17 Pf.iffer, Leon K., 195 Saxena, Adarsh K., 105 Minter, William, 410 Phillips, Christopher F., 464 Sayeed, Kha'Ad P., 105 Minty, Abdul S., 307 Phillips, One L., 333 Schatz, Oskar, 23 Mirimanoff, Jean, 341 Fickus, Robert, 360 Scheich, Manfred, 9 Misra, Kashi P., 105 Pillai, Kesavakurup R., 88 Scheinman, Lawrence, 383 Mitchell, C. R., 18 Firzler, William M., 271 Schelling, Thomas C., 93 Mitchell, Donald W., 230 Pipes, Richard, 89 Schieder, Theodore, 4 Mitscherlich, Alexander, 19 Pisar, Samuel, 361 Schilling, Jurgen, 316 ModelPki, George, 83 Pitman, George R., 445 Schmidt, Helmut, 94, 251 Monaghan, Henry P., 231, 271 Fledge, Robert, 134 Schmitt, Hans A., 24 Montfort, Colonel- division- Pomeroy, William J., 132 Schneider, Fernand-Thiebaut, nsire, 232-233 Possony, Stefan T., 241 95, 252 Moot, Robert C., 308 Posvar, Wesley W., 93 Schnippenkoetter, Swidbert, Morgan, Patrick M., 306 Poulantzas, Nicholas M., 474 375 Morgan, Roger, 84 Prader, Georg, 9 Schatze, Walter, 254 Morgenthau, Hans J., 20, 23 Prescott, J. R., 290 Schatzsack, Clio, 253 Mourin, Maxine, 85 Proxmire, William, 314 Schwan, Alexander, 23 Mowrer, O. H., 17 S,hwarz, Siegfried, 185 Mozingo, David P., 93 Schwarz, Urs, 448 Mailer, Johannes, 234 Scott, Hugh, 122 Mukerjee, Dilip, 419 wester, George H., 421-423 Scott, J. P., 25 Hurl, S. P., 105 Scoville, Herbert, 478

Marti, V. V. Banana, 105 Seatorg, Glenn T , 172 MUskie, Edmund S., 86 Seamans, Rkbert C., 25; Myrdal, Gunnar, 132 Radovanovi6, Ljubomir, 135, Sears, Robert R., 117 362 Seetzen, Jurgen, 475 Ramsey, Russell W., 136 Semenov, V. S., 450 N Ramundo, Bernard A., 334 Sen, Chanakya, 26 Ramsford, H. Edward, 17 Shaplen, Robert, 132 Narain, Iqbal, 105 Rapoport. Anatol, 31, 392 Sharabi, Hisham B., 138 Narain, Vivendra, 105 Rau, Erwin M., 242 Sharma, D. N., 342 Narveson, Jar., 153 Raven, Bertrso. H., 126 Sharrcw, Joel D., 271 Nathusius, 310 Raven, Woltram van, 171 Sherif, Carolyn, 17 Rau, 1.1vig, 235 Fay, 243 Eherif, M.Jtafer, 17 Fcbert, 391 Fnyuoi, D. R., 105 .71-x.rtel., Janes, 21 Neumann, Erich Feter, 21 Rehm, Walter, 315, 244 Gerold H., 4.:;;, Newnan, Arthur ,482 Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 137 Sievert, Regina, 139 Niblock, Michael, 207 Feischauer, Edwin 0., 90 :".igml, Leon Y., 28 Niu, Sien-chong, 473 Reitzner, Almar, 461 Sights, A. P., 256 Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U.S., Fhce, T. C., 245 Sihanouk, Norodom. See Noro- 428 Gt.tholl, 4 dcm Sihanouk Yarman, King of Nordic 2or.ference on Fea':e Re- Rhyne, Charles S., 335 Cambodia search, 31, Lund (1968), 391 Richter, Hans, 165 Silverman, ',mold W., 17 Norman, Ilc.11, 237 Ries, John C., 383 Singer, J. David, 151 ay- AUTHOR iNDEX 107

Singh, Bishwanath, 51 Thant, U, 343 Wallace, J. F., 273 Singh, Nagenira, 365 Thiess, Frank, 35 Walsh, John L., 493 Singh, S. Lila], 244 -homes, Michael W., 72 Walters, Richard H., 17 Singh, ic,gendra, 367 Thompson, Sir Robert G. K., Walton, Richard E., 406 Sivers>n, Randolp% M., 29 152 Walton, Richard J., 274 Sku,-nik, W. A. E., 318 Timasheff, Nicholas S., 6 Walzer, Michael, 153 Small, Melvin, 151 Toch, Hans ,17 Ward, Maurice J., 483 Sm.-t, Ia., 449 Toulemonde, Bernard, 344 Wasserstrom, Richard A., 153 Smith, Gerard C., 450 Wayper, C. L,, 108 Smith, Robert B., 317 U Weidenbaum, Murray L. 306 Snouck-HurgronJe, Jan, 236 Weinberg, PW,ip, 271 Sebik, Erich, 257-258 Uhlig, Franit, 236 Welch, Claude E., 318 Solomon, Robert L., 30 Ulam, Adam B., 160 Whetten, Lawrence L., 37, 274 Sombart, Nicolcus. 23 Ulsamer, Edgar E., 266 White, Isaac D., 154 Son, Chae-sok, 25l U.S. Blue Ribbon Defense Wiberg, Hg.kan, 391 Spartz, John N., ,,5 Panel, 267 Wienand, Karl, 368 Speidel, Hans, 260 U.S. Congress. House. Commit- Wienhafer, Elmer, 277 Sleier, Hans, 23 tee on Foreign Affairs. Sub- Wilcox, Wayne, 105 :standard, William L., 132 committee on Europe, 268 Wilke, Dieter G., 407 Steel, Ronald, 93 U.S. Congress. Sarate. Commit- `dill are, Jean-Claude, 318 Stevenson, John R., 464 tee on Government Opera- Williams, P. M., 315 Stone, Isidor F., 261, 76- tions. Subcommittee on Na- Williams, Ralph E., 1SD 377, 425 tional Security and Irtrcna- Wilpert, Friedrich von, 142 Storrow, James J., 274 tional Operations, 93 Windelen, Heinrich, 463 Storry, Richard, 97 U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Windsor, Philip, 143 Strole, D. L., 236 Media Services, 101 Wiseberg, Laurie, 383 3tuci, Alfred, 366 L.S. Dept. of Army, 269 Woito, Robert, 360 Stuiver, M., 319 U.S. P':esident's Commission on Wolfe, Bertram D., 369 Subrahmanyan, K., 263 an All-Volunteer Armed Wolff, Beverly M., 271 Suh, Lae -Sook, 4 Force, 270 Wood, Alfred J., 453 Sullivan, Robert R., 264 Unnithan, Thottamon K. K. N., Wooters, Carry J., 109, 271 Summerlin, Sam, 424 367 Wriggins, W. Howard, 35 Swanborough, Gordon, 174 UschLer, Manfred, 103 Swingle, Paul G., 31 Symington, William Stuart, 98 V Starves, Robert F., 480 Y-le, Wesley W., 154 Van Den Berghe, Pierre L., 318 York, Herbert F., 320 T Van der Krcef, Justus M., 104 Yams, Shanti P., 105 z Talbot, .hillips, 99 Vendryes, Georges A., 179 Tatu, Michel, 141 Vernant, Jacques, 462 Zador, Heinrich, 279 Taubinger, L. M. von, 176 Vic.ker, Ray, 272 7artman, I. Wiliam, 318 Taylor, Maxwell D., 93 Von Simson, Piers, 465 Zbinclen, Hans, 39 Taylor, Pamela, 271 Zoppo, Ciro E., 280, 383 Taylor, Stuart P., 27 Zurayk, Constantine, 131 Tedeschi, Janes T., 31 Terhune, Kenneth W., 31, 33-34 Wagner, Robert H., 106 Terzibaschitsch, Stefan, 17/, Walker, Richard L.,4 265 Wallace, Don, 107

