May 29, 19.57
Tentative chronology of part played by scientists in decision to use the bomb against Japan
1. Early 1944 "Everyone took for granted that the new bombs ~ould be used in Europe if they were ready in time." (Compton, p. 231; for complete refer ences see attached bibliography) 2. Early 1944 The men on the metallurgical project beginning to think about the future of atomic energy. (Compton, p. 231) 3. Early 1944 H.D. Srr.wth presented A.H. Compton with an outline of major questions relatins to future of atomic energy. (Compton, p. 232)
4. Summer, 1944 At request ~t Metallurgical Project Council the Jeffries Committee was appointed by Com pton R:t to study "postwar work on nucleonics. 11 (Compton, p. 232) .5. Autumn, 1944 The Tolman Committee was appointed by Gen. Groves to look into future possibilities of atomic energy. Formed background for much of work of Interim Committee in spring of 1945. (Compton, p. 232) 6. Nov. 18, 1944 Jeffries Report, "Nucleonics Prospectus," was submitted to Compton With a covering letter (unpublished) signed by Enrico Fermi, James Franck, T.R. Rogness, Zay Jeffries, chairman, R.S. Mulliken, secretary, R.S. Stone, and C.A. Thomas. 1. Dec. 28, 1944 Tolman Committee handed its report to Gen. Groves on future of atomic energy (Compton, p. 233) 8. Early 194.5 Conversations between Groves and A.H. Compton on use of bomb. Groves brings to Stimson's attention the concern of scientists about immediate use and long-term planning. (Compton, p. 233) 9 March, 194.5 Szilard prepares memo. for Roosevels {Szia rd "memo") Chronology -2-
10. April 1945 Compton appointed a committee of those best :informed to consider "anticipated human, military and political co11sequences': of use of the bomb. Report of th~s comrnittee was brought directly to Stimson (Compton and Daniels).
11. Spring 1945 Franck Committee at ~rk. Referred to by Compton as 11 l ithin our project, the subcom mittee on social and political consequences headed by James Franck focused its attention on this problem ThFe use of bomb ~ " (Compton, p. 233) 12. Spring 1945 Szilard writes to the President and went to X Washington to urge that the bomb not be used. (Compton, p. 241) 13. April 12, 1945 Stimson tells Truman briefly about new explosive after Truman is sworn into office. (Truman, p. 10) 14. April 13, 1945 Byrnes gives Truman more details; 11 later"TI\..I...N- received a scientific account from Bush. (Truman, p. 10) 15. April 25, 1945 Stimson discusses with Truman the relation of the bomb to foreign policy and presents a memorandum discussing secrecy and interna tional control.~Truman, pp. 85 and 87 ~ ; Stimson & Bundy, p. b~S"t\ .) Appointment of Interim Committee by Truman "for recommending action to the executive and legislative branches." {Stimson "Decision")
17. May 28, 1945 Szi~rd presents his March memo (which had not reached Roosevelt before his death) to X Sec 1y of State Byrnes in a personal interview in 1:·Ta shington. (Szilard, "Memo") 18. May 31, 1945 Interim Committee discusses use of the bomb. Possibility of non-military demonstration brougat up; Scientific panel asked to prepare a report on this. {Compton, pp. 219, 234) 19. June 1, 1945 Interim Committee after consult at ions w1 th Scientific Panel unanimously decided: 1) bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible 2) dual target, military and other buildings 3) should be used without prior warning. (Stimson, "Decision") Chronology -3-
20. June 1 1 1945 Conclusions of Int. Com. & Sc. Pan. brought to Truman by Stimson. (Truman, p. 419) Ralph Bard later changed his views and dis sented from recommendation No. 3 of the June 1st report. (Stimson, "Decision,") 21. June, 1945 "Eventually, in June, 1945, the suggestions of these various subcommittees tpf the Jeffries Committe~ were collected into a combined report for the use of the Interim Committee and its successors." (Compton, p. 232) 22. About June 9, 1945 Scientific panel to Interim Commit tee (Lawrence, Fermi, Oppenheimer, and A. H. Compton) \ to prepare report on possible non-militarl1demonstratio • (Compton, p. 240) ~ t; o-t" ~ 23. June, 1945 Hearing that Truman was consulting Stimson about use of the bomb, Franck "and certain members of his committee hastened to draft their conolusions. 11 (Compton, p. 235) 24. June 11, 1945 Franck report presented to Stimson; drawn up by committee of 3 physicists, 3 chemists, and 1 biologist; "dispatched to Washington" six days before teste xplosion. (Editorial, Bull. At. Sc., May, 1946jjCf. Compton,p. 236 which states that Franck was in vfashington, but Stimson was away and report was left for him with Geo. L. H arrison, his assist ant) 25. June 11-16, 1945 Interim Committee and its scientific panel consider the Franck report (Stimson states, "The Interim Committee and the Scientific Panel also served as a channel through which suggestions from other sci entists ••• were forwarded to me and to the President. Among the suggestions thus forwarded was one memorandum which question ed using the bomb at a 11 against the enemy. 11 11 11 Stimson, Deci sion ) 26. June 16, 1945 Scientific Panel reports to Interim Com mittee that they can propose no technical demonstration likely to end war and see no alternative to direct military use. (Stimson, "Deci sion,") Chronology -4-
