COMMENTS ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 2 SIGNIFICANT CASES ...... 3 Michael Hahn Allen ...... 5 Stephen Anthony Baba ...... 6 Robert Ernest Cordrey ...... 7 Nelson Cornelious Drummond ...... 8 Wilfredo Garcia ...... 9 Stephen Dwayne Hawkins ...... 10 Brian Patrick Horton ...... 11 Clayton John Lonetree ...... 12 Samuel Lori ng Morison ...... 14 Jeffery Loring Pickerlng ...... 15 Jonathan Jay Pollard ...... 16 Brian Everett Slavens ...... 17 Michael Timothy Tobias ...... 18 John Anthony Walker, Jr...... 19 Michael Lance Walker ...... 20 Jerry Alfred Whitworth ...... 21 Edward Hi lled on Wine ...... 22 Hans Palmer Wold ...... 23
DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS ...... 24
"Operation Showdown" ...... 26 "Operation Lemonaid" ...... 29 "Operation Station Zebra" ...... 30
CASES INVOLVING NISCOM ...... 34
NAVY ESPIONAGE HOTLINE If you suspect espionage or security-related violations, you should notify the Naval Investigative Service at the following toll-free number: 1-800-543-NAVY
(Persons in the District of Columbia should call: 433-9191.) 000 lf 00@@ (W ©u □ @OO
On 26 June 1939, a confidential memorandum being lhc Navy's program manager for informaiion and written al Hyde Park, New York, was issued from 1he personnel security. The fo llowing year, the central White House to the Secretary of Stale, the Secrewry of adjudication of security clearances was added to the the Treasury, lhe Allorney Genernl, the Postmaster command's mission. General, 1he Sccrc1ary of 1hc Navy and the Secrelary of Commerce. The memornndum, in part, read as fo llows: "It is my desire Lha1 Lhc inves1ig:11ion of all cs1>ionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage mullers be controlled and handled by lhc l"cderal Bureau of Investigation of the Department ofJu stice, and the Military Intelligence Division of the War Dcpartmeni, and the Office of Naval lnlelligcncc of the Navy Dcpnrtment. The directors of these 1hree agencies arc to function as a commi11ce to coordinate their acrh,itics. "No investigations should be conducted by an invcs1i gativc agency of 1he Government into mailers involving aetunlly or potentially any espionage, counlcr-espio JUDGE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, nnge, or sabotage, except by Lhe three agencies men DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I ioncd above,,. CONGRATULATES RETIRED NIS SPECIAL The memorandum was signed by Presidenl Franklin AGENT VICTOR J. PALMUCCI AFTER D. Roosevell, and laid Lhc groundwork for what is now PRESENTING HIM WITH THE NATIONAL INTEL LI GENCE DISTINGUISHED 1hc U.S. coun1crin1clligence community. SERVICE MEDAL. Today's Naval lnvcs1igativc Serv ice (NIS) special agents arc lhc suc The Naval Investigat ive Service Command (NlS cessors oft he ugcnts and opera1ivcs COM) is led by a rear admiral who reports directly to the who worked for the Office of Naval Secretary of the Navy and chcChief of Naval Opera1ions. Intelligence (ONJ) in World War I NISCOM has more than 180 ofr. ccs worldwide divided and World Warn. After World War into ten regions hcadquiortcred in New York, N.Y.; 11, the mission of ON J was expanded W,ishington, D.C.; Norfolk, VA.; Charleston, S.C.; Sou to include the invest igation offelon i Diego, CA.; San Frnncisco, CA.; London, UK; Pearl ous crimes and in 1966 the name Harbor, Ml; Yokosuka, Japan; and Subic Bay, Republic Naval Investigative Service wi,s adopled 10 distinguish of the Philippines. the Navy's investigative service from lhe rcs1 of ONI. There arc currently about 1,200 civili,1n NIS special In the years that fol.lowed, NIS conlinucd to grow, agents on duty around the world conduc1ing criminal in 11dding law cnforccmcnl and physical security to i1s vestigations and countcrin1clligcncc opcra1ions fo r the mission in 1982,and esiablishing the NavyA111i-Terrorist Dcpar1menl of the Navy. Alen Center in 1983, followi ng the bombing of the In the United States, NISspccial ugcnts conduc, their Marine barracks in Beirut. eounterin1clligence opera1ions jointly wich the Federal In 1985, NIS was upgraded lo a comm:ond with a nag Bureau of lnvestiga1ion (FBI); overseas, they arc coor officer and was given the addi1ion;,I responsibility of din:11cd ,vith the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
2 The foUowing cases arc examples of the constant the fact that fo r years the U.S. Government chose to llircat of espionage which faces the United States and stress damage assessments over prosecutions. other members of the Free World. In the opinion of the intelligence community, it was When reading these summaries, it should be remem• more important to assess the damage and find out whut be red that these involve the Department of the Navy and had been lost, so that corrective measures could be taken. represent only somcof l11e cases ofespionage against the Anyway, bringing a suspected spy LOn public trial would United States. only increase the chances of more secrets being lost. As 1n some cases, the method ofopera tion used by hostile a result, between 1966 and 1975 the U.S. Government intelligence services is the same. For instance, the undertook no espionage prosecutions. method of recruitment used in the highly-publici1.ed Prosecutions resumed under former Altorney Gen Marine Security Guard invc.~tigation was similar to one eral Griffin Bell, who believed spies could be prosecuted used three decades ea.rlicr, this tirne targeting a U.S. without losing secrets. Wilh the backing of President Army master sergeant, Roy Adair Rhodes. Jimmy Carter, Bell prosccu1cd William H. Kampilcs, a Rhodes was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow CIA employee who was arrested in 1978 for selling a as a mechanic when he was recruited for espionage in technical manual for the KH-ll reconnaissance satellite 1952. In describing his recruitment, Rhodes stated to tbc Soviets. that he had a1tcnded a drinking party with his two Soviet Ano1her problem, until recently, involved inadequate mechanics and two Soviet women. He woke up the next funding for countcriulelligencc activities. However, morning with one of the women. Congress was instrumental in recognizing the short fo ll Two weeks later he was approached by the woman and and in providing funds. two ot her men, one of whom she identifi ed as her brother. The scenario is n film iliar one. Rhodes, who was ESPIONAGF: AND THE U.S. NAVY married and bad a child in the United States, eventually agreed to cooperate with the Soviets. Anyone looki11g at the list of spy cases which have In return for somewhere between $2,500 and $3,000, occurred in recent years will readily sec that espionage is Rhodes later provided the Soviets with information not just a Navy problem. Yet it is understnndablc why about his earlier training in code work and the habits of hostile intelligence SCr\iccs would be interested in tar others assigned to the embassy. geting the Navy and Marine Corps for espionage. Rhodes broke off his contact with l11c Soviets when he Key clements ofo ur national sccurit y strategy•· deter returned to the United States in 1953. His activities rence, forward defense, and aUiance solidarity •· each didn't come to light until 1957, when they were divulged require maritime power. by a defector and confc.ssed Soviet spy, Reino Hayhancn. Deterrence of war has been the cornerstone of Ameri Rhodes was arrested and later convicted ofespionage at can policy since the dawn of the nuclear age. The Navy a courts-martial. contributes essential military capabilities to that deter rent equation. Over one third of the Navy is routinely PROSECUTION VS. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT deployed al sea at any given time, year around. The strategic submarine force, the preeminent and Espionage against the United States is nothing new, m1lSI survivable clement of the U.S. strategic nuclear even though it may seem to be. For years there was little triad, conducts unseen deterrence patrols and is ready Lo or no news about spying. Then suddenly a rash of retaliate instantly should the U.S. be subjected to an espionage cases occurred, rcacl,ing a peak in 1985, the attempted disarming nuclear first strike. Globally dis so-called "The Year of the Spy". persed naval forces a.rnted with sea-launched cruise One of l11c reasoru; it appeared as if the United States mis.~ilcs likc,vise constitute to the deterrent equation by didn't have problems with espionage earlier was due to
