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A Ben A Howeii Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 313.761-4700 800.521-0600 RENDERING TO CAESAR: SECULAR OBEDIENCE AND CONFESSIONAL LOYALTY IN MORITZ OF SAXONY'S DIPLOMACY ON THE EVE OF THE SCMALKALDIC WAR

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By James E. McNutt, B.A., M.A., M.Div.

Ohio State University 1995

Dissertation Committee Approved by James Kittelson John Rule Advisor John Guilmartin epartment of History UMI Number: 9544639

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by James McNutt 1995 In Memory of Helen Eva McNutt: 1924-1994 Virginia Ashby Postlethwait: 1925-1983

ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish, to thank Dr. James M* Kittelson for his guidance and support throughout my graduate studies. Many thanks to Dr. John C. Rule and Dr. John Guilmartin for their assistance while serving on my dissertation committee. I am grateful to the Center for Reformation

Research in St. Louis, Missouri, particularly Ann Thomas, for accomodating my travel schedule; also Dr. Ingeborg Vogelstein and Colgate Rochester Divinity School in Rochester, New York, for granting access to their Reformation manuscript collection. I wish also to express my sincere gratitude to the members and friends of the Price Hill United Methodist Church for their patience and support, especially Mrs. Kathy Maldonado for her generous assistance. Finally, I thank Dr. Michael Peterson, who instilled a dream; Rev. Robert Woods, whose timely counsel preserved it; and my wife Cyndy, whose love nurtured it. Thanks Mike and Katie. This work is dedicated to my mother and mother-in-law, whose love and support prior to their untimely deaths became a source of eternal encouragement.

iii VITA

June 2, 1955...... Born, Huntsville, Ontario Canada 1977...... *...... B.A. Roberts Wesleyan college Rochester, New York 1980-87...... Pastor, Genesee Conference, Free Methodist Church Belfast & Lockport, New York 1987...... M.A. Theology, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, Rochester, New York 1987-92...... Pastor, West Ohio Conference, United Methodist Church New Carlisle, Ohio

1989...... M.Div. United Theological Seminary, Dayton, Ohio 1989-1992...... Graduate Associate, Department of History, Ohio State University 1992-present...... Pastor, West Ohio Conference, United Methodist Church, Cincinnati, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History Studies in Early Modern Europe,..Dr. James Kittelson Dr. John Rule Studies in Medieval Europe Dr. Joseph Lynch Studies in Military History...... Dr. John Guilmartin TABLE 07 CONTENTS

DEDICATION...... ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... *...... iii VITA...... *...... iv ABBREVIATIONS...... vi INTRODUCTION...... 1 CHAPTER PAGE I. HERITAGE AND HERESY, COURTS AND .... 27 CONFESSIONS: MORITZ'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

II. THE LINE IN THE SAND: ...... 9 2 MORITZ'S ROAD TO REGENSBURG III. THE ALBERTINE PROTESTANT: 134 MORITZ AT REGENSBURG IV. CALL TO RESISTANCE: ...... 16 3 THE PAMPHLET WAR V. RENDERING TO GOD: 217 MORITZ AND THE CLERGY VI. RENDERING TO CAESAR: 271 JUSTIFICATION FOR INVASION CONCLUSION ...... 315 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 325

v . ABBREVIATIONS

ADB Allaemeine deutsche Bioaraphie. Leipzig, 1890-1924. CR Corpus Reformatorum. Edited by Carolus Gottleib Bretschneider and Henricus Ernestus Bindseil. 99 Bd. Halle 1834-1860. Hortleder Hortleder, Friedrich. Per Romisichen und Konialichen Maiesteten auch dess heiligen Roroischen Reichs aeistlicher und weltlicher Stande. Churfuersten. Fuersten. Graven. Herrn....Handlunaen und Ausschreiben etc, Von RechtmassjgXeit. Anfang, Fort, und endlich Ausgang dess Teutschen Krieas Kaiser Karl dess fuenfften. wider die Schmalkaldische Bunds. Obersten. Chur, und Fursten Sachsen und Hessen. Gotha: Wolfgang Endters, 1645.

NDB Neue Deutsche Bioaraphie. Berlin, 1953- PKMS Politische Korrespondenz des Herzogs und Kurfuersten Moritz von Sachsen. Hrsg. Erich Brandenburg. Bd. 1: Bis Ende 1543. Leipzig, 1900. Bd. 2: 1544-1546. Leipzig, 1904. Bd. 3. 1 Januar 1547 - 25 Mai 1548. Hrsg. Johannes Herrmann und Gunther Wartenberg. Berlin, 1978.

St. L. Dr. Martin Luthers Saemmtliche Schriften. Hrsg. Johann Georg Walch. St. Louis: Concordia, 1881-1910.

WA D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausoabe. Weimar, 1883-

WA Br D. Martin Luthers Werke. Brief- wechsel. Weimar, 1930- INTRODUCTION

On the nineteenth of June, 1546, a high level councilor in the court of Moritz of Saxony reported from Regensburg to the duchess of Rochlitz of a massive influx of mercenaries in that city. Of special concern to the nervous informer was the rumor that some of the troops had, in a frenzy, drunk their blood as a vow to lay waste to the land.1 Three days later John Frederick, Elector of Saxony and co-commander of the forces of the Schmalkaldic League, informed his brother that such military preparations targeted the adherents of the Augsburg Confession, and requested that he call the churches throughout his territory to ardent prayer

for divine protection.1 Throughout the spring such reports of gathering troops and threatened bloodshed had fed a growing tension and fear throughout Germany. Emperor Charles V had returned to German soil, and rumors were rampant that hoards of his Spanish troops were soon to follow. The issue, as proclaimed from pulpits and published in pamphlets, was religion. The controversies of faith

1 2 and doctrine, obedience to conscience and God, and the locus of true spiritual authority, were no longer matters simply debated by preachers, priests, and popes, but issues woven into political threats and backed by military preparation. On the social spectrum, reaching from rural dorf to imperial and papal court, matters of faith became matters of the sword, and squarely in the middle of this impending conflict stood a twenty-five year old prince, Moritz of Saxony. This young prince of the Albertine line cut a rather intriguing and dynamic figure against the backdrop of the later Reformation movement in Saxony. Two contradictory epithets mark Moritz's legacy, testifying to the sharply divided impressions made on his contemporaries. Vilified as the "Judas of

Meissen," and regarded as a traitor to the Lutheran cause, he was yet honored by many after his death as the "Savior of German Protestantism." How ironic that a prince who has been classified as "Machiavellian, and interpreted almost exclusively along political lines, should bear the weight of two so emphatically religious titles. 3

This dissertation seeks to explore the political and social context of Moritz's public expression of religious loyalty on the eve of what would become known as the Schmalkaldic War of 1546-47. It is significant that a prince so hated by many of his contemporary Lutheran subjects continually professed his allegiance to the Augsburg Confession, and justified his actions during the tense summer of 154 6 on grounds fully sympathetic to the teachings and defense of that confession. As an Albertine prince, Moritz knew himself invested with certain rights and responsibilities on both the imperial and territorial level, and matters of ecclesiastical policy had a prominent place within the purview of his rule. His diplomacy cannot be adequately grasped apart from how this Albertine heritage interfaced with the Lutheran movement within his land, and close attention to his political correspondence provides insight into how he sought to justify his actions precisely within that context.

No attempt will be made to explore Moritz's deeper motives, or evaluate the sincerity of his religious statements. Moritz may indeed have acted out of greed and self-interest, but, as Heiko Oberman reminds us, it is safely assumed that self-interest belongs to the 4

constant forces in history. The question with Moritz is how his self-interest was channeled, controlled, and legitimated.1' Beginning with his negotiations at Regensburg with Charles V in June of 1546, and extending through the summer and into the early fall, this study concludes with Moritz's defense and justification of his invasion and occupation of his cousin, John Frederick's territory. How did those involved in the Schmalkaldic War legitimize their positions? Was the war a question of unconstitutional rebellion, as Charles V had it, or, as his antagonists maintained, an issue of religion? What role did religious confessions play in the struggle, and how did Moritz articulate his responsibilities to Charles V and Ferdinand, and, conversely, with regard to Saxony? The issue of a Christian's duty to obey one's sovereign touched Moritz in two directions: first, with his imperial responsibities to Charles V, and second, with his own demands for obedience from his subjects regarding ducal policy. Moritz's public legitimation for Albertine Saxony's position on the eve of the war rested squarely on the confessional demand to render obedience to legitimate authority. As a territorial prince with final say in ecclesiastical matters, Moritz 5

sought strict correlation between his policies and expressions of loyalty and support from the pulpits throughout his land* The period of time covered by this dissertation encompassed an attempt by a

Reformation prince to utilize his territorial church as a tool of propaganda for political policy. However, particular constraints confronted Moritz as he attempted to communicate his position throughout his territory.

Questions of Moritz's character and motivation aside, his public behavior, especially his intense confessional defense, speaks to issues concerning new approaches to Reformation studies. Until recently, research has concerned itself with theological themes and issues, concentrating on the doctrinal conflicts

and writings of the early movement and the great reformers. How the new reforming principles

restructured sixteenth century society received little

attention. Pronounced scrutiny of the first decade of reform has given way to the exploration of aspects of

the later movement, with scholars focusing on the long term impact on the ecclesiastical, political, economic, and social institutions of the day.5 Moritz's activity during the period covered by this study sheds light on 6 the political nature of the later reform movement in Saxony.

At base this study will also challenge certain trends in much of contemporary scholarship* During the last few decades Reformation research has shifted its focus to the contextual structures and social factors of the period. This tendency has been invaluable in shining light on areas previously ignored or considered irrelevant. A manifestation of this trend is the shift from examining the leaders of movements to those being addressed. More specifically, the emphasis has moved from stressing the actions and words of those who led, be they reforming churchmen or princes, to the "common man," and his popular environment. The result of this historiographical shift is a devaluation of the actions of the "elite." It is argued that the attitudes and convictions of the leaders, such as Luther,

Melanchthon, and "converted" princes, did not effectively reach down and change beliefs on the popular level.1’ Hence, in reporting the convictions of the elite one has not yet really touched the essence of history, which is the convictions and actions of the masses.7 In sum, the Reformation becomes "top heavy," and its implementation in society viewed as a forced imposition by elitist authority. The relevance of 7 confessional beliefs asserted by newly founded churches are in turn minimized, and relegated to the little esteemed field of church history. As a result, when the Reformation is viewed from the political perspective, specifically on a territorial level, one is presented with a picture of a passive population suffering "imposed" religion from manipulating princes busily constructing their modern bureaucratic states.* One cannot deny that much research in the past, whether political or theological, placed undue emphasis on the ideas of the leaders independent from the context of their situation. Bernd Moeller was correct in his trenchant criticism of the common description of

Luther as the "spiritual colosus, who attains his Reformation breakthrough, draws the broad consequences, and then drags people with him as he strides through history..."9 Such methods contributed, however unwittingly, to the view that reform was "imposed" from above, and not really a substantive factor in the lives of the common people. There is little question that the life and political activity of Moritz of Saxony has been, for the most part, studied and interpreted in this fashion.

Yet is it possible, in light of the important advances in contextual studies, to reexamine the words and 8

activities of the leading figures with a refocused eye to social factors that might have influenced their

actions? In other words, attention should be directed

to what prominent individuals actually did within the context of their time, focusing on the reasons they

themselves gave for acting in a particular manner. The question is whether one can locate within the written record a reflection of constraining factors which shaped the actions of the central figures. Were there perceptions on the part of the "elite” of consciously held convictions rising up from the broader level of society which motivated them to respond in a particular manner?1" Portrayed as a purely political animal, and elevated above the social turmoil created by the birth

and maturation of new religious institutions in the empire, Moritz allegedly placed political gain above all and trampled over anything or anybody who stood in his path. His assumed lack of religious principles, coupled with accusations of greed and betrayal, shaped

his popular legacy." Moritz scholarship, especially after the advent of the Rankean school, dealt with their subject almost exclusively within the context of imperial politics, with religious issues minimized or set to the side.12 Characterized as an independent 9

manipulator who used everyone about him as instruments of his will, the young Albertine's reign was generally

portrayed as calculating, unscrupulous, and deceitful. Seemingly elevated above the contingencies and uncertainies of imperial politics, Moritz became the "master of all intrigues."15

Erich Brandenburg's biographical work did much to

eradicate the notion of Moritz as the self-sufficient master statesman by emphasizing the influence of his distinctly Albertine counselors, and the prince's vulnerability to the vicissitudes of Reformation politics. Based on the most thorough examination of the archives to date, Brandenburg established that the young duke's reign, far from the calculated unfolding of a preset agenda, was one of continual adaptation to changing circumstances.14

Though Brandenburg succeeded in revealing the importance of Moritz's Albertine heritage, and firmly placed him in the swift and unpredictable current of sixteenth century imperial politics, his emphasis on historical and social contingency focused narrowly on political maneuvers on the territorial and imperial level. What of Moritz's relationship to the budding church in his territory? What were the implications of the new confession on Moritz's domestic and imperial 10

policy? For Brandenburg and his precursors the issue remained secondary, due to the axiomatic assertion of Moritz's apathetic disposition toward religious questions.15 The work of Simon Xssleib, a contemporary and constant antagonist to Brandenburg, provided a solid challenge to the long standing presupposition of Moritz's confessional indifference.16 Issleib devoted his life to exploring nearly every aspect of Moritz's career with an emphasis on presenting him as an evangelical prince. Though perhaps asserting more than could be critically proven regarding Moritz's confessional disposition, Issleib made a valuable contribution to our knowledge of Moritz's involvement in ecclesiastical matters. Guenther Wartenberg's recent monograph on

Albertine church policy during the formative years of 1541—1546 has convincingly dispelled the myth of Moritz's apathy in ecclesiastical matters. The dean of recent Moritz studies, Wartenberg argued that the young prince took not only an active interest in the development of his territorial church, but did so as a self-conscious Lutheran.17 He argued that Moritz's ecclesiastical measures during the years from 1541-1546 revealed an agenda shaped by his Albertine heritage and 1]

genuine religious concerns. According to Wartenberg, this policy found confirmation with Moritz's declaration to the Estates in July, 1547, that as a Christian elector he would remain faithful to the true religion and the Augsburg Confession.11 His promise found concrete expression in the reopening of the University of Wittenberg, and, later, his refusal to implement the emperor's interim.19 Nestled as it was between the period of church building and the July 1547 pronouncement, Moritz's political posturing during the summer of 154 6 provided the ironic twist to his legacy. Despite professed loyalty and support for the Lutheran church, in June

Moritz entered into an alliance with Charles V, a move which effectively neutralized him in the coming conflict and incurred the wrath of clergy within his territory. Precisely in this context his political correspondence reveals how Moritz attempted to justify his decision and implement his policy toward the emperor throughout his territory. Though Moritz understood and presented himself as a loyal Lutheran, many of his actions were based, by his own correspondence, on constraints that transcended his own personal convictions. 12

Moritz's decision has most commonly been

interpreted as simple political opportunism at the expense of religious integrity. However, within these negotiations and in the weeks that followed he continually swore allegiance to the Augsburg

Confession, arguing that his lawful obedience to the

emperor should not be seen as precluding his loyalty to that teaching. Further, one senses from Moritz's own testimony the necessity of such a confession on his part for political stability within Albertine Saxony. The leaders of the League, together with many Lutheran theologians and pastors called for active resistance against the emperor's perceived attack on the adherents to the Augsburg Confession. As a harsh rhetoric evolved, drawing a sharp confessional line between those who would seek to destroy the gospel and those who would rise to its defense, Albertine political policy compelled Moritz to attempt first to stem the tide of such talk within his lands, and then eventually defend his faith in a lengthy apology.

These two endeavors form the content of the study at hand. The Schmalkaldic War produced a violent collision of many of the leading figures of mid-century Europe:

Charles V, his brother Ferdinand, the papacy, Philip of 13

Hesse, the Elector John Frederick, and many more. Being the first European war on German soil,20 the strategy and tactics of the conflict were a grim harbinger of bloodshed to come in the following

century. At the heart of the matter was rebellion. For the Catholic emperor it was ostensibly an issue of

constitutional disobedience and the need for order. Conversely, his Protestant opponents argued that it was a matter of true faith. Was the Schmalkaldic War then simply a war of religion?

Konrad Repgen's examination of the problematic nature of classifying a military conflict as a "religious war," provides a valuable conceptual framework for this study since it establishes a credible historiographical method which takes seriously the stated religious convictions revolving around the

Schmalkaldic War. Repgen rightly pointed out that from the perspective of causality and motives of the participants, it is virtually impossible to attain any solid historical foundation for asserting a "religious" conflict.The causes for any confrontation which escalates into armed conflict are far too numerous to subsume under the rubric of "religion,” and it is obvious that the historian cannot discern the motives behind an individual's actions, much less a group. 14

Repgen approached the question from the perspective of the western European norm, at least after the twelfth century, that war should only be waged by Christian's as a "just war." From this premise he examined how protagonists legitimated their military action from a religious standpoint. For Repgen "Reliaionskrieg. 11 or war of religion, should be seen as a credible historical tool for the classification of a particular conflict, assuming that the historian ceases "to inquire chiefly and from the outset into the motives of the protagonists concerned, and ...[proceeds]...instead from the concrete legitimation in each case."” In sum, his thesis argues that wars could be termed "Reliqionskrieo" as long as one of the belligerents laid claim to "religion, a religious law, in order to justify his warfare and to substantiate publicly... his use of military force..."*5 This method is especially relevant with respect to

Moritz since the very process of confessional legitimation on the part of the Schmalkaldic leaders, together with their theologians and pastors, jeopardized his attempt to conjoin his confessed religious loyalty with constitutional responsibilities to the emperor. 15

The speculation, tension, and fear, which gripped Germany in the summer of 154 6 War gave rise to a flood of popular propaganda in both pamphlet and song. If Martin Luther was a "media personality," as one scholar aptly asserted,3'* then the Schmalkaldic War might be fairly described as a "media event." In turn, if the

popular medium was, as Oscar Waldeck wrote, the "choir

which accompanied the players on the political stage", then pamphlet literature gives us a glimpse at the popular unrest facing Moritz, and how in turn he sought to justify himself before his subjects. Moritz and his

advisors knew the power and influence of this popular medium, and they not only kept abreast of it, but also

attempted to use it for their own purposes.35

Confronted upon his return from Regensburg by a media assault on the emperor and pope, which called for righteous resistance against those who would destroy the faith, Moritz found himself forced to defend his

Lutheran loyalty against accusations of treason and apostasy. The full weight of resistance theories which had developed within the Protestant camp over the previous fifteen years were brought to bear on the defense of the true gospel. Yet Moritz countered with the equally Lutheran conviction that in matters not touching the faith one must render to Caesar that which 16 is Caesar's. The issue centered on Charles* intentions and the purpose for the conflict. Charles spoke publicly only of constitutional rebellion while the

League cried out against an attack on their faith. Moritz's defense may be viewed from two perspectives. On one hand it is important to remember that he vigorously legitimized his actions within the context of his loyalty to the Lutheran faith, and it is historically significant to examine how this prince with such a tarnished confessional reputation actually articulated his religious convictions during the time his reputation suffered most.36 Historians and theologians who view Moritz's actions during the summer of 1546 and see nothing but wanton greed and apathy for the future of Protestantism, might ask how much their perspective is conditioned by the later events of the Interims and

Gnesio-Lutheran attacks. Mark Edwards has reminded us that "to live in the middle of great events is to live in confusion,"37 meaning that the intentions of the participants and the outcome of the events, which from our perspective seem so obvious, were not so to those struggling day to day. What is known to us now, and from the safe distance of time has been analyzed and categorized, was not clear to the participants of the 17

time, especially a young prince whose primary responsibility was the preservation of his territory.

Secondly, with issues of state discussed and defended in such an intense religious manner, it is appropriate to examine the political and social factors contributing to why Moritz felt compelled to argue in such a manner. Evidence, at least from his own words, points to the necessity of effectively relating to the perceived convictions of his subjects in order to avoid open rebellion. Tne very public religious legitimation for war by the Protestant pamphleteers, and the apparent popular response for that cause on the part of the general population, appeared to validate the prince's concerns. Yet beyond his perception of the connection between confessional integrity and public peace, lay the matter of his actual success, or failure, in propagating his stated convictions.

Precisely at this point domestic social factors appear to have impinged upon Moritz's imperial policies. Such becomes evident through an examination of

Moritz's relationship to his territorial Lutheran clergy. His struggle to bring the Albertine pulpits into line with his political policies raises questions concerning the validity of recent historiographical generalizations regarding the Reformation and the rise 18

of the modern territorial state, most notably, assertions that churches were simply instruments of

princely aggrandizement.28 Statements by some scholars regarding the early modern princes' capacity to utilize the Reformation for their own ends essentially substitutes the prince in the defunct Luther caricature of one who "attains his Reformation breakthrough, draws the broad consequences, and then drags people with him as he strides through history. "2J There is no question that Moritz sought to control the clergy during the summer of 1546, yet, on the basis of his complaints, he appeared to fail. If such a scenario can be adequately substantiated from Moritz's testimony and activity, then recent historical generalizations concerning the relative passivity of the German population and the manipulative power of territorial princes may need modification.

The Protestant Reformation witnessed the establishment of new churches, with confessions aimed at shaping the belief and behavior of entire populations. These endeavors contributed to a process of ecclesiastical and social change which did in fact mold the course of European history. Put simply, new institutions arose which were grounded in the expression of religious truth.w Resilient 19 institutional frameworks were already present in the 1540's, and these new structures played a key role in the course of events during this decade. Moritz of Saxony appears to have bumped into this nascent institution. The Albertine Lutheran church was certainly under his formal authority, yet, as we examine his relationship with his pastors during this volatile summer what is seen of dictatorial control over passive leaders? Moritz's actions reflected a tension between his political activity and the position of the church. Moritz self-consciously worked within limits set by the Augsburg confession, yet to what degree did the followers of that confession, be they clergy, secular nobles, or, at significant times, the common citizen, influence Moritz's political stance in imperial matters? ENDNOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. PKMS, 2, p. 669.

2. John Frederick’s June 22, 1546 letter to John Ernest is published in Zeitschrift fuer Wissenschaftliche Theoloaie 50 (1908), pp. 533-534.

3. For a contemporary account see Roger Ascham, "Report of the Affaires and State of Germany." In Enal ish VJorks of Rocrer Ascham. ed. William Addis Wright. (Cambridge,1904), pp. 153-169. Lewis W. Spitz, The Renaissance and Reformation Movements: Volume 2. The Reformation. (St. Louis: Concordia, 1971), p. 377.

4. For this understanding of self-interest in history see Heiko A. Oberman, The Impact of the Reformation: Essays by Heiko A. Oberman. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), p. 181.

5. James M. Kittelson, "The Confessional Age: The Late Reformation in Germany." In Reformation Europe a Guide to Research. Ed. Steven Ozment. (St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1982), pp. 361-381.

6. This approach is stated succinctly by Gerald Strauss, "A century of Protestantism had brought about little or no change in the common religious conscience and in the ways in which ordinary men and women conducted their lives. Given people's nebulous grasp of the substance of their faith, no meaningful distinction could have existed between Protestants and Catholics - a distinction arising from articulated belief, conscious attachment, and self-perception.” Gerald Strauss, Luther’s House of Learning. (Baltimore: 1978), p . 299.

7. Kittelson, "Confessional Age," p. 367. See also Oberman, Impact, pp. 203-204.

8. A leading Reformation historian exemplifies this type of thinking with the assertion that well into the second half of the sixteenth century no more than ten percent of the the German population ever showed an "active or lasting enthusiasm for reformed ideas." A corollary argument to this view is that the majority of converts were "'involuntary Protestants' created by the 21

princes' confessional choices." Robert Scribner, The German Reformation. Studies in European History. (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 34. Much of Scribner's work is an expansion of this position. See also the conclusion to his essay, "Incombustible Luther," in Popular Culture and Popular Movements. (London: Hambledon Press, 1987), p. 353. "Gerald Strauss suggested a few years ago that we should re-evaluate the presumed success of the Reformation at the grass roots, arguing that it seemed to have made little real impact among the masses.... Our study of "incombustible Luther" suggests that the Reformation was neither as radical nor as successful a break with the past as traditional historiography has led us to believe."

9. See Bernd Moeller's essay, "Problems of Reformation Research," in Imperial Cities and the Reformation: Three Essays. Ed. and Trans, by H. C. Erik Midelfort and Mark U. Edwards Jr. (Durham: Laybrinth Press, 1982), pp. 3-16, for quote, p. 13. 10. Kittelson raises this issue within the context of the formation of the Formula of Concord, asking whether it was possible "...that the political security of the evangelical towns and principalities was thought to be so closely tied to adherance to the Augustana that the politicians felt themselves severly limited in the range of political decisions they could make on confessional matters?" "Confessional Age" p. 369. This question recently received a resounding affirmative response in Bodo Nischan's treatment of the Second Reformation in Brandenburg, where the "common people" were shown to have played a significant role in compelling the Hohenzollern electors to compromise their confessional agenda. See Bodo Nischan, Prince, People, and Confession: The Second Reformation in Brandenburg. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1994), p. 4.

11. "...Maurice was less influenced perhaps by religious motives than any other Prince of the age; and he poured scorn on those who thought that the interests of the State should be subordinate to theological dogma."; A. F. Pollard, "Religious War in Germany." in The Cambridge Modern History, eds. A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothrero, Stanley Leathes (London: The Macmillan Company, 1904), p. 252.; "Moritz was an opportunist with no deep religious convictions. He spent too much of his boyhood in the courts of Albert of Mainz, Duke George, and John Frederick to have been left 22

unaffected. As might be expected, this sparkling-eyed lad turned into a keen, calculating politician, who at the beginning of the Schmalkaldic War joined the forces of the Emperor against the German Protestants until he had gained his objectives, then turned traitor to Charles V when it was his advantage to do so. Like most opportunists, Moritz had his little day. He was mortally wounded in the battle of Sievershausen and died on July 11, 1553." E- G. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times: The Reformation from a Hew Perspective. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), p. 85.; See also, Spitz, Reformation. p.377, where Moritz is simply refered to as "Machiavellian;" and Joseph Lortz, The Reformation in Germany. Vol. 2. Trans. Ronald Walls. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 295, where Moritz is characterized as "an unscrupulous Machiavel1ian." 12. As typified by the work of Maurenbrecher, Moritz's political actions were placed in the context of 19th century political struggles in Germany. Moritz represented the north German protestant nationalism which justly struck against the catholic imperialism of the Habsburgs. Hence the true roots of the heroic German national protestantism are found in the Saxon - Habsburg stuggle of the Reformation age. See, Wilhelm Maurenbrecher. "Kurfuerst Moritz von Sachsen" in Studien und Skizzen zur Geschichte der Reformationszeit. Leipzig, 1874. pp. 138-9.; Also Karl Erich Born, "Moritz von Sachsen und die Fuerstenverschworung gegen Karl V." Historische Ze itschrift. 191 (1961), p. 20.

13. Maurenbrecher summarized Moritz's political reign with the following: "vor allem, er war selbstaendig, unabhaendig: er dachte selbst, er entschied selbst, in entscheidendem Momente handelte er selbst: alle seine Diener und Raethe waren nur Werkzeuge und Mittel seines Willens.” Wilhelm Maurenbrecher, Zur Beurtheilung des Kurfuersten Moritz von Sachsen." Historische Zeitschrift 20 (1868), p. 337. Erich Brandenburg refered specifically to Wilhelm Maurenbrecher, Georg Voigt, Moritz von Sachsen: 1541-1547. (Leipzig, 1876), pp. 143-210; and Leopold von Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation. Bd. 4, 6th Auf. (Leipzig, 1882), pp 298-301, 324-326; when he asserted that, "Man hat die Politik des Herzogs als eine von Anfang an zielbewusste, durch und durch skrupellose und hi.nterlistge gezeichnet," and that based on the evidence it was erroneous to label him as "ein Meister aller Raenke." Erich Brandenburg, Moritz von Sachsen. Bd. 1: Bis zur Wittenberaer Kapitulation 1547. (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 489, 492.

14. From this research came not only the biography, but also the first and second volumes of Moritz's Political Correspondence. The appearance of these critical editions laid the foundation for much of this century's research. The publication history of the correspondence is a story in itself. Abandoning further research on Morit2 in order to pursue interests in 19th century studies, Brandenburg handed the work over to Oswald Hecker who ponderously labored for nearly four decades. Tragically, just as the material neared publication, much of the manuscript was destroyed in the Dresden fire bombing of February 14, 1945. Progress again lagged following the war, and upon Hecker's death in 1952, only notes and indexes remained. The matter was further complicated in that Hecker had worked alone, never training an assistant. In 1956 renewed efforts under the leadership of Franz Lau, Johannes Herrmann, and Guenther Wartenberg, led to the publication of volume three in 1978. 15. Brandenburg set the tone early in his biography when he wrote: "Aus dieser Jugendzeit...hat auch Herzog Moritz schon die religioese Gleichgueltigkeit mitgebracht, die stets ein Grundzug seines Wesens geblieben ist." Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 12.

16. The student of Georg Voigt, Issleib was a master archivalist. His work contains information and details culled from the archives at Bamberg, Dresden, Hannover, Koenigsberg, Copenhagen, Marburg, Munich, Weimar, Vienna, Wolfenbuettal, and Zerbst. In some of these cities portions of the archives were destroyed during World War II, leaving Issleib's work as the only remaining link. A collection of his life's work on Moritz has recently been reprinted and published in two volumes. See Aufsaetze und Beitraede zu Kurfuerst Moritz von Sachsen (1877-1907). 2 Banden. Hrsgb. Reiner Gross. (Leipzig: Zentralantiquariat der DDR, 1989). Though Issleib's most significant work on Moritz's involvement with the reform movement is, "Moritz von Sachsen als evangelischer Fuerst: 1541- 1553." pp. 993-1205, his essay, "Die Jugend Moritzens von Sachsen,” pp. 1-59, contains the sharpest polemic against Brandenburg's position, see especially pp. 4-5, 58-59. 24

17. Guenther Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft und Reformation: Moritz von Sachsen und die albertinischen Kirchenpolitik bis 1546. Ouellen und Forschuncien zur Reformationsqeschichte. Bd.55. (Guetersloh: Mohn, 1988.) See pp. 11-19, for an excellent historiographical overview of Moritz scholarship. For Moritz's loyalty to the church see p. 271. 18. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 271; declaration of July 13, 1547 found in PKMS. 3, p. 464.

19. Moritz never official iy accepted the Augsburg Interim, settling instead for the "Leipzig Interim," a controversial compromise from the hand of Helanchthon. See Robert Kolb, Confessing the Faith: Reformers Define the Church. 1530-1580. (St. Louis, Concordia Publishing, 1991), pp. 65-70.

20. Karl Brandi, Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of an Empire. Translated by C.V. Wedgewood (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 549.

21. Konrad Repgen, "What is a religious War."in Politics and Society in Reformation Europe, eds, E.I. Kouri and T. Scott (London, 1987), pp. 313-14. "...wars should only be termed Religionskriege, in so far as at least one of the belligerents lays claim to 'religion,' a religious law, in order to justify his warfare and to substantiate publicly why his use of military force against a political authority should be bellum iustum."....fwe should cease]"...to inquire chiefly and from the outset into the motives of the protagonists concerned, and..." [proceed] "...instead from the concrete legitimation in eachcase."

22. Repgen, "Religious War," p. 314.

23. Repgen, "Religious War," p. 313,

24. James M. Kittelson, Luther the Reformer: The Storv of the Man and His Career (Minneapolis: Augburg Publishing House, 1986), p. 13

25. Oskar Waldeck, "Die Publizistik des Schmalkaldischen Krieges.11 Archiv fuer Reformat ionsqeschichte VII (1909) p. 6.; A number of popular hymns are published in Rochus V. Liliencron, Hrsg. Die historischen Volkslieder der Deutschen vom 13 bis 16 Jahrhundert. Vierter Band. (Leipzig, 1869.) 2fi

26. This work should in no way be conceived as an attempt to "rehabilitate" Moritz. such presumption is avoided. Yet, this study approaches the events of 1546 from the context of the aged, yet relevant comment by Eyre Evans Crow: "Without seeking to deny the gross dissimulation of Maurice of Saxony, the accusations of gratuitous treachery against him may, in some degree, be met by proofs that his enmities, however made to harmonise with his interests, were conceived upon just grounds, and not feigned, or undertaken from mere ambition. Thus legitimate and long-existing causes of difference existed betwixt him and the captive elector whom he had ruined." Eyre Evans Crow, Eminent Foreign Statesmen. (London, 1833), p. 120. 27. Mark U. Edwards, Printing. Propaganda, and Martin Luther. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 64. 28. For leading proponents of princely manipulation see R. Po-Chia Hsia, Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550-1750. (London: Routledge, 1989) ; Peter Blickle, Communal Reformation: The Quest for Salvation in Sixteenth Century Germany. Trans. Thomas Dunlap (London: Humanities Press, 1992), pp. 193-201. Thomas A. Brady, Turning Swiss: Cities and Empire. 1450-1550. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); See also the work of Gerald Strauss and Robert Scribner noted above. For specific reference to Albertine Saxony and Moritz, see Karlheinz Blaschke, "Reformation and the Rise of the Territorial State" in Luther and the Modern State in Germany. Ed. James D. Tracy. (Kirksville: Sixteenth Century Studies, 1986), pp. 61-75. For a more balanced conclusion, see Euan Cameron, The European Reformation. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 267-272.; and Steven Ozment, Protestants: The Birth of a Revolution. (New York: Doubleday, 1992), pp. 28-29. To eradicate any notion that a "straw man" is being constructed, note the following comments by a most respected voice in Reformation scholarship, Heiko Oberman: "To summarize the prevailing failure thesis: after suffocating its own grassroots movement, the Reformation became a willing prey to the greedy princes; henceforth...the movement which started as a genuine popular campaign for spiritual renewal aborted in the Fuerstenreformat ion. a Reformation 'from above.'" In criticism of this assumption, and in a remark that bears directly on the scope of this study, Oberman states, "More misleading, however, is the suggestion 26

that the role of the Fuersten in the whole drama of the Reformation can be exhaustively described in terms of territorial expansionism under the mere pretext of piety and thirst for justice." Oberman, Impact. pp. 178, 180. 29. A notably example is Blaschke's statement that "war fuer Moritz die Reformation einfach ein Werk politischer Zweckmaessigkeit." See Karlheinz Blaschke, "Moritz von Sachsen," in Die Reformationzeit: 2. Hrsg. Martin Greschat (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1981), p. 300.

30. Kittelson, "Confessional Age." p. 362. C H A P T E R I

HERITAGE AND HERESY, COURTS AND CONFLICTS: MORITZ'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Emperor Charles V's decision for a military solution to his twenty-five year conflict with the Protestant rebels compelled him to seek settlements with several German princes regarding active aid or neutrality. The most significant target of this

endeavor was the young Wettin prince of Albertine

Saxony, Moritz. Charles' ability to bargain with this Lutheran prince, and blood relative to his primary

antagonists, John Frederick of Ernestine Saxony and

Philip of Hesse, lay in the complex history of Saxon territorial relations, together with the unfolding

implications the Reformation imposed on the divided

House of Wettin. How the new teachings played out in the rival territories of Albertine and Ernestine Saxony on both the domestic and imperial level formed the backdrop of the meetings and agreements at Regensburg.

2 7 28

Ernestine - Albertine Relations Prior to Luther For the first twenty years of intense reforming activity the Ernestine and Albertine branches of Saxony were bitter enemies. The religious friction between the territories was only one tangible expression of the deeply rooted, long-standing tension which existed between the houses.' The house of Wettin had slowly grown in power since the twelfth century by the medieval method of feud and marriage. Already firmly established in the areas of Thuringia and Mark Meissen, the eventual garnering of the duchies of Wittenberg and Belzig, together with the bestowal of electoral privilege in 1423, elevated the Wettins to the ranks of Germany's most powerful families. Enfeoffed with the Electorate of Saxony by emperor Sigismund for services rendered against the Hussites, by the middle years of the 15th century the Wettin family controlled large segments of land reaching to, and extending beyond the rivers Elbe in the east, and the Saale in the west.1 Containing some of the richest resources in Germany, these lands embraced large portions of the southwestern Thuringian forests, and the ore-laden Erzgebirge mountains to the southeast. 2 ‘J

The expanse and wealth of this territory necessitated Saxony's constant vigilance for political security with its neighbors. Surrounded by Hesse to the east, Electoral Brandenburg and the Archbishopric of Magdeburg to the north, Bohemian lands to the west, and ecclesiastical territories to the south, Saxony maintained a balance of power through countless treaties, marriages, and protection rights. Complicating matters further was Papal and imperial presence in the bishoprics of Naumburg, Merseburg, and

Meissen, which led to a long history of jostling for lucrative protection rights by various Wettin factions. Geographical factors also shaped the political landscape. The lifeblood of Saxony was the Elbe, Mulde, and Saale rivers, along with their tributaries. The city of Magdeburg's strategic location on the Elbe fostered constant intrigues of neighboring princes for control of this city and its political possessions and influence.3

The wealth of these possessions, together with continual land division between various branches of the family, sparked sporadic internecine bloodshed. The most notorious of these feuds was the destructive

"Saxon Brother's War" of 1446- 1451 between Elector

Frederick II and his younger brother Wilhelm III.4 The 30 land division agreed upon in the final peace treaty continued to split the Saxon leadership until Wilhelm Ill's death in 1482. His territory fell to the control of Frederick's II's sons Ernest and Albert, who had shared rule since 1464. The brothers maintained joint rule for two decades, and during this period the Wettin House experienced its time of greatest influence. In 1476 Ernest's son by the same name received the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, a position held by the Wettins until lost to the Hohenzollern*s of Brandenburg in 1513. A younger son, Albert, held the Archbishopric of Mainz from 1482 to 1484, but with his early death this office also fell to the Hohenzollerns.s Despite mutual leadership, the varied responsibilities of the two brothers created two divergent paths of interests and loyalties. As the elder, Ernest received the prestige and authority of the electoral office. He directed his energies inward toward the territory, endeavoring both to expand and stabilize Saxon possessions. The middle to late fifteenth century witnessed the acceleration of the long developing shift from medieval feudal governance to the nascent stages of the early modern territorial state. In the steps of their predecessors, Ernest and

Albert presided over the increased transition from an 31 agrarian based economy, rooted in personal vassalage of higher or lower nobility, to a growing administrative bureaucracy, based on trade, taxation and legal prerogatives.6 Complexities of feudal strife, together with economic growth and expanding trade, witnessed influential portions of the nobility, who had suffered from the burgeoning financial growth of cities, move from enfeoffed holdings to positions of prominence and authority (Amptleute 1 within the growing bureaucratic administrative districts (Ampternl of the expanding princely court. From this process emerged a ducal court based on territorial rule of rights and privileges, and rooted in a newly developing sense of state rather than purely individual personal rule.7 This development found expression in Ernest and Albert’s "Landesordnung" of 1482, which established a territorial Supreme Court to handle conflicts between the princes and the estates.®

Within Saxony, this period also witnessed increasing involvement on the part of the territorial prince in ecclesiastical matters. Exemplified by efforts in monastic reform, together with oversight of the consolidation of mendicant orders, the princes increasingly laid claim to governing prerogatives in clerical organization and issues.9 This princely 32 reform politic had no universal aim, as with regard to doctrine, but rather with the betterment of the church's worship and practice, particularly understood in the context of moral discipline and obedience to God's laws.1" A close connection developed between the well-being of the church and the well-being of the territorial state, with the care of religion becoming an attribute of the princely office.11 In sum, the process of appropriation of governing functions by the growing bureaucracy of the territorial prince, allowed the expanding court more influence in the consolidated possessions under its control, both secular and spiritual.

With the inclusion of the recently deceased Wilhelm Ill’s territory in 1482, the unified rule of the Saxon brothers needed modification. In 1485 Ernest and Albert agreed to divide their land in what became known as the "Leipzig Partition." This event concretized the growing divergence between the families. Initially for the purpose of settling simmering disputes, the partition actually exacerbated tensions. The Senior Ernestine line, according to old

Saxon law, retained electoral privilege, which granted the right to determine the division of territory, while

Albert was given first choice of possessions. In an 33 attempt to divide the land as equally as possible, taking into consideration cities, natural resources, and trade routes, Ernest plotted a settlement accommodating the present residences of each branch and establishing somewhat unified domains. It was hoped that by striking such a balance the threat of another devastating "Bother's War" might be avoided. Albert, who only reluctantly entered the agreement, spitefully skewed the arrangement by selecting possessions presently under Ernestine control.12 As a result, each branch controlled two large, but geographically separate portions of Saxony. In general terms, the senior Ernestine line retained the Electoral Circle and Wittenberg, along with the bulk of territories to the north. The other major portion of their land was a large chunk of

Thuringia to the south and southwest, including the city of Weimar. The Ernestines gained control of a long narrow portion of land running from its northern territory southward connecting their major possessions. The junior, Albertine, line garnered the Erzgebirge mountains to the east and southeast, and land resting north of the Ernestine territories, stretching westward to Hesse. Albert received the city of Leipzig, along with its prominent University. 34

The initial division left Albertine Saxony in two distinct parts, and travel from the eastward Albertine court in Dresden to her sister city of Leipzig meant

crossing Ernestine borders. The most viable route between the separated territories was through the Mulda pass, located near Wurzen in the Bishopric of Meissen.

Political stability and economic security prompted the

brothers to negotiate joint protection rights over this area, providing a vital economic and political conduit between Albertine territories. Such a patchwork quilt of overlapping territories,

with joint ownership and control of various natural resources, sought at least in principle to necessitate mutual assistance, which in turn would stabilize

relations.11 Yet divergent political agendas in such intimate proximity proved a breeding ground for

territorial friction in the coming years.”

The Ernestine line, by benefit of electoral power

and influence, charted an independent course on the imperial map. Led by the humanistically minded

Frederick III, who came to power after his father’s untimely death in i486,1' Ernestine Saxony took an active part in the Reichsreform movement of the late

fifteenth century.16 In seeking to decentralize the power of the emperor, the reform movement successfully 35 established the Imperial Tribunal rReichskammeraericht1 as an agent to settle disputes and maintain peace within the empire. The German princes won a large measure of control over this tribunal by extracting from Emperor Maximilian the right to appoint its judges. As the first German institution independent of the crown, the Imperial Tribunal embodied the spirit of Reichsreform, and reflected the growing distinction between Kaiser and Reich.17 A significant loss to the Ernestines in the Leipzig Partition was the forfeiture of control over the University of Leipzig. When in 1495 the emperor appealed to the German princes for improvement of higher education, Frederick could claim no such institution under his control. As Elector and First Marshal of the Empire he had little desire to be dependent on rival territorial princes." Further, the needs of a developing bureaucratic state required such an institution of higher learning. Frederick filled this void with the official opening of the University of Wittenberg on October 18, 1502.19 Duke Albert advanced a far different political agenda from his cousin. Despite having no such leverage through an imperial office, Albert carved out an influential role in the empire through diligent and 36

loyal service to the Hapsburgs. Here the junior Wettin line found the counterbalance to the senior line's electoral status, and this relationship to the Hapsburgs would prove not only divisive, but also

decisive in the political history of Saxony. As a warrior prince in loyal service to the empire, Albert distinguished himself in the military campaigns in the Netherlands. He gained imperial recognition by his reception into the Order of the Golden Fleece, and his loyalty to the Church brought him the honor of the Golden Rose from the pope.*' Prior to his death in 1500, Albert introduced hereditary legislation which was to have profound significance for future Albertine politics. In an attempt to abrogate further division of land, Albert issued the "Paternal Arrangement" rvaeterliche ordnunal, ordering that sovereignty of Albertine lands devolve to the eldest son. He arranged to have his eldest son George invested with authority over the entirety of the land, while the younger Henry would be granted smaller tracts of property, along with certain commercial rights and allowances.21 Upon Henry's death his possessions would revert back to unified control, and future junior princes would be invested with a castle and income.22 17

In 1500 George, who had been acting in the capacity of co-regent since 1488, succeeded his father to the throne of Albertine Saxony. As prescribed, Henry obtained the recently acquired Frisian properties in the North Sea, along with a parcel of property in the mineral rich area of Freiberg. This arrangement though lasted only five years. Inability to manage or protect the unstable Frisian possessions prompted Henry to sign a "Brother's Treaty" (Brueder1iche Vertrag] with George. Agreeing to relinquish his Frisian rights to his elder brother, Henry received compensation for the loss by a ducal allowance and a higher portion of revenues from his Freiberg possessions. More importantly though, he signed away the right of succession to the Albertine throne, letting it fall to

George's sons rather than himself.23 Sown with Henry's docile passivity, this treaty would later reap a bitter political harvest in the years to come. Duke George emerged as Albertine territorial sovereign, while Henry, to his apparent satisfaction, relocated to relative reclusion at his court at Freiberg. In 1512 Henry married Katherine of

Mecklenburg, a high spirited twenty-two year old whose proud and energetic nature chafed under the monotonous court life of the minor duchy. Her independent 38 temperament prompted involvement in religious and political matters beyond the limited bounds of Henry's domain, proving fateful to her brother-in-law's reign.24 Meanwhile in Dresden, Duke George busily established himself as a reputable and skilled territorial prince. Building on his father's foundation, he nurtured close ties to the Hapsburg dynasty, and through the politics of marriage he crafted fruitful relations with both the Hessians and

Hohenzollerns.:s Bonds between George and the emperor, together with a rival electoral power could only aggravate tensions between the Wettin houses. George consistently took political positions which countered any expansion of Ernestine influence, and his attachment to the Hapsburgs provided a degree of security against retribution.26 George's elevation corresponded to a period of economic recovery for the Saxon lands, fueled primarily by the growth in mining.27 Augmented financial power provided the duke with a measure of freedom from his provincial estates, and as the Dresden court expanded a growing number of the landed nobility compensated for the loss of influence by taking positions as ducal councilors or administrative officials. As a consequence George gained not only extensive influence 3 9

over a substantial portion of the nobility, but this

estate in turn gained a vested interest in the pro-

Hapsburg Albertine politic.u

Ernestine - Albertine Reactions to Reform. The Ernestine and Albertine houses maintained

relatively peaceable relations through the first three

decades following the Leipzig Partition. Yet their differences in political policy and temperament belied an uneasy truce. The least disruption threatened

conflict, and in the later months of 1517 that disruption came in the form of Martin Luther. The profound implications of the Luther issue on

religious practice and political authority played out

differently in each territory. As one firmly committed to the idea of princely responsibility for the care of

the church, George was sympathetic to the calls for

reform arising from Electoral Saxony, and kept abreast

of the issues with a cautious curiosity.29 "Pious" Duke

George's profoundly personal devotion to orthodox

Catholicism, expressed itself through the order and discipline of his rule as Albertine sovereign. He utilized princely funds to endow new cloisters, and provided generous grants to the university at Leipzig 40 for support of students in preparation for clerical service.

Georges's interest in issues of reform, and his concern for defending the true Catholic faith prompted him, above the objections of many of his theologians and the local bishop, to sponsor a debate between Wittenberg and his own territorial university.*" The issues raised at that famous meeting between John Eck and Martin Luther in July 1519, especially with regard to the Hussite heresy, touched a nerve in George's orthodox sensibilities, and sparked a bitter personal feud between the reformer and the duke. Duke George's intense Catholic piety could not tolerate the attack on the fundamental authority of the Roman Church inherent in Luther's assertions during the debate. When the reformer inadvertently justified some of John Huss's statements against the divine primacy of Rome, George cursed the argument as a plague.1'

Ironically, the prince who became the primary defender of Roman Catholicism in north Germany was the grandson and namesake of George Podiebrad, the excommunicated "Hussite King." Duke George's mother, Sidonie, had been deeply troubled by her father's condemnation and gave herself over to a life long endeavor of redeeming his soul from eternal damnation. 41

Naming her first born son after the condemned, she committed him to the service of the church.11 Raised in strict observant piety, George nurtured a tenacious loyalty to the church of Rome, and his preparation for an ecclesiastical career qualified him as a competent lay-theologian. He was far more prepared than any other territorial prince for participation in the coming religious turmoil.” Leipzig marked the final breech between George and the Ernestine based reform movement, and thereafter Albertine Saxony became the most outspoken and aggressive enemy of Luther and his followers. In 1522 George issued a mandate ordering the arrest of all monks and preachers who propagated the new teachings, together with subjects who partook communion in the reformed manner.” This mandate embodied the sharply negative reaction of the Albertine court toward the Wittenberg movement, and reflected George's attitude and actions for the remainder of his life.” As the struggle raged the in printing wars, George became frustrated at the successful market for reform ideals within his territory. Two years after his ducal mandate the Leipzig printers pleaded financial hardship since they were not allowed to publish the highly profitable evangelical pamphlets from Wittenberg. 42

Their well-stocked supplies of Catholic treatises were

"desired by no one and cannot even be given away.,,w

Worthy of note is the apparent ease, despite active ducal suppression, with which pamphlet material crossed territorial lines and found ready dissemination to a significant portion of the literate population. Duke George would not be the last Albertine prince faced with the headache of contraband propaganda. Despite evangelical inroads, Albertine presses did not go idle. George utilized the printers for the Catholic cause more than any other ruler, underwriting efforts of Catholic controversialists including

Luther's arch foes Johannes Cochlaeus, Jerome Emser, and George Witzil.’7 During the 1530's Leipzig and Dresden accounted for more the 50% of all Catholic controversial literature in the empire. In sum, "were it not for the efforts of Duke George of Albertine Saxony and his stable of publicists, the evangelical media campaign would have been almost unopposed in the vernacular. ",s George and Luther harbored mutual animosity, and over the years they carried on a sporadic and vicious personal and public campaign against each other.M A most volatile issue in their running feud concerned the nature of obedience due secular authority. Following 43

the Diet of Augsburg in 153 0 the Protestant princes struggled to come to grips with legitimizing resistance against the perceived imperial threat. In early 1531 Luther issued his acidic Warning to His Dear German People, in which he absolved German subjects of any

charge of rebellion if they defended themselves against

the militant papacy.40 For George no teaching could claim to be truly Christian if it incited rebellion,41 and the offended duke chastised Luther for promoting disloyalty and insubordination to the emperor.42 The duke countered that if the emperor resorted to force, it would be to crush rebellion, not to persecute the Gospel.41 This fundamental disagreement over the issue of resistance would return with a vengeance on the eve of the Schmalkaldic War.

The political and territorial agendas of the two cousins, so long a source of friction, now found vociferous expression through debates on the nature of the Christian faith and legitimate secular authority. Pitting Lutheran teachings against the power of the church of Rome and imperial edicts fit well with the independent course charted by the Ernestines, while

Albertine political loyalty toward their imperial sovereign found a pious and consistent voice in Duke

George’s call for obedience to authority. Albertine 44

strength had been found in unity and service to their imperial lords. Far from being degrading subservience,

the relationship had proven politically and economically fruitful, giving the Dresden court a degree of prestige in the empire. Woven through this service ran the consistent thread of Christian teaching which found rebellion abhorrent. The intensity of this

issue, cast in the context of Ernestine - Albertine

rivalry, generated an air of blood feud.

Moritz's Youth and Development While attending the Diet of Worms in 1521, Duke George received a report from his brother Henry concerning the birth of a son on March 21. In early

May Archbishop Albert of Mainz baptized the child, and, in what would become one of history's little ironies,

bestowed the name Moritz, in honor of the patron saint

of the city of Magdeburg.44

Little is known of Moritz's early years. One of

six children born to Henry and Katherine, Moritz was

followed in 1522 by Severin, and finally, in 1526 by

August. It may be assumed these Saxon princes* early education followed the pattern of the day, which comprised daily education in religion and court protocol, together with family history and princely ■15 duty to God and country.AS Undoubtedly the young Albertine was versed in the heroic exploits of his grandfather Albert, whose reputation exemplified

Christian duty and imperial honor. Apparently the young Moritz did not take well to the academic portion of his training, but rather found his passion with the weapons of war and the knightly code of honor."6

Moritz's early childhood in the small court at Freiberg found no insulation from the confessional struggles which gripped the empire. In the mid 1520's,

Moritz's mother Katherine became an open advocate of the Reformation. Her contact with Elector John and the electoral prince John Frederick, led to chilled relations with George. Little reason exists for doubting that the mother presented her new religious convictions to her children,47 and Moritz would speak later of being raised with evangelical teaching.