27. 1945 Szilard circulates petitions in Chicago; urges others to do so in Oak Ridge and Los Alamos, requesting that the atomic bomb should not be used in World War II. (Compton, p. 241) 28. Szilard petition in original form gets no support. Szilard turns revised peti tion over to Compton for delivery to Washington, indicating that it was signed by 67 scienti§ts residing in Chicago. (Compton, pp. 241-42) 29. Counter-petititms to Szilard's circulated at Chicago and Oak Ridge. (Compton, pp. 241-42) 30. July 2, 1945 Stimson sends memo to Truman discussing issue of strong warning to Japan of de struction ~f she does not surrender. Bomb not specifically mentioned 1) because of seorecK and 2) because not yet tested. (Stimson 'Decision") 31. July 6, 1945 President's party, including Byrnes but not Stimson, leaves 1rJashington for Potsdam. (This and some of the following items are included as relevant because of the ques tion of what key officials were in Wash ington to receive the opinions of scien tists that were expressed after this date.) 32. July 12, 1945 Poll taken in Met Lab at Chicago. (Compton & Daniels) 33. July 15, 1945 Truman, Byrnes and others arrive in Ber lin; greeted by Stimson at airport. (Truman, p. 339; on date of Stimson's arrival cf. also #35)o 34. July 16, 1945 Bomb successfully tested at Alamogordo. 35. July 16, 1945 News of test flashed to Truman at Pots dam by Stimson. (Truman, p. 415)·cf. Byrnes' statement,(p. 262/1 that 1t took several days for decoding. Stimson i !pU. A!) Qj?, Atig J 91f1t & Bundy ;tr.p . \) 3 7 says word of test was received-~Potsdam on July 16th. 36.July 17, 1945 Stimson flew to Potsdam and gave Truman full details of test (Truman, p. 415) Chronology -5-
37. July 17 to 24, 1945 Truman makes t he decision to use the bomb a ga i nst Japan when it is ready for delivery unless surrender has taken place. Truman does not date this decision exactly, but says as soon as he received details of test from Stimson on J~ly 17th he called together chiefs of staff to review military strategy in light of successful test. (p. 415) Truman also says when he talked with Churchill he favored use of bomb (p. 419) Compton (p. 245) says that Truman h ter told him that it was at that meeting ~ th the Joint Chiefs that he gave his nformal assent" to use of bomb. 38, July 17, 1945 As soon as Stimson arrived in Potsdam, (Truman here uses the date given in #36) Truman called in Byrnes, Leahy, Marshall, Gen. Arnold and Adm. King; they reviewed military strategy in light of the successful test. (Truman, pp. 419-21) 39. July 23, 1945 Col. Nichols asks Compton at Oak Ridge for resu~ s of the poll at the Met. Lab. c. wrote out a message sumrr.arizin~ the results of the ''votes and petitions as objectively as he could. An hour later Nichols came back wanting to know what c. himself thought; gave opinion favoring use. (Compton, p. 246) 40. July 24, 1945 The v·lar :Bepartment 11 was given orders 11 to instruct Gen. Spaatz that first bomb would be dropped as soon after August 3rd as weather permits. Truman told Stimson that order to Spaatz would stand unless Truman notified him of favorable Japanese reply. (Truman, pp. 420-21) 41. July 24, 1945 Truman tells Stalin of "new weapon of unusual destructive force.n (Truman, p. 416) 42. July 26, 1945 Allies broadcast demand that Japan surrender or face destruction. 43. July 28, 1945 Premier of Japan rejects Potsdam ulti matum as unworthy of notice. (Stimson, "Deoisionn; Truman, p. 421) Chronology -6-
44. between decision to use Truman authorizes statement bomb and leaving Potsdam to be released after first bomb is dropped. (Truman, pp. 422-2 3) 45. August 2. 1945 Truman leaves Potsdam; flies to England; home by ship. (Truman, pp. 406, 421, ff.) 46. August 3, 1945 1st day scheduled for dropping bomb, weather permitting. (Truman, p. 4.21.) 47. August 6, 1945 Hiroshima bombed (Aug. 5th at 7:15P.M., Washington time, Truman, p. 421) 48. ~ugust a. 1945 Molotov informed Amb. Harriman in Moscow that Russia would consider itself at war with Japan as of Aug. 9th. Truman re ceived this news on August 8th and imme diately annonnced it at press conference. (Truman, p. 425) 49. August 9, 1945 Nagasaki bombed. ("We gave the Japanese three days in which to make up their minds to surrender, and the bombing would have been held off another two days had weather parmi tted." Truman, p. 426) 50. August 10, 1945 Japanese offer surrender on Potsdam terms but with reservation about sovereignty of emperor. (Stimson, "Decision") ' .