3 cs1ablishing in a polential enemy's mind the threat of nexibility and mobility. distributed, multi-axis auacks. As if these weren't enough reusons 10 make the De Carrier battle groups arc forward-deployed, rapidly partment of the Navy a prime 1arge1 for hostile in1elli mobile, high in readiness, capable of being sustained gcnceagencics,1hcrc is another 1ba1 has undoubtedly 1101 indclinitcly at remolc locations and offer a wide range of escaped the allention of would-be foes. escalation control tactics. They can be intrusive or out of Historically, the Navy and Marine Corps have been on sight, threatening or non-threalerting, easily dispatched 1hccu1 tingcdgeofU.S. policy. Between 1946and 1982, and readily withdrawn. in some 250 ins1ances of employment of American Nuvy special operations forces arc integrated in1<> military forces, naval forces con~t imted the orincipal rcgul:1r deploying forces, arc capable of self-suslaining clement of our response in about 80% of the crises. unconventional warfare in all opern1 ional mediums, and With such a major role 10 play in national security, it arc 1ranspor1able worldwide 10 deter and counter lesser stands 10 reason that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps tbrea1s to ,n1crna1ional stability. will conl inuc lo be logical prime targets of hostile intcl Naval forces, therefore, pr<>vidc a range of options ligcnce service.<. available 10 bols1er deterrence through their crcdil.>ilily,
•
4 Michael Haho Allc11, from Ponchatoulu, Louisiana, ries of rebel force movements and planned Philippiue served fo r 22 years in the U.S. Navy as a Radioman Government accions for mos! of 1986. and retired in 1972, as a Senior Chief Peuy Offi cer. Because of Allen'sstacus 11s a U.S. e.ivilian employed F'ollowing retirement from the U.S. Navy, Allen ran in an overseas locatioo, his case broughc special con a bar in Olongapo, the Philippines, until 1982, when he cerns as 10 how it should be handled. was hi1ed as a photocopy clerk atthe NavalAir St at ion, Afccr the U.S. Juscitc Dep:ire ment indic:itcd Allen Cubi Point, in the Philippines. Allen also had an auto would not be prosccuced in F'e-0cral Coore, Che Honor mobile dealership and ran a cock-fighc ing opcrcion. able Mr. John Lehman, Secretary of chc Navy, exer Co-workers al the communications cenler became cised hisauthoricyundcr Aniclc2ofthc Un.iform Code suspcious of Allen's activities, and rcporeed him to of Military Juscic.c lO h:1vc Allen ap1>rchendcd and au1hori1ies. On ()4 December 1986, the 53-year-old prosecuted in the military juscice syslcm as a reti red Allen, who had routine access to informacion classir.cd U.S. Navy member. Conr.dcntial and Secret, was arrested by the Naval On 14 August 1987, Allen was convicted al a Courls• Investigative Service on suspicion of espionage. Marl ial of compromisi ng U.S. clas.~ilied documents He admilled he gave U.S. classir.ed information to and scnlcnccd 10 eight years in prison, lined $10,000, unauchorizcd persons 10 foster his sclf-cscecm and and as a rcsuh will forfeit his mili1:1ry rcLiremeot personal in1ercs1s. bencr.ts. The documents provided by Allen included sum ma•
5 Described as a brilliant student, cated a desperate need for mooey, Stephen Anthony Baba al age 18 and admillcd lo an unsuccessful a1- graduated with honors from the Uni• tcm pl to cxlorl money from the Navy versity of Maryland with a degree in Federal Credit Union. IL was subse business finance. quently determined that Lhc possibil He received his commission in the i1y existed that Baba was the individ U.S. Navy in 1980, from the Officer ual involved in the forwarding of the Candidate School, Newport, Rhode classified material lo a foreign em Island. His fi rst military assignment bassy. was as an Electronics Material Officer On 23 October 1981, Baba was aboard a San Diego-based frigate, the pl:,ced in pretrial confinement al USS Lang. Metro CorrecLional Center, San Di On 30 September 1981, a source ego, California. On 260ctober 1981, released lo the Naval Investigative Baba was transported lo Chula Vista, Service (NIS) a package containing California, lo allcnd a pretrial hear U.S. classified material consisting of a ing, during which time he aucmptcd copy of the May 1980, "Electronic BABA to escape from confinement. Warfore Evaluation and Education On 20 January 1982, Baba was Quarterly", and two microfichecbssi transaction would take place. O n 06 sentenced to eight years imprison ficd '•secret". October 1981, the executive officer ment, forfoiture of all pay and allow The package was accompanied by of the USS Lang contacted NlSRA ances, and dismissal from the Navy. a 12-page handprinted letter from an Naval Station, San Diego, California, individual claim ing to he an officer in and advised that during the preced the U.S. Navy assigned to an unidenti ing weekend, an officer assigned to fied ship. The letter writer advised he the USS Lang had been arrested for was willing 10 provide classified mate allcmplcd "unarmed" robbery or a rial in rct urn for money, and provided loc11l jewelry store. detailed instructions as lo how the During interrogation, Baba indi-
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Marine Marine . . U.S a a Cordrey, Cordrey, E. E. Robert Robert Yeoman Firs! Class Nelson Cor FBI on 19 September 1%2, at a diner nelious Drummond, U.S. Navy, firs! in Larchmont, New York. He was in came 10 the allcnlion of Ihe Office of 1hc company of two known GRU Naval lnlelligencc (ONI) in June officers and several classified docu• L962. mcnLswererccovcrcd. During in1cr The Federal Bureau of lnvestiga• roga1ion, Drummond confossc 8 In late 1985, the Naval Investigative Service (NlS) and Federal Bureau or I avcstigation (FBI) became aware or alleged espionage activity being conducted by a group of civilians in the Vallejo, California area. Utilizing info rm ation provided bya coopcrnl iog citizen, investigators determ ined that classified docu ments were being stolen from the nearby naval shipyard and sold to a civilian in Vallejo. The investigat ion revealed the documents were being held by the individual who planned Lo take them 10 il fo reign coun1ry Lo sell. Agents discovered tbal the source o( the documents was an active duty Navy membc r allhc shipyard. Later in the investigat ion, one of the criminal part icipants cooperated wit b inve.~ti SURVEILLANCE PH OTO OF GARCIA gators and identir.ed Garcia as the source. Agents learned the espionage NIS and FBI agc n1s conduc1ed government property, and violations scheme resulted in a number of clas iodcpth survcillanccof Garciu which of military regulations. He was sen sifi ed documents being taken to the corroborated and supported the evi tenced to 12 years confi nement, Philippines for the purpose of selling dence agtiinsl him. When agcnls reduced in rank 10 E-.1, forfeiture of them 10 a fo reign power there. confronted Garcia with invcs1igativc pay and allowances, and a dishon Participants in the conspiracy couri fi ndings, Garcia admillcd lo the orable discharge from 1hc U.S. ered the documents on commercial criminal ac:tivity. Navy. Garcia had served in the aircraft and had gathered the mate Al a General Courts-Martial con Navy for 15 years. rial in a residence in M anila. vened in J:munry 1988, Garcia was NIS agents in Mnnila entered the found guilty of espionage, conspir home with a search warrant and acy 10 commit espionage, larceny, recovered the documcn1s before the conspiracy to commit larceny, sale or planned sale. 9 On 18June 1985, a witness seeing reported Sccrct/Noforn/Wnintel a confidential message messages. selling the off al Hawkins explained them 10 a hostile intelli base residence or that the mes• gence masterThird Qu:mer sages mu.st service. OassSlepben have accidentally been Dwayne mixed in Hawkins was charged Hawkins in Naples, "ith some study mat with viola Italy. he brought erials lion of Article 92, NlS special agents home from work. \\TOngful removal interviewed During of classified material, I lawkins, but polygraph exams o and wrongfu he denied any knowl and n 07, 08, destruction l edge or O'.) August 1985, ofa Top Secret messag a classified message Hawkins indi A e. home. at his cated deception. General Courts-M Lnter, he admillcd Upon intcrroga• artial was held 10 having I.ion, 1l a,.kins 14- 15 January 1986, mistakenly take n admillcd that and Ha,.kins the message home; rnkcn he had was sentenced howevcr,addcdlhat the two secret m lo a bad conduct bedidnOI know essages as charge, one dis about th "soll\-cnirs" and also year conlincmcnt e message until his stated that he U.S. at the poin neighbor had rnkcn nn Nary Brig at Philadelphia, ted it OUI 10 him. additional live or six PA, classified and reduction in grade 1la wkins stn1ed he messages from 10 E-1. then placed the C0M message in his SUBG RU-8 and briefcase and re thought turned it about engaging in espionage. 