Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 8, Issue 03 March 2017

AUSTRALIA ADOPTS DATE FOR TRAINING INSIDE THIS ISSUE by Angela M. Williams (DAC) and WO2 Danny Evans (UK LNO), TRADOC G-2 ACE

Threats Integration Kurdish Vulnerabilities ...... 3 The Australian Army has taken an important step in committing to use the Decisive CID of UAVs ...... 8 Action Training Environment (DATE) for training. In February, the Australian Army MTT Update ...... 14 hosted a DATE Transition Working Group with the US, the UK, and Canada. Critical CATS OPFOR Tasks ...... 16 members of the Australian Army training community were in attendance. Several attendees from the US presented Mali Base Bombing ...... 17 information on what DATE is, how to use DATE: Donovia PE ...... 27 it, and what support and supplementary ACE-TI POCs ...... 32 tools exist. The UK and Canada also briefed on their lessons learned since

implementation. The Australians briefed international attendees on their training OEE Red Diamond published structure and their current training by TRADOC G-2 OEE environments. From that point on, ACE Threats Integration working groups were convened to

develop an implementation plan, with For e-subscription, contact: the international attendees serving as Nicole Bier (DAC), advisors to the Australian Army training Intel OPS Coordinator, community. G-2 ACE-TI The next steps involve developing a Topic inquiries: memorandum of understanding and Jon H. Moilanen (DAC), continuing a collaborative relationship G-2 ACE-TI or of support for all of DATE. The Australian Angela Williams (DAC), Army will use DATE for its main training event, a brigade-level field training exercise Deputy Director, G-2 ACE-TI in the middle of 2018, and will immediately begin the process of revising its opposing force doctrine to be DATE-compliant. The addition of Australia to the Copy Editor: DATE community of users presents an even more direct level of collaboration as Laura Deatrick (CGI CTR), the US moves forward with creation of three new DATE environments for Africa, G-2 ACE-TI Europe, and the Pacific.

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RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration This issue of Red Diamond opens with an article on the education, and leader-development learning objectives. Kurdish coalition fighting in Syria and Iraq. The Islamic An article provides the “how-to” of MTTs, from eligibility State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is now in decline and the and topics covered to request procedures and funding. Kurds represent one of the many complexities that will US Army Africa and Africa Command are present on the develop after the contraction of ISIS. Each of the Kurdish African continent and working in partnership with UN, groups in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey has enjoyed degrees of Malian, and other friendly states’ military forces in Phase success against ISIS, which has added to its confidence Zero (shaping) operations. Among these countries, Mali and increased its ambitions. While the Kurds share many is potentially one of the most dangerous. In the northern things in common, being separated by five country part of the country, a UN compound in the city of Gao borders has created unique goals, capabilities, recently suffered what some observers have labeled as disparities, and interests. This article explores the the most serious terrorist attack in the nation’s history. Kurdish coalition and its vulnerabilities. An article discusses the tactics and techniques used in Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) pose a threat from this attack, as well as its broader implications for both near-peer and non-state actors alike. Never before has a Malian and for US forces. military weapons system been so widely proliferated. As This summer, the latest update to the Decisive Action UAVs and their payloads decrease in size, standard visual Training Environment (DATE) will be published. DATE 3.0 combat identification (CID) will not meet the evolving will include many revisions—some substantial, others threat for lower-class UAVs. An article discusses the minor. One example of the former is the description of shortcomings of visual CID of these systems and possible the physical environment of the country of Donovia, methods for alleviating these shortfalls. which is one of the five operational environments within Mobile training teams (MMTs) provide a tailored Threat DATE. While previous editions of DATE focused this Tactics Course based on unit/activity requirements, with depiction solely on the North Caucasus region, DATE 3.0 the purpose to understand and apply an opposing force extends it to the entire country. The final article is an (OPFOR) in support of US Army training, professional excerpt from this expanded discussion.

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Red Diamond Page 2 March 2017 by Rick Burns, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (BMA Ctr) One of the most complex and challenging military operational environments is found in Syria and Iraq. Boundary-blurring conflict and competing interests from at least sixteen different entities require a level of operational and tactical understanding unmatched in other conflict areas. The ascendancy of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is now in decline and the fall of Mosul seems inevitable as Iraqi security forces slowly liberate eastern Mosul. What is not clear, however, is what Syria and Iraq will look like once Mosul falls. What seems very complex now, will become even more complex. A forthcoming TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI document will explore and dissect what this post-Mosul operational environment will look like. This article will discuss one of these areas of complexities—the area occupied by the Kurds. The Kurds represent an ethnic group of between 25 to 35 million people inhabiting the mountainous region running through Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Armenia. While Kurds represent the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, they have never been able to obtain their own permanent nation-state. This aspiration of autonomous statehood continues to play significantly into the politics of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq. Kurds are united by a common race, culture, and language, although they do not have a standard dialect. While the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, other religions and creeds can also be found.1 At the conclusion of World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Western allies provided for a Kurdish state in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres. Three years later, however, the Treaty of Lausanne set national borders that divided the Kurds between the regional countries. Any attempts by the Kurds to create an independent state have been put down in each of the countries where they enjoy only minority status.2 While the Kurds share many things in common, being separated by five country borders has created unique goals, capabilities, disparities, and interests. Over the past decades, a pan-Kurdish push for unification of all regional Kurds into a nation-state has devolved into much more-limited goals of autonomy within existing Syrian, Turkish, Armenian, Iranian, and Iraqi borders. Three of the main Kurdish entities operating in the Syrian-Iraqi operational environment include Hezen Parastina Gel (HPG), the military wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey; Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) or People’s Protection Units operating in Syria; and the Peshmerga, the military force operating under the auspices of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). While facing a common enemy, these Kurdish factions have shown the capacity to cooperate and work together. Each group has, however, its own agenda that often conflicts with that of other Kurdish groups. The following analysis of the battle for Sinjar in northern Iraq illustrates this ability to cooperate when fighting a common enemy and the potential for internal divisions and mistrust of the others’ motives. Figure 1. Kurdish-inhabited areas

Red Diamond Page 3 March 2017 The Battle for Sinjar The battle for Sinjar illustrates the sublevel of shifting relationships in the Syria-Iraq operational environment. Sinjari is a strategically-located Iraqi town in northwestern Nineveh province. It lies along a major ISIS east-west supply route that connects Mosul in Iraq with Raqqa in Syria—two important ISIS-held cities. Sinjar is approximately 52 km east of the Syrian border and 117 km west of Mosul. It is positioned at the foot of the Sinjar Mountains, an east-west mountain range rising 1,463 m above the surrounding alluvial steppe plains. Sinjar is populated primarily by a Kurdish religious minority called the Yazidis. The Yazidis are particularly vulnerable to violence and persecution, having been the object of hatred for centuries because of their religious practices. Yazidis are ethnically Kurdish, but their religion combines elements of Islam, ancient Persian Zoroastrianism, and Eastern Mediterranean Mithraism. While Yazidis are monotheists, they believe in a fallen angel who serves as an intermediary between God and man. To Muslims, this intermediary resembles the Quranic devil. Yazidis are, therefore, considered devil worshippers by their Muslim neighbors. With isolated geography and a history of persecution, the Yazidis rarely intermarry with outsiders and do not accept converts, further distinguishing themselves.3 Figure 2. Strategic cities of Zumar, Wana, and Sinjar In June 2014, ISIS began an offensive in Nineveh province and captured Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, that same month.4 This ISIS victory gave momentum to a push throughout Peshmerga-held Nineveh province. On 1 August 2014, ISIS attacked a Peshmerga unit in the town of Zumar, a small Kurdish-majority outpost 40 km northwest of Mosul. ISIS killed 14 Peshmerga soldiers, while the group sustained 100 casualties and 38 members were taken prisoner in the attack.5 On 2–3 August, in a serious setback for Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers, ISIS succeeded in taking three strategic towns: Zumar, Wana, and Sinjar. Zumar is an oil-rich area that also lies on a road leading to Syria and Wana is a town on the Tigris River within striking distance of the Mosul dam.6 The towns form a triangle west from Mosul to the borders of Syria and Turkey. The capture of these towns gave ISIS both momentum and proximity to seriously threaten those protecting the Mosul dam, which was temporarily captured and then lost by ISIS between 7–18 August 2014.7 ISIS forces continued throughout August 2014 to push Kurdish Peshmerga forces from positions in Nineveh province. On 6 August, ISIS moved to within 49 km of Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish autonomous region, threatening US military and civilian personnel. On 8 August, the US began conducting airstrikes against ISIS positions, beginning around Erbil, to stop ISIS’ advance on that city.8 Starting on 9 August, the US began airstrikes around the Sinjar Mountains to relieve Yazidis and others trapped by ISIS.9 ISIS successes created a humanitarian crisis, with thousands displaced from their homes, kidnapped, injured, and killed by ISIS fighters. In the Sinjar area, ISIS gunned down 5,000 Yazidi men in a series of massacres, detained over 5,000 Yazidi women to be sold into slavery or given to jihadists as wives and sex slaves, and caused as many as 200,000 civilians to flee, 50,000 of whom retreated into the besieged Sinjar Mountains. Pictures of Yazidis surrounded and trapped by ISIS on Mount Sinjar put increasing international pressure on the US administration to act and on Peshmerga forces—who were stinging from multiple defeats at the hands of ISIS—to reclaim lost territory.10 The offensive to take Sinjar back began at dawn on Thursday, 5 November 2015, on three fronts. US-led coalition air attacks preceded the Kurdish ground attack. A coalition of PKK, YPG, Sinjar Resistance Unit (YBS), and Peshmerga fighters attacked south into Sinjar. Opening with a rocket attack, the Kurdish forces moved south from the mountain to reinforce fighters already in the city. Movement through the city was slow and difficult due to ISIS marksmen, snipers, and suicide and planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Most of the ISIS fighters had already left the city under the heavy

i Sinjar is the Arabic name; however, the Kurdish Shingal is also seen in some writings.