DECISION TO USE THE BOMB Bibliography referred to in chronology
Byrnes, James F., Speakin~ Frankly, Harper & Bros., N.Y. ( 1 47) - Compton, Arthur Holly, Atomic Quest, Oxf. Univ. Pres., N.Y. (19561 Compton, t\rthur H., and Daniels, Farrington, "A Poll of Scientists at Chicago," Bull. At . Sc., Vol. 4, No. 2, Feb, 1943 Ehrman, John, Grand Strategt, Vol. VI, October 1944-August Aqp st 1945, Her Hajes y's Stationery Office, London (1956)
Franck} James, "A Report to the Secretary of v.J ar.~.June 1945," Bull. At. Sc~, Vol. 1, No. 10, May 1, 1946.
11 rtTorton, Louis, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb 1 Foreign
Affairs 1 Vol. 35, No. 2, Jan. 1957
Rabinowitch , E. edi~., Minutes to Midnight, Atomic Science and Education Se:::-i es No. l, Bull p A"t; o Sc ., , Chicago (1950) Stimson, Henry L., ''The Decision to Use the B omb," Harper 1 s }1a ~azine, Feb~l-947; reprinted Bull. At. Sc. Vol. 3, No. 2 , Feb • 1947 ..
Stimson, Henry L e and Bundy, McGeorge, On ~ctive Service in Peace and War . 2 vols., Harper and aros., N.Y. (1948); Ch. XXIV, "Tne Bomb and Peace with Russia, n reprinted Bull. At ~ Sc., Vol. 4, No. 8, Aug. 1147 Szill rd, Leo, "Atomic Bombs and the Postwar Position of the United States in the 1-Jorld---1945," Bull. At. Sc. Vol. 3, No. 12, Dec, 1947. Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, Vol. I, Year . . of Decisions, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, (195$). SACHS
I 'I NEW YORK TIMES - NOVEMBER 28, 1945
It waa Dr. Sachs who told the type may thus be constructed. A story about Mr. Roosevelt to the single bomb of this type, carried by ECONOMIST GUIDED committee, and he handed It his boat and exploded In a port, might written record of those early events very well destroy the whole port, -a record interspersed with scien together with some of the sur tific papers and letters from and to rounding territory. However, such EARLY ATOM STEPS the White House. Among them bombs might very well prove to be wu the paper that Dr. Einstein too heavy for transportation by had studied. It was a report by the air." American physicist, Dr. Leo Szil The memorandum of Dr. Szilard Dr. Alexander Sachs, Before ard, recounting his own exJ.>eri was In similar vei n. Dr. Sachs ments and also those of Professor suggested possibilities for Indus Senate Group, Reveals His Enrico Fermi, a fugitive from Fas trial and medical use as well as With Roosevelt cism. military use. First Talk Dr. Einstein and Dr. Szilard were As a r esult of the Nhite House revealed by Dr. Sach' testimony meeting, President Roosevelt told u the first to worry about the im General Watson to bring together GERMANS' STUDIES CITED plications for the United States of Dr. Sachs and Dr. L)'man J. atomic energy in the hands of a Briggs. the then Director of the hostile power. Dr. Einstein urged Bureau of Standards, and have Dr. Sachs to do something, know them form a working committee. They Were Stimulating Factor Ing that the economist could get This was done, the group being the ear of the President. organized as follows : in Efforts of Our Scientists So Dr. Sachs went to the Pres- For the Government, Dr. Briggs, ident Oct. 11, 1939, with a letter Lieut. Col. Keith F . Adamson of to Get the Bomb First from Dr. Einstein, Dr. Szilard's the · Army, and Comdr., later Ad scientific paper and a memoran miral, Gilbert C. Hoover of the Navy; Presidential representative, dum by Dr. Szilard written In By ANTHONY LEVIERO Dr. Sachs; cooperating scientists, every-day language. Dr. Sachs Special to THE NEW YORK TJMIS. E . P . Wlgner. Professor of Theo WASHINGTON, Nov. 27 - The had been dubbed as the "economic retical Physics, Princeton Univer late President Roosevelt listened Jeremiah" for his gloomy views sity; Professor E . Teller, George Washington University; Dr. Fermi to a persuasive man in the White and predictions on Nazi power and world destiny in the years be of Columbia University; and Dr. House on Oct. 11, 1939, two weeks Szilard, then a visiting experimen after Poland was crushed, and got tween wars. tal physicist at Columbia. interested In atomic energy. Then Dr. Sachs also told the President The committee met on Oct. 21, vigor he that the F ermi and Szilard experi 1939, and the discussion, accord with characteristic ments were only one step ahead of brushed aside the hesitations of ing to Dr. Sachs, developed strong those of Nazi physicists. Germany objections that those interested In American scientist. and officials, had already overrun Czechoslo the political-military implications set the atomic project.on ill Irrev vakia, which had good uranium were much too previous in convert ocable course and pressed it to ore, and Hitler had forbidden Its ing a mere potential into an actual pointed historic climax that came export. The Einstein letter result of research. Hence they ward the out that