Initially Duke George took little interest in

Henry's sons, believing they would not play any more significant role in Saxon politics than their father.48 Yet circumstances in his own family forced him to take an active hand in the raising of his nephews. The marriage between his oldest son Johann and Elisabeth of

Hesse had remained childless, and due to age and health prospects were not promising. Complicating matters 46 further, George's other son Frederick was mentally unstable. According to Albertine law succession rights fell to Henry, and eventually Moritz, if neither of George's sons could take the throne. Concerned with the education of this potential Albertine leader, George took the opportunity to place both Moritz and Severin under more favorable influences. The Lutheran sympathies expressed by Katherine prompted George to utilize any opportunity to remove the young prince from his mother's influence.49 It was customary as part of the education of young nobility to send them to live for a period of time at neighboring or foreign courts. When Henry's limited means precluded sending his sons away, George intervened and agreed to cover the cost for his nephews' travel. In

December 153 2 Moritz arrived at the court of Albert of Mainz in Halle, while Severin was sent to the court of one of King Ferdinand's sons.40 Thus began for Moritz an eight year educational experience which exposed him to the lifestyles, rhetoric, and militancy of the competing sides in the Reformation struggle. He would become the object of a political tug of war between the leading figures of Imperial Germany. Evidenced by Archbishop Albert's demand that Moritz not be accompanied by Lutheran sympathizers, 47 religious considerations certainly contributed to the reason why George financed Moritz's stay in Halle.51 To fill the need of a princely aide and advisor, George appointed a young scholar from his Dresden court to assist Moritz at the archbishop's residence. Here began the close and lifelong relationship between Moritz and Christof Carlowitz.

Having already earned the respect of the Albertine court before his twenty-fifth year, Carlowitz represented the best and the brightest of Saxony's young humanist minds. Following four years at Leipzig under the guidance of Peter Mosellanus, the sixteen year old nephew of prominent court councilor George Carlowitz traveled to Basel to study under Erasmus. Earning the great humanist's favor, he entered the service of another influential uncle, Julius Pflug, who praised him for being the most learned product of the Meissen nobility. Despite his youth he quickly moved through the ranks of the court, eventually being employed in ambassadorial trips to England, Poland, and

Brandenburg. His quick elevation at court, and his significance for later developments within Saxony, lay not only in his academic brilliance and political sophistication, but also in his multiple ties to the powerful Meissen noble families. Unquestioned loyalty 48

to George, together with sympathy for the deeply rooted Albertine - Hapsburg politic proved pivotal in his

relationship with Moritz.52 At Halle Moritz witnessed the Renaissance spirit of grand living and worldly gaiety. Albert spent

lavishly on his court, and though producing great debt, it was a lifestyle well fed, dressed, and entertained.53 Marked by a nascent Erasmian humanism, the spiritual and ecclesiastical temperament in Halle sought a

middle road in the struggle for reform. Apart from overreaching assumptions, it is difficult to determine

the influence, if any, this period had on Moritz's

confessional development. Despite the intentions of George and Albert, a fever forced Moritz to bed much of the time and limited his exposure to the full life of the court.5J|

In January of 1534 George ordered both Moritz and

Carlowitz to Dresden where the young prince would

reside for the next three years.55 Here he experienced

the strong anti-Lutheran Catholicism of his uncle, and witnessed first hand the diligent character of George's

leadership. Moritz's residence in Dresden fell hard on

the heels of George's bitter battle with Luther

regarding the issue of rebellion to legitimate

authority. Whether or not the duke instilled the 49

detailed argument into his young prot6g6, it is certain that Moritz resided in a court still simmering from

heated conflict concerning the neuralgic issue of

rebellion against authority, and the nature of a

Christian's duty to their God-ordained ruler.46 If George had hoped that by removing Moritz from the company of his evangelical mother he might indoctrinate the young prince into conservative Catholicism, then the disruptive influences within his own territory and court dashed his aspirations. Even in Dresden, the inner sanctum of anti-Lutheranism, Moritz gained exposure to evangelical teaching. Elisabeth of Hesse, the wife of George's oldest son

Johann, had followed her brother Philip in adherence to

Protestantism.47 This energetic duchess embodied the tenacity of her brother, and continually involved herself with the issues and conflicts of the day. Her pro-Hessian and evangelical sympathies earned George's mistrust, which only grew following the death of her husband in 1537. Elisabeth continually sought to strengthen and exploit Hesse's ties to Albertine

Saxony,48 and utilized her Saxon-Hapsburg connections to aid her brother.59 She no less than George saw Moritz's potential, and took advantage of every opportunity to influence the future ruler.60 5 0

A diplomatic trip to Cassel in the early part of 1537, provided Moritz his first extensive contact with

Philip of Hesse, the man who more than any other would shape the prince's life. The sudden death of Duke Johann, George's heir apparent and Philip's brother-in- law, raised dynastic stakes in territorial relations,

and the deceased's widow Elisabeth wasted little time

in forging ties between her brother and Moritz. The landgrave no doubt measured the possibilities for

future Hessian-Saxon relations, and took an active interest in the young prince.61 Hence, the Hessian connection which had played such a key role in Albertine Saxony's balance of power with the Ernestines ultimately became an erosive factor in Duke George's political and religious plans for his territory.62 Yet if George's intent was to instill within his potential successor a distinctly Albertine character to territorial and imperial matters, later developments suggest that Moritz's stay in Dresden would not be totally in vain. Despite the inroads made by the

Hessians, an effective counterbalance emerged in the person of George von Carlowitz.61 As a product of Meissen noble stock, this career territorial bureaucrat

incarnated the interpenetrating nature of noble privilege and ducal policy. A blatant contradiction to 5 I

the expanding humanistic sophistication of the early modern court in that he could write only his name, Carlowitz nonetheless built a solid career on detailed knowledge of the land and practical experience in administrative duties.66 Working his way up through several local offices, he arrived at the Dresden court

in 1522, shortly after his marriage to Anna von Pflug, a daughter of the high ranking ducal councilor, Caesar von Pflug.65 Tenaciously loyal to Duke George, Carlowitz became a most trusted advisor in matters both foreign and domestic. His counsel reflected the pro-Hapsburg policies which emphasized Albertine strength over against the Ernestines, especially regarding the rights and privileges of the old Meissen noble families.66 His strong anti-Lutheranism earned the wrath of the reformer, who never forgave him for his assistance to

Duke George. Carlowitz became for Luther the embodiment of the hated anti-reform "Meisseners" of Albertine Saxony.6"

Like Duke George, Carlowitz was sympathetic to the pleas for reform, and under the increasing influence of his brother-in law Julius Pflug,68 he took a leading role in the Erasmian reform movement in Saxony. He worked with a number of like-minded legal advisors to 52

initiate religious discussions for the purpose of reaching a compromise in certain debated matters. Although Duke George eventually repudiated these measures, the men who propagated them would outlive his rule and come to have another day.65 Whatever degree of confessional influence Carlowitz had on Moritz in these early years, their working relationship was constructive and positive. Carlowitz remained in close contact with the young prince even after his removal from office by Duke Henry in 1539, and eventually came to play a seminal role in Moritz's own regime. If Philip and Elisabeth's endeavors to sway the prince into the Protestant camp bore ostensible fruit, so also the presence of George Carlowitz shaped the prince's character in a decidedly Albertine fashion.

While Moritz experienced the ideological tug of war in Dresden, reform took root in his home court at Freiberg. Katherine's persistence ultimately won

Henry, and in June 1536 the duchess succeeded in having the Lutheran Jacob Schenk installed as the court preacher at Freiberg. Despite attempts by Duke George and the elder Carlowitz to block or impede full scale religious innovation in Henry's domain, on New Years 5.1

Day 1537 Schenk preached in the Freiberg Cathedral and administered communion in both kinds.70 John Frederick quickly snatched the opportunity to bring Henry into the Protestant political fold by offering him the protection of the Schmalkaldic league.71 The importance of Moritz to the transition became evident when, in return for military defense, the elector required that Henry's son leave Dresden and take up residence at Torgau.’2 In compliance, Moritz returned to his father's territory to participate in the ceremonies for the establishment of reform, after which he accompanied John Frederick to the Ernestine court at Torgau. In July Henry and Moritz signed a protection treaty confirming their territory for the new confession.73

Moritz spent the following two years under the watchful eye of John Frederick. His instructor during this period was Hans Loeser, a very close friend of

Luther. It is of no small significance that Loeser's strong Lutheranism and close relationship with the reformer was coupled with a mutually fond relationship with Moritz. No evidence exists for any tension arising from confessional antipathy on Moritz's part.74 Though little meaningful contact developed between

Moritz and Luther, they were probably introduced during 54

the young prince's visits to Wittenberg or the reformer's trips to Torgau. Apparently Luther made no special impression on the young duke, and conversely,

Luther showed little enthusiasm for Moritz. The reformer's coolness may have been prompted by his

profound mistrust and dislike for anything Albertine/5

The introduction of the Reformation into his brother's realm had been a frustrating conclusion to a long struggle for Duke George, and in early 1537 he

received another blow to his dynastic hopes with the death of his eldest son, Johann. With succession falling upon his weak-minded son Frederick, George took steps to avoid the growing possibility of Henry gaining the throne. Spurred by loyalty to the Church and the fear that Albertine Saxony could fall under Protestant sway, in early May he presented his estates with a plan by which Frederick would ascend to the throne under the guidance of a twenty-four man regency.76 The Albertine estates looked favorably on the move, and the plan gained quick approval in the provincial diet.7’ With the unsteady Frederick provisionally inserted as the future successor to George, the duke took further action to block any chance of Henry's elevation. In

January 1539 he hastily arranged a marriage with the daughter of Ernest of Amnestied, but the plan failed 55 when Frederick died before producing any legitimate progeny.78 Now more than ever Moritz gravitated to the

forefront of the political stage. In February 1539 Charles V reopened negotiations with the Protestants for the purpose of seeking a political settlement which would facilitate unified action against the Turk.'9 To this end representatives from various sides gathered in Frankfurt. In the company of John Frederick, Moritz had the opportunity to make contact with the leading Protestant figures and experience the dynamics and complexities of imperial politics. More importantly, his presence enabled further contact with Philip of Hesse.80

Moritz's attendance at Frankfurt proved an unforeseen benefit to the Ernestines. Reports of prince Frederick's death shook the Albertine entourage, for little if any legal grounds now impeded Henry's ascendancy. Yet, refusing to surrender, Duke George again embraced the politics of marriage.81 In a bold attempt to protect his land from Henry and the Schmalkaldic League, he conspired to revise his final testament so as to grant Moritz succession rights. In return the prince had to marry Frederick's widow, maintain pro-Hapsburg policy, and neither initiate further reform in the territory or secularize church 56 property. Moritz would govern in conjunction with the supervised regency along the guidelines previously established for Frederick. The offer included assurances that Moritz would not have to change confessions, but only desist from any public expression of the new faith. The ever vigilant Elisabeth of Rochlitz learned of the plan and hurriedly informed Katherine in Freiberg.83 The news was forwarded Frankfurt and Moritz was placed under close observation.*4 Apart from courteous refusal, no serious consideration was given the matter. Knowing well his limited options, Moritz respectfully responded that it would not be proper to give himself to George without the permission of his parents or electoral counsel.*5 With all avenues of negotiation now washed away,

George made his final desperate move. In hasty changes to his last will and testament he stipulated that if

Henry declined to maintain membership in the Nuremberg League or preserve the religious status quo in the territory, then all his private property would be refused his brother. Apart from allowances to his daughters, George bequeathed all other properties to emperor Charles v and King Ferdinand, effectively giving his land over to their protection. Yet before 57 the testament could be ratified, George died on April

17, 1539.86 His death ended a bitter chapter in the Reformation movement and opened the doors for reform within Albertine Saxony.

The Albertine Reformation under Duke Henry. The transition of power took place in a relatively smooth manner. Apart from a fruitless attempt by several nobles to force Henry to abide by the unratified final testament of the late duke George, the new sovereign met little resistance. Henry’s twenty- eight month reign witnessed the establishment of the

Augsburg Confession throughout most of Albertine Saxony.® Philip of Hesse counseled for a slowly paced transition, not wanting to upset the fragile stability of peace which existed between the territories, while

John Frederick urged speedy and sweeping action. Henry followed his Ernestine cousin’s advice, and as he traveled through his land ceremoniously receiving homage from his subjects, Lutheran preaching and communion in both kinds marked the accompanying worship services. Such public action made clear Henry's intentions for thoroughgoing evangelical reform. Moritz left Frankfurt and joined his father on the traditional journey through the newly attained lands. 58

His presence offered the opportunity to witness the establishment of the Reformation in the leading cities of Annaberg, Leipzig, Dresden, and Meissen, and he saw firsthand the rapid and peaceful acceptance by a significant portion of Albertine subjects* By late July hasty visitation procedures were initiated, and during the next six weeks the implementation of reform took place under the leadership of leading Ernestine theologians.** From the contemporary accounts of witnesses, the reform measures were enthusiastically embraced by much of Albertine Saxony.89 In September Henry issued the first Albertine church order.90 Commonly referred to as the "Henrichsagenda. '♦ the

order was authored by several leading Ernestine theologians and published in Wittenberg.91 With these developments it appeared that long

standing friction between the neighboring territories would finally be healed. Such would not be the case.

Twenty years of mistrust and hate could not be so quickly washed away. Despite confessional unity, the new religious disposition needed to be filtered through the long-standing political differences between the houses. As the junior branch of the Wettin house, the Albertines had diligently sought to carve their own

niche in the empire, and a key part to their success 59

had been a carefully crafted independence from their

Ernestine cousins. Within weeks of Henry's ascension border skirmishes erupted. Typified by a late June incident in which electoral troops confiscated crops in the Albertine town of Camberg, Henry's court sensed

that John Frederick sought to take advantage of the

aged duke’s physical and political weakness.” Despite the economic upsurge during Duke George's reign, Henry fell heir to a territory deeply in debt.93 Financial pressure necessitated a provincial diet at

Chemnitz in November, 1539. Apart from the passions

that might arise from religious loyalty, a practical political question agitated the Albertine estates: Who was in control? With the Ernestines steering the reform movement there was genuine concern that their

land could fall prey to domination by their electoral

cousins. Needing their support for new taxes, Henry

bowed to the estates' demands. He granted them a hand

in administering the confiscated ecclesiastical property, and submitted to their request to back away from a binding commitment to the Schmalkaldic League.

Further, he agreed to the diet's demand that the second impending church visitation be implemented solely by

Albertine clergy.94 60

This first major step in the Albertine church's divergence from Ernestine Lutheranism brought accusations of Henry's ungratefulness for the elector's support.95 The demand for independent reform and distance from the Schmalkaldic League cast light on the deeply rooted family friction which not only marked

Henry's reign, but also laid the foundation for Moritz's own policies.96 The swift current of imperial and Saxon politics soon swept Moritz into its deliberations and intrigues.

As most young princes of his day he fell target to the politics of marriage. Yet it was precisely in the unfolding circumstances surrounding his eventual marriage that the contours of his public character took shape. Caught up in issues and situations which forced him to make life-defining choices, Moritz revealed a temperament which balanced determined independence with an ability to listen and follow the advice of counsel he deemed loyal. His willingness to follow an independent track apart from the Freiberg court became obvious with his continued relationship with several of his late uncle's former councilors. In coming to power, Henry had removed from ducal office and heavily penalized George and Christof Carlowitz.97 Yet through the complex and 61

baffling channels of family and diplomatic connections

Moritz kept in contact with these men. The young

prince's employment of Joachim Faust, the elder

Carlowitz's former secretary, facilitated active

communications between the Albertine heir and the sophisticated expertise of George's former advisors.98 Contact with the Carlowitz circle meant Moritz not only had access to legal and political minds superior and more experienced than Henry's own councilor's, but also solid inroads to the politically potent Meissen nobility and Hapsburg interests. The months prior to his own elevation witnessed a worldly wise, politically sophisticated court within a court emerge around

Moritz. It was the ever busy Elisabeth of Rochlitz who initiated discussions of marriage between Moritz and her niece Agnes." Katherine favored the union at first, but soured on what she deemed excessive inheritance claims by the Hessians. A fissure opened between Moritz and the Freiberg court when, against the expressed wishes of his mother, Moritz gave oral assurance to Philip that he would marry Agnes. Rage and alienation greeted the young prince's decision and a battle of wills ensued.100 62

Strained negotiations continued through official channels, and with the calming of tempers it appeared that a marriage agreement gained favor at Freiberg.

Yet as Moritz traveled to Cassel for further

discussions, rumors of Philip's bigamous marriage

struck the Albertine Court.11)1 Upon his arrival Philip

informed Moritz of his marriage to a young women from his sister Elisabeth's court. He assured him that the wedding had taken place with the permission of several reformers, including Luther. Despite Henry's order to postpone talks if the reports proved true, Moritz promised to fulfill his vow of marriage and support

Philip. These marriage plans had placed the young prince squarely between his parents and his prospective father-in-law. Henry and Katherine spoke of obedience to parental authority, while Philip spoke of honoring promises made.10* When, in early January 1541, Moritz married Agnes in opposition to his parent's wishes, he was not simply the rebellious child, but rather an independent prince following advice from sophisticated and experienced counsel. The deliberations and eventual consummation of this marriage may have damaged his relationship with Henry and his mother, but more significantly it bound together two of the period's 63 more fascinating leaders. The landgrave became more than Moritz's political ally and father-in-law, he emerged as the young prince's mentor. They shared not only material ties of common blood and soil, but also the kindred spirit of the warrior prince.104 The controversy surrounding Moritz's marriage union reflected the intra-Albertine power struggle which emerged during Henry's reign. On one side stood the Freiberg court, led by Katherine and a leading Albertine advisor, Anton Schoenberg.105 Both leaned toward John Frederick and the Ernestines. The opposition, led by an uneasy tandem of Philip and Carlowitz, guided Moritz in a distinctly independent direction. The power and political sophistication of growing circle of advisors surrounding the young prince surfaced in the climatic confrontation between the parties during the summer preceding Henry's death.11*6

In an attempt to thwart the possible prominence of an old-line Albertine court through Moritz and his cohorts, Katherine and Schoenberg conspired to convince the ailing Henry to bequeath his sons a divided territory. Such a land division would give Katherine regency over August's possessions, seriously weaken

Moritz's power base, and virtually eliminate any 64 balance of power between the rival wettin houses. Hessian interests which had risen further through Moritz's marriage would also be severely reduced. The legal savvy of Moritz's councilors quickly squelched this high-handed maneuver by successfully arguing the legal validity of Albert's Vaeterliche Ordnuncr.107 Thus, with Saxon law on his side, Moritz assumed the throne with relative ease following his father's death on August 18, 1541.

Albertine Saxonv under Moritz.

The distrust which had simmered through the years of territorial and religious tensions between the two Saxon houses quickly came to boil upon Moritz's elevation to Albertine sovereignty. Even before assuming control of the territory, the young duke had committed himself to two treaties which forced him into the diplomatic balancing act that shaped the early years of his reign. While his electoral cousin would pressure Moritz to fulfill the Albertine commitment to the Schmalkaldic League made by the prince and his father in 1537, Moritz knew himself bound by a secret treaty with Charles V and King Ferdinand, signed together with Philip of Hesse in June of 1541."* His cautious attempt to fulfill the obligations of 65

supporting the Schmalkaldic League, while submitting to imperial authority, caused Moritz to straddle an ever- widening gulf of between his co-religionists and Charles V.I(W That fact that the initiator of the 1541 treaty with Charles, which effectively neutralized Moritz's activity with the League, was none other than one of its co-commanders, further illustrates the complex relationship with his father-in-law.110 The new Dresden court served notice that a much more aggressive and sophisticated Albertine policy lay in store for their neighbors. With the immediate reinstatement of several former advisors to the late Duke George, the new regime boasted the talent which had maintained Albertine Saxony's prominence on the imperial level during its pre-reform period. The most conspicuous of the recalled councilors were the veteran George Carlowitz and his brilliant nephew Christof.

These two men were joined by the newly appointed chancellor Simon Pistoris, the respected Leipzig law professor.111 Several other prominent men, including Ludwig Fachs, Christof Turk, and the openly evangelical George Komerstadt, embodied the best and the brightest of the ducal Saxony's legal and political minds. With the exception of Komerstadt all embraced the traditional policy slanted towards cooperation with the 66

Hapsburg court, together with an Erasmian Catholicism which attempted to find middle ground in the religious conflict.112

Assembling such an impressive court may well mark the brilliance of the young prince, and assist in understanding his relatively quick ascension to imperial prominence. Unlike his late uncle before him, Moritz did not busy himself with the daily routine of princely bureaucracy. He built his reputation on the shoulders of well chosen, highly competent advisors."5

In contrast to John Frederick who involved himself in nearly every facet of the court, including proofreading and editing electoral correspondence, Moritz delegated responsibility and made decisions based on options presented by his advisors.1" In an age of expanding bureaucracy the capacity for a prince to listen well and follow the lead of competent minds reveals less a sign of weakness than a mark of maturity.

Foremost on the Dresden agenda was the reestablishing of the Albertine heritage of strong ducal leadership in domestic matters, together with an imperial policy marked by independence from their electoral cousins. As in the former days, the most effective counter to Ernestine dominance would be carefully crafted relations with the emperor. Whereas 67

Henry had kept distance from John Frederick and Philip with his refusal to officially join the Schmalkaldic

League, the removal off his brother's key advisors had stripped him of effective imperial connections. Moritz's decisive actions in the early stages of his reign served notice that things would change. Upon his elevation Moritz faced the need to reestablish his territory on the imperial level, yet do so as a Lutheran prince. Continuance of Henry's reform was not an arbitrary decision. The success of the movement under his father, together with his personal attachment to the landgrave surely impressed upon him that a degree of social stability depended on confessional continuity."' Philip communicated his concern with Moritz over the religious tendencies of the Dresden inner circle.

Though considering Carlowitz and Pistoris to be honorable men and fully capable of assisting the young prince in secular matters, he advised him to seek counsel of other God-fearing people in ecclesiastical affairs."6 He warned Moritz against possible negative influence of "old papists" and related his concern over reports that Carlowitz was holding mass in his house.1" Moritz reassured Philip of his loyalty to the faith and that due attention would be given to its preservation. 68

Though he would not interfere with Carlowitz*s private practices, such would not be tolerated in his presence.118 Moritz backed his assertions of loyalty with action.1,9 Though the elder Carlowitz had a defining role in Albertine-Hapsburg relations, he played only a limited role in ecclesiastical policy.120 Within weeks Moritz took two specific steps to bring church affairs under the purview of his court. On October 15 he issued his first ducal mandate on ecclesiastical matters. Ordering the Leipzig publishing house of Nikolaus Wolrab to print new editions of the Church Order of 1539, the German Psalter, the Augsburg Confession, and Luther's Bible, he prohibited any other liturgical formulas, either evangelical or Catholic.121

In mid-November he called a select group of superintendents from the eastern half of his territory to Dresden for talks with representatives from the Albertine administrative districts. These meetings set the pattern for Moritz's eschewing large political gatherings. Moritz followed his uncle in preferring to work with smaller groups, allowing him to exert more influence.122 Moritz heard complaints from Albertine representatives of harsh and mocking sermons from 69

pastors who attacked authority and impugned the memory of the late Duke George. They accused the clergy of

scandalizing the people with their condemnations of the old faith, and conducting themselves in a manner unworthy of their office.123 That strong pockets of Catholicism still existed was evidenced from the request that pastors should admonish the unconverted with patience and brotherly love. From this meeting emerged the connection between confessional agitation and the public influence of the pulpit.124 Also surfacing was the tension between the landed nobility, whose patronage rights were threatened by the new ecclesiastical measures, and the clergy. Though seeking to gain at least some say in the selection of pastors so as to maintain a degree influence, Moritz rebuffed them and claimed sole right of final decisions in matters of religion. The prince's concern was that friction between the estates and the superintendents could threaten public peace in his territory. Moritz readily assumed the connection between the well-being of the church and the well-being of the princes' territory, and his authority over both.125 Talks at Dresden also marked the first steps towards Moritz's sale of confiscated spiritual property 70 for the further strengthening of the church. Chastising the estates for their poor administration of ecclesiastical finances, he initiated a program of increased secularization, which proved advantageous to the Dresden court over the next several years .126 Using the income to fund new schools and pay salaries for pastors and teachers,'27 this project not only earned him support from the clergy, it also gave him a degree of financial independence to maneuver on the imperial level.128 Moritz gained fuller control over church administration when, during his excursion into Hungary in 1542, he ordered the formation of a special seven person committee to oversee ecclesiastical matters. With the exception of the Dresden superintendent, the body consisted solely of ducal counselors. Headed by chancellor Pistoris and the recently appointed Dresden superintendent Daniel Greiser,129 the committee was authorized to rule on church issues and maintain doctrinal purity in concordance with the Henrichsaaenda.1,11 Expressing full adherence to the

Augsburg Confession, the committee simultaneously placed the administration of that confession under the auspices of the territorial state.131 The creation of 71 this ducal commission foreshadowed the Albertine consistorial organization soon to follow.

The "Landesordnuna” of 1543 codified much of

Moritz's ecclesiastical program initiated in the previous months. A significant aspect of the order was the formal investiture of the territorial prince with the power of the Ban.'” This particular point engendered negative reactions from the Ernestines, most notably Luther, who saw a foreboding mixture of the secular and spiritual realms.1” Moritz continued to expand his territorial bureaucracy while simultaneously instituting reform when, in 1544, following the death of the Catholic Bishop of Merseburg,1” he took advantage of protection rights over the diocese by installing his brother

August as secular administrator. Shortly thereafter he successfully orchestrated the election of Duke George of Anhalt as coadjutor in spiritual matters.1” The appointment of Anhalt to the office of

"coadjutor of spiritual affairs," provided the Albertine court the opportunity to institute a new ecclesiastical structure based on the more centralized authority of a bishop. This project met with initial resistance from the clergy, but through negotiations 72

and compromise the Albertine Lutheran church finally reached full consistorial organization.15* By 154 5 the Dresden court had implemented an

ecclesiastical structure which, at least in principle, embodied the concept of territorial church. Divided into two administrative districts, the consistory of

Merseburg, containing the western Thuringian possessions together with the city of Leipzig, worked as a committee under the guidance of Bishop Anhalt, who

carried the right to name appointees. The consistory

of Meissen received no bishop, and the prince appointed members to that body.137 Each consistory employed two theologians, two lawyers, a law clerk, a secretary, and

a courier. All were considered subordinate to the prince, who held final jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters.158 In sum, within four years of taking power

Moritz had formed a bureaucratic conduit reaching from

his Dresden court to the pulpits of even the most rural

dor f. Moritz's active participation in overseeing church matters indeed reflects the interpenetration of the Reformation movement and aspects of the rise of the early modern territorial state.139 There is no question that Moritz aggressively sought to bring church matters under his control, and did so from the perspective 77 that, as a responsible Christian prince, he must maintain true religion. Yet care must be taken not to overlook the pressures incumbent on a prince to effectively steer an institution which received the support of an influential portion of his subjects. Put differently, we do not find Moritz treating the church or its members, clergy or laity, merely as passive instruments. On the contrary, the seriousness with which he injected his court into ecclesiastical issues betrays a perception of a viable organization which needed to be controlled. This perception of the confessional disposition of his subjects and commitment to control his territorial church factored greatly in shaping Albertine Saxony's religious and political posture on the eve of the Schmalkaldic War. Although under Moritz the Albertine church moved in a direction believed faithful to the Augsburg Confession, the religious situation between the two

Saxon houses remained tense. The Albertine Lutheran church's official position with regard to her electoral neighbors might be best described as benign neglect.

Following the first visitation measures of 1539,

Henry's estates discouraged Ernestine involvement. Except for personal communications between teachers and clergy, the leading Wittenberg theologians' active 74

influence became negligible. Cooled relations fostered an atmosphere of mistrust, especially by Luther, and accusations of ungratefulness for previous support

intensified against Dr esden.1''0 This inner-Wettin friction revealed an important aspect of the reform process within Germany, and further illuminated the context for Moritz's actions on the eve of the Schmalkaldic War. The antipathy between the neighbors rested not on division in doctrinal matters per se, for Albertine Saxony took pains to publish and distribute material formulated by Wittenberg. Generally, the crossover from Wittenberg student to Albertine pastor brought little if any theological adjustment. Yet the Albertine political tradition of independence from their cousins found expression in their refusal to allow Wittenberg active involvement in church matters, and friction rose in direct proportion to the decline of the electoral influence. An infra-Lutheran conflict was brewing on the level of the long standing rivalry dating back to the Leipzig partition.1*1 Such mistrust proved a disadvantage for Moritz. Political antagonism towards the Ernestines risked discord within his own territory since Lutheran identity, Albertine or Ernestine, related closely to 75 the person of Luther and the city of Wittenberg. The great reformer's rumblings over Albertine ecclesiastical policy, together with his intense Ernestine patriotism, helped generate a popular notion of the elector as defender of the true faith. Hence any aggression toward John Frederick could be interpreted as an attack on the Gospel. This sentiment would have immense ramifications for the pulpit and popular opinion in the coming conflict.142 As Moritz's promises of faithfulness to confessional integrity led to tangible measures of reform, so also his oath of fidelity to Charles prompted him to take active involvement in imperial endeavors. Unlike his docile father, the chivalrous blood of his grandfather Albert coursed through

Moritz's veins. In the steps of his forebearer, Moritz offered himself as a warrior prince to the service of the Reich.141 In 1542 he accompanied imperial troops to

Hungary to meet the Turkish advance, and while there he gained the reputation as a brave, if not somewhat reckless soldier.114 In 1544 he rode with Charles to France. These services drew him nearer to the Hapsburgs, and Ferdinand saw in the young prince a potentially useful ally.141 Thus, the double-edged character of Moritz's political policy took shape: 76

Tighter control over a territorial church strictly identified with the Augsburg Confession, and loyal obedience to the emperor in matters not touching the faith. The dynamics of these twin foci, and how they played out during the early years of his reign formed the backdrop for the decision to align with Charles V at Regensburg in June 1546. 77

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. For early Saxon background pertinent to our study see Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 1-5.; Karl Heinz Blaschke, Sachsen iin Zeitalter der Reformation. (Guetersloh: Mohn, 1970.) F. L. Carsten, Princes and Parliments in Germany: From the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century. (Oxford: 1959), pp. 191-204. Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), pp. 27-55. Rudolf Koetzschke and Hellmut Kretzschmar, Saechische Geschichte: Merden und Wandlunaen eines Deutschen Stammes und seiner Heimat im Rahmen der Deutschen Geschichte. (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Wolfgang Weidlich, 1965), pp. 136-148; Anton Schindling and Walter Ziegler, Hrsg. Die Territorien des Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessiona1 isieruna. Land und Konfession 1500-1650: 2. Der Nordosten. (Meunster: Aschendorff Verlag, 1993), pp. 8-86; and Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 20-23.

2. Wettin prince Frederick IV received electoral dignity in 1425. See Carsten, Princes. pp. 196-197.

3. An excellent overview in Issleib, "Magdeburg und Moritz von Sachsen bis zur Belagerung der Stadt (Septbr. 1550)," p. 576.

4. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 21.

5. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, p. 21.

6. Blaschke, Sachsen, p. 19.

7. Blaschke, Sachsen. p. 26; and Carsten, Princes, p. 204 .

8. See Manfred Schulze, Fuersten und Reformation: Geistliche Reformpolitik weltlicher Fuersten vor der Reformation. (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1991.), p. 47, n. 8; also see APB. 1, p. 315.

9. Schulze, Ref orirtpol it ik . pp. 192-197.

10. Schulze, Reformpolit ik. p. 196. 7X

11. ”Es gehoert zum Selbstverstaendnis des Fuersten, dass er auch ueber den geistlichen Wandel in seinem Territoriura wacht und diese Aufgabe nicht den Bischoefen ueberlaesst. Er glaubt sich schon im 15. Jahrhundert dazu aufgerufen, neben dem zeitlichen Wohl auch "geistlichs wesen" in seinem Land zu foerdern und wenn noetig zu reformieren." Schulze, Reformpolitik, pp. 196-197.

12. Schindling, Terr itorien. pp. 9-11; and Saechsische Geschichte, p.147.

13. Wartenberg, Landesherrscha ft, p. 22.

14. For an excellent illustration of how the complex land division effected later reform activity, see Susan C. Karant-Nunn, Zwickau in Transition. 1500-1547: The Reformation as an Agent of Change. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987), p. 9.

15. Ernest died on August 26, 1486, following a fall from a horse, saechsische Geschichte. p. 148.

16. Saechische Geschichte. p. 165; Hoiborn. History. pp. 3 8-43.

17. Michael Hughes, Early Modern Germany: 1477-1806. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 25.

18. Schwiebert, Luther. p. 254.

19. Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: His Road to Reformation. 1483-1521. Trans. James L. Schaaf. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.) p. 118.

20. See APB. 1, p. 316-317; and Saechische Geschichte. p. 164.

21. For George see APB. 8, pp. 684-687; and for an extensive bibliography on relevant material see Guenther Wartenberg, "Luthers Beziehungen zu den Saechsischen Fuersten," in Leben und Werk Martin Luthers von 1526 bis 1546: Festqabe zu Seinem 500 Geburtstacr. Hrsg. Helmar Junghans (Berlin, 1983) , pp. 562-666, 925, n. 132. For Henry see APB, 11, 601-603; also Wartenberg, "Beziehungen," pp. 568-569, 928, n. 188 . 22. Saechische Geschichte. p. 166. 7‘J

23. Brandenburg, Hori tz. p. 10.

24. Katherine (1487-1561) was born the fourth daughter of Duke Magnus II of Mecklenberg, NDB, 11, pp- 325-326; see also Brandenburg, Moritz, p. 10; Karl Heinz Blaschke, Moritz von Sachsen: Ein Reformations- Furst der zweiten Generation. (Goettinge, 1983), p. 14; Wartenberg, Landesherrschafft. pp. 53-54; and Wartenberg, "Beziehungen,” p. 570.

25. In 1515 George married his son John to Elisabeth of Hesse, in 1523 his daughter Christine to Philip of Hesse, and in 1524 another daughter, Magdalena, to Joachim II of Brandenburg. See Schindling, Territor ien. p. 11.

26. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, p. 22.

27. During George's rule revenue from mining increased nearly ten-fold, see Carsten, Princes, p. 202. One particular peasant who gained from this Saxon economic boom during the period was Hans Luther, the father of Martin Luther, Kittelson, Luther the Reformer. pp. 32-3 3.

28. Carsten, Princes. p. 204.

29. For George's involvement with the church see Schulze, Reformpolit ik. pp. 136-143; also Mark U. Edwards, Luther's Last Battles: Politics and Polemics, 15 3 1-46. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1983), pp. 39-40; Hans Becker, "Herzog Georg von Sachsen als Kirchlicher und Theologischer Schriftsteller," Archiv fuer Reformationsgeschichte 24 (1927), pp. 161-269; and Ingetraut Ludolphy, "Die Ursachen der Gegnerschaft zwischen Luther und Herzog Georg von Sachsen," Lutheri ahrbuch (1965), pp. 28-44.

30. For what follows on the Leipzig Debate see Brecht, Road to Reformation, pp. 299-323.

31. Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 320.

32. Ludolphy, "Gegnerschaft," pp. 34-35.

33. Edwards, Last Battles, p. 40.

34. Acten und Briefe zur Kirchenpolitik Herzog Georgs Sachsen. Bd. 1. 1517-1524. Hrsg. Von Felican Gess (Leipzig, 1905), pp. 269-271. 8(1

35. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 31.

36. Quoted from Edwards, Printina. p. 14.

37. Edwards, Printing. pp. 31-37. Specifically to this point see p. 36.

38. Edwards, Print inq. p. 31, 37.

39. Edwards, Last Battles, pp. 38-63.

40. Warnunqe Doctor Martini Luther, an seine lieben Deutschen. WA 30/3, 276-320.

41. Edwards suggests that the violent language of Luther's treatise "betrayed" his denial that he intended no incitement to rebellion. The popular perception that Warning in fact prompted resistance may be evidenced by its reappearance at the hands of the Protestant leadership on the eve of the Schmalkaldic War; see Edwards, Last Battles, pp. 29-30.

42. Widder des Luthers warnunq an die Deutschen das sie dem Kevser nicht sollen gehorsam sein. Ein ander warnunq das sie sich dadurch nicht verfuren noch zu unqehorsam bewegen lassen durch einen aehorsamen unoartei ischen: in WA 30/3, 416-423 .

43. WA 30/3, 4 18.

44. Issleib, "Die Jugend Moritzens von Sachsen, 1521- 1541," p. 2. The letter announcing the birth is published in Albert Friedrich von Langenn, Moritz. Herzog und Churfuerst: eine Darstellung aus dem Zeitalter der Reformation. Teile 2 . (Leipzig, 1841), p.177.

45. Johannes Voigt, Deutsches Hofleben im Zeitalter der Reformat ion. (Dresden: Verlag Wolfgand Jess, 1937), pp.9-10; See also Issleib, "Jugend", p. 3; Blaschke, Moritz, p . 18.

46. During a visit to the Freiburg court, Moritz and his younger brother Severin displayed their fighting skills for their Uncle George. Reports state the younger brother won the day, reflecting greater skills in combat than Moritz. Issleib, "Jugend," p. 3. XI

47. Brandenburg, Moritz. p.11; Issleib, "Jugend" p. 4 .

48. Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 12.

49. Issleib, "Jugend," p. 4.

50. On October 11, 1533, Severin died in Innsbruck. Issleib, "Jugend," p. 4.

51. PKMS. 1, p. 6. See also Wartenberg, LandesherrschaIt. p.104.

52. Christof Carlowitz (1507-1578) see Brandenburg, Moritz. pp. 13-14; Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, p. 64, n. 232; APB, 3, pp. 788-790.

53. Blaschke, Mor itz. p. 16.

54. The nature of Moritz's spiritual temperment was a constant point of conflict between Ericli Brandenburg and Simon Issleib. Brandenburg simply asserted a religious indifference (Gleichgueltigkeit), which ran as a hermeneutical thread throughout his evaluation of these early years; Moritz, pp. 12, 14, 32; Issleib objected to such assertions, "Jugend", pp. 4, n.l; 5, n .3 ; 17, n .3.

55. PKMS. 1, p. 8, n. 1.

56. Edwards, Last Battles, pp. 44-63.

57. For background on Elisabeth see Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 27-28; Wartenberg, "Beziehungen," pp. 566- 568; NDB. 4, p. 451.

58. The hereditary and territorial ties between the Wettin house and the Hessian landgraves dating from the late fourteenth century resulted in dual dynastic marriages between the courts. In 1515 George's heir Johann married Elisabeth of Hesse, and in 1523 Landgrave Philip of Hesse married George's daughter Christine. see Guenther Wartenberg, "Kurfuerst Moritz von Sachsen und die Landgrafschaft Hessen: ein Beitrag zur hessischen Reformationsgeschichte." Jahrbuch der Hessischen Kirchenaeschicht1ichen Vereiniauna, 34 (1983), p . 1.

59. Elisabeth took an active mediating role between Ferdinand and Philip in Wuerttemburg in 1534, X2

contributing to the eventual treaty of Kaadan. NDB, 4, 451.

60. Blaschke, Moritz. pp. 16-17; Brandenburg, Moritz. pp. 14-16; Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 104-105.

61. Blaschke, Moritz, p. 17

62. Wartenberg, MLandgrafschaft Hessen," pp. 2-3.

63. George Carlowitz (1480-1550), ADB, 3, p. 791; Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 15-16; Wartenberg, Landesherrschaf t, pp. 8 7-89.

64. As to Carlowitz1s writing ability see Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 15.

65. Amtmann (Administrator) for Dresden, 1510; Landvogt (Bailiff) for Pirna District, 1517. Hauptmann (Military Captain) for Sagan 1520, He married Anna von Pflug on September 15, 1521, and was appointed to Dresden in 1522, see Wartenberg, Landesherrscha ft. p. 87 .

66. Wartenberg, Landesherrscha ft. p. 87.

67. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaf t. p. 88.

68. Julius Pflug (1499-1564) see the critical edition of his works, Julius Pflug Correspondance. Ed. J.V. Pollet. 5 Vol. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969-1982.)

69. As early as 1534, discussions were held in Leipzig between representatives of Cardinal Albert and Electoral Saxony, with Pflug present. Though these talks were unsuccessful, they foreshadowed the Erasmian attempts for agreement in the later conferences at Hagenau, Worms and Regensburg. See Guenther Wartenberg, "Die Re 1igions-gespraeche von 1534 und 1539. Ihre Bedeutung fuer saechsische-albertinische Innenpolitik und fuer das Wirken Georgs von Karlowitz." in Die Reliaionsgespraeche der Reformationszeit. Hrsg. von Gerhard Mueller. (Guetersloh: Guetersloher Verlaghaus Mohn, 1980), p. 35. See also Joseph Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation: Volume One. Trans, by T. L. Westow (New York: Association Press), pp. 226, 23 5-2 37.

70. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 54. SI

71. Henry received protection from the League, but due to his limited resources against George, he was not officially a member. The ambiguity of this agreement would later engender debate between the Albertines and Ernestines regarding Moritz's responsibi1ites. Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 24.

72. PKMS, 1, pp. 9-1; Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p .105.

73. PKMS, 1, p.14. Text published in Langenn, Moritz. bd 2, pp.177-181.

74. Regarding Loeser see, Wartenberg, "Martin Luther und Moritz von Sachsen." Lutheriahrbuch (42) p. 53; Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 105, n. 442; Issleib's opinion of the influence of this period on Moritz's confessionalism is stated clearly: "doch ist er dort, wie man wuenschte und wollte, ein echter evangelischer Christ geworden." ("There he became, as they wished and desired, a genuine Lutheran Christian."] Issleib, "Jugend", p.10. Impossible as it is to assert Moritz's "genuine" Christianity, it is noteworthy that later appeals to Moritz from Duke George presuppose his loyalty to the Lutheran cause. See also PKMS, 1, p. 3 3; 35.

75. Wartenberg, "Luther und Moritz," p. 53

76. PKMS. 1, p. 11, n. 1.

77. Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 19.

78. Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 31-34.

79. Hubert Jedin, History of the Council of Trent. Vol.1: The Struggle for the council. Trans, by Dom Ernest Graf, (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1957), pp.355, 370-71. Also Lecler, Toleration. p. 229 .

80. For an excellent introduction to Philip, together with bibliography see Hans J. Hillebrand, Landgrave Philipp of Hesse 1504 - 1567: Religion and Politics in the Reformation. (St. Louis: Foundation for Reformation Research, 1967); also Wartenberg, "Landgrafschaft Hessen."

81. Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 31-34; Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, p . 10 6. PKMS, 1, 32-36. X4

82. Carlowitz's offer to Moritz in which any fears are allayed concerning a forced return to Cartholicism, PKMS. 2, p. 35.

83. Elisabeth's letter to Katherine in PKMS. 2, pp. 32-34.

84. Henry's letter to John Frederick asking for his intervention, PKMS. 2, pp. 34-35.

85. "Darum uns nit fugen will, als Ir selbst wol bedencken sollt, dass wir uns von S.L. und Irem hof ahn unsers herrn vaters und 1. mutter, auch des kurfursten rat und willen zu hz. Jorgen zu begebe." PKMS, 2, p. 36 .

86. Brandenburg, Moritz. pp. 33-34.

87. Helga-Maria Kuehn, Die Einziehunq des qeistliches Gutes im Albert inischen Sachsen. 1539-1553 . Mitteldeutsche Forschungen 43. (Koln/Graz, 1966), pp. 24-33. Guenther Wartenberg, "Die Entstehung der sachsenische Landeskirche von 1539-1559." In Das Jahrhundert der Reformation in Sachsen. Hrsg. von Helmar Junghans. (Evangelische VerlagsanstaIt: Berlin, 1989), pp.67-90; and also Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 94-102.

88. Instructions for the first visitation in Emil Sehling, Die Evange1ischen Kirchenordnungen des XVI. Jahrhunderts; Erster Band. Sachsen und Thuringen. nebst anorenzenden Gebieten. 1. Halfte. [EKO} (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 257-264. Wartenberg, "Entstehung." pp. 68- 69 .

89. Note Justus Jonas's reports to Henry and John Frederick in, Der Briefwechsel des Justus Jonas, bd.2. Bearb. von Gustav Kawerau. (Halle, 1885), pp. 351-362; Especially p. 357. EKO, 1/1, p. 86. Wartenberg, "Entstehung." p. 75.

90. EKO. 1/1, pp. 264-281.

91. The forward to the first edition was signed by Justus Jonas, George Spalatin, Casper Cruciger, Freidrich Myconius, Justus Menius, and Johannes Weber, and was published by Hans Luft. See Wartenberg, "Enstehung," p. 71. X5

92. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 94; and PKMS. 1, p. 151.

93. George left a debt of nearly 500,000 guilders, and assets of only 128,393 guilders. See Carsten, Princes. p. 202.

94. Irmgard Hoess, "The Lutheran Church of the Reformation: Problems of its Formation and Organization in the Middle and North German Territories." in The Social History of the Reformation. Ed.s Lawrence P. Buck and Jonathan Zophy. (Columbus: Ohio State, 1972), p. 328; Wartenberg, "Entstehung." pp. 71-72. Second Visitation instructions in EKO, 1/1, pp. 281-284.

95. WA Br 9, 5 18; Guenther Wartenberg, "Luther und Moritz" p. 55.

96. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, p. 95.

97. John Frederick advised the removal of George Carlowitz, and in 1540 both he and his nephew had portions of property confiscated. See Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 87-88; and Brandenburg, Moritz. p . 49 .

98. During the final stages of negotiation over Duke George's will, George Carlowitz won Landgrave Philip's cautious favor by advocating inheritance claims advantageous to Hesse. He considered entering Hessian service following his demotion, but eventually opted to work with the Mansfeld court. As the distance grew between Moritz and his father, Philip saw benefits to the Carlowitz's tightening their relationship to Moritz. See Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 43. For a good example of Philip's caution, note his strong admonition to Carlowitz in a June 13, 1541 letter, "Lass Dich ja nicht verleiten, etwas Herzog Moritz zum Schaden zu thun." PKMS. 1, p. 147.

99. Brandenburg, Mor itz. pp. 39ff. Issleib, "Jugend" p p . 2 6 f f .

100. Issleib, "Jugend," pp. 25-26.

101. Hastings Eells, The Attitude of Martin Bucer Toward the Bigamy of Philip of Hesse. (New Haven: Yale, 1924.) William Walker Rockwell, Die Doppelehe des Landurafen Philipp von Hessen. (Marburg: Elwert, 1904.) X(>

102. Issleib, "Jugend," pp. 28-29.

103. PKMS. 1, p. 86. Langenn, 2, p. 190

104. Karlheinz Blascke, "Moritz von Sachsen." in Die Reformationszeit 2. Hrsg. Martin Greschat. (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1981.) p. 298.

105. Anton von Schoenberg (1495-1554), orginally an advisor to Duke George but converted to Protestantism and entered John Frederick's service in 1533. He joined the Freiburg court in 1536, becoming the primary ducal counselor in 1539. See Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 55 .

106. For Moritz's legal struggle see Brandenburg, Moritz. pp. 74-75; Issleib, "Jugend," pp. 53-59; for correspondence relating to the ordeal see PKMS, 1, pp. 161-182.

107. PKMS. 1, pp. 178-180.

108. Weakened politically by his bigamy, Philipp signed a treaty with Charles in June at Regensburg. Philip successfully included Moritz in the pact. Both agreed to be loyal to Charles in matters not touching the faith. ("Doch ist hierinn ausgenomen die religionsach und was das deselbigen anhanget auf beden seiten...") Text of treaty found in Briefwechse1 Landqraf Philipps des Grossmuetiqen von Hesse mit Bucer. Bd. 3. Hrsg, Max Lenz (Osnabruck: Zeller, 1965). p. 91-96, for quoted religious exemption p.96. Moritz's acknowledgment of the treaty in PKMS, 1, pp. 147; 149-150; Issleib, "Moritz von Sachsen als evangelischer Fuerst, 1541-1553," p. 993.

109. Incentive for compliance in the treaty came with Charles' assurance that he would ratify Moritz's elevation upon Henry's death: "...das er, hertzog Moritz, in gleicher treu und gehorsam gegen uns beleibe in massen gemelter landgrave. Dagegen so sollen und woellen wir als ain romischer kaiser denselben (so] hertzog Moritzen sein land, leut, und gerechtigkeit in gnedigen kaiserlichen bevelch haben, und so begebe, das sein vatter hertzog Hainrich zu sachsen mit tod abgieng, im als den eltesten son die regalien und reichslehen gnediglich leihen und die vatterliche und bruderliche vertrage seiner anherrn. vatters [so] und voettern hertzogen zu Sachsen, die erbung, succession, K7

und belangend, confirmiren und bestettigen." Lenz, Briefwechsel Landgraf. 3, p. 94

110. Brandenburg rightly pointed out that Philip inculcated Moritz with the political posturing of faithfulness to the Protestants in matters of faith, and obedience to to worldly authority in profane matters; see Brandenburg, Moritz, p. 104. The 1541 treaty not only initiated Moritz's working relationship with the Hapsburg's, but to the landgrave's later dismay, it provided the religio-political rationale for the Albertines in the coming years. The complexity of the negotiations emerged in that the agreement did not stop Philip from attacking Brunswick in the summer of 1542, yet it led him to prevent the entrance of Duke William of Cleves into the Schmalkaldic League in 1543. Franz Lau and Ernst Bizer, A History of the Reformation in Germany to 1555. Translated by Brian A. Hardy. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1969), pp. 183-184.

111. Simon Pistoris (1489-1562), studied primarly at Liepzig, with brief stays at Wittenberg and Pavia. Began teaching law at Leipzig in 1515, elevated to full professor in law at the university and appointed to a seat in the Saxon Supreme court in 1519. Joined Duke George's council in 1522, becoming a trusted advisor. Returned to teaching law at Leipzig during Henry's brief reign, rejoined ducal service as chancellor upon Moritz's succession in 1541. For a brief biographical sketch and extensive bibliography see Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 76-81.

112. Moritz's initial appointees: Kasper von Mansfeld, Andreas Pflug, Heinrich Schleinitz, Wolf von Schoenberg, George Carlowitz, Kasper von Schoenberg, Anton von Schoenberg, Ernst Miltitz, Kasper von Schoenberg of Sachsenburg, Heinrich von Luettichau, Melchior Ossa, Christof Ebeleben, George Vitztum, Heinrich von Buenau, Andreas Pflug - district official of Freiberg, Hans von Kitscher, Christof von Haubitz, George Komerstadt, Ludwig Fachs, Hans von Schleinitz, George von Schleinitz, Christof Carlowitz, Simon Pistoris, see PKMS, 1, p. 208. For the religious and political tendencies of the advisors see Saechsishe Geschichte. p. 197; and Wartenberg, "Leipziger Religionsgespraeche." p. 35.

113 . Blaschke, Moritz, pp. 25-28. XX

114. See Brandenburg, Moritz, p. 21; and Wartenberg, "Saechsischen Fuersten," p. 555.

115. Wartenberg, "Entstehung." p. 76.

116. "Was angehet die Regiments besteilung, achten wir warlich Graven Casparn, Jorgen von Carlewitzen und Doctor Simon Pistoris vor erbare menner und fur fromme leuthe, denen ein grosses zuvertrawen stehe, Aber dweil Carlewitz und Pistoris unserer waren religion noch nit so gantz wol bericht,...in den Religion Hendeln, andere gotfurchtige erbare leute neben sie setze und ordnete..." Philip's letter published in Langenn, Moritz, bd. 2, p . 2 11.

117. PKMS. 1, pp. 213; Kuehn, Einz iehung. pp. 75-77.

118. PKMS. 1, p. 216.

119. Herein lay the focal point of Guenther Wartenberg's seminal study on Moritz's ecclesiastical policies from 1451-1546. Wartenberg's research forms the basis for the present summary. For his assertion of the relative neglect of this topic see Landesherrschaft. p. 18.

120. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 270.

121. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, p. 122; See also Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst." pp. 997-998.

122. Participating superintendents and their districts: Anton Lauterbach of Pirna, Johannes Pfeffinger of Leipzig, Casper Zeuner of Freiberg, Johannes Cellarius of Dresden, Petrus Blasanus of Meissen, Johannes Buchner of Oschatz, Lorenz Schroeter of of Annaberg, and Johannes Reimann of of Grosshain. For biographical and bibliographical material on all these clergymen, see. Wartenberg, Landesherrscha ft. p. 123. and pp. 233-267.

