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^M ad rid PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE 8 - 9 *VII -1997
CONTENTS
PARTI : The Madrid Summit: Official Texts
- Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation - Statement by the Secretary General at NATO’s Summit Meeting - 8 July 1997 - Summary of the meeting o f Allied and Partner Heads o f State and Government under the aegis o f the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council - Madrid 9 July 1997 - Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina - Charter on a D istinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine
PART II : Press Info - Background Briefs
The Internal Adaptation of the Alliance
- What is NATO ? - N A T O ’ s Enlargement - The Transformation of NATO’s D efence Posture - NATO’s Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia - The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The External Adaptation of the A lliance
- The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) - The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) - The Partnership between NATO and Russia - The D evelopment o f NATO’s Partnership with Ukraine - The Mediterranean Dialogue
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General Information
Quick Guide to NATO acronyms SFOR Facts and Figures
PARTI
OFFICIAL TEXTS
r Madrid OFFICIAL TEXTS - 9 -VII • 1997
MADRID DECLARATION ON EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY AND COOPERATION
Issued b v the Heads o f State and Government participating in the meeting o f the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 8th July 1997
1. We, the Heads o f State and Government o f the member countries o f the North Atlantic Alliance, have come together in Madrid to give shape to the new NATO as we move towards the 21st century. Substantial progress has been achieved in the internal adaptation o f the Alliance. As a significant step in the evolutionary process o f opening the Alliance, we have invited three countries to begin accession talks. We have substantially strengthened our relationship with Partners through the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and enhancement o f the Partnership for Peace. The signature on 27th May o f the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Charter we will sign tomorrow with Ukraine bear witness to our commitment to an undivided Europe. We are also enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue. Our aim is to reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.
A new Europe is emerging, a Europe o f greater integration and cooperation. An inclusive European security architecture is evolving to which we are contributing, along with other European organisations. Our Alliance will continue to be a driving force in this process.
2. We are moving towards the realisation of our vision of a just and lasting order o f peace for Europe as a whole, based on human rights, freedom and democracy. In looking forward to the 50th anniversary o f the North Atlantic Treaty, we reaffirm our commitment to a strong, dynamic partnership between the European and North American Allies, which has been, and will continue to be, the bedrock o f the Alliance and o f a free and prosperous Europe. The vitality o f the transatlantic link will benefit from the development o f a true, balanced partnership in which Europe is taking on greater responsibility. In this spirit, we are building a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests. We welcome the agreements reached at the European Council in Amsterdam. NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments o f Allies under the Washington Treaty.
3. While maintaining our core function o f collective defence, we have adapted our political and military structures to improve our ability to meet the new challenges o f regional crisis and conflict management. NATO’ s continued contribution to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the unprecedented scale of cooperation with other countries and international organisations there, reflect the cooperative approach which is key to building our com m on security. A new NATO is developing: a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe.
4. The security o f NATO’ s members is inseparably linked to that o f the whole o f Europe. Improving the security and stability environment for nations in the Euro-Atlantic area where peace is fragile and instability currently prevails remains a major Alliance interest. The consolidation o f democratic and free societies on the entire continent, in accordance with OSCE principles, is therefore o f direct and material concern to the Alliance. NAT O ’ s policy is to build effective cooperation through its outreach activities, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, with free nations which share the values o f the Alliance, including members o f the European Union as well as candidates for EU membership.
5. At our last meeting in Brussels, we said that we would expect and would welcome the accession o f new members, as part o f an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole o f Europe. Twelve European countries have so far requested to join the Alliance. W e welcome the aspirations and efforts o f these nations. The time has come to start a new phase o f this process. The Study on NATO Enlargement - which stated, inter alia, that NATO’ s military effectiveness should be sustained as the Alliance enlarges - the results o f the intensified dialogue with interested Partners, and the analyses o f relevant factors associated with the admission o f new members have provided a basis on which to assess the current state o f preparations o f the twelve countries aspiring to Alliance membership. 6. Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol o f Accession at the time o f the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary o f the Washington Treaty in April 1999. During the period leading to accession, the Alliance will involve invited countries, to the greatest extent possible and where appropriate, in Alliance activities, to ensure that they are best prepared to undertake the responsibilities and obligations o f membership in an enlarged Alliance. We direct the Council inP ermanent Session to develop appropriate arrangements for this purpose.
7. Admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance. It will involve the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily require. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to bring to an early conclusion the concrete analysis o f the resource implications o f the forthcoming enlargement, drawing on the continuing work on military implications. We are confident that, in line with the security environment o f the Europe o f today, Alliance costs associated with the integration o f new members will be manageable and that the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided.
8. We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 o f the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles o f the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations o f membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion o f these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests o f the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. To give substance to this commitment, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have previously expressed an interest in becoming NATO members but that were not invited to begin accession talks today will remain under consideration for future membership. The considerations set forth in our 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement will continue to apply with regard to future aspirants, regardless o f their geographic location. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration. Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process o f the Alliance should balance the security concerns o f all Allies.
To support this process, we strongly encourage the active participation by aspiring members in the Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, which will further deepen their political and military involvement in the work o f the Alliance. We also intend to continue the Alliance’s intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions. To this end, these intensified dialogues will cover the full range o f political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision. They will include meeting within the EAPC as well as periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session and the NATO International Staff and with other NATO bodies as appropriate. In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission o f additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us.
We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999. With regard to the aspiring members, we recognise with great interest and take account o f the positive developments towards democracy and the rule o f law in a number o f southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia.
The Alliance recognises the need to build greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the countries o f southeast Europe, and in promoting their increasing integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, we recognise the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members. As we look to the future o f the Alliance, progress towards these objectives will be important for our overall goal o f a free, prosperous and undivided Europe at peace.
9. The establishment o f the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Sintra constitutes a new dimension in the relations with our Partners. We look forward to tomorrow’s meeting with Heads o f State and Government under the aegis o f the EAPC.
The EAPC will be an essential element in our common endeavour to enhance security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Building on the successful experience with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and with Partnership for Peace, it will provide the overarching framework for all aspects o f our wide-ranging cooperation and raise it to a qualitatively new level. It will deepen and give more focus to our multilateral political and security-related discussions, enhance the scope and substance o f our practical cooperation, and increase transparency and confidence in security matters among all EAPC member states. The expanded political dimension o f consultation and cooperation which the EAPC will offer will allow Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political relationship individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance. The EAPC will increase the scope for consultation and cooperation on regional matters and activities.
10. The Partnership for Peace has become the focal point o f our efforts to build new patterns o f practical cooperation in the security realm. Without PfP, we would not have been able to put together and deploy so effectively and efficiently the Implementation and Stabilisation Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the participation o f so many o f our Partners.
We welcome and endorse the decision taken in Sintra to enhance the Partnership for Peace by strengthening the political consultation element, increasing the role Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and by making PfP more operational. Partners will, in future, be able to involve themselves more closely in PfP programme issues as well as PfP operations, Partner staff elements will be established at various levels o f the military structure o f the Alliance, and the Planning and Review Process will become more like the NATO force planning process. On the basis o f the principles o f inclusiveness and self-differentiation, Partner countries will thus be able to draw closer to the Alliance. We invite all Partner countries to take full advantage o f the new possibilities which the enhanced PfP will offer.