Red Diamond Page 4 March 2017 bombardment, leaving behind small sniper teams. ISIS snipers, having been in the city for months, had the advantage of knowledge of the terrain, prepared positions, tunnels, underground shelters, and the element of surprise.11

Figure 3. Battle for Sinjar

Red Diamond Page 5 March 2017 While some Kurdish fighters attacked from the north, others moved from the east and the west of Sinjar to cut off ISIS’ supply line along Highway 47 between Mosul and Raqqa. Fighters, mostly PKK, attacked from the west while a predominately Peshmerga force attacked from the east. ISIS utilized practiced techniques in attempting to prevent its supply line from being cut and its units surrounded. ISIS used marksmen, snipers, ambushes, IEDs, and suicide bombers along the road and in the city to block movement. The coalition force eventually cleared the road after a few days of slow and cautious movement. Most of the ISIS fighters had already exfiltrated from the area as the Kurdish forces made gains. As the Kurds began to claim victory, a few snipers stayed behind to harass and prevent complete Kurdish freedom of movement. Additionally, clearing the city of booby-traps and other kinds of IEDs slowed free movement within the city. In one mass grave, for example, ISIS rigged bodies to explode when moved.12 Kurdish Coalition Vulnerabilities While successful in Sinjar, the coalition that defeated ISIS is an exploitable vulnerability. This coalition included Kurdish forces from the Peshmerga, PKK, YPG, and YBS. The major fault line lies between the PKK and its growing allies and the KRG with its Peshmerga fighters and its allies. The KRG is particularly concerned about other Kurdish groups permanently occupying Iraqi land around Sinjar. Questions of which group will administer the captured area, mistrust, and historical disagreements have potential for eruption. Peshmerga forces are the military arm of the KRG. Of the groups who fought to retake Sinjar, the Peshmerga was the largest and best-resourced. The KRG considers Nineveh province part of its territory.13 It has consistently played down the role of other participants, to the annoyance of those who continued to fight ISIS after the Peshmerga was forced out of the area earlier.14 The major rival to the Peshmerga forces is the PKK. Formed in the 1970s, the PKK is an armed separatist group fighting to gain Kurdish independence from Turkey. Designated by the US as an international terrorist organization, it cannot coordinate directly with the US and needed to pass targets and friendly position coordinates through the Peshmerga during the Sinjar operations. The PKK maintained a forward base at a northern entry point to the city at the foot of Mount Sinjar during the months preceding the final attack.15 A smaller group allied with the PKK is the Syrian YPG, the military arm of the Democratic Union Party. The YPG has emerged from the Syrian civil war with fighting tactics and techniques that allow it to perform well against ISIS. Relying on speed, stealth, and surprise, the YPG has been able to quickly redirect attacks to outflank and ambush its enemy. The YPG has trained over 1,000 Yazidis in one-week courses, giving it influence and loyalty in areas where its fighters are now occupying Iraqi ground previously held by Peshmerga forces. Iraqi Kurds view any permanent occupation by the YPG as a violation of Kurdish sovereignty.16 The Yazidis formed the Sinjar Resistance Unit (YBS) when ISIS forced them out of their city. Allied primarily with the PKK and the YPG, the YBS remained after the Peshmerga left Sinjar in the summer of 2014. The YBS conducted urban attacks in the city and protected displaced Yazidis in the Sinjar Mountain. Increased Yazidi confidence in its own protection forces after the military training, experience, and alliances developed with other Kurdish groups during the Sinjar battles need to be factored into any future KRG dealings with the Yazidis. The Yazidis blamed, in part, the Peshmerga’s retreat from Sinjar in 2014 for the ISIS atrocities that occurred in its absence. This has left the Yazidis with anger toward and mistrust of the Peshmerga fighters.17 Training Implications The Kurds represent one of the many complexities that will develop after the contraction of ISIS. Each of the Kurdish groups in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey has enjoyed degrees of success against ISIS, which has added to its confidence and increased its ambitions. Understanding the nuances of this complex operational environment will be even more critical as the sole focus on ISIS is replaced with multiple groups with divergent interests and agendas. Leaders will have to navigate this new operational environment with a keen understanding of the intricate interactions and relationships between all of the groups.

Reference Burns, Rick. “Battle for Sinjar, Iraq.” US Army, TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. April 2016.

Red Diamond Page 6 March 2017 Notes

1 Frontline. “The Kurd’s Story.” 2014. 2 BBC News. “Who are the Kurds?.” 14 March 2016. 3 Avi Asher-Schapiro. “Who Are the Yazidis, the Ancient, Persecuted, Religious Minority Struggling to Survive in Iraq?” National Geographic. 11 August 2014. 4 Al Jazeera. “Rebels Seize Control of Iraq’s Nineveh.” 10 June 2014. For a more detailed description of the fall of Mosul, see Threat Tactics Report: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. 5 APF. “Jihadists Kill Dozens as Iraq Fighting Rages.” Al Arabiya. 2 August 2014. 6 F. Brinley Bruton. “Mosul Dam: Residents Living Downstream in Wana Fear Annihilation.” NBC News. 9 April 2016; Abdel Hamid Zebari. “Iraq Town Lives in Shadow of World’s ‘Most Dangerous Dam’.” AFP. 6 March 2016; Iraq-Business News. “Kurdish and Arab Families Return to Zummar.” 18 October 2016. 7 Tim Arango. “Sunni Extremists in Iraq Seize 3 Towns from Kurds and Threaten Major Dam.” The New York Times. 3 August 2014; Tim Arango, “Jihadists Rout Kurds in North and Seize Strategic Iraqi Dam.” The New York Times. 7 August 2014; BBC News. “Iraq CrIsis: Mosul Dam Retaken from IS.” 19 August 2014. For a more detailed description of the ISIS defense of the Mosul dam, see Threat Tactics Report: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. 8 Julian E. Barnes, Jeffrey Sparshott, and Nour Malas. “Barack Obama Approves Airstrikes on Iraq, Airdrops Aid.” The Wall Street Journal. 8 August 2014. 9 Dan Roberts, Martin Chulov, and Julian Borger. “Obama Authorises Air Strikes on ISIS to Help Iraqis Besieged on Mountain.” The Guardian. 8 August 2014. 10 Mohammed A. Salih and Wladimir van Wilgenburg. “Iraqi Yazidis: ‘If We Move They Will Kill Us’.” Al Jazeera. 5 August 2014; Steve Hopkins. “Full Horror of the Yazidis Who Didn’t Escape Mount Sinjar: UN Confirms 5,000 Men Were Executed and 7,000 Women Are Now Kept As Sex Slaves.” Daily Mail. 14 October 2014; Martin Chulov. “Iraq’s Largest Christian Town Abandoned As ISIS Advance Continues.” The Guardian. 7 August 2014. 11 BBC News. “Kurds’ ‘Advance on IS-held Sinjar’r.” MSN. 11 December 2015. For more information on snipers and marksmen, see Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. 12 William Watkinson. “Sinjar: 123 Booby-Trapped Bodies of Dead Yazidis Found in Shallow Grave after ISIS Slaughter.” International Business Times. 28 November 2015; BBC News. “Battle for Sinjar: Kurds ‘Advance on IS-Held Iraqi town.” 12 November 2015. 13 Kurdistan Region Security Council. “Operation Free Sinjar Concluded – KRSC Statement.” 14 November 2015; KR Security Council. “Twitter Feed.” Twitter. 11 November 2015. 14 Mohammed A. Salih. “With the Islamic State Gone from Sinjar, Kurdish Groups Battle for Control.” Al Monitor. 10 December 2015. 15 Al Jazeera America. “Exclusive: Inside the PKK’s Frontline Fight against ISIS.” 11 June 2015; Mohammed A. Salih. “With the Islamic State Gone from Sinjar, Kurdish Groups Battle for Control.” Al Monitor. 10 December 2015. 16 Michael Stephens. “Analysis: YPG – the Islamic State’s Worst Enemy.” IHS Jane’s 360; Danny Gold. “Meet the YPG, the Kurdish Militia that Doesn’t Want Help from Anyone.” Vice. 31 October 2012; John Caves. “Syrian Kurds and the Democratic Union Party (PYD).” Institute for the Study of War. 6 December 2012. 17 Sheren Khalel and Matthew Vickery. “Armed and Ready: Displaced Yazidis Battle ISIS in Sinjar.” Middle East Monitor. 7 March 2015; Joanna Paraszczuk. “Yazidi Militias Fight IS in Iraq, Amid Kurdish Rivalries.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. 11 June 2015. ______

Red Diamond Page 7 March 2017 by Nicole Bier (DAC) and Patrick Madden (BMA Ctr), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

“The proliferation of UAS has created an airspace environment in which target identification is an issue…Distinguishing friendly from other UAS may be possible through technical means, but difficulties from proliferation of similar systems is systemic and unlikely to decline in the near- to mid-term.”1 —United States Army Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Strategy Extract, 5 October 2016

As unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)ii and their payloads decrease in size, visual CID of UAVs will become increasingly more difficult. “Low-cost drones may lead to a paradigm shift in ground warfare in the United States, ending more than a half- century of air dominance in which US ground forces have not had to fear attacks from the air.”2 Standard visual CID practices will not meet the evolving threat for lower-class UAVs. In January 2017’s Red Diamond Newsletter, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) provided an assessment of rotational training units (RTUs) and their lack of small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) utilization.3 JMRC suggested that training units are not planning for UAS operations in a congested and contested micro or mini UAV threat environment. It also suggested RTUs should integrate their UAS more effectively, starting at the battalion and brigade level.4 Planning for operations also involves the ability to detect friendly UAS from non-friendly UAVs. CID of UAVs is complex and continues to present challenges. UAVs do not come in a standard shape and size. There is no conventional and internationally-recognized method to name or classify a UAV based on the wings, engine, fuselage, and tail features as with jet aircraft or helicopters. An updated UAV variant may have a new name or fit into a different classification group. The drawn-out weapons system procurement process that militaries have grown comfortable with does not necessarily apply with the development of unmanned aircraft. A UAV can go through the long acquisition cycle or it can be built quickly and discreetly in a garage, similar to improvised explosive devises. Unmanned aircraft pose a threat from near-peer and non-state actors alike. Never before has a military weapons system been so widely proliferated. Worldwide UAV Proliferation Recently, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has received significant amounts of headline attention due to its increasing use of UAVs and associated explosives. Hostile UAV operations are escalating in Syria and Iraq with the number of unidentified UAVs rising. Foreign, indigenous, and crude UAV programs now exist in developing countries. Due to the rate of proliferation, UAV numbers and percentages will likely increase as they have since the last time ACE-TI reported UAV status information. For instance, there were 200 UAV types by 2010.5 The Rand Corporation reported there were 960 types of UAVs produced by 270 companies by 2015.6 It is currently estimated that 86 countries have UAV capability and 19 of these countries have or are acquiring armed UAV capability.7 The top five countries leading this industry include, in order: The United States, Israel, China, Iran, and Russia.8 There were 439 UAV imports/exports from 2010–2014 among 35 different countries, and it was reported that Israel was responsible for 60.7% of worldwide UAV exports from 1985–2014.9 Although Iran is rarely mentioned with regard to advanced technology, its role in the UAV market is growing significantly. Reports indicate that Iran exports UAVs to non-state actors such as Hizballah, a group that has experimented with armed UAVs.10 The ii UAV is the title given to platforms used by adversaries of the US—to include the opposing force (OPFOR). When these platforms are used by US, allied, and friendly forces, even in training, they are referred to as unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

Red Diamond Page 8 March 2017 “proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems – especially the low, slow and small category…pose a significant problem in detection, identification and defeat.”11 UAV Naming Convention and Classification There are various reasons that UAV distinction creates confusion. The many names that unmanned aircraft (UA) are referred by is just one example. Below is a list with 23 different names for UA. Table 1. Different Unmanned Aircraft Names

23 Different Unmanned Aircraft Names Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Non-Traditional Aviation Technology Unmanned Aerospace System Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Unmanned Combat Air System Uninhabited Aircraft System Unmanned Weapon System Remotely Operated Aircraft Unmanned Aircraft System Marine Corps Tactical UAS Unmanned Aerial System Remotely Piloted Aircraft Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Remotely Piloted Vehicle Unmanned Air Vehicle Small Tactical UAS Unmanned Aircraft Enemy UAS Tactical UAV Small UAS Tactical UAS Small UA Drone

