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This Document IS a HOLDING of the ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO Z-SY subject. 2-;4 TT O t U5W zM i k~OFId U1J1\L4 LV:aI TRC& IN NINT:TNT 'iAK EARL3Y TitWETIETHCENTT PIRZ THOII ,S D. &~IIL LT COL 0-30613 Date submitted; 31 Iay 1949 The Prussian system of universal service in nineteenth and early twentieth cen- tunies, by Lt Col T. D. MPhai l. Com~- mand & General Staff College. 31 May 52. This Document IS A HOLDING OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO. -2 5ZL4 COPY NO. __j_ 9 Fi GSC1607Ma Form --- Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 5Z-5M 13 Mar 51 THE PIUSIIN SYSTIEM OF UN VEi~RLL SBRVICE IN NIiNTEENTH AND EARLY T ONTIETH CENITIURIES To properly present the Prussian system of universal service in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it will be neces- sary to orient the class on the origin of the Prussian system of universal service, The history of Prussia presents the novelty of a group of unpromising little provinces speedily growing up in the eighteenth century to a great kingdom which inUhe nineteenth century united Germany under its rule. The major factor in this rise was the strength and efficiency of its military forces. The real father of Prussian militarism was King Frederick William (1713-1740), who made the army the conscious instrument of power politics. He believed that the larger a state's army, the larger the role the state could play in international politics. To ensure himself of -a large number of recruits, and at the same time still the complaints over forcible recruiting, Frederick adopted a system of universal service that was to remain un- changed until :ussia was defeated by Napoleon. By an order which he sent-to the various regiments, he divided his kingdom into districts according to the number of hearths and assigned to each regiment a specific district from which to fill its ranks. Each district in turn was subdivided into as many cantons as. there were companies in the regiment to which it was allotted. If the quota of a regiment was not filled by voluntary enlistment of recruits living in the district, the company could make good the deficiency from a list eligible for service. Under. the canton system all males subject to military service were put on the regimental lists, After taking the military oath, they were subject to call when needed in the regiment.- The canton system not only provided the king with a large permanent supply of recruits, but it was a long step toward making the Prussian army a national one. Native recruits now formed the backbone of the :Prussian army. More than this, the canton system also resulted in a definite improvement in the type of Prussian recruit. Pre- viously recruits hadi most often been habitual idlers or even criminals and generally worthless humans whom the local authorities had delivered to the army or who had been forcibly recruited. Now members of all classes were required to serve Military service was no longer a sudden forcible seizure by recruiting agents, but a career forrdwhich young men were enrolled While still very young. The officers' corps was chosen almost exclusively from the nobility. As the number of noblemen increased, to be an officer was regarded more and more as a privilege reserved for the nobility, and many Junkers eagerly adopted the military profession as a career. They were sharply separated from the non-commissioned of- ficers and enlisted men. This sharp distinction between officers and men was of practical value because it facilitated the main- tenance of strict discipline, which became characteristic of the Prussian system. Following her defeat in 1807 by Napoleon, Prussia was imbued with many of the democratic ideals which the French were carrying by force of arms across the frontiers of old despotic monarchies. The reform had its resulting effect in the army. Foreign recruit- ment and the cruel system of corporal punishment by which discip- line had been maintained in the Prussian army were abolished, B3y the Paris treaty, the Prussian army was definitely fixed at a maximum of 42,000 effectives, and any form of militia besides the national army strictly forbidden. Tn these circumstances the only way left to Prussia for increasing her forces beyond the number authorized was by the training of short-term reservists within the standing army. n this manner it was possible to build,between 130 and I813, 58,000 trained men behind the of- ficial allowed strength, but it did little to train the manpowier as a whole as the military leaders had wished. In the spring of 31813 Prussia organized a revolt against Napoleon. The standing army was mobilized and its numbers raised -2- by incorporation of the reservists to nearly 100,000 men. This was followed by the issuing of the famous ""Landwehr Edict," which mobilized the whole untrained manpower of the country between