With the expanded range o f opportunities comes also the need for adequate political and military representation at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. We have therefore created the possibility for Partners to establish diplomatic missions to NATO under the Brussels Agreement which entered into force on 28th March 1997. We invite and encourage Partner countries to take advantage o f this opportunity.
11. The Founding A ct on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed on 27th May 1997 in Paris, is a historic achievement. It opens a new era in European security relations, an era o f cooperation between NATO and Russia. The Founding Act reflects our shared commitment to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles o f democracy and cooperative security. Its provisions contribute to NATO’ s underlying objective o f enhancing the security o f all European states, which is reinforced also through our actions here in Madrid. It provides NATO and Russia a framework through which we intend to create a strong, stable and enduring partnership. We are committed to working with Russia to make full use o f the provisions o f the Founding Act.
Through the new forum created under the Founding Act, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will consult, cooperate and, where appropriate, act together to address challenges to security in Europe. The activities o f the Council will build upon the principles o f reciprocity and transparency. The cooperation between Russian and NATO troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina and between the staffs at SHAPE demonstrate what is possible when we work together. We will build on this experience, including through PfP, to develop genuine cooperation between NATO and Russia. We look forward to consulting regularly with Russia on a broad range o f topics, and to forging closer cooperation, including militaiy-to-militaiy, through the Permanent Joint Council, which will begin work soon.
12. We attach great importance to tomorrow’s signing o f the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. The NATO-Ukraine Charter will move NATO-Ukraine cooperation onto a more substantive level, offer new potential for strengthening our relationship, and enhance security in the region more widely. We are convinced that Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty are a key factor for ensuring stability in Europe. We continue to support the reform process in Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation with a market e c onomy.
We want to build on steps taken to date in developing a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine. We welcome the practical cooperation achieve d with the Alliance through Ukraine's participation within IFOR and SFOR, as well as the recent opening o f the NAT O Information O ffice in Kyiv, as important contributions in this regard. We look forward to the early and active implementation o f the Charter. 13. The Mediterranean region merits great attention since se curity in the whole o f Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the development o f the Mediterranean initiative that was launched following our last meeting in Brussels. The dialogue we have established between NATO and a number o f Mediterranean countries is developing progressively and successfully, contributes to confidence-building and cooperation in the region, and complements other international efforts. We endorse the measures agreed by NATO Foreign Ministers in Sintra on the widening o f the scope and the enhancement o f the dialogue and, on the basis o f their recommendation, have decided today to establish under the authority o f the North Atlantic Council a new committee, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, which will have the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue.
14. We welcome the progress made on the Alliance’ s internal adaptation. Its fundamental objectives are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness and its ability to react to a wide range o f contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. W e recognise the substantive work which has been carried out on the development o f a new command structure for the Alliance; the implementation o f the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept; and the building o f ESDI within NATO. We attach great importance to an early and successful completion of this process. Building on the earlier reductions and restructuring o f the Alliance’ s military forces, it will provide the Alliance with the full range o f capabilities needed to meet the challenges o f the future.
15. W e welcome the substantial progress made on the development o f a new command structure which will enable the Alliance to carry out the whole range of its missions more effectively and flexibly, support our enhanced relationship with Partners and the admission o f new members, and provide, as part o f the development o f ESDI within NATO, for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations.
W e note that essential elements o f the new command structure have been identified and will form the basis for further work. W e must maintain the momentum o f this work. We have, accordingly, directed the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice o f the Military Committee, to work on the resolution o f outstanding issues with the aim o f reaching agreement on NATO’ s future command structure by the time o f the Council Ministerial meetings in December.
16. Against this background, the members o f the Alliance’ s integrated military structure warmly welcom e today’ s announcement by Spain o f its readiness to participate fully in the Alliance’s new command structure, once agreement has been reached upon it. Spain’s full participation will enhance its overall contribution to the security o f the Alliance, help develop the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO and strengthen the transatlantic link.
17. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the CJTF concept, including the initial designation o f parent headquarters, and look forward to the forthcoming trials. This concept will enhance our ability to command and control multinational and multiservice forces, generated and deployed at short notice, which are capable of conducting a wide range of military operations. Combined Joint Task Forces will also facilitate the possible participation o f non-NATO nations in operations and, by enabling the conduct of WEU-led CJTF operations, will contribute to the development o f ESDI within the Alliance.
18. W e reaffirm, as stated in our 1994 Brussels Declaration, our full support for the development o f the European Security and Defence Identity by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WE U operations. With this in mind, the Alliance is building ESDI, grounded on solid military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permitting the creation o f militarily coherent and effective forces capable o f operating under the political control and strategic direction o f the WEU. We endorse the decisions taken at last year’ s Ministerial meeting in Berlin in this regard which serve the interests o f the Alliance as well as o f the WEU.
W e further endorse the considerable progress made in implementing these decisions and in developing ESDI within the Alliance. In this context we endorse the decisions taken with regard to European command arrangements within NATO to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities (including provisional terms of reference for Deputy SACEUR covering his ESDI-related responsibilities both permanent and during crises and operations), the arrangements for the identification o f NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-led operations, and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context o f such operations. We welcome inclusion of the support for the conduct of WEU-led operations in the context o f the ongoing implementation o f the revised Alliance defence planning process for all Alliance missions. W e also welcome the progress made on work regarding the planning and future exercising o f WEU-led operations, and in developing the necessary practical arrangements for release, monitoring and return o f NATO assets and the exchange o f information between NATO and WEU within the framework o f the NATO-WEU Security Agreement.
We note with satisfaction that the building o f ESDI within the Alliance has much benefitted from the recent agreement in the WEU on the participation o f all European Allies, if they were so to choose, in WE U -led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and preparing for such operations. We also note the desire on Canada’ s part to participate in such operations when its interests make it desirable and under modalities to be developed. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to complete expeditiously its work on developing ESDI within NATO, in cooperation with the WEU.
19. The Alliance Strategic Concept, which we adopted at our meeting in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives o f the Alliance. Recognising that the strategic environment has changed since then, we have decided to examine the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe’ s new security situation and challenges. As recommended by our Foreign Ministers in Sintra, we have decided to direct the Council in Permanent Session to develop terms o f reference for this examination, and an update as necessary, for endorsement at the Autumn M i nisterial meetings. This work will confirm our commitment to the core function of Alliance collective defence and the indispensable transatlantic link.
20. We reiterate our commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including as necessary through joint consultations on how to address contingencies. In this context, we are determined to strengthen the institutional cooperation between the two organisations. We welcome the fact that the WEU has recently undertaken to improve its capacity to plan and conduct crisis management and peacekeeping operations (the Petersberg tasks), including through setting the groundwork for possible WEU-led operations with the support o f NATO assets and capabilities, and accepted the Alliance’ s invitation to contribute to NATO’ s Ministerial Guidance for defence planning. We will therefore continue to develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning, preparation, conduct and exercise o f WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.
21. We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthening the OSCE as a regional organisation according to Chapter VIII o f the Charter o f the United Nations and as a primary instrument for preventing conflict, enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights. The OSCE, as the most inclusive European-wide security organisation, plays an essential role in securing peace, stability and security in Europe. The principles and commitments adopted by the OSCE provide a foundation for the development of a comprehensive and cooperative European security architecture. Our goal is to create in Europe, through the widest possible cooperation among OSCE states, a common space o f security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres o f influence lim iting the sovereignty o f particular states.