The names listed above are not quite one in the same, yet some of them are used interchangeably. The US Army term Future Combat Systems was also proposed at one point. In addition to the numerous ways to refer to UA, the various UAV classification methods also cause a misunderstanding: launch method, altitude classification, operational echelon classification, class, and group, as well as other methods. For example, UAV classification under differently-tiered countries are determined by UAV capability. With the increase of armed UAVs and the US Armed Drone Export Policy, some organizations are tracking a country’s UAV capabilities based on the following: 1) those who possess UAVs, 2) those who possess armed UAVs, and 3) those who use armed UAVs in combat.12 The Wing Loong 1 Chinese medium altitude, long endurance, multi-purpose, armed, and reconnaissance-capable aircraft is one example of a highly-proliferated dual-purpose UAV with multiple variants: Pterosaru I, Pterodactyl I, Sky Saker, WJ-1, GJ- 1, Wing Loong ID, and Wing Loong II (in development). This UAV is included in the ACE-TI 2016 Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) 13 (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Wing Loong I (from WEG, Volume II) Classifying UAVs has become a multifaceted, difficult process due to the speed at which they are proliferated and the vast amount of makes, models, and versions available. There is not one official global methodology to name or classify a UAV as there generally is with tanks, aircraft, and other military weapons and equipment. There are agencies within the US and other countries that classify unmanned aircraft according to their own requirements. For instance, foreign countries that are not allies of the United States have initiated the development of UAV programs and have devised their own UAV naming and classification methods.14 State and non-state actors alike have access to unarmed and armed UAVs, and their naming and classification systems are questionable, and at times, unknown. The increasing number of UAVs traded throughout the world will continue to add to identification and classification challenges.

Red Diamond Page 9 March 2017 Identification of Armored Vehicles, Aircraft, and UAVs Visual identification of vehicles or aircraft requires knowledge of several indicators associated with the object, as well as having the ability to recognize enemy, neutral, or friendly threats under stress, which presents further challenges.15 Indicators that assist with the identification of manned aircraft include physical characteristics and acoustic signatures. US military forces are applying such concepts against UAVs. Regarding CID, “the individual soldier, reconnaissance airmen, or unmanned vehicle sensor operator will still need to rely heavily on their own knowledge.”16 As UAV proliferation grows, the ability to visually identify threat unmanned aircraft will become more challenging. Physical characteristics play a critical role in visual CID. Knowing certain key features of an armored vehicle, such as the general shape of the vehicle and the shape, size, and placement of the turret, gun barrel, tracks, and other indicators assist in the CID of armored vehicles. Research has suggested that the difficult CID aspect of vehicles is sub-ordinate classification, which is discriminating between similar-looking vehicles such as two main battle tanks.17 The various types of UAVs available, the small size of micro and mini UAVs, and the various UAV shapes make sub-ordinate classification of UAVs more difficult.18 Basic classification and super-ordinate classification are easier and become less relevant with UAVs. Basic classification is simply the ability to distinguish an armored vehicle from a civilian vehicle, and super-ordinate classification is the ability to distinguish a vehicle from an aircraft.19 The physical characteristics of a UAV may not be as distinguishable from friendly assets as tanks are through sub-ordinate classification. When there are multiple variants of a main battle tank, such as the M1, M1A1, and M1A2 Abrams—some of which are proliferated—there are noticeable upgrades in capabilities and sometimes physical attributes that align with the technological advancement. However, CID challenges exist. A significant number of M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles were destroyed by friendly fire in the first Iraq War.20 If the identification of military ground vehicles is difficult, attempts to visually identify UAVs will likely cause more confusion. Similar to armored vehicles, understanding key features of an aircraft plays a significant role in its visual identification. Being able to identify an aircraft according to the standard wings, engines, fuselage, and tail (WEFT) method is key. Knowing the characteristics of WEFT items on a jet are all part of the visual CID process for aircraft. Knowing how many rotors and propellers there are and where they are located on a helicopter, along with engines sound and type, fuselage location, and tail size, shape, and position are all part of the visual CID of helicopters, as well. Visual CID of micro UAVs, which is the smallest class of UAVs according to opposing force (OPFOR) classification guidance, requires US ground forces to rely on sub-ordinate classification almost exclusively. For example, making a distinction between intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) UAVs that are generally smaller and quieter than armored vehicles and manned aircraft is more complex, even with the use of sub-ordinate classification. Detecting and identifying future armed UAVs that are smaller and faster will also pose additional challenges. Due to the rate of UAV proliferation, soldiers are not afforded the opportunity, training, and time to study critical identification factors of every single hostile UAV before it enters into combat, thereby resulting in diminishing returns from limited visual CID of UAVs. A more effective identification method is electronic CID. For instance, a manned aircraft with a significant radar cross- section can be detected by antiaircraft radar due to its high speed, service ceiling, and larger size. When there are multiple variants of enemy aircraft, similar to a main battle tank, the additional capabilities are usually included incrementally, and there is ample time for friendly forces to study the change. An F-16 Fighting Falcon can usually be identified through standard visual and electronic CID methods, despite dozens of F-16 variants with major modifications, special mission updates, and engine variants, as well as derivative fighter aircraft from other countries. These aircraft can be detected by thermal signatures. An F-16 also produces significantly more noise than any current threat tactical, mini, or micro unmanned aircraft. WEFT, radar cross-section size, and thermal and acoustic signatures that manned aircraft produce are CID luxuries that US ground forces can rely on. However, soldiers do not have these capabilities when faced with UAVs that operate at 25,000 feet or lower with a limited target profile. In a UAV-thriving environment, soldiers are afforded less time to train for and react to visual CID of UAVs, thereby making other methods of CID more critical. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Findings The challenge of visual identification of UAS is also found in the domestic airspace, especially with hobbyists. As a worldwide growing industry, unmanned aircraft are integrated into a significant number of military and civilian operations. The FAA discovered human-factor challenges with the visual identification of aircraft in the US National Airspace System

Red Diamond Page 10 March 2017 while researching preventative mid-air collision measures. “Research has shown that the average person has a reaction time of 12.5 seconds…a small or high-speed object like small unmanned aircraft could pose a serious threat…this is particularly important with small UAS.”21 Although the FAA’s findings are for commercial and general aviation pilots in uncontested airspace, it is necessary to recognize how these results transfer to a soldier’s visual CID of small UAVs in contested airspaces. Due to the difficulties with visual CID of small unmanned aircraft, the FAA and Department of Defense have been conducting ongoing research with electronic identification systems. Electronic CID of UAVs Recent developments with electronic CID of UAVs are beneficial to ground forces. Two examples include the Anti-UAV Defence System (AUDS) and VMAX, with the former being vehicle-portable and the latter being man-portable.22 The purpose of the multi-faceted AUDS is to defeat the growing threat of various classes of unmanned aircraft.23 AUDS “can detect a drone five miles (8km) away using electronic scanning radar, track it using infrared and daylight cameras and specialist software before disrupting the flight using an inhibitor to block the radio signals that control it.”24 Following AUDS’ earlier testing along the Korean demilitarized zone, this system has recently been fielded to the US military to provide advanced detect, track, classify, disrupt, or neutralize capabilities against threat UAVs in urban or rural terrain in all weather conditions.25 Key locations for AUDS placement will most likely be airfields and forward arming and refueling points to protect fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The other system is called VMAX, a lightweight, tactical, electronic warfare support and attack system that has been fielded in Iraq and Europe.26 VMAX can also detect, locate, monitor, and jam radio frequencies. Active systems, such as AUDS, are very effective against non-peer adversaries, whereas passive systems, such as VMAX, are more effective against near-peer adversaries.27 Procedural CID of UAVs Along with electronic CID, procedural CID can be effective and is based on flight characteristics and point of origin.28 In order to recognize abnormal UAV flight patterns, soldiers must understand friendly UAS flight patterns. Soldiers should understand standard operating procedures (SOPs) and unit techniques and procedures of UAS in order to identify standard vs. non-standard flight behaviors. For instance, it is vital to recognize UAS routes to the front lines, cruising altitudes, operating airspeeds, and mission sets; this knowledge also facilitates the identification of what is not considered normal flight characteristics. An example would be a UAV operating at 100 feet conducting ISR on friendly forces, when (theoretically speaking) standard UAS operations include flights at 250– 500 feet conducting ISR on threat forces, which should be far away from friendly forces. Procedural CID, along with electronic CID, will help with visual CID in some cases. With several hundred threat UAVs available, identification of UAVs is becoming more of a comprehensive process. Relying on visual CID alone will not be enough for current and future UAV threats. UAV Manufacturing Companies

One of many reasons that make the exclusive use of visual CID of UAVs difficult stems from manufacturing changes. An example of a UAV that could generate confusion is the Russian-built front-line reconnaissance micro ZALA 421 series, which has multiple versions, to include fixed and rotary wing models that are included in the 2016 WEG (see Figure 2).29 Another situation that results in confusion with visual CID of UAVs is the acquisition of an original UAV manufacturer. For instance, ZALA-series UAVs were originally owned by the Russian Zala Aero Company, which was recently acquired by Kalashnikov, Russia's largest arms manufacturer. Kalashnikov now produces the ZALA 421- 16E5 tactical UAV.30 The ZALA 421-16E5 is a catapult-launched tactical UAV with Figure 2. ZALA 421-08, ZALA 421-12, a completely different design and capability than the previous, much-smaller and ZALA 421-21 (from WEG, micro, hand-launched ZALA 421 series. Volume II)