12 3 . Wartenberq, Landesherrschaft. P- 124 .

124 . Wartenberg. Landesherrschaft, P- 140 .

12 5 . Wartenberg. Landesherrschaft, P- 126. 126 . Issleib, "evange1ischer Fuerst," pp. 1001-1010 K9

127. Blaschke correctly points out Moritz's significance in the area of education. Yet in doing so he strips the effort of any confessional concern, or any necessity on the duke's part to organize an institution which bore a life of its own. The matter is reduced to a purely political act imposed on a passive institution. Blaschke, "Territorial State." p. 65 .

128. Irmgard Hoess, "Lutheran Church," p. 329.

129. Daniel Greiser (1504-1591), a native Hessen, studied for the priesthood at Erfurt and converted to the Reformation in 1527 through the influence of Erhard Schnepf. Began teaching at Marburg in 1527. Upon the death of Dresden Superintendent Johann Cellarius in early 1542, Landgrave Philip convinced Moritz to appoint Greiser his successor. Greiser, who reluctantly agreed to a six month appointment, eventually held the post for forty-six years. For a brief biographical sketch and bibliography see Wartenberg, Landesherrscha ft. pp. 114-117.

130. Ducal order of May 26, 1542 reads as follows: "Wann re 1igionssachen vorfallen, die lahre gottliches worts, die kirchenordnung und alles, was deme anhengig, belangend, die soellen unser kanzler Dr. Simon Pistoris, der parrherr allheir zu Dresden, Dr. Kommerstadt, Hans von Kitzscher, Dr. Wentzlaus Naumann, George von Schleinitz und Mag. Johann Rivius im fall not hoeren....Darura ist unser genzliche meinung und befelich, ob die vorgenannte durch uns zu der religion siben verordente personen derhalben angelangt wurden, das sie ob solcher unsers herrn vaters kirchenordnung unsers abwesen mit fleiss halten und nimand derselben zu entgegen etwas vorzunehmen oder zu lehren gestatten." PKMS. 1, p. 440. See Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, pp. 143-158; also Wartenberg, "Entstehung," pp. 78-79; Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst," pp. 1032-1033.

131. Wartenberg, "Entstehung," p. 79.

132. EKO. 1, pp. 286-291; Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 173-189.

133. In an October 23 letter to Daniel Greiser, Luther stated that nothing good could come from the Albertine court's investing itself with the power of the Ban, ["Nihil boni sperare possum, Mi Daniel, de forma w

excommunicacionis in aula Vestra presumpta."] 10, 436. See also Wartenberg, "Luther und Moritz", p. 64.

134. Bishop Sigismund of Lindenau died on May 4, 1544.

135. For George III, Prince of Anhalt (1507-1553), see Robert Stupperich, Reformatorenlexikon. (Guetersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1984), pp. 87-88. PKMS. 2, pp. 57-62, 126-128; Emil Sehling, Die Kirchenqesetzgebung unter Moritz von Sachsen 1544-1549 und Georg von AnhaIt. (Leipzig, 1899) ; Erich Brandenburg, "Zur Entstehung des landesherr1ichen Kirchenregimentes im albertinsichen Sachsen." Historisches Vierte1iahrschrift 4 (1901) pp. 195-237; Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst", pp. 1076-1077; see also Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 190-203.

136. For a detailed discussion of this debate see Brandenburg, "landesherr1ichen Kirchenregimentes," where he describes the resulting church organization as a strange mixture of the episcopacy and the territorial state, p . 218.

137. Brandenburg, "landeherrlichen Kirchen regimentes," pp. 216-217; the Dresden court's foundation document describing the responsibilities of the Meissen consisitory is published on pp. 227-228.

138. Hoess, "Formation and Organization," p. 329.

139. Blaschke, "Territorial State."

140. Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: The Preservation of the Church. 1532 -1546, trans. James Schaaf (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1993), pp. 288- 292 .

141. Wartenberg, "Luther und Moritz," p. 68.

142. Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 21-22. Wartenberg, "Luthers Beziehungen" p. 561,

143. In his offer of assistance against the Turkish advance of 1542, Moritz assured King Ferdinand that, "Dorauf E. Mt. ich gantz dinstlicher meinung nicht will bergen, das es E. Kgl. M t . gentzlich davor achten sollen, dass ich nicht allein begirig, mich mit E. Kgl. M t. in underthanigkeit zu bekennen, sonder ganz willig E. Kgl. M t . meines vermugens angeneme and gefellige dienst zu erzeigen." PKMS, 1, p. 345. V]

144. In a letter to the landgrave, George Carlowitz related how during a skirmish before Pest the enthusiastic prince strayed too far into the enemy lines. His horse shot from beneath him, Moritz found himself surrounded. A fellow nobleman rushed to Moritz's side and eventually died warding off the enemy until another horse could be brought. Carlowitz hoped that his gracious lord would be more intelligent in the future.(Ich hoffe, mein gn. herr werde hinfurder witziger werden.) PKMS, 1, pp. 493-494.

145. Paula Sutter Fichtner, Ferdinand of Austria: The Politics of Dvnasticism in the Age of the Reformation (New York: Columbia University, 1982.) p. 151. C H A P T E R II

THE LINE IN THE SAND: MORITZ'S ROAD TO REGENSBURG

Moritz's road to Regensburg was paved by his

struggle for confessional order and political stability within his territory. This tenuous balancing act molded his relationships with John Frederick, Philip, and the Schmalkaldic League, and had far reaching

implications for the progressively unstable field of

imperial politics. Emperor Charles V had never surrendered the conviction of his responsiblity for reuniting the empire both legally and religiously.

Though a military solution was not his primary intention, that possiblity grew as the lines between confessional integrity and imperial rebellion became evermore blurred. As the fissure widened between the

Schmalkaldic League and the emperor, issues of loyalty to faith and obedience to authority came to bear on

Albertine Saxony's imperial policies, eventually leading to Moritz's fateful decision in June 1546.

92 93

A constant source of tension and mistrust between Moritz and John Frederick centered on the Albertine policy of remaining aloof from the Schmalkaldic League.

The first steps in this conflict came with the Brunswick campaign of 1542. During Moritz's extended stay in Hesse in early 1541 Philip convinced the duke of the necessity of taking military action against Henry of Brunswick. Moritz entered into a secret treaty with the landgrave and elector at Naumburg in late October in which the three would either together, or with the assistance of the Schmalkaldic League, undertake military action against Henry.1 Here emerged the first clash of wills between the political figures seeking to shape the future of

Albertine policy. Direct participation in an attack against Charles V's primary north German ally, along with involvement with the Ernestine led League, raised serious hazards for Albertine imperial policy. Despite his initial agreement, George Carlowitz quickly convinced the duke to back off by declaring the 1537 agreement between Duke Henry and the League invalid, hence non-binding on Moritz.2 Despite this official rebuff, Moritz assured John Frederick and Philip that he would readily join them in defending matters of faith.1 Moritz's decision meant victory for those 94

seeking to maintain the traditional Albertine position, and proved a harbinger for decisions to come.4 It was clear that any Albertine involvement with the League would be filtered through the expediency of maintaining harmonious association with the Hapsburgs. Such, of course, was not a priority for the elector.

In January of 154 2 John Frederick took unprecedented legal steps by deposing the recently elected Bishop of the Naumburg diocese, Julius Pflug, and installing the Lutheran, Nikolaus Amsdorf.' The elector's bold move effectively integrated the bishopric into the state of Electoral Saxony.6 As an influential member of the Meissen nobility and brother-in-law to George Carlowitz, Pflug's presence in the bishopric had given Albertine Saxony leverage within a territory under Ernestine protection. Despite Pflug's Erasmian demeanor, his Albertine bloodline posed a political and administrative liability to the senior branch.7 Here again the inner-Wettin struggle flared beneath the surface of ostensible reforming activity. John Frederick's action not only infuriated a better portion of the Albertine court, but also aggravated his deteriorating relations with Charles V, who would later use this deed as one of the grounds for military intervention against the elector.* 95

Perhaps the most significant portent of the conflict to come transpired in March and early April of 1542 .9 On the pretense of collecting obligatory taxes for the defense against the Turk, John Frederick moved troops into the town of Wurzen. Legally an estate of the Bishop of Meissen and under joint Albertine and Ernestine protection, the elector justified his act on the grounds thar Bishop John VIII had refused to hand over the funds. Perhaps in light of his recent success in Naumburg, the elector saw the opportunity to reform the obstinate bishopric.10 Despite a warning from Moritz that such action would not be tolerated, the elector invested the city of Wurzen on March 22.” Moritz took offense to what he considered open aggression against his territorial rights and honor. His impassioned plea for Philip's assistance revealed the profound Albertine mistrust and animosity harbored for their cousins. Moritz felt bullied, and claimed that John Frederick's actions proved the elector's

dissatisfaction with minor causes, and the desire to grasp larger prey in his designs to exploit our youth and bring to fruition the intrigues undertaken against our father and Duke George."'2 Did his cousin think him stupid? Did he think that in his youth he would not understand the political and economic ramifications of such aggression?” 96

John Frederick’s unilateral incursion into the protectorate threatened not only Moritz's princely honor, but also violated the legal boundaries established during the Leipzig partition of 1485. It was specifically for the purpose of giving Albertine Saxony a viable link between her Meissen and Thuringian lands that Ernest and Albert negotiated the joint protection rights. Wurzen controlled the Mulda pass, an important east west trade route for the divided Albertine lands, and therefore carried strong economic and military value. Unlike the many other territorial indiscretions suffered by the Albertines at the hands of John Frederick, this action could not be negotiated away or relegated to the bureaucratic channels of courtly appeals.14 Regardless of John Frederick's rationale, his military presence in Wurzen created a direct threat to Albertine Saxony's political stability and Moritz declared his intention to fight.14

Albertine Saxony immediately mobilized for engagement. Moritz ordered his troops to peacefully escort electoral forces from the city, but if met with military resistance they were to return in kind.16 Philip initiated peace talks which met with success on

April 10, with Moritz and John Frederick signing the treaty of Oschatz. The castle and city of Wurzen were 97

placed under the management of the landgrave, and the

bishopric returned to John VIII. The mutual protection

rights remained as before, with both Moritz and John Frederick given full rights of passage.17 Philip's success in uniting the cousins proved

temporary. The damage had been done, for each prince

saw the willingness of the other to employ military measures for the purpose of territorial policy. Moritz

would neither forgive or forget. John Frederick's action only confirmed for him the long held conviction

that their blood relatives sought domination. Moritz's reaction was in no way youthful

impetuousness. Having been raised and educated as an Albertine prince, he consciously surrounded himself

with advisors who had devoted their lives to maintaining Albertine independence over against

Ernestine Saxony. Wurzen revealed not only the

rationale for Moritz's animosity, but also his

determined willingness to preserve traditional

territorial integrity.

It seemed only a matter of time before the alienation between Moritz and John Frederick spilled

over into the broader field of imperial conflict.

Nearly three decades of threats and counter-threats between the emperor, pope, and Protestant princes, 98

together with the increasing frustration on all sides for a settlement, impelled leaders to seek aggressive

and final solutions. The time of mere saber rattling was over, for many were convinced that the sword would be of better use unsheathed.

Prelude to War. The interpenetrating character of the religious and political issues of sixteenth century Europe found embodiment in the name "Protestant." When six Lutheran princes and fourteen south German cities "protested" against the decision of the 1529 Diet of Speyer to revoke religious liberties granted in that same city three years earlier, it was an act initiated by secular rulers in a secular assembly against a secular superior, in the name of religion.1* That act, which engendered the most common designation for the movement which broke with Catholicism, accelerated the threat of imperial fragmentation. With the matters of faith, law, and social order tightly woven together, the religious division which had scarred German domains for nearly a quarter of a century effectively ground the

Reich1s legal structure to a halt.

The atomizing effect of confessional division on imperial unity prompted cries for a general church 99

council. The council question had been in the air since the early 1520fs, with the divisive issue being under whose auspices such a definitive conference would gather.19 The Protestants demanded a free national council, that is, apart from the formal authority of Rome, while the papacy refused to acknowledge any council not called and officiated under their guidance. Through the years this matter became one more bargaining chip in the complex tug of wars between Protestant and Catholic, emperor and pope, Hapsburg and

Valois. Coupled with the chronic Turkish threat and the intensity of intra-Protestant doctrinal squabbling, definite times and places along with sincere commitments of attendance proved evasive.30 Yet a council was imperative for the emperor's vision of a cohesive empire.31 Charles V had never given up his plan for reestablishing legal unity in the empire. It

was obvious that religious consensus was basic to

political order, hence the solution had to be found in an ecclesiastical authority acknowledged by both sides which could decide on final and binding answers to the religious questions.33 The complexities of the religious issue were

further hampered by disintegrating legal order and central authority. Prominent Protestants were 100 demanding a complete overhaul of the Imperial Tribunal rReichskammeraericht ] , and until such action took place they refused to acknowledge its judicial authority. For several years Charles and Ferdinand made promises and compromises in this matter in order to receive aid for protection against exterior threats,33 yet it became obvious in the early forties that Protestant activity, such as the Brunswick affair and John Frederick's dealings with Naumburg, stripped the empire of its capacity to effectively defend itself from outward aggression and legislate internal peace. Continuance of such a state of affairs threatened the existence of the Reich, and pointed to the necessity for war.33 Decision for war should not infer that military force had been Charles' goal. He sought constitutional obedience and order in all areas including religion, and to this end he did not primarily seek to make war on heretics. Charles sought a unified imperial legal structure in which the religious differences could be managed, and to this end he showed a willingness for religious negotiations.3' Such an opportunity arose in 1538 when Ferdinand's concern over possible Turkish advances in the east raised the possibility of renewed talks with Joachim II of Brandenburg. Joachim felt the principles by which he had reformed his territory 101 offered a basis for conciliation with the emerging moderation of Erasmian Catholics.26

For discussions to take place, the Hapsburgs needed to grant a period of peace. With the Turkish threat providing leverage, Ferdinand granted a six month standstill on all legal action directed at the Protestants. Known as the The "Frankfurt Standstill," the agreement signed in April 1G39 promised an additional fifteen months if the Protestants refrained from further secularization of church property and admitted no addition members to the Schmalkaldic League.27 Despite attempts by both camps to reach a settlement, discussions over the next two years met with no success.2® Negotiations between the Protestants and Catholic moderates scheduled in April 1540 at

Speyer fell victim to plague. After a delay and a move to Hagenau, discussions began in June, but League leaders refused to attend and illness prevented

Melanchthon from participating. Hagenau ended in failure, with the only agreement being to gather at Worms later that same year.29

Officially the meetings at Worms achieved little, but secret meetings between Strassburg theologians and Catholic moderates produced the so-called "Regensburg 102

Book'* which contained tentative doctrinal agreements, including compromise on the article of justification.30 When the emperor ordered the meetings at Worms to adjourn and reassemble at Regensburg later that summer, moderating parties saw a faint glimmer of hope for unity. Enthusiasm though was short-lived, and raised hopes plummeted with shattering finality at Regensburg. Compromise, however much in the spirit of good will, clashed with the conviction that making doctrinal distinctions was intrinsic to confession. What Luther and Erasmus discovered sixteen years earlier, the negotiators experienced with exasperation. When the

articles were discussed in detail and the ramifications of accepting the mediating position became obvious to the opposing sides, the discussions quickly ended. At base, the Protestants rejected the supreme teaching authority of the Catholic church.31 Erasmian moderation failed to breech the gap between the contending parties, and Charles failed to find that common ground on which to settle the dispute. Amidst the disintegration of religious compromise Ferdinand arrived from the Hungarian front with reports of an impending Turkish advance. Despite confessional failure, military concerns necessitated further 103

compromises to the Protestants. Charles extended the provisions of the Peace of Nuremberg as amended by the Frankfurt Standstill for a period of eighteenth months.” It was hoped that a general or national council could be arranged during that period. Such was not to be the case. Charles' frustrations with the papal court's reluctance to commit to any definitive action prompted him to force the issue regarding a reforming council. At the Diet of Speyer in 1544 Charles lost patience. In return for needed support against France, he granted the Germans a future Diet to settle the religious issues. Ironically, this promised national council received a fatal blow with Charles' rapid victory over the French. A stipulation in the Treaty of Crepy forced Francis I to acquiesce to a future council to be called by the pope. Having lost leverage with the defeat of France, Rome called for the opening of a council to be held in Trent in March of 1545. Shifting circumstances forced the emperor to tread cautiously with both the papacy and the Protestants. A double-edged policy emerged from the imperial court as Charles supported the pope's council plans while at the same time continuing to negotiate with the Germans in the language and context of a national council.” 104

Suspicion and mistrust emanated from every side. In early 154 5 Philip of Hesse, prompted by the conviction that the very existence of Protestantism was in the balance, pleaded with his son-in-law to align with the Schmalkaldens. Horitz again assured Philip that he was a loyal Protestant prince and would defend his co-religionists if they were attacked on account of

their faith, but his priority was the defense of the empire against the Turk, a position the League refused

to take without religious guarantees from Charles.34 It was obvious to Charles that merely issuing a call for a council solved little unless the princes and prelates attended and acquiesced. The military presence and subversive activities of the rebels gave faint hope for such a development, convincing the emperor that war was the only viable alternative. As the Diet of Worms opened in March of 154 5, Charles maintained a posture of openness to the Protestants while covertly negotiating with Rome for finances and military support. Justified in his own mind by the Protestant refusal to grant aid in defense of the Turk without religious concessions he signed a treaty with the pope in June.” The instability of imperial order took another blow with the events of the late summer and fall in 105 north Germany.M Duke Henry of Brunswick, who represented the last major force for imperial Catholic policy in the north, attempted to reclaim his lands lost three years earlier. He met with quick defeat and eventual imprisonment at the hands of Philip of Hesse. Henry's incarceration added one more link in the long chain of rebellious actions on the League's part, and served to solidify Charles' resolve to impose a military solution.37 Confronted with a formidable foe Charles sought avenues for fragmenting their coalition. Opportunity for dividing Protestant strength appeared ripe with Moritz's vacillation between the League and the Reich. and more specifically, the well-known friction between Ernestine and Albertine Saxony. As the circumstances on the imperial stage continued to squeeze the Albertines into a definitive stance either for or against the Hapsburgs, the diplomatic gamesmanship of Moritz's councilors grew in intensity. In early 1545 George Carlowitz retired from full participation in ducal politics, and his departure brought George Komerstadt to the forefront of the

Dresden court.1* A long time councilor with solid credentials, Komerstadt deviated from the elder Carlowitz in that he urged closer ties to the

Schmalkaldic league, and as a result two parties 106 emerged in the Dresden Court.39 On one side was Komerstadt who emphasized the Protestant aspects of Albertine politics, but whose deeply rooted Albertine nature knew the importance of maintaining ties with the Hapsburgs. He prodded Moritz to play a constructive mediating role. The opposition led by Christof Carlowitz reflected the more militant anti-Ernestine character of Albertine policy. Seeing war as unavoidable, he pursued the policy of alignment with the Hapsburgs, as they would be favored to win.40 Moritz's first major attempt at constructive mediation resulted in failure, and exposed the prince to critical suspicion from both the League and the Hapsburgs. Though actively participating with Philip in the Fall campaign against Henry of Brunswick, his attempted truce between between the duke and landgrave resulted in Henry's imprisonment. His effort evoked criticism from both parties and raised questions of where his ultimate loyalty lay. Never one to lose an opportunity, Charles moved to exploit the uneasy relations amongst the Protestants. The inherent tension between John Frederick and Moritz would prove to be fruitful for the emperor's plans, and the focal point would be the coveted bishopric of Magdeburg. 107

The Archbishopric of Magdeburg and the Bishopric of Halberstadt had attracted the attention of north German princes for years.4 In coveting this strategic territory Moritz and John Frederick joined a long list. In 1543 Moritz had suggested that the protection rights to the two territories be given to him as payment for services against the French.41 When the emperor balked, he approached the matter from another angle. In early

1544, Moritz opened negotiations with Archbishop

Albert, offering 40,000 gulden to have August appointed as coadjutor, along with the transference of hereditary rights to the Dresden line.43 Albert promised to speak to the emperor about this matter and began working on gaining the resignation of the present coadjutor. Vet before the promise could be fulfilled the archbishop died, and with the elevation of Johann Albert of Brandenburg, Moritz lost another opportunity.44

Albertine loss became Ernestine gain when Johann

Albert turned to the elector for help. The cities of

Halle and Magdeburg fell under the authority of the archbishop, yet due to confessional allegiance these cities refused to acknowledge the new bishop's territorial rights. The proximity and friendly relations between these cities and the elector precluded the archbishop from attempting military 108

action. Negotiations between the parties ensued, resulting in an acknowledgment of the archbishop’s formal authority by the cities, together with a corresponding guarantee of religious toleration.45 These developments only substantiated for Charles that unless the militant rebels could be suppressed the empire was doomed, hence Magdeburg proved pivotal for his Regensburg discussions with Moritz. Throughout the late fall and winter of 1545-1546 confessional and political positions hardened. The

Council of Trent opened on December 13, and Charles became ever more convinced that force would be needed to compel the Protestants to attend.46 Philip diligently worked to organize and fund military measures during the League's diet at Frankfurt and later at their April diet at Worms. His attempts turned to loud complaints that the League was not making sufficient preparation.47 Rumors intensified that Charles sought to uproot the heretics, and popular voices cloaked the military threat in confessional rhetoric.48

Moritz refused to commit, maintaining a position of neutrality. In the face of heightened warnings and pleas to assist his co-religionists, he staunchly held to his tenuous balancing act between what he asserted 109 was loyal Christian obedience to his emperor, and faithfulness to the Augsburg Confession. Herein lay crux of the matter.

The issue of Resistance.

The issue of obedience or resistance to God- ordained authority formed the focal point of the polemical battles which raged during the summer of 154 6 and beyond. Squarely in the middle of this neuralgic debate stood the Lutheran Moritz, educated in the faith and teachings of the new church, hence indoctrinated with the strong admonitions for a Christian's responsibility to obey authority. Yet Moritz's personal relationship with Philip of Hesse undoubtedly offered exposure to the arguments for resistance against ungodly rulers, especially since the landgrave had played a seminal part in the development of the teaching.J<>

The issue of resistance to worldly authority confronted the Protestant movement prior to the Diet of

Augsburg in 1530. w> The political and religious justification for military action against authority which emerged at that time marked a new direction in

Lutheran imperial politics, and underpinned the formation of the Schmalkaldic League. Throughout the I to

1530's theories on resistance continued to be developed and sharpened, shaping the Protestants' view of their rights and privileges in the empire, together with their relationship to the emperor. The issue of the Protestants' right of resistance resurfaced with bitter intensity during the summer of 1545, not only marking the conflict between the rebels and emperor, but striking the chord of disharmony between Moritz and his co-religionists. Since many of the arguments developed throughout the previous decade found expression in the

1546 pamphlet campaign, an overview of resistance theories is necessary. The Lutheran reformers first actively grappled with the issue of resistance following the Diet of Speyer in 1529. Noted for the occasion of the famous "protestation" by the fourteen cities and six princes, the catholic estates rejected the "Protestants" act and resolved to impose the Edict of Worms. Philip of Hesse took the initiative in hammering out an argument for the right to defend the faith in the face of military aggression. In December 1529, in letters to the Elector of Saxony and Margrave of Brandenburg-Ansbach, the landgrave asserted the rights of princes to resist the emperor on the basis of a constitutional rather than roonarchial view of imperial governance.'1 The ] ] ]

Hessians argued that all authority is indeed from God, but they interpreted Paul's statement found in Romans 13 to include all territorial sovereigns. This made the emperor first among equals. They further argued that all sovereigns were bound by legal obligations to one another and that any violation of treaties justified military defense by the offended party. In sum, if it could be established that the emperor had violated his legal standing in regard to the German estates, those estates could lawfully resist. The intrinsic value of this argument lay in the conjoining of military defense with the fundamental Lutheran doctrine that all civil authority was ordained by God. Wittenberg's initial reaction to the Hessian resistance theory was not positive. Elector John submitted the theory to Luther who promptly rejected the premise.55 He could not accept the emperor as being first among equals, holding rather to a monarchial view

of the emperor's office which elevated him qualitatively above other rulers.54 Luther could not endorse what he considered to be undue rebellion

against a God-ordained authority.55

The issue resurfaced in early 1530, as talks began on possible reaction to the scheduled summer diet in

Augsburg. Elector John again sought Luther's opinion 112 concerning the right to resist. The reformer's response of March 6, 1530 was destined to emerge as a key document in the literary conflict on the eve of the Schmalkaldic War.56 Later published as the famous "Doctor Martin Luther's Counsel Written to a Prince Regarding whether Someone may Resist the Emperor if Forcefully Attacked on Account of the Gospel,"57 both the Albertines and the imperialists would exploit this letter to counter arguments of resistance and substantiate demands for obedience. Though details of Luther's argument will be examined later within the context employed, it need only be mentioned here that he vehemently denied the right of resistance to the emperor, specifically with regard to the natural law argument that "it is allowed to repel force by force"

(vim vi repellere licet), and called for passive suffering in the face of aggression.58 Luther's Counsel was not his final word on the matter. The Diet of Augsburg called by Charles to grant the Protestants a fair hearing, ended in disappointment for those hoping that compromise could be reached. The imperial recess clearly rejected the Lutheran position, and the Catholic estates called for a military league for the defense of the empire.59 The issue of resistance resurfaced, with Elector John 113 taking a far more aggressive stand. Having met with little success with Luther and the theologians, John turned to his own Saxon lawyers in the attempt to find sufficient grounds for military mobilization. Under the guidance of Chancellor Gregory Brueck, the advisors drafted a justification for active resistance against the emperor. In late October, Luther, Melanchthon, and Jonas were ordered to Torgau, where in the presence of Brueck and the electoral lawyers they received a straight forward account of the political situation.60 Close attention must be paid to these discussions, for the resolution which emerged from this meeting ended the reformers' outright opposition to resistance, and opened the doors for deliberate steps by the princes to actively defend the faith. The jurists' arguments were not drawn from the constitutional context as with the Hessians, but rather from canon and imperial law.61 Their legal brief posited four cases justifying resistance: if a judge proceeds against a person while the case is under appeal;62 if a judge acts outside his authority;63 when the judge acts unlawfully and the damages are irreparable;w and finally, when the sentence is openly and notoriously unjust.63 Applying these legal 114 precedents to the current circumstances, they argued that since the princes and estates had appealed their case to a free general council, matters of faith were now beyond the emperor's jurisdiction. Further, obedience to the emperor's mandates and commands to act against God's Word would constitute an unsurmountable and irreparable injury, thus, "in matters of faith one must obey God and evangelical truth more than man.""’ The brief stripped the emperor of jurisdiction in matters of faith, and, in the context of his threats to religion, relegated him to the status of private person/7 In sum, if law allowed resistance against a judge attempting irreparable harm to one whose case was on appeal, how much more was resistance due against one who undertook such action without proper authority? Such unlawful actions could only be considered the work of an open and notorious enemy.'* The meeting at Torgau lasted three or four days, and according to later reports, agreement between the lawyers and the theologians was not easily reached.

Apparently the reformers had been called to Torgau not so much as advisors, but as recipients of a lecture on the nuances of law pertaining to the political situation.69 Though Luther refused to recant his previous position that resistance could not be based on 115 natural law fvim vi repellere licet^, he finally agreed to accept the lawyers' legal premise. In a short statement known as the "Torgau Declaration,"70 Luther posed the question: when may one resist authority? His answer placed the entire matter into the hands of the lawyers. If the lawyers were correct, then law allows resistance in the circumstances now confronting the princes. Luther offered no theological rationale apart from a general notion that where no conflict existed between Gospel and secular law, obedience was due the law.71 Did this declaration denote a fundamental shift in Luther's thought? In one sense yes. It ended the reformer's unequivocal opposition to resistance, thus opening the door for future theoretical developments on the matter and giving confessional support to definite military measures by the princes. The use of Luther's note during the formation of the Schmalkaldic League later that year supports the assertion that the Torgau Declaration marked a crucial turning point in the development of Lutheran political theory. Yet Luther later argued that the agreement at Torgau did not reflect a change of heart. In a letter to the concerned Nuremberg city official, Lazarus Spengler, he denied any "recantation" of his earlier position which 116 rejected resistance on the basis of natural law.73 Agreement at Torgau, he stated, "was based on the lawyer's arguments from imperial law which granted the right to resist in matters of notorious injustice.n?< From this premise, that the law itself justifies resistance, he simply followed the scriptural admonition to "render to Caesar, that which is Caesar's," and in this case, Caesar's law granted the right to resist.7S Luther’s modified views on resistance found expression in his famous pamphlet, Dr. Martin Luther's Warning to his beloved German People.76 Embodying the tension between obedience to the emperor and rejection of rebellion, the tract called for active defense of the Gospel. Though primarily pastoral in its intent to soothe the consciences of those who might be scandalized in violently opposing the will of authority, he aggressively argued the Christian's duty to forcefully withstand godless oppression. Luther stressed the devilish nature of the threatened attacks, stressing the case of notorious injustice which validated the lawyer's position. Twice he refered to the lawyers arguments as the grounds for military force against authority.77 Resistance in this case could not be labeled as rebellion, but must be understood as 117

self-defense against, murderers and bloodhounds. In

summation he wrote: "A Christian knows well what he should do, that he give God what is God's and the

emperor, too what is the emperor's, but certainly not the bloodhounds what is not theirs."7® The tyranny of

the aggressor eradicated any accusatory sting of rebellion, for when "murderers and bloodhounds wish to wage war and murder, it is in truth no rebellion to oppose them."79 The logic and polemic of this work

would fit well with the cries for resistance which flowed from the Protestant presses in 1546, for though Luther specifically directed his accusations at the papacy, the tract gained later relevance with the identification of Charles V with the bloodhounds.

Key for the Protestant's initial position was the nature of the notorious injustice or injury of the emperor meddling in the affairs of religion. In 1536 the reformers took a further step in sharpening the theory by stating that resistance was not only allowed, but also an obligation of the princes.®0 Likening the

Catholic insurgence to the invasion of the Turks, Christian duty demanded resistance against such idolatry. As Judas Maccabaeus resisted Antiochus, so also the princes were obligated to fight for correct doctrine.81 Natural law and God's ordinances called the 1 IK princes to resist those who would commit the notorious injury of outlawing clergy marriage, thus tearing apart

God's holy estate. Against such public injury one should resist as one would a murderer on the street.®2 In sum, if the princes and authorities were obligated to resist oppression and immorality, such as the violation of marriage, how much more should they resist public idolatry.*3 A vital aspect of "notorious injustice" merits closer attention, for it adds a dimension to these arguments which grants not only a better understanding of Luther's tension between "rendering to Caesar" and open resistance, but also the eventual division between

Moritz and the League. The Saxon lawyers at Torgau, and later the Wittenberg Gutachten of 1536, argued that one who violated their office as judge, or overstepped the bounds of such an office was guilty of notorious injustice. specifically, the injustice of posturing oneself as judge in matters of faith when, by law, one only had the status of a private person.M The Hessian constitutional argument concluded much the same, asserting that if the emperor violated his election oaths he forfeited his authority and became a "common person."'3 As a result, resistance was not directed against the office, but rather against an enemy who was 119 acting apart from any authority, and thus perpetrating a notorious injustice. As statements over the next decade became sharper and more sophisticated, the aspect of separation of person from office became clearer.** In a 1539 advisory letter to a Brandenburg pastor, Luther addressed the issue of resistance by stating that "our [princes] judge that in this case the emperor is not emperor, but soldier of the pope."*7 Luther's manner of defending the issue implied common assumption which separated person from office. Evidence suggests this manner of viewing the emperor's status may have been in circulation for several years.** From this perspective rendering obedience to Caesar's dignity remained intact. What became the flash point for polemics was

"when and why" the emperor no longer held such dignity.

Theoretically rooted in the earliest Saxon and Hessian justifications for resistance, this argument would find clear expression in the Protestant propaganda on the eve of the Schmalkaldic War. By 154 6 the broad contours of Protestant resistance theory may be summarized as follows. Where the emperor attempted forceful imposition of laws harmful to the true faith, he had overstepped his office and broken his election oath, thus forfeiting 120

the dignity of imperial authority and losing any claim to obedience in the matter. Such action, according to imperial law could only be considered a notorious injustice or injury, permitting resistance. Further, such an attack on the Gospel obligated the princes to protect and defend the true faith, since the church had been entrusted to their care. Put simply, notorious injustice or injury by the emperor's intrusion into religious matters formed the premise from which all

else followed.®9 As the Protestant princes initiated military preparations against the emperor in the spring of 1546, they again sought theological support for the use of force against one's sovereign. In April, John Frederick and Philip sought advice from the spiritual leaders at Wittenberg. Bugenhagen, Crucigar, Major,

and Melanchthon, responded with an advisory letter formulating a justification for military action which not only embraced the principles noted above, but also articulated arguments which would run like a thread

through the protestant polemics in the coming war.w

Beginning with the assertion that God's Word shall never be destroyed, and that God may be punishing Germany for its sin, they admonished the princes that the time had come for repentance and heart-felt prayers 121

for guidance and protection. Though hesitant to counsel on the basis of uncertain suspicions regarding Charles' intentions, they allowed that "if it were certain that the emperor wanted to attack the estates on account of religion," then the estates were justified in resisting, and such resistance would be like defending against a mass-murderer.91 Clearly Charles* intentions were foremost in the minds of the Wittenberg theologians. They structured their advice to the Schmalkaldens on the premise that "if it be certain" [wenn es qewiss istl that Charles sought destruction of the faith, then resistance was legitimate. All that followed rested squarely on the condition of Charles' aggression in matters of faith. Legitimation for defense rested on the nature of the offense. But what if doubts clouded certainty? What if no threat to the true faith could be established? What if it was not evident that the emperor was intruding in matters of faith? A good Lutheran renders to Caesar that which is Caesar's, and to God what is God's, hence when matters of faith were not threatened, due respect and obedience for authority was required the

Christian.92 Moritz's court would argue for this very 122

point, and imperial intentions became the locus of conflict. The question then of obedience to God-ordained authority which shaped the diplomacy of the coming year

transcended mere political gamesmanship. To employ the sword or to keep it sheathed involved profound questions of confessional integrity and conscience to those adhering to the Augsburg Confession.93 As the emperor aligned his forces for the resolution of the conflict, and the Schmalkaldic League cautiously organized their resistance, the words of Luther spoken nearly a decade earlier rang prophetic. In a sermon to the Wittenbergers prior to his leaving for the Schmalkald conference in 1537, Luther warned the congregation that the event taking place was no "child's game," and it "would ring throughout the entire world and into posterity.,,w Luther's estimation of the serious nature of those discussions, and how matters of faith impinged on the stability of the political framework of the time, would prove true in the fateful months to come. m

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. PKMS, 1, p. 225-231.

2. Thomas Brady, "Jacob Sturm and the Seizure of Brunswick-Woelfenbuettel by the Schmalkaldic League, 1542-1545" in Politics. Religion, and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Honor of De Lamar Jensen. ed.s Malcolm R. Thorpe and Arthur J. Slavin (Kirksville: Sixteenth Century Publishers, 1994) pp. 33-51, correctly reports the hesitancy of many Protestants to support this attack, but entirely misses the point with regard to the Albertines. His two references to Moritz are erroneous and misleading. He errs in naming Moritz as one of the "chiefs of the Schmalkaldic League," (p. 33,) and it is misleading when he writes: "In October 1541, the Schmalkaldic chiefs decided to act, and they met at Naumburg with Duke Moritz of Saxony to plan the strike against Henry of Brunswick-Wolfenbuettel. Giving their cause the color of a religious war, so as to make their allies share the costs, they declared war on July 13, 1542, and at the head of twenty thousand men took Henry's lands in a few weeks..."(pp. 35-36.) Though correctly refering to the Naumburg agreement in PKMS, 1, pp. 225- 23 1, he neglects to report the immediate backpedaling of Carlowitz found in PKMS, 1, 234-237. In July Moritz was with Ferdinand fighting the Turk in Hungary.

3. PKMS, 1, pp. 234-237; see also Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst," pp. 999-1000; and Issleib, "Philipp von Hessen, Heinrich von Braunschweig und Moritz von Sachsen in den Jahren 1541-1547," pp. 135- 214 .

4. Brandenburg, Moritz, p. 184.

5. See Pollet, Pfluq Correspondanee. 2, pp. 4-5, 289- 330, and for Nicolaus Amsdorf (1485-1565), pp. 319-321; also see Peter Brunner, Nikolaus von Amsdorf als Bischof von Naumburg. (Guetersloh: Mohn, 1961) pp. 16- 60; Robert Kolb, Nikolaus von Amsdorf f!483-1565): Popular Polemics in the Preservation of Luther's Legacy. (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1978); and Stupperich, Reformatorenlex ikon, pp. 25-27. 124

6. Brecht, Preservation. pp. 300-304.

7. For Pflug's stated intentions for the bishopric see Pollet, Pflug Correspondance, 2, p. 316, n. 1. See also Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 185.

8. Lau and Bizer, History. pp. 176-178.

9. PKMS. 1, pp. 343-411. Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 194-206. Georg Mentz, Johann Friedrich der Grossmuetige: 1503-1554. Zweiter Teil. Vom Regierungsantritt bis zum Beginn des Schmalkaldischen Krieaes. (Jena: Verlag Gustav Fischer, 1908), pp. 499- 505. For Luther's involvement in the ordeal, and the influence of his anti-Albertine position on later polemics against Moritz, see Wartenberg, "Luther und Moritz." pp. 57-59. See also Hermann Kunst, Evange1ischer Glaube und politische Verantwortung. (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1976.) pp. 369- 374 .

10. Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 195.

11. For Moritz's warning to John Frederick see PKMS, 1, p. 344. In the ear iy morning hours of March 22, Wurzen guards opened a city gate for two electoral horsemen and some footsoldiers. Wresting control of the gate from the guards, the intruders signaled a larger body of knights hiding at a distance. Upon entering the city they seized the towers and castle, arrested the city leaders, and locked the doors to the town hall. The occupation force numbered between 178 and 200 soldiers. See Albertine official's report to Moritz, PKMS. 1, pp. 360-361.

12. "Aber solches alles und was wir uns sonst gegen ime willfehrig und fr. erzeigt ungeacht, vermerken wir weiter, dass er an kleinen sachen nicht genug, sonder will die grossen vor die hand nehmen, und denkt veilleicht, in unser jugend das zu vollenden, so er bei unsers herrn vatern und hz. Georgen zeiten im sinne gehabt." PKMS, 1, p. 371.

13. " Und lesst sich villeict unser vetter duencken, es sei itzo in unser jugend zugreifens zeit, wir wuerden auch sein fuerhaben nicht verstehen. Wir vernehmen aber daraus got lob soviel, dass er zum liebsten in unserem lande zu Meissen versperren und alle strassen auf dreien seiten innehalben wollte, also 125

das wir zu unseren herren und freunden, auch unserin lande zu Dhuringen ohne seinen willen oder geleite nicht kommen koennte." PKMS. 1, p. 372.

14. In June of 1541 Henry warned his son concerning the intimidation tactics of the Ernestines in Leipzig, Dornburg, Camburg, and Pforte, stating that his military weakness precluded resistance. PKMS. 1, p. 151; see also Brandenburg, Moritz, p. 68.

15. "Darum seind wir genzlich entschlossen, unserm vetter lenger nicht zuzusehen, sondern uns mittels gottlicher huelfe seiner nach unserm hoechsten vermoegen aufzuhalten und zu wehren, daran nichts zu sparen." PKMS. 1, p. 373.

16. "Wue unser vetter seine befelchhaber oder krigleute In das Schloss oder stadt vorordent, dye Sollen Sie abziehen lassen und abzug schleunig mit ynen vorfugen, Wurden Sie Sich aber des wegern oder zue der were setzen, So Sullen Sie den Ernst kegen ynen auch gebrauchen." Moritz's order published in Langenn, Moritz, bd. 2, pp. 220-221;. See also PKMS. 1, p. 374

17. Text of treaty in PKMS. 1, 407-411. See also Issleib, "evange1ischer Fuerst," p. 1025.

18. Richard Mackenney, Sixteenth Century Europe: Expans ion and Conflict. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993) p. 270; see also Spitz, Reformation, p. 353.

19. Jedin, Counc i1. Vol. 1, pp. 197-219.

20. For a somewhat overstated, yet otherwise excellent presentation of the continual threat from the Turk and its impact on the political negotiations between the emperor and the Protestants, see Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism: 1521-1555. (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), pp. 94-96. An overview of Valois-Hapsburg tensions during this period, see Brandi, Charles V . pp. 237-292, 426-434, 466-523.

21. Horst Rabe, Reichbund und Interim: Die Verfassungs - und Re Iigionspolitik Karls V. und der Reichstag von Augsburg 1547/1548. (Wien: Boehlau Verlag, 1971), p. 91.

22. Albrecht Pius Luttenberger, Glaubenseinheit und Reichsfriede: Konzeptionen und Wege 1 2<>

Konfessionsneutraler Re ichspolitik: 1530-1552 (Kurpfalz. Juelich, Kurbrandenburq. (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1982.)/ P- 714. 23. Horst Rabe, Deutsche Geschichte 1500 - 1600: Das Jabrhundert der Glaubensspa 1tung (Muenchen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1991), pp. 384-385.

24. Rabe, Reichsbund. p, 91. See also Lau and Bizer, History. p. 174.

25. On the following see Jedin, Counci1. Vol. 1, 355- 409.; Robert Stupperich, Der Humanismus und die Wiedervereinigung der Konfessionen. (Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1939), pp. 57-104.

26. For Joachim's reform see Brecht, Luther: Preservation. pp. 295-297; Rabe, Geschichte. p. 37 7; Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism, pp. 67-73.

27. Rabe, Geschichte. p. 378.

28. See Jedin, Counci 1, Vol. 1, pp. 374-389 ; and Brecht, Luther: Preservation, pp. 215-219, 222-228.

29. Jedin, Counci 1. Vol. 1, p. 374 ; Brecht, Luther: Preservation, pp. 216-217.

30. Jedin, Counci 1. Vol. 1, p. 381; text found in CR 4, 190-228.

31. To this point see Jedin, Counci 1. Vol. l, p. 384 ; and Brecht, Luther: Preservation, pp, 226-227.

32. See Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism, pp. 79- 83, especially p. 82; and Brandi, Charles V . pp. 450- 453 .

33. Jedin, Counci 1, Vol. 1. pp. 494-502.

34. Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 358; 367-69. PKMS. 2, pp. 162-63, 166-69. Briefwechsel Landgraf Philipps. 2, pp. 323-329, specifically regarding the Turk, p. 325.

35 . Brandi, Charles V. pp. 526-533.

36. Brandi, Charles V. pp. 540-41.

37. Thomas A. Brady, "Phases and Strategies of the Schmalkaldic League: A Perspective after 450 Years," 127

Archiv fuer Reformationsgeschichte 74 (1983), p. 171; also Brady, "Seizure," pp. 48-49.

38. George Komerstadt (1498-1559), moved with relative ease in both Ernestine and Albertine circles. Son of a Meissen city councilor, Komerstadt began studying law at Leipzig in 1515 and received his doctorate in 1526. In 1525, at Elector John’s request, Komerstadt gained permission to act as Syndic in Zwickau, a position he held for three years. There Komerstadt dealt with all the legal and religious issues arising from the process of reform. In 1528 he returned to service in the Dresden court, where he remained till his death. Granted noble status in 1538, Komerstadt held the respect and trust of George, Henry, Moritz, and August. Though mirroring George Carlowitz's intense Albertine loyalty, Komerstadt counseled for closer relations with the Ernestine branch and the Schmalkaldic League, and with the former's retirement in 1545, Komerstadt1s influence in the ducal court increased. For a brief biography and full bibliographical references see Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 148-154; for reform measures in Zwickau see Karant-Nunn, Zwickau in Transition, pp. 92- 136, especially p. 134.

39. For a discussion on this matter see Erich Brandenburg, "Der Regensburg Vertrag zwischen den Hapsburgern und Moritz von Sachsen (1546)." Historische Zeitschrift 80 (1897) pp. 5-8.

40. Blaschke, Moritz, p. 48.

41. For an overview of Moritz and John Frederick's ambitions and negotiations see Issleib, "Magdeburg und Moritz", pp. 575-579.

42. PKMS. 1, pp. 571-572.

43. PKMS, 2, pp. 26-28. 44. Issleib, "Magdeburg und Moritz," pp. 577-578.

45. Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 413-16. Mentz, Johann Friedrich. p. 559.

46. For the opening of Trent see Jedin, Counci1 . Vol. 1, p. 574.

47. See Jedin, Council. Vol 2, pp. 205-206; Politische Correspondenze der Stadt Strassburg im Zeitalter der 12S

Reformation. Vierter Band 1546-1549. 1 Halband: 1546- 1547. Juni 12. Hrsg. Harry Gerber (Heidelberg, 1931), pp. 6-24, 83-92; Lenz, Briefwechsel, 2, p. 4 37.

48. A popular reaction is exemplified by a pamphlet which ran through at least eight printings: Ein ermahnunq an die keiserliche maiestat des evangeliusms halben in seinem erblanden. Darinnen auch ein trewe warnung an uns Teuschen. Durch einen wolweisen krieasfarnen schoen beschriben. [An Admonition to His Imperial Majesty Regarding the Gospel in his Dominions. Also containing True Warning to We Germans. Beautifully Written by a Most Wise Lord Experienced in War.] Liliencron, 4, pp. 292-298. The author admonished Charles to carefully consider scripture, especially the story of Jonah who called the king to repent, and Pharoah, who gathered a great army to stop Moses but ended with destruction in the sea. Charles should abandon the pope and remain with God, who would aid him in distress. "Darmit, Keiser, will ich dich warnen ich weis, du hast die gschrift erfaren, so les den propheten Jonas, der drei tag im fisch was; den schickt got in die grosse stat Ninive vor des Koenigs rath, ruest laut, die stat soil untergehen. Die mer kam vorn Koenig hin, im sack der aschen thet er buess, wiewol Jonam das verdross. Lass den Bapst, bleib du bei got, so hilft er dir auss aller not. Pharao wolt Moses nicht lan, in das gelobt land lassen gan, auf ihn samlet ein grosses heere, ertrunken all im roten meer." Here, pp. 295-296.

49. For what follows see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume Two. The Age of Reformation. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978.) pp. 194-206; W.D.J. Cargill Thompson, "Luther and Resistance to the Emperor," in Studies in the Reformation: Luther to Hooker.ed. C.W. Dugmore (London: Athone Press, 1980).

50. skinner, Foundations. p. 194.

51. Skinner, Foundations. pp. 195-196; see also Cynthia Grant shoenenberger, "The development of the 127

Lutheran Theory of Resistance: 1523 — 1530," Sixteenth Century Journal 8. (April, 1977), pp. 68-69.

52. Skinner, Foundations. p. 195.

53. WA Br 5, 209. Also see Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career. 1521-1530. ed. Karin Bornkamm and trans. E.T. Bachmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), pp 663- 664; Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: Shaping and Defining the Reformation, 1521-1532. trans. James L. Schaaf (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), pp. 362- 363 .

5 3. Ein Rhatschlaq Doctoris Martini Lutheri. Ob dem Keiser. so er iemands mit gewalt des Euangeli halben, uberziehen wollte. mit recht widerstandt qeschehen moeqe. Etwan an einen Fuersten aeschriben. The work appeared with this title sometime in the late summer of 1546, and appears to have been utilized by the Albertine court to justify their policy with the emperor. It is noteworthy that the letter was first published in a collection edited by Luther's arch enemy John Cochlaus in 1531 at Dresden. The letter serves as authoritative statement for obedience to authority, and would have aided duke George's polemical assault on Luther's later position. See WA Br 5, 256-257.

54. Luther couched this sentiment in the scriptural text of 1 Peter 3, "Ihr sollt den konig ehren," WA Br 5, 209.

55. "Item der Keiser ist ja dieser fursten herr und oberkeit. Nu wolt freylich keiner, das seine unthertanen sich der massen so frue zur wehre widder yhm stelleten, wie hie mit gegen dem Keiser geschehe, Und wurde eigentlich ein auffrurisch und ungehorsam stuck sein." WA Br 5, 210.

56. WA Br 5, 258-261.

58. WA Br 5, 259.

59. Skinner, Foundations. p. 197.

60. Skinner, Foundations, p. 199; Thompson, "Resistance," pp. 24-25. For Gregory Brueck (1483- 1557), see APB. 3, pp. 388-392. no

61. Etlicher Rechtsgelehrten zu Wittenberg Heinung von der Fraqe: Ob man einem Richter, der unrechtmaessig procedirt, Widerstand thun moeae? St. L. 10, pp. 558- 561.

62. "Wenn ein Richter, nachdem appellirt ist, procediret (weiter geht), so mag man ihm wohl mit Gewalt Widerstand thun." St. L. 10, p. 558.

63. "wenn ein Richter ausserhalb Gerichts procedirt und den Part beschweret; auf den Fall mag nan ihm mit gewalt widerstehen." St. L. 10, p. 560.

64. "so gleich ein Richter gerichtlich procedirt, aber wider Recht, und die Beschwerung Oder das gravamen is unwiederbringlich." St. L. 10, p. 560.

65. "wenn das gravamen und also die Sentenz des Richters oeffentlich und notorisch unrecht und wider die recht ist." St. L. 10, p. 560.

66. "so muss man auch in Glaubenssachen Gott und der evange1ischen Wahrheit mehr gehorsam sein, denn Menschen." St. L. 10, p. 560,

67. "Darum ist der Kaiser nicht Richter in unsers christlichen Glaubens Sache, sondern ist nur eine Privatperson..." St. L. 10, p. 560.

68. "Aber einem Richter, der gleich Richter ist und hat die Jurisdiction und Macht ueber die Sache zu erkennen und zu richten, dem mag man widerstand thun, wenn er wider Recht procedirt und verfaehrt, oder von ihm appellirt ist; wie viel mehr dem, der nicht Richter in der Sache ist und hat keine Jurisdiction und Botmaessigkeit in dieser Sache?...Zudem so ist des Kaisers und, deren Dienst...in seinem Vornehmen braucht...in des Glaubens Sachen sind unser Widersacher und Abguenstige oeffentliche, notorische Feinde." St. L . 10, p . 561.

69. Edwards, Battles, p. 25.

70. Thompson, "Resistance," p. 26.

71. "Und wir allzeit gelert haben, das man welltliche recht solle lassen gehen, gelten und halten, was sie vermugen, weil das Euangelion nicht widder die welltliche recht leret. So konnen wirs mit der schrifft n i

nicht anfecten, wo man sich des falls wehren musste.. WA Br 5, 662.

72. For this assertion see Thompson, "Resistance," p. 27. For the significance of the Torgau meetings with regard to the formation of the Schmalkaldic League see Ekkehart Fabian, Die Entstehunq des Schmalkaldischen Bundes und seiner Verfassung 1524/29-1531/3 5. (Tuebingen, 1962), pp. 92-111.

73. WA Br 6, 36. The results at Torgau raised concern in Nuremberg where city officials attempted to remain neutral. In this free imperial city the opposite situation evolved, in that it was the Lutheran theologians, most notably Andreas Osiander, who called for resistance, while the secular leaders called for obedience. Nuremberg's similarity to Albertine Saxony will be touched upon below. See Oliver K. Olson, "Theology of Revolution: Magdeburg, 1550-1551,." Sixteenth Century Journal 3, (April, 1972), pp. 60-61.

74. "brachten sie [the lawyers] das hervor: es liess das Kaiserliche Recht zu, in notorie iniustis violenter resistere potestati. 11 WA Br 6, 36-37.

75. "Denn weil unsere Lehre spricht: Date Caesari, quae sunt Caesaris, et Caesaris sit, sibi resistendum esse in notorie iniustus, haetten wir sein Recht nicht zu aendern noch zu meisten..." WA Br 6, 37. Here Luther puts a twist on the scriptural imperative to "render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's," Matthew 22:21. The power of his statement here is rooted in the presupposition that obedience is due the emperor. This scriptual text would play a key role in Moritz’s leg itimat ion.

76. Warnunge Doctor Martini Luther, an seine lieben Deutschen, WA 30/3, 276-320; Kittelson, Luther. pp. 235-38; also Edwards, Battles, pp. 24-37, especially p. 2 5 .

