The Effects of Fare-Collection Strategies on Transit Level of Service

Transportation Research Record 1036 79 The Effects of Fare-Collection Strategies on Transit Level of Service UPALI VANDEBONA and ANTHONY J. RICHARDSON ABSTRACT It is known that different fare-collection strategies have different passenger boarding and alighting rates for street-based public transport services. In this pape r, various models of stop service times are reviewed, the available empirical observations of boarding and alighting rates are summarized, and the effects of different average boarding rates and coefficients of variation of boarding rates on the route performance of a tram (light rail transit) service are examined. The analysis is conducted using the TRAMS (Transit Route Anima tion and Modeling by Simulation) package. This modeling package is briefly described with particular attention to the passenger demand subroutine as well as the tram stop service times subroutine. As a result o f the analysis , it was found that slower boarding rates produce a slower and less reliable service along the route. The variability of boarding rates has no effect on route travel time but does contribute to greater unreliability in level of service. It is concluded that these level-of-service effects need to be considered when assessing the effect of changes in fare-collection strategies. Public transport operators and managers have found systems to proof-of-payment systems will generally themselves under increasing pressure in recent years bring about significant level-of-service improve because of conflicting expectations from different ments that should be considered in any analysis of groups in the community. On the one hand, public such fare collection strategies. transport users demand better levels of service and This paper makes a contribution to this analysis no increase in fares, while the general community by examining the effects of different boarding rates and the Government Treasury demand that the public on the route performance of a light rail transit transport financial deficit be reduced, or at least (tram) system. Boarding rates are a critical vari curtailed. Given these pressures, public transport able in that they most concisely describe the opera managers are continually looking for methods by tional performance of different fare-collection which the productivity of the public transport sys strategies, as well as different vehicle designs. tem may be enhanced. Route performance is expressed in terms of average In the field of street-based public transport, a passenger travel time, average passenger waiting subject that has received much attention in this time, vehicle bunching, route travel time, and a respect is staffing policy; in particular, the de number of other level-of-service performance mea bate over whether to have a one- or two-man opera sures. The analysis is performed using the TRAMS tion of public transport vehicles has been both (Transit Route Animation and Modeling by Simulation) lengthy and vigorous in Australia and elsewhere. package (see paper by Vandebona and Richardson else Investigations of one-man operations have covered where in this record), and uses a case study example not just staffing policies, but also vehicle design loosely based on an actual tram route in Melbourne, and fare-collection strategies. All three must be Australia. well-integrated if an acceptable one-man operation system is to be devised. In considering this question, it is obvious that FARE-COLLECTION STRATEGIES the effects of a one-man operation go well beyond the immediately apparent staff cost savings. In Fare-collection strategies for street-based public particular, the choice of fare-collection strategy transport may be classified under three major h'}ad has a large influence on whether conversion to a ings: (a) two-man operation where the conductor one-man operation will ultimately prove to be bene collects fares, (b) one-man operation where the ficial or not. If boarding the vehicle is slowed by driver collects fares, and (c) one-man operation the one-man operation, fare-collection strategy, then where the driver does not collect fares. Within each it is possible that the degradation in the level of of these classifications, there are a number of service provided will outweigh the immediate staff different alternatives. In the two-man operation, cost savings per vehicle so that the service is less the conductor may function in one of two ways--either productive overall. Obviously, conversion to a one as a roving conductor who moves through the vehicle man operation needs careful analysis of the opera collecting fares from passengers while the vehicle tional, financial, and economic consequences. Even is in motion, or seated with passengers paying their in situations such as in North America, where all fares as they file past the conductor's position transit services are already one-man operations, it after entering the vehicle. is important to consider the effects that different A one-man operation with fare collection by the fare collection strategies will have on the level of driver gives rise to a wide range of boarding time service provided. The conversion of pay-the-driver rates, depending on the details of the fare-collec- 80 Transportation Research Record 1036 tion procedure and the nature of the fares charged. four basic models that have been proposed for the Two major options for fare collection are to accept prediction of service times. exact fares only or to enable the driver to give change to passengers. As will as seen later, the The Sequential Model former results in a faster boarding rate, while the latter is more conducive to good customer relations. (1) ... The degree of difference between these two options also depends on the nature of the fares charged. For where example, are they flat fares, finely graduated fares accor d i ng to the distance t r avel ed , zone f ares , free Ti service time at stop i, transfers requiring no extra ticket purchase, or Ai number of alighting passengers at stop i, season tickets? Each of these alternatives will have Bi number of boarding passengers at stop i, different boarding rates and, hence, different im y dead time, pacts on the route performance of the service. A ~ alighting time per passenger, and one-man operation with fares not collected by the a boarding time per passenger (sec) • driver means that fares must be collected in some other fashion--unless, of course, the public trans This model is likely t o be appropriat e where port service at the point of usage is free to users. boarding and alighting take place through the same One of the most popular methods of automatic fare door and, hence, proceed sequentially (alighting collection is the exact-change fare box. This method usually preceding boarding). The dead time, y, has been in use in North American services for many accounts for the time lost at the beginning and end years. A minor, though important, aspect of this of the stopping maneuver and is a function of the system is whether the fare is single-coin or multi presence or absence of doors on the vehicle, the ple-coin; single-coin fares give slightly faster nature of any door interlocking device fitted to the boarding rates but are becoming increasingly dif vehicle (e.g., a transmission interlock that pre ficult these days. Watts and Naysmith OJ note the vents doors from being opened until the vehicle is need for a coin of value greater than 50p (in the stopped and a n accel era t i on i nterl ock that prevents United Kingdom). Other methods of payment include the vehicle from moving until the doors are closed), the use of pay-turnstiles on board the vehicle (al and the layout of the stop (e.g., safety-zone board though these are often seen as being an unreliable ing versus curb-loading) • The coefficients ~ and hindrance), and the use of credit card and magnetized a depend primarily on the fare collection system ticket-reading machines. employed, but may also vary with the time of day A complete alternative to the previous methods is (peak ver sus off-peak), a nd with t he t ype of pas the "proof-of-payment" system, in which there are no senger be ing s erved (e .g., elde rly or infirm) , the turnstiles or barriers to entry and no need for any c urrent occupancy of the vehi cle , and the amount of fare payment on boarding the vehicle. All that is baggage carried by passengers. required is that the user have a valid ticket that must be produced if required. Ticket inspectors perform random checks for fare evasion, and the The Interaction Model penalty imposed must be such that the expected cost of purchasing a ticket be no more than the expected (2) cost (including penalties) of not purchasing a ticket. Given this general approach to fare collec This model is again applicable to a single-door t i on, the range of ticket-sel ling procedures is vehicle but instead of assuming complete independence quite wide. Season tickets could be used, books of be tween bearding and alighting events; it allows for tickets could be bought from news agents or other the possibility of interaction between the two stores; tickets may be purchased from ticket-sellers streams of passengers. The coefficient 6 may be at major stops, ticket-selling machines (either at either positive or negative, accounting either for stops or aboard the vehicle), or drivers (at a pre conflicting and congestive effects or for overlap mimum price); or users could simply elect to pay the ping boarding and alighting flows. penalty when caught without a ticket. In a proof-of payment system, with appropriate penalty char9es and The Simultaneous Model a systematic ticket inspection roster, this last method of payment woul d be legitimate and need no YA + ~ longer be thought of as a crime of fare evasion.

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