OEE Red Diamond MAR17
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Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 8, Issue 03 March 2017 AUSTRALIA ADOPTS DATE FOR TRAINING INSIDE THIS ISSUE by Angela M. Williams (DAC) and WO2 Danny Evans (UK LNO), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Kurdish Vulnerabilities ........ 3 The Australian Army has taken an important step in committing to use the Decisive CID of UAVs .......................... 8 Action Training Environment (DATE) for training. In February, the Australian Army MTT Update ......................... 14 hosted a DATE Transition Working Group with the US, the UK, and Canada. Critical CATS OPFOR Tasks ........... 16 members of the Australian Army training community were in attendance. Several attendees from the US presented Mali Base Bombing ............ 17 information on what DATE is, how to use DATE: Donovia PE .............. 27 it, and what support and supplementary ACE-TI POCs ....................... 32 tools exist. The UK and Canada also briefed on their lessons learned since implementation. The Australians briefed international attendees on their training OEE Red Diamond published structure and their current training by TRADOC G-2 OEE environments. From that point on, ACE Threats Integration working groups were convened to develop an implementation plan, with For e-subscription, contact: the international attendees serving as Nicole Bier (DAC), advisors to the Australian Army training Intel OPS Coordinator, community. G-2 ACE-TI The next steps involve developing a Topic inquiries: memorandum of understanding and Jon H. Moilanen (DAC), continuing a collaborative relationship G-2 ACE-TI or of support for all of DATE. The Australian Angela Williams (DAC), Army will use DATE for its main training event, a brigade-level field training exercise Deputy Director, G-2 ACE-TI in the middle of 2018, and will immediately begin the process of revising its opposing force doctrine to be DATE-compliant. The addition of Australia to the Copy Editor: DATE community of users presents an even more direct level of collaboration as Laura Deatrick (CGI CTR), the US moves forward with creation of three new DATE environments for Africa, G-2 ACE-TI Europe, and the Pacific. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration This issue of Red Diamond opens with an article on the education, and leader-development learning objectives. Kurdish coalition fighting in Syria and Iraq. The Islamic An article provides the “how-to” of MTTs, from eligibility State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is now in decline and the and topics covered to request procedures and funding. Kurds represent one of the many complexities that will US Army Africa and Africa Command are present on the develop after the contraction of ISIS. Each of the Kurdish African continent and working in partnership with UN, groups in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey has enjoyed degrees of Malian, and other friendly states’ military forces in Phase success against ISIS, which has added to its confidence Zero (shaping) operations. Among these countries, Mali and increased its ambitions. While the Kurds share many is potentially one of the most dangerous. In the northern things in common, being separated by five country part of the country, a UN compound in the city of Gao borders has created unique goals, capabilities, recently suffered what some observers have labeled as disparities, and interests. This article explores the the most serious terrorist attack in the nation’s history. Kurdish coalition and its vulnerabilities. An article discusses the tactics and techniques used in Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) pose a threat from this attack, as well as its broader implications for both near-peer and non-state actors alike. Never before has a Malian and for US forces. military weapons system been so widely proliferated. As This summer, the latest update to the Decisive Action UAVs and their payloads decrease in size, standard visual Training Environment (DATE) will be published. DATE 3.0 combat identification (CID) will not meet the evolving will include many revisions—some substantial, others threat for lower-class UAVs. An article discusses the minor. One example of the former is the description of shortcomings of visual CID of these systems and possible the physical environment of the country of Donovia, methods for alleviating these shortfalls. which is one of the five operational environments within Mobile training teams (MMTs) provide a tailored Threat DATE. While previous editions of DATE focused this Tactics Course based on unit/activity requirements, with depiction solely on the North Caucasus region, DATE 3.0 the purpose to understand and apply an opposing force extends it to the entire country. The final article is an (OPFOR) in support of US Army training, professional excerpt from this expanded discussion. _______________ Red Diamond Page 2 March 2017 by Rick Burns, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (BMA Ctr) One of the most complex and challenging military operational environments is found in Syria and Iraq. Boundary-blurring conflict