10 his unit, C0MSUO GRU-8. Hawkins further confessed A search or Hawkins's 10 tak ho ing approximately me rcvc!llcd two C 15 additional IA originated Secret messages with the idea or 10 In June 1982, ru, extensive NIS/ This technique, now labeled the FB I investigation was initiated when "Horton Clause" by the NIS, allows it was determined that an unidenti not only for prosecution but for a fied Navy enlisted man had commu determination ns 10 any possible nicated an offer lo commit espio damage to nationa.1 security. With nage. The Navy man indicated high the advent of the "Horton Clause," level access and the desire to sell the damage assessment is consid informa1ion. ered after the prosecution phase The investigation subsequently which entices the suspect lo cooper identified the Navy man us Intelli ate under a post-trial grant-of-im gence Specialist Second Class Brian munity in an effort LO reduce his Patrick Horton, assigned lo the sentence. l-l orton was convicted al rt Nuclear Strike Planning Branch al General Courts-Martial on live the Fleet latclligencc Center, Eu counts of failure 10 report contacts rope and Atlantic, located in Nor HORTON with hostile country na1 ioni1 ls and folk, Virginia. one count !lf solicitation to commit After documenting his activities Based upon evidence accumu espionage. He was sentenced to six through sophisticated investigative lated during the investigation, Hor years conlinemcnl :11 hard labor, technique~. Horton was intcrro,. ton chose LO plead guilty under a forfeiture of all pay and allowances, gated and admiued efforts 10 com pretrial agreement wbich included a a dishonorable discharge and reduc mit espionage. posl-lrial grant of immunity. This tion in pay grade to E-1. During pre-polygraph interroga allowed NlS lo question Horton af tion on 02 and O'.l October 1982, ter his couvictioo and sentencing for Horton additionally admitlcd thut a period of up 10 six months to deter he had single integrated operations mine any damage 10 n:11ional secu plans (SIOP) for sale. rity caused by his actions. 11 Clayton J. Loneerec enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps and in 1984 was posted in Moscow, U.S.S.R., where he served as pare or the Ma rine Corps Guard Dccuchmcnt for lhe U.S. Embassy. During hi s assignmcnl in Moscow, Lonccrce had an a ffair wil h a Soviet woman, Violctca Sein a, who bad previously been a telephone operalor and 1ransla1or al the U.S. E111 b.1ssy. Soon arter L11eir relation ship began, Scina introduced Lone• lree 10 her "Unc.lc Sasha" who was la1cr identified by U.S. incclligcncc LONETREE SEINA as being a KGB agent. In December 1986, Lonclrec I urned himself in loaulhorites al lhe can incclligcncc agents, to provide of espionage and 12 related chnrges. U.S. Embassy in Vienna, Austria. personalilydaca on AmeriCTLn inccll i On 24 August 1987, he was sen Lonctrec was cried on l3 counts gcncc agents, and to provide infor tenced 10 JO years in prison, lined including espionage. Among these mation concerning the noor plans of $5,000.00, loss of all pay and allow counts were c.lrnrges chat he con• the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and ances, reduced 10 the rank of private, spired with Sovie! agcnls lo gather Vienna. On 21 August 1987, the 26- and given a dishonorable discharge. names and photogrnphs of Amcri- year-old Lonee rec was found i;•uilty 12 "PROFESSIONAL, THOROUGH" GAO REPORT SETS THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON NIS INVESTIGATION The NIS investigation into allegations of es graphic locations of certain witnesses.. ." pionage involving Marinc Sccurily Guards was The report slates that the "lack of timely in thoroui;hly investigated itself by the U.S. Gen• vestigative informalion" from 01hcr organi1.. a • eral Accounting Offi ce's Office of Special I nves Lions involved in the investigation further handi tigations. capped the NJS investigations. The GAO iJJquirywas initiated at 1he reques1 Other problems resulted from statements of the Honorable Daniel A. Mica, Chairman, and subsequent retractions by some of the Subcommittee on International Operations, MSGs to NIS, according to the report, which Commillcc on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of added, "These statements caused NJS to con Representatives; and the Honorable Olympia J. sume an enormous amount of investigative ef Snowe, Ranking Minority Member, Subcom fort in trying to verify them." miueeoo International Operations, Commillce The GAO report goes on to say: on Foreign Affairs, U.S. I-louse of Representa "We think that the NIS espionage investiga tives. tion was professlonul und thorough. NIS con• Oo 28 July 1988, GAO submincd its final ducted the investigation in nn aggressive man report, consisting of 32 pages, 10 Reps. Mica ner und di ligently fo llowed a ll logical leads. andSnowe. GAO's assessment ofthc NJS inves Based on our review, we determined the follow tigation begins on page 15 and reads as follows: ing: "Our assessment of the NIS investigation in cluded a review oft he case files, which included •• The investigation was well thouiv>t out and investigat ivc notes, memoranda, and reports. planned,given the exigency of the situation after We also reviewed the various forms, such as Lonetrce confcs.~cd to espionage. polygraph waivers and advice of rights, used by NIS throughout the investigation. We paid .. The investigative methods used by NIS ap particular allention to doeuments that indicated peared to be sound and logically chosen. planning on the part of NIS and its coordination with other involved agencies. We studied the -- NIS appea red 10 be aware of the constitu assessment of the investigat ion prepared by the tional rights of the MSGs and took steps to Marine Corps and received an expert opi nion of protect them. NIS' use of the polygraph. "We supplemented this work with interviews "With respect to NIS' use of 1hc polygraph, of NIS agents who conducted the investigation; we requested that Dr. Gordon Barland, Chiefo f both prosecut ing and defense attorneys or the Research, Department of Ocfcn~c Polygraph MSGs; Marine Corps commanders; MSGs ac Institute, review the utilization of the polygraph tually involved in the investigation, as well as in this matter. Dr. Barland found that within the other MSGs; and Department of Srntc person limits or his review, NlS' polygraph exams were nel. well-planned, properly executed, ,rnd techni "In our opinion, the NIS investigat ion of all callysound. Further, Dr. 8:irland found the use MSG espionage-related activity from 1986 LO of the polygraph in NIS' investigation a prudent 1988 was conducted under difr.cull circum invcstigntivc measure, given the urgency and stances. NIS investigators were forced to work lim iced nhcrnative investigat ive technique~ backward from Lonctrcc's confession in order available." to corroborate hisstntemcnts. They