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DEAD MAN TELL NO LIES: USING KILLED-IN-ACTION (KIA) DATA to EXPOSE the PKK’S REGIONAL SHELL GAME* Andrew SELF** - Jared FERRIS***

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DEAD MAN TELL NO LIES: USING KILLED-IN-ACTION (KIA) DATA to EXPOSE the PKK’S REGIONAL SHELL GAME* Andrew SELF** - Jared FERRIS*** ORSAM REVIEW OF ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS NO.57, JANUARY 2017 REGIONAL AFFAIRS No.57, JANUARY 2017 DEAD MAN TELL NO LIES: USING KILLED-IN-ACTION (KIA) DATA TO EXPOSE THE PKK’S REGIONAL SHELL GAME* Andrew SELF** - Jared FERRIS*** Andrew Self is a Middle East analyst and reserve US Army Utilizing over 2,500 individual reports of PKK, PJAK, and YPG officer. He holds a BA in terrorist deaths, this article examines the relationship between International Affairs and an MA the PKK and its affiliates, and how these groups interact across in Middle East Studies from the time and organizational levels. The first analysis of its kind, it George Washington University in provides a qualitative and quantitative assessment of PKK-af- Washington, DC. He has experience filiate relationships and illustrates a cross-organizational de- in Turkey and throughout the ployment of personnel to match strategic and operational level Middle East, working in the region needs in the different theaters in which the PKK and its affiliates as an Army officer and conducting operate. It provides evidence of an intimate and mutually sup- academic field research as a portive relationship between the PKK and its regional affiliates, civilian. He speaks Turkish fluently and has proficiency in Arabic. challenging the very construct of the PKK as a distinctively dif- ferent group from its affiliates. Rather, it asserts that HPG, YPG, Jared Ferris is a Middle East and YRK armed wings should be analyzed as integrally connec- analyst specializing in the analysis ted groups fighting in a unified regional strategy for Ocalanian of regional Arabic language media Kurdish-autonomy. and social media. His primary Keywords: PKK, PYD, PJAK, Terrorism, Kurdish focus is on Syria and non-state actors. He holds a BA in History * This article first appeared in Center of Excellence - Defence Against from Newman University in Terrorism’s (COE-DAT) Defence Against Terrorism Review (DATR), Vol. 8, Wichita, KS, and is a Master's 2016. candidate in Middle East Studies The views and analysis contained within this article are those of the authors from the George Washington alone and not those of the U.S. government or any other institution. University in Washington, DC. ** BA, MA George Washington University, e-mail: [email protected]. *** MA, George Washington University. DEAD MAN TELL NO LIES: USING KILLED-IN-ACTION (KIA) DATA TO EXPOSE THE PKK’S REGIONAL SHELL GAME Introduction The Syrian conflict and the need to combat the rise of the Is- lamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL/DAESH) has led the US to reassess its Middle East strategy and increase cooperation with non-state militant actors in the region. In this effort, the US has overtly and covertly increased cooperation with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. Such support for the PYD and YPG has caused worry among regional allies, namely Turkey, and national security observers alike, given the group’s accused association with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and its militant wing the People’s Protection Forces (HPG). The US, EU, and Turkey officially recognize the PKK and HPG as terrorist organizations for the decades-long insurgency waged against the Turkish state. Turkey insists that the PKK, PYD, and an Iranian affiliate, the Party of Free Life of Kurd- istan (PJAK) and its East Kurdistan Defense Units (YRK) military wing, are one and the same, claiming differences in names are a semantical attempt to obscure the PKK’s role in Syria and Iran. Conversely, US officials acknowledge the historical ties but claim that the PYD and YPG are different under US law and thus, fair-game for military cooperation,1 even though they designate the PJAK as a terrorist organiza- tion for being ‘controlled’ by the PKK.2 Given this point of contention, as well as the relevance and controversy it represents to US strategy, it is thus nec- essary to understand the relationship between the PKK and its regional affiliate groups. Utilizing statistical data de- rived from HPG, YPG, and YRK ‘killed in action’ (KIA) announcements, news reports, battle assessments, and or- ganization research, this article analyzes the nature of the relationship between the HPG, YPG, YRK to identify the 2 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS NO.57, JANUARY 2017 levels at which they cooperate and how this relationship has evolved over time. It will illustrate that the PJAK and PYD were political creations of the PKK following the latter’s ex- pulsion from Syria in 1998. Significant changes in KIA data correlate to the creation of PJAK and the beginning of the PJAK-Iran conflict, increased violence in Turkey, the Syrian conflict, and the Turkey-PKK ceasefire. As will be shown, the changes suggest the relationship between the PKK and its affiliates is one of strategic and operational unity albeit