This Document IS a HOLDING of the ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO

Z-SY

subject. 2-;4

TT O t U5W zM i k~OFId U1J1\L4 LV:aI TRC&

IN NINT:TNT 'iAK EARL3Y TitWETIETHCENTT PIRZ

THOII ,S D. &~IIL LT COL 0-30613

Date submitted; 31 Iay 1949

The Prussian system of universal service in nineteenth and early twentieth cen- tunies, by Lt Col T. D. MPhai l. Com~- mand & General Staff College. 31 May 52.

This Document IS A HOLDING OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO. -2 5ZL4 COPY NO. __j_

9 Fi GSC1607Ma Form --- Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 5Z-5M 13 Mar 51

THE PIUSIIN SYSTIEM OF UN VEi~RLL SBRVICE

IN NIiNTEENTH AND EARLY T ONTIETH CENITIURIES

To properly present the Prussian system of universal service in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it will be necessary to orient the class on the origin of the Prussian system of universal service, The history of Prussia presents the novelty of a group of unpromising little provinces speedily growing up in the eighteenth century to a great kingdom which inUhe nineteenth century united Germany under its rule. The major factor in this rise was the strength and efficiency of its military forces.

The real father of Prussian militarism was King Frederick

William (1713-1740), who made the army the conscious instrument of power politics. He believed that the larger a state's army, the larger the role the state could play in international politics.

To ensure himself of -a large number of recruits, and at the same time still the complaints over forcible recruiting, Frederick adopted a system of universal service that was to remain unchanged until :ussia was defeated by Napoleon. By an order which he sent-to the various regiments, he divided his kingdom into districts according to the number of hearths and assigned to each regiment a specific district from which to fill its ranks. Each

district in turn was subdivided into as many cantons as. there were

companies in the regiment to which it was allotted. If the quota of a regiment was not filled by voluntary enlistment of recruits living in the district, the company could make good the deficiency

from a list eligible for service.

Under. the canton system all males subject to military service were put on the regimental lists, After taking the military oath, they were subject to call when needed in the regiment.- The canton system not only provided the king with a large permanent supply of recruits, but it was a long step toward making the Prussian army

a national one. Native recruits now formed the backbone of the

:Prussian army. More than this, the canton system also resulted in a definite improvement in the type of Prussian recruit. Pre- viously recruits hadi most often been habitual idlers or even criminals and generally worthless humans whom the local authorities

had delivered to the army or who had been forcibly recruited. Now

members of all classes were required to serve Military service was no longer a sudden forcible seizure by recruiting agents, but

a career forrdwhich young men were enrolled While still very young.

The officers' corps was chosen almost exclusively from the nobility. As the number of noblemen increased, to be an officer was regarded more and more as a privilege reserved for the nobility,

and many Junkers eagerly adopted the military profession as a

career. They were sharply separated from the non-commissioned of-

ficers and enlisted men. This sharp distinction between officers

and men was of practical value because it facilitated the main-

tenance of strict discipline, which became characteristic of the

Prussian system.

Following her defeat in 1807 by Napoleon, Prussia was imbued

with many of the democratic ideals which the French were carrying

by force of arms across the frontiers of old despotic monarchies.

The reform had its resulting effect in the army. Foreign recruit-

ment and the cruel system of corporal punishment by which discip-

line had been maintained in the Prussian army were abolished,

B3y the Paris treaty, the Prussian army was definitely fixed at a maximum of 42,000 effectives, and any form of militia besides

the national army strictly forbidden. Tn these circumstances the

only way left to Prussia for increasing her forces beyond the

number authorized was by the training of short-term reservists within the standing army. n this manner it was possible to build,between 130 and I813, 58,000 trained men behind the of-

ficial allowed strength, but it did little to train the manpowier

as a whole as the military leaders had wished.

In the spring of 31813 Prussia organized a revolt against

Napoleon. The standing army was mobilized and its numbers raised -2- by incorporation of the reservists to nearly 100,000 men. This

was followed by the issuing of the famous ""Landwehr Edict," which

mobilized the whole untrained manpower of the country between the

ages of seventeen and forty. By this scheme all eligible males

were made liable to serve for three years in the standing army,

which in war was to be brought up to full strength by the reservists.

The bulk of the trained reserves., the seven classes from twenty-

six to thirty-two years of age, were formed into the Landwehr,

destined to fight shoulder to shoulder with the "regular regi-

ments of the line."

