The King and His Army: a New Perspective on the Military in 18Th Century Brandenburg-Prussia

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The King and His Army: A New Perspective on the Military in 18th Century Brandenburg-Prussia

Carmen Winkel* Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University, Al Khobar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [email protected]

Abstract

Brandenburg-Prussia has always occupied a special place in the German-speaking historiography. However, this has not resulted in a particularly differentiated state of research. Rather, the Prussian military of the 18th century is still characterized by attributes such as ‘monarchic’ and ‘absolutist, which unreflectively continues the narratives of 19th-century historiography. This article is explicitly challenging this image by assuming a differentiated concept of rulership as well as of the military in the 18th century. Using the aristocratic elites, it will examine how Frederick William I (1713–1740) and Frederick II (1740–1786) ruled the army, and ruled using the army.

Keywords

Brandenburg-Prussia – Absolutism – Frederick II – Nobility – Networking – Patronage – State Building

1 Introduction

Prussia has in many respects been regarded as the archetype for the military in the Early Modern period, resulting in its developments being written largely for the early modern military in general. Brandenburg-Prussia has always

* Dr Winkel earned her PhD from the University of Potsdam (Germany), researching the 18th century Prussian Army. University positions in Germany and China preceded her current post as Assistant Professor at Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University in Saudi Arabia.

The King and His Army 35 occupied a special place in the German-speaking historiography. However, this has not resulted in a particularly differentiated state of research. Rather the Prussian military of the 18th century is still characterized by attributes such as ‘monarchic’ and ‘absolutist’, which unreflectively continues the narratives of 19th-century historiography.1 Decisive for the concentration on Prussia, which is frequently criticized in research but still prevails to date,2 is the person of King Frederick II. In the context of the gradual coalescence of the German princely states into an empire, Frederick II came to symbolize the monarchy in general and thus became the figurehead of a German nation led by Prussia. This resulted in the King being mythologized, his achievements and particularly his military victories having since been repeated mantra-like, not least of all during the 300th anniversary of his birth in 2012.3 Tellingly, beyond the widespread media interest there were hardly any scholarly studies clearly distancing themselves from the Prussia- centric conception of German history. Instead, a long-held static image is con- veyed: that of the King and his army. This article is explicitly challenging this image by assuming a differentiated concept of rulership as well as of the military in the 18th century. Using the aristocratic elites, it will examine how Frederick William I (1713–1740) and Frederick II (1740–1786) ruled the army, and ruled using the army. The focus on the military elite is not only the result of the better availability of sources, but also due to the fact that the relationship between King and officers was a central pillar of the understanding of authority by the monarchs being studied here. Furthermore, more recent studies emphasize how central the relationship between prince and nobility was in the process of state-building and the role played by the integration of the nobility into the structures of the monarch’s rule in the concentration of power.4 The quantitative power of the army, providing a wide variety of opportunities for support and advancement compared to the civilian administration, included ample integration potential

1 For a new approach towards this topic, see my PhD thesis: Carmen Winkel, Im Netz des Königs. Netzwerke und Patronage in der preußischen Armee 1713–1786 (Paderborn, 2011). See also the study by Jutta Nowosadtko, Stehendes Heer im Ständestaat. Das Zusammenleben von Militär- und Zivilbevölkerung im Fürstbistum Münster (1650–1803) (Paderborn, 2011). 2 Ernst-Willi Hansen, “Zur Problematik einer Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Militärs im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Ein Forschungsbericht”, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 6 (2) (1979): 425–460, here 432. 3 For a brief overview of current research, see collected reviews, Carmen Winkel, “Rezensionen zum Friedrichjubiläum”, Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 71 (1) (2012): 66–174. 4 Dagmar Freist, “Einleitung: Staatsbildung, Lokale Herrschaftsprozesse”, in Staatsbildung als kultureller Prozess, eds. Ronald G. Asch and Dagmar Freist (Cologne, 2005), 1–49.

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36 Winkel for members of the nobility and thus also new career opportunities as the nobility provided the majority of officers in nearly all European countries.5 The main sources for this article are letters that were exchanged between the Prus- sian King and his officers. These letters are largely drawn from the Gemeines Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, while some of them can be found in regional archives like Stuttgart or Dessau. These letters were not part of the military archives but rather those of the personal cabinet of the King. Not only were higher nobility officers or officers with higher military ranks allowed to write to the King directly, but also every officer of his army had the right to submit letters to the King who personally replied to each and every one of them. Only a few secretaries worked in the Royal Cabinet; their job was to present these letters to the King and to draft a formal response based on the King’s handwritten notes. The formal drafts softened and phrased in a direct but more formal way the very harsh responses of the King. These letters will be analysed in two ways. Firstly, I will look at the semantics, meaning words, phrases and how the officers addressed the King and, vice versa, how he addressed his officers. Secondly, I will analyse the officers’ requests and the way the King responded. Especially, the conversation with officers from the higher nobility contains two different levels: officers’ birth rank and their military rank. Officers from the higher nobility had to follow the military hierarchy, but this allowed them to approach the King as fellow noblemen.

2 Current State of Research

It is beyond dispute that the military functioned as an agent of state-building and concentration of power in the Early Modern Period.6 However, under the

5 See Johannes Kunisch, “Die Deutschen Führungsschichten im Zeitalter des Absolutismus”, in Deutsche Führungsschichten in der Neuzeit. Eine Zwischenbilanz, eds. Hans Hubert Hoffmann and Günther Franz (Boppard/Rh., 1980), 111–141, here 124. Nearly fifty percent of all officers in Bavaria were of noble birth, seventy percent in Saxony, fifty-six percent in Baden, and in France and the Habsburg Monarchy nearly ninety percent of commissions were held by noblemen throughout the 18th century. Walter Demel, Der europäische Adel. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Munich, 2015), 85; Bernhard R. Kroener, “‘Des Königs Rock’. Das Offizier- korps in Frankreich, Österreich und Preußen im 18. Jahrhundert – Werkzeug sozialer Mili- tarisierung oder Symbol gesellschaftlicher Integration?”, in Die Preussische Armee. Zwischen Ancien Regime und Staatsgründung, ed. Peter Baumgart (Paderborn, 2009), 72–95, here 82; Christopher Storrs and H.M. Scott, “The Military Revolution and the European Nobility, c. 1600–1800”, War in History 3 (1) (1996): 1–42, here 10. 6 Stefan Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung. Leb- enswelten und Kultur in der kursächsischen Armee 1728–1799 (Paderborn, 2006), 16; Ralf Pröve,

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The King and His Army 37 term of absolutism these processes have been viewed for a long time almost exclusively as ‘top-down’, assessing as exemplary in particular the execution of government by a handful of regents, such as Frederick II. For instance, Rolf- Dieter Müller in his 2009 Handbuch für Militärgeschichte considers the relationship of military, state, and society in Prussia an exemplar for the modern absolutist state.7 In stark contrast to, for example, Britain, Prussia is still seen as the “garrison state” with an efficient bureaucracy and a high degree of centralization. In fact, it was much more centralized than France, the Dutch Republic or Spain and had an almost balanced budget during the 18th century. This was due to the fact that Prussia was a domain state rather than a fiscal-military state.8 The royal domains generated 46 percent of Prussia’s revenues in 1740, 54 percent originated from taxes. Revenues from the royal domains were easier to access for the King than tax revenues, because the latter had to be negotiated with the nobility. However, a closer look reveals that Prussia was not as centralized as some researchers have insisted. During the 18th century, when Brandenburg-Prussia finally established itself as a European power, the state remained geographi- cally fragmented and chronically under-resourced. The monarchy was a composition of different provinces, which were not only separated by land but also by density, religion, language, culture, and economic value. Prussia’s power during the 18th century did not lie in the strengths of its fiscal system or its tax revenues, but rather how the state was able to use its limited resources efficiently by a relatively well organized and a for the 18th century extensive bureaucracy.9 Prussia’s lack of resources and credit shaped not only the recruitment system (a prescription-like system of their own subjects), but also the way the military was organized. The lack of financial power was compensated with