Red Diamond Page 11 March 2017 Companies like Kalashnikov upgraded UAVs with different functionalities and new design structures compared to Zala’s original UAV. There are also other manufacturers developing and producing very similar UAVs. For instance, the Rainbow Series CH-4B is produced by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, commonly referred to as CASC, and looks very much like the Wing Loong I, as well as the US MQ-9 Reaper.31 However, other variants of the Wing Loong I do not look like the CH-4B. The Wing Loong I is produced by another Chinese Company, Chengdu Aircraft Design & Research Institute, commonly referred to as CADI. Identifying which one of these aircraft is a threat, not to mention which Chinese UAV is flying, is a very challenging task in a congested and contested airspace due to their very similar physical profiles. Training The topic of training shortfalls was introduced at the beginning of this article. It is also recognized by the military and is being addressed by OPFOR units at combat training centers (CTCs), which incorporate and use UAS and UAVs as part of their force structure during training exercises. The JMRC CTC has reported that training units are not effectively incorporating training for unmanned aircraft in a saturated airspace.32 The same holds true for all the other CTCs. The Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) CTC has also noted that, “Brigade and division-level staffs often do not understand Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) capabilities or how to support or task them.”33 Training units also struggle to detect, identify, and defeat UAVs flying in very competitive airspaces. As a result, counter-UAV efforts, to include training at CTCs, provide environments that include training in congested and contested UAV airspaces that require the complex process of detecting, identifying, and destroying UAVs. Ideal Training Methods At the exponential rate with which UAVs are produced and proliferated, the ability to detect, identify, and defeat them in a congested and contested airspace will become more challenging. An attempt to maintain situational awareness (SA) of threat unmanned aircraft is much more complex than having SA of threat military ground vehicles and manned aircraft. Ideal training methods involve US and coalition forces understanding the friendly and coalition UAS air picture first. Knowing what friendly and coalition air assets are present, how they operate, and where they operate will assist in developing a database library. This archived collection should include catalogued signals, flight characteristics, operational capabilities and limitations, SOPs, techniques, procedures, and physical characteristics of friendly and coalition UAS. Having SA of US and coalition UAS through various identification methods, such as electronic, procedural, and visual, is crucial in identifying friendly from unfriendly unmanned aircraft. In the event an unmanned aircraft does not respond, look like, and/or act like a friendly asset then, through deductive reasoning, it should be considered an unfriendly asset. Part of the US Army strategy evolves around micro, mini, and tactical UAV threats with a “whole of force” approach that includes identification of friendly forces with electronic, procedural, or visual means.34 To accomplish this, standardization in training, doctrine, and employment of UAS is critical. Joint Publication 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, states, “Friendly C2 [command and control] and air defense nodes must be able to differentiate between friendly and enemy Unmanned Aircraft (UA)…UAS operators must follow prescribed airspace control, and air defense identification procedures in order to prevent friendly fire and/or prevent enemy UA exploitation of that airspace.”35 Similar to the JMRC’s assessment introduced earlier on, units participating in MCTP Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) exercises should learn UAS force structure first, then threat UAVs. To understand threat UAVs from a visual and operational lens, refer to the UAV portion of the WEG, which shows a diverse list of UAVs that will be used during MCTP warfighter exercises. Additionally, the unit could incorporate JMRC lessons learned in the article cited above and include its training methodology while preparing for training exercises. The same recommendation holds true for other combat training centers. The worldwide UAV inventory will continually evolve and operational capabilities will change depending on the adversary. It is encouraged that commanders emphasize and support soldier familiarity training with US friendly and coalition UAS signals, flight characteristics, operational capabilities and limitations, SOPs, techniques, procedures, and physical characteristics in order for CID of UAVs to be more effective.

Notes 1 United States Army. “United States Army Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) Strategy Extract.” 5 October 2016. 2 Kelley Sayler. “A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology Primer.” Center for a New American Security. June 2015. 3 LTC Matthew T. Archambault, CPT Franklin G. Peachey, et al. “Opposition Forces versus Rotational Training Unit Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Systems at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center.” Red Diamond. January 2017. (CAC required for access.)

Red Diamond Page 12 March 2017 4 LTC Matthew T. Archambault, CPT Franklin G. Peachey, et al. “Opposition Forces versus Rotational Training Unit Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Systems at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center.” Red Diamond. January 2017. (CAC required for access.) 5 Mark Pomerleau. Drone Threats on the Rise. C4ISRNET. September 2016. Pg 15. 6 John Gordon IV, John Matsumura, et al. “Comparing U.S. Army Systems with Foreign Counterparts: Identifying Possible Capability Gaps and Insights from Other Armies.” 2015. Pg 35. 7 New America. “World of Drones: Military.” International Security. Accessed 29 December 2016. 8 Robert Farley. “The Five Most Deadly Drone Powers in the World.” The National Interest. 16 February 2015. 9 George Arnett. “The Numbers behind the Worldwide Trade in Drones.” The Guardian. 16 March 2015. 10 Robert Farley. “The Five Most Deadly Drone Powers in the World.” The Guardian. 16 February 2015. 11 Mark Pomerleau. Drone Threats on the Rise. C4ISRNET. September 2016. Pg 15. 12 New America. “World of Drones: Military.” International Security. Accessed 29 December 2016. 13 US Army, TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. Worldwide Equipment Guide – Volume 2: Airspace and Air Defense Systems. December 2016. Pg 182. (CAC required for access.) 14 John Gordon IV, John Matsumura, et al. “Comparing U.S. Army Sytems with Foreign Counterparts: Identifying Possible Capability Gaps and Insights from Other Armies.” 2015. Pg 101. 15 Joseph R. Keebler, Dustin C. Smith, et al. “Review of Combat Identification Training: Technologies, Metrics, and Individual Differences.” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 59th Annual Meeting. 2015. 16 Joseph R. Keebler. Dustin C. Smith, et al. “Review of Combat Identification Training: Technologies, Metrics, and Individual Differences.” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 59th Annual Meeting. 2015. 17 Joseph R. Keebler, Dustin C. Smith, et al. “Review of Combat Identification Training: Technologies, Metrics, and Individual Differences.” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 59th Annual Meeting. 2015. 18 Joseph R. Keebler, Department of Human Factors and Systems, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Email correspondence with Nicole Bier. 21 February 2017. 19 Joseph R. Keebler, Dustin C. Smith, et al. “Review of Combat Identification Training: Technologies, Metrics, and Individual Differences.” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 59th Annual Meeting. 2015. 20 Barbara L. O’Kane, Irving Biederman, et al. “An Account of Objects Identification Confusions.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. 1997. Pgs 21–41; Ralph W. Briggs and Joseph H. Goldberg. “Battlefield Recognition of Armored Vehicles.” Human Factors. 1995. Pgs 596–610. 21 Federal Aviation Administration. “Advisory Circular 90-48D: Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance.” US Department of Transportation. April 2016. Pg 2. 22 MAJ Ryan Liebhaber, Asymmetric Warfare Group. Telephone conversation with Nicole Bier. 28 February 2017. 23 Newstex. “Products in the News: World's First Fully Integrated Anti-UAV Defence Systems (AUDS) Now Features Quad Band RF.” 14 September 2015. (ProQuest membership required.) 24 Newstex. “Products in the News: World's First Fully Integrated Anti-UAV Defence Systems (AUDS) Now Features Quad Band RF.” 14 September 2015. (ProQuest membership required.) 25 Jof Enriquez. ”U.S. Military Deploys First Fully Integrated Anti-UAV System.” rfglobalnet. 27 January 2017. 26 MAJ Ryan Liebhaber, Asymmetric Warfare Group. Telephone conversation with Nicole Bier. 2 March 2017. 27 MAJ Ryan Liebhaber, Asymmetric Warfare Group. Telephone conversation with Nicole Bier. 10 March 2017. 28 United States Army. “United States Army Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) Strategy Extract.” 5 October 2016. 29 US Army, TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. Worldwide Equipment Guide – Volume 2: Airspace and Air Defense Systems. December 2016. Pg 182. (CAC required for access.) 30 Charles Forrester. Kalashnikov gets stake in mobile systems provider. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly. 7 December 2016. 31 John Pike. “Chang Hong-4 (CH-4).” Global Security. 12 July 2015. 32 LTC Matthew T. Archambault, CPT Franklin G. Peachey, et al. “Opposition Forces versus Rotational Training Unit Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Systems at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center.” Red Diamond. January 2017. (CAC required for access.) 33 COL Edward T. Bohnemann. “MCTP FY14 Trends in a Decisive Action Warfighter Exercise.” Fiscal Year14. 34 Daniel Wasserbly. US details strategy for countering tactical UASs. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly. 9 November 2016. Pg 13. 35 Defense Technical Information Center. Joint Publication 3-52: Joint Airspace Control. 13 November 2014. Pg III-10–11. ______

Red Diamond Page 13 March 2017 by Kristin Lechowicz (DAC) and Jon H. Moilanen (DAC), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration WHAT: MTT Description. The MTT provides a tailored Threat Tactics Course based on unit/activity requirements, with the purpose to understand and apply an opposing force (OPFOR) in support of US Army training, professional education, and leader-development learning objectives. An OPFOR is a combination of traditional and irregular forces, criminal organizations, and/or terrorist elements that represent varying capabilities of actual worldwide adversaries in doctrine, tactics, techniques, organization, and equipment. The OPFOR is tailored to replicate realistic, robust, and relevant hybrid threats in operational environments (OEs) as presented in US Army Regulation 350-2 and the US Army Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series. A diverse and dynamic OPFOR hybrid threat can be considered an affiliation or association of actors employing traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and/or disruptive capabilities to achieve a mutually-beneficial effect. The MTT uses the US Army’s Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) to provide a consistent tactical setting of OE variables and OPFOR in products. WHO: MTT Attendees. The MTT curriculum addresses threat topics useful to US Army Soldiers and leaders who will act as an opposing force (OPFOR) supporting institutional-readiness training missions such as a Combat Training Center or Regional Collective Training Capability (RCTC); Center of Excellence (CoE) training and curriculum developers; or threat managers, scenario developers, and home station training and installation planners. An MTT can be tailored for US Army battalion or brigade S-2 intelligence staffs or division G-2 staffs to analyze a multi- domain threat or hybrid threat and exercise tactical plans against threat courses of action. The MTT is open to US military, US government employees, and US government contractors. WHERE: MTT Presentation Requirements. An MTT can be presented in a wide range of unit/activity locations, and will adapt to facilities in coordination with the unit/activity point of contact. Preferred course capabilities include:  Computer with DVD/CD deck, projector, and projection screen for instructional lessons;  Internet connectivity for instructor(s) and attendees to Army Knowledge Online (AKO), Army Training Network (ATN), All Partners Access Network (APAN), and instructional videos; and  Three whiteboards or chalkboards (for small group exercises) with dry/erase markers or chalk in a small-group setting with desks and chairs. WHEN: MTT Duration. A typical MTT follows the five/day program similar to the Ft Leavenworth resident Threat Tactics Course (TTC), but can be tailored to a four-, three-, or two-day MTT, based on the unit/activity requirements. HOW: MTT Small-Group Concept. A recommended class size is 8 up to 24 attendees to facilitate small/group learning during the MTT; however, presentations can accommodate larger audiences if the intent is more informational rather than tactical instruction with practical exercises. Instructional methods include lecture, small-group research and discussion of threat topics and class presentations, video vignette assessments, and real/world threat incident analysis. Attendees develop threat courses of action and related intelligence-task preparation and products.

Red Diamond Page 14 March 2017 MTT Main Topics. Special presentations can be coordinated within an MTT format. Instruction includes the following main topics as coordinated with the unit/activity point of contact:  Threat concepts;  OPFOR functional tactics and functional analysis;  Strategic environment (SE), operational environment (OE), and OE variables;  Hybrid threat (HT) in current, complex, persistent conflict and relevant populations;  Threat actors: Regular and irregular forces, criminal organizations, and terrorist elements;  Offensive and defensive tactics and techniques;  Emerging threat capabilities; and  Practical exercises: Tactical offense and defense vignettes. COST: MTT Funding. The unit is responsible for funding the instructor temporary duty (TDY) costs. No additional MTT cost is incurred for course instruction for US military members, US government employees, or US government contractors. The TTC is “Foundry approved training.” The course does not currently reside on the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS); however, steps are being taken to include the TTC into the Foundry’s ATRRS courses. The unit/activity point of contact (POC) can request information from the G-2 ACE-TI course coordinator/course author to assist in identifying a cost estimate for an MTT to the unit’s location. Typical standard planning information includes:  Airfare is round-trip: Kansas City International Airport (MCI) to regional/international airport nearest MTT location;  Round-trip baggage fee for to/from air flight totals approximately $50;  Rental car (compact) from airport to MTT location, estimate $50 per day;  US government per diem and meals and incidental expenses (MIE) authorization. https://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104877; Other incidental costs can may include travel mileage or shuttle service to/from instructor residence/airport, or airport economy parking. Verify these types of cost in direct coordination with the MTT coordinator/instructor; MTT Proponent. The US Army TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the G-2 proponent for the TTC/MTT. The unit POC shapes MTT instruction and learning objectives in direct coordination with the G-2 ACE-TI course coordinator and course author. Coordinate directly with Kristin Lechowicz for course information or scheduling an MTT at a unit/activity. TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI points of contact for additional MTT information:  Kristin Lechowicz, TTC/MTT Coordinator/Course Author, [email protected], 913-684-7922.  Nicole Bier, Intelligence Operations Coordinator, [email protected], 913-684-7907.