77. WA 30/3, 282, 283.

78. "Ein Christ weis wol, was er thun sol, das er gebe, was Gottes ist, und dem Keiser auch, was des Keisers ist, Aber doch nicht bluthunden, was nicht jr ist..." WA 30/3, 282. Here again Luther couches argument in the fundamental presumption of obedience to to authority. m

79. "Denn jnn solchen fall, wenn die itioerder und bluthunde jhe kriegen und morden wollen, so ists auch jnn warheit keine auffrur, sich widder sie setzen und weren." WA 30/3, 282.

SO. In late 1536, John Frederick requested advice from the Wittenberg theologians. Helanchthon authored the Gutachten which was then signed by Luther, Jonas, Bugenhagen, Amsdorf, and Crucigar. OR 3, 126- 131.

8 1. CR 3, 130.

82. "Der andre Fall ist lichter: 'wenn der Sentenz gehet, dass der Priester Ehe unrecht sey und sollen verboten und zurissen werden etc." Dieses ist eine notoria iniuria, und weltliche Sachen, darin natuerliche Vernunft als Gottes ordnung selbs Richter ist. Wider solche oeffentliche iniuria ist der Schutz und die Gegenwehr zugelassen; so sich einer wider einen Moerder auf der Strassen wehret." CR 3, 130.

83. "damit das klaerer sey, dass Fuersten und alle Oberkeiten schuldig sind, oefentliche Gewalt und Unzucht, als Ehezureissung, zu wehren. Und viel mehr sind sie schuldig, oeffentliche Abgoetterei zu wehren." CR 3, 13 1.

84. "Darum ist der Kaiser nicht Richter in unsers christliche Glaubens Sache, sondern ist nur eine Pr ivatperson. 11 St. L. 10, p. 561; "Darum, so der Kaiser etwas thaetlich vornimmt vor dem Concilio pendente appellatione, in Sachen welche die Religion betreffen, und den zugesagten Frieden wahrhaftiglich und ohne Sophisterei belangen: (so) ist er zu jalten als eine Privatperson, und ist solche iniuria, wider die Apellation und zugesagten Frieden angenommen, ein oeffentliche notoria iniuria." CR 3, 129.

85. "So nu der Kaiser uns nit haelt, so hat er sich selbst zu einer gemeiner Person gemacht und kann nit mehr vor ein rechten Kaiser angesehen werden." Assertion made in Philipp's letter to Luther in October 15 3 0, WA Br 5, 653-655.

86. Note Thompson "Resistance," pp. 30-34.

87. "Idea nostri iudicarunt Caesarem in hoc casu non Caesarem esse, sed militem et latronam papae." Wa Br 8, 367 . m

88. Note Hermann Doerries, Wort und Stunde. Dritter Band: Beitraeae zum Verstendnis Luther (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1970) , p. 246, n. 117, wher a) he refers to a theological Gutachten published in 153 o refering to the emperor as a "Geschworenen und Hauptmann des Papstes." Printed in Heinz Scheible, ed., Das Widerstandsrecht als Problem der deutschen Protestanten 1523-1546 (Guetersloh: Mohn, 1969), p. 80.

89. To this point see Olson, "Magdeburg," p. 73.

90. CR 6, 122-124. See also Clyde Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958), p . 277.

91. "...denn wenn es gewiss ist, dass der Kaiser diese Staende von wegen der Religion ueberzeihen woellen, alsdenn ist kein zweifel, diese Staende thun recht, so sie sich und die ihren ernstlich mit Gottes huelf schuetzen,...und is solche Gegenwehr nicht anders, denn als so man einem Haufen Moerder wehren muesste, er werde gefueret vom Kaiser oder ander." CR 6, 123 .

92. Article sixteen of the Augsburg Confession states that "Christians are necessarily bound [necessario debent] to obey their own magistrates and laws, save only when commanded to sin. . ." Triglot Concordia: The Symbolical Books of the Ev. Lutheran Church. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921) pp. 50-51.

93. Luther David Peterson, The Philippst Theologians and the Interims of 1548: Soterioloqical. Ecclesiastical, and Liturgical Compromises and Controversies Within German Lutheranism. Unpublished Dissertation. (University of Wisconsin, 1974.) pp. 447- 81. See also Robert Kolb, Confessing the Faith: Reformers Define the Church. 1530-1580. St. Louis: Concordia, 1991), pp. 13-64.

94. "...Cogitate non esse Kinderspiel was da gegossen werden wirt, klingen in totum mundura et postea qehen." WA 45, 10. CHAPTER III

THE ALBERTINE PROTESTANT: MORITZ AT REGENSBURG

O Charles, Charles, consider what God has gracefully given to you. He has made you a great Lord, thus you should not resist God’s Word, but rather help nurture it. Do not follow your priests and their f inances, but hold firm only to God's Word. For if you don't, hear me well: God is stronger than you...

Thus, O highborn Emperor consider the oath you swore to augment the Holy Roman Empire! let not the priests dissuade you, shed not Christian blood but protect God's Word.1 These words of an anonymous poet capture well the disquieting concern which increasingly gripped Germany

in the early months of 1546. An Admonition to His

Imperial Majesty. Regarding the Gospel in his

Dominions. Also Containing a True Warning to We

Germans. Beautifully Written bv a Most Wise Lord.

Experienced in War, went through at least eight editions in the early months of 1546, suggesting the message touched a popular nerve and found a broad audience." Though clinging to slender hopes for

134 13?

favorable negotiations, at least one leading reformer

sensed a crisis at hand. Having recently lost their

spiritual guide with the death of Luther, Johannes Bugenhagen lamented the possible loss of their secular ruler, the emperor.3 With Charles V forfeiting his dignity if he attacked the gospel, imperial intentions toward the Word of God demarcated the rhetorical battlefield for Protestant spokesmen. Pervasive mutual mistrust marked the Schmalkaldic and imperial antagonists, overshadowing hopes that the religious conferences and diet called for early 1546 in

Regensburg would bring peace. Whether the emperor considered this religious colloquium a serious attempt for reconciliation is not certain. What was certain was that the conference, which opened in late January, soon fell into disarray and division, and eventually disbanded in mid-March.4

Justified by the refusal of several leading

Protestant princes to attend the diet at Regensburg,

Charles continued military mobilization. As the opening of the diet neared he reached out to the nobility in Franconia and Saxony,s exploiting the undercurrent of tension existing between the princes and that estate. Charles contended that "in a malicious and petulant manner, rebellious persons had 136 misrepresented his intentions through fabricated letters and slanderous literature." He denied any attempt to unite with foreign powers for the purpose of making war in the empire, and assured the nobility that he sought to maintain the peace of the empire.6

Charles succeeded in recruiting the brash Franconian prince, Albrecht of Brandenburg-Culmbach, who rejected pleas not to fight against God's truth, claiming that he owed service the emperor who was not fighting men for their religion, but rather suppressing rebellion against just imperial law. Albrecht's ability to raise and equip a formidable force heightened concerns within the Schmalkaldic League.7 The League's lethargy in preparing for war had frustrated the Landgrave of Hesse, for although constantly warning the League of the growing threat, little action had been taken to organize.8 Amidst the chilling rumors of war, Moritz thought it prudent to plant an observer in the imperial court at Regensburg. He sent Christoph Carlowitz to the diet with instructions to monitor the proceedings and to report Hapsburg reaction to Albertine neutrality. Specifically, he ordered Carlowitz to elicit demands Charles might make in granting him protection rights over Magdeburg and Halberstadt. Komerstadt had 117 reservations concerning such negotiations and counseled his prince not to entertain thoughts of attending unless the Hapsburgs were clear in what would be required for the protection rights.9 He urged Carlowitz to use caution in bringing Moritz to Regensburg, especially since the Schmalkaldic leaders had blatantly ignored the imperial summons. Already plagued by growing suspicions over Albertine commitment to the cause of the faith, Komerstadt sensed that Moritz courted trouble in negotiating with the perceived enemy at such a volatile time. Complicating matters further was Moritz's previous arrangement to join Philip and John Frederick for talks in Naumburg. Meeting with Charles would force Moritz to beg off from this commitment, and risk deepening the breech between the Albertines and their confessional allies. Nevertheless, the politically astute Komerstadt knew better than to simply reject Charles' offer without serious consideration. If affairs favored face to face talks between Moritz and Charles, he urged Carlowitz to request a written imperial order so Moritz could show evidence to Philip for his need to attend.10 Initial discussions between Carlowitz and Charles' secretary for German affairs, Nicolas Granvelle," produced an offer that the emperor might be inclined to ns a secret and special relationship with Moritz, but the prince would have to deal with the emperor in person.13

Contrary to the wishes of Komerstadt, Moritz decided to attend. He informed Carlowitz of his coming, yet made it clear that he did not want to make this trip in vain. Anything less than the garnering of protection rights would make the trip useless, so Carlowitz was to immediately report any signs of Hapsburg retreat from the arrangement.” Charles* overtures to the Albertine court were consistent with his policy of dividing the strength of his potential opponent, and in Moritz's case his constitutional designs against disobedient rebels, specifically John Frederick, dovetailed with the long standing Ernestine-Albertine territorial conflict.

However much the immediate circumstances shaped the approach of both parties to these negotiations, the scent of blood-feud hung heavy in the air.

Albertine presence at Regensburg has often been viewed solely from the perspective of the immediate expediency of the political situation, coupled with the eventual fate of the Protestant forces. Here more than anywhere Moritz emerged as the grasping opportunist and traitor to the faith.H Yet such a judgment, apart from anachronistic hindsight, neglects m the contingencies and context of his Wettin background.

Rather than interpreting these negotiations solely from the perspective of Moritz the Lutheran, accuracy compels us to expand the line of vision to include Moritz the Albertine. Far from playing down the confessional aspect of Moritz's position, it helps reveal how his Lutheranism took tangible shape within the social and political contours of his Albertine heritage. Neglecting either of these factors risks the loss of a broader, if not fairer, understanding of the decisions made at Regensburg. As Moritz made his way to the Diet, complications to the impending talks surfaced. In a May 14 letter Carlowitz reported that upon his informing Granvelle of

Moritz's intentions to attend, he was told that any agreements reached between the emperor and prince hinged on Moritz's submission to the decrees of a general council.” Carlowitz was unclear whether Granvelle referred directly to Trent, and in a letter issued three days after Moritz's departure for the conference he informed Komerstadt that without compliance on this point the prince's journey to

Regensburg would be in vain.16 The line was clearly drawn: In return for protection rights over Magdeburg 140

and Halberstadt, Moritz must submit without qualification to the decrees of the council.

Moritz entered the south German Imperial city of Regensburg on May 24 as an Albertine Saxon Protestant prince, and as such he carried not only his personal

convictions and ambitions, but the weight of deeply rooted hereditary responsibilities overlaid with

confessional commitments and promises. That he approached these negotiations from the traditional

Hapsburg-Albertine relationship may be discerned from the customary gift presented to Charles in his first audience with the emperor. Moritz presented Charles with a costly chunk of ore from his Saxon mines upon which was etched the likeness of his late Uncle, Duke George.17 Considering the vast array of possible gifts one might offer their sovereign, the symbolism of the choice should not be understated. Perhaps he was

letting Charles know who held the silver, yet he did so

in a manner which called forth memories of the emperor's late ally. Issues of obedience to secular authority and loyalty to a religious confession were not merely superficial debating points utilized for political posturing, but profound characteristics of a deeply rooted Albertine heritage which were now brought to bear on highly critical and complex circumstances. 141

If the gift to Charles reflected Albertine intentions to discuss matters in the context of imperial obedience and loyalty, the initial draft of the position to be shared with Granvelle revealed that

Moritz would in no less measure speak as a Lutheran prince. The advisory notes of the councilors cut directly to the heart of the matter, presenting in clear fashion the balance the Albertines sought to maintain between Moritz's imperial duties and religious convictions. In presenting Moritz's position they emphasized that

Since Your Princely Grace has been raised, educated, and elevated to sovereignty under the auspices of the religion of the Augsburg Confession, you can abide nothing other than the gospel being correctly taught and preached in your territory. Having also a concern for education, you have taken an active part in ecclesiastical matters within your territory, with the building of schools and the granting of new endowments to the University for educating learned and godly persons.... Your Princely Grace would be willing to submit to an imperially sanctioned free national council in which the estates of the German nation could assemble and settle all disputed religious questions.,s In all other matters it was to be emphatically stated that Moritz offered dutiful obedience to Charles and Ferdinand as his "God-ordained authority."19 As the parties gathered on June 2 for the first series of talks, it was evident to the Albertines that matters would pivot on the issue of a council.20 142

Granvelle wasted little time in casting the discussions in the context of long standing relations between the houses by stating the emperor's warm appreciation for the service of Albertine family to the Hapsburgs, and the hope that Moritz would follow in their footsteps.11 In response to the Saxon's assurance that Moritz followed his forefathers in acknowledging Charles as his "God-ordained authority," Granvelle asserted that he sought

to counsel His Princely Grace [Moritz] as he would his own son. Now there would be no more pleasing and obliging deed than for His Princely Grace to unite with Charles and the whole Christian church in maintaining the religion of his forebearers.22 Such efforts would not go unrewarded, Granvelle continued, since John Frederick's recent activities in the Archbishopric of Magdeburg had troubled the emperor and jeopardized the Ernestine's electoral privilege,

Charles might be inclined to bestow that office on Moritz .21 Caught somewhat off guard, the Albertine councilors quickly admitted that without a prior conference with Moritz they were not prepared to discuss the issue. Yet even in light of this development, and perhaps in view of some conditions such an act might entail, they reiterated Moritz's adherence to the Augsburg Confession and his desire 143

that, the gospel be correctly taught and preached in his territory, concluding with a point that was to play a defining role in the following days.

And even if His Princely Grace were so inclined to such action, it would yet be feared that His Princely Grace's innovations against the Augsburg Confession could not be imposed in his territory without a great tumult and uprising by his subjects. "2‘1 Here is found a direct reference to the confessional disposition of Moritz's subjects, and a clear admission on the part of the Albertine representatives that such had to be taken into consideration with regard to decisions made. They concluded by assuring the chancellor of Moritz’s displeasure with the religious division, and conveyed his great hope that a general, or free council be organized. As the meeting broke off, Granvelle urged the councilors to press upon Moritz the necessity of submission to the council presently meeting in

Trent. Assurance was given that the Pope would not control the council, making it in the emperor's mind a

free council.15 Sensing compromise could be reached in areas such as the real presence in the Lord's Supper, Granvelle assured the Saxons that a dispensation in this and other matters could be attained with Moritz's formal submission to Trent.26 Charles gave no hint of bending on this point, and Granvelle ordered the Saxons 144

to prepare in writing a formal statement of their position.

Gathering with his advisors and assessing the new

set of circumstances placed before him, Moritz ordered his emissaries to repeat his earlier position that, though sincerely desiring the healing of religious division, his territory was dominated by the Augsburg Confession, and he could not move against it.17 The Albertines leaned toward a council compromise by

declaring that they would submit to the decrees as much as possible, but where disagreement remained Charles should show patience and tolerance to their territory.28

Granvelle's answer was sharp and to the point: Moritz had an obligation to obey the decrees of the council. Reiterating Moritz's desire for obedience, the

Albertines stressed that it would be difficult for him to go against his conscience, further, such action would make

their adversaries (namely the pope and his followers) their future judges, and respect must be paid to their subjects, the greater part (pleraaue o a r s '! of whom would sooner die than have their convictions taken from them.29 Again the ducal councilors refered directly to the confessional disposition of Moritz's subjects regarding any response to imperial demands. 145

Apart from speculation as to the precise social identity of the "subjects" in question, or calculation as to a percentage of their "greater part," the connection between confessional stability and public peace revealed a perception on the part of Albertine officials of a confessional activism within a significant portion of the population. Would Moritz's subjects have rebelled if innovations were implemented? Such cannot be answered. But clearly he had no inclination to find out. Evidence then shows the negotiations turning not simply on the prince's personal convictions, but rather on those of a group apparently not under Moritz's full control. Whether the prince actually shared the alleged confessional loyalty is at this juncture secondary, for the primary issue touched political stability and public peace, both of which, at least in the minds of highly competent councilors, would be threatened by religious innovation. The brief presented to Granvelle on June 5, essentially repeated Moritz's initial position.10 Recognizing the emperor's authority and restating his dutiful obedience, he urged establishment of a council in which the religious controversies would be settled.

Based on the emperor's assurances of papal submission, 146

Moritz would concede to the council's decrees, provided they were based on scripture and correct Canon Law.11

Though not referring specifically to Trent, Moritz's acquiescence fit Charles' stated intentions toward that gathering and set the door ajar for a possible agreement. Yet obedience to conciliar decrees necessitated imperial dispensation regarding disputed doctrines, specifically justification by faith, communion in both kinds, and marriage for clergy.32

Repeating his promise to obey the council as far as his

"good conscience and judgment allow,he reminded Charles that it would be impossible to impose new articles of faith upon his territory

without risking the danger of tumult and perhaps even rebellion by his subjects...who would rather be robbed of their lives than their doctrine.34

Plodding into mid-June discussions stalled on the nature and authority of the council. Charles sought

Moritz's promise to abide by the decrees of the council as a precondition for protection rights, while the duke demanded a council under the auspices of the Augsburg confession, or dispensation for his territory with regard to specific articles of faith. One particular instance illustrates well the contention between parties, embodying the threat Granvelle believed intrinsic to confessional reform. A Saxon proposal 147 contained Moritz's assertion that he would willingly obey the emperor "as far as good conscience allowed. Granvelle vehemently rejected the phrase as being injurious to His Imperial Majesty, for "it is certain that His Majesty would desire nothing other than what good conscience could allow, and to that which serves the honor of God."3* Granvelle's anger was not misplaced, for this brief verbal skirmish revealed the folly of splitting religious and secular matters, and presaged the doom of Charles' imperial vision. As these formal negotiations reached a conclusion, the council question remained unsettled. Yet Moritz and Charles still needed each other. The Albertine's were struggling for a firmer political foothold in the threatening storm. War was as yet only a rumor when

Moritz had ridden into Regensburg weeks earlier, but serious warning signs had, in the course of these discussions, turned into concrete declarations of purpose. On June 17, in response to continuing queries concerning his intentions, Charles announced publicly that "to maintain his imperial dignity and preserve peace, law, and unity within the Holy Empire," he sought to punish the "disobedient, disloyal, and obstinate disturbers of the common peace and law."37 Assuring obedient estates they had nothing to fear, his 148 action aimed only at the disobedient rebels who defamed his authority under the guise of religion.M It is noteworthy that Charles specifically condemned the perpetrators for proliferation of rebellious literature throughout their territories, which served only to embitter and incite the "common man" against him.39 Avoiding any legitimation with regard to religion, Charles couched the entire matter in the context of constitutional obedience. Yet privately Charles had confessional concerns. In a now famous letter to his sister, Charles asserted that his constitutional position was a "cover and pretext" for the matter of religion.40 That such was the case would become increasingly clear six months later with his imposed terms to the subdued southern German cities, and especially at the Diet of Augsburg in 1548.41

Charles appeared resolved to crush the rebels. Neutralizing Moritz not only weakened the Protestants militarily, it also drove a wedge into the political unity of the Protestant forces. Yet how could the emperor and the Albertines transcend their council impasse in order to profit from one another? The answer came from the imperialists. Granvelle told the Saxon advisors that Charles would agree with Moritz's demands, but not in writing. In a document dated June 149

19, the Saxon councilors reported that during previous

meetings certain promises were conveyed orally on behalf of Charles. Concerning the council, Granvelle gave assurance that the emperor favored a free and general council in

which all nations should have a place. Reform of

abuses under the Word of God and holy scripture would be undertaken, and the pope himself, along with all

clergy must submit to its decrees.42 The council would not be controlled by the Pope and those few whom he might choose, but rather it would be open to all pious

and learned men, and until that time contentious articles of faith such as communion, clerical marriage, and justification, would not be a source of friction between the Imperial court and Moritz's territory.41

Regarding impending military conflict Granvelle

spoke only of punishing the disobedient, carefully

avoiding any references to religion. Further, if it

was necessary for Charles to punish John Frederick by

stripping him of his territorial rights, Moritz was promised that after indemnity costs the rights would

fall to the Albertine line,44 These concessions from Granvelle, along with the promise of a personal confirmation from the emperor the following day, prompted Moritz to sign the formal treaty.45 In doing 150 so Moritz gained the Magdeburg protection rights and the neutrality the Albertines so desperately craved.

In return Moritz swore obedience to Charles as befitting a prince, submission to the imperial court, observation of the public peace, and defense against the Turk.46 When viewed from the perspective of traditional Albertine policy and Moritz's ecclesiastical responsibilities, the agreement at Regensburg appeared to be a glowing success. Assurances had been given that the coming conflict revolved around issues of constitutional obedience rather than religion. In this matter Moritz had not simply turned a blind eye, for every public statement by Charles asserted this position, and Moritz secured private promises that his own political viability would not be destabilized by any forced confessional change. His obligation as an Albertine prince was to seek security for his territory, and if that duty brought him into a conflict of interests with his Ernestine cousin, then so be it.

Moritz's willingness to take advantage of his cousin's political turmoil can only be adequately interpreted against the Albertine-Ernestine rivalry. If accusations of calculating opportunism are to be leveled at Moritz, then it was an opportunism born not 151 of greed and lust for power, but of long standing territorial rivalry. Though Moritz "confessed" his loyalty to the Augsburg Confession before Charles, the focus of the discussions rested less on the veracity of his personal faith than on the perception of the doctrinal disposition of his subjects. Likewise, regardless of the reliability of Charles' pledge, which can only be questioned from later actions, Moritz and his advisors understood this compromise as a necessary requirement for signing the treaty. Here the constraining factor of the continued status quo of Lutheranism within his realm impinged directly on his imperial policy. The Albertine church appeared more as an institution to be reckoned with than a passive instrument to be manipulated. However, within twenty-four hours circumstances would change, and the Albertines would find that the fence they had straddled for so long had become a razor's edge. As the parties gathered the following day for the personal audience with Charles, the carefully crafted Albertine neutrality took a severe blow.'17 For the most part Charles confirmed Granvelle's conditions and previous assurances, but changed the rules regarding possible conquered territory. A day 152 earlier Granvelle had allowed for Albertine neutrality, with rights to confiscated territory in return for covering Hapsburg military expenses.48 When ushered into imperial presence, Charles granted Moritz his neutrality but altered the conditions, stating that "if it comes to that, whoever executes the sentence gets what is invested."49 At this moment the Albertine's hope of standing aloof from the coming conflict melted away. They were drawn into the ever-increasing military whirlwind in that Moritz himself would have to invest Ernestine land so as to insure Saxon sovereignty in case of an electoral defeat. What then had been gained at Regensburg? There can be little doubt that Charles gained the upper hand over Moritz. Though garnering the long sought after protection rights to Magdeburg and Halberstadt, that prize rested on the condition of obedience to Charles, and any action deemed detrimental to imperial policy risked revocation. Albertine neutrality raised the umseemly specter of forfeited electoral privilege slipping from Wettin control. Put simply, Charles won both ways. Albertine neutrality split the Protestant strength, but, more importantly, any Albertine pursuance of a political policy which would maintain leverage over against their Ernestine cousins or 153 security against Hapsburg dominance effectively forced Moritz to take up the sword for the emperor. Regensburg marked a significant juncture not only in the reign of Moritz, but also in the history of the German Reformation. Regensburg struck the first of several blows which eventually toppled Elector John Frederick and gave birth to the "Judas of Meissen." Yet therein lies the profound irony. Moritz repeatedly legitimized his actions within the framework of the Augsburg Confession and never ceased to argue his loyalty to the Lutheran cause.

The complexity of interpenetrating concerns substantiate the "sheer folly" of approaching the 16th century with the assumption that, "either the political position, the confessional convictions, or the social- economic interests of the key actors dominated."541 That Moritz approached these talks from a self-conscious Protestant position became obvious from the policy struck there. Reducing decisions at Regensburg to motives of greed and mere political expediency ignores Moritz's perception that his territory's economic, social, and spiritual welfare was woven tightly to the authority of emperor and Reich. Deeply rooted tradition confronted the equally concrete religious factors within Moritz's land, compelling him to 154 articulate his princely duties within a confessional framework independent of his personal convictions.

Regensburg not only laid the groundwork for Albertine diplomacy throughout the Schmalkaldic campaigns of the coming year, but it also evoked a commitment from Moritz which placed him in direct confrontation with his co-religionists, fanning the flames of controversy throughout the coming summer. 155

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. "O Carle, Carle, bedenck dich eben, was dir got fuer gnaden hat geben, gmacht dich zu einem grossen herren, solt darumb gottes wort nicht weren, sonder treulich helfen pflanzen, nicht folgn dein pfaffn und ihrn finanzen, allein nim gottes wort fuer dich. Geschicht es nicht, gedenk an inich: got ist vil mechtiger als du... Darumb, o keiser hochgeboren, bedenk den eid: du hast geschworen, das heilig roemisch reich zu meren! lass dich die pfaffen nicht verkeren, vergiess nicht das christen bluet, sonder hab gottes wort in hut.'* Ein ermanuna an die keiserliche maiestat des evanqeliums halben in seinen erblaendern. Darinnen auch ein trewe warnunq an uns Teutschen. Durch einen wolweisen kreigserfarnen herren schoen beschriben. Liliencron, 4, pp. 292-293.

2. Liliencron, 4, p. 298.

3. See Bugenhagen's late April comments to Christian III of Denmark, "Ein grosser Furst hat gesagt nach D. Martini Abscheid: Wir haben bisher zwe grosse Regenten gehabt, vor wilchen wir mustem billich inne halten, im geistlichen Regiment den Luther, im weltlichen den Keisar; gehet uns der Keisar auch ab, so gnade uns Got." Yet Bugenhagen states a few sentences later, "Der Reichstag geht an [Regensburg], Keis Maj. kompt selber dahin, es werden nicht viel Fursten personlich dahin koimen. Der Landgrave ist selbst personlich bei Keis. Maj. gewest und das is gut." Johannes Bugenhagen, Dr. Johannes Bugenhaqens Briefwechsel. Hrsg. o. Vogt. (Stettin, 1888), pp. 356, 358.

4. Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent: Volume II. The First Sessions at Trent 154 6-1547. Trans. Dom Ernest Graf. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1961), pp. 197-203.

S- PKMS. 2, pp. 592-593. Charles' letter is published in Langenn, 2, p. 256. See also Brandenburg, Moritz■ pp. 433-434. 15(>

6. "...itzo etzliche auffrurische personen Muttwilliger posshafftiger weyse Durch ertichte falsche brieffe unnd Schmehschryfften und In Andere mehr wege unss mit unwarheit bey menniglichen einzupilden." Charles' announcement to the nobility published in Langenn, 2, p. 256. 7. For Albrecht see Johannes Voigt, Markgraf Albrecht Alcibiades von Brandenburg Kulmbach. Bd . I (Berlin: 1862), pp. 102-111. For the concerns among the Protestants see PKMS. 2, pp. 593-594, 604-605,

8. Lau and Bizer, Reformation, p. 193. Brandi, Charles V . p. 540.

9. For Carlowitz's Instructions see PKMS. 2, 569-572. Brandenburg, "Regensburg Vertrag" p. 8.

10. Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 431. PKMS, 2, pp. 572- 573 .

11. Nicolas Perrenot, Lord of Granvelle (1484-1550), Charles V's secretary of affairs for Burgundy and Germany. Born in Burgundy and educated for a career in law, Granvelle found the favor and support of Imperial Chancellor Bartolomeao Gattinara. Joining Charles' court in 1525, he worked at the highest levels of diplomacy. Upon Gattinara1s death in 1530 Charles declined to name a new Prime Minister and Chancellor, assuming more personal control over political affairs. Granvelle performed many of the bureaucratic tasks formerly undertaken by the Chancellor, becoming very much the spokesman for Charles V. Granvelle's Burgundian heritage instilled a unique loyalty to Charles, and reflected a supra-national policy which was European in scope. He took a dim view of reforming activity, primarily in its inherent risk of fragmenting the empire. See APB. 9, pp. 580-581; Brandi, Charles V, pp. 470-471. For political disposition see John M. Headly, The Emperor and His Chancellor: A Study of the Imperial Chancellery Under Gattinara. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) pp. 134-135; also G. R. Elton, Reformation Europe: 1517 - 1559. (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) pp. 40-41.

12. PKMS, 2, 580. See also Jedin, Council. Vol. 2, pp. 204-2 05.

13 . PKMS, 2, pp. 587-588. 157

14* Heiko Oberman puts this position quite succinctly: "In July 1546, not many months after Luther's death, civil war broke out in the German empire between the politico-military alliance of the Protestant estates and the emperor and his allies. The devastating blow Charles dealt the commander and leader of the Protestant Schmalkaldic League, Elector John Frederick of Saxony, was made possible by the "Judas of Meissen," the Protestant Duke Maurice of Saxony. The "traitor" crossed over to the emperor's side, betraying his cousin the elector." Heiko Oberman, Luther: Man Between God and the Devil. Trans. Eileen Walliser- Schwarzbart. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 9; see also Manschreck, Melanchthon. p. 278, where he states: "Before the fighting really began, Duke Maurice of Saxony, ambitious for power, turned traitor against the Elector of Saxony."

15. PKMS, 2, pp. 596-597; See also Brandenburg, "Regensburg Vertrag," p. 11.

16. PKMS, 2, p. 602; Brandenburg, in his study of these negotiations, saw the tardiness of Carlowitz,s information as in no way accidental. Moritz would have been well into his journey to the Diet before this last communication reached him. Brandenburg thought it doubtful whether Moritz would have even attended had he known of the strict condition placed on his requests. The position of the Albertine court in the forthcoming discussions, along with Moritz's comments to Philip of Hesse several days into his stay at Regensburg appear to substantiate Brandenburg's assertion. Brandenburg, "Regensburger Vertrag," pp. 11-12; "Was das concilium zu Trent belanget, ist aus dem dekret der vierten session leichtlich zu vermerken, was folgen will. So koennen wir auch wohl ermessen, da die irrigen artikel notduerftig nicht disputiret und erwogen werden, auch sich der papst dem concilio nicht unterworfen, worauf es angefangen; gott wirdet aber sein wort und die wahrheit erhalten." ["Concerning the Council of Trent: from the decees of the fourth session it is easy to note what will follow. This we are well able to infer, since the erroneous articles were not disputed and done away with, and also since, at the outset, the pope did not submit himself to the council. Yet God will maintain his Word and the truth.") PKMS, 2, p. 608.

17. PKMS. 2, p. 609. L5X

18. "... E. F. Gn. weren in der religion der augsburgischen confession erzogen, darinne ufgewachsen und in die regirung kommen; E. F. Gn. konnten auch nicht anders befinden, dann dass das evangelion in E. F. Gn. gebiete rechte gelehret und geprediget worde. So hetten auch E.F.Gn. besondere neigung zu gelehrten leuten; darum hetten E.F.Gn. Ihre universitaet Leipzik reichlicher, dan sie zuvor gewest, begabet, stattliche stipendia geordnet, auch schulen vor die jugend aufgerichtet, und wollen gerne, dass gelehrte gottselige leute mochten uferzogen werden; wie dann auch E.F.Gn. in Ihren landen zwei consistoria und den bann halten liessen. So wollten auch E.F.Gn. gerne, dass ein gemein, frei oder nacional christlich concilium mit vorwissen und bewilligung der Ksl. und Kgl. Mten. und aller stende deutscher nacion mochte versammlet..." PKMS, 2, p. 611.

19. "als Ihre von gott verordente oberkeit," PKMS. 2, p. 611.

20. PKMS. 2, pp. 614-623.

21. PKMS. 2, p. 615.

22. "...nichts anders raten, den das er seinem eigenen sohnen raten wollte. Nun waere an dem...kein behaglicher, besser noch gefaelliger werk thun konnte, denn dass S.F.Gn. sich in der religionsach mit beiden I. Mten und der gemeinen christlichen kirchen verglichen, und der religion verharret, darinnen S.F.Gn. loebliche vorfahren gewesen und veharret haetten." PKMS. 2, p. 616.

23. "Und hat dabei mit eingefuerht, dass der erzbischop zu Magdeburg....heimliche practiken mit dem kurf. zu Sachsen zu machen,.... Er wollte uns auch vertraulich nicht bergen, dass solche sachen vorliefen dass gemelter kurfurst und seine posteritaet in gefahrnis stunden, etwas zu verlieren, das I. Mten und auch er niemandes lieber denn S.F.Gn. goennen wollte;" PKMS, 2, p. 616.

24. " Und ob es S.F.Gn. geneigt, waere doch zu besorgen, dass es ohne einen grossen tumult und aufregen seiner unterthanen, da S.F.Gn. einige neuerung wider die augspurgische confession vornehmen sollte, nicht beschehen moechte." PKMS. 2, p. 617. LVJ

25. PKMS. 2, pp. 617-618. See also, Jedin, Council. Vol. 2, p. 204.

26. PKMS. 2, p. 621; Brandenburg, "Regensburger Vertrag," p . 16.

27. "dass u. gn. herr die religion in ihrem fuerstentum lauts der augsburgischen confession, nicht erstlich aufgericht, sondern also funden, da S. F. Gn. in ihre regierung getreten, dass auch S. F. Gn. in derselben religion auferzogen waeren, darum koentten S. F. Gn. sich ihrer gewissen und unterthanen halber also gestrack und ohne unterscheid, zufoerderst S.F. Gn. und der ihren ungehoert, nicht verpf1ichten." PKMS. 2, p. 618 .

28. "Da aber in etlichen artikeln zweiung bleiben sollten,...mit unterthaenigster bitte, die Ksl. Kgl. Mt. wollten in denselben artikeln mit S. F. Gn. und ihrer getreuen landschaft gn. geduld tragen." ["but s hould division remain in some articles... it is humbly asked that the emperor and king have patience with his princely grace and his estates."] PKMS. 2, 619. 26. "denn es waere ja schwer, sonderlich in sachen, welche die gewissen anlangten, sich in ein ding zu verpf1ichten, des man nicht gewiss waere, was es sein sollte,... Item ubi adversarii, utpote summus pontifex et sui, essent futuri judices. Item ubi etiam esset respectus subitorum habendus, quorum pleraque pars ita essent animati, ut citius sibi vitam quam conceptam opinionem eripi patiantur." PKMS, 2, 621.

30. PKMS. 2, p. 623-27.

29. PKMS, 2, p. 642 ; See also, Jedin, Counci 1. Vol. 2, pp. 2 04-2 05.

32. PKMS, 2, p . 62 5.

33. "salva conscientia et existimatione sua facere poterit.. PKMS. 2, p. 625.

34. "... neque vero etiam sine gravi periculo ac tumulta ac fortasse etiam rebellione subditorum suorum sese....cum praesertim majori parti subitorum....vitam fortunasque suas citius quam doctrinam atque usum istiusmodi articulorum sibi eripi passuri esse videantur." PKMS, 2, p. 625. I(,U

35. "et salva conscientia fieri potuerit." PKMS. 2, p . 637 .

36. "Ea verba, quibus linea subducta est: quantum salva conscientia etc; non possunt admitti sine injuria Caes. Mtis, cum certum sit, illam tantum ea expetere, quae cum bona conscientia et ad honorem dei fieri convenit. Id quod Sua Mtas cupit est hoc ipsum." PKMS. 2, p. 641.

37. Charles’ pronouncement found in Karl Lanz, Correspondenz des Karls V. bd . 2, (Frankfurt/Main, 1966) pp. 496-500. For specific statement of purpose p. 499, " Und seind derhalben zum hochsten verursacht und dringlich dahin bewegt, und zu erhaltung unser Kay, hocheit, auch fridens, rechts, rhue und ainigkeit im heiligen reiche, verhuetung und abwendung des beschwer1ichen, sorglichen lasts und nachteiligen unrats, so euch und andern stetten und stenden des h. reichs eruolgen mochte, entlich entschlossen, die bemelten unsern und des reichs ungehorsamen, untrewen und widerspenzigen betrueber und zerstorer gemaines frides und rechtes durch verleihung gotlicher gnaden und hilff zu geburhlichem gehorsam anzuhalten, zuweisen, und dadaurch gemaine teutsche nation in rhue, frid, und ainkeit zu setzen."

38. "...so dieselben verhinderer und zerstorer solcher vergleichung zu unser hailwertigen Christenlichen religion, oder der eeren gottes (die sy allein zu ainem teckmantel und beschonung ires unpillichen furmemens allenthalben furwenden) truegen..." Lanz, Correspondenz. p. 498.

39. "des uns auch ire erdichte auffrurische erruerige schme und schandtbuecher und gemelde, die sy allenthalben hin und wider in iren furstenthumen, landen und gepeiten in truck und sonst aussgeen lassen, den gemain man dardurch gegen uns uns zuerpittern und zu emporung und auffrur zu bewegen und zureitzen..." Lanz, Correspondenz. p. 498.

40. That Charles' position was settled well before this point in time is revealed in a letter to his sister, dated June 9, 1546. Charles told Maria that he had decided after much thought to commence war against the Duke of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse on the basis of their imprisonment of the Duke of Brunswick: "me suis resolu commencer la guerre contre lesdicts due de Saxen et lantgraue de Hessen a loccasion de la lr>]

detention dudict du de Brunswyck." Lanz, Correspondenz, p. 488. Of significance is the emperor's further comment that this "cover and pretext" of war might not stop the renegades from thinking that it is a matter of religion, it will nevertheless serve to divide. "Et combien que ceste couuerte et pretexte de guerre ne pourra du tout encourrir, que lesdicts dessuoyez ne pensent bien, que ce soit pour cause de la religion; toutesfois sera ce occasion de les separer." Lanz, Correspondenz. p. 488. Repgen's argument in "Religious War", p. 320, that Charles does not "expressly concede... that his public justification of the Schmalkaldic War is only a pretence and pretext," but rather only talks "...about the political opportuneness of one legitimation or the other for the impending war," appears to overlook the broad context of Charles' remarks concerning the the extreme danger in the affair of religion, and his concern that the rest of Germany may be lost from "our holy Faith:" "...lextreme dangier de laffaire de la religion,...tant daliener le reste de ceste Germanye de nostre saincte foy."(p. 488). Charles showed his political talent by effectively masking his religious intentions (which became obvious at Augsburg two years later), and making good on his claim that such public legitimization would divide the Protestants.

41. For his pacification project see Brandi, Charles V, pp. 561-562. For a detailed account of Strasbourg's surrender and the Interim, see Thomas A. Brady, Protestant Politics: Jacob Sturm (1489-1553) and the German Reformation. (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), pp. 308-317, 337-347 ; see also Kolb, Confessinet the Faith, pp. 6 5

42. "...dass der Ksl. und Kgl. Mt. endlich gemut und meinung dahin gericht were, dass ein frei christlich, rechtsgeschaffen, gemein concilium von alien nationen sollte gehalten werden, darinnen nichts anders als die ehre gottes rein und ernstlich gesucht wurde, und alle missbreuch in geistlichen und weltlichen staenden rechtsgeschaffen nach dem wort gottes und der heiligen schrift sollen reformirt und abgethan werden tarn in capite quam in membris, dem der papst, wenn er es schon nit gerne thete, und alle andere geistlichen mussten unterworfen sein..." PKMS. p. 657.

43. " So were der artikel mit der justification schon vergleichen und were darinne kein streit wo man einander recht verstehen wolle. Es hat sich auch S. Gn. [(>2

horen lassen, obgleich etwas in gemelten concilio furfallen mocht, des sich hz. Moritzen unterthanen beschweren und sobald nit konnte abgetan oder geandert werden, dass deshalben die Ksl. Mt. in sie nit dringen noch eilen wollten, sundern in dem mit S,F.Gn. und den unterthanen gn. geduld tragen; das wurde auch die Ksl. Mt. S.F.Gn. wohl selbst mundlich zusagen." PKMS. 2, pp. 658-659.

44. PKMS. 2, 659.

45. Brandenburg, "Regensburger Vertrag," p. 33.

46. "...quo Caesareae ac Regiae Majestati obedientia legitima in Imperio conservetur et manuteneatur, juditium quoque Camerae Imperialis instituatur et puplica pax observetur, et denique Majestatibus ipsorum pro communis Germaniae defensione necessaria contra Turcam auxilia praestentur." PKMS. 2, p. 661.

47. Brandenburg, "Regensburg Vertrag" pp. 35-36.

48. "Es hat auch bemelter von Granvel weiter angefangen, ob es sich vielleicht zutruge, dass die Ksl. M t . ein straf und vielleicht einen heerzog wider etliche ungehorsame furnehmen und damit vielleicht etliche land beruhren oder anders angreifen musste, damit S.F.Gn. sammtlich beliehen were und die anwartung hette, dass solches S.F.Gn. ohne schaden und nachteil sein, sundern ihr und ihren erben das ihre daran vorbehalten sein und folgen sollte, auch nach erstattung des ufgewandten unkostens, der leidlich und nit ubermessig sollte angeschlagen sein, uberantwort werden." PKMS. 2, p. 659.

49. "Komroet es dorzu, so schaue ein jeder zu dem seinen; wer etwas bekomme, der habs, wann der acht order dergleichen sollte ergehen." PKMS. 2, p. 674.

50. Note James Kittelson's comments in his favorable review of Katarina Sieh-Burens', Oligarchie. Konfession. und Politik im 16. Jahrhundert. Zur socialen Verflectung der Auctsburaer Buerqermeister und Stadtpfleger 1518-1618. (Muenchen: Ernst Vogel, 1986.), in The Sixteenth Century Journal. 19 (1988) p. 487. CHAPTER IV

CALL TO RESISTANCE: THE PAMPHLET WAR

The rumor concerning the Imperial Majesty has gotten so far out of hand that lazy people, including some who don't attach their names, compose and promulgate shameful and abusive poetry, rhymes, and songs against His Majesty- Such work, having been introduced into our principality and land, and imparted to our people, pays no heed to the scriptural admonition, "speak no evil of your ruler," or to the fact that such ripe libel is forbidden by law and punishable by beheading, even if devised and perpetrated against a lesser person.'

Germany in the summer of 1546 witnessed the first stages of the most massive outpouring of the written word in both volume and verbal violence since the mid-

1520rs.: Moritz's public complaint concerning the shameful literature crossing his borders hints to the impact the pamphlet movement had on his policies throughout the long summer leading to war.

Regensburg forced Moritz to deal diplomatically in two directions. On the imperial level his primary objective was preservation of neutrality in the escalating military build-up of the Schmalkaldic League and Charles V. Success depended on the mollification

163 164

of his co-religionists, support of the Albertine estates, and the passivity of his subjects. Domestically he needed to allay fears of eminent danger to his lands bred by rumors fulminating against the

emperor. Vital to this task would be a credible expression of confessional loyalty. Yet the plausibility of such a confession meant convincing an alarmed populous that imperial war preparations were not aimed at the extermination of the Lutheran faith. That imperial concern touched matters of secular obedience and not religion was at that point in time a matter of public record. Whether Moritz actually believed Charles is beyond the reach of any historian and certainly the scope of this study. Whatever his private thoughts, he publicly charted a course between

imperial demands and the pleading of the Schmalkaldic

League on the hope, if not the total conviction, that Charles V would act according to his word. Moritz could plead obedience to Charles in matters concerning worldly issues as grounds for refusing to join Philip and John Frederick only so long as it could be effectively asserted that the conflict did not concern religion. Yet, in the midst of spreading anti imperial rhetoric, Moritz had spent nearly a month in 165 the company of the alleged foe of true Christianity. Moritz knew of circulating rumors among the "common people" alleging his conversion to Catholicism, which apparently gave rise to a popular and somewhat hostile climate.3 The very territorial confessional sympathies so strenuously defended in the negotiations with Charles now created the most formidable obstacle for

Albertine neutrality. Uncertainty surrounding Moritz's intentions and the secrecy of his deal with the emperor provided hope to his co-religionists that he might be won to their side. Yet, what Philip was beginning to lack in patience with his son-in-law, John Frederick made up with suspicion. Passionate appeals flooded the Dresden court pleading for aid. Philip begged him to see Charles' threat to God's Word and his duty to resist, for "what man would not battle such evil for his creator and for God's honor, and his eternal salvation, also for the sake of the dear fatherland?"'1 Moritz's mother-in-law, Christine, not only pleaded with him personally on Philip's behalf, but also requested her daughter to convince her husband to help.3 when asked by his young wife about his intentions, Moritz replied that he sought to act honorably, and if all went as his wished, no ill would befall her father.* 166

Faced with these appeals, and with due

consideration of the political and military consequences of his response, Moritz initiated direct

conversations with the leaders of the League. In early July Moritz sent Ludwig Fachs to the landgrave and elector's military camp in Ichterhausen. Fachs gave the landgrave assurances of Moritz's friendship, and

his promise to "remain faithful to God's Word."7 Philip's attempt to convince the emissary that the

emperor's promises were a cover for his true intentions

of destroying the faith only evoked the response that "such was in God's hand and no power on earth could

destroy God's Word."8 Unsatisfied by such an answer, the landgrave

contended that many of the issues revolving around the

emperor's June 17 pronouncement dealt with disobedience

in matters of religion, proving, to his satisfaction

that the faith was at stake.9 In his estimation war was unavoidable, and both he and the elector expected compliance to the Oschatz treaty in which Moritz

promised to defend Christian teaching and the Gospel

against attack.10 Yet if he persisted in maintaining

neutrality, the landgrave and elector would still

consider him their friend. This being said however, Philip impatiently cut to the point: would Moritz help J67

or not? He wanted to hear only one word; "Yes or No."11

Fachs begged off by stating that his prince thought it

better to negotiate than fight. The landgrave and elector continued their attempts

to persuade Moritz to actively intervene.12 They could not let sit Moritz* argument that no power on earth could destroy God’s Word, with its tacit implication that the church needed no human protection for its

survival. Philip, having heard this line of thought

two decades earlier from Luther himself, had no desire to fight these theoretical battles again.11 They agreed that indeed there was no worldly power so strong as to

subdue God's Word, and the holy and apostolic church

built upon that Word must remain till the end of the

world,

Nevertheless, a Christian ruler as a member of that church must, to the best of his ability, protect and maintain that church and to offer help against all tyranny.M Philip urged Moritz to question his own

theologians and preachers according to their

consciences, they would undoubtedly instruct him in the truth and in his obligations in this matter. Knowing well that there were many subjects throughout their lands who, despite the "high blessedness of the cause," desired peace for the sake of protecting their own property, Philip and John Frederick reminded Moritz of 168

the words of Jesus, "whoever loves his own more than me is not worthy of me."15 The point was obvious. The cause of Christ called loyal Christians to active participation in the resistance against papal and imperial tyranny.

This exchange laid bare the fundamental division between Moritz and the league. His desire to convince his co-religionists that he remained loyal to God's Word, understood specifically in the context of the Augsburg Confession, would become increasingly untenable since such faithfulness, in the view of his fellow Protestants, found expression in active resistance against those attacking the true faith. The League's commitment to resistance took shape not only in the mustering of troops, but also in the initiation of a public pamphlet campaign defending their cause and legitimizing mobilization. This

intensely confessional and increasingly violent

literature stemming from the leaders of the league and their theologians and pastors, would eventually prove crippling to Moritz's own religious justification. His predicament is clarified through an examination of the content of the confessional propaganda which exploded from the Protestant presses during the weeks following Regensburg. 169

The Duty to Resist Awake! And do not delay! Prepare for valiant resistance, giving no ground to the foreign spirit, acting quickly, for this is best. Especially you dear Saxony, you're more than equal to the task! In your province began the powerful ascent of the Divine Word, thus your conscience, honor, and confidence are fully redeemed from papal tyranny and deceit. Thus be readily prepared, you must not suffer the eternal shame of allowing such grace to be taken away. Fear not, although the emperor leads, because in God's Word he does not believe. The noted saying use must we, Obey God more than he.... For the emperor owns not God's Word, so we render to him that which is his, but follow God according to his Word, humbled completely beneath his hand, so shall we remain, our cities, people, and land.16 The Arnstadt citizen who authored these words, one Peter Watzdorff,'7 prefaced his pamphlet with a copy of a letter he had received from John Frederick thanking him for an earlier "Trostschrift" dedicated to the elector.'* In his note of gratitude John Frederick assured his admirer that "the present military preparations against us and our compatriots concerns religion," and he left no doubt that "this is God's cause, touching his divine majesty, eternal saving

Word, and his divine honor and name!"19 170

From the mobilization camp at Ichterhausen the

landgrave and elector let loose the first salvos of their own pamphlet war. Since mid-June it had been common knowledge that the emperor intended to punish certain rebellious princes of the empire* Though no names were specifically mentioned, it was obvious to all that Philip and John Frederick were Charles'

primary targets.20 On July 4, they issued a open manifesto to the emperor publicly proclaiming their innocence of all crimes.21 The treatise, though couched in a respectful tone, contained the rudiments for later

bitter polemic. Acknowledging reports concerning Charles' intentions to punish certain rebels, they had trusted that such threats were not directed at them. Now hearing that they were the targets, they protested the unjust nature of Charles' actions. Reference was made to Charles' election oath in which he swore to proceed in such matters according to the laws, ordinances, and recesses of the empire.22 Since clearly no grounds for his conduct existed, the emperor misused his office and authority.21 They purposed to publicly proclaim their innocence, and to assert that Charles' operation was

aided by the Antichrist in Rome... solely for the purpose of uprooting our true Christian religion, God's Word, his Holy Gospel, and the suppression Germany's freedom and liberty.2"1 171

This pamphlet contained the main themes of the League's defense. First, Charles' accusations of

disobedience were false. Second, his military solution contravened imperial law and due process, hence Charles' was in violation of his imperial oath.

Finally, and this would become the dominant

justification for Protestant resistance, Charles* illegal conduct was a cover-up for his conspiracy with

the pope to uproot the Lutheran faith and destroy

German liberty. Here appeared a shading of the rationale for resistance against the "pope's soldier" who had forfeited authority. All future Protestant legitimation essentially flowed from this pivotal point, and in the end drove the final wedge between the

league and Moritz.

On the same day the League's military leaders published their public defense from Ichterhausen,

Johannes Bugenhagen, the prominent Wittenberg theologian and pastor, issued a spiritual call to arms to the clergy in John Frederick's territory.^ As superintendent, this pamphlet may be seen as the first official statement of the position of the electoral

Lutheran churches. Captured in the work is the initial blast of the pastoral propaganda which would be disseminated through the pulpits in Saxony, and 172

evidence suggests the tract, or at least the ideas

expressed, made its way into Albertine parishes, for it contained the violent language Moritz eventually felt

compelled to address.** Bugenhagen painted in dark colors the political

and military threats that hung over the land.

A people from a foreign land, thirsting for German blood, ignorant of the Gospel, and pledged to do evil and treachery, are being led into Germany, it is necessary and rightfully commanded by God, that one protect the church, the youth, women, and chaste young women against such invaders, as one would protect against murders and rapists.27 Quoting extensively from mostly Old Testament passages, Bugenhagen offered scriptural support for resistance, together with comfort and assurance in the face of

potential suffering.28

The tract is biblical not only in the actual quoting of scripture but also with comparisons of

Germany's circumstances with the heroes of Israel's faith. Figures such as Judas Maccabaeus and Daniel

proved God's faithfulness in the past, so also his

protection in this troubled time.29 Exhorting the

pastors to remember that the only sure defense was Gou, it was imperative that the congregations be encouraged

to repent of their sins and lead better lives. The evil coming upon the land was a punishment, but such punishment should lead the church to repentance.” 173

Bugenhagen knew the question of rebellion would

touch the consciences of his congregations, so to brace

his flock against such a counter-accusation he

emphasized that it was "certain that the enemy above all seeks the extermination of divine truth, and the perpetual establishment of idolatry and obscenity."51

Though the enemy might claim that such was not the case, the congregations should remember that the Jews accused Jesus of rebellion, so no credence should be given to "false masks," and prayers should continually go forth to God for him to protect his doctrine.53 The people were encouraged that God would hold and protect them in their suffering, just as he protected the Israelites at the Red Sea.55 Making no specific accusation against Charles,

Bugenhagen focused rather on the machinations of the pope, who had "sent vast amounts of money and people," making it clear that the enemy's chief concern was "the uprooting of Christian doctrine and the devastation of the government and cities where correct doctrine was preached. 1,54 The emphasis clearly lay with the threat to the gospel and God's church as it stood under the protective guidance of John Frederick and the landgrave, and he identified the enemy as anyone who 174 aligned against these two leaders. In this context Bugenhagen made perhaps his most confessionally acute assertion, and one that could only have negative ramifications for Moritz’s policy. The superintendent stated that

it was certain the enemy, and all that helped them, contended against God, and made themselves guilty of innocent blood which was shed for true doctrine from Abel onward.15 This accusation referred to New Testament book of Luke, chapter 11, where Jesus castigated the Pharisees and the unbelieving generation, making them responsible for the blood of the prophets shed from the beginning of the world. With pointed polemic Bugenhagen graphically included the threatened Protestants within the lineage of prophetic suffering.