“Militär und Gesellschaft im Preußen des 18. Jahrhunderts. Vorstellung eines Forschungs- konzepts”, Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit 8 (1) (2008): 72–80, here 78. 7 Rolf-Dieter Müller, Militärgeschichte (Cologne, 2009), 152. 8 John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth, eds., Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany (London, 1999); Mark Dincecco, Political Transformations and Public Finances. Europe, 1650–1913 (Cambridge, 2011); Rafael Torres Sanchez, Constructing a Fiscal- Military State in Eighteenth-Century Spain (Wiesbaden, 2015). 9 Peter Wilson, “Prussia as a Fiscal-Military State 1640–1806”, in The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-century Europe, eds. Christopher Storrs (London, 2009), 98; Michael North, “Fi- nances and Power in the German State system”, in The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global His- tory 1500–1914, eds. Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla and Patrick K. O’Brien (Cambridge, 2012), 157–158.

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38 Winkel immaterial resources to attract noblemen to join the army.10 This was true not only for noble families of Brandenburg and Prussia, but also for the higher nobility and princes of the Reich. The paradigm of absolutism received an expanded, social dimension with the introduction of the concept of ‘social disciplining’ in the 1970s and 1980s. This thesis was further accentuated for Brandenburg-Prussia under the term of ‘social militarisation’. The initiator and most popular proponent of this impact- ful theory was Otto Büsch, later Professor of History at the Free University Ber- lin, who in his 1962 published thesis assumed a social militarization of Prussian society by means of the recruitment of soldiers via the Canton System.11 In his postulated identity of the military and social systems he found a “Sonderweg” (literally special path) in the development of Brandenburg-Prussia, a view which has doggedly persisted in spite of several revisions. For example, Manfred Messerschmidt’s article in the voluminous Handbuch der Preußischen Ge- schichte, published in 2000, restates this thesis without acknowledging the numerous studies that have substantially revised this picture in the meantime.12 This anachronistic view is particularly evident when considering the ‘favou- rite subject’ of Prussian military history, the officer corps. The normative and socially disciplining interference by the monarch was seen as fulfilled in an almost exemplary fashion within the officer corps, using the integration of the allegedly “politically emasculated” nobility into the army as powerful proof.13 Even though this explanatory model has been rejected by the history of the nobility,14 more recent military-historical studies,15 such as those by Georg

10 For a detailed analysis of how many noblemen of every territory actually served in the army as officers, see: Carmen Winkel, “Getreue wie goldt oder ‘malicieus wie der deuffel’? Der brandenburg-preußische Adel und der Dienst als Offizier”, in Brandenburg und seine Landschaften. Zentrum und Region vom Spätmittelalter bis 1800, eds. Lorenz Friedrich Beck and Frank Göse (Berlin, 2009), 199–219. 11 Jutta Nowasadtko, Krieg, Gewalt und Ordnung. Einführung in die Militärgeschichte (Tübin- gen, 2009), 119. 12 Manfred Messerschmidt, “Das preußische Militärwesen”, in Handbuch der preussischen Geschichte, Vol. 3, ed. Wolfgang Neugebauer (Berlin, 2000), 319–547. 13 Rainer Wohlfeil, “Adel und Heerwesen”, in Deutscher Adel 1555–1740, ed. Hellmuth Rössler (Darmstadt, 1965), 315–343, here 329. 14 Frank Göse, Rittergut-Garnison-Residenz. Studien zur Sozialstruktur und politischen Wirksamkeit des brandenburgischen Adels 1648–1763 (Berlin, 2005); Ibid., “Zum Verhält- nis von landadliger Sozialisation zu adliger Militärkarriere. Das Beispiel Preußen und Österreich im ausgehenden 17. und 18. Jahrhundert”, Mitteilungen des Instituts für öster- reichische Geschichte 109 (1) (2001): 118–153. 15 There are a number of studies on the Prussian army which provide a more precise and differentiated examination of the role of the military during the processes of the growth

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The King and His Army 39

Hebbelmann and Rolf Straubel, emphasize this thesis by continuing to place the person of the monarch at the centre of their investigation and by regarding his absolute claim to power to be fulfilled in this system.16 In conclusion of these brief remarks, it remains to be noted that while research in the last 20 years has established the image of the military as a part of society, older narratives still dominate the subject. Prussia’s army continues to be viewed as a prime example of the enforcement of an absolutist claim to rule by the monarch,17 who in this sphere was supposedly able to success- fully implement his normative and disciplining efforts. But this one sided, top-down perspective does not answer the central question related to the Prus- sian military, namely, how and whether this often lauded, close bond between monarch and military had been established. Other than in Britain or Spain, in Prussia the King was very engaged in all questions regarding the military and saw it as his “weapon”.18 Answering this question requires the abandonment of well-trodden paths of interpretation and a re-orientation towards questions about the functional mechanisms of authority in general, which are being intensively discussed in the current research of the Early Modern Period.19

3 Authority and Areas of Freedom in the Military

Central to the understanding of the military in the Early Modern Period is the consideration of armed power as an instrument of rule.20 The pithy quotations

of central authority and state building, but they represent the exception from the rule. Mention should be made of the work of Beate Engelen, Martin Winter, Frank Göse and Daniel Hohrath as a representative sample. 16 Georg Hebbelmann Das preußische “Offizierkorps” im 18. Jahrhundert. Analyse der Sozial- struktur einer Funktionselite (Münster, 1998), Rolf Straubel, “Er möchte nur wissen, daß die Armée mir gehöret”. Friedrich II. und seine Offiziere. Ausgewählte Aspekte der königlichen Personalpolitik (Berlin, 2012). 17 The marked concentration on the person of the King becomes particularly apparent by means of the generally very poor state of research regarding many central field commanders of the period. For example, there is no modern biography of Leopold of Anhalt- Dessau who played a central role in the Prussian army. 18 Brewer and Hellmuth, Rethinking Leviathan. 19 Representative mention should be made of the book: Herrschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit. Umrisse eines dynamisch-kommunikativen Prozesses, eds. Markus Meumann and Ralf Pro- eve (Berlin, 2004). 20 Jointly responsible for this very narrow perspective is the much shortened definition of the military as a fighting unit, which is being used as a research and source term, thus