Red Diamond Page 15 March 2017 NEW―Updated OPFOR Tasks in Combined Arms Training Strategies The opposing force (OPFOR) tasks in US Army Training Circular (TC) 7-101, Exercise Design (2010), have been updated as of March 2017 to 17 tasks and drills from the previous 24 tasks. These updated tasks are now posted in the US Army Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS). With common access card entry to the Army Training Network (ATN), this special bulletin shows an “Easy 1-2-3 sequence” of how to find the updated OPFOR tasks in CATS. As the US Army Combined Arms Center-Training Management Directorate (TMD) transitions CATS to the new US Army “Objective T” charter and formats, outdated OPFOR tasks will gradually be removed from CATS. Several obsolete OPFOR tasks will remain in the listing until that format transition is complete. To identify the current 17 OPFOR tasks, find the task number sequence in parentheses behind the task title. The sequence will have the following format: (71-CO-85xx) with the last two digits being the task number. See the visual aid (below) to access ATN, enter the CATS site, and prompt the CATS site-search tool with OPFOR as the key word.

Figure 1. Easy 1-2-3 sequence for OPFOR tasks and drills in CATS The updated OPFOR tasks and drills are as follows: No. OPFOR Task Title (Task Identification Number) 01 OPFOR Execute an Assault (71-CO-8501) 02 OPFOR Execute an Ambush (71-CO-8502) 03 OPFOR Execute a Raid (71-CO-8503) 04 OPFOR Execute a Reconnaissance Attack (71-CO-8504) 05 OPFOR Execute Reconnaissance (71-CO-8505) 06 OPFOR Execute Counterreconnaissance (71-CO-8506) 07 OPFOR Execute Defense of Complex Battle Position (71-CO-8507) 08 OPFOR All Arms Air Defense (71-CO-8508) 09 OPFOR Antilanding Actions (71-CO-8509) 10 OPFOR Disrupt (71-CO-8510) 11 OPFOR Actions on Contact (71-CO-8511) 12 OPFOR Situational Breach (71-CO-8512) 13 OPFOR Break Contact (71-CO-8513) 14 OPFOR Fix (71-CO-8514) 15 OPFOR Fire and Maneuver (71-CO-8515) 16 OPFOR Execute an Act of Terrorism (71-CO-8516) 17 OPFOR Crime (71-CO-8517)

Red Diamond Page 16 March 2017 by Jim Bird, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (IDSI Ctr) Africa is a huge continent, containing a number of dangerous neighborhoods with threat actors fully capable of furnishing the catalyst for a US or coalition regionally-aligned force deployment. A glance at the map below should provide an appreciation of just how large Africa is, making minor allowances for some countries that have had their boundaries graphically adjusted slightly to make them fit within the continent’s landmass.

Figure 1. The size of Africa relative to selected countries (modified by ACE-TI) Africa is clearly sufficiently-large to encompass any number of operational environments. Among these, Mali is potentially one of the most dangerous. In the northern part of the country, a UN compound in the city of Gao recently suffered what some observers have labeled as the most serious terrorist attack in the nation’s history.1

Red Diamond Page 17 March 2017 The Terrorist Attack On 18 January 2017, at approximately 0900 local time, one or more suicide bombers—estimates regarding the exact number of perpetrators range from one to five—eluded local security measures and crashed an explosives-laden 4x4 bearing UN markings through the flimsy metal gate of the UN-sponsored Mécanisme Opérationnel de Coordination, commonly called the Joint Operational Mechanism base in English. After running down several soldiers and local militia members inside the compound, the driver detonated his concealed cargo of explosives.2 A Malian government spokesman, Mountaga Hall, declared that the suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) detonated “just at the moment when forces Figure 2. The geographical proximity of Gao, Mali, and other signatories had gathered to salute the national flag to the West African region and go on patrol. So the moment was chosen to claim the highest number of victims.”3 The joint patrols were symbolically important because they signified a new level of cooperation among the Malian Armed Forces, separatist factions, and pro- government militias, all brought together under the provisions of a 2015 peace accord. A Chinese medical detachment— part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali—was first to arrive on the scene, accompanied by a Senegalese Rapid Reaction Force. Witnesses described horrific carnage: only 15 of the dozens of bodies were found intact near the explosion site. The number of casualties overwhelmed the local medical-care delivery system. At Gao’s hospital, all other activities ceased as all hands turned to the overriding effort of triaging scores of wounded Malian soldiers and militia members. According to Dr. Sadou Maiga, “some [victims] have died from their wounds, and others are in a very grave state. At this point, it’s not the toll of dead and injured that interests me, it’s saving who I can.”4 A day after the attack, the death toll stood at 77.5 Ironically, no UN peacekeepers numbered among the casualties: all victims were members of the Malian Army and allied militia members, mostly formerly-disaffected separatists who had recently signed onto a peace agreement with the country’s central government. Following the attack, Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita declared a three-day period of national mourning. Meanwhile, Mali Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop, speaking before the UN Security Council, characterized the bombing as “criminal, cowardly, and barbaric,” and vowed that Mali would not be distracted “from our will to move forward to promote peace and act against those who are trying to sabotage the peace process.”6

Figure 3. ACE-TI tactical sketch showing 18 January 2017 SVBIED attack sequence

Red Diamond Page 18 March 2017 Perpetrators’ Timing and Motivation Little time passed before the saboteur of the peace at Gao’s Joint Operational Mechanism base became apparent. In the waning hours of 18 January—the same day the attack occurred—a local franchise of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility via Facebook and the Mauritanian news agency Alakhbar.7 According to analysts at the Long War Journal, AQIM “said in a statement that the group’s Murabitoon battalion…led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar executed the attack. Their claim said that a suicide bomber, identified as Abdul Hadi al Fulani, detonated within a joint French-UN military base, killing 80.”8 The AQIM media release characterized al Fulani as a “knight of the Mourabitoun battalion” and a “martyrdom-seeking hero.”9 The dead perpetrator was apparently tenacious in pursuit of his martyrdom: he allegedly participated in an earlier suicide assault in Gao on 29 November 2016, but somehow survived the incident. Having lived to bomb another day, he returned to Gao the following January and carried his martyrdom task through to completion.10 The timing of the 18 January SVBIED attack is significant for two reasons, both related to an information warfare (INFOWAR) campaign aimed at intimidating Gao’s local population, the Malian government, and the international community at large. As already Figure 4. Alleged “martyrdom-seeking hero” Abdul Hadi al Fulani noted, al Fulani, acting either alone or in concert with a few others, rammed the gate of the Joint Operational Mechanism base. This occurred just as hundreds of militia members and Malian soldiers were preparing for a flag-raising ceremony, to be followed immediately thereafter by conducting joint patrols throughout the surrounding countryside. The arrangement that laid the groundwork for this type of militia-Malian Army collaboration was a June 2015 Algerian-brokered peace accord. Struck with United Nations approval, it aimed at ending decades of conflict between ethnic Tuareg separatist rebels and Mali’s central government. Two French deployments to the region— Operation Serval in January 2013 and Operation Barkhane in July 2014—went a long way toward motivating numerous separatist factions to come to the negotiating table. In part because Mali is a former French colony, the French deployments were conducted at the request of the Malian government and under UN auspices.11 These former anti-government factions that had recently pursued a course of cooperation with Mali’s government are viewed as collaborators by AQIM and its local franchise, Belmokhtar’s Murabitoon battalion. In part, the intent behind the 18 January SVBIED attack was to punish the local militias and the Malian Army for cooperating with the French, and to dissuade others from following their example. The conduct of joint patrols by the Malian Army and the newly-reconciled militia groups would have been a precedent-setting event, and the 18 January SVBIED attack effectively prevented it from happening on schedule.12 The statement released by the AQIM franchise confirmed that the intent of the 18 January Figure 5. The Joint Operational Mechanism base and surrounding terrain attack was “punishment for

Red Diamond Page 19 March 2017 cooperation with France.”13 It went on to say that “with this operation, we warn all who were lured by France to march as its allies that we will not allow the establishment of military posts and headquarters or the convening of patrols belonging to the French occupiers to wage war against the mujahadeen.”14 The INFOWAR Dimension Besides being tactically crafted to maximize the blast’s devastation in order to intimidate northern Mali’s local population, the timing of the SVBIED attack was also likely synchronized to achieve a strategic INFOWAR effect. Just days earlier, French President François Hollande had visited Mali’s capital city of Bamako to attend the 27th Africa-France summit— his last opportunity to participate in a gathering of this kind before his term in office concludes later this spring. For the past five years, Hollande’s Africa policy envisioned establishing “a new relationship [with Mali] founded on equality, trust, and solidarity.”15 This new and redirected relationship—intended to make a clean break with France’s past post-colonial stance toward its former colonies—prior to 18 January 2017 was widely considered one of the few bright spots in a second presidential term plagued “by the most abysmal approval ratings of any head of state in the history of [the] Fifth Republic.”16 Thus it was that on the day prior to the attack, J. Peter Pham of the Atlantic Council Africa Center reported that “the venue and date of the summit, held 13-14 of January were carefully selected to focus attention on what proved to be the high point of Hollande’s Africa policy, perhaps even his foreign policy in general.”17 Symbolically, “the summit took place four years to the day from when French forces launched Operation Serval against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other jihadist groups that [had taken advantage] of the free flow of fighters and weapons” occasioned by the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya.18 Islamist militants, especially including groups associated with AQIM, then leveraged their recently-gained advantage in weapons and personnel to seize control of the northern two-thirds of Mali. They eventually endangered the remainder of the country before being checked by the French-led intervention of February 2013 that stopped their advance on the capital city. By January of this year it seemed only logical for analysts at the Atlantic Council Africa Center to conclude that Mali was “certainly more back from the brink,” at least in comparison with the situation that had prevailed four years ago.19 If the timing of the 27th Africa- France summit was carefully selected, the timing of the SVBIED attack perpetrated the following week may have been more than

just a tactical move to maximize Figure 6. A closer view of the Joint Operational Mechanism base showing casualties. In addition to the breached gate (center) mass-casualty dimension, the attack turned a new page in the history of the ongoing INFOWAR by raising suspicions throughout the international community that perhaps Mali is less back from the brink than many observers previously thought, or that the issue of Mali’s national sovereignty is still yet to be decided. On 19 January, Francois Delattre, France’s ambassador to the United Nations, said that the attack was an “attempt against the ongoing efforts in Mali to stabilize the country and a direct effort to undermine the [UN-backed] peace agreement.”20 Only 48 hours before the ambassador made this comment, Gao was considered to be the best-secured town in northern Mali.21 Speaking from Washington, DC, Corrine Dufka, the associate director of Human Rights Watch (HRW), said that the 18 January suicide bombing “was very bad news for Mali and for the international community who have put a tremendous effort in trying to put Mali back together after the spectacular collapse in 2012.”22 In that context, she mentioned three main points stressed in HRW’s most recent report on human rights abuses in Mali: (1) “a continuing growing presence of the armed groups in northern…and central Mali where [Dufka] documented 27 executions by armed groups of those being accused of being [government] informants;” (2) a dubious if slowly-improving track record of sporadic abuses perpetrated by Malian security forces; and (3) similar “abuses by [UN] peacekeepers whose mandate is to ensure civilian protection.”23