Bugenhagen*s pastoral "propaganda" concluded with a prayer to be read in all the churches.

Truthful, Eternal, Almighty God, Father of our Savior Jesus Christ, Creator of heaven and earth, together with your Eternal Son and Holy Spirit. We confess our profound sin, and that with great ingratitude we have sinned not only unknowingly but knowingly. We deserve your wrath and punishment, and have a heartfelt disdain for our sin. We ask from our hearts that you would graciously forgive all our sin, for your Son Jesus Christ's sake who you established as reconciler. Rule our hearts with your Holy Spirit so that with true faith, righteous petitions, and true obedience, we may always live for you. You see the great danger confronting our rulers, together with everyone: man, wife, and child. We have no protection apart from your 175

help. You know the hearts of all men, and you see that our enemy seeks aboveall to uproot true doctrine and to establish and maintain their treacherous idolatry. So we ask you from our hearts, through our Savior Jesus Christ, that you would for yourglory's sake graciously protect and defend for now and forever our rulers, our churches, ourselves, and our children and homes, as you preserved your people of Israel at the Red Sea. Destroy the counsel and the power of our enemy and the murderous foreign nation. Do not allow their immorality and atrocities to come upon our wives and children. For thy glory's sake graciously maintain your teaching and blessed Christian government in this land. Incline our rulers with your Holy Spirit to Christian leadership, that they and their subjects, in true knowledge of Jesus Christ, in righteous petitions and obedience toward you, may live and remain in peace, giving you eternal praise and thanks. You have said "Call upon me in trouble and I will hear you, so that you may praise me." Your words are true, therefore I ask you: hear us in this great distress, and graciously defend us for your Son Jesus Christ's sake. Amen.w This prayer captured the essential aspects of the Protestant pastoral position and set the tone for what followed. Confession of sin and admonition to

repentance and improved lifestyle, petition for divine protection, the assertion that the enemy sought the destruction of the faith, and close identification with the Old Testament people of Israel. With the question of resistance and confessional

integrity so closely conjoined, it is not surprising that the polemicists quickly gathered at the grave of the late Martin Luther. The reformer's words most certainly found a heightened sense of authority in 176 light, of his recent passing. Few parishoners would have been spared the flood of encomiums, praising him as a “chariot of Israel," and elevating him to the status of national hero.37 The reformer's grappling with the validity of resistance in the 1530's, and his eventual shift of position on the matter has already been discussed. Yet one of the results of that period was a distinct "paper trail" of published material reflecting arguments both for and against active resistance. Two of Luther's works in particular played a key role in the literary battles of the summer of 1546; his March, 1530 advisory letter iCounsel!, which strongly condemned resistance by Christians,™ and his later "Warning to his Dear German People." published a year after the Counsel and reflecting his altered perspective.39 Luther's voice evidently still touched consciences, raising doubts as to whether good

Christians could resist God-ordained authority. In early July a pious Lutheran knight and Albertine subject, Henry of Einseidel, sent a copy of Luther's

1530 Counsel to Melanchthon inquiring as to the legitimacy of resistance in light of the late reformer's advice contained therein. It is not certain in what form Henry had this work. Luther himself was 177

confronted with the letter and questioned on his opinion of the matter the year before at Leipzig. He reportedly refused comment and complained of its misuse

by the enemy.40 Although Counsel would be reissued in pamphlet form by those sympathetic to Charles and Moritz sometime in the early weeks of the campaign,41

it cannot be ascertained whether it was this new edition which Henry sent Melanchthon. Since this work would be republished several times in the coming months by the imperial and Albertine loyalists, its content merits a closer examination.42 In the uneasy spring prior to the Diet of Augsburg, Elector John had solicited advice from Luther regarding military measures if rejection of the

Protestant cause turned violent. The reformer responded in a manner which could only frustrate those seeking justification for resistance, arguing that

Christians could not under any circumstances take up arms against the emperor. He forbid resistance on the grounds that, "according to scripture is it in no way fitting that someone who wants to be a Christian set himself against his authority.1,43 Key for Luther was the divine sanction of the emperor's authority, and particular actions, whether right or wrong, did not touch the sanctity of that office. In this context 178

Luther quoted Christ's statement that we should "Render to Caesar that which is Caesar's," and as long as the emperor remains in office obedience is due him, for to do otherwise would be illegitimate rebellion.44 Such a monarchical view of the emperor made all princes of the empire subservient, and rendered any military action against that office illegitimate.45

Utilizing such an opinion from Luther's hand by those desiring to quell antagonistic fires was not surprising, for the tract's theology dovetailed with the political agenda of the Albertine court. Simply put: true Christians do not rebel, and loyal Lutherans owe obedience to their rightful leader. Yet it was not only the reasoning within the letter that gave it relevance for the circumstances of

154 6, but also the authority, or more accurately the authorities behind it. Luther's introductory remarks contained material damaging to the League's cause, for there he informed his elector that the forthcoming advice was a product of joint deliberations between himself, Justus Jonas, Johann Bugenhagen, and Philip

Melanchthon, a veritable who's who of the resistance movement’s pastoral leadership of 154 6144, Consequently, the letter contained not only an argument against resistance from the hand of Luther, but bore the stamp 179 of approval from the very leaders who were later calling for military action. Luther was dead, but these leaders were very much alive, and their complicity in this brief left them open for charges of hypocrisy. Perhaps such association with the letter motivated Melanchthon*s hurried response to Henry of Einseidel.47 Assuring Henry that he remembered well the events of that time, and admitting Luther's authorship, he nevertheless added that it was imperative for him to understand that Counsel in no sense embodied Luther's final opinion. Due to shifting circumstances the reformer had changed his mind and argued in opposition to his earlier views.4* Melanchthon illustrated the correct view of resistance by suggesting a situation where a prince wanted to unlawfully take away a subject's wife. The subject, Melanchthon argued, would have every right to protect his wife, for natural law grants the right to defend one's loved ones. "Protection is a natural law, and natural law is divine law."49 In this light if a prince acts as a murderer, then subjects have the divine right to protect themselves. Thus the Protestant princes act lawfully, "for the foreign people, the Spanish and Italians, who 180 so thirst for your blood, should be considered nothing other than murderers."50

It is probable that this incident prompted Melanchthon to reissue Luther's famous 1531 treatise under the title, "Doctor Martin Luther's Warning to His

Dear German People, written Some Years Earlier Concerning the Present Circumstances in which the Enemies of Christian Truth Seek to Invade and Destroy the Churches and Land in which the Pure Teaching of the Gospel is Preached, with a Preface by Philip Melanchthon.51 The significance of Luther's Warning was that it granted legitimacy for defensive action taken for the sake of the gospel when confronted with notorious injustice. Portraying the Lutherans as victims of aggressive papal tyranny, he contended that if any war should arise it would be the fault of the papists. Such defense should not be considered insurrection, for "defense against bloodhounds cannot be rebellious."51 Though Luther's efforts were essentially pastoral, in that he didn't want the people to be burdened with bad consciences, he nevertheless would not condemn those who fought against the "murderous and bloodthirsty papists," nor would he allow them to be labeled as seditious.5’ Speaking as the "prophet of the 181

Germans, "s< he counseled the people to refuse any call by the emperor to take up arms against Lutherans. Such an act of disobedience was justified since aiding the emperor would be an attack on the gospel.54 In rhetorical flourish Luther disavowed any attempt to incite the German people to military action, but argued that the burden of guilt for any bloodshed fell squarely on the papacy and any who joined their efforts. If attacked the Protestants had every right to defend themselves, and do so with clear consciences.46 Arguably the most influential aspect of this treatise was not the somewhat convoluted argument for resistance, but rather the inflammatory nature of the work itself, especially in the characterization of his opponents. Luther vigorously denied that he called for

Lutherans to break the peace, yet his acidic and violent rhetoric may have contributed to such an end.

In sum, the issue was not so much Luther's intended motive in writing, but rather the effect of the work itself, and the rhetorical force of this treatise as a weapon of spiritual authority and agitation may help explain its frequent publication on the eve of the

Schmalkaldic campaigns.47 182

Such pastoral justification for armed resistance

on the eve of the Schmalkaldic War provided a powerful

weapon for the League's sympathizers. From the pen of the great reformer himself came not only a call for righteous defense, but also absolution of consciences.

The double threat to the Albertine position was obvious, for not only did it grant the right to take up arms, but also undermined any defense based on

obedience to the emperor. Melanchthon*s preface to Luther's Warning left no doubt as to his position on the matter,58 and nowhere is found the reputed flaccid waverer, an accusation

often applied to Luther's spiritual heir.59 The elder

reformer had testified to the sharp contrast in public

temperament between Melanchthon and himself,60 but on

this occasion Luther's successor showed the capacity to wield words with the force of a woodsman's axe. Melanchthon echoed the call for defending the gospel. Just as Jesus had entrusted his mother into

John's care as he hung on the cross, so also he has

entrusted the church into the care of all men,

especially the rulers. Thankfulness for what Jesus did

for them on the cross should lead all men to join together and protect the church and correct doctrine.61

Anyone "who is not a crude, Godless person, having even 183 a spark of Christian understanding, should know the nobility of preserving the true Church." It was now vitally important that all God-fearing people in Germany consider their obligation in the threatening storm of war. It was clear that the pope with his supply of money and soldiers sought nothing other than the

uprooting of true doctrine being taught in the churches, and the reestablishing of idolatry and error through bloodshed and murder, together with the devastation of the German nation and the rending of the electoral and ducal houses of Saxony.62 The exposure of the enemy's intentions made it incumbent upon all God-fearing men to separate themselves from such idolatry. Quoting Saint Paul, he asked "what harmony existed between Christ and

Belial?"6’ The challenge was clear, confessional integrity meant active resistance against papal tyranny.

Melanchthon aggressively countered circulating reports denying the enemy sought the destruction of the faith, but, rather, only sought to punish the disobedient who had unjustly attacked bishops and property, unfairly expelled monks, and unlawfully imprisoned the Duke of Brunswick. Allegedly all that was intended was the clearing away of some "hard heads," making possible a harmonious order. These 184

protestations, Melanchthon argued, were merely "false masks" for the destruction of true doctrine and the establishment of idolatry, for their own testimony betrayed them. Obviously the return of monks to their previous stations meant the reintroduction of the idolatrous mass, together with the slander of true doctrine from the pulpits. In sum, "he who does not see in this matter the cause of religion simply does not care about matters of religion."64 Melanchthon's pastoral concern emerged when he spoke of the attack on the faithful who may suffer and die for the cause of the gospel. The question was whether one would die the dear death of Abel, or live the lascivious life of Cain? All die, yet the issue determined how the readers would stand before God.6S Relating how Abel, Jeremiah, John the Baptist, Christ, and Paul, were attacked by tyrants, yet remained firm.

He exhorted the readers to remain faithful to their confession of the true doctrine of God.66 He had no intention of calling the people to passive suffering, since "defense is a law which God has planted in nature, and there is much difference between such defense and rebellion."67 Killing a murderer who attacked a man or his family in the street or home was to be considered a work pleasing to God.68 Melanchthon 185 vehemently paralleled Luther1s Warning by dispelling the accusation that military defense is rebellion, and to help the consciences of those who were being called to take up arms. These works of Bugenhagen, Luther, and Melanchthon exemplify the emerging spiritual justification for confessionally motivated military action. Their prestige as spiritual leaders, especially the sainted Luther, validated rumors that the tyranny of the pope and his servants threatened the gospel. Most notably though, these works illustrated the growing consensus that resistance against Charles was in itself a mark of confessional integrity. The clarion call to resistance resonated far beyond the walls of Wittenberg, finding voice with other Protestant activists in Germany. An excellent example is found in Reutlingen pastor-poet, Johannes Schradin's ,M True and Established Report and Pronouncement of the Dangerous. Turkish, and Evil Assaults and Machinations Undertaken by that Great

Enemy of God, the Pope, and his Allies. Against the Praiseworthy Protesting Estates and Some Adherents to the Gospel. For the Purpose of the Painful and Unrestorable Submission and Destruction of the German

Lands. Also How a Necessary and Compelled Defense and 186

Resistance Should be Implemented.70 Schradin's work is significant for two reasons. First, his popular poem contains the salient features of the resistance theory, and secondly, that the work went through at least six editions in 1546 bespeaks of an active market.n

Schradin succinctly pronounced the forfeiture of

Charles' imperial status, asserting confessional linkage between true faith in Christ and the requirement to resist.

So from him [Charles] you are totally free, no one stands in obligation and may lawfully resist him, since he is now a Priest's knight acting against his office and duty. Thus you do not sin, If you send a strong people and army to mount resistance, because this rule is fair, which in Latin is used by the lawyer "whoever breaks faith to you faith to him has been broken" No one is obligated to maintain faith with those who will not hold it themselves. He would also take your freedom repudiating thus his authority. Also he knows well as a Christian what one should render the emperor, namely, whatever is the emperor’s as Jesus Christ himself taught us. Yet when the emperor goes too far and wants to grasp and have too much, and demands that which is not his, Christ never taught us that in such a case we should give too him.72 Freedom from the emperor, the "priest's knight," laid the polemical axe to any appeal for obedience to

Charles V. IS7

Rhetoric of this stripe seems to have known no

territorial boundaries, for in the weeks following Regensburg the Dresden court percieved a threat in the literary invective directed at the emperor circulating in their land, and sought to stop it. Moritz later

argued that:

No one can justly accuse us of abandoning our faith, and the duty which binds us to the emperor precludes taking action against him. For these reasons we have banned the sale and distribution in our land of the anonymous derogatory poems and rhymes which belittle the emperor and other people.7J The polemical eruption following the prince's return shatters any retrospective interpretation of those negotiations as pure political gamesmanship. By setting policy within the percieved constraints of the religious convictions of his subjects, Moritz assumed the potential for such aggressive reaction on the part of the Albertine citizenry, as well as the intrinsic connection between confessional allegiance and his own political viability. Whether he was surprised by the intensity of the response, and the actual threat which arose, cannot be determined. What is certain is that

Dresden sensed their vulnerability, and responsed with measures to stabilize the situation. 188

Chemnitz Landtag The inflammatory atmosphere created by the rhetoric of war compelled the Albertine court to take steps to stabilize relations not only with the league's leaders, but also domestically with their estates and subjects. In response to a request for aid from John Frederick, Moritz informed the elector that severity of the situation compelled him to summon the estates for advice and assistance.1^

Moritz had not called a territorial diet in nearly five years. The ability to finance his expanding bureaucracy, construction projects, and diplomatic endeavors, through judicious use of the secularization of church property had provided a large degree of financial independence from his estates.

Transference of wealth from the church to portions of the nobility fostered loyalty from the benefactors, while use of the proceeds for endowments to the university and the building of new schools won the approval of the Lutheran clergy.7' Ironically, that very freedom placed him in the crossfire between

Charles and his subjects, and forced him back into the arms of his estates. 18‘>

Much of what had been kept within court circles would now have to be cautiously communicated to a larger forum, and Moritz risked having agitated nobles, clergy, and city leaders call for immediate alliance with their fellow Protestants in the League.76 Here, as with the direct talks with the league, he would need to emphasize the secular character of the conflict and assure his estates of Charles' benign intentions regarding religion. Success depended in large part on constructing credible negotiations between the League and Charles. In this endeavor the Albertines found a common voice with their neighbor to the north. Elector Joachim II of Brandenburg. In late June Joachim had communicated the need for discussions regarding the recent developments, since he faced a similar decision to Moritz concerning his role in the coming conflict.77 As with Albertine Saxony, a significant portion of Brandenburg territory harbored Protestant sympathies and care was needed to avoid agitation by openly declaring against the Schmalkaldic League. Joachim's deep debt made him dependent on his estates, and, much like Dresden, having to deal with that group could prove risky. Further complicating matters was Joachim's own pursuit of Magdeburg, and 190

aligning against: Charles could only damage those ambitions.78 Despite these domestic considerations, Joachim appreciated the threat to princely liberties inherent in a Hapsburg victory over the League. The elector's concern hastened him to align with Moritz in seeking a settlement within a constitutional and political

context, meaning that as far as possible confessional matters would be set to the side.79 He readily agreed to joint mediation efforts with the Albertines between the emperor and the League.*0 When the Albertine estates gathered in the early morning of July 13 at Chemnitz, the introductory address made clear Moritz's need for support and his desire for Albertine unity.*1 A priority was the formation of a liaison committee between the entire

body of estates and the Dresden court. Arguing that

dependence on the will of a full territorial diet would

slow the decision making process considerably, the prince proposed a six member advisory committee to assist in negotiations throughout the coming weeks. The estates' response to this request revealed the centrality of the religious issues in the matter, together with their exposure to some forms of the accusatory rhetoric towards the motives of Hapsburgs.8* m

Having been "subjected to all manner of speech alleging Charles' intentions to uproot the faith,"83 they demanded the procurement of an unequivocal declaration by Charles* that

the Imperial Majesty's disposition and intention has never been, is not now, and never will be the suppression of the Word of God by the sword, but that His Imperial Majesty will abide by his statements of previous diets and shall assemble a general Christian council of all Christian nations which will seek nothing other than the implementation of a true Christian reformation in a manner conducive to the adherents of the Augsburg Confession.84 If such a promise could be obtained then the estates asserted their willingness to remain neutral,83 but every attempt should be made in conjunction with Joachim II for a peaceful solution to the impasse. If mediation failed, and it was clear that the break centered on secular issues, then neutrality and mobilization for the protection of Albertine territory should be implemented. Finally, compromising on the formation of a special six member committee they allowed Moritz to select its members,86 but hedged on empowering that group to levy taxes or initiate military action.83 Charles' assurances at Regensburg allowed Moritz's ready agreement to obtain written clarification. An imperial statement denying any intention of attacking the faith would create a constructive tool for the 192

Albertine court's pacification of their subjects, and with mediation measures with Joachim already underway, further evidence of Charles' constitutional focus offered substantiation for compromise on the secular level."* Moritz's request for an advisory committee was only partially met. He asked for a hasty selection of the six advisors, but protested that such a group must have the power to gather funds and order military action since delay in gathering the full diet could prove disastrous. The estates refused to surrender total control over taxation and military decisions, but compromised by granting Moritz permission to raise an army of 4000 foot and 300 horse for defensive purposes. Initial results at Chemnitz gave the appearance that Moritz successfully trod the narrow political path initiated at Regensburg. Maintaining neutrality, he successfully circumvented the confessionally risky estates with the formation of a special committee, and gained approval for a small military force. Yet on the heels of this achievement the complexities of maintaining constructive contacts with the Hapsburgs reared its head, and the confessional constraints which

Moritz had pleaded to the emperor took concrete form. 193

Moritz and Macrdeburcr The secrecy of Regensburg touched Moritz’s

interests but not necessarily Charles*. With the emperor's strategy aimed at driving a wedge between the

Protestant princes, any friction arising from territorial disputes would be welcomed. It comes then as little surprise that Charles would push the issue of Magdeburg rather quickly, demanding that Moritz fulfill his obligations of the treaty. In an imperial mandate which reached Chemnitz on the concluding day of the diet, he ordered Moritz and the Archbishop of Magdeburg to gather their estates within the month and publicly announce Albertine protection rights.50

On the surface Charles* mandate seemed the fulfillment of Moritz's dynastic dreams. In his hand he now held an imperial blessing for gaining political leverage in one of the most coveted territories in the empire. Yet however legal and opportune the circumstances, Moritz found himself immediately confronted by what his councilors percieved to be a formidable obstacle. Their primary concern was the pro-electoral mood of the territory, and the fear that 194 any attempt to impose the imperial mandate might lead to unrest*

The Albertine councilors' hesitancy may have been well founded, for the archbishop's residence of Halle was also a center of a vigorous anti-imperial polemic, primarily from the pen and pulpit of Justus Jonas.91 The reformer's overt loyalty to John Frederick had made issues of resistance and obedience exceptionally volatile topics within city, and if Jonas was even remotely accurate with his estimate that as many as ten to eleven thousand people attended evangelical services each Sunday, the churches within the city provided the means for reaching a impressive number of citizens.92 Jonas had an active pen, and just days earlier he had published a popular prayer. The Seventy-ninth Psalm

Presented in Rhyme. To be Suna and Praved For Comfort by All Christians During thiS-JJanqerous Time, in which he graphically portrayed the threat at hand.93

Accusing the pope and "Satan’s ramble," of plotting the slaughter of preacher's and God's servants, the enemy would treat their victims' bodies as "crow food," and

"cast their holy remains to the dogs, mingling the innocent blood which cries out to heaven."94 Justly assuming the continuity of content between his pamphlet and his pulpit, Jonas's efforts at Halle represented a i ys

visceral polemic which potentially found the ears of thousands of citizens in the city and its environs. Whether or not the Albertine advisors were aware of Jonas's conduct or the particulars of his message, they seemed convinced that the attachment on the part of the inhabitants to the elector and his cause, created a formidable obstacle to Moritz's newly won authority. After weighing the matter carefully, they informed him that:

The council humbly proposes that Your Princely Grace withhold the protection rights mandate at this time. It might easily incite unrest, and it would be more prudent to wait until calmer circumstances before considering implementation.” To facilitate this end they returned the mandate, asking the emperor to omit any specific date for enforcement, and instructed the ducal envoy to justify their request by informing Charles that:

Concerning the implementation of protection rights: on account of the bishopric's subjects, the majority of whom are our co-religionists, the matter should not be pursued at this time, but rather delayed a month or two so as to not engender an unmanagable situation, especially since some make common cause and intrigue with the opposition.96 Moritz's response to Charles' mandate exemplifies the direct correlation in the minds of his advisors between confessional activism and political viability.

Whether Moritz had Justus Jonas specifically in mind 196 when he talked of those who took common cause and intrigued with the opposition cannot be ascertained, though a few months later the prince made direct reference to the content of Jonas's preaching when ordering his banishment from the city.97 In sum, Moritz's long-sought protections rights over the highly coveted archbishopric were essentially blocked, not by imperial law, but by the perception on his part of the confessional temperament of its subjects, the intensity of which compelled the prince to bite the hand that fed him.

The Failure of Mediation Albertine response to Charles' request undergirded the connection between confessional stability and public peace, and further substantiated Moritz's endeavors to couch the language of the conflict, together with possible avenues for resolution, in secular terms. Such was the path pursued in Albertine- Brandenburg mediation between the League and Charles during the latter half of July. Moritz and Joachim, caught as they were between their worldly lord and their blood relatives, approached the negotiations as evangelical loyalists and protectors of the "Christian and true religion."9® 1 9 7

They instructed their emissaries to inform John

Frederick and Philip that they would fight if rumors of Charles' militant intent against the confession proved true." Conversely, if no proof existed for doubting Charles' previous assurances, then the princes had no choice but to swear obedience to lawful authority, for

apart from matters of religion we are bound unreservedly and with all servility to the emperor, and the relationship we have with you does not exempt us from our duty to obedience.1*' Moritz and Joachim listed seven issues they classified as profansachen. or "secular issues," in which they sought compromises from the elector and

landgrave: 1) Their relationship to the Imperial

Supreme Court. 2) The recognition of Ferdinand as King of the Romans. 3) The recall of their representatives

from the Regensburg colloquium in March of that year.

4) The Brunswick matter, including the imprisonment of Duke Henry. 5) The conflict with Julius Pflug for the bishopric of Naumburg. 6) The Saxon-Bohemian struggle for the Cloister at Dobriluk. 7) The Schmalkaldic

League's attempts to unite with foreign powers.1*" It

is clear, especially in regard to issues 1, 3 and 5, that Moritz and Joachim approached the discussion with the emperor's non-confessional intentions as their primary consideration.102 198

Regardless of whether or not this diplomacy embodies mere "political opportunism,"103 it appears both princes saw their best interests served by attempting to circumvent the religious nature of the dispute. Personal interests, whether domestic or

imperial, most assuredly embraced a concern for stability and peace, as Moritz's dynastic delay in Magdeburg clearly showed. They knew very well that serious religious questions were woven deeply into the

fabric of each issue listed, hence they sought a secular legal framework in which the issues could be

settled. Yet as their cautiously worded instructions reveal, it was precisely in the matters of religion that the greatest potential for conflict emerged. The

League's primary justification for their action was the conviction that the Word of God was at stake. Far from being ambivalent to this confessional matter, Moritz and Joachim knew its explosive potential, especially with regard to resisting the emperor.

The Imperial Majesty is our worldly lord and authority, and one is obligated to render obedience in all divine and human laws regarding secular matters...where this is rejected there arises the possibility of horrible bloodshed of poor innocent people, and irreparable damage to the German nation and empire.1**

The intensity with which Morit2 and Joachim attempted to frame the issue in secular terms found 199

recipocal energy with the elector and landgrave's determination to proclaim a holy war. The Schmalkaldic League's vigorous refusal to accept the Albertine-

Brandenburg claim regarding the emperor's benign intentions towards the faith served well to summarize their position on the eve of the war. They considered meaningless any promise by Charles not to uproot the true religion since he had earlier condemned the Lutherans as heretics. Such word games were simply part of a "sham to trick the people into believing that his military actions were aimed at punishing rebels."10' John Frederick and Philip pleaded innocent and charged Charles with violation of imperial law and due process.106 The truth was that "their disobedience lay in their refusal to repudiate the true faith and accept papal idolatry."107 Clearly a month of diplomacy had gained nothing in the way of compromise from either side. Moritz and

Joachim's attempt to conciliate the matter within a constitutional context met with the forceful claim that the very existence of the Gospel was at stake. The question on which everything hinged was simple: What were Charles' intentions? Weeks of talks solved nothing. 2

Adamant rejection of any mediation in a secular context could only contribute to the erosion of Albertine neutrality. Convinced of the religious nature of the threat the League's spokesmen would escalate their rhetoric, pressuring Dresden to defend its diplomacy. The attitude of his estates toward the religious question made clear that Moritz's difficulty could not be abated through maneuvering on the imperial level alone. While the Albertines wrestled with the high stakes negotiations between the Hapsburgs and the Schmalkaldic League, they lacked the luxury of calculating their policies in detached isolation. The issue had to be contained at home as well. Potential domestic hostility necessitated a noncommittal posturing between the imperial antagonists. Yet could such a "public relations" campaign succeed? Thrown on the defensive,

Moritz found himself scrambling for confessional damage control, and the obvious tools were his own Albertine Lutheran pulpits. 2(11

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. "Wie dann die sage/ der Kayserlichen Maiestat halben/ also weit komen/ das auch muessige leute/ schand und Schmehegetichte/ Reyme und Gesenge wider jre Maiestat machen/ und zum theyl one namen ausgehen lassen/ welche in unsere Fuerstenthumb und Lande eingeschoben/ und den Leuten beybracht werden/ ungeachtet das die Schrifft sagt/ Principi populi tui no maledicas/ Und das solche famos Libell in Rechten bey straffe der entheuptunge verboten sein/ ob die auch gleich wider geringere Personen ertichtet unnd ausgebreitet worden." Unser von Gotts genaden Moritzes Hertzooen zu Sachssen/ Landtgraffen in Doeringen/ unnd Hargraffen zu Meissen/ Erklerunue/ wie wir der Christlichen Religion geneicit/ Unnd welcher ursach halben/ wir Uns/ wider die Kavserlicher Maiestat/ nicht einaelassen/ noch umbgehen haben koennen/ Uns umb Unsers Vettern Lande anzunehmen. (Leipzig, 1546), Ai i ia.

2. See Brady, Protestant Politics, pp. 306-307, where he aptly points out that "Whereas the pamphleteers of 1525 had spared the emperor and his office, the more apocalyptic Protestant mood of 1546-47 judged the emperor and all other temporal rulers according to their militancy for God and the true gospel and against Satan and his minions, the pope and the emperor."

3. Moritz related the accusations to Elizabeth of Rochlitz in early August, "dass von gemeinen leuten unerfindlich auf uns geredet wirdet.... denjenigen, die uns selbst erdichtet nachreden, wir haben uns dem papsttum wieder untergeben, das sacrament in einer gestalt zu Regenspurg genommen, die religion in unsern landen zu verandern angefangen etc.," PKMS, 2, p. 758; Electoral emmissary Franz Burkhard reported from Chemnitz that "dass der gemeine mann im ganzen lande zu dem sachen ganze viel geneigt..." letter from July 9, in PKMS, 2, p. 709.

4. "wilcher mann wollt urn seines schoepfers und gottes ehre und der ewigen seligkeit, auch um des leiben vaterlands willen sich gegen solich unvermuthlich boese listig furnehmen mennlich und kecklich zu streiten. . .11 PKMS, 2, p. 679. 202

5. PKMS. 2, p. 685.

6. Agnes told her mother that "aber S.L.[Moritz] hat mir kein ander antwort gegeben, den gesaget, was er gethun koent, das wolt ehr thun, und ehr wolt, das es meinen herrn vattern ginge, wie S.L. wolt, so wurt es S.Gn. nicht uble gehen. 11 PKMS. 2, p. 706.

7. "Und ist unser gemuet dohin gerichte, bei gottes worte zu bleiben..." PKMS. 2, p. 688.

8. "dass solche in gottes hand stehe, dann keine weltliche macht so stark, dass sie gottes wort kann dempfen." PKMS. 2, p. G88.

9. "Doraus befindlich, das man alles in den ungehorsam ziehen will, was der religion anhendig." PKMS. 2, p. 693.

10. PKMS, 2, p. 695. The Oschatz Treaty settled the Wurzen incident of 1542, and therein Moritz agreed in matters of "die christliche lehre und evangelium...wollen wir uns derer defension zu hulfe und rettung also verhalten..." PKMS. 1, p. 422.

11. "Aber S. F. Gn. hat mir gleichwohl gefragt, ob dann E. F. Gn. ihnen helfen wollten Oder nicht, das sollte ich S. F. Gn. mit einem worte sagen." PKMS. 2, p . 69 5.

12. Brandenburg, Mor itz, p. 448.

13. Luther's argument in this regard is clearly stated in his March 6, 1530 advisory letter to Elector John, revealing its relevance for the issues at hand.

14. "Aber gleichwohl were ein itzliche christliche oberkeit die glieder deselbten kirchen seins besten vermoegens zu schuetzen und dieselben zu erhalten auch wider alle tyrannei zu erweitern helfen fur gott schuldig." PKMS, 2, p. 704.

15. ..der herr...gesagt, wer das seine meher liebet dann mich, ist mich nicht wirdig." The dominical saying is an apparent paraphrase of Matthew 10:37, and is located the collection of sayings where Jesus spoke of bringing a sword rather than peace, and the division which shall arise with his coming. PKMS. 2, p. 704.

16. "Darumb wacht auf und seumpt euch nicht, 21J

in gegenwehr euch tapfer richt, lasst ie nicht ein die frembde gest, schickt euch eilend, das ist das best. Und sonderlich ihr lieben Sachsen, ihr seit diesem handel wol gewachsen. In ewer provinz ist angefangen das goettlich wort mit gewalt aufgangen, dadurch ihr seit genzlich erlost eur gewissen und seid auch getrost von bapst tyrannei und trieglichkeit, darumb seit unseumlich bereit; ihr muestet euch auch des ewig schemen, solch gnad wider lassen zu nemen. Scheucht nicht, ob wol der Keiser das heubt; dieweil er gottes worten nicht gleubt, muss wir den spruch gebrauchen sein, mehr gott, denn ihm gehorsam sein.... dem keiser nicht gotts wort zuzueigen, sondern ihm geben, was ihm gehort, und gott folgen nach seinem wort, demuetigen ganz unter seine hand, so bleiben uns stedt, leut und land. Ermanung an die oberlandischen und sechsischen stedte, auch landschaften der christlichen religion verwandten.fAn Admonition to the South German and Saxon Cities, Together with the Estates Sympathetic to the Christian Religion.] Liliencron, 4, pp* 325-326.

17. See Franz Schnorr von Carolsfeld, "Briefe von Peter Watzdorff," Archive fuer Litteraturgeschichte 10 (1881), pp. 174-188.

18. The pamphlet was dated July 11, 1546. Watzdorff's Trostschrift must have reached the elector sometime in June or early July since the his response was dated July 7. Quick correspondence was possible since the elector's military camp at Ichterhausen rested only a few kilometers north of Arnstadt. For pamphlet date see Carolsfeld, p. 181; and for date of electoral response see Liliencron, 4, p. 324.

19. "die itzige fuerhabende Kriegsgewerb, und kriegsruestung, wider uns und unser mitverwandte in der religion betreffende. ..Wei 1 denn diese sach Gottes selbst ist, und seiner Goettlichen Maiestat ewigs se1igmachendes wort, auch sein Goetliche ehr und namen beruet." published in Liliencron, 4, p. 324, n. l.

20. Note John Frederick's June 22 letter to Johann Ernst, "So wollen wir doch euer lib freundlicher 2

meynunge nit bergen, das wir aus glaublichem bericht und gehabter kundschaft souil vernomen, das solche gewerbe und Ruestunge widder uns und die stende unser Christlichen Religion und Aynunge gemaint und gelten solle.11, letter published in Zeitschrift fuer Wissenschaft1iche Theologie 50 (1908), p. 533.

21. Copei evnes Schreibens/ So der Churfuerst zu Sachssen/ Und der landtaraft zu hessen/ etc. An die Roeraischen Kevserlichen Maiestat/ von wegen irer Maiestat yetzo fuerhabenden unpillichen Kriegsruestuna/ gethan/ Darinne sich auch ire Chuer/ und F.G. entschuldigen/ Das sie zu solchem Thun/ Kevn ursach gegeben. etc. [Copy of a Letter Which was sent by the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse to Roman Imperial Majesty on Account of His Majesty’s Unjust Military Preparation, In Which the Elector and Princely Grace Express Their Innocence.] Marpurg, 1546.

22. "Zuedem wissen sich/ der Key. Mait. der Franckfurtischen/ zur zeit jrer Mai. wahl/ verbrifften und versigelten/ auch bei Keyserlich beteurungen gegeben Obligation/ und darzue wie sich in solchen fellen/ den rechten/ Reichsordenungen/ Landtfrieden/ Reichsabschieden/ und friedstenden nach zue Procediren gebuert hette/," Schreibens. Aiiia. Charles capitulation oath found in Deutsche Reichstag Akten. Jungere Reihe. Erster Band. (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 864-876; specifically to this point Charles swore, "Wir sollen und wellen auch sonderlich die vorgemachten guldin bullen, kuniglichen landfriden und ander des heiligen reichs ordnungen und gesetz confirmiren, erneuen und, wo not, dieselben mit rat unser und des reichs churfursten, fursten and anderer stende pesseren, wie zu jeder zeit des reichs gelegenheit ervordern wirdet." p. 866.

23. "Darumb es als leichtlich zuerachten/ E. Key. Mait. zuthun ist/ und uns getroesten/ das E. Key Mait. darzue nit ursach haben/ sondern das sich Ewer Mait. ihres Keyserlich Ampts unnd Authoritet/ gegen uns unnd unsere mitverwandten/ alleyn mit der that/ ohne alien Goettlichen und rechtmassigen zuefall woellen missbrauchen/," Schreibens. Aiiia-Aiiib.

24. "...das wir solchs vermeynten ungehorsams unschueldig/ und das solich E. Key. Mait. thetlich und gewaltig fuernemen/ und fuerhaben/ auss anstifftung des Antechrist zu Rom/ und seines unchrist1ichen Councilii zu Trient/ alleyn zuvertilgen unserer waren 2D5

Christlichen Religion/ Gottes wort/ und seines heyligen heylwertigen Euangelii/ auch zu zuundertruecken der Freiheyt und Libertet/ der Teutschen Nation heer ruere/" Schreibens, aiiiib.

25. Ein Schrifft D. Johann Bugenhagen Pomerani/ pastoris der Kirchen zu Wittenberg/ An andere Pastorn und Predigern/ Von der itzigen Kriegsruestung. Wittenberg: Hans Luft, 1546.

26. Bishop George of Anhalt appeared familiar with portions of the work only days after its publication.

27. "Nach dem grosse schreckliche Kriegsruestung vor augen sind/ uns ein Volck aus frembden Nation/ das nach Deudschen blut duerstet/ und Christlische lere nicht weis/ und grimmiglich hasset/ und alle grausamkeit und unzucht zu uben pfleget/ in Deudschland gefueret wird/ Dagegen die hohe notturfft foddert/ recht und von Gott geboten ist/ die Kirchen/ Jugent/ Frawen und Jungfrawen/ wider sie/ als wider der Moerder/ Frawen und Jungfrawen schender/ zu schuetzen/, 11 Schrifft, Aiia-Ai ib.

2S. Specific passages mentioned include, Joel 2:13, Isaiah 48, Numbers 14, Jeremiah 14, Proverbs 24, Psalm 26 and 41, Luke 11, John 14. All primarily deal with calling upon God for protection, and/or God's providential care over his people or church.

29. Schri f ft. Aiiiib.

30. Schri f ft. Aiib.

31. "Denn dieses ist gewis/ das die fiende furnemlich suchen vertilgung Goettlicher warheit/ und ewige erhaltung oeffent1icher Abgoetterey und unzucht." Schr i f f t, Ai i ia.

32. Schrifft, Aiiia.

33. Schrifft, Aiiiia.

34. "Denn der Bapst hat zu deisem Krieg gros gelt und volck gesand/ daraus klar ist/ das die Feinde furnemlich Christliche Lere zu vertilgen/ und die Herrschaft und Stedte/ darin rechte Lere geprediget/ zu verwuesten/ furhaben." Schrifft. Aiiia. 20f>

35. "Dagegen aber ist gewiss/ das die Feinde/ und alle/ so ihnen huelffe thun/ wider Gott streiten/ und sich schueldig machen an allem unschueldigen Blut/ das umb der rechten Lere willen vergossen is von Abel an." Schr i fft, Bia.

36. "Warhafftiger/ Ewiger/ A1lmechtiger Gott/ Vater unsers Heilands Jhesu Chrsiti/ schepffer himmels und der Erden/ sampt deinem ewigen Son/ und heiligen Geist/ Wir bekennen/ das wir leider viel sunde haben/ und nicht allein unwissent1ich/ sondern auch wissentlich mit grosser undankbarkeit gesundiget/ und haben deinen zorn und straff wol verdienet/ und haben ein hertzlich misfallen an unsern sunden. Wir bitten dich aber von hertzen/ du wollest uns alle unser sunde/ umb deines lieben Sons willen Jhesu Christi/ den du zum Versuner gesetz hast/ gnediglich vergeben/ und mit deinem heiligen Geist unsere hertzen regirn/ das wir in rechtem glauben/ rechter anruffung/ rechtem gehorsaiti fur dir allezeit leben. Und dieweil du sihest die grosse Not unser Herrschaft/ unser aller/ Man/ Weib und Kinder/ und wir one deine hulff keinen schutz haben/ Erkennest auch aller Menchen hertzen/ und sihest das unsere Feinde furnemlich suchen vertilgung rechter Lere/ und auffrichtung und bestetigung jrer schendlichen Abgoetterey und unzucht/ so bitten wir dich von hertzen/ durch unsern Heiland Jhesum Christum/ du wollest umb deiner Ehre willen/ unser Herrschaft/ unser Kirchen/ uns/ unser Kinder und Heuslin/ gnediglich jtzund und allezeit schuetzen und bewaren/ wie du dien Volck Israel im roten Meer erhalten und geschuetzet hast/ und wollest der Feinde rat und macht zerstoeren/ und die moerdische Frembde Nation/ jre unzucht und grausamkeit nicht an unsern Weib unf Kindern uben lassen. Du wollest auch umb deiner Ehre willen/ furthin deine Lere und Christliche selige Regiment/ in diesen Landen gnediglich erhalten/ und unsere Herrschafft mit deinem heiligen Geist/ zu Christlicher seliger regierung neigen/ das sie und die unterthan/ in rechter erkentnis Jhesu Christi/ in rechter annruffung und gehorsam gegen dir/ und in frieden leben und bleiben/ und dich ewiglich preisen und dir dancken. Du has gesprochen/ Ruff mich an in der not/ so wil ich dich erhoeren/ das du mich preisen solt. Solche deine wort sind on zweifel war/ Darumb bit ich dich/ du wollest uns in dieser grossen Not auch erhoeren/ umb deines Sons willen Jhesu Christi/ und wollest uns gnediglich bewaren/ Amen." Schrifft. Biia-Biiib 2(17

37. CR 6, 58-59; also Kittelson, Luther, pp. 298-299; and E. Greenwald, ed., Two Funeral Sermons on the Death of Dr. Martin Luther. (Lancaster, 1883.)

38. WA Br 5, 258-261.

39. WA 30/3, 276-3 2.

40. WA Br 5, 252.

41. See Liliencron, 4, p. 345, n. 1; and WA Br 5, 252-255.

42. Publishing background discussed in WA Br 5, 249- 258 .

43. "Aber nach der Schrifft wil sichs ynn keinen wegs zimen, das sich iemand [wer ein Christ sein will] widder seine Oberkeit setze, got gebe, sie thu recht oder unrscht, sondern ein Christ sol gewalt und unrecht leiden, sonderlich von seiner oberkeit." WA Br 5, 258.

44. "Weltliche odder Beptissche rechte sehen hierinn nicht an, das oberkeit eine gottliche ordnung sey,....Aber weil keiser keiser, furst furst bleibt, wenn er gleich alle gebot Gottes ubertrete , ia ob er gleich ein heide were, so sol ers auch sein, ob er gleich sein eid und Pflicht nicht helt, bis das er abgesetzt oder nimer keiser sey. Uns soli der spruch Christi fest stehen: "Gebt dem keiser, was des keisers ist,"....Und Summa: Sunde hebt oberkeit und gehorsam nicht auff,....Sonst weil er ungestrafft und keiser bleibt, sol yhm auch neimand gehorsam entzihen odder widder yhm streben. Denn das ist rotterey und auffruhr und zwitracht ansahen." WA Br 5, 258-259.

45. "So sind ia alle aller fursten unterthan auch des keisers unterthan, ia raehr denn der fursten, und schickt sich nicht, das yemand mit gwalt wolt des keisers unterthan [wider den] keiser yhren herrn schutzen, gleich wie sichs [ziement, dassj der Burgermeister Torgaw wolt [die burger wider den] fursten Sachsen mit gealt schutzen, [so lang er furst] zu Sachsen ist." WA Br 5, 259.

46. "..hab ich mit meinen lieben herren und freunden Doctor Jonas, Johann Pomer und Magister Philipsen befragt und berathschagt." WA Br 5, 258. 20X

47. CR 2, 603-604* For the erroneous placement in 1532, see WA 30/3, 258.

48. "Ich kann mich sehr wohl erinnern aller Schriften und Untereden, so sich in die funfzehn Jahr von dieser Frag zugetragen, und wiewohl diese Meinung erstlich vom ehrwuerdigen Herrn Doct. Martino allein also begriffen, so ist doch hernach diese Sache stattlicher, und von ihm mit andern fleissiger disputirt worden." CR 2, 603.

49. "Nun ist der Schutz natuerliches Recht; item, naturliches Recht ist wahrheit goettliches Recht." CR 2, 604.

50. " Darum thun die Fuersten recht, uns sind die fremden Voelker, Hispanier und Italiener, so Ewr Blut begehren, nicht anders denn wie Moerder zu achten in diesem Fall." CR 2, 604.

51. Warnunge D. Martini Luther, an seine lieben Deudschen. vor etlichen Jaren geschrieben auf diesen fall, so die Feinde Christlicher Warheit diese Kirchen und Land, darinne reine Lehr des Euanaelii qeprediat wird. mit einer Vorrede Philippi Helanthon. Publishing background in WA Br 30/3, 264-268; Melanchthon's preface published in CR 6, 190-197.

52- "...gegen were widder die bluthunde nicht aufruerissch sein kann." WA 30/3, 283.

53. "die moerdische und blutgyrige Papisten." WA 30/3, 282.

54. "Aber weil jch der Deudschen Prophet bin..." WA 30/3, 290.

55. "Das ist aber mein trewer Rat, das wo der Keiser wuerde auffbieten und widder unser teil umb des Bapsts sachen odder unser lere willen kriegen wolt, als die Papisten jtzt grewlich rhuemen und trotzen (jch mich aber zum Keiser noch nicht versehe), das jnn solchem fall kein mensch sich dazu gebrauchen lasse noch dem Keiser gehorsam sey, Sondern sey gewis, das jm von Gott hart verboten ist, jnn solchem fall dem Keiser zu gehorchen, Und wer jm gehorchet, das der wisse, wie er Gott ungehormsam und sein leib und seel ewiglich verkriegen wird..." WA 30/3, 291.

56. "Dis wil ich meinen leiben Deudschen zur warnung gesagt haben. Und wie droben, also bezeuge jch hie 209

auch, das jch nicht zu krieg noch auffrur noch gegenwere wil jemand hetzen odder reitzen, Sondern allein zura friede. Wo aber unser Teufel, die Papisten, nicht wollen friede halten, sondern nit solchen verstocken greweln ungebuesst widder den heiligen geist rasend dennoch kriegen und drueber blutige koepffe davon bringen odder gar zu boden gehen wuerden, wil jch hie nit offentlich bezeuget haben, das jch solchs nicht gethan noch ursach dazu gegeben habe, Sondern sie wollens so haben, jr blut sey auff jrem kopff..." WA 30/3, 320.

57. For this discussion see Edwards, Last Battles, pp. 30-31, 44-49.

58. Praefatio published in CR 6, 190-197.

59. For a critical reevaluation of the "gentle” Melanchthon see Timothy Wengert, "The Day Philip Melanchthon Got Mad," Lutheran Quarterly 5 (Winter, 1991), pp. 419-433, especially p. 419.

60. An excellent example is found in Luther's preface to Melanchthon's Commentary on Colossians, where the reformer states, "I was born that I must take the field and fight sects and devils, thus my books are very stormy and warlike. I must uproot the stumps and obstacles, hack away the thorns and thickets, drain the stagnant pools, and am the coarse forester who must break and cut the clutter. But Master Philip proceeds softly and calmly, cultivating and planting, watching and watering with the gifts God has given him." (Ich bin dazu geboren, das ich mit den rotten und teuffeln mus kriegen und zu felde ligen, darumb neiner buecher viel stuermisch und kriegisch sind. Ich mus die kloetze und stemme ausrotten, dornen und hecken weg hawen, die pfuetzen ausfullen und bin der grobe waldrechter, der die ban brechen und zurichten mus. Aber M. Philipps feret seuberlich und still daher, bawet und pflantzet, sehet und begeust mit lust, nach dem Gott hat gegeben seine gaben reichlich." WA 30/2, p. 68-69.

61. CR 6, 190.

62. "die Sache ist von ihm furnemlich dahin gemeint, rechte Lehre, so in unsern Kirchen gepredigt wird, auszurotten, seine Abgotterey und Irrtum mit Blutvergiessen und Mord, und ewiger Verwuestung Deutscher Nation, und Zereissung der Chur und 2 1CJ

Fuerstlichen Haueser, widerura aufzurichten.. CR 6, 190-191.

63. "Was nu in solchem Fall ein jeder ehrlicher Mann zu thun schuldig ist, koennen sich alle Gottfuertige leichtlich erinnern, nemlich, dass sie Gotte erstlich dieses schuldig sind, das sie nichte huelfe thun, Abgoetterey zu staerken, wie geschrieben ist: Du sollt dich nicht fremder Suenden theilhaftig niachen. Item iiCorin. vj. Ihr sollt den Unglaubigen nicht helfen, verstehe, Abgotterey zu staerken. Denn wie kann Christus und Belial sich zusammen fuegen?" CR 6, 191.

64. "Wer dieses nicht fuer Religionsachen achtet, dem ist die Religion nicht hart angelegen." CR 6, 192.

65. "Ob nu solche sterben wie Abel, sollen sie solchen Tod viel lieber wollen, denn Cains Leben und alle Wollust und Gewalt aller Bischoven und Cardinal. Es sind doch alle Menschen in den Tod gesteckt. Dieses ist aber zu betrachten, wie wir nach diesem Leben fuer Gottes und der ganzen Kirschen Gericht in Ewigkeit stehen wollen!" CR 6, 194-195.

66. CR 6, 195.

67. "...und ist natuerliche Gegenwehre ein recht Werk, das Gott in die Natur gepflanzt hat, und sind sehr weit zu unterscheiden Gegenwehr und Aufruhr." CR 6, 195.

68. "So ein Moerder auf der Strassen, oder in deinem Haus dich oder dein Weib oder Kind ueberfallen will, so ist der Schutz und Gegenwehr ein recht Gottfaellig Werk, wenn gleich der Moerder darob erstochen wird." CR 6, 195.

69. Johannes Schradin (15007-1561), born in Reutlingen and educated in theology. Embraced reform in the mid—twenties, becoming a loyal and vocal advocate for the cause. APB. 30, pp. 438-439; and Stupperich, Reformatorenlexikon, p. 191.

7 0. Warhafte und qeqruendte meldunq und anzejqen der geschwinden tuerkischen boesen anschlect und pratik. so wider die loeblichen protestirenden stende und evangeliums einia verwandten durch die qrossen fejnd gottes. den babst und seinen anhang fueruenomen und zu iemerlichen unwiderbrinalichen undergehen und verderben des deudschen lands erdacht sein. Item der aenoetiaten qedrunanen defension und gegenwehr. auch wie sich 21 1

darinne zu halten sei. Published in Liliencron, 4, pp. 302-310. For publishing date of July 7, 1546, see p. 302 .

71. I follow here the statement of Mark Edwards that, "At the very least we should be able to assume that the printer expected that there would be a market for his product. If he were correct in his expectation, then the printing of a work is a valid although indirect measure of public interest...But if the printer reprinted the work several times...we may safely assume that he did so to meet the demands of his customers." See Edwards, Printina, p. 8. Schradin was not alone. A contemporaneous pamphlet by an anonymous author, entitled: Ein Warnung. gedicht an alle und iede ware liebhaber des heiligen evangelions Christi und freiheit der loblichen deudschen nation von gott verlihen. in diser qefahrlichen kriegsruestung wol zu bedencken. [A Warning, Composed for Each and Every True Lover of the Holy Gospel of Christ and God Bestowed German Liberty, To be Well considered in This Dangerous War Preparation] went through at least four printings. See Liliencron, 4, pp. 320-324.

72. "...so seit ir auch von im ganz fre, das keiner im verpflichtet sei, und widerstreitet im mit recht, dann er ist iezt ein pfaffenknecht, handlet wider sein ampt und pflicht. Darumb so sundiget ir nicht, so ir mit starkem volk und heer euch schicket zu gegenwer, weil diese regel billich ist, die im latein braucht der jurist: qui fregerit tibi fidem, frangatur fides eidem, niemant zu halten ist verpflicht dem, der im heltet glauben nicht. So er euch nimpt ewer freiheit, verleurt er auch sein oberkeit. Auch wisset ir als Christen wol, was man dem keiser geben sol, nemlich was des keisers ist, wie uns selbs leret Jhesus Christ. Wann nun der keiser ubers zil wil greifen und haben zuvil und fordert, das im nicht gehoert, das hat uns Christus nie gelert, dass mann im solichs geben sol,..." Liliencron, 4, pp. 3 08-3 09. 73. "Wir haben auch daraus ursachen/ das wir die Schandgetichte und reyrae/ so zuverkleinerunge der Kayserlichen Maiestat/ und anderer leute/ one namen ausgehen/ in unsern Landen nicht gestatten feil zuhaben/ noch auszubreiten/ Solches were auch wider unsere pflicht/ damit wir jrer Maiestat verwandt sein. Erklerunge. Ciia-Ciib.

74. Moritz assured John Frederick that he himself kept Philip informed of the "public talk" concerning Charles' preparations for war, and how such talk burdened him, " Und weil zu Regensburg allerlei anzeigung an uns durch gemeine rede gelangt, wie Ksl. Mt. in grosser rustung sein solle, haben wir nicht unterlassen, sulichs herrn Philipsen, landgrafen zu Hessen, anzuzeigen Wu nun sulichs wider E.L. und gemeldeten unsern vatern und die christliche religion gelten sollte, konnten wir es nit ahne merkliche beschwerung unsers gemuths vernehraen." PKMS. 2, p. 684 .