In this manner it was hoped to combine the superior military

efficiency and discipline of a standing force with those patriotic

virtues which the reformers had been at such pains to arouse in

the mass of the nation. To that end Boyen, Minister of War, was

anxious to preserve and foster the Landwehr's peculiar status as

a l"citizen" force, based indeed upon conscription,. but relying

mainly upon spontaneous enthusiasm,

In Prussia, political life after 1815 subsided into stag-

nation that lasted for nearly thirty-three years. Liberalism

began its onslaught upon the standing army, the extremists de-

nounced these- "mercenary hordes," and demanded their abolition

in favor of a popular militia. This period ofhpeace and stagna-

tion resulted in universal conscription becoaing almost a farce.

Since its institution in 1314, the tandwehr system had never

been adapted to the growing manpower of the country. Its yearly

contingent of recruits still stood at 40,000 when the population

.had risen fron eleven to eighteen millions and the class yearly

available for conscription to 155,000. In the mobilization of

1850, men who had -once, been conscripted and trained were called

up for service long after they had passed their military prime,

while thousands of much younger men who had escaped conscription

were left at home0

To remedy this the king submitted to the Liberal Landtag -3- the project of a law authorizing an increase of tthe yearly contingent from 40,000 to 63,000 in the standing army, the establishment of thirty-nine new regiments, and increasing the length of service in the standing armyy to three years. Eut this project seemed to the Liberal majority controlling the Landtag to contain military implications which aroused their apprehension and opposition.

Unable to agree over the length of service, the conflict over the reorganization of the army developed into a fundamental trial of strength between the king and the Liberal Landtag0

At this critical moment Otto Von Bismark was induced to become chancellor. He proceeded to reorganize the army regardless

of opposition and to enter into a desperate struggle with the enraged Landtag.

Fully aware that a great European policy could not be carried through with a standing army of 200,000 and 400,000 Landwehr,

Bismark immediately began a reorganization of the army that was to last with but few changes until World War I. The yearly contingent of recruits was increased to 63,000, the period of liability to serve in the active army. and reserve was increased to forty- five years. Within four years of his taking over the reins, the

ussian army was rejuvenated, homogeneous, and efficient, Vic- torious campaigns over the Danes, French, and Austrians endowed the army with a popularity such as it never enjoyed before.

Converting all of Tlrussia into a vast military organization, he applied the whole intelligence of the nation, either directly or indirectly, to military affairs. To this end he geared industry, commerce, taxation, and agriculture, in fact almost every phase of national life. So completely did he center the interests of the Prussian state in" the army that it can be said Prussia of that period was not a state that possessed an army but an army

that possessed a state*

-4- Subject 2-54

THE PRUSSIAN SYSTEM OF UNIVRSAL SERVICE

IN NINETEENTH1 AND EARLY TVENllIETh CENTUJRIES \

THOMA.S D. McPHkIL LT COL Qr3 0623

Date submitted: 31 May 1949

TABLE OF CONTEN'TS

rage

Origin of Prussian System of Universal Service . " " 1

Era of Military and Political Reform. . a . .* * " 3

Era of Blood andlIron . ... *. . ,.a *" "9 7

The Prussian Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer

" a " 0 O of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century .

Conclusion...... **, " s 0e 10

Annex 1 - Directive

Annex 2 - Bibliography TI PRUSSIAN SYSTEJ1] OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE

IN NI1TETr H AND EARLY T1 NTILTH CENNTURIES

J?.IGIN OF THE. iUSSIAN SYSTEM OF UMV2PUiALLF,'VICE

The history of Prussia presents the novelty of a group of

unpromising little provinces speedily expanding in the eighteenth

century to a great kingdom which in the nineteenth century united

Germany under its rule. The major factors in this rise were the.

strength and efficiency of its military forces.

The real father of Prussian militarism was King Frederick

William (1713-1740), who by dint of persistent effort managed to

organize a force fourth largest in Europe in size and first in

efficiency. This army he made the conscious instrument of power

politics. He believed that the larger a state's army, the larger

role the state could play in international politics.

The king specifically stated that "All subjects, according

to their natural birth and the order and command of God Almighty,

are obliged to serve with their goods and blood; l thereby laying

down the principles of universal liability to military service.