We continue to support the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, in accordance with the decisions o f the 1996 Lisbon Summit, includingc onsideration o f developing a Charter on European Security.
22. We welcome the successful holding of elections in Albania as a vital first step in providing the basis for greater stability, democratic government and law and order in the country. We stress, in this context, the importance o f a firm commitment by all political forces to continue the process o f national reconciliation. We also welcome the crucial role o f the Italian-led Multinational Protection Force, with the participation o f several Allies and Partners, in helping to create a secure environment for the re-establishment o f peace and order. We value the efforts o f the OSCE as the coordinating framework for international assistance in Albania, together with the important contributions made by the EU, WEU and the Council o f Europe. We are following closely events in Albania and are considering measures through the Partnership for Peace to assist, as soon as the situation permits, in the reco nstruction o f the armed forces of Albania as an important element o f the reform process. Continued international support will be essential in helping to restore stability in Albania.
23. W e continue to attach greatest importance to further the means o f non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.
We welcome the progress made since the Brussels Summit, as an integral part o f NATO’ s adaptation, to intensify and expand Alliance political and defence efforts aimed at preventing proliferation and safeguarding NATO’s strategic unity and freedom of action despite the risks posed by nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. We attach the utmost importance to these efforts, welcome the Alliance’s substantial achievements, and direct that work continue.
W e call on all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Recognising that enhancing confidence in compliance would reinforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we reaffirm our determination to complete as soon as possible through negotiation a legally binding and effective verification mechanism. We urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty without delay so that negotiation o f START IH may begin.
We support the vigorous pursuit o f an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban world wide the use, stockpiling, production and transfer o f anti-personnel mines. We note the positive developments in the Conference on Disarmament. We further note the progress made by the Ottawa Process with its goal o f achieving a ban by the end o f the year.
24. W e continue to attach utmost importance to the CFE Treaty and its integrity. In this context, we welcome the entry into force o f the CFE Flank Agreement on 15th May 1997 and underline its importance for regional stability. We share the commitment o f all thirty States Parties to continue full implementation o f the CFE Treaty, its associated documents, and the Flank Agreement. We confirm our readiness to work cooperatively with other States Parties to achieve, as expeditiously as possible, an adapted CFE Treaty that takes account o f the changed political and military circumstances in Europe, continues to serve as a cornerstone o f stability, and provides undiminished security for all. NATO has advanced a comprehensive proposal for adaptation o f the CFE Treaty on the basis o f a revised Treaty structure o f national and territorial ceilings. The Allies have already stated their intention to reduce significantly their future aggregate national ceilings for Treaty-Limited Equipment. We look forward to working with other States Parties on the early completion o f a Framework Agreement on CFE adaptation.
25. W e reaffirm the importance o f arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats o f a wider nature, including those linked to illegal arms trade and acts o f terrorism, which affect Alliance security interests. We continue to condemn all acts o f international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations o f human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct o f normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.
26. The steps we have taken today, and tomorrow’ s meeting with our Partners under the aegis o f the EAPC, bring us closer to our goal o f building cooperative security in Europe. We remain committed to a free and undivided Euro-Atlantic community in which all can enjoy peace and prosperity. Renewed in structure and approach, strengthened in purpose and resolve, and with a growing membership, NATO will continue to play its part in achieving this goal and in meeting die security challenges in the times ahead.
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27. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of Spain. W e are looking forward to meeting again on the occasion o f the 50th anniversary o f the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1999. OFFICIAL TEXTS
STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT NATO’S SUMMIT MEETING - 8 JULY 1997
Today, Heads o f State and Government have agreed to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the protocol o f accession at the time o f the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary o f the Washington Treaty in April 1999.
We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 o f the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles o f the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years.
NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have previously expressed an interest in becoming NATO members but that were not invited to begin accession talks today will remain under consideration for future membership.
No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives o f the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.
In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission o f additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us. We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999. With regard to the aspiring members, we recognise with great interest and take account o f the positive developments towards democracy and the rule o f law in a number o f southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia.The Alliance recognises the need to build greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the countries o f southeast Europe, and in promoting their increasing integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, we recognise the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region who are also aspiring members. As we look to the future o f the Alliance, progress towards these objectives will be important for our overall goal o f a free, prosperous and undivided Europe at peace.
SUMMIT-SO MMET OFFICIAL TEXTS
SUMMARY OF TFTF MEETING OF ALLIED AND PARTNER HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL MADRID. 9 JULY 1997
The Heads o f State and Government, or their representatives, o f NATO and Cooperation Partner countries, today held a meeting and a working lunch under the aegis o f the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This was the first gathering o f Allied and Partner Heads o f State and Government.
Discussion at the meeting and working lunch focussed on the broad subject o f security risks and challenges as well as opportunities for effective co-operative security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Attention was devoted to how the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which was established by Allied and Partner Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May, 1997, can most effectively be used to serve the interests o f its members and to contribute to security and stability. TheE APC was founded as a new cooperative mechanism that will allow Partner countries to build a stronger political relationship with the Alliance and provide a framework for practical cooperation under the Partnership for Peace. It will also give Partners opportunities for greater involvement in decision-making on activities in which they participate.
There was also discussion about how to improve crisis prevention and crisis management, particularly peace-keeping, through the Partnership; and how practical regional cooperation could contribute both to strengthening stability and security in the respective region concerned and in the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. A number of contributions highlighted the need to complement the work o f the OSCE and other relevant institutions in these fields.
The discussion underlined once again our awareness that the security o f all our countries - Allies and Partners - is inseparably linked. Participants stressed the fundamental importance o f the EAPC as the vehicle through which Partners can develop their relationship with NATO, in the interests o f security and stability across the Euro-Atlantic area.
SUMMIT-SO MMET OFFICIAL TEXTS
SPECIAL DECLARATION ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Issned bv the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 8th July1997
We, the Heads o f State and Government o f NATO, reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation o f the Peace Agreement, and to the establishment o f Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state. We strongly endorse the recent statements o f the Steering Board o f the Peace Implementation Council at Sintra, the Summit o f the Eight at D enver, and the Contact Group in The Hague calling on the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to accelerate implementation o f the Peace Agreement.
We commend the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and are proud o f its crucial contribution in helping to bring peace to that country. Working with NATO’ s partners in SFOR, we intend to see that its mandate is carried out to its fullest.
We commend the efforts of Carl Bildt, whose tenure as High Representative achieved important progress in implementing the civilian aspects o f the Peace Agreement, and welcome the appointment o f Carlos Westendorp as the new High Representative. SFOR will continue to work closely and effectively with the High Representative, the OSCE and other major international organisations and agencies implementing civilian aspects o f the Peace Agreement, not least in connection with the municipal elections scheduled for September 1997. While SFOR's mandate comes to an end in June 1998, we have a commitment to and a long-term interest in stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the surrounding region. The authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be in no doubt that there can be no military option for any party or ethnic group now or in the future.
We call on the Parties to the Peace Agreement to comply fully with the commitments they themselves have agreed and to implement the Peace Agreement without delay. They must uphold the right o f refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in a peaceful and orderly manner. They must fulfil their arms control obligations. They must comply with all provisions regarding police, including the need to restructure, reform and certify police forces. They must also allow fair and open access to the media. We expect Croatia and the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia, as regional signatories to the Peace Agreement, to contribute effectively to its full implementation.