75. See Hoess, "Formation and Organization," p. 329. Blaschke, Moritz. p. 31.

76. Brandenburg, Moritz. pp. 451-452.

77. PKMS, 2. p. 689.

78. For Joachim's internal situation see Brandenburg Moritz. p. 449.

79. For a detailed study of Joachim's diplomacy through these turbulent years see Luttenberger, Glaubenseinheit; specifically for matters at hand, pp. 398 - 411.

80. PKMS. 2, p. 698.

81. PKMS. 2, pp. 722-724; see also Johannes Falke, "Die Steuerbewi11igung der Landstaende im Kurfuerstenthura Sachsen bis zu Anfang des 17 Jahrhundert." Zeitschrift fuer die gesammte Staats- wissenschaft. 30 (1874), pp. 435-438.

82. To decide this issue the estates elected a twenty-five member commission. The Meissen nobility elected ten representives, the Thuringian nobility ten, and the cities five. The Dresden court found strong 2 1.1

representation with the selection of George Carlowitz, Christopf Tuerk, Ludwig Fachs, and several other ducal councilors. Full list of participants found in PKMS, 2 , p. 723.

83. The estates' precise concerns are found in Moritz's order to his emmissary: "Die ursach dieser schickung geschieht uf bitt unserer landschaft; dann allerlei reden vor sie kommen, als hab es die meinung, die religion zu tilgen..." PKMS, 2, p.729.

84. "dass der Ksl. Mt. gemuthe, will noch meinung nit sei gewesen, auch noch nit sei, die christliche religion und das wort gottes mit der schwert zu dempfem oder zu bekriegen, sondern dass S. Ksl. M t ., wie sich dieselbe uf vielen reichstagen und in reichsabschieden vernehmen lassen, wollten einem gemeinem christlichen concilio, von alien christlichen nationen versammelt, und dorinnen ahne alle affect gehandelt und nichts anders dann die ehre gottes und rechtschaffene christlichen reformation soli gesuchten werden, dahin auch in der augsburgischen confession apelliert," PKMS. 2, p . 7 3 0.

85. Although dominated by nobility sympathetic to close Hapsburg relations, they concluded that they must place the eternal before the temporal, and if religion was indeed the issue they would fight if threatened. PKMS. 2, p. 723; see also Brandenburg, Moritz. pp. 453- 454. For clear presentation of their concerns see PKMS, 2, 729-731.

86. Presented a list of twenty-five names, Moritz stocked the special committee with Dresden court councilors: otto von Dieskau, Wolf von Ende, George Carlowitz, Christoph Ebeleben, Andreas Pflug, and Ludwig Fachs. PKMS. 2, p. 723.

87. Negotiations concerning troops and taxes found in PKMS. 2, p . 724.

88. Charles complied on July 29 with the Albertine's request for a definitive pronouncement. His "Explanation" repeated his previous promises, claiming that contrary to the rumors being spread among the people, he had no intention of uprooting the Christian religion and the Word of God by the sword."...so ist doch unser gemeut, will, noch meinung nit gewesen, auch noch nit, die christlich religion und das wort gottes 214

{wie uns etlich mit ungrund auflegen und in die leute tragen) mit schwert zu vertilgen. 11 PKMS, 2, p. 753 .

89. PKMS. 2, p. 724.

90. PKMS, 2, p. 722. See also Issleib, 11 Evange 1 isicher Fuerst.1’, pp. 150-151.

91. For Justus Jonas (1493-1555), see Martin Lehmann, Justus Jonas. Loval Reformer. (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1963) pp. 156-163; Gustav Kawerau, ed . Der Briefwechsel des Justus Jonas. 2 bd. (Hildesheim, 1967); and Stupperich, Reformatorenlex ikon. pp. 110-111.

92. Jonas reported to Melanchthon that as many as ten to eleven thousand people attended the services at the three evangelical churches each Sunday, see Kawerau, Jonas, 2, p . 193.

93. Per Neun und Sibentziqste Psalm, zu diesen geferlichen zeiten. alien Christen zu trost zu singen und zu beten in Reime gestalt. Published in Philipp Wackernagel, Das deutsche Kirchenlied von den altesten zeit bis au Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts. Bd. 3 (Leipzig, B.G. Tuebner, 1870), pp. 43-44. The pamphlet was dated July 9.

94. "Die prediger und die diener dein wolten sie grewlich schlachten, Ir leib, die doch tewr sind fur dir, fuer raben speise achten. Auch heilgen fleicsch, unschuldig blut, das im den himmel schreien thut, solten die hunde schlingen. Wackernagel, 3, p. 44.

95. "Die rete bedenken untertenig, dass E. F. Gn. mit dem befohlenen schutze diese zeit innehalte. Dann es mochte eine unruhe in deme leichtere geberen; und dass man uf die leichtere und bessere bequemikeit actung gebe." PKMS, 2, 722.

96. "Mit der insinuation des schutzes wirdet bedacht, wegen der stiftsuntertanen, der ein grosser teil der religion verwandt, in diesen leuften sobald nit fortzufahren, sundern einen monat oder zwene damit zu verzichen, auf dass nit widersetzigkeit furfalle, sunderlich und zuvor, weil etzliche auf dem andern teil hangen und practicirt haben sollen." PKMS, 2, p. 730. 215

97. Moritz reported to Ferdinand that, "dass die Prediger auf die kanzel und sonst die Ksl. Mt ., E. Kgl. Mt. und mich mit Schmaehreden beschimpt und den gemeinen Haufen gegen der Erzbischof, ihr obrigkeit, aufgehetzt haben, so habe ich mich, da es die gelegenheit gab, mit meinen und E. Mt. Kriegsvolk in die stadt verfuegt...ein predicant mit namen Justus Jonas, und von der Hall syndicus, Dr. Kilian Goltstein. . .dieselben zwo personen in 10 tagen zu enturlauben und aus ihrer stadt zu schaffen." PKMS. 2, pp. 949-950.

98. "die christliche und wahrhaftige religion...", PKMS. 2, p . 732.

99. "do sich die Ksl. Mt. oder sunst imands unterstehen wurde, die christliche und wahrhaftige religion zu verdrucken oder auszureuten, dass wir uns aus gnaden gottes wohl zu schuldig auf denselben fall leib, gut und blut und all unser hoechstes vermoegen daruber zu lassen, darbei zuzusetzen, und durch keine menschliche gewalt davon abdringen lassen." PKMS, 2, p. 732 .

100. "...weil wir wussten, dass ausserhalb der religion wir der Ksl. Mt. mit aller unterthenigkeit ahne unterscheid verwandt, und uns das verwandtnis, damit wir I.L. zugethan, aus solchen gehorsam nicht heben moecht..." PKMS. 2, p. 737.

101. PKMS, 2, p. 734.

102. See Luttenberger, Glaubenseinheit, p, 339.

103. It appears Luttenberger leans in this direction when he writes, "Solches Problemverstaendnis war bei Moritz zu einem wesentlichen Teil, wenn auch sicher nicht vollstaendig, Ausdruck eines auf die Wahrung eigener, partikularer Interessen ausgerichteten, politischen Opportunismus.", Glaubense inheit, p. 339 .

104. "...dass die Ksl. Mt. unser aller weltlicher herr und oberer sei, und dass man I. M t . alien goettlichen und menschlichen rechten nach in weltlichen und profansachen gehorasm und untethenigkeit zu leisten und zu beweisen schuldig....wo dieses verachtet, dass daraus ein schrecklich blutvergiessen vieler armer unschuldigen leut und zudem ein unwiederbringlicher schade und endlicher untergang teutscher nation und dem 210

hi. reich entstehen und erfolgen moechte.11 PKMS, 2, p. 736 .

105. "Was die Erklaerung der Ksl. Mt. anlangt, dass dieselbe unsere religion fur christlichen geachtet, nicht vermerken konnen; aber das wir wohl vernoinmen, dass I. Mt. zu einem schien in die leut gebildet und sich in gemein hab vernehmen lassen, als were I Mt. gemut nicht, der religion halben etwas furzunehmen, sondern etzliche ungehorsame fursten zu strafen..." PKMS■ 2, p. 747.

106. "Dass wir gegen dies unordent1ich, unbillig furnehmen Gegenruestung haben vornehmen muessenm Koennten I. L. bedenken. Auch wenn wir Ungehorsam begangen haetten, waere doch ein ordentlicher Prozess notwendig gewesen; ein vorgehen ohne einen solchen were ein verkehrung aller rechtlichen und des hi. reichs ordenungen und gegen der Ksl. Mt . eigene Verschreibungen. 11 PKMS. 2, p. 747.

107. "Wir haben in weltlichen Sachen der Ksl. Mt. alien schuldigen Gehorsam geleistet und sogar mehr gethan als wir schuldig waren....dass der wahre Grund der ist, dass wir nicht unsere wahre Religion verlassen und die papistische Abgoetterei annehmen wollen; darin besteht unser Ungehorsam." PKMS, 2, p. 749. C H A P T E R V

RENDERING TO GOD: MORITZ AND THE CLERGY

It is however not a little troubling to us that from the beginning this matter unfortunately came into our land with the preachers and theologians. When something is done against God's Word, or some other public injustice, if it benefits the preachers and theologians they bestow their favor without reservation. Indeed! They make excuses and cloak it with the divine Word. If, on the other hand, others act according to God's Word and in a just manner but the theologians and preachers are not inclined to them, then the act cannot remain innocent, and the divine Word is employed against it...such action by the preachers and theologians heaps contempt not only on their office, but also upon the divine Word.

Moritz to Bishop Anhalt, Fall 15461

Calming the Storm

The struggle for credible legitimation for military resistance witnessed the feverish diplomacy of envoys' demands and counter demands, together with highly charged publications by the leading religious figures, even to the wresting of Luther's words from the grave. Yet however eloquent the theoretical position put forth, or the profound authority of the late reformer, the deeper question emerges as to whether these polemics had any noted effect on the

2 17 218 broader level of the general population. Did such theological ruminations remain within the sphere of the intellectual and clerical elite? Evidence suggests that they did not. Further, it appears the call for resistance against devilish tyranny, and the flood of anti-papal and Hapsburg sermonizing markedly influenced Moritz's response both to Charles and his Albertine clergy. The concern of the Albertine estates at Chemnitz revealed that Moritz returned to a homeland buzzing with rumors and speculation regarding Charles' military intent and the fate of religion. Yet even before gathering with the territorial diet, Dresden had sensed the need "during these uncertain times" for a unified church order for prayer and fasting.3 In examining the content of the order endorsed by Moritz, one finds a stark contrast to its Ernestine counterpart, particularly with the specific instructions for the conduct of the clergy. Ducal attention to the dynamic between pastor and people revealed a perception that the clergy had the capacity to directly influence a significant portion of Albertine subjects, and the disposition of those subjects weighed heavy in the success or failure of Moritz's cautiously crafted plans. 219

The pulpits needed to be controlled, and in principle Moritz had the means and authority to bring them to heel. Had he not effectively integrated the ecclesiastical bureaucracy into his expanding ducal regime, artfully constructing a chain of command stemming from his own person, through his officials to

the consistories? Was not the Albertine church essentially an arm cf the territorial state, hence precisely in these most tenuous times the tool of

propagating princely policy? Theoretically yes, and the Dresden court wasted little time in attempting to make the pulpits an asset rather than a liability. Moritz ordered Bishop George of Anhalt to issue a special prayer, together with a call for special worship services and fasts to be uniformly implemented throughout Albertine territories. George hastily produced an order entitled. Instruction how the Pastors in these Dangerous Times Should Exhort the People to

Repentance and Praver. On Princely Command. Through the Most Worthy. Illustrious, and High Born Prince and Lord, Lord George, prince of Anhalt.% Upon its completion he sent a copy to the prince for review and approval, but feared it would have little result without express enforcement through Moritz's provincial authorities.4 220

The bishop seemed to cautiously share the prevalent spirit of mistrust and suspicion over the emperor's motives, for he warned that although presently there appeared to be no intention to attack religion, at an opportune time "the ambiguous meaning of religion may change, provoking the emperor, with greater pretense, to act against all the Christian confession for disobedience."5 In accepting the content for Anhalt's order, Moritz responded to the bishop's concerns with adamant reassurance that he would not turn from God's Word, and showed sensitivity to the political fallout by promising the bishop that he would spare no effort in the attempting to mediate a peaceful solution to the conflict.6

The emphasis throughout Anhalt's pamphlet was clearly on the sinfulness of the people which has brought this threat upon them. Prayer for the protection of the country was needed, but "with out true acknowledgment of sin, together with true contrition and repentance, heartfelt and ernest prayers can't take place."7 Thus the call for a searching of souls and betterment of lives.

The Albertine Instruction differed with

Bugenhagen's work in one glaring fashion. While the 221

Wittenberg order said much about the enemy's threat to the faith, Anhalt shared little in this regard. The

bishop certainly knew of the rumors, and appeared to

have been familiar with Bugenhagen's publication, or at least the tenor of rhetoric reflected therein.4 Despite this, Anhalt couched a mild reference to the

enemy in a general petition for God to protect the German Nation from harm.’

The Albertine bureaucracy appears to have respected the power of the pulpit as a public forum for

news and propaganda, and the capacity therein to effectively agitate the audience. Such is evidenced by the order specifying what was to be preached, or

perhaps more accurately what was not to be preached.

Pastors were commanded to offer their congregations

"nothing from the pulpit concerning uncertain news, or

talk which would serve to embitter."'" They were

further ordered to refrain from "sharp, useless words against authority which serve to arouse ill-will and

division," and to warn their people against unchristian

cursing and blasphemy." Like Bugenhagen, Bishop Anhalt concluded the pamphlet with a prayer to be uniformly implemented in the churches. Read in its entirety it summarizes well the passive approach to the coming conflict. 222

Almighty, Eternal, Merciful and Gracious God, who, together with your dear Son Jesus Christ our Redeemer and the Holy Spirit, exists in three indivisible persons as one true God. You have in these last days and troubled times through Fatherly love again graciously let your Divine Word shine forth in the world. But we have not received it, nor let it better our lives. Thereby we have fallen under your frightening wrath and harsh punishment. For this reason you have undoubtedly brought this trouble upon us and the German nation. Yet you have promised from your unfathomable goodness and mercy, grace and forgiveness to all who heartily fear you and call upon the name of Christ. So we ask you earnestly that you graciously forgive all our sins and errors which we have at times committed against your majesty and our neighbors. For the betterment of our lives graciously bestow your Holy Spirit. Protect us from sects and heretics, and preserve your Holy Word in us with purity and uprightness. Graciously lead the hearts and inclinations of the Imperial Majesty, Electors, and Princes in the knowledge of your divine truth, and Christian peace and unity through your Holy Spirit. Protect us from bloodshed and the suppression of our nation. May we live in Godliness and compassion to the end that our faith may be our salvation and blessedness. Through Jesus Christ our Lord, who through the Holy Spirit and God lives and reigns forever, Amen.13 The command for the clergy to pray that God would turn the hearts of the emperor and princes to divine truth, together with protection from war and bloodshed, communicated nothing concerning the reasons

for the animosity between the two parties, or violence against the people for the sake of the Gospel. Moritz's intention with this order, based on his own comments shortly after its publication, was to restore calm to the increasingly agitated "common people."13 Assumed throughout was his right and 223 authority to shape the church's message. Convinced of the interpenetrating character of pulpit and public policy, Moritz sought active support from what he obviously considered a branch of his government. The very nature of the Albertine prayer and the subsequent reaction to it struck directly at the heart of Moritz's difficult situation. Consistent with preserving neutrality he sought a passive stance over against the emperor, expressing a desire for peace between the parties. Minimizing the threat to religion within his territory, together with quieting the anti-imperial voices, were necessary steps for any chance at remaining aloof from military conflict. Yet however efficient the channels of princely bureaucracy the question arises: did he succeed? What response did Moritz engender by his attempt to pacify the population "from the top down," through the agency of his clergy? This was of pivotal concern for the duke, since it was becoming increasingly clear that there could be no middle ground.

Call to Holv War Events in South Germany during the later part of

July and early August played a key role in impelling

Moritz along the path toward military involvement, and 224 in turn intensified the confessional friction at home. It is, of course, impossible to identify all the derogatory literature that Moritz later complained about flowing into his lands during this time,14 however, it appears that he took exception to the general tenor of Protestant propaganda which found some exposure within his land. In an August 15 letter to John Frederick and Philip, Moritz reiterated that since Charles intended no violence against the faith, he sought only to "give God what is Godfs and fulfill his duty's to his sovereign."1' Yet he was aware of the complaints circulating within his territory, and considered the accusations unjust.

It concerns us that on our account there has arisen here and there accusatory and vexatious speech by a portion of subjects. For now we will show patience, for in due time further reports will clearly show that we were treated unjustly.lfi In an accompanying letter addressed soley to the landgrave, Moritz expressed open disdain for the content of the accusations against him, and suggested that John Frederick endorsed the rumors.

It concerns us that we are treated as though we have decided to abandon our Christian religion....and that some people might suggest to you that we are remaining neutral so as to obtain our cousin's and your land. Such is infered by a published poem which, among other things, speaks of young princes, who in their thirst for worldly glory have been led by the emperor to separate 225

themselves from their co-religionists. Attached to this rhyme is a letter from the elector to the author of Arnstadt, which suggests you might be hearing things about us that are not true... it brings no little distress to be so falsely accused.17 His complaint reveals not only knowledge of the presence of popular Protestant progaganda within his land, but also his concern over the specific confessional content of the literature.

Moritz may have taken steps to silence the "talk that serves to embitter" within his own territory, but there was little that could be done to muffle the explosion that surrounded the outbreak of military conflict along the Danube. In mid-July, Protestant mercenary Schertlin von Burtenbach's march south from

Augsburg ostensibly initiated the military phase of the Schmalkaldic War.1® Kept abreast of imperial maneuvers, Schertlin sought to engage papal Italian reinforcements moving north to Regensburg. Seizing the fortress at

Fuessen and gaining control of the Inn valley and Fern pass, the League forced the Italians into a lengthy detour. In reaction to this military action, the emperor undertook the writing of the Imperial Ban. Printed on the 20th of July in Ingolstadt, knowledge of the ban existed in diplomatic circles but the emperor delayed publication.'9 226

The League's mobilization on the Danube, placed

Charles in a vulnerable position at Regensburg. Anticipating a full-scale assault, he retreated with his troops to Landshut, where Papal and Spanish troops joined him in early August.20 The day following the unification of his troops, Charles received the declaration of war, or Verwahrunasschrift. from the Schmalkaldic League, in which they justified their actions on the basis Charles' unconstitutional attack on religion.21 Since it was the Imperial Majesty's intention "to uproot the divine Word and Lutheran doctrine, together with suppressing the liberty and freedom of the empire,” the adherents of the Augsburg Confession had every right to resist.22 Further, by transgression of imperial recesses and treaties, and violation of his sworn obligation through violence unbecoming an emperor, Charles had deposed himself and forfeited the dignity and elevation of his office previously bestowed by the electors and empire.15 They denounced his military action as devoid of due legal process, and accused him breaking his capitulation oath in which he swore to prevent any within the empire of either high or low estate to be placed under the ban without fair reason or due process.2'* 227

At base the declaration centered on religious justification rather than constitutional legality. To be sure, constitutional matters were involved, but only as consequential to the accusations toward Charles' religious intentions. Consistent with the long developing resistance theories, the emperor forfeited his office and authority by attempting to dictate matters of religion, and constitutional issues, however significant, remained secondary to the rhetoric of f a i t h .25

The elector and landgrave ordered a page in the company of a trumpeter to deliver the Verwahrunasschrift to the imperial camp. Charles refused to receive the declaration, and though rejecting Alba's suggestion that both messengers be summarily hanged, he promptly condemned the Protestant leaders and returned their representatives with orders to inform the League of the Imperial Ban's immediate enforcement.26 The elector and landgrave promptly published the contents of their Verwahrunasschrift. and the pamphlet became their public legitimation and response to the Ban.27 The Imperial Ban repeated Charles' consistent public position by carefully avoiding any emphasis on religion as a motive for military action.2* Beginning 228

with an assertion of affection for Germany, Charles stated his concern for the maintenance of peace and harmony with the empire. His goal had always been to settle the religious division in a peaceful manner through a general Christian Council.29 There were no grounds for the accusation made by some that his intentions were to destroy the true Christian faith.w Elector John Frederick and Landgrave Philip had resisted all efforts of reconciliation and endangered the peace by rejecting their dutiful obedience to authority. Not only did they move against the emperor,

but enticed others to join their disobedience.31 They acknowledged no court or authority, thus hindering the administration of justice. Their unjust disobedience against legitimate authority was "perpetrated under the appearance of religion,"31 and they had no grounds in the true Christian religion to defy higher authority.

Charles condemned the derogatory literature spreading throughout the territories "undoubtedly for the purpose of stirring up the common person against the emperor."31 He insisted that ample opportunity had been given the princes to heal the turmoil, and that the patience shown Philip in 1541 at Regensburg, and to

John Frederick at Speyer in 1544, was done in hope that such tolerance would prompt them to turn from their 2 2l)

rebellion and disobedience.14 Yet since the elector and landgrave rejected such patience:

On the basis of due consideration of the matters of this case, and by our responsibility to our God-ordained office, we recognize, declare, and proclaim the named John Frederick, Elector of Saxony, and Landgrave Philipp of Hess, as disobedient, unfaithful, undutiful and oathbreaking rebels, mutinous outlaws, and violators of imperial dignity and majesty. They are breakers of the generally proclaimed peace of the land, and are to suffer the pains and punishments of condemned outlaws.” It took little time for Wittenberg to respond to

the emperor's execution of the Ban. George Major anonymously authored a scathing attack on the authority of the emperor, calling for resistance against attacks on the Gospel. In his Declaration of the Eternal.

Heavenly. Almighty Majesty Against Emperor Charles.

King of Spain, etc. . and Pope Paul III.36 Major defended the pure teachings of the church, and claimed

those teachings were now threatened by the military actions of Charles and the Pope. Speaking prophetically as with the voice of God, Major listed

the many charges put forth by the anti-imperial camp against Charles, and asserted proofs of the emperor’s intent to uproot the faith. On the basis of such evil

intentions Major declared that Charles "cannot have his authority from us [God], the divine majesty," and hence, his imperial dignity is false.37 What the 230 leaders of the League claimed from a constitutional basis, that Charles forfeited legitimate authority and dignity, Major vehemently asserted from a religious and prophetic basis.

One ought to resist such authority which seeks the destruction of true doctrine, worship, morality, compassion, peace and unity, along with persecuting the pious, and in its stead erects false doctrine, idolatry, adultery, immorality, sodomy, larceny and theft, and which defends and protects evil, for whoever resists such a one resists not the law of God, but rather of the devil.’8 Toward his conclusion, Major took a rhetorical turn which very well might have been aimed at Moritz:

It means little for you to stand to the side and claim neutrality, for you are to employ your body, goods, and blood, you of whatever estate, authority or subject, are obligated to help preserve the law of God, which natural law also teaches you, to punish the evil doers, protect the pious, and to help maintain correct divine teaching and worship. Where this is not done, there arises from earthly government a devilish tyranny as with the Turks, which kneels not to God's law and the law of nature, but rather to their own authority, such as the Pope is doing. This type of law the emperor and Ferdinand want to construct in Germany through the power of their Spanish and Italian troops, and which one can only assist by sitting still. Major was not alone in his response to the Ban. Nuremberg pastor Andreas Osiander published, A

Comforting Letter Against the Godless Persecutor of the Word of God. dedicating the work to John Frederick's half-brother, Johann Ernst, who was visiting Nuremberg at the time. Osiander forcefully articulated the anti- 231 imperial themes of Charles being the pope's henchman, and his intent to destroy the faith under the pretext of rebellion.41 Osiander told his readers.

We know well that the Imperial Majesty's intent is as Satan's, namely, to destroy Christianity, crush God's Word, and, as is his manner, impose his lies. He seeks to kill all who neither believe such lies, nor want to confess or worship them. As a result the kingdom of sin. death, and his Antichrist is preserved and propagated."” osiander's impassioned attack on the emperor frayed the nerves of the Nuremberg city council. This city's political stance bore a strong resemblance to

Moritz, and events throughout the summer reflect in microcosm the pressures and problems confronting the Albertines.41 As an imperial city, Nuremberg's rulers had close ties and obligations to Charles. As Moritz, the city stood aloof of the Schmalkaldic League and as tensions mounted throughout the spring they hesitated in actively supporting the League's mobilization.44 The city council was caught, as Moritz, between obedience to their emperor and the protestant rhetoric of resistance. Their grasp at neutrality precipitated "bad talk in the market-place, as well among the citizens," accusing the city father's of favoring the emperor. The council ordered each member to disavow 232 such partisanship in hopes of publicly assuring that God's Word would not be abandoned.45 It was not only the pamphlets which disturbed the magistrates, but also the constant flow of invective streaming from the pulpits. An extant Osiander sermon captured the spirit of his pulpit as he vigorously exploited the argument for active resistance.46 Since Charles participated in the popes false worship and sought to establish the devil’s doctrines against God's Word at the expense of much innocent blood,

his godless acts merit disobedience and he cannot be acknowledged as true authority but rather as a tyrant. He had forfeited his office and lordship by his godlessness.47 In sum, Osiander*s publishing and preaching provide not only another example of the violent language which erupted in response to the military campaign, but also reveal that the clerical woes on

Moritz's horizon were not unique. The Albertine prince was soon to discover, just as the Nuremberg magistrates, that activist preachers made poor spokesmen for any pro-Lutheran justification for neutrality. At the outset of this verbal fire storm Moritz had sought to press his confessional loyalty, at least within private diplomatic circles. On August 15 he wrote to John Frederick and Philip asserting he sought 211 only "to act toward God and our authority as befitting a Christian prince,"4* protesting his faithfulness to the "true Christian religion," specifically, "to place the eternal before the temporal, and allow no power on earth to tear it from them."49 Put simply, Moritz sought to "Render unto Caesar that which was Caesar's, and unto God, that which is God's."50 Legally and confessionally Moritz had a point; but did it really matter? He could readily voice his position on the level of imperial diplomacy, but how was he to be heard on the broader spectrum of society. Who would speak for the prince? The cries of the theologians and pastors only fortified the League's stance, and as the military campaign escalated so also did the violence of the accusations, which increasingly played not only to the piety of the people and to their loyalty as good Germans and Christians, but also to their fears.

Stories circulated of the Pope poisoning wells.51 Rumor bred rumor, and the tales of impending doom grew more horrific. Bugenhagen reported that Charles, together with the pope, had ordered some commanders "to spare death to no one, including all children to the age of two."52 Fear of atrocities at the hands of invaders found expression not only in threats of what 234 might come, but also in accounts of what was taking

place in the campaign along the Danube. In a letter to

Albrecht of Prussia, Veit Dietrich described an incident which for him clearly revealed the nature of the conflict. In relating how imperial troops had stabbed to death a Protestant who refused to recant his

faith, he sharply commented that "nevertheless, there are yet many who do not want to believe that the emperor fights against religion."53

Powerful words indeed, but did they in any way adversely effect Albertine policy? Evidence suggests that they did. Apparently the spirit of the pamphlets,

if not the actual works themselves, found a significant audience within Moritz's territory, and the rumblings of his pastors which Moritz had attempted to stifle, increasingly became a roar. Charles* execution of the

Ban simply affirmed what the Schmalkaldic propagandists had been proclaiming throughout the spring and early summer, and effectively sealed the division between the parties.

As this verbal onslaught from his fellow

Lutheran’s increased the pressure on Dresden, Charles delivered an ultimatum which further crippled hopes for neutrality. On August 18, Moritz received the imperial order to execute the Ban throughout his territory, and 235 to immediately occupy the possessions of the condemned.54 Together with repeated assurances that his intentions were not to uproot the Christian religion,5'

Charles' order carried strong threats. If Moritz attempted on the basis of blood relations or previous treaties with the condemned to avoid his obligations as a prince of the empire, he himself would lose all rights and privileges. Further, if he delayed or neglected to act, then any territory conquered would remain in the power of the one enforcing the Ban.56 The true cost for Magdeburg and Halberstadt now came due. Charles' price was nothing less than active participation. An Imperial ultimatum now hung over the

Albertine court as well as the rebels. Moritz could no longer be content on putting the best face on a sideline politic, for the far greater threat emerged in the spectre of confiscation and loss of hereditary

Wettin possessions. Despite assuring his father-in-law he would spare no effort in attempting to change the emperor's mind,

Moritz's options were limited.57 As an imperial prince duty required him to execute the ban, and failure to do so courted political disaster for both houses of Saxony. The difficult task would be to convince his own estates and churches, together with his electoral 2K> neighbors, that armed investment of his cousin's land bore no threat either to the Lutheran cause or to traditional Saxon sovereignty. But did he not have written assurances from Charles himself? Did he not have well reasoned and imperially sanctioned legal prerogatives, together with a scripturally based justification for assisting the emperor? What was needed now was the cooperation and support from the ecclesiastical branch of his ducal government.

Moritz and His Albertine Clercrv With hopes of negotiation eroded away and finally forced to make a military choice, Moritz met with his Committee of Six at the end of August in Freiberg/8 The ducal court found itself confronted on one side with the immediate concern of the imperial edict, and on the other side with disruptive clergy. Discussions revealed the advisor's concern that anti-imperial attitudes prevelant throughout much of north Germany were finding found root in the Albertine churches. This development merited consternation since Moritz premised his ducal policy on Charles' benign intentions toward the confession. As already noted, Moritz and his fellow Lutherans collided not on the issue of obedience per se, but on 237

Charles* purpose for military intervention. Did the emperor seek to eradicate the "true religion?” Political and spiritual legitimation for both sides hinged on the answer to this question. The dominant thread running through nearly all of the Protestant’s resistance arguments, and posited by the Wittenberg theologians in April,” stated that resistance to authority could be mounted if the emperor intruded in matters of faith, for such intrusion meant violation of oath and forfeiture of office. The Albertine court nowhere rejected this premise. Quite to the contrary, they repeatedly informed their compatriots that they would fight if such could be proven. But what if it was not certain that the emperor was moving against the faith? What if insufficient evidence existed to claim

Charles' forfeiture? Precisely here lay Dresden's justification for neutrality. Despite weeks of constant assurances within private diplomatic circles of his confessional loyalty and Charles* secular purpose, Moritz's councilors now informed him that,

throughout your territory and other lands it is treated as fact that His Imperial Majesty's intention is to uproot our Christian religion, and other reasons (for his military action] are only false pretexts. Such is being spread hither and yon by preachers from the pulpits, as they work up the people by telling them they are obligated to 238

offer their body and blood to defend the Word of God.60 Though the extent of the "hither and yon" of the preaching, or the degree to which the people were "worked up," cannot be determined, apparently it was of such a level as to merit concern and require remedy. The advisors decided that the first step in successfully implementing their projected policy necessitated a broad dissemination of the imperial assurance, and the most viable channel for doing so lay in the parish pulpits. To counter any potential unrest they recommended

a ducal mandate be issued,... together with a copy of the imperial declaration of intent regarding religion, which should be conveyed to the people in Your Princely Grace's land. Thereby with gentle forebearance the pastors might deter restlessness and alter the people's disposition.61 Moritz promptly issued the mandate on August 29. Informing the recipients that,

the Coadjutor of Merseburg's order regarding the form of prayer for seeking grace from almighty God, together with the proper implementation of the prayer has not been utilized everywhere. Those receiving this mandate [superintendents and ducal officials] should strongly control the preachers everywhere, seeing that they do not alter the prayer in any manner. He who does not follow this warning shall be reported to the duke. Furthermore, the recipients should share the contents of the imperial declaration, and attempt to bring it to the attention of the preachers.6* The content of the ducal mandate betrayed a degree of failure on the part of the court to impose order on 239 their preachers through Moritz’s previous attempt to stem the rhetoric of the Albertine clergy. To the Dresden court's thinking, the anti-imperial discourse flowing from the pulpits clearly violated Anhalt's ban on "uncertain news or other speech which served to embitter.«OT Two aspects of Moritz's order merit closer consideration. First, it provided a conspicuous example of the territorial prince exercising control over an arm of his government. All the bureaucratic tools were in place for the utilization of this office for furtherance of princely policy. Foremost in the rationale for the mandate's promulgation was the assumption that the clergy carried the capacity to influence and shape the attitudes and conduct of their congregations. On this basis the prince sought to propagate a vital component for his territorial policy: keep the people quiet. The second salient feature in the mandate was its focus on the issue of obedience to authority. This concern cast the conflict in two distinct, yet jointly rooted directions. Moritz's rights over the clergy were confirmed by the Lutheran confessional imperative to obey one's rightful authority, except in sin. For Moritz, Charles' oral and written promises eliminated 240

any threat of sinful acts against the Gospel hence the

Albertines were obligated not to attack their sovereign. In turn, Moritz's duty as the God-ordained leader of his territorial church was to bring an end to the antagonism of the clergy. As Moritz was obligated to obey Charles, so were the clergy obligated to obey

their prince. Failure to comply could only be construed as a violation of the pastoral office and

duty. For Moritz the matter was settled, and the only

issue needing resolution was the dutiful obedience of

his pastors. In sum, the issue at hand is not concerned with whether Charles was telling the truth, or whether Moritz in fact believed him. What is at issue is the attempt of a territorial prince to reach down through his bureaucratic state and manipulate the message of his Lutheran pastors. With obvious minimal success with his intitial church order the question arises: did Moritz fare better with his second attempt to quell the voices of discontent? Based on immediate reaction, together with evidence culled from the court proceedings for those

imprisoned for slanderous speech during the fall and winter of 1546-47, Dresden's confidence in Charles* 241

promises found little support from the Albertine clergy.64

An immediate response to the order for the pastors to utilize the Anhalt prayer and to cease and

desist all inflammatory preaching against the emperor came in the form of a written protest from six Leipzig

preachers.65 The pastor’s reply to Moritz clearly paralleled the thoroughgoing mistrust of Charles and the call for resistance propagated by Wittenberg and

the Schmalkaldic League. The participation of the highly respected and influential superintendent Johannes Pfeffinger

contributed to the letter's polemical leverage.66 As

the leading Albertine theologian, Pfeffinger's involvement in territorial ecclesiastical affairs

reached back even before the official introduction of

reform, and his well-known proximity to the Wittenberg

inner circle provided him prestige and influence over

the Albertine clergy second only to Melanchthon.67 The Leipzig pastors' joint declaration provided a literary

bridge between the plethora of anti-imperial voices outside Albertine Saxony and the reputed disposition of the clergy with Moritz' domain.

Declaring their humble reception of the ducal mandate commanding them not to hold the emperor in 242 disfavor, nevertheless as pastors they must faithfully uphold their preaching office till death.6* Faithfulness to their office obligated them to pray against their enemies, and the greatest enemy was the pope of Rome. Against this enemy they must with all their ability, and "in the name of our dear Lord and Savior Christ's name, cry out, write, teach, and pray."69 In like manner they must pray against all who join themselves together with the pope, "be they emperor, king, prince, or lord," just as they would against the Turk.™ They would diligently ask God to protect and defend their gracious prince, along with the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse, who protect the holy Word and Gospel, and to give them victory, comfort, strength, and wisdom against the enemies of Christianity and the Gospel.11

They justified their speech against the emperor on the basis of his hostility toward true Christian doctrine, listing four points which they believed clearly betrayed his intention. First, Charles had obligated himself to the pope to destroy the Lutherans. Having already publicly announced his intentions of punishing the "perpetrators of slanderous literature and art," together with those scorning the papacy and its council, he would lead Germany's hateful, 241

bloodthirsty, and mortal enemy against them.72 This referred most likely to Charles' accusations in the ban condemning the anti-imperial literature being disseminated throughout the rebel territories for the purpose of working up the common man.73 Secondly, Charles allowed those confessing the faith to be put to death, thus bringing innocent blood upon himself.711 Thirdly, he endorsed erroneous doctrine such as being propagated by writings from Louvain, and fourthly, in the same vein, he adhered to papal teaching and considered the Lutherans heretics.75 The four points were, as the League's accusations, more assertions than "proofs," but they reveal a pattern of consensus stretching from the military camp to the chancel. Where Charles saw rebellious action in need of imperial correction, Lutheran pastor's saw pious works of faith against a devilish enemy. Again, what were the emperor's intentions? To this point the pastors warned Moritz that Charles did not mean the Lutheran faith in his "dim and convoluted" explanation, for the papists themselves refer to their own erroneous religion as the "Christian Word of God."76 For these reasons it was impossible to pray for favor upon the emperor and king, but rather to call upon God to turn back the adversaries of God's Word.77 244

Despite conjoining Moritz with John Frederick and Philip as those princes preserving the true faith, the letter moved in a polemical direction antithetical to Albertine neutrality. The pastor's confronted Moritz with the confessional options in their sharpest form.

Two parties stand before our eyes. One has maintained the gospel and the true teaching of the Word of God, while the other has openly harmed and persecuted the same, and is loyal to papal doctrine. Between these two parties there is no middle ground.7® Here within the broader context of this letter came the complete repudiation of any political or religious posture which would not actively oppose Charles. Weaving confessional integrity to resisting the imperial threat, they "[called]... upon God for a victory against Charles as an adversary of pious Christian princes," and stated their willingness to sacrifice their bodies and life for the cause.79 The Leipzig pastors considered themselves loyal

Albertines and conveyed to Moritz that they bore no animosity. The letter stemmed not from their private opinions and feelings, but rather from a simple Christian concern and the responsibility of their pastoral office.80 Despite these assurances, the letter heightened tensions between court and clergy, and it certainly led to Moritz's future mistrust of

Pf ef f inger 245

The Leipzig letter could have only confirmed the seriousness of the situation for Moritz. Even before receiving the pastoral protest he had ordered Bishop

Anhalt and several superintendents to gather at Altzella in mid-September for "extremely urgent reasons."*1 The gravity of the matter prompted Moritz to appoint chancellor Simon Pistoris to confront the ministers. Pistoris reprimanded the superintendents for either altering, or in many cases not implementing the prayer in public worship. Such action meant direct disobedience not only to their bishop who had drafted the prayer, but also to the August 29 ducal mandate. Through their "loud, spiteful and impassioned rhetoric" the pastors had not only violated Bishop Anhalt's order, but also overstepped the bounds of their pastoral office.81

Clearly the Dresden court was sensitive to an unexceptable level of negative preaching, and, from the tenor of the talks, previous measure had failed to bring matters under control. Percieving the rejection of the prayer as an expression of animosity toward the emperor which could only be a detriment to ducal endeavors, the superintendent's were ordered to desist from expressing their personal feelings (affectibus 246 privatise from the pulpits.M In the presence of the Albertine chancellor the church leaders were ordered to review the Instruction and discuss any changes that might lead to a compromise, though Moritz wanted no discussion on the prayer itself.** The superintendent's response to Moritz reveals the deep chasm between the prince and these church officials. Though they communicated their position in a respectful manner, they obviously held to the conviction that the faith was under siege.*6

We have not spoken from the pulpit of uncertain news which serves to embitter. One should, as announced in the order, threaten punishment and call to repentance those who would blaspheme and contend against the Word of God, and point out to the people what an atrocious sin it is to knowingly persecute and despise God's Word. One should provide scriptural examples of God's wrath and punishment, and gain models of confession from the sainted martyrs, so if God does lay a cross or persecution upon us the people may be held in Christian security, and strengthened with comforting exhortations that our poor German nation (in which God has let his Word shine) shall not be lost....Yet in the troubles before us, which the order itself describes, we cannot avoid viewing the matter and call black, black, and white, white, and apply it to our times, since the Word of God never changes. Yet now such speech is labeled disobedient to the Instruction, and rooted only in our personal feelings which serve to embitter. Your Princely Grace might consider how difficult it is to touch on such matters and avoid prickly preaching and prayers We never considered it either your or the order's intent to prohibit us, together with other pastors in your territory, from preaching against and warning the people of the pope and his cohort's imported errors.*1 247

Having stated this, the preachers informed Moritz of their obligation to change the wording of the

prayer. In full obedience to the command to pray for those in authority, they amended the Anhalt prayer from

"Graciously lead the hearts and inclinations of the Imperial Majesty, Electors, and Princes in the knowledge of your divine truth," to "May God enlighten the emperor and others with his divine Word, and graciously deliver them from papal deception and seduction."88 This new form of the prayer, they argued,

could not "in light of the present circumstances or due consideration before God and their consciences be changed or softened."89

Yet precisely in this rewording the

superintendents tipped their hand as to what was meant

by calling "black, black, and white, white." Charles was in league with the pope, and his actions could only

be considered a threat to the faith. The very phrasing

of the altered prayer stood in direct contradiction to a policy which would assist the emperor in any manner. As with Anhalt's order and his own August mandate, discussions at Altzella ended in failure for the Albertine court. Moritz emphatically rejected the

superintendent's proposed change, and he commanded 248

Anhalt to see that his preachers utilized the original form of the prayer in the pulpits- He would in no way

tolerate anyone in his land making changes in the prayer at their own convenience, and preachers who conduct themselves otherwise shall earn our disfavor. "w Moritz needed his pastor's to propagate ducal policy, especially as he sought to garner support for military action while at the same time making assurances of confessional loyalty. Accusations of Charles' ultimate allegiance to the pope had profound implications for Moritz's fragile imperial policy. The not so subtle changes in the prayer carried dangerous political overtones, and Moritz would not have his preachers play politics with the pulpit, unless, of course, they were his politics. Did the Leipzig pastors and the superintendents at

Altzella reflect the general mood of the clergy throughout Moritz's territory, and did he have any success in bringing his pastor's to heel?9’ Later testimony from city officials casts light back on this period of time when Moritz's sought to make the pulpits toe the political line. Particulary significant to the matter at hand were the statements implicating the clergy in fomenting discord. Taken from depositions given in Moritz's presence, representative burgomasters reported the conduct of 249 certain citizens in Pirna, Heissen, and Dresden during the preceeding year. While Pirna appeared to have had limited disturbances and complained only about the "ranting” of a church deacon named Johann Symler,92 Heissen claimed that,

the preachers had conveyed to the people that the war sought the destruction of the gospel, and thus for that reason they [the preachers] sided with the enemy more than [Moritz].” More specific was the testimony from Dresden:

he [the burgomaster] had not noted all the suspected persons in Dresden who before, during, and after the war, spoke or acted in a derogatory manner toward [Moritz] beyond Michel Weidelichen and Joachim Schreyefolgen, and likewise the preachers. The pastor, preacher, and Herr Johannes and Herr Martinus had all remarked that they sided with the enemy more than [Moritz].M All the burgomasters agreed that such conduct had led to a dangerous state of affairs, and they promised Moritz from this point forward they

would pay closer attention to persons inclined to riot and rebellion, keeping a close eye on the inns, and in the same fashion, closer attention would be paid to the preachers.’5 These hearings also provided an example of the content of the sermonizing. Reportedly a pastor had preached that,

Whereas the emperor, king, and prince are persecuting the gospel, if you pick up and move to another place, and give yourself over to our brother's and sisters in the faith, then you have changed for a better home and wife than you have had to this point, and you will produce a different child.96 250

Howevermuch this bit of rhetoric embodies the attitude behind a significant portion of subjects eventually crossing over into Ernestine lands, it certainly reflected the negative response to Moritz's union with the emperor.97

Such later testimony validates the concerns expressed at the time by the ducal advisors and influential nobility. A month after the promulagtion of the August mandate Moritz's councilors informed him that:

it is well known that not only the common man, but also a majority of others carry intense animosity toward the emperor in these military maneuvers, and are enthusiastically supportive of the elector and landgrave.98 So much for pacification. Undoubtedly Dresden gave credence to the well-connected Elisabeth of Rochlitz who reported from deep inside Albertine territory that she heard "complaints throughout the land," and a

"general clamor."99 Evidence suggests a degree of unrest sufficient to eventually warrant Moritz to levy fines and imprison individuals for malicious talk against the emperor or his person.IWI Yet it appears that in some cases this action produced a circular problem which only aggravated the situation. When disturbances erupted in

Freiberg following the diet in October, Moritz banished 251 the prominent city councilor Hans Loss for accusing the prince of seeking to reimpose Catholicism. Loss relocated to Ernestine territory and joined with other deportees in initiating a vociferous pamphlet campaign against their former prince.101

How much of this agitation can be directly traced to the preachers. It is apparent that ducal orders for the clergy to stifle their derogatory language and propagate Charles' benign intent were either ignored or gained little sympathy. Contact with the Leipzig preachers and the superintendents uncovered a strong activist streak, at least among these men. Discerning or caluclating the demeanor and loyalty of every pastor is impossible, but from the testimony of contemporaries it appears that on the eve and outbreak of war the

Albertine clergy had a reputation for contributing to public dissension. Most disturbing to Moritz was that a significant branch of his ducal government either blatantly refused, or simply failed to support what he deemed legitimate imperial and territorial policy.

Such an impression would help explain Moritz's bitter comments to Bishop Anhalt in the late Fall concerning the conduct of the preachers and theologians in the previous months. 252

If, on the other hand, others act according to God’s Word and in a just manner but the theologians and preachers are not inclined to them, then the act cannot remain innocent, and the divine Word is employed against it....102 Moritz seemed to express anger that, for the most part, his own clergy turned on him and attempted to drive a confessional wedge between his policy and his religious loyalty. This offended the prince not just because he thought he had acted in a legitimate manner, but that by raising confessional doubts a degree of agitation surfaced which clouded his imperial agenda. Despite his constant assurances of doctrinal fidelity, Moritz experienced the frustration of a weakening political viability due to being the target of suspicion of apostasy. Moritz took a calculated gamble in believing the emperor when he said that he did not seek to uproot the faith of the Augsburg Confession. The high stakes of that decision surfaced with the resistance at home.

The Schmalkaldic league, together with clerical supporters throughout Germany, simply refused to accept the imperial position and bound loyalty to the Augsburg

Confession to open resistance against ’’the pope's soldier" who waged war on the Word of God. The failure of mediation squeezed Moritz from both sides, prompting cautious nods to the opposing sides without fully complying with either's demands. 253

Hesitancy to lay claims to Magdeburg reflected his

tenuous predicament. Despite having protection rights

in hand, Moritz refused the emperor's order to go public for fear of revolt. However dear the opportunity, perceptions of the depth of confessional

identity forced him to indefinitely delay. Those perceptions found vindication not only with the strong evangelical support within Halle, but also from Magdeburg, which delivered a foretaste of their gift

for pointed polemic by exhorting its citizens to pray

that God would "smash the heads of the princes who are

our enemies."'” Conversely, Moritz's fealty to Charles deterred him from endorsing the conviction that matters of faith were at stake. Acceptance of the emperor’s word compelled Moritz to seek justification in the doctrine of "rendering unto Caesar that which was Caesar's."

Precisely here Moritz needed the support of his territorial church. None was forthcoming. On the contrary, Moritz sensed the clergy's hostility. This led to crisis when he received orders to execute the imperial ban and invest John Frederick's territory. Failure to comply risked forfeiture of his rank, together with the threat of Saxony coming under foreign domination. Confronted by the concrete 254 political circumstances of survival, Moritz called his estates to Freiberg to assist in constructing a policy which would hopefully assure his co-religionists that he sought to render to God, despite the looming inevitability of also rendering to Caesar. 255

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. "Uns ist aber gleichwohl nicht wenig beschwerlich, dass die sachen, zuvorderst unter den predicanten und theologen in unserm lande leider dahin gekommen, wann gleich etlich wider gottes wort oder sonst offentlich unrecht thun, wann ihnen nur die predicanten und theologen sonst wohlgewogen seind, wird ihnen alle ihre sache ohne underschied gebilligt, ja auch dazu mit dem mantel des gottlichen wortes beschoenet und bedecket. Hinwider aber, wann andere schon gottes befehl gemess oder sonst wohl und recht handeln, wann ihnen die theologen und prediger nicht wohl geneigt sein, so kann ihre handlung doch nicht unbeschuldet bleiben, und muss sich das gottliche wort abermals dazu uberseits gebrauchen und detorquiern lassen.,.nicht allein dem amt, darin die gemelten prediger und theologen sind, sondern auch dem gottlichen wort selbst eine merkliche verachtung erfolgen wurde." PKHS, 2, p. 956.

2. Note Bishop Anhalt's remark that he wrote the prayer..."Auf E. L. Begehr, dass bei diesen geswchimden Laeuften and zwei tagen woechentlich ein gemeines Gebet und christliches Fasten gehalten werden solle..." PKHS. 2, p. 709.

3. Underricht wie die Pharherrn das volck in diesen geschwinden und gefehrlichen zeiten zur buss und qebett vermanen sollen/ auf Fuerstlichen befelh/ durch den hochwirdiain durchlauchtiaen hochaeboren Fuersten und herrn/ herrn Georqen Fuersten zu Anhalt. Coadiuatorn in Geistlichen sachen zu Mersenburak etc. Leipzig, 1546.

4. "Wir fuerchten aber, dass es wenig Folge haben wird, wenn E.L.nicht Ihren Amtleuten und Stadtraeten befehlen, ueber der Ausfuehrung zu wachen." PKHS, 2, p. 709 .

5. "Und obwohl hierinne itziger zeit nicht die meinunge sein solle, die religion anzugreifen, so konnen doch die dunkeln wort von der religion zu gelegener zeit weitleufig deutunge gewinnen;...und wurden dann...Ksl. Mt. und mit mehrem schein wider alle der christlichen confession zugethanen, als were sie 256

auch als ungehorsame zu strafen, reize. . . 11 PKMS, 2, pp. 710 .

6. PKMS. 2, p. 712.

7. "So dan auch one rechtschaffene erkentnis der sunde und ware reue und busse ein hertlichs ernstlich gebett nicht geschehen kan." Underricht. Bia.

8. Bugenhagen spoke of "a people from a foreign nation thirsting after German blood and not knowing Christian teaching,..ein Volck aus frembden Nation/ das nach Deudschem blut duerstet/ und Christliche lere nicht weis.. . Schrifft. Aiia; while in his letter to Moritz, Anhalt spoke of the threat "of the foreign people, of which they say, know nothing of God's law and lust after German possesions and blood..." [Dann so die frembden voelker, darvon man saget, die von gotts nichts rechts wissen und deutsche guts und bluts begierig...] PKMS. 2, p. 710.

9. Underrichc, Aiib.

10. "Und damit ir eigentlich wissen mueget/ was dem Christlichem volck solle fuerzuhalten sein/ haben wir euch dasselbe hierbei stuckweise/ vermelden wollen/ das ir solchs dem Christlichen volck uff der Canzel woltet furlesen/ und aussert dem/ ungewisse zeitung/ und andere reden so zu verbitterung dienen auf den predigt sturl nicht brengen." Underricht, Aiiia.

11. "Neben dem auch die Leute vermahnen das unchristliche fluchen und gotts lestern abzustellen/ Auch sich spitziger/ unnuetzer wortt wider die obrigkeitten/ dadurch unwille unnd uneinigkeit erregt werden moechten enthalten." Underricht, Biiib.

12. "Almechtiger/ Ewiger/ Barmhertziger/ guetiger Gott/ der du mitt deinem liebenn Sohn Jesu Christo unserm herrn unnd erloeser. sambt dem heilgen geiste/ in dreien unterschiedlichen personen ein eineger warhafftiger gott bist/ der du uns in disen letzen fehrlichen zeiten/ der wellt dein heilges goetlichs wort aus sonder vetterlicher lieb widerumb has gnediglich leuchten lassen/ aber wir uns desselben leider/ wenig annehmen noch besseren/ damit wir in deinen erschreklichen zorn und schwere straff greulich gefallen seind/ derhalben/ du auch diese kegenwertige grosse sehrligkeiten uber uns unnd Teutsche nation one zweifel hast komen lassen/ Dieweil du aber aus 257

gruntloser guete und barmherzigkeit/ gnade und vergebung der suenden hast zugesagt alien so dich gleuben unnd im nahmen Christi ernstiich anruffen/ So bitten wir dich Erstlich/ das du uns wollest gnediglich vergeben all unsere suende unnd missthat/ damit wir jemals wider dein goettlich Maiestet und unsern nechsten gesuendiget haben/ und zur besserung unsers lebens deinen heyligen geist gnediglich mittheilen/ Auch fuer alien Rotthen und Ketzereien behuetten/ unnd dein heiliges wort bey uns rein und rechschaffen erhalten/ und davon durch keine widerwertigkeit abfallen lassen. Darzu Roem. Kay. May. aller Churfuersten und Fuersten hertzen und gemuethe zur erkentnis deiner Goettlichen warheit and Christlichen frieds und einikeit/ durch deinen heiligen geist gnediglich leitten/ auff das blutvergiessen/ unnd verderb Deutscher nation verhuettet/ und wir in aller Gottseligkeit und erbarkeit auff diser welt leben/ und das ende unnsers glaubens nemlich unser sehlen heil und seligkeit davon bringen moechten/ Durch Jesum Christum unsernn hernn/ der mit dir unnd dem heylgen geist ein Gott lebet und regiert in ewigkeit/ Amen." Underricht. Bi i i ib-ci ia.