113 SUBJECT INDEX [Numbers refer to entries.:

!FAB CeGNIRIES--Centirei relations with the Un,ited States, 138 ABM. SecAntimissile defense systems Soviet policy, ANZUS TREATY. See Pacific Security Treaty ARAB-1SRAELI DISPU":E. 131 under 'reaties, agreements, etc. Arab view, 138 ACCIDENTAL WAR, 403 intern tier.sl law, 468 AEROSPACE INDUSTRY Palestinian refugees, 133 France, 409 settlement, 122, 125 Great Britain, 165 creation of a Sear East "..-,corny, 355 AFRICA FaJestinian refugees 46, conflict, 16 role of srall countries, 120 role of the military, 315 U.S. policy, 114 Sino-Soviet competition, 272 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1956-1957), '29 AFRICA, NORIii, 14 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1967), 136 AFRO-ASIAN NA:IONS, role in the ..'n'ted Na- AFC1.GeFNTSI1 :7STRY. Sce Defense industsy tions, 342 ARP.EL FORCES,505 AGREEMENTS. See Treaties, agreements, etc. air-mobile forces, 167 AGGRESSION Communist China, 243, 25/ anthropological analysis, 32 comparative statistics, 220 behavioral analysis, 17 East Germany, 2:,4 biological aspects, 25 Europe, 239 Communist view, Great Britain, 187, 354 See also Conflict; Violence Israel, 279 AIRCRAFT U.S.S.R. Anglo-German collaboration, 174 patriotism, 301 France, 409 See also specific branches under U.S.S.R. Great Britain, 168 West Germany, 2C.T., 251, 277 naval, 148 See also peacekeeping and security forces AIRPOWER ARMS AND A.E.AMENTS Mediterranean area, 74 national expenditures, 220 U.S. doctrine, 256 Nerth Atlantic Treaty Grganikat;on, 1(4 ALBANIA, rule in Europe, 459 reiuction or elimination, 370, 3'S,:178, ALLIANCE FOB FROGRESS, 71 313, 437 ALLIANCES Australian view, 387 Anglo-French nuclear deterrent force, 207 bibliography, 2(9 role in Soviet-U.S. raritine competition, effect on Asia, 384 222 effect of A.B]4 deployment, 3?0 '.united States, 101, 154 history, 376 See alsoTreaties, agreements, etc.; S.r.- Leti. 414 alinement mitJal talancel force re-diction, 3e::5 AMALRIK, ANDREI, 126 naval limitation, 373 ANTARCTIC TREATY, 380 roclear weapons, 371 kalc:Nism, United States, 313 post-World War II period, 377 ANTIMILITABISM, United States, 306 pr:spects, 381 ANIIMISSII.7. DEFENSE SYSTEMS Pugwash movement, 446 deployment strategic arms limitation talks. See effects, 436, 439, 401, 443, 445 under :;e,;otiations U.S. controversy, 158, 295-29), 353 U.S. role, 339 limitation. Son Negutiations--strategic U.S. policies and proposals, St?, 391 arms limitation talks U.S.-Soviet draft treaty in the ses1ei, sea -base] antiballistic missile intercept system 177, 1E,D, verification, Unitei Ctates Crnference en criticism, 181 A[77,,r,ntS (1:1-1)del,i policy, 231, 390 i,r,qn ViC,, :IC programs, 266 See also Jtrateg.c armt limitation talk Senate debates, 258 under Ne,7,utiations ANTISUIWRINE WARFARE, United States, 155 research and development. See -.efe.nse re- ARAB COUNiRIES search End development relations with the Great icwPrs, 125 trace an], dissemiration, 333, 47.8

108 SUBJECT 1N.A.X 109

AR21.3 AND ARY,Ai,PC13--Ocntin'ied BIBLICGRAPHTE3--Csntinued trade and disserinaticn--L,ntilcied peace research, 374 France, 409 Vietnam, 136 Libya, 117 war and peace, 360 South Africa, 243, 307 UPOLOGICAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biolsg- United States, 49, 175, 41U ical weapons United States, undersea long-range missile BOUNDARIES. INTERNATIONAL system, 166 concepts of, 30 See also Chemical and biological weapons; Sins-Indian dispute, 127 Conventional weapons; Military balance; FREZHNEV DOCTRINE, 32, 334 Missiles; Nucicor weapons IR11)2SH COIC1ONWFALTH IF NATIONS, 11 ARMS RACE nail-Lary culture, 294 effect of strategy, 383 rote in international security, 102 history, 376 mathematical analysis, 390, 335 role of technology, 437 Soviet-U.S. competition, 281, 320, 436, 438 C011E021. Council for Mutual Economic As- Soviet view, 249 sistance United Nations role, 4E3 CAY2bOTIA ARMS TRADE. SeeArms ani armaments--trale insurgency, 129 and disserAnation U.C. poli.ey, 39 ARMS TRAEIC. See Arcs an3 armaments--trade U.S.-South iietnamooe intervention, 131 and disseni nation international law, 323 ASIA CANALA balance of power, 1 defense policies and programs, ClYil de- effect of ma,!or war, 111 fense, 273, 296 Japanese role, 63, 235 foreign policy, 55, 61 role of outside powers, 33 foreign relatians, United States, 61 security in, 110, 259, radioactive fallout, 210 Australian nuclear policies, 416 SrYION, foreign policy, 105 role of Japan, 108 THAI, foreign relations, France, 134 U.S. policy, 321 CHEMICAL AND IOLOGICAL WEAION,1, 7375 , U.S. role, 60 Australian view, 380 Soviet policy, 69 tar., 426 U.S. policy, 44, 76, 92, 132 iritish proposal, 361 U.S. presence, 40 on biological weapons (proposed), 430 See also Near East; Southeast Asia; specif- role of the International Red C.ros,:, 3E1 ic countries disposal, 427 ASSOCIATIONS defoliants. See under HerEicides; United American Association for the Advancement of Statesdefense policies and programs; 1e- Science, 309 foliant program unier Vietnam National Academy of Sciences, 309 international law, 331 ATLANTIC 1+1LIANCE. See North Atlantic Treaty NAT) view, 366 Organi. tation U.S. policy, 38-429,131 See entries beginning With nuclear West Germany, 432 A.:0MS. FOB PEACE 11201:. See Nuclear energy_ C65CJ,UNIST peaceful uses alprcagl, to negotiations, 402 AUSTRALIA Armed Forces, :63 an: the international Atomic Energy Agency, civil-rilitari relations, 219, 243 336 OefEnse policies and programs defense policies and programs, 227, 229 strategic weapons systems, 212 disarmament policies ani proposals, 360 strategy, 257 nuclear policies and programs, nonprolifera- effect cn strategic tarns limitation talEs, tion treaty, 416 443 AUSTRIA, 399 foreign policy, 105, 152 Africa, 212 Asia,35 history, 96 FAJANCE OF PUWER -done:1a, 65 Far Fast, 1 oliforation of nuclear wsapo..e, 122 Near East, 137 S'...uth Asia, 26 U.-.-1).S.O.R., 434 Southeast Asia, 45, 59,79 far East, 274 C- itti:tacs, 70 See also Military balance fcrelrreletl,ns bAlKAN C) F)11);, 459 :niia, la, 211, 263 BALYIC SEA AREA, 21.2 ini:ro-sia, 104 FAn;INING PHEOFY, 31 U.S.S.R., 1211, 128 Zt,ItIrJci KAN, 377 r.,,cltar war potential, Indian virw, 413 MLANY, IMP, 163 nuclear yeapohs, tibl1ogra04, 269 BIBLIC,GPAYHIES r.-.clear weapons developsent, 176 international relations, 20 role of U.S.- and .-Eviet-t.alned scien- NATO and nuclear weapons, 269 tists, 124 ocean, legal aspects, 470 0,reat to Reiiblic of Korea, 213 t ri 10 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