Compliance with all these commitments will be the prerequisite for our continued assistance: those who honour their commitments will receive our support; those who do not will find themselves denied any hope o f talcing up membership in the wider community o f nations.
We are deeply concerned by the political crisis in the Republika Srpska, where an increasingly anti-democratic climate and abuses o f police authority, in contravention o f obligations under the Peace Agreement, are undermining basic human rights, obstructing progress on the Peace Agreement and threatening wider security. It is especially unacceptable that the citizens o f Republika Srpska are being denied full and objective information on developments. The democratic process is being distorted in order to block the constitutional decisions o f the elected president of Republika Srpska, which must be respected.
We expect those responsible for this challenge to authority to resolve political differences peacefully and through dialogue, in a manner consistent with the rule o f law and the democratic principles o f the Peace Agreement. Further, in that regard, we demand that police in Republika Srpska halt acts o f intimidation and comply fully with all provisions o f the Peace Agreement Republika Srpska, an integral part o f Bosnia and Herzegovina, otherwise risks even greater isolation from the international community and greater difficulties in obtaining the international support and economic assistance on which its future prosperity depends.
We will not tolerate any recourse to force or violence, or the unauthorised deployment o f military or paramilitary forces.
There can be no lasting peace without justice. We call upon the leaders o f the region to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and fulfil their obligation to deliver those indicted for war crimes for trial at the International Tribunal in The Hague.
Madrid • VII • 19 9 7 OFFICIAL TEXTS
CHARTER ON A DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND UKRAINE
I. Building an Enhanced NATO-Ukraine Relationship
1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member States and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Ukraine,
- building on a political commitment at the highest level;
- recognizing the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe which have inseparably linked the security o f every state to that o f all the others;
- determined to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation in order to enhance security and stability, and to cooperate in building a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe;
- stressing the profound transformation undertaken by NATO since the end o f the Cold War and its continued adaptation to meet the changing circumstances o f Euro-Atlantic security, including its support, on a case-by-case basis, o f new missions o f peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority o f the United Nations Security Council or the responsibility o f the OSCE;
- welcoming the progress achieved by Ukraine and looking forward to further steps to develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical economic reforms, and to deepen the process o f integration with the full range o f European and Euro-Atlantic structures;
- noting NATO’s positive role in maintaining peace and stability in Europe and in promoting greater confidence and transparency in the Euro-Atlantic area, and its openness for cooperation with the new democracies o f Central and Eastern Europe, an inseparable part o f which is Ukraine;
- convinced that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one o f the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole;
- mindful o f the importance o f a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine and recognizing the solid progress made, across a broad range o f activities, to develop an enhanced and strengthened relationship between NATO and Ukraine on the foundations created by the Joint Press Statement o f 14S eptember 1995;
- determined to further expand and intensify their cooperation in the framework o f the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, including the enhanced Partnership for Peace programme;
- welcoming their practical cooperation within IFOR/SFOR and other peacekeeping operations on the territory o f the former Yugoslavia;
- sharing the view that the opening o f the Alliance to new members, in accordance with Article 10 o f the Washington Treaty, is directed at enhancing the stability o f Europe, and the security o f all countries in Europe without recreating dividing lines;
are committed, on the basis o f this Charter, to further broaden and strengthen their cooperation and to develop a distinctive and effective partnership, which will promote further stability and common democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe.
II. Principles for the Development of NATO-Ukraine Relations
2. NATO and Ukraine will base their relationship on the principles, obligations and commitments under international law and international instruments, including the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents. Accordingly, NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to:
- the recognition that security o f all states in the OSCE area is indivisible, that no state should pursue its security at the expense o f that o f another state, and that no state can regard any part o f the OSCE region as its sphere o f influence;
- refrain from the threat or use o f force against any state in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter or Helsinki Final Act principles guiding participating States;
- the inherent right o f all states to choose and to implement freely their own security arrangements, and to be free to choose or change their security arrangements, including treaties o f alliance, as they evolve;
- respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence o f all other states, for the inviolability o f frontiers, and the development o f good-neighbourly relations;
- the rule o f law, the fostering o f democracy, political pluralism and a market economy;
- human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;
- the prevention o f conflicts and settlement o f disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles.
3. Ukraine reaffirms its determination to carry forward its defence reforms, to strengthen democratic and civilian control o f the armed forces, and to increase their interoperability with the forces o f NATO and Partner countries. NATO reaffirms its support for Ukraine’ s efforts in these areas.
4. Ukraine welcomes NATO’ s continuing and active adaptation to meet the changing circumstances o f Euro-Atlantic security, and its role, in cooperation with other international organizations such as the OSCE, the European Union, the Council o f Europe and the Western European Union in promoting Euro-Atlantic security and fostering a general climate o f trust and confidence in Europe. m . Areas for Consultation and/or Cooperation between NATO and Ukraine
5. Reaffirming the common goal o f implementation o f a broad range o f issues for consultation and cooperation, NATO and Ukraine commit themselves to develop and strengthen their consultation and/or cooperation in the areas described below. In this regard, NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to the full development o f the EAPC and the enhanced PfP. This includes Ukrainian participation in operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority o f the UN Security Council, or the responsibility o f the OSCE, and, i f CJTF are used in such cases, Ukrainian participation in them at an early stage on a case-by-case basis, subject to decisions by the North Adantic Council on specific operations. o. Consultations between NATO and Ukraine will cover issues o f common concern, such as:
- political and security related subjects, in particular the development of Euro-Atlantic security and stability, including the security o f Ukraine;
- conflict prevention, crisis management, peace support, conflict resolution and humanitarian operations, taking into account the roles o f the United Nations and die OSCE in this field;
- the political and defence aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation;
- disarmament and arms control issues, including those related to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Open Skies Treaty and confidence and security building measures in the 1994 Vienna Document;
- arms exports and related technology transfers;
- combatting drug-trafficking and terrorism.
7. Areas for consultation and cooperation, in particular through joint seminars, joint working groups, and other cooperative programmes, will cover a broad range o f topics, such as:
- civil emergency planning, and disaster preparedness;
- civil-military relations, democratic control o f the armed forces, and Ukrainian defence reform;
- defence planning, budgeting, policy, strategy and national security concepts;
defence conversion; - NATO-Ukraine military cooperation and interoperability;
- economic aspects o f security;
- science and technology issues;
- environmental security issues, including nuclear safety;
- aerospace research and development, through AGARD;
- civil-military coordination o f air traffic management and control.
8. In addition, NATO and Ukraine will explore to the broadest possible degree the following areas for cooperation:
- armaments cooperation (beyond the existing CNAD dialogue);
- military training, including PfP exercises on Ukrainian territory and NATO support for the Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion;
- promotion o f defence cooperation between Ukraine and its neighbours.
9. Other areas for consultation and cooperation may be added, by mutual agreement, on the basis o f experience gained.
10. Given the importance of information activities to improve reciprocal knowledge and understanding, NATO has established an Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv. The Ukrainian side will provide its full support to the operation o f the Centre in accordance with the Memorandum o f Understanding between NATO and the Government o f Ukraine signed at Kyiv on 7 May 1997.