13. "Und nachdem wir sonderlich darzu geluck haben, dass von gemeinen leuten unerfindlich auf uns geredet wirdet, thun wir E.L. hiemit 2uschicken, welchergestaIt wir unser unterthanen zu dem gebet ermahnen lassen,..." PKMS. 2, p. 758.

14. See p. 164, above. Court records from 1547 reveal that there was hardly a city in Moritz's territory which did not report that either literature or negative rumors circulated about the prince. See Johannes Hermann, "Armenbibel als 1Schmaehgemalde' in Schmalkaldischen Krieg." Lutheriahrbuch 32 (1965), p. 72 .

15. "und wollen uns demnach gegen E.L. also erkleren, dass unser gemuet dohin gericht ist, gotte, was gottes ist, zu geben....auch unserer oberkeit das zu pflegen, was wir in unserer lehnspflicht gelobt und geschworen haben." PKMS. 2, p. 767.

16. "Und wiewohl es nicht ahn, dass uns angelangt, wie von den unterthanen zum teil und sonst hin- und wieder unserthalben allerlei verdechtige und verdriessliche rede geschehen sollen, so wollten wir doch der itzigen leufte halben dieselben dieser zeit in geduld stellen 25S

und zu gelegener zeit E.L, derhalben ferner berichten, doraus soviel an tag bracht werden soli, dass uns unrecht geschiet." PKMS. 2, p. 768.

17. "Dann uns gelangt an, dass wir ausgetragen, als ob wir von unserer christlichen religion weichen wollten;...und dass auch leute uns bei E.L. vielleicht raoegen zugemessen haben, als ob wir darura still sitzen, dass wir unsers 1. vettern und E.L. lande bekommen wollten. Zu dene, dass auch gedruckte reime ausgangen, darinne unter anderm gemeldet, dass junge fursten allbereit nach zeitliche ehre doersten, darum sie sich durch Kaiser liessen von den religionsverwandten stenden trennen, an weichen reime des kurfursten schreiben, so S. L. an einen von Arnstadt solcher reim halber gethan haben soli, gedruckt, aus welchem allem wir in nachdenken gefuhrt, es moechten E.L. unserthalben viel ein ander bedenken haben, dann sichs in warheit heltet und were uns gleichwohl nicht wenig bekoemmer1ich, dass wir und die unsern in unverschulte verdacht kommen sollten." PKMS, 2, pp. 769-770, 771. Moritz’s reference is to Peter Watzdorff's pamphlet prefaced by John Frederick's letter, see above, p. 172. Moritz took exception to the verse: "As already some young princes thirsting after worldly glory believe the emperor's words, who with his false mask holds them for friends." [Wie allbereit etlich junge fuersten nach zeitlicher ehr begint zu duersten, glauben den keiserlichen worten sein, die also unter guten shein ihnen werden freundlichen fuergehalten.] Liliencron, 4, p. 324.

18 . The standard historiographical study of the Schmalkaldic War is Georg Voigt, Die Geschichtsschreibung ueber den Schmalkadiscben Krieq. (Leipzig, Hirzel, 1874.) The classic source for the campaigns is Luis de Avila, "Commentario de la Guerra de Alamania hecha por Carlos V." in Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles. Vol. 21 (1858), pp. 409-449. For excellent summaries of the war see Brandi, Charles V , pp. 549 - 556, 561-573; and William S. Maltby, Alba: A Biography of Fernando Alvarez de Toledo. Third Duke of Alba. 1507-1582. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 56-64. 25M

19. Carlowitz knew of the Ban, though he had not seen it, and expected it to be promulgated with two or three days, "...die Ksl. Mt. ist schon geschritten, dass sie, wie man sagt, etliche stende in des reichs acht gethan, welche acht, wie ich hore (dann ich noch nicht gesehen) gereit gedruckt und in 2 oder 3 tagen promugiert soil werden." PKMS. 2, 755.

20. PKMS. 2, 757.

21. Abtruck der Verwahrunqs Schrifft/ der Chur unnd Fuersten/ auch Graffen/ Herren/ und Staedte/ der Augspuraischen Confession Einungsverwandten/ iher i etz iqen qenothtrangten und verursachten Kreigsrustung halben/ An Kevserliche Haiestat aussqancen/ in Laeaer vor Landshut/ und beschehen/ Anno M.D. XLVI. den 11. Auqusti. f Print of the Declaration of War of the Elector, Princes, Graven, Lords, and Cities, Concerning the Present Compelled and Occasioned War Preparations by the Those United by the Augsburg Confession, Issued to His Imperial Majesty in the Camp Before Landshut on August 11, 1546.] In Hortleder. pp. 410-413.

22. "Denn dass E. Maj. Gemuethe seye/ das Goettliche Wort/ und die Lehre die sie Lutherische nennen/ zu vertilgen/ auch des Reichs Liebertet und Frieheit zu verdrucken. 11 Hortleder, p. 411.

23. "...zu wider/ ...Reichsabschieden unnd Vertraegen/ auch Ewer Majestat geschworen Obligation/ unnd sich dermassen durch solch ihr gewaltsam unnd unkeyeser1ich Fuernehmen/ der Wuerden und Hochheit/ welche sie von den Churfuersten/ unnd dem Reich ordentlich empfangen/ selbst entsetzen und verlustig machen." Hortleder, p. 413.

25. Repgen, "Religious War?", pp. 320-321.

26. Avila, "Commentario", p. 414. PKMS, 2, p. 773.

27. Waldeck, "Die Publizistik des Schmalkaldischen Krieges I," p. 25.

28. Roemischer Kavserlicher Maiestat Declaration. Wider Hertzoa Johans Friderichen Churfuersten von Sachsen/ unnd Landtqraff Philjpsen von Hessen. Ingolstadt, 1546. 260

29. "...unser gemueth/ will unnd mainung/ anderst nie gewesen/ unnd noch nitt ist/ dann das solch beschwerlich jrrung/ vermoeg vil ergangen Reichshandlungen/ und gemainer Stende selbs gethonen bewilligung/ durch ein gemain Christlichen Concilium/ oder ander gebuerlich weg und mittel. . . 11 Declaration . Ai ib-Ai i ia.

30. 11. . -das uns mit grundt nit auffgelegt werden mag? das wir die ware Christlich Religion/ oder Teutsche Nation Libertet/ inn ainicherlay wege zuschwechen/ zumindern/ oder zuschmeiern/ vil weniger zuverdrucken/ (wie uns etliche(doch one alien grund/ mit gesparter warhait/ und jres aigens willens) understeen zuzemessen..." Declaration. Aiiia.

31. "...nit allain wider uns unnd unser Kayserliche hochhait auffgelaint/ sonder auch ander unser unser unnd des heiligen Reichs Stende/ Glider/ und underthanen/ zugleichmessiger ingehorsams/ auch unzimblichen/ unnd im Rechten verpotten Conspiration und anhang auffgewigelt/ angewisen/ geraitzt/ bewegt/" Declaration. Aiiib.

32. "so ueben unnd treiben sie solches alles des meren tails/ allain undter dem beruembten unnd verwendten lieblichen anmuetigen schein der Religion." Declaration. Biia.

33. "one zweifel mainung/ den gemainen Man/ durch solche und andere weg und mittel/ wider uns zubewegen." Declaration, Biiia.

34. "Und uns darauff in dem verschinen ain und viertzigisten Jare/ allhiezu Regenspurg/ gegen dem landtgraven/ unnd nachmals auff unserm nechtsgehalten Speyrischen Reichstag des vier unnd vierzigisten Jars der mindern Jarzal/ gegen dem Churfuersten zu Sachssen/ mit alien gnaden erzaigt und bewisen/ und gentzlich verhofft/ sie durch solch unser ubermessige gedult/ gnad und guete/ von jren schweren Rebellion/ ungehorsame/ auch unzimblichen Practiken unnd fuernemmen/ ye zuletzt abzuwenden unnd zugewinnen/ auch also den wege der straff zuverhuetten." Declaration. Bi i i ia.

35. "Demnach haben wir nach erwegung aller gelegenhait/ unnd gestalt diser sachen/ auss erhaischung und forderung der hohen unvermeidlichen not/ unnd schuldiger pflicht unsers von Got befolhlnen 261

Ampts/ die genanten Johans Friderichen Churfuersten von Sachsen/ unnd Landtgraff Philipsen von hessen/ als unsere ungehorsamen/ untrewen/ pflicht und Aidpruchtige Rebellen/ Aufruerischen/ veraechter/ unnd verletzer unser Kaiserlichen Hochhait und Mayestat/ verprecher des gemainen aussgekundten Landtfriedens/ in unser und des heiligen Reichs Acht und Aberacht/ auch obgemelte Peenen/ Straffen und Pueffen gefallen sein/ erkent/ erklert/ und verkundt/ und sy auss dem Friden un den Unfriden gesetzt." Declaration, Cb-Ciia.

36. Ewicrer/ Goettlicher Allmaechtiger Haiestat/ Declaration wider Keyser Carl/ Koenig zu Hispanien etc. und Bapst Pauluin den Dritten. In Hortleder, pp. 122- 136. See also Peterson, Phi1ippist. pp. 457-463. For George Major (1502-1574), see Stupperich, Ref ormatorenlexikon. pp. 136-137 .

37. "Kan er/ der Kaiser/ nicht von uns/ Goettlicher Maiestate Oberkeit sein/" Hortleder, p. 133.

38. "Wer nun solchen Oberkait widerstebet/ welche rechte Goettliche Lehre/ rechten Gottesdienst/ Zucht/ und Erbarkeit/ Fried und Einigkeit/ zerstoeret/ unnd die Froimne verfolget/ unnd dargegen falsche Lehre/ Abgoetterey/ Ehebruch/ Unzucht/ Sodomey/ Diebstal/ Rauberey/ die Boesen schutzen/ und verteidiget/ der widerstrebet nicht Gottes/ sindern dess Teuffels Ordnung." Hortleder, p. 133.

39. "Es gilt allhie nichts/ das du dich Neutralisch halten/ und keinem theil/ Huelffe thun wolst. Denn du mit Leib/ Gut/ unnd Blut/ du seyest welches Standts du woellest/ Oberkeit/ oder Unterthan/ Gottes Ordnung/ dass die Boesen gestrafft/ und die frommen geschuezt werden/ dass rechte Goettliche Lehre/ rechte Goettliche Dienst auffgericht werde/ shuldig bist zu helfen/ unnd erhalten/ welches dich auch des natuerlich Recht lehret. Dann wo solches nicht geschicht/ so wird aussdem weltlichen Regiment/ ein lauter teuffelisch Tyranney/ wei bey dem Tuerken/ bey weichen nicht was Gottes Ordnung gebeut/ und das Recht der Natur lehret/ sondern was er will/ was er gebeut/ rechte ist/ wie dann auch dess Pabsts Recht/ Lehre/ unnd Gottes Dienst/ ist. Ein solch Recht wollen Keyser und Koenig Fernandas durch jhre Hispanier und Italinaner in Teutsch Landen auch anrichten/ darzu du dann ihen mit deinem Stillsitzen/ und also unser Ordnung/ Rechte Lehre/ und Gottes Dienst/ so viel an die ist/ auch zureissen hulffest." Hortleder, p. 133. 262

4O . Ein trostschrifft wider die qottlosen verfolqer

heiligen vaterunsers qezoqen, an den durchleuchticren, hochaeborn fuersten und herrn, herrn Johansen Ernst. hertzogen zu Sachsen , landaraven in Duerinaen und maruraven zu Meissen Published in Andreas Osiander D.A.. Gesaitausaabe. Band 8: Schriften und Briefe Aoril 1543 bis Ende 1548. Hrsg. Gerhard Muller und Gottfried Seebass (Guetersloh: Mohn, 1975), pp. 432 ff. For Andreas Osiander (1498-1552), see Stupperich, Reformatorenlexikon, pp. 160-161.

41. "...die gottlosen, blutgirigen papisten abermals ein neue practiken ertunden und gestifftet, durch welche K.M., unther einem neuen schein und glimpf etliche christliche stende und liebhaber des heiligen und se1igmachenden worts gottis im reich teutscher nation zu uberzihen, zu verderben und zu vertilgen,. . . Osiander. 8, p. 432.

42. "...was K.M. im sinn hat, so wissen wir doch wol, was der laidig satan im sinn hat, nemlich die christenheit zu verderben, Gottis wort unterzutrucken und nach seiner art luegen an dessibigen stat zu setzen, darnach alle die, so sie nicht fur warheit halten, bekennen und anpeten woellen, zu ermorden und also das reich der sunden, des tods und seines antichrists zu erhalten und weiter ausszubraiten." Osiander, 8, pp. 433-434.

43. See the comment of Thomas A. Brady in his review of Guenther Wartenberg's Landesherschafft und Reformation. in The Sixteenth Century Journal 21 (Summer, 1990), p. 289. For a fuller discussion on Nuremberg's political situation in the Schmalkaldic War see Gerald Strauss, Nuremberg in the Sixteenth Century (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966) pp. 181-184.

44. For what follows concerning Nuremberg see Bernhard Klaus, Veit Dietrich: Leben und Werk. (Nuernberg: Vereins fuer Bayerische Kirchengeschichte, 1958), pp. 252-253.

45. In mid-July the city council's concern over "allerley ungeschickter und boeser reden am kaufmansmarckt und sonst unter der gemeind," which rumored the city fathers "...dem Kaiser hofierten," prompted an order for each council member to publicly assert that "...inen di beschuldigt parthei1ickeit 2(..l

unpillich zugemessen wird, vil weniger...gesinndt vom wort Gottes zu weichen." Council minutes quoted from Klaus, Dietr ich. p. 252.

46. For the timing of the sermon see Osiander, 8, p. 477 .

47. "...wie ytzt leider die obrigkeit teils thut, [die] des babsts falschen gottesdinst, die teuffelslere, wider Gottis wort mit gewalt erhalten wil, drob vil unschuldigs blut vergossen wirt, so sol man solcher gotlosen obrigkeit mitnichtn gehorsam sein und auch in solchem fall nicht fur obrikeit erkennen, sonder fur thyrannen; dann sie entsetzen sich in diesem fal selbs von yhrn wirden, ampt und herlichkeit durch yhr gotlosses wesen. . . , 11 Os iander. 8, p. 480.

48. "dass wir alles thun wollen, was uns als christlichsn Fuersten gegen Gott und unsere Obrigkeit gebuehrt." PKMS,2, pp. 764-765.

49. "Und haben demnach E.L. aus unserer antwort und sonst mehrmals genugsam verstanden und vernommen, was wir und unsere landschaft unserer wahren christlichen religion halben zu thun bedacht, nemlich das ewige derae zeitlichen vorzusetzen und vermittelst gottlicher genade und hulfe uns mit gewalte dorvone nicht abdringen zu lassen." PKMS. 2, p. 765.

50. See Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst," p. 1145.

51. Philip related to Georg Komerstadt reports that the pope had sent poison through Ingolstadt for this purpose, PKMS, 2, p. 782. In late August the landgrave and elector issued a pamphlet with the title, "An Open Account Concerning the Murderous Arsonist and Poisoner: Sent by the Antichrist, the Pope at Rome, to Harm Germany with Murderous Arson and Poison," [Des Churfuersten zu Sachssen etc. Und Landqrauen zu Hessen etc. Offen Auffschreiben/ Der Mordbrenner und Vorgiffter Halben: Die vom Antichrist/ dem Babst zu Rom abgefertiaet/ Deudschland mit Mordbrandt und vorqifftung zubeschedigen. 1546.] in which they accused the pope of perpetrating this heinous crime. Hot satisfied with subsidizing the emperor's irrefutable attack against the true Christian religion, the pope in his murderous and bloodthirsty manner had now sent agents to poison the springs, ponds, and other standing water throughout Germany. "What the emperor misses with the sword, the pope seeks to finish with poison." 264

["...und was der Keyser mit der schwert nicht allenthaben vermag/ das wil der Babst mit gift ausrichten.. . , Aiiib.

52. "Auch haben wir erfahren das Carolus mit dem Babst beschlossen habe und etlichen Haubtleuten befohlen, das sie niemands verschonen sollen zu toten, auch die Kinder von zwen Jaren." Buaenhaaens Briefwechsel, p. 381.

53. "Es hat auch diese Eroberung einer Maertyrer gemacht. Sie haben naemlich einen Kirchendiener bekommen; als dieser auf ihr Ansuchen von der christlichen Lehre nicht weichen, sondern eher auch sein Leben lassen wollte, haben sie ihn auf einen Tisch geworfen, ihm erstlich ausgeschnitten und darnach ihn mit Messern so lange gestochen und gefropfet, bis er ihnen unter den Haenden gestorben ist. Und dennoch sollen noch viele seyn, die nicht glauben wollen, dass der Kaiser wider die Religion kriege. 11 Quoted in Klaus, Veit Dietrich, p. 253.

54. PKMS, 2, pp. 760-762.

55. "...und gar nicht in meinung, die christlichen religion, wort gottes, mit dem schwert zu dempfen und auszureiten..." PKMS, 2, p. 761.

56. "dann wo D.L. hierin seumig oder nachlessig erscheinen, und mittler weil solche obberuhrte land und leute durch uns Oder andere erobert und eingenommen wurden, so hett D.L. leichtlich zu ermessen, dass dieselben lande und leut, unangesehen D.L. furgewandten gerechtigkeit, bei denen bleiben wurden, die sie also in kraft und zu vollziehunge der acht erobert und eingenommen hetten." PKMS. 2, p. 762.

57. PKMS. 2, p. 778.

58. Participants in the meetingincluded the Sechser- ausschuss: Wolf von Ende, Otto von Dieskau, Georg Carlowitz, Christof Ebeleben, Andreas Pflug, Ludwig Fachs; and Moritz's court advisors: Ernst von Miltitz, christopf Carlowitz, Christopf Tuerk, Georg Komerstadt. PKMS, 2, p. 796, n . 2 .

59. Cf. above p. 121.

60. "Diewiele aber in E.F.Gn. und andern furstenthumen und landen nicht allein in zweifel gestellet, sondern auch vor gewiss und klar gehalten und ungeachtet werden will, als ob der Ksl. Mt. meinung sein sollte, unsere christliche religion zu tilgen und andere ursachen zu schein vorzuwenden, solches auch durch die predicanten hin und weider auf der kanzel in ihren predigten ausgebreitet, und das volk angereizet wirdet, mit den und dergleichen worten: das ein jeder schuldig sei, sich in diesen kriegsleuften zu erhaltunge des wort gottes gebrauchen zu lassen, gut und blut dobei zuzusetzen, und gleich zu verstehen geben.. PKMS, 2, p. 797.

61. " . . .stellen wir in E.F.Gn. bedencken, obs gut sei...ein ausschreiben gethan und ein zettel, wie das concept auch hierbei, eingelegt worde, uf dass die summa und meinung der deklaration unter die leute in E.F.Gn. landen gebracht, und die pfarrhernn dodurch mit glimpf abgehalten mochten werden, ein anders in die leute zu bilden. PKMS. 2, pp. 797-798.

62. "Des Koadjutors von Merseburg Verordnung, welcher-gesta 11 der allmechtige gott um gnade zu bitten, wie das leben und gebet sollte gerichtet sein, werde nicht ueberall befolgt. Daher sollten die adressaten ueberall die Prediger streng kontrollienren, das sie nichts anderes bein Gebet einfuehrten. Wer eine Verwarnung nicht beachte, solle dem Herzoge gemeltet werden." PKMS, 2, p. 797, n. 2.

63. "Ungewisse zeitung/ und andere reden so zu verbitterung dienen auf den predigt stuelnicht brengen." Underricht. Aiiia.

64. Selections of proceedings and testimony from the ducal hearings in 1547 have been published by Oswald A. Hecker, "Die Stimmung der Dresdner Buerger im SchmalkaIdischen Krieg, 1546-47," Dresdner Geschichts- blaetter. 19 (1910), pp. 105-124.

6 5. Warhafftige Copev einer Schrifft/ so die Ehrwirdeiaen Herrn Predicanten zu Leipzig / an Herzog Moritzen zu Sachsen gethan etc. 1547. The six pastors signing the letter were Johannes Pfeffinger, Georgius Mohr, Nicolaus Haucke, Steffanus Schonbach, Vincencius Stange, and Casper Lindener. For publishing background see Peterson, Philippist Theologians, pp. 463-464.

66. For Johannes Pfeffinger (1493-1573), see Wartenberq. Landesherrschaft. pp. 253-255. 2(>( i

67. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, p. 253.

68. "Es ist uns hierunten genanten Predicanten zu Leipzig/ von dem Herrn Burgermeister/ und dem obren Stadschreiber/ E.F.G. Mandat zugestelt worden/ des datum helt/ den 26 [sic] Augusti dieses lauffenden 46. Jares/ und darbey befohlen/ Das wir des Keysers jnn unguten nicht gedencken woelten etc. Welches wir alles jnn unterthenigkeit vernommen/ und uns jnn unserm Predigamt (on rhum zu sagen) biszanher Christlich und gebuerlich gehalten/ Wie uns denn im grund der warheit/ nicht anders mag nachgesagt werden/ und woellen uns mit Gottes huelff/ noch und bisz jnn unser gruben also halten. 11 Warhafftjqe Copev." Aiia.

69. "Dieweil nun Gottes hoecster Feindt/ inn der warheit und nach dem Euangelio Christi (das wir lehren) sich erfindet/ der Bapst zu Rom...und wider diesen Gottesfiend schreyen/ schreiben/ lehren/ beten/ und alles das jenige so wir koennen und muegen/ inn unsers lieben Herrn und Sei igmachers Christi nairten thun.** Warhafftjqe Copev. Aiib.

70. "Desgleichen muessen wir beten/ das Gott aller der jenige fuernemen/ anschlege/ huelffe/ radt und that hindern/ zustrawen und zerstoeren woellen/ die sich mit der Bapst verbinden...Es sey Keyser/ Kuening/ Fuerst oder Herr/ Und gleich so wider sie beten/ als wider den Tuercken." Warhafftjqe Copev. Aiib-Aiiia.

71. "Widerumb muessen wir Gott den Herrn trewlich und vleissing bitten/ das er die jenigen/ als Gott lob E.F.G. Item der Chrfuerst zu Sachsen/ Item der Landtgraf zu Hessen etc....(so seinem heiligen Wort und Euangelio...verteidigen...) gnediglichen woellen beschirmen und beschuetzen/ Sieg/ Trost/ Sterck und Weisheit geben wider die Feinde der Christenheit/ und des heiligen Euangelii." Warhafftjqe Copev. Aiiia*

72. "Zum Ersten/ Das er sich mit dem Bapst/ zu ausrottung der Lutheraner (denn also nennet man uns) vorpflichtet. Hessige? Blutgirige/ und unser Todtfeinde uber uns fueret/ Offentlich aus schreibet/ das die Schmeheschrifften/ und gemelde/ auch verachtung Bepstlicher und seines Concilii Autboritet/ zu straffen gesinnet. 11 Warhafftjqe Copey. Aiiia-Aiiib.

73. " Dergleichen auch die lesterlichen/ Schandt/ ind schmechschrifften/ und gemelte/ die sie im Truck/ und 207

sonst injren fuerstenthuinben/ Landen und gepieten aussgeen/....(one zweifel mainung/ den gemainen Man/ durch solche und andere weg und mittel/ wider uns zubewegen." Declaration, Biiia-Biiib.

74. "Zum Andern/ Das er die jenigen/ so Gottes Wort jnn einiger weise bekennen/ zu toedten/ und hinzurichten gestattet/ und sich desellben unschuldigen Bluts theilhafftig machet." Warhaffitae Copev. Aiiib.

75. "Zum Dritten/ Das er gebeut/ die geradt widerwertigen jrrigen Artikel unser Lehre/ anzunemen/ zu Gleuben und zu predigen/ Wie der Louoniensium schrifften und andere mehr klar ausweisen. Zum veirden/ Das er vor sich mit alien erzeygungen und haltung aller vorigen Papistischen jrrigen gebreuchen/ klerlich zuverstehen gibet/ er sey der falschen und jrrigen papistischen lehr gentzlich anhengig" Warhaff itge Copey , Aiiib.

76. "Und ist die Erklerung Key, Maie. (als solt es der unsern waren Religion nicht gelten) gar perplexe und dunkel gesetz/ Denn die papistischen...nennen jhre jrrige Religion auch Christlich/ Gottes wort... " Warhafftige Copev. Aiiiia.

77. "1st derwegen/ Gnediger fuerst und Herr/ uns nun mehr unmoeglich Gott zu bitten/ das er jnn solchem fuernemen/ handel und sachen/ Key. Oder Koen. Maie. oder jrgents einem fuersten/ Herrn/ oder andern/ glueck verleyhen woelte/ Sondern muessen da wider beten/ flehen und ruffen zu Gott dem Vater/ unsers Herrn und Seligmachers/ das er gnediglich/ als der rechte Einige Gott und Vater/ den widersachern seines Worts (was deshalben fuer einen schein dieselbigen vorwenden) steuren und wehren woellen/ Amen. Warhafftige Copev. Ai i i ib-Bia.

78. "Und stehen Gnediger Fuerst und Herr/ zwo Parteyan fuer augen/ Die eine/ hat bisanher ob dem Euangelio/ und der rechten waren lehre des Wort Gottes gehalten/ und ist der noch bekendtlich und anhengig. Die andere hat dieselbige offentlich geschendet/ und befohlen zuverfolgen/ und ist der widerwertigen und papistitichen lehre auff heutigen tag anhendig." Darzwischen ist kein mittel..." Warhafftige Copey. Bia .

79. "Darzu wir ja muessen Gott umb sieg wider den Keyser/ als widersacher der frommen Christlichen 2()X

Fuersten zuvorleihen/ beten/ flehen/ und anruffen/ Darob unsere leib unf leben/ jhm/ dem guetigen God heimstellen. 11 Warhafftige Copev, Biia.

80. MWir bitten aber E.F.G* umb Gottes unsers Herrn Christi willen/ E.F.G. woellen ob diesem unsern langen und ungezierten schreiben/ kein ungenediges missfallen tragen/ dasselbe gnediglich bewegen/ Denn wir vor Gott in unserm gewissen zeugen/ das wir solche schreiben aus keinem Privatem affectibus. noch jemandts zuvorhetzen gethan/ Sondern aus guter einfeltiger/ Christiicher/ mitleidlicher und amptsnoth..." Warhafftiqer Copev, Bii ib.

81. See Peterson, Philippist Theologians, p. 468.

82. "aus entlichen bewegenden ursachen..." source quoted in Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 210.

83. "aus lautern gehessigen affectibus reden, im ziel des amts nit bleiben..." see Erich Brandenburg, "Entstehung des landesherr1ichen Kirchenregiment im albertinischen Sachsen." Historische Vierteliahrschrift. 4 (1901), PP* 219, 236-237. Also Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst," pp. 1153-1155.

84. Brandenburg, "Enstehung," p. 236.

85. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. p. 211.

86. The Superintendents written response is published in Brandenburg, "Entstehung," pp. 236-37.

87. "Denn wir nicht von ungewisser zeitung aufm predigsteul, die zu verbitterung dienen, geredt. Soli man aber, wie in die ordnung vermeldet, die greuliche laster, und was wider gottes wort streitet und dem entgegen, strafen und zur buss vermahnen, dem volk anzeigen, was fur ein grausame sund es sei, gottes wort wissentlich verfolgen und verachten, ab exemplis scripturarum gottes zorn und strafe einbilden, und nach der heiligen merterer exempel zur bekenntniss, und, so von gott ein kreuz order verfolgung uber uns verhenget, die leut zu christlicher bestendigkeit bei seinem gottlichen wort fest zu bleiben, mit trostlichen vermahnungen sterken, und dass die arme Deutsche nacion (darin gott sein wort hat lassen leuchten) nit verlassen werde...und in uns in dieser vorstehenden not zu erinnern, eben dieser unterricht gestellt, so konnen 2 (i‘)

und rtiogen wir das nit meiden, Hussen der sachen unter augen fallen gehen, davon reden und schwarz schwarz, und weiss weiss nennen und ad nostra tempora appliciren, denn wort stehet und erstrecket sich uf alle zeit dass weder E.F.Gn. gemut noch ausgeschriebner ordnung meinung und inhalt dahin sich nit erstrecken oder gehen, dass uns und andere in E.F.Gn. furstenthum pfarrherrn und predigern gewehret oder verboten sein soil, des babsts und seines anhangs eingefuehrte irrthum zu strafen, darwider zu predigen und das volk davor zu warnen, also nit gemeint sein soil..." Brandenburg, "Entstehung," pp. 236-237.

88. "Zum andern vor alle weltliche oberkeit, Ksl. Mt. und andere, dass sie gott mit erkenntnis seines worts erleuchte und aus des babsts trug und verleitung gnediglich wolle erretten." Brandenburg, "Entstehung," p . 2 3 7.

89. "...vor gut ansehen und wissens nach gelegenheit der sachen vor gott und in unserm gewissen nit gelinder zu machen." Brandenburg, "Entstehung," p. 237.

90. Es ist aber unser fr. bitt. E.L. wollen daran sein, dass von unsern geistlichen auf dem predigstuhl die form des gebets in allermasse gehalten werde, wie E.L. die anfangs gestellt. Dann wir seind nit bedacht, in unserm lande zu gestatten, dass ein jeder nach seiner gelegenheit in dem gebet anderung mache. Wu es aber die prediger nicht also halten werden, sollen sie unser misfallen zu vermerken haben." PKMS, 2, pp. 870- 871 .

91. Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, p. 210.

92. "hauefigen geschwinden Worte..." Hecker, "Stimmung," p. 117.

93. "Die prediger haben in die leute [gejbracht, das dieser krieg zu vertilgung des evangelii angerichtet und [sie] also jenem teil mehr dan u.gnst.h. anhengig macht." Hecker, "Stimmung," p. 117.

94. "er hette allhier zu Dresden verdechtige personen nicht vermarkt, so sich vor, in und nach dieser kriegshandlung u. gnst. h. etwas zu nachteil gehandelt ader geredet, assurhalb Michel Weidelichen und Joachim schreyefolgen, desgleichen die predicanten; der pfarrer, prediger, und herr Johannes und herr Martinus hetten sich vermarken lassen, das sie mehr auf des 27u

fsinds teil dann u. gnst. h. gewesen." Hecker, 11 Stimmung , " p. 116.

95. MSie wussten die gefehrlichen leufte, darum sollten sie gute achtung auf die untertanen und ihre mitburger geben, ob sich verdechtige reden zutru[e]gen. Und hette sich u.gnst.h. versehen [gehabt], sie sollte zuvor besser achtung geben haben auf die personen, so zu meuterey und aufruhr dienten, der halben sie solchs in wirtsheusern uns sonst bestellen sollen. Dergleichen auf die predicanten achtung zu geben." Hecker, "Stiramung," p. 117.

96. "Wann gleich der Keyser, Konig und furst das evangelium verfolgen, wie sie dann tun, und Du Dich an einen andern ort zu unsern brudern und schwestern zu den Glaubensgenossen begeben wollest, so wurdest Du wohl ander[e] guter und ein besser weib, dann Du vorhin gehabt hettest, bekommen auch ander[e] Kinder." Hecker, "Stimmung," p, 112.

97. For complaints of citizens fleeing to John Frederick see PKMS, 3, p. 68.

98. From September 25, "Dann es ist wisslich und am tage, wie nicht alleine der gemeine mann, sondern auch andere zum mehren teil in dieser kriegsubunge der Ksl. M t . ufs hochst widerig und deme korfursten und landgrafen beifall geben und meher geneigt sein mochten..." PKMS. 2, p. 826.

99. From October 14, "Ich hort auch, es yst eyn klage drober im lant...dan es yst ein gemeyn geschreig..." PKMS. 2, p. 880.

100. Hecker, "Stimmung," p. 106.

101. See Hanns-Heinz Kasper, and Eberhard Waechtler, Hrsg. Geschichte der Bergstadt Freiberg (Weimar: H erman Boehlaus, 1986), pp. 110-111; see also Hecker, "Stimmung," p. 106, n. 2.

102. PKMS, 2, p. 956; see p. 218, n. 1, above.

103. Hortleder, p. 258; "Zerschmetter den Kopff der Fuersten die uns Feindt sind." C H A P T E R VI

RENDERING TO CAESAR: JUSTIFICATION FOR INVASION

Then if we have received so many assurances from His Majesty that we have nothing to fear in matters concerning God and religion, and that we are unhindered by His Majesty to give to God what is God's, so are we bound by truth and good conscience to give to the emperor fas Christ our savior commanded) also what is the emperor's, just as our princely duty requires.

Moritz of Saxony, October 15461

Charles' mandate, coupled with public unrest, put

Moritz and his advisors between the Scylla of imperial duty, and the Charybdis of confessional integrity. The emperor's advance against John Frederick forced the committee to reconsider defensive treaty obligations with the elector, specifically the Oschatz agreement of

1542.: If indeed Charles sought to destroy the faith then Moritz would be obligated to "place the eternal before the temporal," and take up arms in defense.1

But herein lay the rub: since the emperor publicly stated that no attack would be made on religion, nothing in the agreement obligated Moritz to assist his cousin.

271 272

By accepting Charles' word on the matter, Moritz was legally bound to execute the imperial ban. His delay in enforcing the imperial mandate shortened the tempers of both Charles and Ferdinand. The dilemma was how to inform the elector of its implementation without bringing undue hardship on both territories. How, under the auspices of a sworn enemy, was Moritz to occupy his cousin's land without such action reckoned as hostile aggression? It was of the "highest necessity" that Moritz "conduct himself in a proper manner, so as not to bring trouble upon himself or his land."4 The solution tendered in the last days of August in Freiberg charted the political course for the late October invasion of Ernestine Saxony. In what might be termed the "foreign hands" policy, Albertine councilors suggested that in case of an imperial invasion, Moritz be prepared to invest

Ernestine possessions. John Frederick would be informed that such action stemmed not from Moritz's own person, but rather from the power of the ban, and his involvement sought only to deter the fall of Ernestine land into foreign hands. Failure to act would not only risk the loss of the elector's land, but also damage

Moritz's own interests. Conversely, Albertine confiscation assured its preservation for the Wettin 273 family.5 All in all, the new circumstances would necessitate recalling the Albertine estates in order to gain money and troops.6

Meanwhile, Moritz paid close attention to

Ferdinand's military preparations, and kept an eye southward to events along the Danube. It was imperative to come to terms with the king, not only regarding the delay in executing the ban, but also with military preparations in case of a Schmalkaldic victory. Moritz ordered George Carlowitz, who had left the comforts of retirement, and Komerstadt to Prague to negotiate a mutual protection treaty, instructing them to lay out the groundwork for an agreement, but to inform the king that no final decision could be reached until their prince could meet with his estates.7

Ferdinand would have none of it. As the talks opened on September 6, the king demanded Moritz execute the ban without delay. The king sought a direct answer as to whether Moritz would enforce the Ban or not. If he questioned his capacity to invade he could be assured of the King's support.8 Yet the bottom line remained that if Moritz wanted the territory, he would have to enforce the imperial edict himself.9 Tired of Albertine delaying tactics, Ferdinand insisted that Moritz decide by September 12 whether he would move 274 against Ernestine Saxony. When the emissaries protested, Ferdinand exploded, "You want to delay?

Such is a dangerous waste of time, for the rain and the Winter are approaching, a day is now a month, and a month a year!"10

Upon the advisors return, Moritz immediately informed the king that a decision by September 12 was impossible since support from his estates would be needed for such an undertaking.11 Yet where Ferdinand failed with words, he succeeded with saber rattling. Military movements in Bohemia initiated a chain of events which eventually brought Moritz to the table. Earlier in the summer Charles had pressed his brother to raise troops for the purpose of intimidation and eventual invasion.12 Despite a high degree of sympathy for John Frederick within the Utraquist community, Ferdinand circulated the imperial ban and assured them of the purely constitutional intention of pacifying rebellion. While couching the mobilization in terms of defending the borders, the king raised nearly 24,000 men from the Bohemian estates.11 In mid-September reports of troop movements in northern Bohemia filtered into Saxony. Though informing the Ernestine's at Weimar that the mustering was for defensive purposes alone,M Dresden's knowledge 275

of Ferdinand's prior offer of assisting in an invasion carried a greater threat. The king lost no time in exploiting the situation. As he moved his troops into the vicinity of Cadan, he sent Hans Hofmann to Moritz with yet another letter from Charles, demanding the immediate enforcement of the edict, together with his own request that Moritz come to Prague, where a final plan and agreement could be worked out.1* The hastily assembled Committee of Six advised

Moritz that any definitive action regarding the ban would need concurrence of the estates, for alienation of that body risked loss of needed taxes and assistance."1 Further, since it was certain that not only the "common man," but a majority rzum mehren teill of others bore great animosity to the emperor and favored the elector and landgrave,11 they thought it prudent for him to remain neutral and make no final commitment to the emperor or king.1® With regard to the ban, Moritz should promise that he would implement it at the appropriate time.19 Despite their inclination toward non-intervention, serious consideration had to be given to Charles' letter at hand. In repeating his order for Moritz to fulfill his sworn duty and enforce the ban. 276 circumstances in Bohemia now gave him the leverage of an immediate threat.

We have no doubt...that you will pursue the previous agreements... and not lack in doing your share and lose the opportunity before you now; especially in consideration that our brother shall not allow any hinderance on his part, and is already prepared to execute the task.... again, our brother is prepared and on his way...and nothing will hinder him.20 The military capacity for imminent aggression against John Frederick now camped near the border. With these circumstances thrust before them, the Albertine councilors concluded that if Ferdinand attacked then Moritz should initiate the "foreign hands" policy, and invest Ernestine Saxony.21 Unfortunately the record does not contain Hofmann's response to the Albertine position. Nevertheless it appears that he convinced Dresden of

Ferdinand's intention to attack whether or not he had

Albertine assistance.22 Such adamant posturing by the

Hapsburgs, together with the presence of Bohemian soldiers, ostensibly pointed to impending attack. Sensing the seriousness of the situation, Moritz issued a call for his estates to gather at Freiberg on October 8, then he gathered his advisors and quickly rode to Prague for negotiations with Ferdinand.21 The talks which led to Moritz's final decision to invade took place during the first five days of 277

October. Rehashing the well-worn arguments of the past weeks, the king pushed for the execution of the Ban and emphasized the only issues to be considered would be

the logistics of the military action.3^ Moritz countered that since the elector had not yet been

humbled, the possibility of his swift return with a

powerful army raised doubts as to the Albertine's capability to resist. Further, consideration had to be given to the common 11 landvolk" who favor the elector,

including Moritz's own subjects!”

Here again we see Moritz, as he did earlier at

Regensburg, direct attention to factors that stood beyond his control. Whereas in Regensburg he spoke of the confessional disposition of his subjects, he now spoke of their attachment to John Frederick. The confessional undertones of the people's loyalty was

clear to the prince, and had been the source of his

frustration with the Albertine clergy. Having been

unable to successfully implement an effective

propaganda campaign through the agency of his church,

Moritz now confronted a formidable obstacle in his own land. He had no qualms about taking the land, he felt he had sufficient legal and confessional grounds to do so. His difficulty lay in keeping what he took. 278

Pleading inability to act apart from his estates,

he pushed for time by asserting that if it were still possible to avoid the war through peaceful negotiations, he would spare no effort in working toward that end.26 The king, however, emphatically rejected any notions of peace and pushed for Moritz to fulfill the obligations of the Regensburg treaty, which meant providing necessary means and assistance in executing the ban.27

On October 2, in hopes of breaking the stalemate, the parties exchanged treaty proposals. In response to an Albertine draft which called simply for defensive measures in case of a Schmalkaldic attack,28 the

Bohemians countered with a purely offensive treaty stating times, targets, and troop strengths.29

Ferdinand's proposal, back with threats and a sizable force at the border, convinced the Dresden court to throw in their hand. After much discussion over the next two days, the Albertines offered a plan calling for Moritz to invest electoral possessions six days after Ferdinand's crossing of the borders. The king would move on electoral territory held in fief to

Bohemia, while Moritz took the imperial fiefs and bishoprics.’0 Both agreed to assist the other in time 279 of need, and no portion of the treaty could be changed without the permission of the other.31 What prompted the Albertines to finally capitulate and commit to the invasion? Reports from an Ernestine spy related that Moritz's advisors aggressively worked to overcome their prince's hesitations for invasion, though at the time of receiving the information it was not yet clear which direction Moritz would turn.32

Evidently the advisors also sought promises from Charles regarding reception of John Frederick's forfeited electoral dignity.33 The October 4 proposal stated that "since the King would not desist from the execution of the ban, and was bent on a violent assault of electoral land," Moritz would invade within approximately six days.M With the wording of the

Albertine proposal, together with the later statements of justification, it would appear that between October 2 and 4, the court decided to act on the basis of

Ferdinand's stated intentions, and Moritz finally accepted the arguments for the "foreign hands" policy. While the Albertine entourage left to join with their estates at Freiberg, the king quickly sent Charles a draft of the treaty. The emperor in turn hastily wrote Moritz telling him to sign the treaty and to fulfill his promises as a prince of the Reich. 2 8 0

Attached to Charles’ imperial blessing, was a less than subtle warning to "quickly validate the agreement since Ferdinand would not hesitate, and in fact was already on the way."35 Moritz opened the Freiberg Diet on October 8 by reminding the gathering of their earlier decisions at Chemnitz.3* Informing the estates that despite his following through with their prior requests for imperial assurances for the faith and negotiations between the league and emperor, it appeared that an impasse existed between the antagonists. With the breakdown of talks and resulting imperial condemnation of the rebels came the eventual demand from Charles for Albertine execution of the Ban. Now Bohemian troops stood in readiness to invade Saxon lands for the purpose of punishing John Frederick.

It is clear that the Bohemian crown and its allies have made impressive preparations and are in fact already on the way. Their intention is to attack our electoral cousin's land. Should all of our descendents, including the entire house of Saxony come under foreign hands, that would inflict upon us the utmost anguish.31 Faced with a difficult decision regarding obedience to the emperor and their relationship to their relatives and co-religionists, after much deliberation the estates aligned themselves with their princes' "foreign hands" policy. The recess of October 281

11, instructed Moritz, after gaining further assurances of Charles* benign intentions toward the faith, not to attempt to resist the imperial action. Since the risk

of Saxon lands appeared valid, the estates decided to issue a letter to the elector asking that in case of foreign invasion, he order his subjects to surrender themselves to Moritz's protection.M Acquiescence of the Albertine estates brought to full circle the preliminary steps taken at Prague. While the Dresden court sent Diskau, Fachs, and the younger Carlowitz to Prague to set detailed parameters to their union with Ferdinand, the estates communicated their intent as tactfully as possible to the elector and landgrave. Cautiously woven into both letters was the sensitive matter of confessional integrity, making it ever more apparent that Moritz's political maneuvers cannot be fully grasped apart from his perception of popular confessional loyalty among his subjects.

Negotiations at Prague revealed the deep concern over the confessional question. In addition to strategy and tactics of the campaign, along with details concerning mutual defense, expenditures and eventual treaties, Moritz demanded that Ferdinand undertake no innovations of religion in the territories invested. Significantly, the final details of the 282

military treaty for invasion embodied the consistent demands made initially at Regensburg, namely, that the religious confession of the German lands could not be altered. In fact the demand was technically expanded, in that at Regensburg assurances were granted for Albertine domains, whereas now on the eve of invasion, Moritz sought protection for confiscated Ernestine territory. What the emperor has promised in principle - that the war did not concern religion - Moritz demanded in contractual treaty.

We ask also concerning the land and cities which His Majesty will invest according to the agreements at Prague, that the subjects be graciously allowed to remain in the religion they now practice, and with the Word of God, and that nothing will be undertaken until a general Christian agreement in which Moritz participates.* Emerging from these October negotiations was the

consistent Albertine push for religious guarantees. The estates' letter to the elector contained the assurance that religion would not be touched,40 and

Moritz's personal message to the landgrave adamantly reasserted his faithfulness, stating that "no power could draw him away from the Christian religion in which he now stood."41 Dresden's consistent reiteration of confessional

loyalty bears little resemblance to any calculated manipulation of a passive organization. Politics were 283

certainly at hand, and momentous issues of territorial control and imperial prestige were at stake. To ignore Moritz1s obvious opportunism in this regard would be

naive. However, what must not be overlooked is the intrinsic import of an expression of confessional

loyalty by the Albertines as a necessary support for

their political power play.

Moritz's formal declaration to the elector on October 27 crystallized the results of the long summer of diplomacy. Despite the courteous tone, Moritz's

failure to utilize John Frederick's electoral title, addressing him rather as "highborn prince," revealed the profound ramifications of accepting the authority of the imperial ban. John Frederick could be considered nothing less than an imperial outlaw, and though this was not ostensibly stated, the Albertine's

foreign hands policy presupposed the forfeiture of territory. Moritz sought to avoid the threat to the whole house of Saxony arising from any occupation by foreign troops. Albertine assistance in executing the ban, Moritz assured John Frederick, stemmed from their acceptance of imperial assurances that "our Christian religion, which we would never allow to be usurped by force, would not be uprooted." Here on the eve of the

Bohemian invasion, and with the die cast for the 284

Albertine investment of Ernestine territory, Moritz clearly revealed that the fulcrum for his political policy was the official acceptance of Charles' promises for confessional stability.

You no doubt learned from our estates1 letter of October 11 that we cannot successfully resist an attack from Bohemia by the emperor and king, and the harsh penalty for ignoring the imperial mandate would bring a crushing result to the whole house of Saxony if our interconnected lands were occupied by foreign soldiers. Since we have received assurances from the emperor that the faith - which we would never let be taken away by force - shall not be uprooted, we have in counsel with our estates decided in the best interests of our common house to invest your land, and as far as possible prevent it from coming under foreign hands .43 Albertine opportunism in the affair is undeniable.

Moritz's councilors had already lobbied hard for the bestowal of electoral rights on their prince.45 Within the context of the internecine struggle between the

Wettin houses, Moritz wouldn't frown on the humiliation of John Frederick. The imperial ban provided the means to further long-standing Albertine interests. Yet accenting Albertine opportunism risks overlooking that

Moritz never lost sight of protecting and maintaining the confessional status quo in his territory, and garnering assurances in this matter from Charles shaped his policy. Nowhere can we find Moritz taking an apathetic view of the Lutheran church, either within his territory or John Frederick's. On the contrary, 285 the prince seemed intent on convincing his co religionists that measures would be taken to preserve confessional integrity.

Constitutionally Moritz could argue for assisting Ferdinand in executing the ban, and yet at the same time press his loyalty to Lutheran teaching and the preservation of the church. On this legal basis Moritz argued that he only rendered to Caesar that which was Caesar's, and to God that which was God's. Yet, despite these diplomatic and private assurances, the neuralgic issue of religion which lay at the very heart of the Schmalkaldic resistance eventually forced the Albertine court to deal with the matter in a public manner.

Elisabeth of Rochlitz provided a prelude to the accusations which would rain down on Moritz. On learning of the his decisions at Freiberg, Elisabeth issued a series of stinging letters to the prince, accusing him of treachery to Philip, and expressing the wish that whoever counseled him in such actions be promptly hung! She pleaded with him to "consider his German blood, his father and mother, and not to unite with the devil."45 Amid the insinuations of traitorous intent toward blood and nation, Elisabeth spoke of complaints rising throughout the land concerning 286

Moritz's union with Ferdinand. The prince's unwillingness to dutifully resist fueled a "general clamor. ',46 If Elisabeth's verbal assaults reflected the antagonism of a portion of the nobility, then the October 23 letter from Bishop Anhalt exemplified the nervous clergy, together with the period's propensity for exaggerated rumor. The bishop sought a response from the prince regarding circulating rumors that Moritz intended to invest the Electoral Circle and raze Wittenberg. George could not believe that Moritz would harm the very city in which God had let the divine light shine forth.47 Despite Moritz' hasty response that he certainly had never considered such an undertaking, the fact that such a rumor circulated could only reaffirm his tenuous political footing. Relations with his clergy throughout the summer impressed upon Moritz the destabilizing effect of the negative preaching. To this point, at least on the public level, the Albertine court had remained relatively quiet. The intense search for neutrality had prompted reticence. But now, having failed to defuse the matter through ecclesiastical and court channels, it became incumbent to issue a thorough public defense of their actions. 287

Moritz' Defense Our, By the Grace of God Moritz of saxony. Landgrave of Thuringia, and Margrave pf Meissen, Declaration, How We Are Inclined to the Christian Religion. And The Reasons We Could Not Engage the Imperial Maiestv. Hor Were Able to Avoid Investing Our Cousin's Lands.4* issued on October 27, four days after the first Bohemian troops crossed into Ernestine land, represented Moritz's public legitimation.'19 The pamphlet's argument casts light in two directions; retrospectively on Moritz's own perception of his reign prior to the war, and conversely, a forthright legitimation for his actions in the coming months. The intensity of the defense gives the work a somewhat repetitive character, thus the argument is better analyzed thematically rather then sequentially. The most prominent and often repeated theme was

Moritz's faithfulness in word and deed to the Augsburg Confession. With that claim however, he then needed to defend both his previous neutrality and present military mobilization. This defense forced him to articulate his responsibilities to the emperor, revealing his understanding of the nature of the 288 conflict, and ultimately his precise purpose in occupying John Frederick's territory.

Moritz had known for months that rumors circulated alleging his subservience to the pope and covert Catholicism.50 His dealings throughout summer with the leaders of the league, his family, and his own clergy obviously impressed upon him that any appeal to the public mustreflect confessional loyalty on his part. Repudiating the published rumors that he had forsaken his Christian religion and the true doctrine of God's

Word, "as confessed in the Augsburg Confession," Moritz argued that "that very Word had been, and with

God's help, would always be preached and taught by

Christian preachers in his land."51 He claimed not to understand why some would castigate him before God with groundless lies when it was clear to all that within his territories he had supported Christian doctrine, the Word of God, and the holy sacrament as instituted by Christ our Savior.52

He reiterated throughout his insistence on faithful administration of the sacraments and legitimate Christian ceremonies,53 along with providing aid and protection for the preachers in their duties of proclaiming the Word of God in its purity, "without the 2 8 9

intermingling of human teachings and vain

pronouncements."M In a confession that could have come from the lips

of Melanchthon himself, Moritz stated that,

he knew of no greater obligation before God than to spread throughout the land the divine truth, the holy word found in the Old and New Testaments, and manifested through the mouths of God's holy prophets, Apostles and evangelists, indeed, God's only begotten son, the only mediator and redeemer, Jesus Christ-55 To this end, he facilitated the spreading of the word through aiding and protecting his pastors.46 Had he not endeavored to follow his late father's reform by reissuing Henry's church order, together with subsidizing the publication of evangelical books?