were handi capped in these efforts because of the gco- 13 Samuel Loring Morison was born tion with 1.ru!Ju; where he was earn these still classified photographs was in London, England 14 On 07 J u11e 1983, an individual using 1hc name Chris in 1hc milirnry. Pickering assumed an alias, Christopher lophcr Eric Loring cnlcred the Naval Rcgionul Medical Eric Loring, hid ihe facts of his prior USMC affiliation, Clinic, Sca11lc, Washington, ac1ing very erralicand sllll· nnd enlisted in the U.S. Navy on 23 January 1979. ing thal be possessed a large quanlity of "secrcl docu• During interrogation, Pickering admitted stealing Lhe rncn1s viu,J to lhe sccuri1y of our coun1ry." classified material from 1hc ship's office of the USS The individual was in possession of one plaslic ad Fanning (FF-1076) beLween July and October 1982. drcssograph card imprinted wilh lhc address of 1he Pickering like,vise expressed an in1e res1in the KGB, and Soviel Embassy, Washinglon, D.C. During permissive advised of faniasizing about espionage. searches of Subjccl's aulomobilc and his residence by He uhimatcly admilled mailing a live-page Secret NlS Special Agents, four Governmcnl marked enve document to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., lopes conlaining classified microfiche and 147 micro along with a typed lcllcr offering nddi1ioooJ classified fiche cards conlaining a variety of classified defense material to Lhc SovicLUnion. 1>ublica1ions were localed. On 03 October 1983, Pickering pied guilty al a General Through invcs1igation, 1he indvidual was identified as Courts-Martial 10 several violations ofthc UCMJ includ Jeffery Loring Pickering, who had previously served in ing Arliclc 134 (violaLions of Title 18 U.S. Code Section the U.S. Marine Corps. During his Marine cnlis1men1, 793 {b) and (c) • espionage statu1es). Picke ring was he was described ns a 1hicf, thrill seeker, and a pcrpc1uul convicted and awarded confincmcnl al hard labor for live liar. years, fo rfciL urc of $400.00 per month for 60 monLhs, Pickering lefl the Marines in Augusl 1973, bul became reduction 10 E-1 and a bad conduce discharge. dissalisficd with civilian life and began cfforls lo re-enlist 15 Jonathan Juy Pollard was born in In the summer of 1986, the 31- Galveston, Texas, and grew up in year-old Pollard married Anne L. South Bend, Indiana. In 1976, Pol Henderson, then 25 years old, in a lard grnduatcd from Stanford Uni civil ceremony in 11 :dy. Mrs. Hen versity with a degree in polit ical sci derson-Pollard had attended the c11ce and subsequently allcndcd the University of M:,ryland. Fletcher School of Law and Diplo In early 1984, Pollard requested a macy, Tufts University. meeting with an Israeli military offi. lt1 1980, Pollard moved to the cer. A meeting was effected in the Washington, O.C., area and was summer of 1984, at which time Pol hired by the Naval Intelligence Sup lard agreed to pass classified infor port Center (NJSC) where he mation to his Israeli contacts. worked as a civilian analys1. In 1984, For the next 18 months Pollard POLLARD Pollard was hired by the Naval Jnv es pro,;cled a significant volu me of clas• Ligativc Service a'- 3 terrorism unu silicd information taken from ltis Pollard was arrcsccd on 21 Novem lysl. place of employment. ber t985 as a rcsu 11 of reports by co At the time or Lhis espionage ac workers of hissuspic ious activities in t iviLy, Poll:ird wns serving ns a GS-12 the oflicc. The fo llowing day, 22 lntt lligcnoe Research Specialist in November 1985, his wife, Mrs. Anne the Ant i-Terrorist Alert Center, Henderson-Pollard, was also ar Suit land, Maryland. Pollard would rested. take documents from the oflicc to an On 04 June 1986, both pleaded apartment where !hey would be guilty Lo charges broughc against photocopied. By chc time of his them. Pollard was sentenced on 04 • apprehension, Pollard had passed a March 1987, to life imprisonment volurncof material th at would meas fo r cspionugc and Henderson-Pol ure ten fee t by six feel. lard w.ts sentenced 10 two concur Pc,llnrd w,is originally ideologi renL live year terms for conspiracy cally mot ivucc 16 PFC Brian Everett Slavens, USMC, Marine Barracks, Embassy less than thirty minutes, during which time he Adak, Alaska, advised his sister, while on lcuvc, that he was asked to provide a autobiographical sketch and to did not intend to return to the Marine Corps, and that he reconsider his actions. had visited the Soviet Embassy ln Washington, D.C., Slavens subsequently requested legal counsel, and his during late August/early September 1982. lawyer later ngreed for Slavens to undergo a polygraph Slavens' father alerted the Marine Corps of his son's examination. Slavens was administered a polygraph intent to desert, and summarily Slavens was arrested by exam on 05 September 1982, the results of which indi N"IS Special Agents on 04 September 1982. cated that he did not disclose any classified information During interrogation, Slavens admitted ente ring the 10 the Soviets. Soviet Embassy in Washington, O.C., and offering to On 24 November 1982, Slavens plcadc 17 lF Dffii1 @ lF f}fJ W On 29 July 1984, Radioman Sca was discounted from $.100,000.00 10 Irene, and Bruce Tobias when the nian Michael T. Tobias, assigned as $1,000.00, a price chat Tobias's three repentcdly failed lie dclcclor a radioman aboard the landing ship younger brother, Bruce Edward, tcsls, particularly on mailers regard USS Peoria (LST-1183) secreted participated in selling. Several calls ing lhe existence and disposition of crypto cards from a shredder before were placed 10 1he USSS by Pizzo, two more cryplo cards which were theirde-~t ruction. The theft occurred one of which was traced by the FBI. never found. when a second radioman assigned 10 The suspects were confronted by On 22Ja.n11t1ry 1985, Bruce Tobias the destruction detail signed orr 1he FBI agents and submillcd lo an and Dttlc Irene pied guilty to two des1ruction report for 12 cards wilh• interview lo verify their identilica counts of theft of Government prop ou1 witnessing !heir actual destruc tion. The interview concluded wi1h erty. Bruce Tobias was sentenced to lion. insufficient evidence to detain sub lime served (159days) and 1cn years In Augusl 1984, Tobias and a jects. Thefollo,vingdny, both Tobias probation. Onie Irene was sen- friend, Francis Pizzo, Jr,, drove 10 and Pizzo ned 10 California with Lhe 1enccd to two years conlincment. the Soviet Consulate in Snn Fnm• help of an acquaintance, Dule Irene. On 7 August 1985, Pir..l.O pleaded cisco, bul arrived during the early On 17 August 1984, Tobias and guilty lo four counls of conspiracy morning before regular business Piuo were arresled in San Fran and one counl of theft of Govern hours. Having failed in their init ial cisco. While con lined, Tobias called ment property and was sentenced 10 nilcm pt lo coo1ae1 a "foreign Irene, suggesting he retrieve and ten years confinement and live years power", and obviously having sec dcslroy nine e_qrds from behind ;1 probation. ond thoughl.S about commiting es toilet in Tobias's apartment. On 14Augusl 1985,MichaelTobias pionage, the pair drove back to San On 22 August 1984, Irene was inter was convicted of four counls of con Diego and called the U.S. Secret viewed al his house al which time he spiracy and three counts of theft of Service ( USSS) offering 10 sell tbc produced lhe nine cryplo cards Lhat Government property and scn cards back lo lhc Govcrnmen1 for he had failed 10 destroy. lenccd lo 20 years confinement and amncsly and money. The Government withdrew plea five years proba1ion. The price lo the U.S. Govern111cn1 barg"in arrangements with Pizzo. • 18 John Anthony Walker, Jr. was Walker recruited others in10 his raised in Scranton, Pennsylvania, network, including Jerry Alfred where he had an unhappy childhood. \Vhitworth, n senior chief radioman His parents, both alcoholics, were wbo bad served with h,m. Walker separated. Inter recruited his own son, who had Walker left high school while in the cnlisled in the U.S. Nnvy. He also 11th gr.tde and on 25 October 1955 aucmptcd unsuccessfully 10 rccruil he joined the U.S. Navy. While serv one of his daughters, who was serv ing in the Navy, Walker wns consid ing in lhc U.S. Army. ered highly competent and in the A Soviet defcelorsaid the KGB first half of bis21 years ofactive duty c.onsidered this the most impOrtant he rose from the grade ofSeaman to opera1ion in its history. Wnrrnnt Officer. Walker's wife knew, almost from While in the service he earned the the beginning, that her husband was Navy cquivalency for a high school involved in espionage. O n numerous and college diploma. When he re• occasions she had t hrcatened 10 turn tired in July 1976 he had reached the JOHN WALKER him in to authorities. · grade of Chief Warrrnnt Officer. An unhappy marriage eventually His active duty assignments in the Sovicl KGB, Walker directly led to divorce and finally, in 1985, cluded responsible positions in compromised numerous pieces of Walker's former wife informed the conuuunications including Commu clas.