and competing interests from at least sixteen different entities require a level of operational and tactical understanding unmatched in other conflict areas. The ascendancy of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is now in decline and the fall of Mosul seems inevitable as Iraqi security forces slowly liberate eastern Mosul. What is not clear, however, is what Syria and Iraq will look like once Mosul falls. What seems very complex now, will become even more complex. A forthcoming TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI document will explore and dissect what this post-Mosul operational environment will look like. This article will discuss one of these areas of complexities—the area occupied by the Kurds. The Kurds represent an ethnic group of between 25 to 35 million people inhabiting the mountainous region running through Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Armenia. While Kurds represent the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, they have never been able to obtain their own permanent nation-state. This aspiration of autonomous statehood continues to play significantly into the politics of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq. Kurds are united by a common race, culture, and language, although they do not have a standard dialect. While the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, other religions and creeds can also be found.1 At the conclusion of World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Western allies provided for a Kurdish state in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres. Three years later, however, the Treaty of Lausanne set national borders that divided the Kurds between the regional countries. Any attempts by the Kurds to create an independent state have been put down in each of the countries where they enjoy only minority status.2 While the Kurds share many things in common, being separated by five country borders has created unique goals, capabilities, disparities, and interests. Over the past decades, a pan-Kurdish push for unification of all regional Kurds into a nation-state has devolved into much more-limited goals of autonomy within existing Syrian, Turkish, Armenian, Iranian, and Iraqi borders. Three of the main Kurdish entities operating in the Syrian-Iraqi operational environment include Hezen Parastina Gel (HPG), the military wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey; Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) or People’s Protection Units operating in Syria; and the Peshmerga, the military force operating under the auspices of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). While facing a common enemy, these Kurdish factions have shown the capacity to cooperate and work together. Each group has, however, its own agenda that often conflicts with that of other Kurdish groups. The following analysis of the battle for Sinjar in northern Iraq illustrates this ability to cooperate when fighting a common enemy and the potential for internal divisions and mistrust of the others’ motives. Figure 1. Kurdish-inhabited areas Red Diamond Page 3 March 2017 The Battle for Sinjar The battle for Sinjar illustrates the sublevel of shifting relationships in the Syria-Iraq operational environment. Sinjari is a strategically-located Iraqi town in northwestern Nineveh province. It lies along a major ISIS east-west supply route that connects Mosul in Iraq with Raqqa in Syria—two important ISIS-held cities. Sinjar is approximately 52 km east of the Syrian border and 117 km west of Mosul. It is positioned at the foot of the Sinjar Mountains, an east-west mountain range rising 1,463 m above the surrounding alluvial steppe plains. Sinjar is populated primarily by a Kurdish religious minority called the Yazidis. The Yazidis are particularly vulnerable to violence and persecution, having been the object of hatred for centuries because of their religious practices. Yazidis are ethnically Kurdish, but their religion combines elements of Islam, ancient Persian Zoroastrianism, and Eastern Mediterranean Mithraism. While Yazidis are monotheists, they believe in a fallen angel who serves as an intermediary between God and man. To Muslims, this intermediary resembles the Quranic devil. Yazidis are, therefore, considered devil worshippers by their Muslim neighbors. With isolated geography and a history of persecution, the Yazidis rarely intermarry with outsiders and do not accept converts, further distinguishing themselves.3 Figure 2. Strategic cities of Zumar, Wana, and Sinjar In June 2014, ISIS began an offensive in Nineveh province and captured Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, that same month.4 This ISIS victory gave momentum to a push throughout Peshmerga-held Nineveh province. On 1 August 2014, ISIS attacked a Peshmerga unit in the town of Zumar, a small Kurdish-majority outpost 40 km northwest of Mosul. ISIS killed 14 Peshmerga soldiers, while the group sustained 100 casualties and 38 members were taken prisoner in the attack.5 On 2–3 August, in a serious setback for Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers, ISIS succeeded in taking three strategic towns: Zumar, Wana, and Sinjar.