CHINA, Ct7MI.P. .rI--Continded C'NFEFINCES--Gsntinued threat to United States, 281, 293 International Atomic Energy Agency symposd_m U.N. sip, 440 on safeguards, 477 U.N. polio , , 344 International Radiation Protection Associa- view of Japan's defense policies and pro- tion Congress, 23 (1970), 297 6rams, 273 Nordic Conference on Feace Research, 3d, view of Nationalist China, 28 Lund (1965), 391 See alsoSino-American relations: Sim:- Pugwash Conference on Science and World Af- Soviet dispute fairs, 446 CHRISTIANITY symposium on engineering with nuclear ex'io- rule in East-West relations, 35 sives, 160 view of Europe, 351 Washington Conference on the Limitation of view of war, 353 Armaments (1921-1922), 372 CI1 .LDEFENSE, 296 See also Negotiations Canada, 273 CONFLICT role of volunteers, 253 causes, 15 West Germany, 217, 240 international, perception of injury, 29 CIVILLITARY P;--.LATIONS, resolution, 369, 406 Africa, 318 computer analysis, 405 civic-action progrwts, 354 counselling, 431 CorzAihist China, 219, 243 role of international law, 321 Indonesia, 65 st'..otural aspects, 31 Third World, 293 See alsoAggression; Violence; War United States, 256, 286 CONTAINMENT, Southeast Asia, 407 West Germany, 251, 27 r, 291, 316 CONTROL. See Inspection and verification See also Antihilitarism; Militarism; Mili- CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, ecological effects, 311 tary-industrial complex; Scientific-mili- CO:rNEKENCE THEORY, 89, 369 tary relations CO;;VERSION. See economic conversion under CLAUSEWITZ, KARL VON, 149-150 Defense industry; Defensa research and de- COFFEY', JOSEPH I., 233 velopment--'jnited States COLL WAR, 62 COOPERATION, INTERIATIONAL history, 57, 123 Avis,68 COLLECTIVE 2EEE2 Z5. Sec:rity, interna- 'southeast Isis, 458 tional COST-EFFECT1WEN:ISS ANALYSIS, U.S. AP-I deploy- CCILE(.:TIVE SECURITY. See Security, interna- ment, 441 tional COUNCIL FOB :DUAL ECONOMIC ASSISIA:;CE, role COMv.AND CON:ROL of East Germany, 12 communications systems, 397 COUNTERINSURGENCY nuclear geapons. ElnoPe, d96 U.S. policy, 175 Tonkin Gulf Crisis (1964), 404 See also Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency CO=TEE 05 DISAEMAMENT, 386 CRISIS MANAGE/INT, 4.I4 CO!.1-,1C.N MARKET. SeeEuropean Ecoomic Commun- flexible response. 199 ity Formosa Straits crises, 28 0!=NICATINS SYSTEMS, MLITARY, United perception of injury, 29 States, 397 CZECHISLDVARIA, Soviet invasion, effect cn CO:.MNIFX i-`nropean integration, 461 an! Soviet foreign policy, 130 ideology, 5 U.S. v1ev, 313 00=_rNIST C,JNTR1ES EECIS1C;NMAKING Euerrilla warfare st'-ategy, 152 and perception of injury, 29 international law, 330 behavioral analysis,6 Soviet relations with, 334 bureaucracy, 386 views on Faropean security, 37 Unite' States, 93, 237 Fee alsoE'.ste:n KTrope; ?inc- Soviet dis- criticIsn, 267, 323 pute; Warsaw Treaty '.,rganization, specific evecutivc vs, legislative, 33, 95 countries Vietnaz Wax, 4)0 CCM-VIERS, international relations analysis, D233 !;.55 N.7:91-= 55:2 EXIENDITUPES, :93 4:5 cnyarative statistics, 220 CONFiENCE OF ALL EUROEIAN OWN:RIK.; (IRD- ec.:nomic effects, PL.:4EL). See European security conference Great Tritain, 65 (proposed) underConferenc,c; alcc onder apan, 2;1 E,repe--security in relucticns. :ee Lefenve cdttask:, CCNFFRENCE THE CO!,MilLE t3 D1SAIVA, United :tote:, 2,4, 236 U.S.-Joviet draft treaty on the seated, 369 criticism, 314 eccitutic effects, conference of non-nuclear-weapon countries, West Semany, civil defense, 217 375 DFFESSF CITB4IKi Furopear security conference (proposed).56, Great Pritain, 15; 62, 141 United States, 235, 305, 312 Finnish view, 453 econtriic effects, 352 Soviet view,360 DETM,E 1NDCSIRY 7.I.co61at vier,362 economic conversion, 312 11r, SUBJECT INDEX III

r.)EFENSE. INDUSTRYContinued ECONOMIC ETFECTS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 305, economic conversion Ccntinued 310 shipbuilding, 182 shipbLilding, 482 United States, 481, 483 United States, 293, 316, 312, 483 United States, 282 ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, internat-onal See also Aerospace industry; Military-in- firms, 22 dustrial complex; Nuclear energy industry EIGHTEEN NATION COIOIITTEE ON DISARMAMENT.See DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, United States, 282 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D., and disarmarlent, 377 Japan, 245 ITGLAED. See Great Britain oceanography, 473 ENVIRONNENTAL POLLUTION. See Ecology strategic weapons systems, 448 ESCALATION, 256 United States, 304 ETHOLOGY. 25 economic conversion, 491 See aii. Violencecauses; War -- causes; naval, 236 also underPeace--approaches U.S.-Soviet competition, 161 EUROPE DEFOLIANTS. See _under Herbicides German problem, 455 DrANTE integration, 351, 451, 457 East -West, 440 British policy, 239 proposal for a European security confer- nuclear deterrent force, 207 ence, 453 role in Fear East pesos settl.,,ment, 355 Europe, 123 role of Great Britain, 190 West German policy, 94 science and technoLogy, weapons development, Soviet -U.S., 434 164 DI,G7FRRENCE, 395 security in, 4, 123, 194, 452, 456 and flexible response, 199 air-motile forces, 167 and strategic arms limitation talks, 449 Anglo-German relations, 84 Anglo-''.,u h nuclear force, 282 Communist view, 37 assured d!struction, 448 deterrence, 396 effect c. ABM deployment, 298 European security conference (Prolcoed). India, 418 46, 81-82, 113, 223, 362 of Communist China, 413 Finish proposal, 453 role of multiple independently targetable prospects, 141 reentry vehicles, 169 Soviet view, 46C sea-based vs. land-based, 226 French view, 254 stable deterrence, 445 role of. theory, 31 Balkan countries, 459 Western Europe, 396 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 192, See alsoStrategy 233, 260 DEvELOPING COUNTRIES United States, 102, 204, 268, 286 relations with the West, 15 'Welt German Navy, 198 South Asia, 26 strategic arms limitation talks, 447 DIPLCACY, military attaoh4s, 10 U.S. Air Force, 234 DISENGAGEMENT, U.S. policy in Vietnam, 86 West German view, 276, 457 DRAFT. See Military service, compulsory urificatfon, 39, 112, 454, 462 German reunification., 143 history, 24 E West German policy, 94 See also East -West relations; Central Eu- ENDC. See Conference of the Committee on rope; Eastern Europe; European-U.S. rela- Disarmament tions; Western Europe; specific countries See EURATOM. European Atomic Energy Commun- NJNOPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE (PROPOSED). See ity under Conferences; also underEurope--se- FAST-WEST RELATIONS curity in moral and ethical aspects, 35 EUROPEAN-U.S. RE,ATIONS the German problem, 455 problems and prospects, 268 trade, 361 See also horth Atlantic Treaty Organization West German policy, 94 See also Soviet-U.S. relations; specific F countries LASTEAN EUROPE FALLOUT. See Radioactive fallout and European Integration, 461 FAR EAST. See Asia; South Asia; Southeast Soviet policy, 3, 58 Asia; specific countries view cn European security, 37 FINLAND See also East-West relations; specific neutrality, 457 countries proposal for a European security conference, ECOLOGY 453 disposal of chemical end biological weapons, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, 192, 199 427 FOOD SUPPLIES, WORLD, 359 effects of war, 311 FORCE, USE CF, United Nations, 347 ECONOMIC COTiER.310N. See under Def.,-me in- KREIGN POLICY, IL dustry; Defense research and development- - decisionmaking process, 8 United States foreign ministers. 83 112 ARMS CONTROL 6. DISARM AS! ENT