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40 Winkel of Frederick William I and Frederick II, which seamlessly fit the image of their absolutist rule, provide eloquent testimony. They repeatedly emphasized that “the army is mine” (“die Armee gehöret mir”) or “Let them know, I am master over my soldiers and I alone determine their fate” (“sie sollen nur wissen, das ich der Herr über meine Soldaten bin und allein die Geschicke bestimme”). They repeated their claim to rule over the army in numerous such pronouncements and thus cast themselves as baroque princes. Generations of historians have fallen for this self-projection and did not question the limits of these claims, but rather viewed and still view the army as a monolithic block whose fate was solely determined by the King. In contrast to this, and analogous to the replacement of the image of absolutism, Early Modern research has developed a more differentiated definition of governance. Authority is no longer seen to be a unilateral, top-down process of domination by the monarch, but as a multi-polar, dynamic, and re- ciprocal act of interaction and communication between the actors involved.21 Recently, this has been summarized succinctly under the tag of ‘negotiation’ (Aushandeln). Having said that, the German term does distort the actual meaning by suggesting “an equal and egalitarian constellation between ruler and subjects”.22 The term ‘negotiation’ used in the English-language Early Modern research is more precise than the German translation. The fact remains that rule is not a unilateral and dominion-oriented process but rather one that is formed by the exchange between the participants. This perspective opens up the analysis of those areas beyond the monarch’s reach within the army. The regiments had been increasingly subjected to the claim of the rule of the monarch since the late 17th century. In the course of the nation-building process characterized by increasing centralization, bureaucra- tization and juridification, the monarch assumed increasing powers formerly exercised by the regimental commander. Nevertheless, the image of increasing control of the King over the military, which neatly fits the concept of the absolutist monarch and developed in this particular research context, has already been revised. In reality, while the regiments were subordinated to the ruler, the

preventing any option to use it in an operational context. The early modern military is partially being researched to date using modern technical terminology, a terminology which leads to distorted assumptions and an erroneous understanding of the military in the Early Modern Period. See Pröve, Militär und Gesellschaft, 76. 21 Wolfgang Reinhard, “Zusammenfassung: Staatsbildung durch ‘Aushandeln’?”, in Staatsbil- dung als kultureller Prozess. Strukturwandel und Legitimation von Herrschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit, eds. Ronald G. Asch and Dagmar Freist (Cologne, 2005), 429–439, here 430. 22 Ibid., 434.

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The King and His Army 41 regimental commander/colonel-in-chief remained crucial for the replenishment of troops and the promotion of officers.23 In spite of all encroachments into the colonel-in-chiefs’ right of appointment by the crown, all attempts to centrally administer the military units failed during the 18th century. Admin- istrative vacancies remained in areas such as the recruitment of young officers, economic administration, as well as the enforcement of military justice.24 The colonels’ duty to assess their officers on a regular basis and to inform the monarch of the outcome, as well as their right of the proposal for new appointments and promotions, made them the central entities deciding military careers.25 The colonel was his regiment’s economic administrator and thus his officers’ ‘employer’. This linkage function between King and officers turned the regimental commander into an intermediary, who redistributed the monarch’s resources among his officers.26 The colonels-in-chief were also able to use the regimental economy, which enabled them to autonomously administer the resources of their units to employ a system of grace and favour. Central areas such as the appointment of new officers were held by regimental commanders/colonels-in-chief even though the King repeatedly exercised influence and took personnel decisions. Thus, the colonels had access to varied resources and did not merely occupy an intermediary position,27 but functioned as patrons to their officers. As the regimental commander was able to influence decisions of the King in his role as broker or contractor, for example through recommendations or negative as- sessments of officers, his position cannot, therefore, be described as a mere intermediary.28

23 Jutta Nowosadtko, “‘Der Militairstand ist ein privilegierter Stand, der seine eigenen Ge- setze, obrigkeitliche Ordnung und Gerichtsbarkeit hat.’ Die ‘Verstaatlichung’ stehender Heere in systemtheoretischer Perspektive”, in Herrschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit, eds. Markus Meumann and Ralf Proeve (Berlin, 2005), 21–143, here 123. 24 Nowosadtko, Der Militairstand, 133. 25 The regiment in the British Army retained its central significance for the career and training of its officers until well into the 20th century. See David French, Military Identi- ties. The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People, c. 1870–2000 (Oxford, 2008). 26 Andreas Klein, Regeln der Patronage. Eine historisch-anthropologische Studie der Mik- ropolitik des John James Hamilton, First Marquess of Abercorn, in Irland (Augsburg, 2009), 42; Heiko Droste emphasises the role of the patrons as “Shareholders of the Crown” who brokered crown resources to their clients, thus binding them; see Ibid., Im Dienste der Krone. Schwedische Diplomaten im 17. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 2006), 298. 27 Klein, Regeln der Patronage, 43. 28 Klein identifies four types of brokers, among these, the broker with ‘leverage’, see ibid., 46.

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42 Winkel

The regimental commander had the duty to submit nominations for promotion in the event of any vacancies. This did not only include promotions following a tour of duty. Commanders informed the King of officers’ mistakes, derelictions, and proposed alternatives. Due to the nature of available sources, it is not possible to establish how often commanders deviated from rules of promotion by seniority. However, an inspection of an extensive body of military correspondence between 1740 and 1763 suggests that this process was not an exception.29 Even though the commander played a central role in the army, final control over most decisions concerning every matter (e.g., promotions, the use of the regimental budget, the dismissal of officers, the appointment of new officers etc.) belonged to the King. He had the final say and needed to be informed about these matters by the regimental commanders. In reality, both rulers, Frederick Wilhelm I and Frederick II followed the suggestions they received from the regimental commanders. Nevertheless, they always had the power to overrule every decision by the commander, but they rarely made use of this right.

4 The Army and the Officer Corps as a Means of Rule

The army functioned not only as an instrument of external and internal enforcement for the early modern monarch, but also as a representation of authority and the integration of elites. These aspects have frequently been referenced by the research into Brandenburg-Prussia.30 Furthermore, the monarch’s claim to power could be impressively represented using the army. Just consider the deployment of a ruler’s monograms on the uniforms31 or the wearing of an officer’s uniform by Frederick William I and Frederick II. The thus publicized proximity to the army is not a mere claim to power, but should rather be seen as a technique and practice of rule. In order to engender subser- vience, particularly among officers of noble birth, the monarchy staged a close

29 See Carmen Winkel, “Die Rekrutierung der militärischen Elite über soziale Netzwerke: Das preußische Offizierkorps (1713–1786)”, Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 39 (2011): 32–55. 30 See Peter-Michael Hahn, “Dynastische Selbstdarstellung und Militärmacht. Kriegerische Symbolik als höfische Zeichensprache in Brandenburg-Preußen im 17. Jahrhundert”, in Frieden und Krieg, Vol. 2, ed. Ronald G. Asch (Munich, 2001), 115–137. 31 Robert von Schrötter, “Das preußische Offizierkorps unter dem ersten Könige von Preußen”, Forschungen zur Brandenburgisch Preußischen Geschichte 26 (1913), part 1, 77– 143; part 2, in ibid. 27 (1914), part 2, 97–167.