the ages of seventeen and forty. By this scheme all eligible males were made liable to serve for three years in the standing army, which in war was to be brought up to full strength by the reservists. The bulk of the trained reserves., the seven classes from twenty- six to thirty-two years of age, were formed into the Landwehr, destined to fight shoulder to shoulder with the "regular regi- ments of the line." In this manner it was hoped to combine the superior military efficiency and discipline of a standing force with those patriotic virtues which the reformers had been at such pains to arouse in the mass of the nation. To that end Boyen, Minister of War, was anxious to preserve and foster the Landwehr's peculiar status as a l"citizen" force, based indeed upon conscription,. but relying mainly upon spontaneous enthusiasm, In Prussia, political life after 1815 subsided into stag- nation that lasted for nearly thirty-three years. Liberalism began its onslaught upon the standing army, the extremists de- nounced these- "mercenary hordes," and demanded their abolition in favor of a popular militia. This period ofhpeace and stagna- tion resulted in universal conscription becoaing almost a farce. Since its institution in 1314, the tandwehr system had never been adapted to the growing manpower of the country. Its yearly contingent of recruits still stood at 40,000 when the population .had risen fron eleven to eighteen millions and the class yearly available for conscription to 155,000. In the mobilization of 1850, men who had -once, been conscripted and trained were called up for service long after they had passed their military prime, while thousands of much younger men who had escaped conscription were left at home0 To remedy this the king submitted to the Liberal Landtag -3- the project of a law authorizing an increase of tthe yearly contin- gent from 40,000 to 63,000 in the standing army, the establish- ment of thirty-nine new regiments, and increasing the length of service in the standing armyy to three years. Eut this project seemed to the Liberal majority controlling the Landtag to contain military implications which aroused their apprehension and op- position. Unable to agree over the length of service, the conflict over the reorganization of the army developed into a fundamental trial of strength between the king and the Liberal Landtag0 At this critical moment Otto Von Bismark was induced to be- come chancellor. He proceeded to reorganize the army regardless of opposition and to enter into a desperate struggle with the enraged Landtag. Fully aware that a great European policy could not be car- ried through with a standing army of 200,000 and 400,000 Landwehr, Bismark immediately began a reorganization of the army that was to last with but few changes until World War I. The yearly con- tingent of recruits was increased to 63,000, the period of liabil- ity to serve in the active army. and reserve was increased to forty- five years. Within four years of his taking over the reins, the ussian army was rejuvenated, homogeneous, and efficient, Vic- torious campaigns over the Danes, French, and Austrians endowed the army with a popularity such as it never enjoyed before. Converting all of Tlrussia into a vast military organization, he applied the whole intelligence of the nation, either directly or indirectly, to military affairs. To this end he geared industry, commerce, taxation, and agriculture, in fact almost every phase of national life. So completely did he center the interests of the Prussian state in" the army that it can be said Prussia of that period was not a state that possessed an army but an army that possessed a state* -4- Subject 2-54 THE PRUSSIAN SYSTEM OF UNIVRSAL SERVICE IN NINETEENTH1 AND EARLY TVENllIETh CENTUJRIES \ THOMA.S D. McPHkIL LT COL Qr3 0623 Date submitted: 31 May 1949 TABLE OF CONTEN'TS rage Origin of Prussian System of Universal Service . " " 1 Era of Military and Political Reform. a . .* * " 3 Era of Blood andlIron . ... *. ,.a *" "9 7 The Prussian Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer " a " 0 O of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century . Conclusion. .**, " s 0e 10 Annex 1 - Directive Annex 2 - Bibliography TI PRUSSIAN SYSTEJ1] OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN NI1TETr H AND EARLY T1 NTILTH CENNTURIES J?.IGIN OF THE. iUSSIAN SYSTEM OF UMV2PUiALLF,'VICE The history of Prussia presents the novelty of a group of unpromising little provinces speedily expanding in the eighteenth century to a great kingdom which in the nineteenth century united Germany under its rule. The major factors in this rise were the. strength and efficiency of its military forces. The real father of Prussian militarism was King Frederick William (1713-1740), who by dint of persistent effort managed to organize a force fourth largest in Europe in size and first in efficiency.
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