IV. Practical Arrangements for Consultation Candooperation betweenA NTO and Ukraine
11. Consultation and cooperation as set out in this Charter will be implemented through:
- NATO-Ukraine meetings at the level o f the North Atlantic Council at intervals to be mutually agreed;
- NATO-Ukraine meetings with appropriate NATO Committees as mutually agreed;
- reciprocal high level visits;
- mechanisms for military cooperation, including periodic meetings with NATO Chiefs o f Defence and activities within the framework o f the enhanced Partnership for Peace programme;
- a military liaison mission o f Ukraine will be established as part o f a Ukrainian mission to NATO in Brussels. NATO retains the right reciprocally to establish a NATO military liaison mission in Kyiv.
Meetings will normally take place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Under exceptional circumstances, they may be convened elsewhere, including in Ukraine, as mutually agreed. Meetings, as a rule, will take place on the basis o f an agreed calendar.
12. NATO and Ukraine consider their relationship as an evolving, dynamic process. To ensure that they are developing their relationship and implementing the provisions o f this Charter to the fullest extent possible, the North Atlantic Council will periodically meet with Ukraine as the NATO-Ukraine Commission, as a rule not less than twice a year. The NATO-Ukraine Commission will not duplicate the functions o f other mechanisms described in this Charter, but instead would meet to assess broadly the implementation o f the relationship, survey planning for the future, and suggest ways to improve or further develop cooperation between NATO and Ukraine.
13. NATO and Ukraine will encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Verkhovna Rada.
V. Cooperation for a More Secare Europe
14. NATO Allies will continue to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle o f inviolability o f frontiers, as key factors o f stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe and in the continent as a whole. 15. NATO and Ukraine will develop a crisis consultative mechanism to consult together whenever Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
16. NATO welcomes and supports the fact that Ukraine received security assurances from all five nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, and recalls the commitments undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom, together with Russia, and by France unilaterally, which took the historic decision in Budapest in 1994 to provide Ukraine with security assurances as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT .
Ukraine’ s landmark decision to renounce nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state greatly contributed to the strengthening o f security and stability in Europe and has earned Ukraine special stature in the world community. NATO welcomes Ukraine’s decision to support the indefinite extension o f the NPT and its contribution to the withdrawal and dismantlement o f nuclear weapons which were based on its territory.
Ukraine’ s strengthened cooperation with NATO will enhance and deepen the political dialogue between Ukraine and the members o f the Alliance on a broad range o f security matters, including on nuclear issues. This will contribute to the improvement o f the overall security environment in Europe.
17. NATO and Ukraine note the entry into force o f the CFE Flank Document on 15 May 1997. NATO and Ukraine will continue to cooperate on issues o f mutual interest such as CFE adaptation. NATO and Ukraine intend to improve the operation o f the CFE treaty in a changing environment and, through that, the security o f each state party, irrespective o f whether it belongs to a political-military alliance. They share the view that the presence of foreign troops on the territory o f a participating state must be in conformity with international law, the freely expressed consent o f the host state or a relevant decision o f the United Nations Security Council.
18. Ukraine welcomes the statement by NATO members that enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO’ s current nuclear posture and, therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory o f new members nor any need to change any aspect o f NATO’ s nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so.
19. NA TO member States and Ukraine will continue fully to implement all agreements on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and confidence-building measures they are part of.
* * *
The present Charter takes effect upon its signature.
The present Charter is established in two originals in the English, French and Ukrainian languages, all three texts having equal validity. PART II
PRESS INFO
Madrid PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE
WHAT IS NATO ?
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established by inter-governmental association of free and independent states, NATO the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, commonlyr eferred to as the Treaty of has no supranational authority or policy-making function independent Washington. of its members. Decisions taken by NATO are therefore decisions taken by all its member countries. By the same token, NATO can only implement a course of action if all the member countries are in NATO's cun-ent 16 member states are: agreement
Belgium Greece (since 1952) Norway NATO’S TRANSFORMATION Canada Iceland Portugal Throughout its history NATO has evolved to take account of changing Denmark Italy Spain (since 1982) circumstances. During the 1990s, it has undergone a process of far- reaching adaptation, in the light of the changes which have occurred France Luxembourg Turkey (since 1952) following the end of the Cold War, in order to meet new challenges. Germany (since 1955) The Netherlands United Kingdom Its core mission remains collective defence, but its organisation, military capability and structures have been adapted to enable it to United States address new tasks, in particular those involving cooperation with non member countries and crisis management The Alliance has developed In accordance with the decisions of NATO Heads of State and procedures and mechanisms for close cooperation with its Partner Government at the July 1997 Summit Meeting in Madrid, other countries, for example through Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic countries are being invited to begin negotiations with a view to Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the NATO- becoming members of the Alliance under the terms of Article 10 of the Ukraine Charter. It has reduced its military capabilities and str uctures Treaty of Washington. The Alliance will remain open to future, significantly. additional accessions at a later date. Through the development, within the Alliance, of the European Security and Defence Identity and of the concept of Combined Joint Task POLITICAL GOALS AND BASIC TASKS Forces, NATO now is capable of organising a range of responses to a wide range of operational possibilities. It has evolved as an The North Atlantic Alliance embodies the transatlantic partnership organisation and has developed its political and military structures to between the European members of NATO and the United States and take account of the transformation of the European security Canada, designed to bring about peace and stability throughout Europe. environment Changes in NATO's structures and policies reflect the The objectives of the partnership between the European and North common agreement between NATO member countries to maintain the American members of the Alliance are primarily political, underpinned political and military cooperation essential for their joint security. At by shared defence planning and military cooperation and by the same time, they have extended their cooperation to new partners in cooperation and consultation in economic, scientific, environmentalCentral and Eastern Europe, in order to promote stability and security and other relevant fields. Throughout the years of the Cold War, in Europe as a whole. however, NATO focused above all on the development and maintenance of collective defence and on overcoming the fundamental political issues dividing Europe. Today its focus is on promoting KEY INNOVATIONS stability throughout Europe through cooperation and by developing the means for collective crisis management and peacekeeping. Key innovations undertaken since 1989 include the adoption of a new Strategic Concept; development of increased coordination and NATO is an alliance based on political and military cooperation among cooperation with other international institutions, such as the United independent member countries, established in accordance with Article Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 51 of the United Nations Charter. As stated in the preamble to the (OSCE), the Western European Union (WEU) and die European Union North Atlantic Treaty, Alliance members are committed to (EU); and agreement to make NATO's assets and experience available safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their to support international peacekeeping operations. NATO supported UN peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia beginning in 1992, until the rule of law. the successful conclusion of a peace agreement in December 199S and the deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR.) At the Article 4 of the Treaty provides for consultations among the Allies end of 1996, IFOR was replaced by a NATO-led Stabilisation Force whenever any o f them believes that their territorial integrity, political (SFOR). independence or security is threatened. NATO member states are committed to the defence of one another by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This stipulates that an armed attack against one or NATO’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all. The Strategic Concept adopted at the 1991 Rome Summit meeting combined a broad approach to security based on dialogue and cooperation with the maintenance of NATO's collective defence DECISION TAKING capability.