FffETUN P71.1CY--CoTtihue0 CEP17ANY FEDOP.A17 PrIT6L7C)--C.-elinued role of military-indTatrial complex, 356 peace research, j6;!. C:ee also under :,recifin cauntries relations with Fast Germany, 63, 73, 118, FRANCE 139. 143 arms, trade and dissegdnation, aircraft, 409 OnANA, relations with the U.S.S.R., 75 defense policies and programs, 197 CHEAT bfi1TA1N foreign policy, 56 aircraft, 174 mutual balanced force reductions, 254 and Third World military traditions, 594 proliferation of nuclear weapons, 422 defense Policies and programs, 168, 167, foreign relations 195, 218 Australis, 416 civic-action progyass, 354 Chad, 134 East of 79, 110, 264 Libya, 117 navel, 159 NATO policy, 194 Ferman Uulf, 119 nuc/eas policies and prag ,ms, .119, 224 disarmament policies and proposals, chemical role in Europe, 3 and biological weapons, 431 role in NATO', 233 foreign policy, 22 1503 TPATI5N-A76RESSION H1TO11E2I5, 27 foreign relations South Airlca, 45, 216 C,ermany, 84 NAT) policy, 251 GTO. See General and complete disarmament national security policies, 239 GALBRAITH, 25EN KENNETH, 369 Navy, 168 021.51GEEORY, 31 role in Europe, 451 negotiation, 405 Ghua POWER,/ peace research, 34 policy toward Southeast Asia, 4C7 GAVIN, JAM22 M., 149 role in South Asia, 105 GENF/3AL AND COMPLETE DISAC,VA/IlliT, 332, 370, ,.7JERRILLA WARFARE 381 Asia, 132 and Asia, 384 Communist strategy, 152 moral and ethical aspects, 353 psychological aspects, 146 Scv:et policy, 379 See also Counterinsurgency; Insurgency U.S. policies aril proposals, 393 9J1NFA, relations with the U..S.?-, 75 See alsoArms and arzaments--reduction ur GI_E' OF ?AIA, right of innocent pascage, elimination; .Negotiations -- strategic arms limitation talks GEIliVA DISARY.AMENT CONFERENCE. See Confer- ence of the Committee on Disarmament RERDIC1LES GENEVA FROTOCOL (1925). See Protocol Prohlt- defoliants, 282, 309 iting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Foi- ecological effects, Vi-thar, 311 sonous or Other Gases, and of Racteriologi- Soviet viev, 42t, cal lethods of Warfare under Treaties, and '.%heva Ifete,00l, agreements, etc. ,OCFLE CONVEN-,T0N, U.S. ratification, 333 X11 'AN'Y foreign relations, foland, 142 IP.FA. ',7nre International Atemi, Energy Agency reTnificatich, 46, 139, 143, 340, 162 111312 two-state ctn:ept, 455 disarmament policies and proposals, i05 EAST foreign policy, 5), 105 almisstoh to the United Natiors, 340 oppositisn parties, ais Armed Forces, 244 :loath Asia, 26 relations with the U.S.S.R., 72 Southeast Asia, 45, 79 relations with West Gerrany, 46, 63_64, 7, nation,d security policies, 78, 211, 263 118, 130, 139, 143, 463 nuclear policies and programs, 413, 413-4C0 lTFRYANf 11:5ERAL REPU?LIC) relations with Communist China, 127 almissicn to the United Nations, 240 INDIAN 02122 aircraft, Anglo-Ue.man collaboration, 374 co774erAtion, 272 Armed Forces, 235, 277, 291, 316 :;cadet policios, 228 chmisal and biological weapons, 42 strategic situation, 119, 195 lefnse iolicis 1E9, 217, INDXH:NA WAR. ',See Vietnam War 24"J, 251, s'6 ifii;EFIk.65,14 Fr.pean ecc.rity conference iproposei), 11, 4r7I1FCATION foreicis ;,:icy, 91 a,r1a1 recirn.aissanae, 1.5T East,.ro E,ropo, L6, 64, 13), 2flb, L61, t,..3 arms contra_ ,.recm,2nts, :;1, 4/5 [stir. 1:,rica, 113 lah cn clerical and tiological wenichs, 432 U.2..2.3., 456 IAEA safeguarlT, 47( forei-h relations notproliferation treaty, 1.7-476 0rtat ?ritain. 64 strategic arrs limitation agreementi., 443 i,lanl. 121 V.S. view, 3,7 Li,52, 14o, 4,s IN:G?GrNDI I re;. -r s-rice, 10, 53 cr...11, 134 ;cicy, 21, 194 5213 Ice alsoCoan!erinsurgen:yi Guerrilla war- 193 fare