Red Diamond Page 20 March 2017 What Makes Mali Special The spark that initiated the French intervention in Mali was an armed rebellion of Tuareg and Arab factions that challenged the legitimacy of the country’s central government. The contending parties to what amounted to a civil war generally fell into two major categories: the Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA), which sought independence for territory comprising most of the northern half of Mali, including the regions of Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, and the northeast portion of Mopti (see Figure 7); and the Platform, which consisted of a coalition of several generally pro-government militia groups, all with their own political agendas and memberships reflecting traditional tribal identities.24

Figure 7. Mali regions map The French-led Operation Serval in early 2013 consisted of some 5,000 personnel, 80% of them French, deployed in support of UN Resolution 2085, passed by the Security Council on 20 December 2012. The threefold objective of Operation Serval was (1) to suppress the separatist insurgency that had gathered sufficient southward momentum to threaten Mali’s capital city of Bamako; (2) to provide a safe haven for French nationals; and (3) to restore Mali’s territorial integrity.25 Operating in tandem with Operation Serval were several forces from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Initially, AFISMA reflected a civilian initiative of the African Union called MISAHEL, a combination of Mali and Sahel. In coordination with this effort the UN created its own civilian counterpart, called the United Nations Office in Mali, or UNOM.26 Because AFSIMA was comprised of indigenous African nations, its participation in the intervention lent an added aura of credibility to a counterinsurgency effort that otherwise would have been undertaken exclusively by a former colonial power. In accordance with another UN Security Council resolution, on 1 July 2013, AFISMA fell by the wayside as its authority transferred to a more long-term initiative called the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The ongoing MINUSMA effort is supported by an amalgam of countries, including France, that “would comprise up to

Red Diamond Page 21 March 2017 11,200 military personnel, including reserve battalions capable of deploying rapidly within the country as and when required,” and 1,440 police consisting of organized police units and individual police personnel.27 Two reserve battalions of infantry, most likely under MINUSMA auspices, were deployed to Gao in the aftermath of the 18 January attack.28 When the first French intervention began in early 2013, there was a meager silver lining on the cloud of conflict overspreading Mali’s northern region: at least some of the internecine warring groups were secular in their orientation. This fact made some kind of future peace arrangement seem achievable. However, by the time the second French intervention brought about the “Ougadougou [peace] Agreement” of June 2015, AQIM had already insinuated itself into the region, and neither it nor its local franchises were interested in a secular-based cessation of hostilities.29 That meant that as MINUSMA activities began to ramp up in Mali, UN peacekeepers themselves became targets for hostile threat actors in the operational environment. The task facing MINUSMA was already daunting enough without the complicating factor of Islamist extremism overlaying the longstanding mutual hostility prevalent among some of the secular threat actors. As one European diplomat observed, “the difficulty for Mali is not signing yet another peace agreement, but applying it.”30 The situation vaguely resembled conditions confronting the US Army during the 19th-century Indian Wars on America’s western frontier: negotiators could meet with any number of representatives from the various tribes, but the problem lay in arriving at a consensus strong enough to guarantee compliance by all the interested parties. As David Law, a Senior Fellow with the Center for Security Governance, noted in November 2016, “Implementation of the agreement Figure 8. SVBIED detonation as seen from the Chinese medical detachment compound has been severely limited over the past year or so, as its signatory groups have continued to clash...A year after [the Ougadougou Agreement’s] signing, the peace process appears frozen. There remains a fundamental lack of confidence between Bamako and the predominantly Tuareg forces that are supposed to work together with them to bring peace to the North.”31 As Islamist extremists effectively hijacked what formerly had been a separatist uprising by ethnic Tuareg people, the force protection situation for UN peacekeepers in Mali grew increasingly untenable. Militants actually began targeting MINUSMA personnel, whom they dubbed “Crusader occupation forces.”32 Meanwhile, in June 2016 the UN Security Council renewed MINUSMA’s mandate for another year. As the year wore on, Long War Journal staffers compiled a record totaling 257 terrorist attacks perpetrated in Mali and the wider West Africa region throughout 2016, a 150% increase relative to 106 incidents tallied during calendar year 2015. Of the 257 attacks, 93 involved improvised explosive devices, and of those, 6 were suicide bombings carried out near Gao, a commercial hub with just under 90,000 inhabitants.33 Target selection by Al Qaeda affiliates underscores the dangers facing MINUSMA personnel. Of the 257 attacks noted above, only 14% (37) were directed against civilians. Instead, Malian security forces (military, national guard, gendarmerie, and police) bore the brunt of the attacks (84 instances), while “UN forces were targeted 75 times, second most frequently. Another 35 [attacks] were directed at French forces.”34 Statistics vary regarding the number of UN casualties in Mali over the past four years. The Washington Post contends that “118 peacekeepers have been killed,” while the Long War Journal asserts that, “since the UN mandate began in 2013, more than 80 peacekeepers and six other employees have been killed in Mali.”35 Both sources agree, however, that MINUSMA is “the world body’s deadliest ongoing peace operation,” and that the frequency and scale of the 2016 AQIM-related attacks is likely to continue throughout 2017.36 Since World War II, UN peacekeeping forces have deployed to 69 world trouble spots, including civil wars, border disputes, and failed states. However, “the Mali mission is the only one of the 16 active U.N. peacekeeping operations that authorizes troops to deter and counter ‘asymmetric threats.’”37 Moreover, “the Mali mission marks the first time a significant peacekeeping contingent has been sent to help a state regain control over areas contested by terrorist groups.”38

Red Diamond Page 22 March 2017 All concerned are dissatisfied with the current set of circumstances. On the one hand, the patchwork of small international contingents that comprise the MINUSMA force in Mali are often poorly-trained, insufficiently-equipped, and ill-prepared to confront a rabid adversary who construes peacekeepers as the enemy. In sum, the operational environment (OE) bears little resemblance to ceasefire environments traditionally monitored by UN elements. On the other hand, the measures necessary to defeat Islamist militants tend to undermine the legitimacy of the peacekeeping effort, and complicates the UN’s role as an impartial mediator between warring groups. In Mali, the International Committee of the Red Cross regards the United Nations as “a party to the conflict,” and “at its New York headquarters and around the world, diplomats are debating: Should U.N. forces be engaged in counterterrorism at all?”39 The problem for troops on the ground is both urgent and immediate. Their UN leader in Gao, Mohamed El-Amine Souef (a native of the Comoros Islands), readily Figure 9. Crater left by the 18 January 2017 SVBIED detonation admits that upon deployment “we weren’t ready for these challenges,” and that, in order to be effective against jihadists, “we need to be able to hit the terrorists where they are, before they hit us.”40 Although the UN Security Council seemed to express agreement by vaguely authorizing a “more active and robust” role for its Mali contingent, real-world counterterrorism capacity lags far behind positive intentions.41 Despite constrained resources, some improvements are underway. A fleet of unmanned aerial systems is currently augmenting surveillance efforts in the OE, and Mali is now host to the first-ever UN intelligence cell, headquartered in Bamako and with analysts dispersed throughout the country. Finally, thousands of European troops, including sizable elements from Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden are present in the OE, including some with counterinsurgency experience acquired in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding these improvements, the MINUSMA footprint in Mali still remains too weak to take on terrorist cells whenever and wherever they can be located. Dutch Colonel Mike Kerkhove, commander of the aforementioned intelligence unit, provided an example wherein a UN force, after identifying what appeared to be a terrorist compound, chose to bypass it, knowing “that the nearest battalion of UN troops, from Senegal, didn’t have the weapons or air support [needed] to engage in a fight with transnational terrorists.”42 The Way Ahead and Training Applications Whatever the vulnerabilities and problem areas, though, several knowledgeable observers agree that UN missions resembling the one in Mali will become increasingly common in the future. As Colonel Kerkhove observed, “We are trying to learn these lessons here [in Mali], rather than in Iraq, Libya or Syria. This is not the end of this type of mission. It’s the beginning.”43 If AQIM- associated groups can still roam portions of the West African countryside in defiance of UN mandates, Kerkhove and his fellow peacekeepers at least have the satisfaction of knowing that the likes of Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abdul Hadi al Fulani did not have the last word in northern Mali. Although they delayed the departure of joint Figure 10. Overhead view of casualty collection efforts and patrols from Gao’s Joint Operational Mechanism SVBIED crater immediately following the attack base, they could not altogether preempt the mission. Just over a month after the 18 January SVBIED attack on the UN compound, on 23 February Reuters was able to report that “Malian soldiers staged their first joint patrol…with members

Red Diamond Page 23 March 2017 of rival armed groups in the town of Gao...Hundreds of soldiers from Mali’s army, France’s operation Barkhane, the U.N. peacekeeping mission, the Tuareg separatist Coordination of Azawad Movements and pro-government militias took part in the patrol.”44 Departing mid-morning on foot and in pick-up trucks, the patrol traversed a four-mile route and returned safely without meeting any resistance. This success, though significant, is limited in scope. Just over a week after the 18 January attack, some locals, sensing that UN forces were on the verge of creating a buffer zone in northern Mali that would cut across Gao region, staged a protest that partially surrounded the operating base. The demonstrators objected that such a buffer zone would potentially favor Tuareg separatists in an area where pro-government militias currently have the upper hand. At any rate, two people died and four others were wounded in the melee, with local media reporting that UN personnel used live ammunition to break the siege of their compound. In other words, the INFOWAR revolving around MINUSMA’s credibility still rages. It is also noteworthy that by fading into the countryside on 23 February, the terrorist adversary behaved in a manner typical of asymmetric forces when overmatched by superior firepower: AQIM and its affiliates are still out there in close proximity, no doubt waiting to renew the fight at a time and place of their own choosing. The 18 January terrorist attack in Mali brings to mind the “Planning Cycle, Action, and Exploitation” section of TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.07 C3, A Soldier’s Primer to Terrorism TTP. In order for the AQIM group to carry out its mission, its methodology necessarily included a set of principles that included (1) conducting broad target analysis and general intentions; (2) conducting on-site reconnaissance and surveilling the objective; and (3) selecting a specific target and acquiring the vehicle and explosives needed to destroy it. Then, as the announced date of the joint patrols drew near, the terrorists likely intensified and refined their target surveillance and intelligence gathering efforts. Finally, at the appointed time and place, they carried out their attack. No doubt the bombers were supported by observers/handlers who exfiltrated the UN compound following the SVBIED detonation. All of these actions lend themselves to being replicated for inclusion in opposing forces’ training scenarios.45 The 18 January 2017 SVBIED attack on the Joint Operational Mechanism base in Gao, Mali could well be a harbinger of things to come for US forces. The commander of the Dutch intelligence unit aptly stated the case when he said that the MINUSMA Mali deployment was not the end of this type of mission, but the beginning. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, contains a chapter that addresses the several different phases of deployments. One of these is shaping operations (Phase 0). Shaping operations “are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined Figure 11. Map showing AQIM and offshoots’ areas of influence national strategic and strategic military (modified by ACE-TI) objectives.”46 By definition, the MINUSMA mission in Mali underwrites the international legitimacy of the UN and UN-mandated deployments and requires multinational cooperation to be successful. The Joint Publication paragraph on shaping goes on to say that Phase 0 activities “are designed to ensure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access.”47 US Army Africa and Africa Command are already present on the African continent and working in partnership with MINUSMA, Malian security forces, and the militaries of other friendly states to shore up their legitimacy and improve their respective military capabilities. The capacity of the militaries the US supports to deter and defeat adversaries active in the operational environment is a perennial challenge that warrants the attention of regionally-aligned US units whose missions entail possible deployment to this vast and troubled region. US Army elements should never be forced to say, “we weren’t ready for these challenges.”48