the most important at Hiroshima after his death. urged that the government should source o! uranium was In the leave this project to the univer As the early history of the Belgian Congo and Dr. Sachs sities, which anyhow had evinced world-shaking discovery unfolded added that he predicted the inva active interest. today before the special Senate sion of Belgium and the possibility Early in 1940 Dr. Sachs and Dr. committee on atomic energy it of losing this source for the United Einstein were dissatisfied with the States. Tha t would leave only waa disclosed that an economist, progress and scope of the atomic Canadian uranium for America, he to stage manager project and Dr. Sachs wrote not a scientist, wu added. General Watson, pleading for lar of the atomic drama. This econo Nazi awareness on atomic en ger aid that could be based on a mist, the man who drew back the ergy was attributed by Dr. Sachs favorable evaluation by Dr. Ein curtain on nuclear fi11ion for Mr. to the fact that the son of German stein of work then being completed Under-Secretary ot State von at Columbia University. Roosevelt, wu the Russian-born Weizaecker, was a physicist. who Alexander Sachs, who served the In April, Dr. Sachs testified, he eventually became head of the was back In the White House with President as an Informal adviser. Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. and later new forebodings of Nazi aggres In the near background when of the Institute of Physics. The sions and predicting Invasions that the President began to act stood Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, said the would deprive the United States of Einstein letter, was "where some Prof. Albert Einstein. This dis contact with Western Europe. He of the American work on uranium reported that Dr. Einstein had in tinguished physicist read a report ." of recent experiments a month and is now being repeated formation of the Intensification of a day before the outbreak of World Elnsteln Letter Quoted uranium research under the lead War II and wrote out a prediction In the Einstein letter President ership of Weizsaecker's son, and of an atomic bomb. He told Mr. Roosevelt read suggestions for that Dr. Szilard's work was prov Roosevelt that such a bomb, car government development of atomic ing more promising than Dr. Fred ried by ship, could destroy a port energy and this prevision of the eric Jollot-Curie's in France. and the surrounding region. use of a tomic force: Wants Blessing, Not ScoW'ge "In the course of the last four Dr. Sachs Is an American In opening the first session of months it has been made probable WASHINGTON, Nov. 2T (}P) the Senate "Blue Ribbon" Commit through the work of Joliot in In response to Inquiries Chairman France as well as F ermi and Szi tee, the chairman, Senator Brien McMahon issued the following McMahon of Connecticut, said lard in America- that it may be atomic energy might well hold tre come possible to set up a nuclear statement concerning Dr. Sachs' mendous benefits to mankind, but chain reaction in a large mass of background. that' the best judgment was neces uranium by which vast amounts "Dr. Alexander Sachs, presently sary to keep it "a blessing to man of powe~ and large quantities of economic advisor and industrial new radium-like elements would kind and not a scourge." He added consultant, maintains his own of legislation would not be generated. Now it appears this that specific fices at 72 Wall Street. Dr. Sachs be considered until all the facts could be achieved in the immediate were known. This was interpreted future. was vice president and chief econ to mean the Senate committee "This new phenomenon would O!Jlist of the Lehman Corporation, would disregard the controversial also lead to the construction of an important investment corpora atomic energy control bill, now be bombs, and it is conceivable- tion, during tire entire Thirties. fore the House. though much less certain-that ex tremely powerful bombs of a new "He predicted the great Harvard University as well as Cambridge University in England. Dr. Sachs Is an American citizen." 11tE NEW YORKER , DECEMDE.I\ l , l 9 -t 5 ,. -.:.