Thus by a stroke of the pen, the Prussian monarch changed the old

obligation of serving in the militia for local defense into the

new one of serving in the National Army. To ensure himself of a

large number of recruits and at the same time still the complaints

over forcible recruiting, Frederick adopted a system of universal

service that was to remain unchanged in Prussia until her defeat

by Napoleon. By an order which he sent to the various regiments,

he divided his kingdom into districts according to the number of

hearths and assigned to each regiment a specific district from

which to fill its ranks. .Each district in turn was subdivided

into as many cantons as there were companies in the regiment to

which it was allotted. If the quota of a regiment was not filled

by voluntary enlistment of recruits living in the district, the

company could make good the deficiency from a list eligible for

1 - See nnex 2, ref. no. 3, p 76. service. Under the "canton system" all males subject to military

.service were put on the regimental lists and after taking the,

military oath were subject to call when needed by the regiment.

The principle of universal service was not rigidly enforced;

liberal exemptions were made in the interests of industry, trade,

and education. Practically the whole upper stratum of the bour-

geoisie down to the more prosperous artisans was exempted. Thus

the burden of serving in the ranks fell largely on the, shoulders

of the small artisans, servants, agricultural laborers, and poor

peasants. It was the policy to permit the growth of the army

without putting obstacles in the way of expansion of commerce

and industry. But the middle class was exempt only at a price,--

it had to bear the burden of a system of taxation designed chiefly

to meet the expense of a large standing army.

The canton system not only provided the king with a large

permanent supply of recruits, but it was a long step toward

making the Prussian Army a national one. Native recruits now

formed the backbone of the Prussian Army. The canton system also

resulted in a definite improvement in the type of Prussian recruit.

Previously recruits had most often been habitual idlers or even

criminals and generally worthless hunans whom the local authorities

had delivered to the army or who had been forcibly recruited. Now

members of all classes were required to serve. Military service

was no longer a sudden forcible.seizure by recruiting agents, but

a career for which younger men were enrolled while still very

young.

The officer corps was chosen almost exclusively from the

nobility. Thus another step was taken toward making the Prussian

Army a national one. At first some of the noble families were

opposed to entering the king's service, but the ruling monarch

did not hesitate to send his messengers to requisition the young

noblemen. As the number of noblemen increased, to be an officer

was regarded more'and more as a privilege reserved for the nobility,

-2- and many Junkers eagerly adopted the military profession as a career. They were sharply separated from the non-commissioned

officers and enlisted men. This sharp distinction between officers and men was of practical value because it facilitated the main- tenance of that strict discipline which bedame characteristic of the Prussian system. The Prussian monarch not only constituted his officers a separate class; he also gave them the foremost place in state and society.

BRA OF MILTARY AND POLITICAL REFORM

Following her defeat in 1807 by Napoleon, Irussia was imbued with many of the democratic ideals which the French were carrying by force of arms across the frontiers of old despotic monarchies.

The reform had its resulting effect in the army. Foreigin recruit- ment and the cruel.system of corporal punishment by which discip-

line had been maintained in the Prussian Army were abolished.

By the Paris treaty, the Prussian Army was definitely fixed

at a maximum of 42,000 effectives, with the distribution of this

number rigidly determined, and any form of national militia be-

sides tbe national army was strictly forbidden. Under these cir-

cumstances the only way left to Prussia for increasing her forces

beyond the numbers authorized, was by the training of short term

reservists within the standing army. Although the king had given

his consent to the proclamation of the principle of universal

conscription, he could not be induced to make it effective. All

that Scharnhorst, the military leader, could obtain from him was

permission to draft a small number of recruits per company and

replace them with others after a minimum of training. In that

manner it was possible to build up between 1808 and 1813 a reserve

of 58,000 trained men behind the officially allowed strength, but

it did little to train the whole manpower as Scharnhorst had wished.

In the spring of 1813 Prussia organized a revolt against

Napoleon. The standing army was mobilized and its numbers raised

by incorporation of the reservists to nearly 100,000 men. This was followed by the issuing of the famous 'andwehr Edict," which mobilized the whole untrained manpower of the country between the ages of seventeen and forty. Boyen, Minister of War, in issuing his "'andwehr Edict," established the principle of universal conscription along the lines that all were made liable to serve for three years (from twenty to twenty-three) in the standing army, which in war was to be brought up to full strength by the reservists of the next two classes (twenty-four and twenty-five). The bulk of the trained reserves, the seven classes from twenty-six to thirty-two years of age, were formed into the Landwehr, destined to fight shoulder to shoulder with the regular "regiments of the line."