NATO decisions are taken on the basis of consensus, after discussion and consultation among the member nations. As a multinational, The Strategic Concept was notable for setting out the routemap by - a commitment to the defence of its members; which NATO would evolve in the future. There were three key areas of new emphasis: - a commitment to the wider stability of the Euro-Atlantic area through: a broad approach to security, in which cooperation and dialogue would play a prominent part; the accession of new members;
military capabilities would be reduced but restructured for the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic crisis management missions, as well as collective defence; Partnership Council, which brings together all and OSCE countries capable and willing to join in a process of cooperative security ; the European Allies would assume a greater responsibility for their own security. The development of Partnership for Peace as a programme of military cooperation designed to The concept provided for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and improve the ability of Allies and Partners for joint introduced major changes in NATO's integrated military forces, action in a crisis ; including substantial reductions in their size and readiness; improvements in their mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different the introduction of new mechanisms for a close and contingencies; increased use of multinational formations; the creation permanent relationship with Russia ; of a multinational Rapid Reaction Corps; and the adaptation of defence planning arrangements and procedures. the implementation of a Charter for a distinctive partnership with Ukraine ; NATO's military command structure was streamlined and the Alliance's defence planning arrangements were adapted in order to take into the streamlining and optimisation of the military command account future requirements for crisis management and peacekeeping. structure to enable it to undertake crisis management and peacekeeping operations which could include the The direction set by the Strategic Concept was intensified by participation of Partner countries ; subsequent decisions. Partnership for Peace created permanent mechanisms for close military cooperation. The concept of Combined the development of a European Security Identity within Joint Task Forces was introduced at the 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO and, for operations where it is agreed that the d esigned to make NAT O's joint military assets available for wider Western European Union should have responsibility, operations by NATO nations or by the Western European Union. arrangements for die loan of Alliance assets and capabilities; Since 1996 the European Security and Defence Identity is being developed within NATO. the establishment of a Mediterranean dialogue designed to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean and NATO Foreign Ministers decided at their meeting in Sintra, Portugal, to improve understanding. on 29 May 1997, that the Strategic Concept should be reviewed to ensure that it remains consistent with developments which have taken * * * place since it was agreed. The North Adantic Treaty Organisation will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Washington on 4 April THE MADRID SUMMIT: JULY 1997 1999.
The Madrid Summit brings together the many strands of change which have been underway since the start of the decade. The new NATO can be characterised by the following: Madrid PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE
NATO’S ENLARGEMENT
"The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other EuropeanThe Study on NAT O Enlargement further outlined that NATO state in a position to further the principles o f this Treaty enlargement and to will contribute to enhanced stability and security for all contribute to the security o f the North Atlantic area to accede countries to this in the Euro-Atlantic area by encouraging and supporting Treaty. (...)" democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the Article 10, The North Atlantic Treaty military; fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and Washington DC, 4 April 1949 consensus building which characterise relations among present members of the Alliance; promoting good-neighbourly relations in the whole Euro-Atlantic area; increasing transparency in defence planning The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 brought NATO into being as an and military budgets and thus confidence among states; reinforcing the Alliance of independent countries with a common interest in tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe; strengthening maintaining peace and defending thei r freedom through political the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international solidarity and adequate collective defence. Over the next several security and to support peacekeeping activities under the UN or decades, in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, four countries OSCE; and by strengthening and broadening the transatlantic joined the initial twelve signatories, raising the total number of NATO partnership. Allies to the current sixteen. The Alliance plans once again to take in new members in 1999, the year of NAT O’s 5 0th anniversary, in With regard to the “how” of enlargement, the Study on NATO accordance with the decisions of Allied Heads of State and Enlargement confirmed that, as in the past, any future extension of the Government at the Summit Meeting in Madrid in July 1997. Alliance’s membership would be through accession of new member states to the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with its Article 10. The openness of the Alliance was reaffirmed by Allied Heads of State Once admitted, new members will enjoy all the rights and assume all and Government at their previous Summit meeting in Brussels in obligations of membership under the Treaty; and will need to accept January 1994, when they also stated that they expected and would and conform with the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all w elcome NATO enlargement that would reach to their east, as part of members of the Alliance at the time that they join. The Study made an evolutionary process, talcing into account political and security clear that willingness and ability to meet such commitments, not only developments in the whole of Europe. In the three and a half years on paper but in practice, would be a critical factor in any decision to since the 1994 Summit. NATO and Parmer countries interested in invite a country to join. Allies also wish to avoid a situation where a joining have undertaken intensive preparations, in particular through new member might “close the door” behind it to new admissions in the a series of dialogue meetings held in 1996 and 1997. Work will future by other countries which may also aspire to membership. States continue with those prospective new member countries identified at which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including Madrid in order to ensure their smooth integration into the Alliance irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must also settle upon accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1999. At the same time, those disputes in advance of accession, by peaceful means, in the Alliance will work to deepen relations with all other Partner accordance with OSCE principles. The Study also stipulated that the countries through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the enhanced ability of interested countries to contribute militarily to collective Partnership for Peace and specific arrangements agreed with Russia and defence and to peacekeeping and other new missions of the Alliance Ukraine. would be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the Alliance. Ultimately, the Study concluded, Allies will decide by ***** consensus whether to invite each new member to join, based on their judgment of whether doing so will contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area at the time such a decision is to be made No 1995 - DEFINING THE “WHY AND HOW” OF NATO country outside the Alliance has a veto or ‘droit de regard’ over the ENLARGEMENT process of enlargement or decisions relating to it.
Following a decision by Allied Foreign Ministers in December 1994, the “why and how” of future admissions into the Alliance was examined by the Allies during 1995. The result of this examination, 1996-1997 - TOWARDS THE “WHO AND WHEN” OF the “Study on NAT O Enlargement”, was shared with interested Partner ENLARGEMENT countries in September 1995 and made public. In December 1995, Allied Foreign Ministers decided, on the basis of With regard to the “why” of NATO enlargement, the Study concluded the Study on NATO Enlargement and Partner country rea ctions to it, that, with the end of die Cold War and the disappearance of die that the next phase of the enlargement process would consist of three Warsaw Treaty Organisation, there is both a need and a unique elements: intensified, individual dialogue with int erested Partners; opportunity to build an improved security architecture in the whole of further consideration of what NATO must do internally to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic area, without recreating dividing lines. NATO enlargement preserves the effectiveness of the Alliance; and further enlargement will be a further step towards the Alliance's basic goal of enhancement of the Partnership for Peace to help those interested enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro- Partners to prepare to assume the responsibilities of membership and Atlantic area, complementing broader trends towards integration to strengthen long-term partnership with others. In this latter regard, (notably the enlargement of the EU and WEU and the strengthening of Ministers also expressed a particular interest in developing the the OSCE). Enlargement will threaten no one; NATO is and will Alliance’s relations with, respectively, Russia and Ukraine. remain a purely defensive Alliance whose fundamental purpose is to preserve peace in the Euro-Atlantic area and to provide security to its members. During 1996 and 1997, a NATO Staff team conduct ed a s eries of In preparation for the discussion and decisions to be taken by Heads of individual dialogu e sessions with delegations from 12 Partner countries State and Government at the July 1997 Madrid Summit as to which interested in NATO membership. Most of these countries also took up countries to invite to start accession talks with the Alliance, a the Alliance’s offer o f a “16+1" dialogue meeting with Allies during comprehensive report was compiled. This brought together the analysis the Spring of 1997.1 The dialogue process allowed Partners to gain a of the military and other relevant factors associated with the admission fuller understanding of the rights and obligations of Alliance of new members, the results of the latest round o f intensified dialogue membership and to review their efforts in relation to the precepts and sessions, information on the necessary adaptation of Alliance structures principles included in the Study on NATO Enlargement. NATO, in to integrate new members, as well as a plan for conducting accession turn, was able to acquire a better appreciation of what individual talks. Partners might or might not contribute to the Alliance.