1 1 Q SUBJECT INDEX 113

l'/E1,1,1GLNCIS, 4'9 EN: R;1 2,2:2,N CI, 333, 142 fore-len Australiao view, 336 ,,atichs Asia, 68 nonproliferation treaty, 476 safeguards sy.-,-tem, 47/ United States, 201 IN715127I0NAL C(JURT 01 JUSTICE, 325 -ational sec,rity policies, 201,210, 225 IN2EKAT1011AL LAW nuclear policies and programs, 412,421 and Soviet-U.- relations, 324 rearnonent, 493 concept of self-defense, 323 role in Asia, 1, 76, 1o6, 213,25) word role, 85 Convention on the Continental Shelf,46' ,:enocide Convention, 333 OAF.Er:RS, KARL, 315 )ernany, statue of, 73 Gulf of ,:,qaba, 468 IC international adjudication, 321 international legal crier, 350 KENrEDY, .1025 F. and disarmament, 317 intervention. SeeIntervention laws of war, 33I-332 and tne nuclear test ban treaty,425 ot,ter space, 472 i ;S3A, risk of war, 213 :_TEA, reexl.mination, 321 role in maintaining peace, 335, 365 approach to negotiations, 402 seabed, 471 defense policies and programs,213 21205 I0 OF Soviet doctrine, 322, 326, 330, 334 theoretical analysis, 325 comparison with South Vietnam, 394 national security policies, Vienna Convention o% the Law ofTreaties, 213 328-329 U.S.-Korea nutool defense treaty,259 See also U3, troop withdrawal, 398 War- -:oral and ethicalaspects INTERNATIONAL ORNAN:ZATION, 339, 343 32122A5 ApzasTicE CONFERENCE, 38 and the maintenance of peace, 365 KOREAN wsk, settlement, 394 behavioral analysis, 338 control over ocean and seabed, 465 protler,s and prospects, 337 role in the prohibition of che7.ical LAIRD, 2*IVIN R., 261 all bio- LADO logical weapons, 341 Soviet el -a, 326 r-,le in origins Vietnacs r, 116 US. policy, 9 1:;TERNATI-7,: 1123AVIZATi0N5. SeeCreanira- ticns :AT1N A2.2:2122 1 bii1=E:A.71:=L nuclear -free core, 333, 335, 414 i:ACE 1,:U SD:n.171 l',251.1_;ii:?0- POEF,D), 384 relations with the U,S.S.R., Lj INTERNATIONAL i.F.D CI:WS, 341 V.S. policy, 71, 106 West Gernan role, 103 IN:F.FiAT:ONAL DELATIDNS, 7, 383 LIBYA, 117 behavioral analysis, 6, 8 blIllotrathies, 20 LI51E0 NrinASURE:5, nlatheratt..31 criticism, 381 35)D See also need for reorientation, 22 specific steaoures, e.e., t,cgot,a- peace research mcver:nt, 391 tic,ns--strategic arcs linitationtalks; role of national character, 33 Noclear test tan treaty; etc. study and teaching, 93 115111.1 1.315, 154, 38.9 world order, 350 LIN, 1-1.4'), 219 See also Alliances; World order INTENATI,NAL SECT,FITY. Ste Security, inter- 11 national NNPV. IN See 1C'vltiple independently targetablh civil wars, 15 reentry vehicles TNA:!.ARA, 20127 S., Czechoslovakia. See Czechoslovakia--Soiet invasion 2.413RE-1). See Africa, 'north U.S. policy, 67, 184, 274 YAL1, 75 MA511:M1; 222. 233 IS IATICNISM, United Stater:, 50,67, ISFAEL PASSIVE PETALIATINN, A/7,ei Forces, 279 YAMEMATICAL 39D 32.1 Aista, right of innocent !.:5'2117ERP2NE,AI1 AREA passage, end the Falkan countries, 33 relations with Arab coutries, 122 Soviet Navy, 215 2ee alsoArab-Israeli dispute; Aral-Israeli 74, 28) strategic Sit.a&tiGn, 1Z4 War (1956-1957); Arat-IsraeliWar (1967) 17,Pi C:',A51, 75 U.S. policy, 132 WINE, 257 1A:,d, 3.1! .ACTB:t: S., JAFAN EAST. See .tar :'st !CLITAFISX, 315 defense policies and proioa....., 215,22, foreign policy, 97 Africa, 319 Asia, 33 Crz.unist view, 5 Southeast Asia, 59 in Freldian psychology, 283 1:3, 245, 275 119 114 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

MLITARI3:-Gcntinued NEGOT IATION, ART bP,, 406 role in arms race, 437 computer analysis, 405 sociological aspects, 284 Soviet policy, 77 See alsoAntimilitarism; Civil-milita.1% re- U.S., with Communist powers, 401 lations; Military-industrial complex NEGOTIHIONS MILIT4RY AID, U:teal States to Portugal, 41C Communist approach, 402 MILITARY BALANCE, 220 naval limitation, 373 East-West, navies, 205 Soviet policy, 100, 387 U.S.-U.S.S.R., 203, 209, 252, 261 strategic arms limitation talks, 158, 189, Mediterranean area, 124 204, 299, 300, 371, 381, 385, 434, 436, Soviet maritime expansion, 258 436-442, 447, 450 strategic arms limitation talks, 300 Australian view, 380 See also Balance of power effect of Pugwash conferences, 446 MILITARY BUDGETS AND EKEENDITURES. See De- NATO view, 388 fense budgets and expenditures prognosis, 433, 443 MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, U.S., 306 role of military intelligence, 479 and Congress, 314 Dino-Soviet dispute, 111 and disarmament, 377 loviet policy, 46, 77 See also Civil-military relations; BAlitar- technological aspects, 444 ism U.S. policy, 262, 379 MILITARY ORGAiIZATIONS, 284 U.F. public opinion, 435 MILITARY POWER, 214 U.S. Senate debates, 288 MILITARY PROCUREMENT. SeeDefense procure- West German view, 94, 276 ment See alsoConferences 102LITAM PROFESSION, 294-295 NEFAL, 105 MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOMENT. See De- NEUTRALITY fense research and development Austria, 399 MILITARY SERVICE, COMSULSORY Finland, 457 alternatives, 196, 312 Japanese Socialist Party view, 210 United States, 270 Swedish policy, 57 MILITARY STRATEGY. See Strategy Switzerland, 91 MISSILES, 171 See also Nona-inement development, 371 NEUTRALIZATION, .outheast Asia, 4'07 Soviet Navy, 156 NIGERIA, 75 Soviet-U.S. competition, 261 NIXON DOCTRINE, 76, 80 Undersea Long-Range Missile System, 166, NONALINEv.ENT 188, 226 Balkan countries, 135 See alsoAntimissile defense systems; spe- See alsoAlliances; Neutrality cific types, e.g. Multiple independently NONLETHAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biologi- targetable reentry vehicles; also under cal weapons specific countries NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. See under Prolifer- MORALIiY OF WAR. See War-moral and ethical ation of nuclear weapons aspects NONVIO...ENCE, 51 MJLTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VE- sociological analysis, 367 HICLES See also Violence deployment, 163, 169, 299, 436, 443 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 232 limitation. SeeNegotiations--strategic and European security, 223 arms limitation talks British policies and programs, 237 MJTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION. See under communications systems, 397 Arcs and armaments -- reduction or elimination Communist view, 185 Council view of proposed European security N conference, 362 defense policies and programs, 2D6 NATO. SeeNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization disarmament policies and proposals, 368 NATIONAL CHARACTER, 33 history, 123 NATIONAL INTEREST, 8 nuclear weapons bibliogr.khy, 269 NAVAL WARFARE, 236 problems and prospects, 233, 260 antisubmarine warfare, 155 public opinion, West Germany, 21 international law, 331-332 role in European unification, 454 role of aircraft, 146 role of U.S. Air Force, 234 NA714S Spanish view, 42 world comparison, 205 statistics, 235 See also :.avy under specific countries strategy. 189, 192, 199, 235 NEAR EAST U.S. policy, 184, 194 Arab-Israeli dispute. SeeArab-Israeli weapons technology, 164 dispute West German role, 251 balance of ,over, 274 See also Europe -- security in; European-U.S. political settlement, 122 relations; also NATO policy under spe- proposal for a Near East Community, 355 cific countries role of Great Fevers, 137 NJ CLEAR ENERGY Soviet policy, 161, 2i$0 military potential, 416 tension. See Tensico-Near East peaceful uses U.S. policy. 49, 120. 124 India, 420 ,-nn SUBJECT INDEX IIS