-- - .. A R.E.POR. TER. AT LAR.GE THE CONTEMPORANEOUS MEMORANDA OF DR.. SACHS J\LEXANDER SAcHs, mentioned in Sachs is fifty-two, has curls, and dor, and caution; and of the emergence r'l. the Smyth Report on the atomic looks so much like Ed Wynn that and diffusion of certain attitudes and bomb as the man who got when he was in Washington with the habits characterized by facile skepticism President Roosevelt interested in atomic N.R.A., his colleagues would tell visit as to all principles and standards, by an research, in the fall of 1939, came to ors that Ed Wynn was working there; exaltation of th e quantitative and ignor this country from Russia when he was they would then open the door to Sachs' ing of the qualit~v e-illu st r a ted not eleven, received a scientific degree at office and permit these people from the least in the prev;~iling financial and Columbia when he was nineteen, and outside world to peek in and admire this bu iness forecasting hy mere mechanical when he was twenty went to work as interesting bureaucratic wrinkle. Sachs guides which prove d so unperceiving a clerk for the Wall Street firm of Lee likes to carry research around with him and so misleading in the greatest slump Higginson. A year or so later he re and is the possessor of forty second-hand in history-by the vogue of irrational turned to Columbia as a postgraduate briefcases, a birthday gift from some ism and psychologizing and the whole student of philosophy. In 1916, when jocular Lehman Corporation officials. technique of propaganda, regimented he was twenty-three, he was made a His pockets are stuffed with memo opinion, and super-salesmanship for Francis Parkman Fellow in philosophy randa, which he deposits in a pile on the 'putting it over' on the public to the at Harvard, wli.ere later he was also floor when he is looking for something, point of having succeeded in putting it made a Henry Rogers Fellow in juris and both in writing and in conversation over on oneself." prudence and sociology. These ap he uses such phrases as "if only we could Dr. Sachs is credited with having pointments enabled him to spend a cou overcome the scleroticism of the Ri!!ht furnished Dorothy Thompson and Ma ple of years studying philosophy, juris and th e mfantilism of the Left," " secu jor George Fielding Eliot with a num prudence, and sociology at Harvard, lar Calvinism," "this .Jeremiahesque ob ber of their id eas. They, in turn, are and further enabled him, when he re server" (Sachs), and "an instrument of credited with having made Sachs com turned to the Wall Street district, to divisiveness among the survived triad prehensible, on occasion, to the public. join the Downtown Harvard Lunch of hegemonous powers" (the atomic Sachs himself is the man who accom Club, a group of Harvard downtown bomb). Dr. Sachs likes to embed his plished the possibly more monumental men who maintain a couple of lunch phrases in rather long se ntences. In feat of making Einstein, Dr. Leo Szi rooms over Angelo's Restaurant on 1932, in a typical three-thousand-word lard, and Professor E nrico Fermi, three Pearl Street. Sachs has been an eco letter, he wrote Lord Reading: "The men whose work on uranium fi sion nomic adviser to a number of important apparent success of the monetary doc helped in the discovery of the secret of private investors, among them Walter trine and the forecasting technique based atomic disintegration, comprehensible to Meyer, a brother of Eugene. In 1931, thereon in dealing with the business re President Roosevelt. In the spring of while Sachs was abroad, the late Lord cessions of 1923 and 192 7-which, 1939, around the time the Axis seized Reading, then Foreign Secretary of the while serious on the inadequate and mis Prague, Szilard summed up the work British Cabinet, invited him to serve as leading business curves, too heavily he and Fermi had done at Columbia on his informal economic consultant, with weighted with regressive economic ac the matter in a report entitled "Instan out pay. Sachs accepted and, after he tivities, were mere pauses in the major taneous Emission of Fast Neutrons in had returned to this country, proceeded postwar reconstruction expansion-so the Interaction of Slow Neutrons with to pelt Reading with long letters of strengthened the belief in the validity Uranium." Einstein read the Szilard economic counsel. In 1933 he was in of this moni ti c monetary doctrine that report, which was printed in the April Washington, working for the N.R.A. businessmen came to adopt a sort of 15, 1939, number of the Physical R e In 1936 he was elected a vice-president fatalistic reliance on man;~ged Federal view, and he and Szilard and Sachs and of the Lehman Corporation, an invest Reserve poli cies, and abdic;~ted their Professor Eug-e ne P. 'Vi~;ner , a Prince ment trust managed by Lehman Broth qualitative thinking and practical cau ton physicist, all of whom were friends, ers, and in 1942 he resigned to become tion fo r mech;~nical indicators and quan began to discuss the role an atomic bomb an independent economic consultant. He titati ve measures wh1ch, for all their might have in a world apparently about has been consulted by, among others, elaborate sophi ti cation, had only n tan to go to war. Sachs had just covered the Lehman Corporation; the War gential relation to the dynamic realities the same subject, in an interoffice com Emergency Pipelines Corporation, of the economic overproduction and the munication to himself called "Notes on which during the war built the petro financial inflation that