As became clear during the dialogue process, the drive to join NATO has been a strong motivation for Partner countries to actively seek BEYOND MADRID peaceful solutions to bilateral disputes with neighbouring countries. It has also encouraged efforts to strengthen domestic democratic reforms The Madrid Summit represents a major milestone in the history of the and, in particular, to establish sound civil-military relations and Alliance, but by no means the end of the enlargement process. The democratic control of aimed forces. Alliance remains open to further accessions in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It also became clear that the principles, policies and procedures reflected in the Study on NATO Enlargement were widely shared. By The next steps in the enlargement process, following the decisions the beginning of 1997, all 12 participants in the dialogue process taken at Madrid, involve accession preparations with those prospective interested in NATO membership had clearly stated their desire for the new member countries identified at the Summit, leading to the earliest possible integration into the Alliance, including participation signature by all NATO Allies of Accession Protocols which will be in its military structure and in Alliance collective defence planning. subject to national ratification procedures in each Alliance member The individual dialogue sessions provided a useful opportunity to country. Once the ratification procedures are complete, prospective reiterate that the Alliance has no 'a priori’ requirement for the new members will be invited, in accordance with their own national stationing of Alliance troops or nuclear weapons on the territory of newprocedures, to deposit their instrument of accession with the member countries, as was made clear in the Study on Enlargement. Government of the United States of America. This accords with the procedure laid down in Article 14 of the North Atlantic Treaty which Through the dialogue process, NATO Military Authorities were also identifies the United States Government as the depositary of the Treaty. able to obtain detailed information on defence assets and capabilities The countries concerned then formally become members of NATO. of participating countries. Together with information obtained in the framework of Partnership for Peace and from published sources, this The Alliance aims to welcome new members into the Alliance by the enabled them to analyse the military factors associated with the time of its 50th anniversary in 1999. At the same time, it is determined possible accession of each of the 12 Partner countries interested in to develop relations with all other Parmer countries as well, whether NATO membership, in accordance with the request made by NATO they are interested in memb ership or not This will includc Defence Ministers in December 1996. strengthening political consultation and practical cooperation in the context of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, developing more individualized cooperation under the enhanced Partnership for Peace, as well as giving substance to the specific arrangements agreed during Dialogue sessions were held with the following countries the Spring of 1997 with Russia and Ukraine. which expr essed interest in NATO membership: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Note: Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name). SUMMIT-SOMMET ^M adrid PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE 8-9 - VII ■ 1997
THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATO ’S DEFENCE POSTURE
At the London Summit in 1990 the Alliance made clear that it no changes in NATO’s defence posture introduced since 1990. longer regarded the countries of the then Warsaw Treaty Organization as adversaries. NATO also began a process of transformation reflected Land Forces in a new Strategic Concept as well as a radical reduction and restructuring of NATO forces. The Strategic Concept was based on a Major combat units available to NATO have been reduced by 35%. broad approach to security in which cooperation and dialogue with Only 35% of this reduced force is kept at 30 days readiness or less, non-member countries would play a prominent part The establishment compared to 90% which was maintained at 2 days readiness or less in of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), followed by the 1990. introduction of the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), constituted the first steps in this direction. Subsequently, a new body known as the Maritime Forces Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) has been established to replace the NACC and to provide the framework for future political Major naval combatants available to NATO have been reduced by and security-relat ed consultations and for enhanced cooperation under 32%. Fewer than 60% are now at 30 days readiness or less, compared PfP. to three-quarters maintained at 2 days readiness or less in 1990.
In addition, following the signature of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council has been created. A Charter between NATO and Ukraine has also been concluded and a aj 0 r N a v a l C o m b a ta n ts NATO-Ukraine Commission established.
In the military sphere, peacekeeping was accepted as one of the future missions of NATO forces. This decision led to the formation of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), tasked with the implementation of the military aspects of the Bosnian Peace Agreement, followed by the establishment of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR). ’
NATO's previous strategy was based on a classified NATO document, known as MC 14/3, which emphasized deterrence through the maintenance of a major war-fighting capability ("forward defence”) and gave a central role to nuclear weapons among military options 3*6 1*0 90 60 30 20 10 E 2 1 available to the Alliance ("flexible response"). Days
The current Strategic Concept is a public document which emphasizes that preparations for defence against a full-scale military attack are no Air Forces longer the focus of Alliance planning. It reflects the judgement that Combat squadrons available to NATO have been cut by 41%. Only risks to NATO are more likely to arise from instability, including about half are at 30 days readiness or less, compared to nearly 70% at ethnic rivalry or territorial disputes. It also reflects a move away from 12 hours readiness in 1990. forward defence and flexible response and a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The focus is now on maintaining an adequate but much reduced defence capability, a well-developed crisis-management capability, an enhanced dialogue with other nations and a cooperative approach to security, including arms control. Aircraft Squadrons
This major change in approach is clearly reflected in substantia]
Land Forces Divisions
366 1S0 >0 60 30 20 10 6 2 1 Days
Military Personnel
NATO nations have cut their military personnel by 24%. 365 1SO 90 60 30 20 10 5 2 1 Days Defence Expenditures emphasis on armoured warfare; smaller force structures and an Alliance nations have cut defenc e expenditures by 22%. The increased proportion of professional forces or the complete elimination proportion of GDP spent on defence by NATO Allies has decre ased of conscription in favour of all-regular forces. from 4.1% to 2.8%.