with some level of tactical level autonomy.3 The KIA data, along with supporting evidence, indicates that distinctions between PKK and affiliate personnel are The US has largely superficial with individual fighters repeatedly being overtly and shifted between units and fronts to meet strategic organi- covertly increased zational needs. The PKK’s relationship with its affiliates is cooperation with not only one of a sponsor giving birth to regional sister or- the Democratic ganizations, but also one of an inseparable strategic leader- Union Party (PYD) ship body exercising direct command and control over only and its People’s nominally distinguishable units. Rather than being separate Protection Units conflicts, the Syrian and Iranian conflicts represent different (YPG) in Syria. military fronts in a unified regional campaign for Kurdish autonomy in which the PKK is overtly involved. Like a shell game, the PKK leadership in Kandil4 shifts personnel be- tween its affiliates and fronts, attempting to obscure the true nature of the organization and circumvent international ter- rorist labels. In this sense, the PKK has no true affiliates, but rather three fronts and three names corresponding to those fronts, consisting of the same personalities, leadership, ide- ology, and history of terrorism. Similar to the greater Kurdish movement, the PKK is not a monolithic organization. Since Abdallah Ocalan’s impris- onment in 1999, some observers have suggested that two competing centers of gravity have emerged between Ocalan 3 DEAD MAN TELL NO LIES: USING KILLED-IN-ACTION (KIA) DATA TO EXPOSE THE PKK’S REGIONAL SHELL GAME on one hand, and the rest of the PKK’s leadership based in Kandil, Iraq.5 Ocalan’s peculiar status as de jure leader, de- spite his continued incarceration, is the subject of debate and deserving of research in its own regard. This article is simi- larly ambivalent about his direct leadership role after 1999. Even within the leadership in Kandil, there are competing voices and personalities between different generations and commanders. Thus, the personal politics of the PKK are be- yond the scope of this article. Research also does not mean to suggest that the PJAK, PYD, and PKK are one monolith- ic top-to-bottom organization. Instead, the authors aim to construct a functional understanding of the PKK’s organi- zation and affiliate relationships, showing how these groups interact and their unity across different levels. This article argues that the leadership between the organizations is inter- connected by shared leadership body in Kandil. The scope of this analysis is largely driven by the KIA data, but cor- roborated by the US Treasury Department’s analysis of the PJAK, the International Crisis Group’s study of the YPG, interviews with the senior Turkish military officials, ground reporting from reporters and researchers who traveled to Kandil, as well as other evidence referenced throughout the paper. Terms and Usage The PKK’s continuous effort to escape its terrorist designa- tion as well as the international and multilingual nature of the conflict has created numerous acronyms that can be con- fusing, particularly because terms vary significantly between and among countries and there is no consensus on specific definitions and usage. This article will make the following distinctions: For the sake of familiarity, the term PKK will 4 ORSAM REVIEW OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS NO.57, JANUARY 2017 be used although the group has officially changed its name. ‘PKK’ will refer to the outlawed Ocalanian Kurdish orga- nization in Turkey to which military, student, and political entities belong. ‘HPG’ refers specifically to those military units of the PKK focused on operations in Turkey. ‘PJAK’ Significant refers to the greater organization fighting against the Irani- changes in KIA an state to which the ‘YRK’ military wing belongs. ‘PYD’ refers to the Kurdish political organization in Syria. ‘YPG’ data correlate refers specifically to the military units of the PYD in Syria, to the creation including the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). ‘KCK’ will of PJAK and the be used to describe the umbrella organization to which the beginning of PYD, PJAK, PKK and their respective military wings be- the PJAK-Iran long. The acronyms and their translations are listed below: conflict, increased violence in Turkey, PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party) the Syrian conflict, and the Turkey- HPG: Hêzên Parastina Gel (The People’s Defense Forces) PKK ceasefire. The KCK: Koma Civakên Kurdistan (Group of Communities in changes suggest Kurdistan) the relationship PJAK: Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê (The Party of Free Life between the PKK of Kurdistan) and its affiliates is YRK: Yekîneyên Parastina Rojhilatê Kurdistan (East Kurdistan one of strategic Defense Units) and operational PYD: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (The Democratic Union Party) unity albeit with YPG: Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (The People’s Protections Units) some level of KNC: Kurdish National Council (Encûmena Niştimanî ya Kurdî tactical level li Sûriyê) autonomy.
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