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The King and His Army 43 personal bond between the King and the officers – which due to the size of the officer corps always remained aspirational – without actually achieving it. Old- er research has already pointed out that regular military inspections, reviews, and manoeuvres in Prussia were of limited military value, as the presented skills consisted of a variety of weapons’ drill and pre-rehearsed sequences of troop movements.32 To a greater degree, it was an opportunity to effectively stage the monarch’s prerogative of control of the army by using these occa- sions to carry out ‘personnel management’. The subalterns were advised in advance, even by the King himself, to lodge petitions regarding retirement, dis- charge, marriage, etc. The colonel-in-chief and regimental commanders used the events to present their new Junker, introduce the officers who were about to be discharged on medical grounds, and in turn petitioned themselves for promotions or other benefits. This staging of the personal proximity of the ruler to his army, and to his officers in particular, demonstrates that the military was not only an instrument of power, but rather presented techniques of governance used to generate the loyalty of officers and men. These techniques include social as well as symbolic, semantic, and ritual practices. One of these practices, which has thus far been ignored by both the territorial as well as the military historiography will be presented here representatively. It concerns the so-called parade horses or Sterbepferde (literally ‘death horses’). Part of military customary law was the practice shortly after the death of a general or officer to give up his ‘best horse’, including the tack, to the monarch. For subalterns, the horse went to the regimental commander, for generals the horse had to be sent to the Kings. The custom of transferring items of military equipment on the death of its officer owner to his superior can probably be traced back to the feudal relationship between nobility and ruler and the associated duty of military service. The transfer of specific items to the feudal or estate lord formed an integral part of the customary law in several regions of the empire in the Early Modern Period.33 Similar provisions can be found for the estate ownership. Here, too, the lord was able to claim specific items after the death of an estate subject such as the Sterbepferd in the event of the death of a tenant farmer. This portion of the inheritance thus symbolized the essence of the relationship between estate lord and subject. In the military,

32 Curt Jany, Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee bis zum Jahre 1807, Vol. 1 (Berlin, 1928), 833. 33 Johann Samuel Ersch, Allgemeine Encyklopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste, 1. Sektion, 15. Theil, Vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1852), 68. Under the term of best head the estate of feudal lords were able to claim agricultural equipment or part of the livestock.

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44 Winkel this symbol was the horse, based on the feudal bond of the vassals and the duty of military service towards the prince. Nonetheless, military service by the nobility became decreasingly significant during the 16th and 17th centuries until it was finally abandoned in exchange for monetary equivalents. The payment of these Lehenspferdegelder34 (literally feudal horse payments), which were proportionate to the size of the nobleman’s estate, were evidence of the further loosening of the feudal bond between nobility and prince. The conversion of estates into an allodial property, i.e., making them hereditary, by Frederick William I in Brandenburg-Prussia in 1717/18, effectively abolished the feudal system – at least in some provinces. The provision of horses was dropped when estates became the hereditary property of the nobility and it was replaced by a regular payment in lieu of horses, which equated to a de facto taxation of the nobility.35 The demand for the Sterbepferd, however, was not maintained for reasons of tradition, but in order to stage a symbolic personal service relationship. Aus- tria, for example, only introduced the provision of Sterbepferde in 1732. From this point on, every staff officer was obliged, after his death, to supply out of his estate a horse to his colonel.36 That it was the regimental commander rather than the King who was the recipient in this scenario is entirely consistent in light of the dominant position of the commander vis-à-vis the monarch until the first half of the 18th century.37 For the monarch, the horse represented the old feudal covenant of protection and loyalty between knight and prince. The absence of a formal arrange- ment for the provision of the horse is indicative of a customary law. There is no mention of this practice in any of the Prussian regulations between 1713 and 1786.38 It has not been possible to clarify whether the horses were regularly

34 The payment of these dues in Prussia can be verified as early as the beginning of the 18th century; see Frank Göse, “Das Verhältnis Friedrich Wilhelms I. zum Adel”, in Der Soldaten- könig Friedrich Wilhelm I. in seiner Zeit, eds. Friedrich Beck, Julius H. Schoeps (Potsdam, 2003), 99–141, here 104. 35 Ibid., 101. 36 Alphons von Domin-Petrushevecz, Neuere österreichische Rechtsgeschichte (Wien, 1869), 25. 37 Michael Hochedlinger, “Mars Ennobled: The Ascent of the Military and the Creation of a Military Nobility in Mid-Eighteenth Century Austria”, German History 17 (1999): 141–177, here 146. 38 That this practice was based on military customary law may be deduced from the form of words used when abolishing it, namely that it concerned a ‘former custom’; see Carl Ludwig Rabe, Preußische Gesetze und Verordnungen welche auf die allgemeine Deposital-, Hypotheken-, Gerichts-, Criminal- und Städte-Ordnung, auf das allgemeine Landrecht, auf

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The King and His Army 45 claimed or were surrendered only on the initiative of the officer’s dependents. However, the fact that dependents enquired of the monarch whether and how the horse should be delivered suggests a common knowledge of the process and thus common acceptance.39 The horse was due as a portion of the inheritance to the monarch or regimental commander as Praecipuum, i.e. upfront payment, irrespective of the officer’s estate. There is evidence that this custom was practiced in the Prus- sian army during the reigns of Frederick William I and Frederick II. Depend- ing on the social standing of the general concerned, these parade horses were publicly presented and personally handed over to the monarch in Potsdam. In one example, the Prince of Anhalt-Zerbst personally delivered the expensively decorated parade horse to the royal residence after the death of Prince Leop- old of Anhalt-Dessau.40 These Sterbepferde, which as in the case of the late Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, alongside their symbolic significance, also possessed considerable financial value, were used by the King in turn as a resource for patronage as he re-gifted them. The Dessau Sterbepferd was given to Adjutant General von Winterfeld who was one of the King’s particular protégés. General von Grumbkow, the monarch’s adjutant, in turn, received the parade horse of the late General Field Marshal von Glasenapp.41 The extensive coverage of these presents in the pa- pers indicates that in the courtly-military milieu they represented an important indication of royal favour and thus augmented the social and symbolic capital of the favoured officer.42 The parade horse was a military symbol that can also be interpreted as the last execution of an order by the subordinate to his superior. The Prince of

den Anhang zum allgemeinen Landrechte und zur allgemeinen Gerichstordnung, auf die landschaftlichen Credit-Reglements und auf Provinzial- und Statuar-Rechte Bezug haben, Vol. 2: 1790–1794 (Halle, 1816), 299. 39 Gemeines Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz [hereafter GStA PK], viii. HA Slg. Kurt von Priesdorff, No. 1761. 40 Johann David Erdmann Preuß, Urkundenbuch zur Lebensgeschichte Friedrichs des Großen, Vol. 5 (Berlin, 1834), 248. 41 Preuß, Urkundenbuch zur Lebensgeschichte, 248. The king bequeathed the parade horse of a fallen officer of the Regiment of Hussars Wurmb to the Major of Hussars von Zi- eten as a reward for his good service; see GStA PK, viii. HA Slg. Kurt von Priesdorff, No. 1761, letter dated 6th February 1741. The horse of General von Bredow, in turn, went to his nephew who served as the ensign in the 1st Battalion of Guards; see Kurt von Pries- dorff, Soldatisches Führertum, 10 Vols. (Hamburg, 1936–1942), here Vol.1, 273. The re-gifting thus had a significant social component. 42 See Preuß, Urkundenbuch zur Lebensgeschichte, 248.