~ificd informntion and equip FBI or his espionage ac1ivi1ies. An nications Systems Officer for the ment 10 include the decryption keys investigation and surveillance of Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet which, in 1urn, led tothecompromisc Walker resu lted in his being arrested and Com munical ions Oflicer for lhc of al least n million classified mes• af1er he dropped classified informa• Naval Surface Force Atlantic Fleet. sagi:s of 1he mili1ury services and lion in a suburb of Washington, D.C. During his mi litary career, Walker U.S. intelligence agencies. The documcn1s, most of which made some investments on which he In addition, Walker recogni,.cd came from 1hc USS Nimitz on wh ich lost money. Being in moncrnry need, thal when he left activcdu1yhewould his son Michael was serving, were in late 1968 at the age of 30, Walker no longer have direcJ access to clas hidden in a garbage bag. The arrc.~l went lo the Soviet Embassy in Wash sified informa1ion. He therefore look placed on 20 May 1985, at a ington, D.C., and offered hisscrvici:s recruited a friend on active duly in motel in Rockville, Maryland, where fo r purposes of espionage. the U.S. Navywho also held commu Walker was spending the night. Walker compromised key curds nicaiions posi1ions similar 10 those In October 1985, Walker pleaded used for enciphering mc>1Sagcs aod previously occupied by Walker. guilty coespionage charges and on 06 111s0 provided iuformaliou on lhe Upon rcliremcnl nnd his opening November 1986, he was sentenced 10 encryp1ion devices 1hemselves. The or a private investigation firm, 1wo life terms plus 1cn years to be Sovicls provided Walker with a rotor Walker allempled to furl her expand served concurrenlly. As a result of decryption device used for testing his espionage ncl by first rccrui1ing pica bargaining, Walker agreed 10 wiringeircuilry for rotors used by the his bro1her, arctircd U.S. Navy offi. turn slate's evidence concerning the U.S. Navy fo r encryption purposes. cer, and urging him 10 !ind civilian Navy friend whom he recruited in During his more lhan 17 years of employment ,vi1h a Depar1men1 of exchange for a lighter sentence for espionage performed on behalf of Defense conlrnctor. his son who had also pleaded guilty. 19 Michael La nce Walke r, the only son or John Anthony Walker, dropped o ut of high school in 1980, due lo problems associated with the use of drugs and poor grades. Having left his divorced mothe r's house to live with his father in Norfolk, he reentered high school and graduated in June 1982. Although he wanted to go to college, his grades were inadcquutc fo r college ncccp1ancc. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy on 13 December 1982. T he younger Walke r was co nvinced by his father that he could make money by turning over classified docume nts lo him. Michael agreed lo the arrange• menl for monernry reasons ns well as his desire to please his fo1 her. Following his recruitment in approximat ely August 1983, Michael began 1urnin g over clossilicd documents to his father. His access 10 classified mntcrial increased when he was assigned lo O pe rat ions Adminis1ra1 ion as:, Scaman (E-3) aboard the aircraft ca rrier USS Nimitz. MICHAEL WALKER Following !he arrest of John Walker, Michael Walker was int erviewed aboard the carrier by the Naval Investigative Service. In his berthing compar1men1 invest igators round approximately 15 1>0unds of classified info rm ation which had been destined fo r destruction but which Michael had hidden aw:,y to turn over to his father al the time of his next port call. Michael Walker wa~ arrc.Slcd on 22 May 1985. During interrogation it was determined that he bad passed so many documents 10 his fa t her t!,nt he h:1d no accurate count of the I ornl. It was cs1i ma1cd he had passed in excess of 1500 documents since his initial agreement 10 cooperate with his fa ther. On 28 October 1985, 1he 22-ycar-old Michael pleaded guilty to ro ve counts of espionage. On 06 November 1986, he was scnlenccd 10 1wo 25-ycar terms a nd three IO•yc:ir terms to run concurrently. 20 .ferry Alfred Whitworth was born payments for selling clas.~ilied infor in Muldrow, Oklahoma, on JO mation. August 1939. His parents separated Walker asked Whitworth lo pro shortly after he was boro and he was vide him the informntion which he, in raised by his grandparents and an Lurn, would sell Lo criminalclcmears uncle. He was known as a good where there was a known market. natured youth who, in his senior year The two men would then split the in high school, was voted class clown. profits. Whitworth agreed to coop ln September 1956, Whitworth erate with the knowledge that the joined tl,e U.S. Navy. Following his information was being sold lo the four year enlistment in Lhe Navy, KGB coming only at a late r date in Wl1itworlh left the service and e n their conspiracy. rolled in college. He was uns uccess Whitworth thcreartcr reenlisted in ful in hi~ college classes and reen the Navy. He advanced to Senior listed in the Navy in 1962. Chier Radioman and received the During an assignment in 1970, highest ratings fr om his superiors. WHITWORTH when Whitworth and John Anthony Following his recruitment by Walke r, Jr. were stationed together, Walker, Whitworth became a model the two became acquainted and service me mber and excelled in his 24 July 1986 on seven counts of es Walke r eventually started a con specially until his retirement on 31 pionage and one count of tax eva scious effort lo assess Whitworth as October 1983. sion. On 28 August 1986 Whitworth a potential agent for expanding and Whitworth was secretly married in was sentenced lo 365 years in prison continuing Walker's espionage ef 1976. Between 1hat year and 1985, and a $4 10,000.00 fine. fo rts on behalf of tbe KGB. Whitworth met with Walker on an In 1974, Whitworth had decided to average of two lo four timc.s a year al resign from active duty. During this which time he would pass to Walker same year, in a San Diego restaurant, 25 to 50 rolls of Minox film contain Walker finally asked Whitworth to ing classified information. join him in a conspiracy which would Whitworth's trial began on 06 allow them to receive significant March 1986. He was convicted on 21 In August 1968, Sonar Technician First Class Edward An investigation resulted in the arrest of Wine. A llilledon Wine, Jr., U.S. Navy, arranged 10 provide subsequent search resulted in the discovery of handwri1- classified U.S. submarine information to a civilian asso 1e11 notes containing Secret data pertaining 10 submarine ciate for passage to rcprcsenlatives of the Soviet Union patrol schedules and a Confidential 1ecl111ical publica in New York City. Wine hnd been assigned to a nuclear Li on. submarine, USS Sblc (SSN-578), homeportcd in New Wine was given a General Cour1s-M11rtial and he plcd London, Connecticut. guilty to mishandling classified material, was sente nced The civilian associate informed the Federal Bureau of to three years in prison, reduced 10 E-1 and given n lnves1iga1ion (FBI) of Wine's in1cnti(1n, and the FBI dishonorublc discharge. contac1cd the Naval Jnvcstiga1ivc Service (NIS). 