international journal of military history and historiography 39 (2019) 34-62 IJMH brill.com/ijmh The King and His Army: A New Perspective on the Military in 18th Century Brandenburg-Prussia Carmen Winkel* Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University, Al Khobar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [email protected] Abstract Brandenburg-Prussia has always occupied a special place in the German-speaking historiography. However, this has not resulted in a particularly differentiated state of research. Rather, the Prussian military of the 18th century is still characterized by at- tributes such as ‘monarchic’ and ‘absolutist, which unreflectively continues the narra- tives of 19th-century historiography. This article is explicitly challenging this image by assuming a differentiated concept of rulership as well as of the military in the 18th cen- tury. Using the aristocratic elites, it will examine how Frederick William I (1713–1740) and Frederick II (1740–1786) ruled the army, and ruled using the army. Keywords Brandenburg-Prussia – Absolutism – Frederick II – Nobility – Networking – Patronage – State Building 1 Introduction Prussia has in many respects been regarded as the archetype for the military in the Early Modern period, resulting in its developments being written large- ly for the early modern military in general. Brandenburg-Prussia has always * Dr Winkel earned her PhD from the University of Potsdam (Germany), researching the 18th century Prussian Army. University positions in Germany and China preceded her current post as Assistant Professor at Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University in Saudi Arabia. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/24683302-03901003Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 06:17:56AM via free access <UN> The King and His Army 35 occupied a special place in the German-speaking historiography. However, this has not resulted in a particularly differentiated state of research. Rather the Prussian military of the 18th century is still characterized by attributes such as ‘monarchic’ and ‘absolutist’, which unreflectively continues the narratives of 19th-century historiography.1 Decisive for the concentration on Prussia, which is frequently criticized in research but still prevails to date,2 is the person of King Frederick II. In the con- text of the gradual coalescence of the German princely states into an empire, Frederick II came to symbolize the monarchy in general and thus became the figurehead of a German nation led by Prussia. This resulted in the King being mythologized, his achievements and particularly his military victories having since been repeated mantra-like, not least of all during the 300th anniversary of his birth in 2012.3 Tellingly, beyond the widespread media interest there were hardly any scholarly studies clearly distancing themselves from the Prussia- centric conception of German history. Instead, a long-held static image is con- veyed: that of the King and his army. This article is explicitly challenging this image by assuming a differenti- ated concept of rulership as well as of the military in the 18th century. Using the aristocratic elites, it will examine how Frederick William I (1713–1740) and Frederick II (1740–1786) ruled the army, and ruled using the army. The focus on the military elite is not only the result of the better availability of sources, but also due to the fact that the relationship between King and officers was a central pillar of the understanding of authority by the monarchs being stud- ied here. Furthermore, more recent studies emphasize how central the re- lationship between prince and nobility was in the process of state-building and the role played by the integration of the nobility into the structures of the monarch’s rule in the concentration of power.4 The quantitative power of the army, providing a wide variety of opportunities for support and advancement compared to the civilian administration, included ample integration potential 1 For a new approach towards this topic, see my PhD thesis: Carmen Winkel, Im Netz des Königs. Netzwerke und Patronage in der preußischen Armee 1713–1786 (Paderborn, 2011). See also the study by Jutta Nowosadtko, Stehendes Heer im Ständestaat. Das Zusammenleben von Militär- und Zivilbevölkerung im Fürstbistum Münster (1650–1803) (Paderborn, 2011). 2 Ernst-Willi Hansen, “Zur Problematik einer Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Militärs im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Ein Forschungsbericht”, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 6 (2) (1979): 425–460, here 432. 3 For a brief overview of current research, see collected reviews, Carmen Winkel, “Rezensionen zum Friedrichjubiläum”, Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 71 (1) (2012): 66–174. 