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46 Winkel

Anhalt-Dessau visited Frederick William I on his deathbed shortly before the King died on 29 May 1740. As a result, the King ordered his English horses to be paraded in order for the Prince to choose one (“engehlsche pferde Rausführen laßen das ich mihr habe ein[s] aus Suchen müßen”).43 As General Field Marshal, the prince held a higher military rank than the dying monarch who remained a colonel throughout his life and who had never promoted himself on his accession. Through the symbolic gift of the Sterbep- ferd the monarch, on the one hand, confirmed the military hierarchy and rec- ognized the higher-ranking officer in the Prussian army. On the other hand, he presented himself as part of the officer corps and thus explicitly demonstrated the bond connecting him to all officers. The King not only symbolized his connection to the military via the wearing of the uniform, but he saw himself, as clearly demonstrated in this example, as part of the officer corps.44 In the transfer of the horse to the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau the King himself apparent- ly demonstrated this connection by justifying his action as a retiring colonel towards the first field marshal of the army (“als ein vom Dienst ausscheidender Oberste dem ersten Feldmarschall des Heeres”).45 The importance of the gift for the prince is demonstrated by his mention- ing it in a letter, which he sent the day after the death of the King, to his son Maurice. In the prince’s obituary of Frederick William I, the transfer also found extensive mention. Leopold, therefore, instructed his successors to always keep the horse and tack in their possession in memory of this splendid King.46 These pieces of equipment served, on the one hand, as mementos to his patron and friend, and on the other hand, these symbols of royal favour became part of the family treasure of the Princes of Anhalt-Dessau. Apart from its financial value, the horse was a symbol of royal favour and expression of gratitude for the prince’s long service, a fact explicitly referenced by the prince in his obituary of the King.

43 Otto Krauske, Die Briefe König Friedrich Wilhelms I. an den Fürsten Leopold von Anhalt- Dessau 1704–1740 (Berlin, 1905), 714, quoted here the letter of Prince Leopold to his son Maurice dated the 1st of June 1740 describing the last hours of the monarch. 44 Rainer Wohlfeil, “Adel und Heerwesen”, in Deutscher Adel 1555–1740, ed. Hellmuth Rössler (Darmstadt, 1965), 315–343, here 335. 45 Quoted after: Friedrich von Oppeln-Bronikowski, Der alte Dessauer. Fürst Leopold von Anhalt-Dessau. Ein Bild seines Lebens und Wirkens (Stuttgart, 1941), Athenaion, 54, no source reference. 46 Quoted after: Krauske, Die Briefe König Friedrich Wilhelms I., 716.

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The King and His Army 47

5 Rule through Cooperation

The importance of local elites in the integration of new territories has been repeatedly emphasized in the research in recent years. Personal networks helped to bridge geographical distances and to establish communication.47 Such contacts played a prominent role in Brandenburg-Prussia as the fragmented territory was the prime example of a so-called composite monarchy.48 For example, following the acquisition of Neuenburg, Frederick I elevated several Neuenburg families into the nobility. As well, during the reign of Frederick William II there were a striking number of ennoblements of families from the principality, now part of Prussia. These ennoblements were not only restricted to officers but included individuals in influential positions, such as the state councillors Jonas Hory and Etienne Meuron, as well as Mayor Johann Henri de Pierre, to name but a few.49 The integration of Neuenburg would have been impossible without Prus- sian cooperation with the Bondeli family. Neuenburg, only 800 square kilome- tres, became a part of Brandenburg-Prussia in 1707 after Marie de Nemours, the last reigning duchess, died childless. The new territory was neither very large nor a region of great wealth, but it allowed the Prussian King to strengthen his political position against the French monarch, who saw Neuenburg due to its geographical position as part of his political sphere of influence. The example of Neuenburg also demonstrates the tight interlocking relationship between foreign, domestic, and military policy. The Bondelis were

47 Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler, “Einleitung”, in Nähe in der Ferne. Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit (Berlin, 2005), 9–15, here 9. 48 Birgit Emich emphasizes this aspect and draws attention to the fact that there are hardly any studies covering Brandenburg-Prussia’s policy of integration; see Birgit Emich, Ter- ritoriale Integration in der Frühen Neuzeit. Ferrara und der Kirchenstaat (Cologne, 2005), 24. On the perspectives offered by this theme for a ‘modern political history’ see Michael Rohrschneider, “Zusammengesetzte Staatlichkeit in der Frühen Neuzeit. Aspekte und Perspektiven der neueren Forschung am Beispiel Brandenburg-Preußens”, Archiv für Kul- turgeschichte 90 (2008): 321–351, here 322. 49 Maximilian Ferdinand Gritzner, Chronologische Matrikel der Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Standeserhöhungen und Gnadenakte (Berlin, 1874), 16, 20. The ennoblement of the upper stratum of Neuenburg society is mentioned neither in older nor more recent literature on the integration of Neuenburg into the Prussian monarchy in the 18th century; see Philipe Henry, “Les Relations Politiques entre Neuchâtel et Berlin au xviiie Siècle”, in Schweizer im Berlin des 18. Jahrhunderts, eds. Martin Fontius and Helmut Holzhey (Berlin, 1996), 33–45.

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48 Winkel part of one of the most influential families in Bern and used their connections to further Prussian claims for Neuenburg. In this function, the Bondeli family established contact with Alexander von Dohna, son of Frederick von Dohna, who served as an officer in the army of Electoral Brandenburg and owned a regiment. It is unclear exactly when Siméon Bondeli and Alexander von Dohna met, but both were often at the elector’s court and belonged to the Bernese elite. An expression of this close relationship was the provision of two of Siméon Bondeli’s brothers and the son of his brother-in-law to the von Dohna regiment.50 The Bondeli family placed at least four of its members in the von Dohna regiment, something encouraged by von Dohna himself, as he required supporters in Bern who could take care of his estates in Coppet (“weil er in Bern Interessenvertreter brauchte, die sich um die Belange seiner Güter in Coppet kümmerten”).51 Whereas only fifteen Swiss officers had previously joined the Prussian army, this number rose after the Seven Years’ War. Between 1764 and 1786, seventy- three Swiss entered regular units of the Prussian army as officers.52 The majority of these came from Bern and the principality of Neuenburg, which had belonged to Prussia since 1707.53 The Prussian influence had played a significant role here. The von Dohna family, too, continued to care for its clients. For example, Christoph II Count of Dohna petitioned the King in 1756 for a commission for a member of the Bondeli family. Christoph von Dohna was at this point Lieutenant General and colonel-in-chief of infantry regiment #16, which had been established by his relative, Alexander Count von Dohna in 1689.54 Christoph von Dohna requested the appointment of Bondeli to the rank of full ensign, that is to say, a promotion without a corresponding vacancy in the officer corps (“Gefreiten Corporal von Bondeli, welcher das Bürger Recht in Bern,

50 Rudolf Gugger, “Finanzierung der Ausbildung eidgenössischer Subalternoffiziere in Pre- ussen am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts”, in Gente ferocissima. Solddienst und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz (15.-19. Jahrhundert). Eine Festschrift für Alain Dubois, ed. Norbert Furrer (Zu- rich, 1997), 198, footnote 136. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., 191. A Swiss Freibatallion was in existence during the Seven Year War, but it was disbanded at the end of this war. 53 Wolfgang Stribrny, Die Könige von Preußen als Fürsten von Neuenburg-Neuchâtel (1707– 1848). Geschichte einer Personalunion (Berlin, 1998); Henry Favre, Neuenburgs Union mit Preussen und seine Zugehörigkeit zur Eidgenossenschaft. Ein Beitrag zur Verfassungsge- schichte von Neuenburg bis zu einem Aufgehen in der Eidgenossenschaft (Leipzig, 1932). 54 Zur Errichtungsgeschichte des Regiments, see Adolph Menzel, Die Armee Friedrichs des Großen in ihrer Uniformierung, ND der Ausgabe Berlin 1908 (Augsburg, 1998), 135.