they fai led to Imminence World War in Perspective leum pipelines from the West to the grasp and evaluate." After a few stac Accrued Errors and Cultural Crisis of Atlantic seaboard; and-again without cato sentences of fifty or sixty words the Inter-War Decades," which read, pay-by the Petroleum Industry War each, he went on: "It [the collec in part: Council, set up in 1942 at the sugges tive illusion about the forces underlying There is still time for Western Civili tion of Harold Ickes, then Petroleum American post-' Vorld 'Var I pros zation, and especially for the exception Administrator, to coordinate and over perity] can only be understood as a prod ally and fortunately situated United States, uct and m a nif es t ;~tio n of the postwar to use the time-drafts that can still be see the war work of the oil companies. made on the Bank: of History, for the Sachs was also, during the war, an culture: of the eclipse of certain attitudes preparedness that has and will become O.S.S. consultant on matters so secret and habits of rational management of more and more urgent and inevitable for that not even Collier's or Life has writ affairs in the light of intellectually de all members of Western Civilization as a termined or accepted principles and result of the past errors committed and in ten them up, and he sent many hush the course of the prospective unfolding ag hush, and perhaps even hush-hush-hush, ethical standards and critical judgment gressions of Nazi Germany. communications to General D onovan. applied with old-fashioned logic, can- - 2- try. from the Belgian Congo, then the Adamson, of the Army Ordnance De maJor so urce of it, before the Germans partment, and Commander Gilbert C. invaded Belgium; ( 3) a letter to the Hoover, of the Navy Bureau of Ord President from his interlocutor which nance) , by Sachs, as Roosevelt's repre referred to "the con truction, as an sentative, and by Fermi, Szilard, Wig eventual probability, of bombs of hither ncr, Fred L. Mohler, head of the to unenvisaged potency and scope," and atomic-physics section of th e Bureau of went on to say, "It is nece sary to en Standards, and Profe sor E. Teller, a large and accelerate th e experimental theoretical-physics authority at G eorge Through sources available to Ein work, which can no longer be ca rried Washington University. Einstein had stein, the four men knew that Germany out within the limited budget of the de also been in vi ted, but, according to Dr. had stopped the exportation of pitch partments of theoretical phy ics in our Sa hs, his "health and shy dispo ition blende-the ore that yields both radium universities." In September of 1939, interpo ed ob tacles." and uranium-from Czechoslovakia to after the German invasion of Poland At the Uranium Committee's first other countries and that uranium re the Pre ident and Congress were pre~ meeting, a number of the men were in search ~as going on at a great pace at occupied with the revi ion of the Neu favor of the government's leaving the Institute of Chemistry of the Kaiser trality Act, and it took Sachs several atomic research t o the universities. Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. "I am an weeks to arrange for this interview. Briggs, h owever, after outlining the economist, not a scientist," Sachs has Sachs read his three documents out world situation for the benefit of the told friends, "but I had a prior relation loud to the Presid ent becau e of a th eory more cloistered scientists, urged every ship with the President, and Szilard and he has that busy people, especia ll y Presi one, as Sachs puts it, "to engage in a Einstein agreed I was the right person dents, give anything they read almost an mental projection from the normal to make the relevant elaborate scientific automatic brushoff. "People are punch course of research-development to the material intelligible to Mr. Roosevelt. drunk with printer's ink and it's mo tly impact of a mere scientific possibility up No scientist could sell it to him." Sachs mascara on the eyes," he explained to on the national defense" and to "weigh had been on casual terms with Roose me. The October 11th White H ouse differently in the new setting th e risk velt ever since he had done the eco interview was one of a co n iderable coefficients attached to even remote pos nomic research for some of Roosevelt's se:ies, during which Sachs, according to sibilities." On ovember I st, in a report speeches in the 1932 campaign. fnends, would ease the President into to the President signed by Briggs, the discussion with a few learned jokes. Adamson, and H oove r and entitled THE following blow-by-blow ac- I asked Dr. Sachs about this, and he en "Possible Use of Uranium for Sub count of the Roosevelt-Sachs-et-al. tered a modest disclaimer. "I'd just tell marine Power and High Destructive meetings which ensued, and which him I'd paid for the trip to Washington Bombs," the committee said that if the eventually produced the Manhattan and couldn't deduct it from m y in come chain reac tion which would presumably District project, is the result of a recent tax and would he plea e pay attention," follow uranium fission "could be con conversation I had with Dr. Sachs in he s.