Red Diamond Page 24 March 2017 Notes

1 Euronews. “Al Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Mali’s Deadliest Suicide Attack.”18 January 2017; Margaret Besheer. “Dozens Dead in Suicide Car Bombing in Mali.” Voice of America. 18 January 2017; Al Jazeera. “Suicide Blast Kills Dozens at Army Base in Mali’s Gao.” 18 January 2017. 2 Euronews. “Al Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Mali’s Deadliest Suicide Attack.” 8 January 2017; Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017; Caleb Weiss. “AQIM Claims Massive Suicide Attack on Malian Base.” Long War Journal. 18 January 2017. 3 CGTN Africa. “Footage Shows Moment of Deadly Suicide Blast.” YouTube. 18 January 2017. 4 CGTN Africa. “Chinese Peacekeeping Medical Unit in Northern Mali Treats Victims of Attack.” YouTube. 19 January 2017; 1 Search. “Mali: Suicide Attack Kills Dozens in Gao Military Camp.”18 January 2017. 5 ABC News. “French Military: Death Toll in Mali Base Attack Rises to 77.” 19 January 2017. 6 Margaret Besheer. “Dozens Dead in Suicide Car Bombing in Mali.” Voice of America. 8 January 2017; BBC News. “UN Base in Mali’s Gao City Hit By Deadly Clashes. ”27 January 2017; 1 Search. “Mali: Suicide Attack Kills Dozens in Gao Military Camp.” 18 January 2017; Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. 7 Euronews. “Al Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Mali’s Deadliest Suicide Attack.” 18 January 2017; Angela Dewan and Mohammed Tawfeeq. “Mali Suicide Bombing: Al Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Responsibility.” CNN. 19 January 2017. 8 Caleb Weiss. “AQIM Claims Massive Suicide Attack on Malian Base.” Long War Journal. 18 January 2017. 9 ABC News. “French Military: Death Toll in Mali Base Attack Rises to 77.” 19 January 2017. 10 Caleb Weiss. “AQIM Claims Massive Suicide Attack on Malian Base.” Long War Journal. 18 January 2017. 11 1 Search. “Mali: Suicide Attack Kills Dozens in Gao Military Camp.” 18 January 2017; Caleb Weiss. “Al Qaeda Linked To More Than 250 West African Attacks In 2016.” Long War Journal. 7 January 2017; Souleymane Ag Anara and Matthew Mpoke Bigg. “Mali Soldiers, Armed Groups, Hold First Joint Patrol in Northern Town.” Reuters. 23 February 2017; Cyril Bensimon. “Mali’s Separatist War Ends At Last.” The Guardian. 30 June 2015; BBC News. “France Sets Up Anti-Islamist Force in Africa’s Sahel.” 14 July 2014; Al Jazeera. “Suicide Blast Kills Dozens at Army Base in Mali’s Gao.” 18 January 2017. 12 Caleb Weiss. “AQIM Claims Massive Suicide Attack on Malian Base.” Long War Journal. 18 January 2017. 13 Al Jazeera. “Suicide Blast Kills Dozens at Army Base in Mali’s Gao.” 18 January 2017. 14 ABC News. “French Military: Death Toll in Mali Base Attack Rises to 77.” 19 January 2017; Angela Dewan and Mohammed Tawfeeq. “Mali Suicide Bombing: Al Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Responsibility.” CNN. 19 January 2017. 15 J. Peter Pham. “Africa: Monsieur Hollande Goes to Africa.” AllAfrica. 17 January 2017. 16 J. Peter Pham. “Africa: Monsieur Hollande Goes to Africa.” AllAfrica. 17 January 2017. 17 J. Peter Pham. “Africa: Monsieur Hollande Goes to Africa.” AllAfrica. 17 January 2017. 18 J. Peter Pham. “Africa: Monsieur Hollande Goes to Africa.” AllAfrica. 17 January 2017. 19 J. Peter Pham. “Africa: Monsieur Hollande Goes to Africa.” AllAfrica. 17 January 2017. 20 Angela Dewan and Mohammed Tawfeeq. “Mali Suicide Bombing: Al Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Responsibility.” CNN. 19 January 2017; 1 Search. “Mali: Suicide Attack Kills Dozens in Gao Military Camp.” 18 January 2017. 21 Al Jazeera. “Suicide Blast Kills Dozens at Army Base in Mali’s Gao.” 18 January 2017. 22 Al Jazeera. “Suicide Blast Kills Dozens at Army Base in Mali’s Gao.” 18 January 2017. 23 Al Jazeera. “Suicide Blast Kills Dozens at Army Base in Mali’s Gao.” 18 January 2017. 24 Cyril Bensimon. “Mali’s Separatist War Ends At Last.” The Guardian. 30 June 2015. 25 David Law. “The Malian Crisis: The Stumbling Stabilization Effort.” Security Sector Reform Resource Center. 10 November 2016; United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. “MINUSMA Background.” Accessed 1 March 2017. 26 David Law. “The Malian Crisis: The Stumbling Stabilization Effort.” Security Sector Reform Resource Center. 10 November 2016. 27 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. “MINUSMA Background.” Accessed 1 March 2017. 28 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. “MINUSMA Background.” Accessed 1 March 2017; David Law. “The Malian Crisis: The Stumbling Stabilization Effort.” Security Sector Reform Resource Center. 10 November 2016; Chinese Global Television Network. “Chinese Peacekeeping Medical Unit in Northern Mali Treats Victims of Attack.” YouTube. 19 January 2017. 29 David Law. “The Malian Crisis: The Stumbling Stabilization Effort.” Security Sector Reform Resource Center. 10 November 2016. 30 Cyril Bensimon. “Mali’s Separatist War Ends At Last.” The Guardian. 30 June 2015. 31 David Law. “The Malian Crisis: The Stumbling Stabilization Effort.” Security Sector Reform Resource Center. 10 November 2016; 1 Search. “Mali: Suicide Attack Kills Dozens in Gao Military Camp.” 18 January 2017. 32 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. 33 David Law. “The Malian Crisis: The Stumbling Stabilization Effort.” Security Sector Reform Resource Center. 10 November 2016; Caleb Weiss. “Al Qaeda Linked To More Than 250 West African Attacks In 2016.” Long War Journal. 7 January 2017; Caleb Weiss. “AQIM Claims Massive Suicide Attack on Malian Base.” Long War Journal. 18 January 2017. 34 Caleb Weiss. “Al Qaeda Linked To More Than 250 West African Attacks In 2016.” Long War Journal. 7 January 2017. 35 Caleb Weiss. “Al Qaeda Linked To More Than 250 West African Attacks In 2016.” Long War Journal. 7 January 2017; Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. 36 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017; Caleb Weiss. “Al Qaeda Linked To More Than 250 West African Attacks In 2016.” Long War Journal. 7 January 2017. 37 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. 38 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. 39 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. 40 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017.

Red Diamond Page 25 March 2017 41 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. 42 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. 43 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. 44 Souleymane Ag Anara and Matthew Mpoke Bigg. “Mali Soldiers, Armed Groups, Hold First Joint Patrol in Northern Town.” Reuters. 23 February 2017. 45 US Army, TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.07 C3. A Soldier’s Primer to Terrorism TTP. August 2012. Pgs 38–45, 62; US Army, TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. TC 7-100.3. Irregular Opposing Forces. August 2014. Pgs 6-10, 6-11. 46 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operational Planning. 11 August 2011. Pgs III-38–III-41. 47 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operational Planning. 11 August 2011. Pgs III-38–III-41. 48 Kevin Sieff. “The World’s Most Dangerous U.N. Mission.” Washington Post. 17 February 2017. ______

Red Diamond Page 26 March 2017 by Laura Deatrick, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Ctr) This summer, the latest update to the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) will be published. DATE 3.0 will include many revisions—some substantial, others minor. One example of the former is the description of the physical environment of the country of Donovia, which is one of the five operational environments within DATE. While previous editions of DATE focused this depiction solely on the North Caucasus region, DATE 3.0 extends it to the entire country. What follows is an excerpt from this expanded discussion. Terrain Donovia lies in the very easternmost part of Europe. It shares borders with several different countries, including both Gorgas and Atropia, and three bodies of water—the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Caspian Sea. The country contains varied terrain to include mountains, hills, lowland plains, forests, steppes, and uplands.

Figure 1. Topography of Donovia

Red Diamond Page 27 March 2017 Roughly Y-shaped, Donovia can be divided into northern and southern parts, with the northern “fork” of the Y separated from the southern “stem” by a neck of land measuring around 500 km from east to west. In the north, the Dnieper, Volga, and Kama Rivers form most of the country’s northern boundary and the Ural River defines much of the far eastern border. In the south, the country consists primarily of the land confined by the Azov and Black Seas on the west, the Greater Caucasus Mountains to the south, and the Caspian Sea on the east. The vast majority of Donovia lies below 1000 feet in elevation, with the only notable exceptions being the Ural Mountains in the far east and the Greater Caucasus Mountains in the far south. The terrain of northern Donovia consists of a series of uplands and lower plains. The Desna Uplands lie in the far west, followed by the Oka Plain to the east. In the center of the region, the Volga Hills descend eastward to the Volga Plain. The Ural Uplands lie further east and rise to the Ural Mountains, which end at the Ural River and Donovia’s border. The northern region lies entirely above sea level, with the Ural Mountains reaching up to 5,380 feet. In southern Donovia, the North Caucasus Plain gives way to the Caspian Lowland in the east and the Barbodrag Upland in the south, then finally to the Greater Caucasus Mountains in the far south. While the North Caucasus Plain’s elevation is similar to most of northern Donovia, the Caspian Lowland lies below sea level. The highest point in Donovia—and all of Europe—is Mount Elbrus, which lies at 18,510 feet above sea level in the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The eight southernmost republics in the country form the North Caucasus region, whose unique features include the Kuban-Azov Lowland (west) and the Ostremek Plain (east)—both part of the North Caucasus Plain—and the Kuma-Manich Depression (north).