By this scheme he hoped to combine the superior military efficiency and discipline of a standing force with those patriotic virtues which the reformers had been at such pains to arouse in the mass of the nation. To that end he was anxious to preserve and foster the Landwehr's peculiar status as a "citizen' force, based indeed upon conscription, but relying rather upon spontaneous enthusiasm, by keeping it as far as possible apart from the contaminating influences of the standing army and linking it up with civilian life. Small fortified arsenals scattered throughout the country were to form rallying points for local resistance in time of war and centers of military training in time of peace. The officers of the Landwehr were to be drawn principally from the local "bourgeoisie," privileged to serve only one year provided they had acquired a certain degree of education and were able to equip and maintain themselves at their own expense:

In Prussia, political life after 1815 subsided into stag- nation that lasted for nearly thirty-three years. Liberalism began its onslaught upon the standing army. In the absolute monarchy of the eighteenth century, the army had been an instrument of foreign policy in the hands of the monarch, almost com-

2 - See Annex 2, re no, l,p 49.

l-- pletely divorced from the life of the people, Now the army was dragged out of its unpolitical position into the very midst of political strife. The Liberal extremists denounced these t mer. cenary hordes" and demanded their abolition in favor of popular militia. The struggle'between the monarchy and the Liberals resulted in the Liberals concentrating upon an attempt to subject the army to an oath on the constitution rather than to the monarch,

For many years the struggle for these demands met with little suc- cess until 1848 when the powers of reaction crumbled overnight.

In practically all German states the troops were sworn in on the constitution, a popular militia was conceded in many cases, and in one state, "Baden," the standing army was democratized,

Since its institution in 1814 the Landwehr system had never been adapted to the growing manpower of the country. Its yearly contingent of recruits still stood at 40,000 at a time when the population had risen from eleven to eighteen millions and the class yearly available for conscription to 155,000. Under the circumstances universal conscription had become almost a farce.

In the mobilization of 1850, men who had once been conscripted and trained were called up for service long after they had passed their military prime, while thousands of much younger men who had escaped conscription were left at home. This inadequate exploi- tation of the country's manpower was more intolerable since the

Landwehr had failed to fulfill its expectations during the mobilization of 1850. The more mature outlook of the Landwehr men, which had been counted upon to offset their lack of youthful elasticity, had merely served to accentuate their lack of discipline and non- military spirit. Its officers, chosen up to- the grade of captain mainly from the ranks of the one year volunteers, could not in many ways compare with the regular officers of the line. The result was that the Landwehr, when it had been called to the colors, had proved completely unequal to the demands made upon it, and by its intimate combination with the standing army

-5- threatened to reduce the efficiency of that force also.

To remedy this the king saw no other way than to abolish the dualism of the standing army and the Landwehr,--the Landwehr to

be transformed into a reserve entrusted with secondary duties in the rear; the standing army to be greatly strengthened, both by being considerably enlarged and by being allotted five instead of two classes of reservists; and the Landwehr to be reduced from

seven to four classes, embracing the men from twenty-nine to thirty-

two years of age. During the Franco-Austrian 'Tar :Prussia mobilized nine army corps. The deficiencies of the dualism again became ap- parent,--for example 55,000 married men were called to the colors while 155,000 younger men escaped service. To correct this, the king submitted to.the Liberal Landtag the project of a law authorizing an increase of the yearly contingent from 40,000 to 63,000 in the standing army, the establishment of thirty-nine new regiments, and increasing the length of service in the standing army to three years,--thus increasing the striking efficiency of the standing army.

To the king and his collaborators the issue appeared a simple technical problem,--the restoration of the military strength of

Prussia by means best adapted to that purpose. But their project seemed to the Liberal majority controlling the Landtag to contain military implications, which immediately aroused their apprehension and opposition. The Landwehr had long been the favorite child of Liberalism. Legend had magnified its very creditable achievements, until in the popular imagination it completely outshone the standing army. In contrast to the latter, which was regarded with suspicion as the instrument of the ruler and of reaction, the

Landwehr was acclaimed as the true citizens' force. Its officer corps, drawn chiefly from the classes that formed the backbone of the Liberal movement, was felt to be a guarantee against the possibility of its being misused as an instrument of internal repres- sion. The Landtag made its acceptance of the plan dependent upon -6i- the reduction of the period of service from three to two years and when that was refused, rejected the law. A compromise was attempted but the king refused to go below three years in the required period of service. In his opinion only such prolonged training could instill in the soldier the necessary discipline and military spirit. When no compromise could be reached, the Landtag cut the appropriation for the reorganization out of the budget, thus raising the fundamental issue of whether or not the king's prerogative entitled him to undertake the reorganization without the necessary authorization of law and the appropriation of the necessary funds by the Landtag. The conflict over the reorganization of the army developed into a fundamental trial of strength between the king and the Liberal Landtag.