-1id. "I once made a joke about trolled so as to proceed gradually it his office downtown. On October 11 Americans' being G od's Frozen People, might conceivably be used as a continu 1939, visiting Roosevelt for over a~ during the wartime freeze on every ous source o.f power in submarines, thus hour, Sachs read to, and left with, th e thing-to which, incidentally, I was in avoiding the use of large storage bat President three items: ( 1) an August some particul ars opposed." teries for under-water power," and th at 2nd letter to Roosevelt from Einstein Roosevelt, to whom atomic research if the reaction "turned ou t to be ex which said, "This new phenomenon was news, reacted favorably to the plosive in character it would provide a [i.e., the expected conversion of urani October 11th talk, during which Sachs possible source of bombs with a destruc um into a source of energy] would al o suggested that the President arrange for tiveness vastly greater than anything lead to the construction of bombs .... a continuous liaison between the scien now known." The report urged that A single bomb of this type, carried by tists working on uranium, the Adminis uranium research be given financial boat and exploded in a port, might very tration, and the War and Navy Depart support by the government. By Febru well destroy the whole port togeth er ments. "He seemed to share the sense of ary, 1940, $6,000 of Army and Navy with some of the surrounding terri- urgency," Sachs says. "He was a man funds had been allotted to th e research tory; " (' ?)~ an August 15th memo from of quick appercepti on." Toward the end being done at Columbia. Einstein and Szilard which said, "There is no doubt of this conversation, the President ar Sachs, who kept conferring with each that it [the destructive power of these ranged for the liaison Sachs was asking other, felt that this was a tiny drop in bombs] .wou},d go far beyond all military for by calling in his aide, the late Gen the bucket. On March 7th, by prear con~ept10ns, and urged that a quantity e~·al Edwin M. Watson, and instructing rangement, Einstein wrote Sachs calling of p1tchblende be brought to this coun- h1m to set up an Army-Navy committee attention to the intensified atomic work under the chairmanship of Dr. Lyman going on in Berlin. "I have now J. Briggs, Director of the National Bu learned," he said, "that research there reau of Standards, to consider the ideas is being carried out in great secrecy and and material Sachs had prese nted. H e that it has been extended to another of also asked Sachs to stay over in ' Vash the Kaiser Wilhelm institutes, the In ington to confer with Briggs the next stitute of Physics." Sachs forwarded day. This conference led to a meeting, this letter to Roosevelt, and in a talk on October 21st, attended by the three with the President, early in April, he members of the new government com read a copy of it out loud and sug mittee (the Advisory Committee on gested that $1 00,000 be provided for Ur:mium: Briggs, Colonel Keith F. preliminary work toward the setting up - ~ - , of a. large-scale experiment. Roosevelt and execution of technical projects of presumably surveying me from it, "a got General Watson to call another utility for national defense." Watson major source of new power enlarges the Uranium Committee meeting. This was assured him the President would con physical geography and transforms the held on April 27th and was attended sider the matter, and on June 15th, the sociographic complex along the dimen- by Briggs, Fermi, Szilard, Adamson, day after the German Army entered ion of depth. What have remained Hoover, Wigner, Sachs, Rear Admiral Paris, Roosevelt set up the National De the desert areas of the world and the Hnrold G. Bowen, Director of the fense Research Committee, headed by sterile spaces are related to the inade Naval Research Laboratory, and Dr. Dr. Vannevar Bush. After Pearl Har quacies and inaccessibilities of water and George B. Pegram, Dean of the Grad bor, it was renamed the Office of energy sources. In the light of the re uate Faculties of Columbia. Sachs again Scientific Research and Development. flections given in certain exhibits con tried to get Einstein to show 11p, but, he The Briggs committee became a sub nected with the formative stages of the says, "it became clear that indisposition committee of the Bush committee, atomic project, it is reasonable rather on account of a cold and the shyness atomic-bomb research was on its way