22 HtuJs Palmer Wold was an Intelligence Specialist the roll of lilm sci,.cd by NIS contained photogrn1,hs Third Class assigned lo tbc Intelligence Division aboard from a LOP secret publication. NIS was apprised of 1bc USS Ranger, when he requested and was granted leave contents of the mm and initiated an investigation into the from lJ June through 02 July 1983. matter. The leave was granted with the understanding that Wold admilled to NIS speci:il agen1s that he had Wold would remain in the local San Diego area, but on covertly photographed portions of a 101> secret publica or about 02July Wold's command received a message tion aboard USS Ranger during early June, 1983, with from the American Red Cross, Subic Bay, Republic of the intention of contacting the Soviets. The film, proc the Philippines (RP), in which Wold requested an exten essed under strict security measures, revealed that it did sion of leave. Wold's request was granted and his leave in fact contain images of pages from a top secret publi was extended for five additional days. But he fa iled to calion entilled "NAVY APPLICATION OF NA report for duty on 07 July 1983 and w1ls listed as an TIONAL RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS (U)". It unauthorized absentee. was determined that a total of twelve out of focus images Wold's command then re<1ues1ed NIS assiswncc in were on the roll of film. locating him and ensuring his 1urnovcr to the Special On 05 October 1983, Wold pied guil1 y a1 a General Security Officer for the Commander of the U.S. Naval Cour(swMarlial to 11 unauthorit..cd absence"~ "missing Forces in the Philippines (COMUSNA VPHIL) al Subie movement"; "using marijuana onboard the USS Bay for appropriate debriefing. Ranger"; "folsc swearing''; nnd three spccilic'-1t ions of On 19 July 1983, Wold was apprehended by NIS violating Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 793, "making pho- special agents at his lfancec's residence in O longapo 1ographswi1h in1cnt or reason to believe information was City, in the Republic of the Philippines, for being an to be used to the injury of the U.S. orthc advantage of n unauthorized absentee. During Wold's apprehension, an foreign naLion ." undeveloped roll of Kodak 110 color film was seized. Wold was sentenced to four years at hard labor; a Wold was released to the N2 (Intelligence) for dishonorable discharge; forfeiture of all pay and allow COMUSNA VPHIL 10 be debriefed. During his proc ance.~; and reduction in rate to E-1. essing at N2, Wold told a chief intelligenccs pccialisl that 23 Counteriotclligence operations enable the U.S. intelli 10 deccct fraud, wasce and abuse, Special Agent Olive got gence community to monitor hostile intelligence scrvice-s another idea. so approprintc countermeasures can be taken 10 pro1ec1 "I noticed they dealt a lot with subm arine communica sensitive information upon which the survival of this coun- tions, and I scarred chin king chat the Soviets would be 1ry may one day rcsl. exl rcmely incercstcd in chis type of information,'' Special One way this is done is ch rough 1hc use of double ugcnls Agent Olive said. " I wrole up n pro1:,osal 10 recrui1acivi li:in •· individuals under the concrol of one intelligence agency double agent and cargct him againsl lhc Soviets by ha,fog who offe r their services 10 an opposing intelligence ;igcncy. him supply controlled information to them aboul subma Through the use of double ageols, !he U.S. inlclligencc rine acoustic.\ and comm unicacions. comm unicy is able to identify hostile intelligence services': "II was initially inlcndcd to find oul exactly what 1hc 011era1ives and agcncs, "Lrndccrafl ", clec-1roni c ,md photo• Soviets were looking for in the area of submarine comm u grapl1iceavesdropping capabilitics, and sources ond mcch nications and 10 discover how they would task a.ad handle ods of opcra1ions . someone working fo r lhe Navy in an orea such as Char ln some cn.scs, double agent operacions have resulted in lcscon, which is away from diplomalic es1ablishmcn1s." 1he arrest of hostile intelligence service officers. Some of As au artcr 1hough1, Special AgenL Olive modified il 10 these hostile in1clligcnceofr.cers had diplomacie immunity 1arge1 Che Ease German inlelligcnce Service •• the Minis and were deported. Others were convicced of espionage Lerium foerSlnntssicherhcit (MI'S). and lacer 1raded for prisoners held in Eastern bloc coun Special Agcn1 Olive then presented it lo lhe FBI and tries. eight monchs lacer, lhc opcracion began. "The 1010! lake Anoeh er goal of double agenl opcracions is to discour rrom chis operation," Special Agent Olive said, "proved to age hoslile incelligencc agencies from nccepting "walk be much more than I ever dreamed." ins11, whocome to them offering their services. "\Valk.ins", such as John Walker, have been responsible for a majoricy of1h c dam age done 10 nacionalsecu rity Ihr ough espionage. Since 1hc Federal Burc:111 of lnvcs1iga1ion has primary jurisdiccion in counccrintelligencc mailers inside the U.S., all doublcagcnl operationsconduc1ed inside the U.S. arc THE QOUIILE AGENT coordin aced with Che FBI. Thc firsLa nd mosl important Lask facingll,e NIS and 1hc FBI was IO find someone ,villing lo be the "double agent". "We were looking for a very special type or person," IIOW TII EYWORK Spcci11 I Agent Oli,•e said. "Several people had been inter viewed under the prelcXI of a security survey. As soon as Although "double agenl" operacions arc lhe result of Bill Tanner was interviewed, we knew immediately he was careful planning and preparations, 1hcy somecimes begin in going lo be !he man fo r the job. wha1 might be considered a less than spcctacul11r foshion. "He was very calm and fo rthrigh1, and had a very good A very successrul and one of 1he few double agcnl opera record. He seemed like he would stand up well under lions made public in rcccnl ycarsstar1edwi1h, wha1 for lack extreme pressure and think clearly al thc same Lime - or a bctler word, was a daydream. something lhal would lacer prove invaluable to the success In I hesummcr of 1980, NIS Special Agent Ron Olive was of this opcracion. He was intelligent and knowledgeable of involved in a fraud survey al whal was then the Naval lhc world situalion ~,nd, or course, submarinccommunica Elcclronic Sys1cms Engineering Center (NA VELEX) in lions." Charleston, S.C. Although the purpose or 1hc survey was Although Tanner was the top prospcc1, he wasn't aware 24 NAVAL BILL TANNER of iLu ntil weeks later. "After doing some background checks on Tanner, we OTHER DOUBLE AGENT OPERATIONS called him and asked him 10 meet us at a local restaurant,'' Special Agent Olive said, "He didn't know why we asked him to meet with us, We just told him he would be meeting Ironically, while Special Agent Olive was drawing up the with agents from the FBI and NJS," plans ror one "double agent" operation, a story about Tanner agreed and IAtcr met with Special Agent Olive another one involving the NIS and 1hc FBI appeared in the and an FBI Agent. June 198() edi1ion of Reader's Oigc$l. Written by Jeremy "We dido'l tell him what his job would be," Special J. Lcggall and entitled "Art Lindberg's Wal k in the Cold", Agent Olive said. "We just asked him ifhe would be willing it outlined an operation which targeted hostile intelligence to participate in a highly sensitive operation for 1he Navy. agentsworkingou1 of chcSovieLUnion's United Nations "As we expected, he was dumfo undcd. We told him it Mission in New York. could put him in a hostile environment where there could Lindberg, alicucenant commander in the U.S. Navy, was be a high degree or a!l)(icty and pressure, We told him this recruited much like Tanner, And like Tanner, Lindberg operation would be ou1side of normal working hours and was miirried with children, it would not interfere with his job. Then we told him to go For Lindberg it began in April 19n with a call from NIS home and think about it and we would gel back with him in Special Agent Terry Tate. It was 1hc scart of "Opcrnlion a week or so. Lcmonaid''. "About a week later we go1 together again, He said he Nine years later a woman naval officer, Donnn Geiger, 1hought about i1 and really wanted to participate in it. lfo received a similar call from an NTS srecial agent and was subsequently recruited formally and his tr:iiningbegan became the double agent in "Operacion Station Zebra". for 1hc operation." It was called "Operation Showdown". 