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The King and His Army 49 und daselbst wie in der gantzen Schweitz angesehene Verwandte hat, zum über completten Fähnrich allerunterthänigst zu declariren […]”).55 He justified his nomination citing “the good conduct of this young person and expressing the hope that this would assist in the recruitment of troops”. Foreign recruitment has not been examined enough yet by the research, but it is without question a sign for the “Herrschaftsverdichtung”. The historiography described with the term Herrschaftsverdichtung refers to a linear process of the growing intensity and range of the political authority. However, his example shows how difficult it is to describe processes with terms like Herrschaftsver- dichtung, because even though recruitment abroad was now no longer in the hands of the Regiments, it was still possible for commanders to use their networks and influence to recruit soldiers from outside the kingdom. Some regiments were even explicitly allowed to continue foreign recruitment without the interference of the King. This practice was used by the King to “award” certain regiments for their good behaviour and military value during the war. Regimental commanders made targeted use of their officers’ social and economic capital by commissioning noblemen as recruitment officers solely on the basis of their excellent connections in potential recruitment territories. These officers did not carry out regular duties but via their networks procured recruits for the Prussian army. Foreign recruitment was solely sustained via these mostly aristocratic networks in the 18th century. Prince Augustus William of Brunswick-Bevern requested his ensign von Werckamp on his transfer from infantry regiment #25 to be commander of infantry regiment #4156 in 1742. Regiment von Kalckstein had already assented to the transfer of the ensign. The prince justified his request with familial obliga- tions. Young Werckamp had been entrusted to him by his relatives. They, in return for the Prince’s protection of their son, had promised free recruitment in the county of Wittgenstein (“daß wenn ich selbigen zu Berlin etwaß erlern- en laßen, auch vor bezahlung deßen Equipage, wenn er Officier würde, sorgte, und solches in der Werbung dortigen Orthes besonders in der Grafschafft Witt- genstein, in welcher ich schon seit einigen Jahren die Werbung und Enrollierung junger Burschen allein habe, wieder zu gute kommen sollte. Es ist solches auch bereits nicht ohne Effect gewesen, so lange ich bey dem Kalcksteinschen Regiment gestanden […]”).57

55 GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 96, No. 602 S, Acta des Kabinets Friedrich II. Correspondence with Lieutenant General Christof Count Dohna, letter dated 1st June 1756. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid.

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50 Winkel

The military elite is a particularly good example of networking by elites in all domains of politics. As the strict separation of civilian and military spheres was still unknown in the 18th century, high ranking officers were given courtly offices as a matter of course or conducted diplomatic missions on the basis of their family connections, linguistic abilities or their positions of trust with the monarch.58 This was aided by the often close contacts of noble families abroad, a general feature of nobility, which was interconnected across borders rather than nationally.59 The cooperation between King and nobility within the military is particularly impressive when considering the allocation of regiments to members of the high nobility. Service in the military by members of the high nobility can already be observed in the army of Brandenburg in the 17th century. The elevated military and political prestige of the Prussian army following its victory in the Seven Years’ War, provided an alternative to the Habsburg military, which had attracted many representatives of European dynasties before 1721. This has been cited as the motivation for the service of several princes under the Prussian colours from the middle of the 18th century.60 However, Brandenburg had already embarked on influencing Protestant imperial princes since the end of the 17th century, thereby creating for itself a successful client system within the empire.61 The increasing attractiveness of the court at Berlin was owed on the one hand to the policy of financial subsidies by Prussia, which assumed tax payments due to the empire and emperor on behalf of financially distressed counts of the empire.62 The King undoubtedly owned resources that made him an attractive patron for imperial princes who often faced tremendous financial stress due to the pressures of upholding a lifestyle befitting their noble birth and the financial shortcomings resulting from the lack of efficient instruments to collect tax revenues in their countries. These resources were

58 On the foreign policy significance of officers see Carmen Winkel, “Im Dienste seiner Majestät: Netzwerke im Offizierkorps als Mittel der Außenpolitik (1713–1786)”, in Mil- itärische Eliten in der Frühen Neuzeit, eds. Gundula Gahlen and Carmen Winkel (Potsdam, 2010), 59–85. 59 Kunisch, Die Deutschen Führungsschichten, 125. 60 Ronald G. Asch, Europäischer Adel in der Frühen Neuzeit. Eine Einführung (Köln, 2008), 211. 61 Volker Press, “Reichsgrafenstand und Reich. Zur Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte des deutschen Hochadels in der frühen Neuzeit”, in Wege in die Zeitgeschichte. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Gerhard Schulz, eds. Jürgen Heideking, Gerhard Hufnagel and Franz Knipping (Berlin, 1989), 3–30, here 20. 62 This aspect was particularly delicate as the imperial immediacy of imperial princes and counts was threatened by the take-over of these payments by their patron Prussia.

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The King and His Army 51 accessible for foreign princes through the military. The King oftentimes used his private finances, the so-called “Schatulle”, to reward money to noble officers, interestingly not only to high ranking officers but also the lower ranks, especially to young lieutenants.63 On the other hand, at least since the end of the Seven Years’ War, Prussia’s attractiveness for foreign princes was based on its increased political and military significance.64 However, as the King’s efforts of courting specific families clearly demonstrate, the attachment of imperial princes to the Prussian monarch could not rely solely on factors such as prestige or economic considerations. It appears that in Prussia the formation of a clientele of imperial princes was usually achieved via the army. Among the staff officers promoted to general between 1740 and 1786, 27 were princes who thus provided around eight percent of all generals.65 The service of officers from the high nobility, either of princes of the House of Hohenzollern or scions of other dynasties, stood under very different auspices than that of the comrades from the lower nobility. Sixty-seven percent of the officers promoted to the rank of Major General between 1740 and 1763 had a length of service of over 44 years. Princes promoted during this period achieved this rank after an average of five to twelve years.66 They did not have to serve from the proverbial scratch, but were preferentially promoted. However, the varied demands of office made no exception for officers from the high nobility, as it demanded of them certain abilities as well as subordination under experienced officers. This led to tensions and conflicts that required the monarch’s intervention and often resulted in a clearly parti- san resolution in favour of the officer from the high nobility.67

63 Perspectivia.net, http://quellen.perspectivia.net/bestaende/spsg-schatullrechnungen/ einleitung/recherchemoeglichkeiten, accessed 22 March 2018. 64 Press, Reichsgrafenstand und Reich, 20. As a consequence, service in the Prussian army was not particularly attractive to Protestant princes of the empire in the 17th century – sons of the Catholic houses tended to serve in the imperial church. Only a few counts of the empire served in Brandenburg’s army or entered civilian service. See Johannes Arndt, “Zwischen kollegialer Solidarität. Die Reichsgrafen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert”, in Der Eu- ropäische Adel im Ancien Régime. Von der Krise der ständischen Monarchien bis zur Revolu- tion (1600–1789), ed. Ronald G. Asch (Cologne, 2001), 105–129, here 117. 65 Joachim Engelmann, Friedrich der Große und seine Generale. Mit Gemälden von Günter Dorn (Utting, 1998), 89. Engelmann’s numbers are based on an analysis of the biographi- cal information in Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum. 66 Numbers according to Engelmann, Friedrich der Große, 19. 67 Major General von Bieberstein was dismissed as regimental commander in 1752 because the seventeen-year-old Prince Frederick Eugene, who had only entered service in 1750, refused to submit to his superior. The General was reappointed to a command at the start

