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Georgetown Security Studies Review Volume 6 | Issue 2 August 2018 A Publication of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Disclaimer The views expressed in Georgetown Security Studies Review do not necessarily represent those of the editors or staff of GSSR, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University. The editorial board of GSSR and its affiliated peer reviewers strive to verify the accuracy of all factual information contained in GSSR. However, the staffs of GSSR, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Georgetown University make no warranties or representations regarding the completeness or accuracy of information contained in GSSR, and they assume no legal liability or responsibility for the content of any work contained therein. Copyright 2012-2017, Georgetown Security Studies Review. All rights reserved. ISSN 2474-8552 (print); ISSN 2474-8560 (online) GEORGETOWN SECURITY STUDIES REVIEW Published by the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Editorial Board Rebekah H. Kennel, Editor-in-Chief Jack Rock Lucas, Deputy Editor Shannon Mizzi, Associate Editor for Africa Nicholas Bradford, Associate Editor for the Americas Brigitta Schuchert, Associate Editor for Indo-Pacific Luke Drabyn, Associate Editor for Europe Stan Sundel, Associate Editor for the Middle East Stephanie Pillion, Associate Editor for National Security & the Military Henry Appel, Associate Editor for South and Central Asia Max Freeman, Associate Editor for Technology & Cyber Security Sarah Gilkes, Associate Editor for Terrorism & Counterterrorism The Georgetown Security Studies Review is the official academic journal of Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. Founded in 2012, the GSSR has also served as the official publication of the Center for Security Studies and publishes regular columns in its online Forum and occasional special edition reports. Access the Georgetown Security Studies Review online at http://gssr.georgetown.edu Connect on Facebook at http://www.facebook.com/GeorgetownUniversityGSSR Follow the Georgetown Security Studies Review on Twitter at ‘@gssreview’ Contact the Editor-in-Chief at [email protected] Table of Contents Trump’s First Year: Analyzing the Trump Administration’s Use of Drone 6 Strikes as a Counterterrorism Strategy in 2017 Rebecca Malone Urgent Reasons to Modernize and Strengthen The Espionage Act and a 19 Framework to Do So; A Comparative Study of Convicted Spies and Four Prominent Leaks: The Pentagon Papers, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Chelsea Manning, and Edward Snowden Paula A. Doyle Rationale and Information Strategy to Enable Internal Resistance in 36 North Korea David C. McDonald A New Strategy for Syria: How Coercive Diplomacy Can Deter Assad 52 from Using Chemical Weapons Stephanie Pillion Abu Musab al-Suri Goes Online: Conditions for the Success of Jihadist 66 Online Strategies Sarah Marie Gresser Post-Apartheid Reconciliation in South Africa’s Military and Society 75 Noah Becker Paramilitary Financing in Northern Ireland, 1969–1998: How Arms 86 Deals, Crime, and International Networks Fueled the Troubles David de Sola 4 Georgetown Security Studies Review Note from the Editor It is with great pleasure that we present the Georgetown Security Studies Review Volume 6, Issue 2. We hope you enjoy the new design as much as the contents within. Inside this Issue our authors explore a wide variety of security topics drawing upon a broad range of regions, functional areas, and history. Given the eclectic mix of articles, I am certain this publication will have something of interest for every reader. I would like to thank the following for their support and guidance: Dr. Keir Lieber Annie Kraft Jordan Moeny Mariah Kim Kathryn Owens, Georgetown University Press Lastly this publication would not be possible without the efforts of our peer reviewers who worked very closely with the Editorial Board to produce the publication before you. Best wishes, Rebekah H. Kennel Editor-in-Chief August 2018 Volume 6 | Issue 2 5 Trump’s First Year: Analyzing the Trump Administration’s Use of Drone Strikes as a Counterterrorism Strategy in 2017 Rebecca Malone Drone strikes have been a key aspect of United States’ counterterrorism strategy since the sec- ond term of the George W. Bush adminaistration and increased in use during Barack Obama’s terms in office. The Donald Trump administration continues to capitalize on previous administrations’ coun- terterrorism strategies, increasing the number of strikes and expanding areas of active hostility to allow for quicker turn-around on decisions to carry out strikes. Counterterrorism strikes outside of active battlefields increased almost threefold from 2016 to 2017, with