ERA OF B3L0OD AND IRON

At this critical moment, Otto Von Bisrnark was induced to become chancellor. Declaring himself ready to carry on in sup- port of the king, he proceeded to reorganize-the army, regardless of opposition, and proceeded to enter into a desperate struggle with the infuriated Landtag. Fully aware that a great European policy could not be carried through with a standing army of 200,000 and 400,000 Landwehr, Bismark immediately began a reorganization of the army that was to last until World War I with but slight modification. The yearly contingent of recruits was increased to

63,000, the period of liability to serve in the active army, reserve, and Landwehr was increased to forty-five years. Within four years of his taking over the reins, the Prussian Army was rejuvenated, homogeneous, and efficient. Embarking upon a policy of blood and iron, he united the German States under Prussia.

Victorious campaigns over the Danes, French, and Austrians endowed the army with a popularity such as it had never enjoyed before.

Converting all Prussia into a vast military organization, he applied the whole intelligence of the nation, either directly or indirectly, to military affairs. To this end he geared industry,

-7- commerce, taxation, and agriculture,--in fact almost every phase of national life. So completely did he center the interests of the Prussian State in the arry that it can be said Prussia of that period was not a state that possessed an army, but an army that possessed a state.

As the social prestige of the officers increased to an absurd extent, the middle classes and aristocracy and the sons of finan- ciers and industrialists, who had held aloof from the army, began to press in increasing numbers for admittance into ranks; while the civilian aimed at being at least connected with it as a reserve officer.

The popularity of the arry ensured that its needs received favorable consideration in the Reichstag. The power of the Liberals was broken by discrediting them before the nation as 'enemies of the army."

The military monarchy of the Hohenzollerns was firmly established and the victorious course of democracy was checked in its march across Europe until World War I.

THE~ PRUSSIAN OFFICER AND NON-CQMiMISSIONED OFFICER

OF THE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

One of the main achievements of the reform of the nineteenth century was the breaking down of the obsolete prejudice by which the officers' ranks had been almost exclusively reserved to the nobly born and the substitution of an examination and selection by the officers' corps of a unit. These efforts of the Liberal reformers to broaden the social bases of the Prussian officers' corps, like all the Liberal achievements, were to a large extent destroyed again during the long years of reaction. During the wars of liberation the officers' corps had experienced a large influx of bourgeois elements who preferred to stay in the army at the end of hostilities rather than go back to a civilian profession. The result was that for a time the balance between noble and non-noble elements became almost equal. In the subsequent period of reaction these volunteer elements of greatly varying quality and antecedents were gradually eliminated and the aristo- cratic character of the officers' corps was re-established.

Bismark's unification of the German States led to a far- reaching assimilation of the officers of the smaller contingents to the Prussian model. At the same time the Prussian officers' corps underwent a profound change which began with Bismark's reorganization of the army. The extens:ion of the circles from which the officers' corps was allowed to select its members resulted in the bourgeois elements rising from thirty-five percent in 1860 to seventy percent in 1913.

The second great social development within the Prussian Army during the nineteenth century was the accentuation of the class line between the officers on one hand and the non-commissioned officers and the rank and file on the other. The gulf between the upper and lower orders became more pronounced, and the possibility

of a man's rising to a commission more remote, The mass of the people had to serve two or three years according to the term of service in force, and during that time could enlist voluntarily for a further period of three years, often extended to twelve years in all. They could rise to the rank of non-commissioned officer and in particularly lucky cases to that of sergeant major.

After twelve years of service these non-commissioned officers were normally dismissed and placed in suitable positions as subordinate officials in the constabulary, the postal service, and other similar places. While the old type of lifelong non-commissioned officer of the eighteenth century disappeared, the non-commissioned officer of the nineteenth century developed into a special body below the officers' corps, ranking socially with the rank and file, and with no hope in time of peace of rising from the one to the other. In time of wart the promotion to commissioned rank for bravery in the field was never entirely dropped, but became more and more rare in practice, as the difference in social status made the assimilation

-9- of those promoted more difficult. Even after the wars against

Napoleon, officers thus promoted had to go through a one year's course and pass a special examination. Many resigned voluntarily as they did not think themselves capable of serving as officers.