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52 Winkel

It is clear that the post as a regimental commander/chief was not only inter- esting for foreign princes and noblemen because of the possible financial gain, but more so because it guaranteed a very close connection to the King. This connection could be used for accessing other resources like the King’s support in inner-family-quarrels or for omnipresent 18th-century inheritance disputes. Not all the officers from the high nobility actively served in the army as some held merely titular ranks, which promised high incomes but did not require actual service. Actively serving reigning princes were the exception68 as the manifold demands of military service clashed with the official duties of a prince. Reigning princes continued to lead their regiments, but the actual business of the regiment was often carried out by a commander. In contrast, members of the houses of imperial princes were expected to carry out active military service. Purely honorary posts were the absolute exception; these lesser nobles were expected to ‘learn’ their duties, which amounted to requirements for their physical presence as the training of an officer was conducted as part of the daily garrison duties. Military-historical research has thus far treated the service of reigning imperial princes or their sons in the armies of European dynasties under the aspect of aristocratic self-image.69 It was customary during the Early Mod- ern Period to fill offices with certain individuals out of political or personal considerations.70 Loyalty and political benefit were more important than any professional expertise when making appointments.71 Personal service and the associated rewards updated and maintained relationships of patronage.72 Patronage provided access to royal offices in the Early Modern Period. These

of the Seven Years’ War. On the subject also see Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, Vol. 1, No. 349, 323. 68 Rouven Pons, Die Kunst der Loyalität. Ludwig viii von Hessen-Darmstadt (1691–1768) und der Wiener Kaiserhof (Marburg, 2009), 145. 69 An exception is Ernst Opgenoorth, “Ausländer”in Brandenburg-Preussen. Als leitende Beamte und Offiziere 1604–1871 (Würzburg, 1967), 57–60; on the French foreign regiments see Ronald G. Asch, “Ständische Stellung und Selbstverständnis des Adels im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert”, in Der europäische Adel, ed. Ronald G. Asch, 3–49, here 17. 70 Wolfram Fischer, “Rekrutierung und Ausbildung von Personal für den modernen Staat: Beamte, Offiziere und Techniker in England, Frankreich und Preußen in der frühen Neuzeit”, in Studien zum Beginn der modernen Welt, ed. Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart, 1977), 194–217, here 202. 71 Wolfgang Reinhard, “Kommentar: Mikrogeschichte und Makrogeschichte”, in Nähe in der Ferne, eds. Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler (Berlin, 2004), 135–145, here 136. 72 Christian Wieland, Fürsten, Freunde, Diplomaten. Die römisch-florentinischen Beziehun- gen unter Paul V. (1605–1621) (Berlin, 2004), 17.

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The King and His Army 53 mechanisms have hardly been considered for the military where the emphasis has been on the military-professional requirements associated with military service. However, here, too, the allocation of offices was oriented towards political considerations and paid scant regards to the actual military competence or training of the holder of the rank. This naturally led to conflicts of rank and social standing with the ‘professional soldiers’. While in Prussia, military offices were never for sale, like for instance in France.73 Nevertheless, the award of high military offices to members of the high nobility motivated by political and familial considerations still resulted in conflicts that were the result of the contrast of noble status consciousness and the requirements for professional- ization, a contrast frequently pointed out in the research.74 This was the case with Hereditary Prince Frederick of Hesse-Kassel who, following his conversion to Catholicism, was accepted into Prussian service out of political considerations. When the Prince was subsequently involved in several disputes concerning rank, Frederick II repeatedly stressed the Prince’s political significance. Thus, he urged Baron de la Motte, mentor to the Prince, not to allow the conflict with the Hessian hereditary prince to escalate. Freder- ick II pleaded with de la Motte to do him a favour and yield to the Prince on the question of rank. He reminded him of the Prince’s special status, and as Fred- erick had need of the Prince in important matters, he again asked de la Motte to indulge the King not to make an issue of rank, but rather to flatter the Prince (“so ersuche ich Euch um des Himmels willen, Mir den Gefallen zu thun und jetzo gegen ihn in dem Artikel wegen des Ranges nachzugeben. Ihr wisset bereits, dass alle mit ihm ad honores und sonder Conséquence ist, und da Ich den Prinzen in sonst wichtigen Angelegenheiten nöthig habe, so werdet Ihr Mir eine besondere Gefälligkeit erweisen, wenn Ihr Euch wegen eines Ranges gegen ihn nicht moviret, vielmehr denselben flattiren und Distinictions bezeigen werdet”).75 In a letter, Frederick II justified the prince’s assignment to a military command against this background: given the current political constellations, and the age and poor health of the hereditary prince’s father, he was keen to man- age the prince in such a way so to prevent him from taking a position that

73 A more detailed description can be found in Rafe Blaufarb, The French army 1750–1820. Careers, talent, merit (Manchester, 2002). 74 See Frank Göse, “‘Es war mir wie einem armen Gemeinen zu Muthe’. Überlegungen zur Professionalisierung adliger Offiziere ausgewählter deutscher Reichsterritorien im 17. Jah- rhundert”, in Militärische Eliten in der Fruehen Neuzeit, eds. Gundula Gahlen and Carmen Winkel (Potsdam, 2010), 185–215. 75 Politische Correspondenz Friedrich’s des Großen, ed. Preußische Akademie der Wissen- schaften, 47 Vols. (Berlin Duncker, 1879–2003), Vol. 14, No. 8807, 454.

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54 Winkel could be prejudicial to the King and his allies (“Ich habe, gedachten Erbprinzen in gegenwärtigen Conjuncturen, bei den zumal seines Herrn Vaters Durchlaucht erreichten Jahren und denen schwächlichen Gesundheitsumständen, worinnen er sich findet, zu menagiren, auf dass ersterer nicht eine Partie nehme, so Mir und Meinen Alliirten sehr präjudicirlich sein könnte”).76 The King was acting out of his dynastic interest completely disregarding intra-army dependencies in the negotiations. Regiments becoming vacant represented for the King an important asset for dispensing patronage. Frederick Charles Ferdinand of Brunswick-Bevern, younger brother of Duke Augustus- William, joined the Prussian army in 1756 at the instigation of his brother who had already been serving there since 1731. Frederick Charles had previously been in Danish service and he petitioned the King to appoint him to his Danish rank of major general and to give him command of a regiment that had “already participated in the King’s glorious campaigns”.77 However, in a marginal note to the petition, the King remarked that he was “unable to give him an old regiment”. The outbreak of war had severely limited the resources for military patronage. Newly raised regiments were preferentially allocated to experienced officers; furthermore, commands needed to be given to the politically significant among the monarch’s clients who additionally required a military mentor. The Prince of Brunswick-Bevern remained without a regiment until 1757 when he received the major general’s commission, which in accordance with the Prince’s wishes had been back-dated and thus matched the service age of the rank he had held in the Danish army.78 On the order of the King dated 16th January 1757, he was finally appointed to his regimental command in accordance with his petition, albeit not to the field regiment he had aspired to. Instead by the royal order, he received command of the formerly Saxon regiment Prince Xavier, which was re-named Young-Bevern to dif- ferentiate it from Regiment #7, the Old-Bevern.79 The King had integrated all the Saxon regiments into the Prussian army following the capitulation of the Saxon army at Pirna – a course of action that was based on the assumed Prus- sian sympathies among the Saxons, something which soon proved to be a fatal misjudgement.80 The Saxon regiments, in contrast with the usual procedure to distribute individual captured enemy soldiers among the regiments, were

76 Ibid., No. 8864, 507–508. 77 GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 96, No. 102 K, Des Erbprinzen Friedrich Carl Ferdinands Immediat Korrespondenz 1757–1759, letter dated 18th December 1756. 78 Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, Vol. 1, ri No. 410, 396. 79 Jany, Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee, Vol. 2, 376. 80 Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert, 353.