Figure 2. Topography of the North Caucasus Region Bodies of Water Donovia’s major bodies of water are primarily seas and reservoirs. The landlocked Caspian Sea, to the east, also borders Atropia and Ariana. Shallow in the north and deepening to the south, it possesses oil and natural gas reserves that are sometimes the subject of disputes among its bordering countries. The Azov and Black Seas, on the west, allow maritime access to the Mediterranean Sea and, by extension, the Atlantic Ocean. The Azov Sea is the world’s shallowest sea, with a maximum depth of only 46 feet. It is rich in fish and other marine life, and is fished extensively. The Black Sea is considerably deeper and is shared by neighboring Gorgas, among other countries. Donovia boasts ports on all three seas.

Red Diamond Page 28 March 2017 The country lacks large natural lakes, but has three substantial reservoirs whose uses include drinking water, irrigation, and hydroelectric power. Donovia possesses a large river system that runs throughout the country. The largest of these rivers, the Volga, is Europe’s longest river. More than 2,000 miles of its 2,193-mile course lie either on the border of or inside Donovia. The Don is the second-longest river in the country, with a course of 1,162 miles. Other important waterways include the Desna, Dnieper, Kama, Moscow, Oka, and Ural Rivers in the north, and the Kuban, Kuma, Manich, Sunsha, Sulak, and Terek Rivers in the south. Most of these rivers terminate at the Azov, Black, or Caspian Seas and are at least partway navigable. Many of them, including the Volga, Don, Kama, Ural, Sulak, and Terek, have hydroelectric power plants along their courses. Canals—such as the Barbodrag canal system in the Northern Caucasus and the Moscow Canal between the Moscow and Volga Rivers—provide water, transport, and/or hydroelectric power to parts of the country. Mobility Classification Movement in Donovia is less restricted in the upland steppes and lowland plains than in the mountains. Heavy snows and icy conditions seriously hamper troop movement in the mountains during winter months, while flooding causes mobility problems in spring and summer. The presence of dense forests in the north and south increases difficulties and provides cover for enemy forces and smugglers, while multiple rivers and streams challenge mechanized and motorized movement. Air operation impediments include tall mountains, thick forests, steep valleys and gorges, strong winds and sudden wind direction changes, low clouds, dense mist and fog, and dust storms. Donovia actively uses landmines in the region, especially in the Gamrun Republic and in the Greater Caucasus Mountains along the border with Gorgas. Natural Hazards Donovia is subject to many types of natural disasters, including hailstorms, tornadoes, wildfires, and floods. Mountainous areas experience land and mudslides, and the North Caucasus region has frequent earthquakes. Record heavy rains created flooding and landslides in the latter region in 1993, leaving more than 230 people dead and totally destroying over 20,000 homes, with the total number of people affected in the hundreds of thousands. The North Caucasus region has also experienced major earthquakes, including one in 2008 that measured 5.8 on the Richter scale and left 13 people dead. Lower-magnitude events are frequent, with over 35 magnitude 3.0–3.9 earthquakes occurring last year. Subterranean Environment Donovia, well aware of the advanced surveillance capabilities of its enemies, has developed a significant subterranean environment to combat this capability. This environment likely includes networks, tunnels, and facilities that support government-regulated, primarily military, activities and illicit criminal activities. The underground facilities (UGFs) managed by the Donovian government support national missile and nuclear enrichment and development programs. Due to the sensitivity of these programs, much of the activity associated with them is conducted in the UGFs to provide protection from enemy detection and destruction. In southern Donovia, along the border of Atropia, there is a network of tunnels used by the Donovian-supported insurgent group Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB). The network of tunnels is used by this group to facilitate access into Atropia. It is believed that these tunnels support the movement of personnel and supplies for the BFB’s operations. The criminal network in Donovia also makes significant use of underground tunnel systems. Donovia has become a hotbed for the black market that deals in human trafficking, drug trafficking, and weapons trade. It is believed that the Al Iksir Cartel, the local criminal gang, has created a significant tunnel network in southern Donovia and northern Atropia to facilitate its operations. It is rumored that the Donovian Mafia also controls smuggling tunnels into neighboring countries. One popular theory is that none of the tunnels has been discovered due to corruption or intimidation. In addition, insurgent and criminal groups from neighboring countries have constructed their own tunnels into Donovia. Vegetation Land Cover Around 15% of Donovia consists of forested land, primarily in the far north, the Volga Hills, and in/around both mountain ranges. Lower-elevation forests normally have broadleaf trees—namely ash, beech, birch, elm, hornbeam, maple, and oak—while those at higher elevations usually consist of conifers such as spruce, pine, fir, and yew. In the Greater Caucasus

Red Diamond Page 29 March 2017 Mountains, these give way to subalpine and alpine meadows as elevation increases. Great portions of the steppes and plains are devoted to agriculture. Those that are not and the dryer, semi-desert areas in the Caspian Lowland are covered by cereal vegetation, flowering plants, grasses, and sagebrush. Agriculture Donovian agricultural pursuits employ 20% of the labor force and produce 4% of the national GDP, with the southern region playing a very important role in this sector. While the country possesses only 12% arable land overall, most of the North Caucasus Plain is arable; much of the remainder of the country is either used for pasture or covered with forests. Crops produced in Donovia include wheat, corn, millet, barley, oats, sunflowers, sugar beets, hemp, tea, potatoes, vegetables, melons, and other fruit and vines. The vast majority (70–90%) of available land is used for cereal or fodder crops, with the remainder dedicated to potatoes, vegetables, melons, and industrial crops such as sunflower and hemp. In addition to the presence of many rivers and reasonable rainfall, a canal system that provides irrigation is present in the Ostremek Plain. Climate Donovia mainly experiences a continental climate, while the Black Sea coastal region is subtropical and the southeast, near the Caspian Sea, is subarid. Summers are longer and warmer in the south than in the north, with the opposite being true for winters. While summer temperatures range from comfortable to hot, temperatures in winter are subfreezing throughout the country. The mountains experience cooler temperatures year-round as compared to the steppes and plains, as well as heavy snow in the winter. Precipitation levels peak in June/July and are higher in the mountains than in the plains. Table 1. Seasons Season Months Remarks Winter November–March longer in the north; shorter in the south Spring April–May later in the north; earlier in the south Summer June–August shorter in the north; longer in the south Fall September–October earlier in the north; later in the south Weather Precipitation Precipitation in Donovia varies by location and elevation, with amounts usually decreasing as one moves to lower elevations. Most of the country receives 12–25 inches annually, with the far northwest and the Ural Mountains receiving more (25–40 inches). The Caspian Lowland is the driest part of the country, with only 4–12 inches of precipitation falling each year. The Greater Caucasus Mountains is by far the wettest part of Donovia, with up 125 inches of annual precipitation. Rains usually peak in June/July, and snow falls heavily in the mountains during winter. Flooding can occur in the lower elevations in spring and summer due to both rain and snow runoff from the mountains. Temperature—Heat Index Temperatures vary with elevation in Donovia, with July being the hottest month. Average temperatures in the Greater Caucasus Mountains reach only 50°F in July as compared to 81°F in the Caspian Lowland and 73°F in the north. With moderate relative humidity levels and maximum temperatures that can reach 100°F in the north and even higher in the south, summer days can be quite uncomfortable. Temperature—Wind Chill Donovia has cold winters, with all areas experiencing sub-freezing average temperatures. January is the coldest month, with averages as low as 30°F on the coasts, 18°F on the plains and steppes, and 1°F in the Ural Mountains. Monthly minimum air temperatures can reach -40°F in the northeast, with the country’s absolute minimum being around -65°F. The Greater Caucasus Mountains, though at a much higher elevation than the Urals, tend to be warmer due to the presence of the Black and Caspian Seas. Higher elevations also experience significant snowfall, especially in the mountains, which can be coupled with mist and fog.

Red Diamond Page 30 March 2017 Relative Humidity As with other elements of weather in Donovia, relative humidity—which ranges from 40% to 100%—varies by elevation and location. The mountains are driest in April/May and reach peak humidity around September/October, with usual levels ranging from 60–100% throughout the year. The rest of the country experiences the lowest relative humidity from May–August (40%) and the highest during November–January (90%), with humidity increasing earlier in the year with greater northern latitude. Wind The year-round prevailing wind direction throughout Donovia is from the west. With the exception of the Ural Mountains and the Barbodrag Upland, average wind speeds tend to be low to moderate throughout the country. This limits locations for potential wind power, but provides aircraft with a safer environment. The only exceptions to this are the occasional weather hazard—such as tornadoes—and some wind phenomena that are specific to the North Caucasus region of the country. One of the winds the North Caucasus region experiences is bora, meaning a very strong gust of cold wind. More common in the winter, cold air trapped in the western Greater Caucasus foothills reaches sufficient altitude to flow through the mountain pass and northwest along the Black Sea coast. Lasting several days at a time, temperatures can drop 35°F while wind speed may exceed 130 mph. On the opposite side of the spectrum are the fens, or warm, dry winds. These winds may raise temperatures 25°F, reach 45 mph, and can change direction twice within a 24-hour period. They usually occur in the mountains and foothills of the Greater Caucasus Mountains, and their effects are exacerbated in valleys and gorges. Dust storms also occur in this region. They peak in May and August, and are more common during droughts. One such storm, in 1970, lasted for 200 hours and blew away several inches of topsoil. Threats to operations from these wind types are multiple. In addition to sudden extreme temperature and wind speed changes, ice presents a serious danger to operations during boras. Wind direction changes endanger airborne operations during fens, and dust storms can damage both machinery and equipment as well as limit visibility. Training Implications The expansion of Donovia’s physical environment description provides additional detail for commands desiring to train within the country’s operational environment. Training community members that may wish to take advantage of this opportunity include home-station trainers, Special Forces commands, and foreign partners such as Britain and Canada. Once published, DATE 3.0 will be available at ACE-TI’s homepage on the Army Training Network. ______

Red Diamond Page 31 March 2017 What ACE Threats Integration ACE Threats Integration POCs Supports for YOUR Readiness

Determine Operational Environment (OE) conditions for Army training, education, and leader development.

Design, document, and integrate hybrid threat opposing forces (OPFOR) doctrine for near-term/midterm OEs.

Develop and update threat methods, tactics, and techniques in HQDA Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series.

Design and update Army exercise design methods-learning model in TC 7-101/7-102.

Develop and update the US Army Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE).

Develop and update the US Army Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE) products.

Conduct Threat Tactics Course resident at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Conduct Threat Tactics mobile training team (MTT) at units and activities.

Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness in threat models and OEs.

Research, author, and publish OE and threat related classified/unclassified documents for Army operational and institutional domains.

Support Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Home Station Training (HST) and OE Master Plan reviews and updates.

Support TRADOC G-2 threat and OE accreditation program for Army Centers of Excellence (CoEs), schools, and collective training at sites for Army/USAR/ARNG.

Respond to requests for information (RFIs) on threat and OE issues.

Red Diamond Page 32 March 2017