25 On 21 December 1981, Bill Tan operation and areas of inte rest, two ner, u civilian engineer employed al other important results occurred. the Naval Electronic Systems Engi First, Zchc's conviclion wusconsid• neering Center in Charleston, S.C., cred a landmark case because all es walked int o the East Gcrma,1 Em pionage activity occurred outside lhc bassy in Washington, D.C., and of U.S. Previous convictions in other fe red 10 exchange clas.silicd informa espionage cases were based on activity tion for money. which had occurred inside the U.S. Unknown to the East Germans, Second, Zehe's arrest and convic Tanner was a ''double agent" working tion set upu major East-West prisoner undcnhc control of lhe Naval lnvcsti exchange. gat ive Service (NIS) and Federal A front-page article in the 12 June Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 1985 edition of the Washington Post The target of the "double agent " described in detail the prisoner ex operation, code named "Operation change at the "rickety span of the Showdown''. was 1hc East German GheneckcBridge" in Berlin --the situ inte lligence service, the Ministc rium of another famous prisoner exchange, fucr Staa1ssi<:herhci1 (MfS). ZEH E which occurred in1962when U-2 pilot In the weeks and months 1h31 fol Frnncis Gary Powers, who was shol lowed, Tanner met with East German approached by Tanner in the lobby of down over the Soviet Union, was agents a dozen times, ,vi1h seven the Boston-Sheraton. The face-to• traded fo r Soviet spy Rudolf Abel. meeting.s in Mexico City and one in r:,ce confronl:llion had been set up by According to the article, "Western East Berlin . In return fo r what the the NIS and FBI. When Zehe at sources involved in theswap said it was East Germans be lieved was highly te mpted to leave, he was arresled by evident thnt the East Germans we re sensitive informat ion aboul un an1 i FB I ngents. exceptionally cager to gain the release submarine system and submarine Zehe subsequently pleaded guilty of Alfred Zehe, a Dresden physi communication~, i'(mncr received to seven count s of espionage and one cist.. .." more than $21,000. The transactions count of conspiracy. On4April 1985, The article, datelined ll June took pluce outside the United States. he was sentenced to four concurre nt began as fo llows: • In the fo ll of 1983, the FBI learned eigh1-ycar prison terms, a $5,000 line "The United States traded one 1ha1 Tanner's primary contucl, East :rnd two years probation aft er release. accused and three convicted spies German physicist Alfred Zehe, was "Operation Sh0\!,1c.lown" was a today fo r 23 prisoners held in East coming to Boston, Mas.sachuseus, to mc1jor success. In addition to giving German and Polish jails in what diplo ,11tcnd a vacuum physics conference. the U.S. intell igence communily in mats describe as the biggest East On 3 November 1983, Zehe was sight into the MfS, its methods of West swap of its kind in Europe .... " 26 ''Whatever it takes'' On February 14, 1986, an NIS Special Agenl was pre A: To begin with, I was very impressed with the way se,11ed with the Nalional Intelligence Medal of it bad been handled by the previous case oniccrs. And, Achievement for his parl in "Operation Showdown". I was impressed with Bill Tanner. He's a very intelli The ceremony was held al 1he Ccnlral Intelligence gent, patriotic individual. II was largely thr.ough Mr. Agency. The fo llowing is from an in-house interview Tanner's abilities and tenacity tbat the opcrat,on was as conducted prior to rhc award ceremony. successful as it was. Q: When did you get invoh·cd In "Opcrulion Show Q: Wl,nt wns your reaction when you fo und oul lhnt down,,..! you were l>elni; assigned to the euse'/ A: I was the third in a series of case officers assigned A: After reviewing the case file, my thoughts were 10 "Operation Showdown". The operation began in that the opernlion was going quit e well anti I was just 1981. NIS Special Agen1 Ron Olive ini1ia1cd 1l~c hoping that I wouldn't screw it up. 1hough1 and initiated contacl with the double ogcnt, B,11 Tanner, along with lhe FBI. After Ron Olive was transferred from the Char Q: What was your job·/ leston, S.C., area, NTS Special Agent Keith Hitt look over the operation. Then, subscq uent to his leaving, I A: Thcrenrc a lot ofthing.s a case officer docs that took over the operation. When I say "look over" let me we really can't talk about. But basically, the job is to emphasiw that I am referring to the NJS part of the provide the double agent wi1h information and training operation. This was a joint operation with the FBI. 10 prepare him how to react in different situations he might lind himself in ... likc when. he has a fa~ ~o fac_c confrontation with :1 rcprcscntat,ve of a hostile rntelh Q: how far along was "Operation Showdo ..11" by gcnce service. the time you took It over for NIS'! A: I guess Mr. Tanner had been in contact with the Q: How do your prepare someone lo meet a hostile East Germans for a liltlc more than a year. He had intelligence offi<..-er'/ already made trips out of Lhe country, He had already passed some of the information. And the groundwork A: IL iakes a lot of prepara1ion, because you have to had been laid for his trip to East Berlin, get a person in 1hc proper mindset to lie effectively while he's 1alking to someone who is a trained intelli gence officer. More than that, I just can't say. Q: How long were you on the cnsc'! A: About Lwo and a half years. Q: Did"Opcrution Showdown" domlnntcyourlifo? A: The FCI (foreign counterintelligence) liclcl itself Q: What was your first Impression of"01>tr11tlo11 dominates your life, but that case in particular. Showdown"'! 27 Q: Whal do you remember Tanntr the most about Mr. ? it of his own volition. Nobody is coerced kind of things into doing the Bill did. So I wanted A: Thelhinglhat could call Bill to knowtbal he sticksoul in mymindare1hewords it off, even al the last hcsa.id 10 me ha,'C minute. And that would jusl before he wen been line. We linishcdamcctingandl t 10 Ea~l Berlin. We would ha,'C fallen back toldliimonelas1 had something else. and done don'I ha\'C 1imc," Bill,)OU 10 go. If you feel un But he ju~l turned fcarfol comfor1ablc or you're and looked at for your safely, "Whatever it me and said, 1han )'OU ha,'Cn'I g0110 lakes". And that's 1ru go." Bill c. Anyone whodoc~w was just a patriot, h:11 Billdid,does pure and simple, laking opporlunit) to do a the job fo r his country. PRESENTED TO THE NIS IN CASE AGENT "OPERATION SHOWDOWN" 28 "Operation Lernonaid" took place in New York in the late 1970s and utilized a Navy Lieutenant Com mander Ari Li.ndberg as n double agent. Lt.Cmdr. Lindberg was ap proached by the Naval Investigative Service in April tm. After some meetings and interviews, NJS Spe cial Agent Terry Talc asked Lt.Cmdr. Lindberg if he would be willing 10 consider performing a sensit ive assignment for his country. LI.Cmdr. Lindberg accepted the .. assignment and was later introduced to FBI agents from New York, who assisted in briefing him on the opera CHERNVAVEV ENGER tion. In August 1m, Ll.Cmdr. Lind of drop sites where that informnt ion of the Soviet Mission 10 1hc United berg took a trip on the Soviet cruise could be ldl and payment money Nations. Zinyakin, who bud diplo• ship Kazaklislan. Upon the ship's could be found. NJS and FBI agents ma1ic immunity, was expelled from return to New York, Ll.Cmdr. Lind kept the drop zones under surveil the United Stales. The other two, berg passed a note to one or the lance and later identified the soviet Rudolph Petrovich Chcrnyayev 1H1 calls Ll.Cmdr. Lindberg was given arrested three Soviets. al Kennedy Airport in New York. contact