the United States conducting nearly 200 strikes outside of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan in 2017. While the Trump administration has bolstered its counterterrorism campaign, it has not introduced a formal counterterrorism strategy. A formal counterterrorism strategy is necessary to ensure that strikes successfully decapitate leadership and deter jihadist networks worldwide. Only by implementing a formal counterterrorism strategy can the Trump administration justify its use of strikes as an effective and valuable counterterrorism strategy. Since President Donald Trump’s hold in these areas. It is particularly perti- inauguration in January 2017, the United nent for operations involving air strikes from States has conducted nearly 200 drone strikes drones as well as manned aircraft, but it is against global jihadist networks outside of also used when authorizing special operations active war zones. Strikes outside of active raids. This is because “in an area of active hos- war zones increased approximately 285 per- tilities, the military or the Central Intelligence cent between 2016 and 2017, according to Agency (CIA) would be able to make the call data from the Foundation for the Defense of themselves about whether it was appropriate Democracies (FDD).1 This increase is a no- or not to release a weapon from a drone.”4 ticeable change in strike quantity and scope Thus, designating an area of active hostilities of the United States’ counterterrorism op- would grant the military and the CIA the au- erations from the Obama administration. thority to launch a strike without having to go Under the Obama administration, through the bureaucratic White House sign- military commanders could only authorize ing process, requiring a decision for a drone strikes in “areas of active hostilities.” “Areas strike to be personally authorized by the Prin- of active hostilities” is a term coined by the cipal of the nominating operating agency, re- Obama administration in 2013 to identify ar- viewed and approved by Principals and Dep- eas where U.S. troops can operate with legal uties of the National Security Council, and protections in places where war has not been then presented to the President for decision.5 declared.2 Designating an area of active hostil- While the Obama administration only des- ities is not the same as declaring war, nor does ignated Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and certain it allow the president to bypass congressional areas of Libya as “areas of active hostilities;” approval governing U.S. troop deployments. the Trump administration expanded those The term was meant to limit the areas where the Obama-era designations to include Yemen, military could operate freely in expansive geo- Somalia, Pakistan, and the entirety of Libya.6 graphic conflicts like the global war on terror. By expanding these Obama-era au- An area of active hostilities is essen- thorities, the Trump administration increased tially an area of undeclared war.3 Although the United States’ counterterrorism cam- there is no declaration of war, the laws of war paign in the Middle East and North Afri- 6 Georgetown Security Studies Review ca. This strike quantity and scope change of Strikes as a U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy the drone campaign demonstrates a shift in Since the second term of the George the overall U.S. counterterrorism strategy to W. Bush administration, drone strikes have focus more on regions where the U.S. mili- emerged as the United States’ primary strat- tary does not have an active ground presence. egy in the global war on terror. The Bush ad- It is important to compare the Unit- ministration introduced strikes as a method to ed States’ counterterrorism strategy and use weaken terrorism networks in ungoverned re- of drones under the Obama and Trump ad- gions where U.S.-led ground operations were ministrations and analyze the objectives of unfeasible due to the danger to personnel, the Trump administration’s shift in strategy the large scope of terrorism networks, Amer- to determine the effectiveness of the Trump ica’s relative lack of soft power in the Mid- administration’s strategy. There are no interna- dle East, and the absence of willing govern- tional laws or frameworks regulating the U.S. mental partners. The Bureau of Investigative government’s use of armed drones, wheth- Journalism, an independent and non-profit er in active combat zones or outside areas of investigative journalism organization based active hostilities. The guidelines that are in in the United Kingdom, estimates the Bush place within the United States are largely the administration oversaw 57 strikes, the major- result of Executive decisions, such as Presi- ity of which took place in Pakistan’s border