NUCLEAR WERGY--Cnn'tinued peaceful usesCctitinded OCEAN instectionand verification, 45 carbon-14, 319 Japan, 412 continental shelf, 467 rucLEAR ENERGY' INDUSTRY, U.S., 172 corporate sovereignty, 465 NUCLEAR EXPII.OIONS international law, 466 effects, 296 peaceful uses, bibliography, 470 peaceful uses, .63, 165, 417 pollution, draft convention cn the seated, International Atomic Energy Agency, 336 4CL nonproliferation treaty, 415 research, 250 U.:;.S.R., 162 strategic importance, .73 See also Nuclear energypeaceful uses See also Sea:ced See also Nuclear weapons tests; Fauiation, OIER-KEISSE LIFE, 142 Radioactive fallout OKINAWA, reversion to Japanese control, 191, NUCLEAR E{FLOSICLS, CNDERGROOND, 427 210 NUCLEAR FORCES, 224 OSGANDZATIONS 7.0jCLEAR-FREE SOLES American Assoziaz.ion for the Advancement ct satin America, 365 Science, 265 South Asia, /.:5 Federation of American Scientists, 288 NIILFAR RALIATICN. See Radiation International Atonic Energy Agency, 338 NUCLEAR REACTORS International Red Cross, 341 fast-breeder, 172 , 175, 120 Members of Congreor for Peace Through Law, India, 419 302 Japan, 412 See also specific organizations, e.g., In- NJCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOW,ENT ternational Red Cross France, 179 OSITOLITIK, See Germany (Federal Republic)- - gas-centrifuge technology, 42) foreign policy -- Eastern Europe India, 418 NjULEAR SAFEGUARDS SY:.L:ill6 F Jap-sanese view, 421 nonproliferation treaty, 336, 476 PACEY. IN TERRIS EJOANNES XXIII, PURE], 353 NUCLEAR STRATEGY FACIFIC OCEAN, 8D India, 135, 416 PACIFISM, 315, 353 United States, 188 PAKISTAN NISCLEAR TEST FAN TREATY, 370, 438 foreign policy, 26, 66, 99, 17)5 and peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, relations with India. 263 162, 417 FAX g-tFRICXNA. 12 effect on weapons development, 439 FEAE U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 121 achievement and maintenance, 365, 369 NUCLEAR VAR Europe, 4, 461 prevention. See Deterrence sociological analysis, 367 psychological aspects, 3D3 violence, 289 See also Oivil defcnse; War world order, 381 NUCLEAR WEAPDNS, 171 a;Irc'5ch?L. 87, 319, 357. 363, 382 accidents, 103 art of negotiation, 106 anOsition, 413 liblicgraphy, 360 deterrence, 395 Clausewitzian theory, 149 development, 371 co..,rselling, 338 Australia, 1:6 eddcation, 147 Communist China, 212, 424 ethology, 13 France, 224 international adjudication, India, 118-119 international law, 327, 335 Japan, 121 interrational trade, 361 dissemination. See Froliferati,n of nucle- noral and religious, 351, iii ar weapons psychology, 19 effects. See Nuclear explosions -- effects; sociology, 23 Nucl-ar warprobable effects; NJolear socio;clitical, 352 weapons tests; Radiation; Faliosctive iviss I.e;artmhnt of Fence fallout w)rli foci Indian view, 211 tblicgraphy, 3'1 lays nf war, 331 role of intellect...11s, 17 North Atlantic treaty Organixation, titliog- a also Was raphy, II1571 mr_.7Eva, United .Itates. 51 proliferation. lee proliferation of nJcle- ar weapons IFACI R11.iARCii.. 23, 863, _i64 and the soldier, 357 public opinion, United States, 435 a;;Ilcaticns, 392 reduction Cr elimination. Fee Negotia- criticism, 159 tionsstrategic arms limitation talcs care theory, ,34 space, 176 history, 144, 349. 356, 364, 37.. tactical ..:ses, 192 rethoiology, 391 See alsoKissiles Vest Gen- ..any, 352,368, 161

19)1 116 ARMS CONTROL DISARMAMEN T

PEACEFUL OdEXISIENCE, 5, 331 SATELLITES, 170 PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DICPtiTES, 348, 389 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 383 ITACEF.UL USES CF NUCLEAR ENERGY. See Nuclear effects on civilization, 382 energypeameful uses effects on strategic arms limitation talks, PEACEKEEPING, 383 444 PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY FORCES United States, 178, 304 command and control, 346 U.S.-Soviet competition, 157 United Nations, 339, 345, 347 SCIENITSTS, 382 PERCLAN GULF, 119, 264 SEABED, 388 PLOWSHARE, /ROJECT, 160 corporate sovereignty, 4c5 See also Nuclear explosions -- peaceful uses demilitarization vs. denuclearizaticn, 474 POLAND, relations with Germany, 121, 142 international control, 337, 471 POLLUTION, See Ecology peaceful uses, 469 POPULATIDN EXPLOSION, 359 tibliography, 470 PORTUGAL, U.S. military aid, 410 U.S, policy, 464 POWER (CONCEPT), 214 strategic importance, 473 FRE-GONDOLA, PROJECT, 165 treaties, agreements, etc. (proposed), F19011FERATIN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 353 380 effect of A3M deployment, 298 See also Ocean effect of nonsignatories of nonproliferation SEAFGWER, 205 treaty, 422 antimissile defense systems, 180 E-rope, 204 Ealtic Sea area 242 European deterrence system, 396 Cape of Good Hope route, 48, 246 nonproliferation treaty, 370. 375, 381, 438 role cf nasal aircraft, 148 and peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, Soviet-U.S. competition, 137, 222, 230, 280 417 U.S.S.R., 215, 250, 258, 271 Australian view, 416 United States, 166, 186, 188, 236 International Atomic Energy Agency, 336 SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL, 378 safeguards system, 476-477 and national sovereignty, 339 Japan, 225, 421 nuclear weapons, 375 peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 475 Soviet policy, 81 peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, 415 U.S. role, 102 Swedish view, 423 See also North Atlantic Treaty Crgamiza- Swiss view, 411 tion; Security, regional FR)TOCOL PROHIBITING THE USE IN WAR OF ASEKYX- SECURITY, REGIONAL IATIN.9, POISONOUS OR OM ER GASPS, AND OF Asia, 110, 213, 263 BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE, 426 Balkan countries, 135 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF WAS 303 Eastern Europe, 152 PULIC OPINION Southeast Asia, 59 United States, 93, 435 ZEIT-DEFENSE, 323 West Germany, 21 SENEGAL, 75 IGGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AF- SHIPS FAIRS, 446 Great Britain, 159 U.S.S.R., 156, 173 United States, 462 RADIATION, protection, 287, 297 SIND-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1 RADICACTIVE FALLOUT accommodation, 40 atmosphere, 292 history, 70 detection and measurement, 290 prognosis, 58, 96 ocean, 319 Taiwan issue, 76 REARMAMENT, Japan, 245 U.S. policy, 49 REGIONALISM, Southeast Asia, 458 SING - INDIAN DISPUTE, 127 REM2JE SENSING, 480 SIND-SOVIET DISPUTE, 69, 115 REPORT ON MILITARY SPENDING (1970) EMElaBERS CT Communist Chinese policy, 153 CAGRESS FOR PACE THROUGH LAW), 302 Communist Chinese territorial claims, 128 RESEARCH AND LEVELOFMENT See Lefense re- effect on Korea, 213 search and development; Nuclear research and effect on Soviet disarmament policies and development proposals, 357 REV:IETENS, 9 Indian Ocean area, 272 KMAN CATHOLIC CKGRCH pcssitility of war, 96, Ill, 126, 181 effect or. Iclish-West Ge-man relations, 121 prognosis, 58 view cf war, 353 Seth Asia, 26 West German view, 52 F.7_1S.1I2. See Uricn of Soviet Socialist PeiA- 13.2 :I50- SOVIET RELATIONS, 1 SG,LITH AFRICA, REFUEL1C OF

S defense policies and progrars, 307 fcreign policy, 15 SAPS. See Strategic arms limitation talks proliferation of nuclear weapons, 422 under Negotiations relations with Great Britain, SAFIXASdS SIS7EMS. See tidclear safec,iards I tr1H ASIA systems international relations, it SAIISPCRY, HASSI&ON, 126 security in, 1705

1t,n SUBIECT IND. 'X II?