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The King and His Army 55 integrated into the Prussian army en bloc. Prussian officers were put in command of the men and ten new Prussian regiments were formed from the re- mainder of the Saxon army. The Saxon officers were, other than the soldiers and the corporals, not pressed into the Prussian army. Most of them were held imprisoned or returned home after their imprisonment.81 This led to massive numbers of desertions from the former Saxon regiments now under Prussian command. The former regiment Xavier lost so many soldiers by April that it had to be replenished in Liegnitz using Silesian recruits. The regiment finally broke up completely, or rather the 1st Battalion was taken prisoner at Schweidnitz, by the end of 1757.82 Frederick II was intent on raising further Saxon battalions in spite of the mass desertions by the Saxons. Orders regarding measures designed to prevent mass desertions were issued but were ineffectual.83 Prince Frederick Charles Ferdinand petitioned for a regular regiment following the loss of his own, referencing the King’s assurance to that effect on entering his command.84 Frederick II’s response was unequivocal: “I took him out of attachment to his brother. He will not get an old regiment. Why did he allow his own to break up” (“ich hette ihn aus Complaisance vohr seinen Bruder genommen ein alt Regiment kriegt er nicht, warum hat er das sei- nige aus einander laufen lassen”).85 Even though the cabinet secretary translated the content of Frederick’s marginal note into a polite letter of response, the Prince would have under- stood the accusation contained in the toned down version: “I am unable to allocate you one of the old regiments as they are already taken. You will recall that I have taken you into service out of attachment to your older brother. I re- gret that your previous regiment has broken up.” (“Ich kann Euer Liebden keines von denen alten Regimentern conferiren, da von denen selben bereits alle besetzt sind. Dabey werden Dieselben sich erinnern, daß Ich sie aus complaisance vor

81 Marcus von Salisch, Treue Deserteure. Das kursächsische Militär und der Siebenjährige Krieg (Munich, 2009), 140. 82 Jany, Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee, Vol. 2, 376. Most units were disbanded towards the end of 1757 as they had suffered great losses due to desertions on the retreat from Bohemia. The Saxon soldiers from the 2nd Battalion Young-Bevern had mutinied when ordered to march to Silesia. The situation was only calmed following the intervention of armed peasants and called in Prussian troops. See Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhun- dert, 360. 83 Erwin Dette, Friedrich der Große und sein Heer (Göttingen, 1915), 28; Politische Correspon- denz, 1889, Vol. 14, 451, footnote 2. 84 GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 96, No. 102 K, Des Erbprinzen Friedrich Carl Ferdinands Immediat Korrespondenz 1757–1759, letter dated 10th January 1758. 85 Ibid.

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Dero älteren Herrn Bruder in den Dienst genommen. Inzwischen es mir leyd thut, das das Euer Liebden vorher conferirt gewesene Regiment auseinander gelauffen ist.”)86 The King had taken the prince into service only out of the obligation of kin- ship. The prince, who apart from his social capital, a member of a branch line related to the Prussians, brought neither practical skills nor other political, social or symbolic capital and ultimately only represented a burden for the monarch. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that he had been given a more than thankless military command. The leadership of regiments formed from Saxon recruits proved an especially difficult task as they were prone to mass desertions, and Saxon soldiers often protested against the Prussian drills, which were practiced particularly severely here.87 The appointment did not follow considerations of skill, but Frederick II rather used the many new vacancies resulting from the raising of the ten new regiments to supply his less important clients, such as the Prince of Brunswick.88 The explosive nature of this regimental assignment is demonstrated by the fact that the King other- wise allocated these new regiments, which were difficult to command due to their personal composition, to long-serving professional soldiers.89 However, he was unable to ignore the repeated petitions of the prince even though no other vacant regiments were available.

6 Conclusion

The Brandenburg-Prussian army offers a highly multi-faceted picture based on a differentiated definition of a rule. The army was an instrument of power, a means to represent authority, an important means of integration for foreign elites, and finally the space in which nobility and monarch cooperated on varied levels. It has been argued here that the integration of the nobility into the monarch’s regimen was successful using a variety of instruments of power. Part- ly, this covered traditional means of rule, such as feudal ties. Beyond this,

86 Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, Vol. 1, No. 410, 397. 87 Salisch, Treue Deserteure, 141–153. 88 Duffy described the officers who were assigned to these units as “second class”, but they were more accurately characterized as inexperienced; Christopher Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great (London, 1974), 140. 89 A complete list of the regimental commanders of these ten new infantry units can be found in Jany, Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee, Vol. 2, 375–377.

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Prussian rulers developed varied new instruments, such as the symbol of the parade horse or their wearing of the army uniform. However, the limits of the regal claim to power became equally apparent. The influence of the colonels- in-chief and regimental commanders on their units was significant, in spite of the increased subordination under the monarch. The opinion of the colonels regarding the recruitment and promotion of officers was decisive for the King. The achievement of the process of negotiation of governance in the military is demonstrated in the successful cooperation of nobility and monarch. The replenishment of troops, in particular, could not have been achieved without the collaboration of the nobility. Even though every other Prussian soldier during the 18th century came from Prussia, an enormous number of soldiers was required particularly for the three Silesian Wars, which could not have been re- cruited from the small kingdom. Recruitment was very much characterized by networks among the nobility. A policy of recruitment without these networks would hardly have been feasible, particularly when, as in the case of Prussia, it came to the significant overexpansion of troop numbers in contrast to the number of inhabitants and economic potential. It appears that in Prussia the formation of a clientele of imperial princes was usually achieved via the army. The rising military and political prestige of the victorious Prussian army following the Seven Years’ War provided an alternative to the Habsburg military for many representatives of European dynasties. However, Brandenburg had already embarked on influencing Protestant imperial princes since the end of the 17th century, thereby creating for itself a successful client system within the empire. At the end of the Seven Years’ War, Prussia’s attractiveness was based on its increased political and military significance. However, as the King’s efforts of courting specific families clearly demonstrate, the attachment of imperial princes to the Prussian monarch could not rely solely on factors such as prestige or economic considerations, but rather on political considerations, as highlighted on the example of the Prince of Hesse-Kassel in this paper. The Prussian Army and its officers have been studied extensively, but always from the perspective from above, meaning from the perspective of the King and the state. By changing the perspective and exploring the relationship between the King and his officers from below, in other words from the perspective of the latter, it became clear that their relationship with the King was a form of patronage. The army’s development has so far been explained as a linear, conscious process of state building, wherein the King played the central role. This article has shown that the Prussian army developed as a result of the patronage relationship between the King and his officers and how the elements of this relation were part of the military culture and at the same

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58 Winkel time part of the monarch’s rule. In contrast to the traditional historiographical interpretations of networks and patronage in the army, this does not indicate a sign of dysfunction but rather an integral component of military interactions.

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