to than speculative to say that new worlds which makes Dr. Einstein recoil from becoming a two-billion-dollar federal will open 11p and that the existing world participating in large groups woul!l pre project, and Dr. Sachs happily and vol will be enriched. The area from the vent his attendance." Einstein did, how untarily faded out of the picture. "I Sahara to the Arctic, from the jungle to ever, send Dr. Briggs a letter, to be read provided for my own disappearance," the arid, will in the course of a time that at the meeting, which seconded a Sachs he told me. we can control be transformed by the suggestion that a board of trustees be set lifting of the deep-lying water and by up to head "a non-profit organization T that point in our conversation, making accessible power and heat.'' which, with the approval of the Gov A Dr. Sachs gave me permission to ernment committee, should secure from dive into a pile of memoranda on the AS I was about to depart, Dr. Sachs governmental or private sources, or floor. I came up with a recent letter £'\. reached into a briefcase and pre both, the necessary funds for carrying from General Donovan. "U nclassi sented me with copies of some financial out the work," so that it "could be car fied," he said, relieved, and handed it tables he worked up for President ried out much faster than through a over. "Dear Alexander," it ran. "His Roo evelt, including one whose title he loose cooperation of university labora tory deserves the full story of the Atomic had telescoped into "Close-up Compar tories and Government departments." Project. The nation is indebted to you i on of American and British War The April 27th meeting gave Dr. for the catalytic function which you per Economies on Per Capita Basis Com Sachs the feeling that the time-drafts formed. 'We may our ends by our be mensurating Per Capita Gross National on the Bank of History were being ex ginnings know.' How could the project Product and War Expenditures in Dol hausted without our making sufficient have ended other than successfully lar Terms with Adjustments in Case progress:- "The majority of the commit when you-the deft intermediary be Britain for (a) Productivity Shifts and tee," he said the other day, "accustomed tween committee room, laboratory, and (b) Rooource Disinvestment.'' I wiped to the small scale of physical laboratories planning board-helped lay its founda the mascara from my eyes and slipped at the universities and the correspond tions so well? Sincerely, Bill.'' out before he could start reading out ingly reduced scales of the budgets of "My relationship to the President loud or regale me with a learned governmental scientific laboratories, joke. did was that of a possible Ishmaelite," said -GEOFFREY not appear T. HELLMAN ready to design a large-sc::tle Dr. Sachs, filing General Donovan's and comprehensive program, and in letter back on the floor. "My contempo • stead insisted on bit-a-bit procedures raneous memoranda threw into sharp with ranked preferences and time de relief the decisive choice of the period ferments." namely, between the leisurely bit-a Two weeks later, history, in the bitarian procedure of dispersed univer shape of the German invasion of Bel sity experiments and tense and coor gium, came to the aid of Sachs and the dinated large-scale experimentation. more urgent of his scientist colle::tgucs. Today the choice is in a converse di ("The situation adumbrated in the ini rection. If the research from here on tial presentation of October 11, 1939, remains under the control of the Army, had come to pass" is the way Dr. Sachs then the military use will come to throt says it.) On May 11th, after a discus ion tle the independence and initiative with Einstein, Fermi, Szilard, Pegram, which, operating through a pluralism of and Professor Harold C. U rey of Co sources, make for those novelties and lumbia, he wrote the President that the mutations in human thought that give invasion of Belgium, heightening the us the great discoveries.'' d::tnger that the supply of uranium fr01~ Dr. Sachs thinks that the atomic the Belgian Congo would be cut off, bomb should be turned over to an inter had accented the pressing need of gov national police force under Chiefs of ernmental atomic-research backing. Staff of a World Security Council and Four days later Dr. Sachs recommended further developed on an :,land in the to General Watson the establishment of Pacific as a weapon to strengthen the a Scientific Council of National Defense control of the existing world organiza "composed of executives, engineers, and tion. He also feels that ::ttomir .. nergy economists, acting in behalf of the Gov should be m:tdc available for peaceful ernment, who should be invested with projects. "From the vantage point of administrative powers for the testing cultur-al-technological history," he said,