4 Dagmar Freist, “Einleitung: Staatsbildung, Lokale Herrschaftsprozesse”, in Staatsbildung als kultureller Prozess, eds. Ronald G. Asch and Dagmar Freist (Cologne, 2005), 1–49. international journal of military history and historiographyDownloaded 39 (2019)from Brill.com10/01/2021 34-62 06:17:56AM via free access <UN> 36 Winkel for members of the nobility and thus also new career opportunities as the no- bility provided the majority of officers in nearly all European countries.5 The main sources for this article are letters that were exchanged between the Prus- sian King and his officers. These letters are largely drawn from the Gemeines Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, while some of them can be found in regional archives like Stuttgart or Dessau. These letters were not part of the military archives but rather those of the personal cabinet of the King. Not only were higher nobility officers or officers with higher military ranks al- lowed to write to the King directly, but also every officer of his army had the right to submit letters to the King who personally replied to each and every one of them. Only a few secretaries worked in the Royal Cabinet; their job was to present these letters to the King and to draft a formal response based on the King’s handwritten notes. The formal drafts softened and phrased in a direct but more formal way the very harsh responses of the King. These letters will be analysed in two ways. Firstly, I will look at the semantics, meaning words, phrases and how the officers addressed the King and, vice versa, how he ad- dressed his officers. Secondly, I will analyse the officers’ requests and the way the King responded. Especially, the conversation with officers from the higher nobility contains two different levels: officers’ birth rank and their military rank. Officers from the higher nobility had to follow the military hierarchy, but this allowed them to approach the King as fellow noblemen. 2 Current State of Research It is beyond dispute that the military functioned as an agent of state-building and concentration of power in the Early Modern Period.6 However, under the 5 See Johannes Kunisch, “Die Deutschen Führungsschichten im Zeitalter des Absolutismus”, in Deutsche Führungsschichten in der Neuzeit. Eine Zwischenbilanz, eds. Hans Hubert Hoffmann and Günther Franz (Boppard/Rh., 1980), 111–141, here 124. Nearly fifty percent of all officers in Bavaria were of noble birth, seventy percent in Saxony, fifty-six percent in Baden, and in France and the Habsburg Monarchy nearly ninety percent of commissions were held by noblemen throughout the 18th century. Walter Demel, Der europäische Adel. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Munich, 2015), 85; Bernhard R. Kroener, “‘Des Königs Rock’. Das Offizier- korps in Frankreich, Österreich und Preußen im 18. Jahrhundert – Werkzeug sozialer Mili- tarisierung oder Symbol gesellschaftlicher Integration?”, in Die Preussische Armee. Zwischen Ancien Regime und Staatsgründung, ed. Peter Baumgart (Paderborn, 2009), 72–95, here 82; Christopher Storrs and H.M. Scott, “The Military Revolution and the European Nobility, c. 1600–1800”, War in History 3 (1) (1996): 1–42, here 10. 6 Stefan Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung. Leb- enswelten und Kultur in der kursächsischen Armee 1728–1799 (Paderborn, 2006), 16; Ralf Pröve, international journal of military history and historiographyDownloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 39 (2019) 34-62 06:17:56AM via free access <UN> The King and His Army 37 term of absolutism these processes have been viewed for a long time almost exclusively as ‘top-down’, assessing as exemplary in particular the execution of government by a handful of regents, such as Frederick II. For instance, Rolf- Dieter Müller in his 2009 Handbuch für Militärgeschichte considers the rela- tionship of military, state, and society in Prussia an exemplar for the modern absolutist state.7 In stark contrast to, for example, Britain, Prussia is still seen as the “garrison state” with an efficient bureaucracy and a high degree of central- ization. In fact, it was much more centralized than France, the Dutch Republic or Spain and had an almost balanced budget during the 18th century. This was due to the fact that Prussia was a domain state rather than a fiscal-military state.8 The royal domains generated 46 percent of Prussia’s revenues in 1740, 54 percent originated from taxes. Revenues from the royal domains were easier to access for the King than tax revenues, because the latter had to be negotiated with the nobility. However, a closer look reveals that Prussia was not as centralized as some researchers have insisted. During the 18th century, when Brandenburg-Prussia finally established itself as a European power, the state remained geographi- cally fragmented and chronically under-resourced. The monarchy was a com- position of different provinces, which were not only separated by land but also by density, religion, language, culture, and economic value. Prussia’s power during the 18th century did not lie in the strengths of its fiscal system or its tax revenues, but rather how the state was able to use its limited resources efficiently by a relatively well organized and a for the 18th century extensive bureaucracy.9 Prussia’s lack of resources and credit shaped not only the recruitment sys- tem (a prescription-like system of their own subjects), but also the way the military was organized.