Enforcement of the "Heinrichsaqende" assured the

"praiseworthy and honorable performance of Christian ceremonies and the blessed sacrament throughout the

land,"47 while the utilization of confiscated church property provided for the building schools and stipends,58 Thus any "unpartisan observer must admit the groundlessness of accusations of apostasy."59 He refered to the recent provincial diets at Chemnitz and Freiberg, where clear and open declarations were made concerning his faithfulness to

"our true Christian religion in which we have by God's grace stood constant, and by that same divine grace 2 W will remain until death.60 He claimed all such evidence

proved that those accusing him of returning to the papacy were lying. It was clear to Moritz that the reason for the false rumors lay with his accusers seeking grounds for why he would not take arms against "our God-ordained authority," the emperor.61 Such people were convinced that the emperor "sought the destruction of our true Christian religion, and the establishment of a spurious

Council, with the pope and his cohorts as final arbiters.Since other princes and estates chose to take arms in defense, Moritz's refusal incurred accusations of apostasy. Belief that the emperor sought to uproot the faith led to the propagation of "shameful and abusive poetry, rhymes, and songs against his majesty." This material which had been brought into Moritz's territory and imparted to his subjects transgressed the scriptural admonition, "speak not evil of your ruler."63

Vehemently rejecting the accusation that he had abandoned the faith by not taking up arms against Charles,64 Moritz asserted that his duty as a Christian prince precluded resistance since "as we are obligated to give God what is God's, so also the divine truth teaches us to render to the emperor that which is the 291

emperor's."64 Being mindful of the theologian's counsels of the previous years regarding resistance, he claimed that,

in our communications to our friends, we expressed our willingness to "place the eternal before the temporal" if convinced of the emperor's inclination to suppress the faith with the sword.66 Moritz assured the readers that careful consideration had been given to this issue both by himself and the provincial diet. The estates had obtained promises that no harm would come to their religion and the Word of God, and that Charles sought a peaceful and friendly solution to the religious division through just and legal channels.67 The pamphlet rejected earlier accusations that when Charles promised the continuance of "true religion," he in fact meant Catholicism.68 Moritz adamantly asserted that there was no misunderstanding here, for His Majesty knew well

in what religion we and our estates stand, and His Majesty knows we confessed, and continue to confess, that we and our estates adhere to the Augsburg Confession...so there can be no misunderstanding.69 Evidence of Charles demeanor in matters of religion rested not only in his multiple public pronouncements, but also in the fact that many princes, knights, and common soldiers were in the emperor's 292

camp, who, no less than the opponents of Charles, were followers of the Augsburg Confession.

They openly confess their faith, hear evangelical preaching, and celebrate the sacrament according to the institution of Christ. These same princes and soldiers, being with the emperor on a daily basis, would surely know if Charles intended harm, and would certainly not lend assistance if such were the case.70 Here then is found the razor's edge for dividing Moritz from his co-religionists. In principle Moritz worked from the same position as the Wittenberg theologians, whose legitimation for resistance followed hard on the condition that Hif it be certain that the emperor was attacking the estates on account of religion.'171 The Albertine court simply argued that no such certainty existed. Lacking this basic premise all arguments for resistance crumbled. What then, in light of accepting Charles assurances, was Moritz’s obligation? He was, as a dutiful Christian prince, obligated to "give to God that which is God’s," yet must, "as Christ our savior had commanded, give to the emperor what is the emperor's"72 Moritz cloaked himself not only as a diligent protector of God’s word, but also as a prince of the empire victimized by larger circumstances. Pleading the inevitability of a Hapsburg invasion, he protested his earthly duty to protect not only his own land, but 293 also the larger Wettin inheritance. The imperial mandate to execute the ban issued by Charles in August,71 had carried the threat if Moritz did not look to his own interests, or undertake measures to secure his cousin's territory, foreign troops would confiscate the land, with territorial rights falling to those who conquered. Hence, neutrality risked the loss not only of Ernestine possessions, but also his own hereditary privileges. After careful consideration it was decided by the Albertine estates that neither legal justification nor military strength allowed military confrontation with King Ferdinand.75 Moritz's assistance to Ferdinand sought protection not only for himself, but for John Frederick's as well. Thus emerged his "foreign hands policy," a policy deemed defensive, yet one which eventually sparked his reputation as an ambitious Machiavellian, earning him the title of "Judas of Meissen."76

Dresden's grave concern should any lands of the

Saxon house be lost to "foreign hands" [frembde hendel cannot be considered a hollow fear.77 The Wurzen incident of 1542 showed how the intermingled character of Ernestine and Albertine lands eliminated the necessity of a massive invasion to destabilize the political and economic balance of either territory. 294

The proximity of Ferdinand to Wettin Erzgebirge possessions offered the sobering possibility that even a limited, well-chosen seizure carried the potential to seriously damage dynastic interests.7* With resistance to Charles legally and military ruled out, the threat of invasion forced intervention so as to protect the land and people from subjection to a foreign power. Be assured, Moritz argued, that it was not his intention by uniting with Ferdinand to simply conquer his cousin's territory for himself, rather, it was to keep the potentially confiscated possessions within the Saxon House. Moritz did not skirt the fact that his own interests were at stake, yet from the Albertine court's perspective, to resist Charles meant military suicide in the service of unwarranted rebellion against God-ordained authority.79 Opportunistic? Certainly so. Yet the opportunities emerged from contingent circumstances beyond the control of the Albertine prince. The political prowess of the Albertine court cannot be found in blatant manipulation of circumstances, but rather in the cautious implementation of both confessional and constitutional factors to legitimize their act. The very existence and language of Moritz’s Erklerunae. belies a necessity to articulate his 295

political posture in a confessional manner, evidently

to calm a potentially damaging ecclesiastical situation

which had spread into the broader public arena. In sum, Moritz's published defense was a slanted,

self-serving piece of propaganda. But what political document is not? There is little question that despite

the highly confessional tone, this was a political document. Presenting himself as a peace-seeking prince

of the empire, Moritz claimed his Christian duty obligated him to render to God that which was God’s and to the emperor that which was the emperor's. Constitutionally, the imperial ban rendered John Frederick's dignity null and void, together with all

previous treaties and mutual territorial rights with

Moritz. Thus legally Moritz was well within his

imperial rights and duties.

Yet here is where Moritz appears to have experienced the greatest frustration. Although having both constitutional and confessional legitimation he collided with the confessional constraints of his subjects, particularly the clergy. Despite a concerted effort on his part he failed to turn the t'de of the confessional rhetoric, and came under attack from his own citizens. 2 9 6

The complexity of the issue of obedience to

secular authority and expression of confessional loyalty found illustration in a fascinating three part pamphlet which appeared shortly after Moritz* military intervention. The joining of three distinct works into one piece of propaganda serves to summarize Albertine public posturing at the outset of conflict in Saxony.*0 The first section contained, A New Hvmn to Honor

His Maiestv. The Roman Emperor Charles V . . in which homage was rendered to Charles' God-ordained authority, and his responsibility to maintain order. No power on earth stands firm who does not allow himself to be ruled and led by God; For God is in all ways the Lord, to who praise and honor is owed forever; to who I give myself while I live under his protection; In repelling the enemy God himself contends for me.

All kingdoms and princedoms, which God has given me, I command constantly under his protection, let me not waver, though the enemy resists; Yet God knows well, and he shall soon destroy through his justice, those living in disobedience. Justly will I bear the sword of the Lord on this earth, not drawing it with out reason, then, only to punish evil people...*1

As a hymn to imperial glory and authority this brief work does not particularly stand out. It 297

contained the themes Charles had repeated throughout

the previous summer, namely, the enemy's resistance embodied unjust disobedience against his divine right, and in repelling them he did his Christian duty. However it was in the two works attached to this encomium where the significance of the pamphlet emerged.

The second part to this publication was Luther's famous 1531 letter to Elector John in which the reformer decried resistance against authority.Here lay an obvious attempt to utilize the reformer's spiritual authority against the his opponents. Yet it was with the final segment of the pamphlet that the praise of imperial authority, together with Luther's call to radical obedience came full circle.

Under the brief title, A Hew Hvmn. a call for Christian obedience and loyalty to the Augsburg Confession was given in Moritz's name.*1

Kill as you will O angry world, in God have I placed my trust, who shall firmly keep me,*... But now it seems to be, that everyone desires to be his own lord, haughty and proud; they devise many slanderous books and hymns, each wanting to mock authority, flattering the common man. Yet passionately I reject that, because God calls for fear and honor at all times to authority; 298

"give to God what is due God, but also to emperor was belongs to him," this Christ himself taught us.

0 God, bestow on me your grace, allow me to walk the righteous way! as long as you defend my life, 1 will faithfully confess your word, as it stands in the Confession delivered at Augsburg.*4

Coupled with his lengthy defense and the personal communications to his co-religionists, the utterances made here in Moritz's name reveal a determined effort on the part of the Dresden court to express confessional loyalty. Here the prince made clear his Lutheran identity with a direct reference to the Augsburg Confession, and the context of his pronouncement, attached to Charles secular authority and Luther's spiritual authority, make it clear that he

sought to legitmize his political act in decidedly Lutheran terms.

Telling, however, was the reference to the

criticism aimed at him by those who would mock authority through the agency of slanderous books and hymns. His complaint concerning those who desired to be their own lord echoed the reason why he refused to allow the pastors to change the mandated prayer to their own liking.

It may perhaps be an overstatement to say that

Moritz was desperate in attempting to gain a 299 sympathetic confessional ear. One senses more anger than desperation. But regardless of the degree of either of these emotions, it is accurate to say that he was actively concerned not to alienate his subjects any further, and this concern clearly shaped his policies during this period. In sum, however much modern Reformation scholars impose an interpretive agenda on this period which isolates religion from politics and society, and treats it as secondary or epiphenominal, on the eve of the schmalkaldic War the Dresden court had no such luxury. ®s 30(J

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. "Denn do wir von jrer Haiestat so viel erklerunge jres gemuets haben/ das wir uns in Gottes und unser Religion sache nicht zubefahren haben/ und das wir von jrer Haiestat ungehindert/ Gotte geben moegen was Gottes ist/ So Koennen wir in warheit mit guten gewissen unf fuge/ nicht fuer uber/ wir muessen dem Kayser (wie Christus unser Heiland geheissen und geb.'ten hat) auch geben was des Kaysers ist/ Und wie uns unser Lehnspf1icht/ die wir jrer Haiestat geschworen haben/ weisen." Erklerunge. Ciib.

2- PKMS, 2, p. 799. See also Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst," pp. 1148-1149.

3. "Do nuhe die Ksl. Mt. I. Kf. unf F. Gn. der religion uberzoge und dieselbige tilgen wollte, so konnten E.F.Gn. nicht voruber, sie mussten das ewige derae zeitlichen vorsetzen.. PKMS. 2, p. 799.

4. "Und ist die hochste notdurft, dass E.F.Gn. heirin gute mass halten, domit dodurch E.F.Gn. selbst und deise lanse nicht in beschwerunge gefuhrt werden." PKMS. 2, p. 800.

5. "...so dunket uns ratsam sein, do sich der Ksl. oder kriegsvolk oder sonst jemands anders uf I Mt. befehl in anzog begebe wider die lande, doran E.F.Gn. interesse haben, und E.F.Gn. freunde oder Ihre landschaft selbst weren nicht also stark oder gefasst, solche gewalt abzuwenden, und dieweile E.F.Gn. aus kraft des ksl. mandats ahne nachteil E.F.Gn. lande darzu nicht kommen konnen, ihnen beistand zu leisten. dass E.F.Gn. alsodann Ihren vettern solchs liessen vermelden und dobei des ksl. mandats abschrift zuschicken, mit vermeldungen, dass E.F.Gn. am liebsten gesehen, I. Kf. und F.Gn. hetten die gutliche handlunge hiebevorn uf treumeiniichs fr. suchen eingereumt und fr. gefolgt; und wiewohl E.F.Gn. I.Kf. und F.Gn. Ihre lande am liebsten gonnten, dieselben auch zu E.F.Gn. zu brengen nie begehret hetten, dieweile aber die sache nu so weit gereicht, das die lande in fremde hende gewendet und vergewaltigt, und nicht allein sie davon kommen, sondern auch E.F. Gn. (nicht als vor E.F.Gn. eigene person, sondern aus kraft des ksl. geswinden MU

mandats und uf dass E.F.Gn. selbst und Ihre eigene land und leute nicht infahr und verderben gesatzt) nicht umgehen, die wege vorzunehmen und zu versuchen, ob gott genade wollt geben, dass dieselben lande durch E.F.Gn. bei dem stamm erhalten werden mochten." PKMS, 2, pp. 800-801.

6. PKMS. 2, p . 802.

7* PKMS, 2, p. 808, n. 3.

8. "Und were die Kgl. Mt. wohl geneigt, zu thun, was das kai'aoliche mandat mitbrechte. Weil aber die Ksl. M t . mit hz. Moritzen gehandelt und sich erkleret, was vir genade Ksl. M t . hz. Moritzen wolle erzeigen, musste sich S.F.Gn. erkleren, ob S.F.Gn. darzu stark genyg weren, oder ob sie hulfe bedurfen wurden, was S. F. G n . 1. Mt. dagegen zu thun erbotig?" PKMS, 2, 813; see also Brandenburg, Moritz, pp. 475-476; also Issleib, "evange 1 ischer Fuerst, 11 pp. 1154-1155.

9. "Wollw u.gn. herr allein haben, musste S.F.Gn. allein exequiren." PKMS, 2, p. 814.

10. "Darauf der konig personlich geantwurt" ' Ihr wollet temporiren! Das ist zeit verlegen, sulichs ist schedlich und gehet der regen und winter herbei; ist itzo ein tag ein monat, ein monat ein jahr etc.*" PKMS. 2, p. 816.

11. PKMS. 2, 816-817.

12. Brandenburg, Moritz. pp. 477-478.

13. Paula Sutter Fichtner, "When Brother's Agree: Bohemia, the Habsburgs, and the Schmalkaldic Wars, 1546-1547," Austrian History Yearbook 11 (1975), pp. 69-70.

14. PKMS, 2, p. 824.

15. Charles* letter in PKMS, pp. 822-823. See also Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 478; and Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst, pp. 1156-1157.

16. "Und stunde doruf, wo sich E.F.Gn. darein lassen, dass E.F.Gn. eine unwillige landschaft machen und bei derselben zu diesen sachen, darzu man geld und ihrer, oder hulfe haben und erhalten mochten." PKMS, 2, p. 826. i(l2

17. "Dann es ist wisslich und am tage, wie nicht alliene der gemeine mann, sondern auch andere zum mehren teile in dieser kriegsubunge der Ksl. Mt. ufs hochst widerig und deme korforsten und landgrafen beifall geben und meher geneigt sein mochten..." PKMS. 2 , p . 82 6.

18. "Soviel die sache an ihr selbst antrifft und was E.F.Gn. dorinne zu rathen, bedenken wir, dieweile E.F. Gn. freihe steht und sich gegen der ksl. und Kgl. Mt. bisher noch nichts endlichs verpf1icht..." PKMS. 2, p. 827 .

19. PKMS. 2 , 828.

20. "Nun stellen wir in keinen zweifel, D.L. werde derselben jungsten anzeigung und zuembietung, so, als obstehet, durch den von Granvellen an uns gelangt, und der vorigen handlung und D.L. verstrostung in allweg nachsetzen, und Ihres teils keinen mangel erscheinen noch diese jetzig gelegenheit verlaufen lassen, furnehmlich in betrachtung, dass unser bruder seines teils auch nichts erwinden lassen, und allbereit, wie wir bericht werden, mit seiner rustung allerding gefasst ist, die execution fur S.L. teil fuzunehmen...Herwiederum wirdet unser bruder (dieweil S.L. numals, wie vorstehet, allerding gefasst und im anzug ist und mit aller seiner rustung auf St. Michelstag schieristkunftig zu Caden einkommen wirdet) seines teils ohne alien zweifel nichts erwinden lassen." PKMS, 2, pp. 823-824.

21. "Wann die Ksl. oder Kgl. Mt . ein kriegsvolk uf des korfurst lande schickten, die einzunehmen, und der korfurst oder landgraf vermochten die nicht zu retten, das also augenscheinlich worde, dass das vorhanden were, dass die lande in fremde hende kommen sollten, uf den fall were zu raten, dass E.F.Gn. vorkemen; so worden die lande sich ahne widerstand an E.F.Gn. zu ihrer errettunge ergeben, trost, hulf und das vertrauen zu E.F.Gn. haben, die worden sie vor dem fremden kriegsvolke schutzen und retten." PKMS, 2, p. 828.

22. Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 479.

23. Brandenburg, Moritz. p. 479.

24. PKMS, 2, pp. 831-832. 3 <13

25. "Und hange an ihme das gemeine landvolk nicht alleine seins, sondern auch hz. Moritzen landes." PKMS. 2, p . 832.

26. PKMS. 2, p . 832.

27. Though Moritz legitimately denied that the treaty called for such specific measures, quite frankly the matter at hand no longer centered on past words, but rather on present troops mustering near the border of hereditary Saxon territory. This fact appears to have given sufficient substantiation to Ferdinand's adamant assertions of an inevitable attack, convincing the Albertines that Ferdinand would no longer delay. For Ferdinand's appeal to Regensburg see PKMS. 2, p. 833. Komerstadt argued the absence of such specifics, to which Ferdinand's advisor Hans Hofmann concurred. PKMS , 2 , p . 83 3.

28 . PKMS , 2 , pp. 837-838.

29 . PKMS . 2 , pp. 838-84 1 ,

30. Herein lay the key legal precedent for Moritz's actions. Ancient Germanic custom dating back to the infeudation practices of Frederick Barbarossa and codied two centuries later in the Golden Bull of 1356, held that qualifications as an imperial prince, together with a vote in the imperial diet rested in holding certain territories in fief to the German king. Portions of John Frederick’s territory were never considered his personal possessions, but were rather imperial possesions legally bound over to his care and authority. The ban essentially striped John Frederick of his imperial rights, hence Charles was well within his rights to appoint a valid imperial prince to take feudal rights. For legal context see Paula Sutter Fichtner, Protestantism and Primogeniture in Early Modern Germany, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 8-9.

31. PKMS. 2, pp. 841-842.

32. This bit of counter-intelligence was among the papers confiscated during the Albertine takeover in 1547. The spy worked for Johann Wilhelm and had a source within Albertine camp. The informant, who sought to portray Moritz in favorable light, saw the situation deteriorating for the elector [die sachen sehen ihn ganz ubel an] and gave the impression that .104

his prince was being manipulated by his advisors. "...derselbige gute freund von hz. Moritz personlich verstanden hat diese wort: 'Wir vermerken, dass der konig ist im furhaben wider unsern vettern, den kurfursten, mit den Beheim zu uberziehen, wir werden aber gleichwohl bericht, als sollten sichs die Beheim wegern und ausem lande nicht ziehen wollen; darum seind wir der hoffnung es werde ihm feirl.' Gleichwohl, wie die raete wider von hof kommen und I.F.Gn. relation gethan, hat derselbige gut freund vermerkt, dass die raete gut ufs konigs seit gewesen und gleich hz. Moritz weich gemacht und bewogen; was aber beschlossen wird, kann man nicht wissen. 11 PKMS. 2, pp. 843-844. For the origin of this brief see PKMS, 2, p. 842, n. 2.

33. "Man wollt auch sagen, weil [der kurfurst] die kur verwirkt, dass er mit der kur von Ksl. Mt. auch versehen sollte werden..." PKMS. 2, p. 843.

34. "Da die Kgl.Mt. mit der execucion nicht verziehen und mit taetlichen angriffe ins kurfusten lande ziehen und angreifen wurd, dass S.F.Gn. ungefaehr1ich in sechs tagen hernach auch angriffen." PKMS. 2, p. 841.

35. "...den Sie Ihres interesse halben unserer gn. bewilligung und mit D.L. gepflogenen handlungen nach heiraus zu gewarten hat, eigentlich bedenken und die sachen keinesweges lenger anstellen noch damit verziehen. Unser Bruder wird auch nicht saeumen und ist bereits im anzuge." PKMS, 2, p. 846.

36. Moritz's proposition to the estates found in PKMS, 2, pp. 847-848; see also Falke, "Landestaende," pp. 4 39-44 5.

37. "So ist am tage, das die kron Beheim und zu gehorige lande in trefflicher ruestunge und allbereit im anzuge sein, der meinunge, in unseres vettern, des kurfursten, lande zu ziehen....Sol1te nun das alles von uns und unsern nachkommen, und also vom ganzen hause zu Sachsen, in fremde hende kommen, das were uns zum hochsten bekommer1ich,...Es ist Euch auch wisslich, wie gar gemengt unsers vettern lande in den unser liegen, also da ein fremd kriegsvolk unsers vettern land uberziehen und bekriegen sollte, dass unsere lande und Ihr, wie zu besorgen, zum mehrern teil auch verderbt mochten werden....Begehren derwegen wir und unser bruder, herr Augustus, nachdeme S.L. des mit uns einig, gn., Ihr wollet die sach mit fleiss erwegen und uns 105

hierin das beste raten und helfen, uns und Euch, auch deme ganzen haus zu Sachsen zu gute.” PKMS. 2, p. 848.

38. "do sie durch ein fremd kriegsvolk uberzogen und im fremde hende bracht werden sollten, die underthanen hochgemelts kurfursten zu bewegen, das sie sich su E.F.Gn. wendten und E.F.Gn. ergeben." PKMS, 2, p. 850

39. Instructions for the representatives found in PKMS, 2, pp. 862-864. Moritz's demand is as follows, "Vor das ander dass auch S.Kgl.Mt. die unterthanen der land und stedt, so S.Kgl.Mt., wie im pragisher abshiede gemeldt, einnehmen und erobern wurd, bei ihrer religion, wie sie die itzo haben, und dem wort gottes gn. wollte bleiben lassen und sie davon mit gewalt nit dringen noch zu dringen gestatten, bis zu einer gemeinen christlichen vergleicheung, darein sich hz. Moritz einlassen wirdet." PKMS, p. 863. Final treaty found in PKMS. 2, pp. 872-877. Ferdinand agreed to the following, "Wir kunig Ferdinand bewilligen auch hiemit g n ., die unterthanen, so wir in dieser achtexecutionach einnehmen und erobern werden, von jetziger ihrer religion mit gewalt nit zu dringen, sondern darbei bleiben zu lassen bis auf ein christliche vergleichung." PKMS, p. 875.

40. "Doch soil hiermit die religion in allwege ausgeschlossen sein und bleiben." PKMS, 2, p. 861.

41. "sunderlich auch das anzeigen, dass wir uns von der christlichen religion, darin wir sein, durch keine gewalt wollen abdringen lassen." PKMS, 2, p. 867.

42. "E.L. werden ohne Zweifel aus dem Schreiben unserer Landschaft vom 11. Oktober ersehen haben, wie sorglich es wegen des Ueberfalles von Boehmen her steht, und dass unserer und wir uns nicht haben entsch1iessen koennen, uns gegen die Ksl. und Kgl. Mt. einzulassen; ferner, was uns in den Ksl. Mandaten bei schweren Strafen befolen ist, und wie verderblich es fuer das ganze Haus Sachsen sein wuerde, wenn die vermengten Lande von fremdem Kriegsvolk besetzt werden sollten...Da wir ferner von Ksl. Mt. die Erklaerung haben - der wir glauben - dass unsere chrisltiche Religion - von der wir und unsere Lande uns durch keine Gewalt dringen lassen wollen - nicht vertilgt werden soil, da aber der Einfall nunmehr hereindringt, so haben wir uns mit Rat unserer Landschaft entschlossen, im Interesse des Gesamthauses auf Wege zu trachten, damit E.L. lande soviel moglich, in femden hende nicht kommen." PKMS, 2, pp. 902-903.

43. The issue of the electorate had been raised at Regensburg by the imperial side, yet as the time neared for decisive action the Albertines pressed for clarity and assurances in the matter; see PKMS. 2, pp. 843, 864, 886, 894. On Ferdinand’s request Charles issued an announcement on October 27 bestowing the electorate on Moritz. Ferdinand, though, was instructed to hold the edict until Moritz invested Ernestine territory, broke off relations with John Frederick, and promised full obedience to Charles, see Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst, " p. 171.

44. "Acht got, wey obel deintt E.L. mein bruder damit, das sich E.L. mit der koning vorbintt!...Ich wolt, wer E.L. das geraden hett, das der am galgen heinckl" PKMS. 2, p. 879.

45. "E.L. bedenck doch, dass E.L. ein geborner Douschsser yst, wer E.L. vatter und mutter yst, und henk nich so auff dey ein seyden zu des douffel anhanck und Spanger." PKMS, 2, p. 879.

46. "Ich hort auch. es yst eyn klage drober ym lant, das E.L. sich da vorbindt, auch das man hort, das E.L. nicht rechschaffen wern wil; und E.L. haltz vor keyn bussen, das ichzt schriben, dan es yst ein gemeyn geschreig..." PKMS. 2, p. 880.

47. A summary of this letter is found in PKMS. 2, p. 906 .

48. Unser von Gotts aenaden Moritzes Hertzogen zu Sachssen/ Landtcrraffen in Doerinaen/ unnd Mararaffen zu Meissen/ Erklerunge/ wie wir der Christlichen Religion geneiat/ Unnd welcher ursach halben/ wir Uns/ wider die Kavserlicher Maiestat/ nicht eingelassen/ noch umbgehen haben koennen/ Uns umb Unsers Vettern Lande anzunehmen. Leipz ig: 1546.

49. Bohemian troops under the command of Sebastian von Weitmuel entered Ernestine Saxony on October 23, investing the fortresses of Platten and Gottesgab. For the best narrative of the north Saxon campaign see Voigt, Moritz, pp. 211- 444 , for the publishing date of pamphlet see Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst," p. 1164. 307

50. Mention of the "erdichtet nachreden" is made in his early August letter to Elisabeth, see PKMS. 2, p. 758 .

51. "...unser Christlichen Religion und reiner lehre Gottes worts/ wie die in der Augspurgischen Confession bekandt/ unnd durch Christliche Prediger in unsern Landen und Fuerstenthumen/ bisher geprediget und geleret worden ist/ noch gepredigt und geleret wird/ und mit Gottes huelffe fuer und fuer gepredigt und geleret werden sol..." Erklerunge. Aiia.

52. "...koennen wir bey uns nicht wol ermessen/ nach dem es je offenbar und am tage ist/ wie oben gemelt/ das wir in unsern Fuerstenthum und Landen/ die Christliche lehre unnd das wort Gottes/ Gott lob/ rein/ lauter und klar predigen/ die hochwirdigen Sacramenta/ nach der einsatzung Christi unsers Heilands/ ministriren und reichen/ auch selbst gebrauchen/ Und alle rechtschaffene Christliche Ceremonien in unsern Kirchen halten lassen." Erklerunge. Aiia.

53. See Erklerunge. Aiiib, Aiiiib, Bib, Biia, Eib.

54. "one vermischung menschen unnd vergeblicher zusatzungen..." Erk1erunge, Aiib

55. "Nu wissen wir auff erden nichts so gros/ das wir vor Gottes angesicht schuldig seind/ dann das wir seinen Namen in unser Landen... Seine Goettliche warheit/ das ist sein heiliges wort/ das er uns in der Schrifft des Alten und Newen testaments/ durch den raund seiner heiligen Propheten/ Aposteln und Evangelisten/ ja seines eingebornen Sons/ unsers einigen Mittlers unnd erloesers Jhesu christi/ geoffenbaret hat..." Erklerunge, Aiiiia-Aiiiib.

56. "Und wir moegen uns mit froelichem gemuet des berhuemen/ das es unserhalben in unsern Landen/ an dem alien bisanher keinen mangel gehabt/ sol auch mit Gottes huelffe/ an uns kein mangel erscheinen/ Sondern unser Prediger/ Pfarherr und Seelsorger/ sollen das Goetlliche wort lauter uns rein predigen...dabey wir sie/ mit Gottes huelffe/ gnediglich schuetzen/ schirmen und handhaben woellen/ und tragen keinen zweifel/ sie werden unsere Underthanen Christlich underweisen/ allein Gottes eher vor augen haben/ und sich sonst nichts bewegen lassen." Erklerunge, Aiiiib-Bia. 30N

57. "So haben wir auch eine Ki rchenordenunge/ die der Hochgeboren Fuerste/ unser freuntlicher lieber Herr und Vater seliger/...in druck gegeben...und un unsern Landen/ bis uff diese zeit/ loeblich/ ehrlich/ und wol gehalten wirdet/ nicht alleine mit christlichen Ceremonien/ sondern auch mit raichung der hochwirdigen Sacraraenta.. Erklerunge, Bia. On October 15, 1541, Moritz reissued Henry's mandate of January 22, 1540, ordering ducal subsidies for printing books. No other publications were allowed. The "Henrichsagende" became the the only valid church order. See Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 121-122.

58. "...und weists aus das werck an jme selbst/ wie stadlich wir die verleddigten gesitliche gueter/ in unsern Landen/ zu Gotts ehre/ und zu unterhaltung der Kirchen und Schulddiener/ angewendt/ und nicht alleine die alten Stipendia in unser Universitet zu Leipzig gebessert/ sondern das wir auch uffs newe eine gute anzal Sitpendien verordent haben..." Erklerunge. Bia. See also Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft, p. 177.

59. "Also das menniglich unparteiisch aus solichen offenlichen sachen uns entschuIdiget haben/ und uns bekennen mus/ das man uns mit ungrunde und unbestande zu misst/ als ob wir von der Christlichen Religion abweichen theten." Erklerunge. Bia.

60. "Das wir bey unser waren Christlichen Religion vormittelst Goettlicher genade/ bestendig bleiben/,..unnd vormittelst Goettlicher genade/ bis in unsere gruben/ darauff verharren woellen." Erklerunge. Biia .

61. "Sie wolten dann vor eine ursache anziehen/ das wir uns in den jtzt vorstehenden beschwer1ichen kriegsleufften/ wider die Roemische Kaiserliche und Koenigliche Maiestaten/ unser aller gnedidste Herrn/ und von Got geordente Oberkeit und Lehnsherrn/ nicht haben bewegen lassen..." Erklerunae. Aiib.

62. "das ihre Maiestat/ unsere ware Christliche Religion verdrucken und austilgen/ Und dieselbigen einem vordechtigen Councilio/ do der Bapst Richter/ und die seiner allein die Schluss stimmen." Erklerunge. Ai ib-Ai i ia.

63. "das auch muessige leute/ schand und Schmehegetichte/ Reyme und Gesenge wider jre Maiestat machen/...welche ins unsere Fuerstenthum und Lande Id'J

eingeschoben/ und den Leuten beybracht werden/ ungeachtet das die Schrifft sagt/ principi populi tui non maledicas.. Erklerunge, Aiiia.

64. "Das wir uns aber/ wider die Kayserliche Maiestat/ nicht haben in huelffe begeben/ unnd einlassen woellen/ Daraus kan nicht volgen/ noch uns mit grunde/ bestand und warheit zugemessen werden/ das wir von unserer Christlichen Religion abfellig werden wolten." Erklerunge. Biib.

65. "Dann gleich wie wir schuldig seind/ Gotte/ was Gottes ist/ zugeben/ also leret uns auch die Goettliche warheit/ das wir der Oberkeit/ dem Keyser/ geben sollen/ was des Kaisers ist." Erklerunge, Biib.

66. "Wiewol wir auch eingedenck sein/ was vor etlichen jaren die Theologi berichtet und gerathen haben/ uff die frage/ Ob sich auch ein Christlicher Fuerst zur wehre stellen solle/ wenn er von der Kayserlichen Maiestat vom worte Gottes wolte gedrungen werden/ So haben wir uns doch in etlichen unseren Schreiben/ auch duech werbung und botschaffte kegen unsere freunde/ freuntlich vernemen lassen/ wes gemuets wir seind/ und was wir zuthun bedacht und entschlossen/ Do wir befunden/ das die Kayserliche Maiestat unsere Christliche Religion mit der schwerte zudempffen und zu unterdrucken understehen wuerde/ Nemlich/ das eige dem zeitlichen vorzusetzen.. Erklerunge. Biiia.

67. "Wir haben aber/ uff unserer Landschaft/ juengst zu kempnitz vorgewante bitte/ nicht underlassen/ an ire Kayseliche Maiestat nachmals zu schreiben/ und zu bitten umb erklerunge/ ob jre Maiestat/ wie man jr/ aus allerley vermutungen/ ufflegte/ unsere Religion durch die Kriegsuebung tigen oder verdrucken wolten/ Unnd haben darauff von jrer Maiestat eine schrifft1iche/ dergleichen auch einer schrifft/ die jre Maiestat an unsere Landschaffte gethan/ und sonst in anderen schreiben/ erklerunge bekomen/ Das jrer Maiestat gemuet und meinung nicht sey/ uns und unsere Underthane unnd Landschafft/ von unserer Religion/ und dem worte Gottes/ zu dringen/ sondern gentzlich dabey bleiben zulassen/ Und die Zwispalt der Religion durch friedliche und freuntliche handelunge/ oder durch bebuerliche mittel und wege..." Erklerunge, Biiib- Biiiia.

68. Both Philip and Elisabeth chastized Moritz for not seeing through Charles' understanding of "Christian .Ill)

religion." "Mit der christlichen Religion meint er stets die alte. papistische. Unser Religion haelt er fuer Ketzerei." PKMS. 2, p. 817; and "Und dorfen E.L. nicht denken noch glauben, wenn gleich Carl von Gent vorgiebt, er gedenk wider die religion noch wort gottes nicht zu thun, dass dadurch unser wahre christliche religion soli verstanden werden; sondern er meint sein alte papistische religion, die er vor wahrhaftig helt." PKMS. 2, p. 822.

69. "Und jre Maiestat wol wissen/ wasser Religion wir und unser Landschaft sein/...Unnd jre Maiestat wissen/ wie wir denn jr bekant/ und noch bekennen/ das wir und unsere Landschaft der Augspurgischen Confession anhengig/ unnd in der selbigen Religion sein/ so kan heirin kein missverstand vorfallen/ als ob jre Maiestat jre/ unnd nicht unsere Religion/ meinten..." Erklerunge. Biiiia-Biiiib.

70. "Zu fordest auch/ das etliche Fuersten/ auch von der Ritterschaft/ und gemeine Kriegsleut/ wie wislich/ bey der Kaiserlichen Maiestat jtzo im feld leger und in bestellunge sein/ die unserer Christlichen Religion nicht weniger denn die andern Fuersten unnd Stende der Augspurgischen Confession anhengig/ die bekennen/ auch in jren Landen unnd Gebeithen/ und wie wir bericht/ in jrem Feldlager predigen lassen/ die auch die hochwirdigen Sacramenta/ nach der einsatzunge Christi unsers Heilands/ gebrauchen/ und von unserer Religion sich nicht wenden lassen/ noch davon abweichen woellen. Dieselben Fuersten/ und andere Kriegsleute/ seind jtzo teglich umb die Kayserliche Maiestat/ das sie sich jrer Maiestat gemuets leichtlich erkunden moegen/ und wir haltens davor gewis/ do sie einige fahre/ der Religion halben/ vermercken/ So wuerden sie/ als Christliche Fuersten und Leute/ der Kayserlichen Maiestat nicht beyfall geben. bey jrer Maiestat nicht bleiben/ noch zu solcher verdruckunge helffen." Erklerunge. Cia-Cib.

72. Cf. above p. 121.

72. "Denn do wir von jrer Maiestat so viel erklerunge jres gemuets haben/ das wir uns in Gottes und unserer Religion sache nicht zubefahren haben/ und das wir von jrer Maiestat ungehindert/ Gotte geben moegen was Gottes ist/ So koennen wir in warheit mit gutem gewissen und fuge/ nicht fuer uber/ wir mussen dem Kayser ( wie Christus unser Heiland geheissen und geboten hat) auch geben was des Kaysers ist/ Und wie uns unser Lehnspflicht/ die wir jrer Maiestat geschworen haben/ weisen." Erklerunge. Ciib.

7 3. Erklerunge, C i i i i a.

74. "Denn uns unnd unserer Landschafft seind hiebevor Kayseliche Mandata zukommen/ darinn uns unser Interesse unnd anwartunge/ die wir an unser Vettern Lande haben/ angezogen unnd geboten wird/ do wir die in andere hende nicht wolten komen lassen/ das wir dieselbige Lande/ von wegen gemelts unser Interess/ selbst einnemen/ und das unsere Landschaft uns darzu helffen solte/ Unnd wird uns die peen mit angehenckt/ Nemlich/ wo wir' darinn seumig/ oder hinlessig erscheinen/ unnd der Kayserlichen Maiestat darinn nicht gehorsame leisten/ und mittler weile obbemelte Lande unnd Leute/ durch jre Kay. May. oder andere erobert/ oder eingenomen worden/ So solten dieselben Lande und Leute/ unangesehen unserer gerechtigkeit gesampter Lehen und anwartung/ bey denen bleiben/ die sie also erobert unnd eingenomen... " Erk1erunge. Ciiiia.

75. "So haben wir doch bey uns nicht ermessen/ auch in unserer getrewen Landschafft Rathe nicht finden koennen/ das wir uns wider die Roemische Koenigliche Maiestat/ unsern Lebnsherrn/ mit gewalt einlegen/ und uns understehen solten/ den ueber zug mit gewalt und beharlich zuwehren " Erklerunge. Ciiiib-Dia.

76. See Roger Ascham's comments in his "A discours and affaires of the state of Germanie," where, in discussing the morality inherent in Moritz’s action against John Frederick, he states, "...with consciences confirmed with Machiavelles doctrine to thincke say and do what soeuer may serve best for profite or pleasure,” in, Aschara, Works. p. 160. One of the earliest references comparing Moritz's actions to the traitorous Judas came from John Frederick's open letter to the Albertine estates on December 22, 1546; "Wir mussen auch bekennen/ Das uns solche ewers herrn unvordienete unfreundschaft und untrewe/ darein Ir Ine sonder zweiffel durch Finantzery und vorretterlich Judas gelt/ Damit Ihr euch zum theil erkauffen lassen/ gefuehrt/ uffs hoechste/ auch vielmehr thaurt und zuhertzen gehet..." Abaetrueckte Copey Hertzoa Johans Fridrichen Churfuersten zu Sachssen und Burqgraffen zu Maadeburq Vorwarnung veaen Hertzog Moritzen seins Vettern Landschafften/ zu seiner Churfuerstlichen Gnaden unvormeidlichen und genodtrenqten Defension. (1546), Ai iiib. 1 1 2

77. "Solte nu das alles von Uns unnd Unsern Nachkomen/ und also vom gantzen Hause zu Sachssen/ in frembde hende komen/ das were uns zum hoechsten bekuemmer1ich..." Erklerunge, Dib.

78. "So ist augenscheinlich am tage/ wie gar gemengt unsers Vettern Lande in den unsern ligen/ Also do ein frembd kriegsvolck unsers Vettern Lande ueberzihen und bekriegen solte/ das unsere eigene Lande und Underthane/ wie zu besorgen zum mehreteil/ auch verderbt muesten werden." Erklerunge. Dib-Diia.

79. "Dieweil es aber nunmehr die gelegenheit gewint/ das do kein mittel ist/ und die macht der Oberkeit daher dringt/ derer uns mit gewalt zu widerstehen nicht gezieraen wil/ auch uns beharlich nicht moeglich ist/ Dieweil auch unsers Vettern Lande mit unsern Landen also vermengt liegen/ das dieselben unsers Vettern Lande duech frembde kriegsvolck nicht ueberzogen werden konnen/ one verderb unserer eigenen Lande und Leute/ So hats nuraehr eine andere gelegenheit/ unnd nemlich die/ das wir gedrungen werden/ unsere Land und Leute durch frembde kriegsvolck/ sampt unsers Vettern Landen verderben zulassen/ und darzu unsers Interess und anwartender gerechtigkeit an unsers Vettern Landen zu gerathen/ und die in frembde hende vom Hause zu Sachssen komen zulassen/ auch in der Oberkeit ungehorsam zufallen/ Oder aber/ wir muessen selbst darzu thun/ uns umb die Lande fuer unsers Interess selbst annemen/ unnd die beim Hause zu Sachssen behalten." Erklerunge, Diib-Diiia.

80. Liliencron, 4, pp. 345-347, 350.

81. Kain gwalt uf diser erd bleibt f est, der sich nit lest von got regieren und leiten; dann got in all weg ist der herr, dem breis und eer geburt zu alien zeiten; dem ich mich ergeb die weil ich leb in seinen schutz; dem feid zu trutz wirdt got selbs fuer mich streiten.

All Koenigreich und furstenthum in ainer summ, 11.1

die mir hat got gegeben, bevilche ich stets in seinen schirm, lass mich nit irrn, ob die feind schon widerstreben; denn got kent sie wol der sie auch bald sol machen zu nicht durch sein ger icht, die ungehorsam lebent.

Recht wil ich fuern dem herrn sein schwert auf diser erd, wils nit on ursach zucken, dann nur zur straf der bosen leut... Liliencron, 4, pp. 345-345.

82. Cf. above, p. 95. Published in 1546 as, Ein Ratschlag Doctoris Martini Lutheri. Ob dem Kaiser, so er jemands mit gewalt. des Euancreli halben uberziehen volte, mit rechte widerstandt geschehen moeaen. Etwan an Churfuersten Johansen seliqer ungefehrlich im 1531 Jar geschr ieben. 11 Liliencron, 4, p. 345.

83. Ein new Lied. Liliencron, 4, p. 350. The Hymn was an acrostic with the first lines of each verse spelling out "Moritz Herzog zu Sachsen:" (Mor) wie du wilt, du arge welt... (Itz)t sols aber wol stehn und sein... (Herz)lich mir das zu wider ist... {O g)ot, verlei mir dein genad... (Zu) aller zeit wil ich auch mehr... (Sachsen,) Fchwaben, sein wer sie....

84. Mor wie di wilt, du arge welt, auf got hab ich mein trost gestelt, der wirt mich wol erhalten;...

Itzt sols aber wol stehn und sein se i n, das ieder sein eigen herr wil sein, homueten und stolzieren; schmebuecher und 1ieder erdenkt man vil, ein ieder die obrigkeit lestern wil, dem gemeinem man hofieren.

Herzlich mir das zu wider ist, weil got die obrigkeit zu aller frist heist fuerchten und auch ehren; 3 14

"gebet got, was got gebuert, dem keiser auch, was ihm gehoert,11 thut Christus uns selbst lehren. O got verlei mir dein genad, lass mich halten die rechte wag! als lang weret mein leben, wil ich dein wort bekennen schon, wie steht in der confession zu Augspurg ubergehen. Liliencron, 4, p. 350.

85. See Ozment, Protestants, p. 30. CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined the inextricable

relationship between imperial politics, secular

authority, and confessional loyalty, within the context

of Moritz of Saxony's diplomacy on the eve of the

Schmalkaldic War. Was Moritz the "master of all

intrigues?" This examination of the prince's political

manuevering during the summer of 1546 sought to dispel

the myth of the Machiavellian Moritz as a

confessionally apathetic, morally bankrupt manipualtor

of both church and state. Evidence culled from the

sources suggests that Moritz was compelled to manuever

on an imperial stage set not solely by his designs. As

stated at the outset, the focus of the work centered

not on Moritz's own personal convictions, as though we

could measure his motives, but rather how he

legitimated his response to situations continually

found to be beyond his absolute control.

Beginning with the initial agreement at

Regensburg, Moritz repeatedly asserted his loyalty to the Augsburg Confession, but more significantly, he

3 15 316 negotiated from a perception of the confessional attitudes of his subjects. Moritz never surrendered the conviction that his capacity to effectively rule was contingent on the stability of the Lutheran faith in his territory* This perception found immediate validation upon his return home, as the Protestant presses and pulpits exploded with a call for a holy war against the forces opposing the Augsburg Confession. Resistance to Charles V was elevated to the status of an article of faith, trapping Moritz between active loyalty to a credo of resistance, and obedience to his imperial sovereign. Moritz's eventual decision to seize John Frederick's territory has for the most part been interpreted as a traitorous expression of blatant greed. That Moritz and his Albertine court postured themselves in the service of self interest is, of course, obvious and undeniable. Self-interest belongs to the constant forces in history on all levels of society. Yet, as Heiko Oberman has commented, "The crucial question is how self-interest is channeled, controlled, and legitimized: undisguised, naked greed has no impact."1 This bit of wisdom serves well to place Moritz's situation in a more responsible context.

When the political ramifications of his distinctly 317

Albertine heritage are considered, it must be granted

that from an imperial-constitutional perspective, Moritz had legal prerogatives for his action against John Frederick. Further, based on the evidence available to Moritz at the time, and considering how consistently he sought and received imperial assurances concerning the continuance of the faith of the Augsburg Confession, it is fair to conclude that he did indeed take seriously his duty to preserve the ’’Word of God."

His alliance with Charles, however damaging to Ernestine Saxon prestige, fell within the contours of princely concern for his land’s common good, which included the stability of Lutheran worship. Within this confessional context his action could be legitimized specifically by recourse to article sixteen of the Augsburg Confession.

Yet however theoretically sound Moritz’s position, the most important factor for the prince was the propagation of that policy through the pulpits of his territory. At his disposal lay the bureaucracy of his Albertine Lutheran churches, with its capacity to channel princely policy through a network of pulpits reaching to the most rural village. Yet the question arises: did Moritz succeed in gaining sympathetic voices in the pulpits in the weeks prior to the 3 18 outbreak of war in Saxony? Evidence suggests that he did not. The accusations Moritz countered in his published defense of his occupation of Ernestine lands reflected not only a confessionally hostile environment, but match almost word for word the arguments of the pastors. He repeatedly asserted that the conflict did not concern matters of religion, and just because he did not enter into alliance against Charles V it did not follow that he had abandoned the faith. It would appear then that having failed to silence the voices he was compelled to answer them. Moritz's alienation of the Lutheran clergy struck close to home when, in early November, his own personal chaplain, Johannes Weiss, packed up and left the prince's camp outside Zwickau in protest over his lord's actions,2 and the duke's frustration with the destabilizing effect of such antagonistic preachers may help explain his sharp actions toward Justus Jonas after taking Halle in November of 1546. Although granting full evangelical rights to the city, Moritz banished Jonas for his subversive activities against rightful authority.3 Moritz's failure and anger concerning the clergy surfaced in a late November letter to Bishop Anhalt.

In announcing that the occupation had proceeded to that 3 1 < J

point, without bloodshed and that evangelical worship had been retained, he expressed bitterness on how the ordeal had been presented in his territory by the preachers and theologians.4 Moritz ordered George to admonish the pastors for judging worldly matters from the pulpit, a practice "neither taught not exemplified by Christ or his apostles," and thus a "misuse of the saving Word of God."* The office of preacher carried the capacity to move groups of people to action, or, in some instances more detrimental to ducal policy, inaction. Moritz knew this, he took it for granted, hence he sought to control the pulpits in his land. He failed. The failure offers the following consideration. The issue is not whether Charles was telling the truth, or whether Moritz was a loyal Lutheran. At issue is that Moritz attempted to compel his church to toe the political line. As an arm of the Albertine state, the churches were commanded to cease maligning Charles V, and to pacify their congregations. Yet despite these efforts, Moritz found himself, together with the emperor, as a target for public scorn and wrath. The prince may indeed have given little concern to the personal attacks, whether it be the elector's wife stating her desire to see him "hung from the nearest 320 tree,,,

The Protestant Reformation witnessed the establishment of new churchs, with confessions aimed at shaping the belief and behavior of entire populations.

These endeavors contributed to a process of ecclesiastical and social changes which did in fact impact the course of European history.10 Resilient institutional frameworks emerged by the 1540's, and these new structures played a key role in the course of events during this decade. Contrary to the common assumption prevalent today that the new churches evolved into power tools for princely state building, evidence in the case of Moritz points to a more dialectical relationship between his court and the 121

church. His actions reflected the tension between his political goals and the convictions of the pastors

within his territory, a tension which he could not eradicate by princely authority. Moritz presented himself to Charles V and his subjects as a loyal Lutheran, yet much of his policy was based, by his own

correspondence, on factors that transcended his own

personal convictions. Evidence suggests that, at least in the area of Saxony, the image of the nascent

Evangelical church as a passive instrument for princely

aggrandizement needs modification. Events also imply that Moritz had to maneuver on a field designed, not only by princely ambition, but by subjects expressing loyalty to a religious confession. Did the vehement rhetoric which couched the military

preparations and early conflict of the Schmalkaldic War

in purely religious categories remain within the sphere

of the intellectual and clerical elite? It most

certainly did not, though evidence suggests that at

least one mid-century Albertine prince wished it had.

Were a "greater part” of Moritz's subjects willing to

sacrifice their life for doctrine? Such cannot be answered. What cannot be denied though is that Moritz thought sufficient support for reform ideals existed so as to make doctrinal innovation an undue risk, and 322 beyond asserting as much to Charles V, he actually undertook specific political and ecclesiastical measures based on that assumption. His action stands in stark contrast to any speculation concerning the malleability of passive "involuntary Protestants." Based on Moritz's words and behavior it appears, at least in areas touching his political viability, that those loyal to the Augsburg Confession, be they clergy, secular nobles, or, not least, the common citizens, bore sufficient attachment to their confessional identity, and expressed a willingness to defend the same, so as to shape Moritz's political stance in the months prior to the Schmalkaldic War. 32.1

ENDNOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. Oberman, "Impact," p. 181.

2. Issleib, "evangelischer Fuerst," p. 1167, n. 2; see also Wartenberg, Landesherrschaft. pp. 111-114.

3. Moritz reported to Ferdinand that, "dass die Prediger auf die kanzel und sonst die Ksl. M t ., E. Kgl. Mt. und mich mit Schraaehreden beschimpt und den gemeinen Haufen gegen der Erzbischof, ihr obrigkeit, aufgehetzt haben, so habe ich mich, da es die gelegenheit gab, mit meinen und E. Mt. Kriegsvolk in die stadt verfuegt...ein predicant mit namen Justus Jonas, und von der Hall syndicus, Dr. Kilian Goltstein...dieselben zwo personen in 10 tagen zu enturlauben und aus ihrer stadt zu schaffen." PKMS, 2, pp. 949-950. Jonas's activity is summarized in his October 27 letter to John Frederick, Jonas wrote: "Und gebe e. ch. g. uf mein undertanigst meinung zu erkennen, das ich in disser kirchen zu Halle sampt alien predigern teglich one underlass mitt hochstem vliess das christlich volk, sonderlich die unschuldig iugent, vormane, das sie ernstlich im glauben im namen Jesu Christi, unsers ewigen mittlers, zu Gott ruffen wollen, das er e. ch, und f. g, und alien e. ch. und f. g. mittvorwanten protestirende stenden wider den antichristen zu Rome, wider die grosse untrew Caroli V. , hispanisches Diocletiani, sterck wolle verleihen, glueck heil und wunderbar sieg von himel." [and I would humbly have your Electoral Grace know that I, together with all the preachers, daily and without exception, diligently exhort the Christian people, especially the innocent youth, to earnestly call upon God in the name of Jesus Christ our eternal mediator, to give strength, good fortune, and a wonderous victory from heaven, against the antichrist of Rome and Charles V, the Spanish Diocletion.J Kawerau, Jonas. 2, p. 210.

4. "wider gottes wort oder sonst offenlich unrecht thun." PKMS. 2, p. 956.

5. "sie des vom unserm herrn Christo und seinen aposteln unsers wissens nicht viel lehre und noch viel weniger exempel haben..." PKMS, 2, p. 956; see also Issleib, "evange1ischer Fuerst," p. 1168. 124

6. Voigt, Moritz. p. 222.

7. Voigt, Moritz. pp. 235, n. 5.

8. PKMS, 3, p. 66; see also PKMS, 3, p. 165, where Moritz complained to Ferdinand of his inability to trust his subjects.

9. PKMS. 3, p. 66-68. 10. Kittleson, "The Confessional Age," p. 362. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Anhalt, George, Prince of, Underricht wie die Pfarherrn das volck. in diesen qeschwinden und gefehrlichen zeiten zur buss und qebett vermanen sollen /auff Fuerstlich befehl / durch den hochwirdiqen durchlauchtioen hochaeborn Fuersten und herrn / herrn Georqen Fuersten zu Anhalt. Coadiuatorn in Geistlichen sachen zu Mersenburgk. Thumpropsten zu Maqdenburgk. Leipzig: Valentin Bapst, 1546.

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______. [with Philipp of Hesse] Copev evnes schreibens so der Churfuerst zu Sachssen und der Landtqraff zu Hessen/ an der Roemischen maiestat von wegen irer maiestat vetzo fuerhabenden unpillichen Krieqsruestung/ gethan/ Darinne sich auch ire

325 320

Chuer/ und F.G. entschuldiaen/ Das sie zu solchen than/ Kevn ursach qegeben, Marburg, 1546. _____ • Offen ausschreiben/ Der Mordbrenner und Voroif fter_halben: Die vom Antichrist/ dero Bapst zu Rom abgefertiget/ Peudschland mit Mortbrandt und vorgjfftung zubeschedicen. H. D. 1546. Karl V. Roeman ishcher Kavserlicher Maiestat Declaration. Wider Hertzog Johanns Friderichen Churfuersten von Sachsen, und Lorf. Philp. v. Hessen. Ingolstadt: Alexander Weissenhorn, 1546.

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