instructions on the type or One of them was Vladimir Pel• information 10 get and the locations rovich Zinyakin, who was a 01cmbcr 29 On 2 Dember 1986 Donna Geiger walked onboard a Soviet scientific rcsc:irch vessel, Lhe Akademik Boris Peirov, which was in the harbor of St. John's, Newfoundland, for a three day R&R. Geiger, a Navy leiutenanL who was later promoted to lieutenant commander, was a double agent who had been recruited by the Naval Investigative Service. She was the key rigure in a highly successful double agent operation involving the NIS, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Secu rit y Intelligence Service (CSIS). "MICHAEL", WITH BACK TO CAMERA, MEETS Lt.Cmdr. Geiger had just been WITH DOUBLE AGENT DONNA GEIGER stationed at the U.S. Naval Facility (NA VFAC) in ArgenLia, New• fou ndland. When she went on• On 17 May 1987, acting on dircc• Sound Underwater Surveillance board the Soviet ship, she por• I ions she received by mnil, Lt.Cmdr. System (SOSUS) and NA VFAC tayc 30 wi1h a modified camera designed for about one bour and 25 minu1cs. docume nt photography, secret writ Lt.Cmdr. Geiger w~s given more ing materials and an ''accominoda money in exchange for one classified tion address" in East Berlin where document and portions of ano1her. she could mail lcuers Lo signal fo r But when Ra1kai left the room he othe r meetings. was 11rres1ed in,mediatelyin 1hc hall On llJunc L988Lt.Cmdr.Gcigcr way. and "Michael" met again. By this On 6 February 1989, Ratkai Lime "Michael" had been identified pleaded guilty to espionage in the as Stephen Joseph Ratka.i, a Cana Suprc meCourtofNewl'oundland. 11 dian-born son of a Hungarian Marked the first conviction under ernigrc. Ratkai held dual Canadian Section 3(1C) or the Canadian Offi and Hungarian citizen.ship. cial Secrets Act for espionage. When they me1 at the Hotel On 9 March 1989, Ratkai was Newfoundland, Lt.Cmdr. Geiger sentenced to two concurrent nine steered Ratkai to a room which had year prison terms. been outfilled with audio and video surveillance. The meeting lasted RATKAI 31 "CURIOSITY' LED OFFICER TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT The following is from ;on inte rview with l he NIS cases, when you t:ilk to people who have been in case agent on Operation Station Zebra: volved in this the patriotism and the oppor1uni1y 10 serve their country comes through. Thal may sound corny, but it's 1rue. Anyone who has been involved in Q: How wus Lt.Cmd r. Geiger selected? 1his typeof operations knows 1herc is a loLmore hard work involved than thrills. There is a lot of preparn A: We use various selection processes, but in this tion and drudgery for those few hours o f operalional case, she was recommended by her commanding contact. orticcr. We work very closely with the command during the selection process and in this particular case, 1bm re lationship enabled us to find cxac1ly the Q: Wl,ut type or pers on Is Donna Geiger? type of person we were looking for. We wan1cd someone wilh prior opcra1ional experience in anti A: S he's bright. .. articulate ... dcdicated and s ubmarine warfare, particularly in SOSUS, and pa1rio1ic. .. cvery, hing th:,t you would e nvision the Donna was it. modern woma.n being. She was a wife, mother and naval offi cer, ;md atthcsamc time did an outstanding double agent. She was a quick learner and had the Q: Wl,at type of person volunteers for this type or ability 10 tl1ink on her feet in stressfu l situations. We nssig,nment'! had a lot of confidence in her abili1y and she neve r disappointed us. A: First of all, for 1he mosl [>art we sclccl candidates for 1his type of operation. Then we give them 1he opportunity lo volunteer. Because of 1hc cliffcrenl Q: Whut wns her response when you firs t contacted scenarios and goals of the operations we have to her? consider candida1cs from a variety of backgrounds, including orticcrs, enlisted and civilian DoN (De A: When we first conrncted he r we only told her she partment of the Navy) e mployees. They a rc carc full y was being considered for participation in a sensitive screened prior to selection and there arc some ope ration that had been approved by the Navy. We commonalities. They have good pe rformance rcc met with her several times and I think initally ii was <>r 32 Q: What were some orthcbcnlits ofS ta tion Zebra'! Q: What will happen to Donna Geiger now'! Is there any possibility she may be used In the Cl llchl A: It accomplished several things. It reafr.rmc-d our again? belief that that Sovicl shipping in the St.J ohn's area was involved in inlelligcncc collection. We learned A: I think that would be highly uolikely. In cases more about Soviet methodology fo r ostensibly han• such as these, parlicularly lhosc which result in dling an "American spy" in C:,nada. And third and prosecution, the double agents resume their regular probably most important was the identification and careers. proscc111ion of an illegal agent who ,,s a Canadia.n citizen could have gone anywhere in Canada and the United Slales lo collect information. SURVEILLANCE PHOTOS OF RATKAI 33 Cg£®~® UOOW@fbWOOO® NELSON C. DRUMMOND • 1%2 MlCHAEL T. TOBIAS· 1984 EDWARD H. WINE · 1%8 JAY C. WOLFF · 1984 SAHAG KHATCl-fER DEDEYAN - 1973 WILFREDO M. GARCIA· 1.985 RUDOLPH CM ERNYA YEV · 19n STEPHEN D. I-IAWKINS -1985 VALDIK ENGER· 1977 ANNE H. POLLARD • 1985 EUGENE L. MADSEN · 1979 JONATHAN J. POLLARD -1985 STEPHEN A. BABA · 1981 ARTHUR J. WALKER· 1985 MICHAEL R. MURPHY· 1981 JOHN A. WALKER· 1985 ALFRED ZEHE- J.981 MICHAEL L. WALKER -1985 BRIAN P. HORTON· 1982 JERRY A. WHITWORTH -1985 BRIAN E. SLAYENS • 1982 MJCI-IAEL H. ALLEN · 1986 ROBERT W. ELLIS -1983 ROBERT D. HAGUEWOOD • 1986 JEFFERY L. PICKERING· 1983 Cl.A YTON J. LONETREE · 1986 I-IANS P. WOLD· .1983 STEPHEPH RATKA I · 1986 ROBERT E. CORDREY · 1984 CRA IG D. KUNKLE · 1989 SAMUELL. MORISON. 1984 RANDALL S. BUSH • 1989 FRANCIS X. PIZZO - 1984 GARY L. LEDBETTER · 1967 EDWIN R. FR YER • 1985 MICHAEL WYDRA· 1969 JAMES E. DEARMOND· 1986 GLENN A. MCINTYRE. 19n MICI-IAEL C. JOHNSON · 1986 JOEL YAGER· 1.9n KENNETH J. KELLlHER · 1986 DOUGLAS R. BACON. 1982 ALFONSO T. RU IZ- 1986 ALAND. COBERLY. 1983 DA V1 D L. FLEMING • 1987 DA VfD A. HEDIGER • 1983 JOHNS. HAMMOND · 1987 KARL R. KELLY. 1983 ROGER A. VOLIN · 1987 JOHN R. MA YNARO • 1983 ROBERT L. WILDMAN· 1987 BRUCE L. KEARN· 1984 ROBERT H. VALENTINE -1988 MICHAEL R. MOORE · 1984 SCOTT J. CHATTIN· 1989 RANDALL L. R08ERT$0N · 1984 HENRY 0. SPADE -1989 •Oates listed indicate year case was initiated 34 THE HISTORY OF THE ROSE For centuries the rose, such as the one held by the woman above, has been used to symbolize secrecy. According to researchers at the U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry, the term "subrosa" dates back to the Middle Ages, when a rose was hung over a door, on a chandelier or some other high fixture where secret meetings were held as a reminder that everything said was to be kept confidential. Today, the rose Is still used as a symbol of secrecy and can be found on the crests of some U.S. Army Intelligence units. The picture above has a special significance when discussing this aspect of the rose's history because the woman Is Violetta Selna, the KGB operative, who was used to lure Marine Sgt. Clayton Lonetree Into a web of espionage. The photograph was part of the evidence seized by NIS special agents during a search of Lonetree's possessions. 35 NAVY ESPIONAGE HOTLINE If you suspect espionage or security-related violations, you should notify the Naval Investigative Service at the following toll-free number: 1-800-543-NA VY (Persons in the District of Columbia should call: 433-9191.) ALL DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ACTIVE DUTY, RESERVE AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED BY SECNAVINST 5510.1H OF 29 APRIL 1988 (THE NAVY SECURITY MANUAL) TO REPORT ANY FORM OF CONTACT, INTENTIONAL OR OTHERWISE, WITH ANY CITIZEN OF A COMMUNIST CONTROLLED COUNTRY OR COUNTRY CURRENTLY HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES, TO THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.