SOGtH A31A-Cnntinaed SWIlT'nRIAND E;ee alSOFarlast; `Sou th, act Asia; s) eol fie foreign p.olicy, 91 countries n:clear policies and pn)cr%ms, 411 SnUMEA.:T P..2)J1 peace research, 366 conceptOfboundaries, 33 international cooperation, 4;8 security in 'iTCHNGLC.GY, 2, 43Y 115.105 role, 45, 79 TENSIDG Looses Ian policy, 1(14 Cambodia, 029 U.S. role, 59 Iran-Suudi Arabia, 264 U.S. policy, 8) Near East, 122, 131, 137-13e, 161 Western poi-icy, 407 Sine-inh'ian border, 127 See also Asia; South Asia; Vietnam Pat; South Africa, 337 siecific countries 0hRI2DRIAL DISPUTin Si_li.11EAST ARIA TREATY OKIIANIZATZON, Cornunist China-India, 128 S,'VEREIGNTI, 322, 339 Golf of A3aba, 1468 :l.1'1).1' UNION. See Union of Fuvict Soi,lirt Sler-Neisse lino, 121 Republics See also line-Soviet dispute SDVIE7-U.S. RELATIONS, 189, 204 TERRORISM. See under Viilence and international lag, 324 MINI) WORlD. SeeDeveloping countries and the German question, 194 TDDIVINSRT, SERGE, 126 cc nvergenoe theory, 89, 369 TONXIN GULF CRISIS (1964), 404 deaente 434 INTERNATIONAL, 361 effect on Soviet d is arma:nent policies cued TREATIES, AOREEMEItTS, ETC. 364 programs, 387 arms control and disarmament, 380 hirtor7, 123 nonproliferation treaty. See under Pro- military balance. Sec Military balance liferation of nuclear weapons Near East, 274 Pacific Security Treaty (1951), 227 nuclear test ban treaty negotiations, 425 Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of As- possibility of war, 376 pthyziating, Poisonous or Other G3S,2S, and pr,,,,,nosi.s, 58 of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 426 See also Negctiations--strategic arms limi- U.(3. ratification, 528-429 tation talks Soviet doctrine, 326 GFACE Treaty of Mutual Cooperation ant Security Indian programs, 419 (Japar.-Cnited States), 108, 2u1, 210, 225 military use 171, 176 Treaty for the Prohibition cf Nuclear ..leap- peaceful uses, 474 01.5in Latin America, 385, 414 U.S. prograrus, 170 Turko-Groek Naval Protocol (193(1), '313 S:ACE LAW, 472 Turko-Soviet Naval Protocol (1931), 373 S:AIN, 52 United States, 1 STONE, :/..REMY 2., 288 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, STRATEGIC ARMS LIMISATION TAMS. fee under 3(38-329 Negotiations West Gernan-Scvlet renunciaticr-of-force STRATEGIC NNMBING agreement, 41, 82, 140, 330, 462 ecological effects, 311 See also North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- Vietnam, 256 tinn; Warsaw Treaty Crganization; specific STRATEGIC WRIAPIN3 SYSTE13S, limitation. :e.e treaties Negotiations-strategic arr.s limitation TRIATIN, I,3PEEI7NTS, ETC. (1-RGROSED) talks United Kingdom draft _unvention for the pro- STRATEGY hibitiofi of biological methods of warfare, air-mobile forces, 167 351, 431 bibliography, 269 U.S. draft convent.o4 on the international Crmunist Chita, 219 seabed ea, 464 effect of technology, 336 U.S.-Republic of Force joint security trea- India, 211, 413, 418 ty, 213, 69 Mao Tse-tung's doctrines, 251 U.S.-Soviet draft treaty prohibiting the em- mathematical analysis, 163 placement of nuclear weapons and other North Atlantic Treaty Crganization, 199, weapons of rasa destruction on the s(abci ;'35 and ocean floor ant in the subsoil ¶1.,re- flexible reslonse, 192 of, ?50, 1.69, 575 naval, .1.6 1-RRATY CF IlATELO1.CO. Seatreaty for tie survey, 376 irchibition of Nuclear ',"capers in Latin U.S.S.R., 221 America u.nier Treaties, ageer.ents, etc. Unite' States, 6G, iôS, 116, eSS, 12 Tl,EA-if CCI FRINCIFLFS Cr..VERNING 1111. ACIIVITI:,t :,a-basel deterrent, 166, If SIATEz, IN TEE EXFL6PATi3N AID 'ISE OF ,,P7- tactical, 175 FIR flArE, NCLUDING TEl WiON AND C.TH!'R CF1K.- West Germany, 235 BDDlES, 350 See alsoDeterrence 7111N, ..,CbMAPINE WARFARE, 331-332 SUbMARINES, U.S.S.R., 23). :WYT1N foreign policy, 67 t1."2. See Unierrea Lung-Range Missile Syutem nonlroliferation treaty, 423 underMissiles 1 94r/ 118 :1/4RMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. See Guerrilla war- THE UNITED a.5%120 AND THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN fare; Irn,urgency EUROPE5,796.211 I. CC:TETI, 232 UNILATERAL DISARMAd.ENT, 353 UNITED STATES UNION OF SOVIET SWIALIST REWBLICS aerial reconnaissance capabilities, 480 and European security, 37 and Communist Chinese nuclear-weapons pro- Armed Forces, 301 gram, 424 Baltic Sea area, 242 antimissile defense systems. See Antimis- defense policies and programs, lel, 209, 260 sile defense systems antimissile defense systems, Armed Forces Europe, 194, 206 is Europe, 216 future, 300 pronosal for an all-volunte,?r Armed Indian Ocean area, 272 Force, 270 maritime supremacy, 259 See also specific branches under United Mediterranean area, 124, 182, 215, 250 States (Government) Nary, 156 arra and armaments, 249 strategic weapons systems, 261 arms trade and dissemination, 410 defense research and development, 161 constitutionality of Vietnam War policy, disarmament. policies and proposals, 377, 231, ni 379, 387 defense budget and expenditures, 282, 312 chemical and biological weapons, 426, 431 criticism, 226, 302, 314 foreign policy, 58, 77, Si, 95, 152 economic effects, 306 AZrica, 75 planning procedures, 308 Arat-Israeli dispute, 133 defense cuttas.ks, 248, 397 Asia, 38, 69, 110 defense industry comparison with U.S. foreign policy, 89 economic conversion, 483 Eastern Europe, 3 shipbuilding, 482 Europe, 46, 112, 456 defense policies and programs, 93, 20), ideological factors, 100 204, 265, 267 Indian Ccean arca, 228 and South Africa, 45 Mediterranean area, 74 Near East, 137, 274 antisubrarine warfare, 155 chemical and biological weapons, 127 Southeast Asia, 59 criticism, 429 foreign relations Soviet view, 126 Communist China, 226, 128 civil defense, 253 East Germany, 72 criticism, 209 Indonesia, 104 japan, 85 decisionmaking, 98 defoliation, 309 Latin America, 47 Spain. /2 deployment of strategic weapons systems, 262, 299, 141 West Gerany, 41, 62, al.°. 462 Europe, 268 international law, 324, 326, 330 formulation, 237 invasion of C7echoslcva3ia. See Czechoslo- future, 300 vakia-Sovirt invasion graduated military pressure, 256 maritime policy, 222, 25D herbicides, 255 military intelligen...e, 479 Korea, 213, 259 national security policies, 221 Mediterranean area, 124, 152, Navy, 173, 205, 215, 222, 228, 230, 258 Fersian Gulf, 264 nuclear explosions, 162 role cf Robert McNamara, 217 nuclear policies and programs, 424 seapow,". 191 peaceful coexistence, 334 South Korea, 398 possibility of war with Communist China, 111 r,le in world peace, 384 strategic weapons systems, 177, 16.3, satellites, 170 255, 261, 266, 281, 300, 320 science and technology, 157 strategy. See Strategy -- United States strategic arcs limitation talks. tactical weapons systems, 175 See under Vietnam, Negotiations SeeVietnam War-U.S. policy strategic weapons systems, 203 strategic arms limitation talks. See under Negotiations strategy. SeeStrategy-U.S.S.R. defense research and development, 161, 451 sdbmarines, 155 disarmament policies and proposals, See also East-West relations; Sito-Soviet dispute; Soviet-U.S. relations chemical an] biological weapons, 428, 1:1 criticise, 37), 379 UNITE) KINGDOM. See Great Britain seated, 464 UNITED SAIIINS, 315 and qace lay, 472 Senate debates, 285 financing of participation in World War I, Charter, enemy-state clauses, 310 233 committee on the causes of war (proposed), foreign all policies, 107 356 foreign policy, 49, 54, 93 disarmament policies and proposals, 338 alliances, 17'. information dissemilation, 454 Arab-Israel! dispute, 133 1,ba,:ekeeping and sec,blty forces, 345-317 Asia, 3, 49, 44, 76, 57, 93, 92. 132 problems and prospects, 337, 339, 343 British view, 102 relations with cp5munist China, 344 cold war, 57 role of Afro-Asian nations, 312 Ccnrunist China, 70 SUBJECT INDE,C I i9