In the wars of unification such promotions were infinitely rarer, and of the twenty-eight non-commissioned officers promoted in the field in 1864 and 1866, one-quarter had.left the service in

1867 and of the rest only a handful seems to have carried, on and risen to higher positions,

Thus we find an almost impassable gulf separating the officers and non-commissioned officers, a development that was to acquire great significance during World War I.

GONCLU.I ON

The Prussian systemof universal service, with its hardships, discipline, and privations, did much to instill in the Prussian the nationalism that was to withstand the surge of democratic ideals that swept Murope in the nineneenth century. It provided the leaders with the necessary forces to realize the dream of centuries, a unification of the German States.

The effective system of universal service, in conjunction with the effective mobilization of the nation's resources, was to pro- vide Prussia (Germany) with a large, trained, and efficient army, extensively used by its leaders in exerting Prussian influence in international politics.

-10- Annex 1 DIRECTIVE

C0vI6vkD AND GENEJAL STAFF COL-'GE.

DEPARTMENT OF OE RATINS AND TRAINING

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

22 November 1948

MONOGRPH SUBJECT NUMBE.R 2-54

Regular Cpurse, Phase V, 1948-49

STUDENT MPhail, Thomas D., Lt Col, Inf 030613 (Name) 'Rank) ( ASN

FACULPTY ADVISOR Howard P. Drsons Jr Rm 212 Sheridan 4184 Tame Lt Col Bldg & Rm No . Tel No)

SUBJECT: Military Organization: The Prussian System of Universal Service, 19th and early 20th Centuries.

REFERENCES : 'Cambridge Modern'History, X, 415-417; XI, 265, 290-291, 409-411, 489, 579-50, 623-624;- I, 59-61, 96-97, 233-2340PMaud, "tConscription"t, Brittannic, llth1ncclopeia Ed;lRosinski, The German Arm , pp 80-139; xVagts, The istory of Militarism, p0 163-38;IErgang, The Potsdam Fuhrer: Frederi l iTm I Father of Prussian Militarism; Ransome, ed., "Military Training: Compulsory or Volunteer Proceedings of'the Aca- demnyof Political Science, July, l916, Nickerson, The Armed Horde, 17 9 9; .eukem, Social and Political Aspects of Conscription: Europe's Experience, '"Military Affairs, Spring, 1941; ' Colby, "Army", Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; .Colby, "Conscription", 'ibid; Colby, "Military Training", ibid; Colby, "Militia", ibid; olby, "Con- scription in Modern Form", Infantry Journal, June, l9 Avon der Coltz, The Nation in Arms, pp 13-3O

NOTE TO STUDENTS :

1. The references above are furnished to give the student enough material with which to begin his research. It is anticipated that the student will make use of all other available sources in order to give adequate scope to his subject and, when appropriate, to complete dvel- opment of the subject to date.

2. The scope suggested below is intended as a guide only, and is not to be construed as a limitation on the student's perusal of the subject. SCOPE 1. Territorial basis.

2. Active army and reserves; numbers and terms of service; exemptions and special privileges.

3. The professional officers' corps as a continuous training mechanism.

4. Economic and social aspects.

Annex 1 Annex 2 BBTBIOGRAPY

Ji. Rosinski, Herbert, The German Army. Washington: The

Infantry Journal, 1944.

~. Vagts, Alfred, The History of Militarism. New York: W. W.

Norton and Company, 1937.

/3. Frgang, Robert, The Potsdam Fuhrer. New York: Columbia

University Press, 1941,

4. Nickerson, Hoffman, The Armied Horde. New York: G. P. 'Putmam and Sons, 1940.

5. Montross, Lynn, War Through the Ages. New York: Harper and

Brothers, 1944.

6. Spaulding, Oliver, Warfare., New York: Harcourt Brace and

Company, 1925.

7. Mitchell, William, Outlines of World's Military History.

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Co., 1931.

8. Phillips, Thomas, Frederick the Great, Instructions for His

Generals. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Pub-

lishing Co., 1944.

, 9. Von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms. London: Hugh Rees,

Limited, 1906.

110. tConscription. " The Encyclopedia Brittannica, 1945. Vol. 6.

/11. Colby, Elbridge, "Army", "Conscription", "Military Training",

"Militia"'. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1931.

4 12. Cambridge Modern History, 1911. Vol. VIII, pp. 330-337;

Vol. IX, pp. 272-287, pp. 409-411, pp. 579-580; Vol. XII,

pp. 134-173.

Annex 2