UNITED STATES-Continued foreign policy -- Continued STATES (aVEFNENT)--Continued Dept. of Defense -- Continued comparison with Soviet foreign policy, 89 criticism, 51, 60, 62 Secretary, 217 Europe, 112 Dept. of State, 401 Far East, 1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 237 India, 99 National Science Foundation, 178 inc'_ian Ocean area, 195, 272 Navy, 236, 383 Indochina, 129 antisubmarine warfare, 155 isolationism, 5c, 67, 286 communications systems, 397 Latin America, 71, 106 comparison with Soviet Navy, 222 Near Fast, 120, 137-138, 274 Indian Ocean area, 195 Fakistan, 99 strategic role, 180 role of Congress, 43 submarine program, 188 role of technology, 2 undersea long-range missile system, 166 President Sian- Soviet dispute, 111 Southeast Asia, 59, 79 foreign aid powers, 107 use of force, 289 role in foreign policy, 101, 109 Vietnam. See Vietnam War - -U.S. policy war powers, 143, 231, 271 foreign relations Asian countries, 90 Australia, 227 VIENNA CONVENTION ON 1315 LAW OF Communist China. See Sino-American re- TREATIES, 328- lations 329 Japan, Ice, 201, 210 V:ETNAM, SOUTH, U.S. troop withdrawal,395 VIETNAM WAR intelligence methodology, 479 internal security, 313 air-mobile forces, 167 intervention, 274 Australian role, 229 bibliography, 136 national security policies, 180, 181, 186, 586 chemical and biological weapons,426, 1,29 iclear g.:arantees, 298 Communist strategy, 152 oceanographic research, 473 defoliation program, 309 effects ratificaticm of the Genocide Convention, 333 role in, ecological, 311 Arab-Israeli dispute, 114 on U.S. defense policy, 209 Asia, 68 on U.S. maritime strategy, 230 rA70, 191, 206, 260 or U.S. society, 317 on world peace, 132 Washington Conference on the Limitation of legal aspects, 323 Armaments C1921-1922), 272 world peace, 381 moral and ethical aspects, 353 eriOns, 116 science and te,hnology, 157, 304 space policies and programs, 170 settlement aftermath, 90 Vietnam War. SeeVietnam War--U.S. policy view of Soviet strategic threat, 203 m6lication of Clausevitzian theory, 149 world role, 12 comparison with Korean settlement, 394 See also East-West relations; Sino-American economic effects, 312 relations; United States (Government) U.S. policy, 19, 241, 398 UNITED STATES (GOVERMENT) constitutionality, 231, 271 Air force, 234 criticism, 22, 51, 129, 132,256, 100 communications systems, 397 Tonkin GO( crisis, 404 U.S. troop withdrawal, 86 Hardpoint defense system, 266 VIOLENCE impact of defense cutbacks, 248 Arms Ccntrol and Disarmament Agency, 401 causes, 13, 27, 119, 147 Army, 397, 127 low-level, 378 Atomic Energy Commission, 172, 127 organizational aspects, 281 Congress role in achieving peace, 289 appropriations power, 109 terrorism, 36 defense spending, 314 foreign aid pavers, 107 Hose of Peprescntatives, Committee on Sci- WAR ence and AstronaJtics, Subcommittee on blitzkrieg, 151 Science, Research and Development, 311 cases, 13, 11, 19, 25, 141, 356, i53, role in foreign policy, 43, 98,101, 191 35) role in national security policy, 201 charging nature of, 356 Senate, 288 history, 145 vex powers, 231. 271 !Gust %sr, 353 Dept. of Defense legal aspects, 331-332 Congressional criticism, 226 moral and ethical aspects, 153,313, 315, defense budget and expenditures, 1:8 353 organization arri management, 267 q;erAltative analysis, 151 research and development, 161 st-ategy. SeeStrategy study rf, 150, 360 role in civilian research anddevelopment, 312 survey, 378 termiration, 144, 349, 364 120 :1RNIS CONTROL & DISARNIAM LNT

WAR--Ccntinued WES:ERN EURTECsntinued victory, 358 See also specific countries Vietnam. See Vietnam War EiROPEAN UN:ON WAR CRE!,ES. See International law - -war supervision of West German CEW ben, 432 crimes; War- -moral ami ethical aspects WORLD GOVER2/.ENT, 7 WARSAW PACT. See Warsaw Treaty Organization WORLD LAW. See international la, WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION WORLD ORDER end European security, 223 approaches, 351 and NATO, 194 Asia, 384 European security conference (proposed), lid. changing nature of, 365 history, 123 role cf international law, 325, 335 problem.- .nd prospects, 452 U.N. contribution, 347 role. cr E,.st '.;.:rmany, 72 U.S. role, 12 WASh:.H.10T CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITAT:ON OF WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER, 335 (1927.-1922), 372 WORLD POLITICS. See International relations fee Arms and armaments; also spec- WORLD WAR I, 50, 293 iriQ types of weapons: e.g., Missiles;Nu WORLDWAR II, 76 :,-or weapons COUNTRIPZ maritime policy, 222 relations with South Africa, 307 WESTEEN EUROPE unification, 396 YUGOSLAVIA, 459

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