Defence spending levels of NATO countries
• North America, GDP North America, Defence Expenditures
* NATO Europe, GDP NATO Eurept, Defence Expenditures
Nuclear Weapons Forward Stationing of Forces NATO’s land-based nuclear stockpile has been cut by over 80%. Two-thirds of the land forces formerly stationed in Germany have been Nuclear artillery, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles have withdrawn. Forward stationed combat aircraft have been cut by 70%. been eliminated. Nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from surface This reduction will increase to over 80% by the year 2002. Forward- warships. Nuclear free-fall bombs have been reduced in number and stationed military personnel have beer, cut by tw o-thirds. United Stales
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the readiness of dual-capable aircraft h as been reduced. US nuclear forces in Europe have been reduced from about 300,000 to about forces are being cut by a third u nder the Strategic Aims Reductions 100,000. Talks (START I) and will reduc e by two-thirds under START II. The United Kingdom is cutting warheads on strategic submarines by 25% Military Exercises compared to 1990. France will eliminate short- and intermediate-range The NATO exercise programme has been cut back. Large-scale, surface-to-surface missiles and has postponed a new reinforcement exercises, like the REFORGER series of exercises, are submarine-launched missile system. no longer carried out. More emphasis is being put on crisis-management and peacekeeping exercises, including combined Force Structures exercises with Pf P Partners. Moreover, exercises are no longer based Alliance nations are restructuring their forces for smaller scale on die premise of an East-West conflict Today’s military exercises operations, including crisis management and peaceke eping tasks. make use of generic scenarios without reference to any specific country Essentia] characteristics of these restructured forces include a reduced or explicit conflict situations. “ Madrid PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE 9 -VII • 1 997
NATO S ROLE IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE FORMER YUGO SLAVIA
The political basis for the Alliance's role in the former Yugoslavia was authority of the Councils of both organizations. Operational control of established at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial session the combined NATO/WEU Task Force was delegated, through NATO's in Oslo, in June 1992. At that time NATO Foreign Ministers announced Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEU R ), to the Commander their readiness to support, on a case by case basis, in accordance with Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) in Naples. their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) - Following the initialling of die Peace Agreement on 21 November 1995, subsequently renamed the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in NATO and the WEU adapted Operation Sharp Guard in accordance with Europe (OSCE). This included making available Alliance resources and the UN Security Council Resolutions suspending sanctions expertise for peacekeepingoperations. (UNSCR 1022) and phasing out the arms embargo, subject to certain conditions (UNSCR 1021). In accordance with UNSCR 1022, NATO Ln December 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers stated that the Alliance was and the WEU stopped enforcing the sanctions on 22 November 1995, also ready to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the although this enforcement can be reinstated if the Parties do not meet the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility conditions specified by the UN. for international peace and security. Ministers reviewed peacekeeping and sanctions/embargo enforcement measures already being undertaken With the termination of the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia by NATO countries, individually and as an Alliance, to support the on 18 June 1996, operationSharp Guard was suspended the same day in implementation of UN Security Council resolutions relating to theaccordance with the direction of the NATO and WEU Councils. conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They indicated that the Alliance was However, although enforcement operations have been suspended, ready to respond positively to further initiatives that the UN Secretary Operation Sharp Guard has not been terminated. NATO and WEU are General might take in seeking Alliance assistance in this field. prepared to resume enforcement operations if sanctions are reimposed in accordance with UNSCR 1022. Between 1992 and 1995. the Alliance took several key decisions, leading to operations by NATO naval forces, in conjunction with the Western Since the beginning of the enforcement operation, approximately 74,000 European Union, to monitor and subsequently enforce the UN embargo ships were challenged by NATO and WEU forces, nearly 6,000 were and s anctions in the Adriatic: and by NATO air forces, first to monitor inspected at sea and just over 1,400 were diverted and inspected in port. and then to enforce, the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. TheNo ships were reported to have broken the embargo, though six were Alliance also provided close air support to the UN Protection Forcecaught attempting to do so. (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and authorised air strikes to relieve the strangulation of Sarajevo and other threatened Safe Areas. Air Operations Decisive action by the Alliance in support of the UN in the former NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft Yugoslavia, together with a determined diplomatic effort, broke the siege began monitoring operations in October 1992, in support of UNSCR 781, of Sarajevo, led to a genuine cease-fire and made a negotiated solution which established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Data on to the conflict possible in autumn 1995. possible violations of the no-fly zone was passed to die appropriate UN authorities on a regular basis. With the signature of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1995, deployment of the On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 816 NATO-led Implementation Force began. Its mission is to implement the audiorising enforcement of die no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and military aspects of the Peace Agreement and to support, within the limits extending die ban to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing of its existing mandate and available resources, other organizations aircraft except those authorised by UNPROFOR. In the event of further responsible for implementation of the civilian aspects of theP eace violations, it authorised UN member states to take all necessary measures Agreement. Additional information on the operations leading up to the to ensure compliance. signature of the Peace Agreement is provided below. Operation Deny Flight Maritime Operations A NATO enforcement operation, calledDeny Flight, began on 12 April NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force 1993. It initially involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), (later increased to more than 200) from various Alliance nations, flying began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in July 1992. These from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. By operations were undertaken in support of the UN arms embargo against December 1995, almost 100,000 sorties had been flown by fighter and all republics of die former Yugoslavia ( UN Security Council Resolution supporting aircraft 713) and die sanctions against die Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (UNSCR 757). On 28 February 1994, four warplanes violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina were shot down by NATO aircraft. This was the In November 1992, as an extension of the maritime monitoring first military engagement ever undertaken by the Alliance. operations, NATO and WEU forces in the Adriatic began enforcement operations in support of the UN a snctions/embargo (UNSCR 787). Close Air Support Operations were then no longer restricted to registering possible In June 1993, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to offer protective air violations and included stopping, inspecting and diverting ships when power for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the required. performance of its overall mandate. In July, NATO aircraft began flying training missions for providing such close air support C( AS). On 10 and At a joint session of die North Atlantic Council and the Council of the 11 April 1994, following a request from the UN ForceC ommand, NATO Western European Union on 8 June 1993, the combined NATO/WEU aircraft, for die first time, provided close air support to protect UN concept of operations was approved. This operation, namedSharp personnel in Gorazde, a UN-designated Safe Area in Guard, included a single command and control arrangement under the Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 22 September 1994, following a Bosnian Serb attack on an On 19 November 1994, under the authority of UNSCR 958, the North UNPROFOR vehicle near Sarajevo, NATO aircraft carried out an air Atlantic Council approved extension of Close Air Suppon to Croatia forstrike against a Bosnian Serb tank, again at die request of UNPROFOR. the protection of UN ofrces in that country. After the Council decided on 19 November 1994 to extend air strikes into On 11 July 1995, the UN called for NATO Close Air Support to protect Croatia, based on UNSCR 958, NATO aircraft attacked the Udbina UN peacekeepers threatened by Bosnian Serb forces advancing on the airfield in Serb-held Croatia, on 21 November, in response to recent UN-declared Safe Area of Srebrenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO attacks launched from that airfield against targets in the Bihac area of aircraft attacked targets as identified by, and under the control of, the Bosnia-Herzegovina. UN. Despite NATO's air support, the Safe Area of Srebrenica fell to Bosnian Serb forces which soon overran the nearby Safe Area of Zepa as After attacks on two NATO aircraft launched from a surface-to-air well. missile site south of Otoka, in north-west Bosnia-Herzegovina, air strikes were conducted against air defence radars in that area by NATO aircraft On 9 October 1995, NATO aircraft attacked a Bosnian Serb Army on 23 November 1994. Command and Control bunker, near Tuzla, in response to a request for air support from UN peace forces, which had come under artillery Following a deterioration of the situation in former Yugoslavia, including shelling from Bosnian Serb guns for a second consecutive day. violations of the Exclusion Zones and the shelling of Safe Areas, air strikes were again carried out on 25 and 26 May 1995, targeting Bosnian Air Strikes Serb ammunition depots in Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some 370 UN On 2 August 1993, the Council agreed to make immediate preparations peacekeepers in Bosnia were taken hostage and subsequently used as for undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and other human shields at potential targets in a bid to prevent further air strikes. areas continued, including wide-scale interference with humanitarian NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, on 30 assistance, stronger measures, including air strikes against those May, condemned the escalation of violence in Bosnia and the hostile acts responsible, in the context of UNSCR 836 ("Safe Areas"). The Council against UN personnel by the Bosnian Serbs. By 18 June, the UN tasked the NATO Military Authorities to draw up operational options for hostages had been releas ed and remaining peacekeeping forces which had air strikes, in close coordination with UNPROFOR. been isolated at weapons collection sites around Sarajevo were withdrawn from these sites. On 9 August 1993, the North Atlantic Council approved the "Operational Options for Air Strikes in Bosnia-Heizegovina", forwarded by the Following the international meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina held in Military Committee, including the targeting identification process and London on 21 July 1995, the North Atlantic C ouncil approved, on 25 NATO/UN command and control arrangements for air strikes. July, the necessary planning aimed at deterring an attack on the Safe Area of Gorazde, while ensuring that NATO air power would be used in a \ t the January 1994 Brussels Summit, Alliance leaders reaffirmed their timely and effective way if this Safe Area was threatened or attacked. -eadiness to cany out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of The Council, on 1 August, took similar decisions aimed at deterring Sarajevo, the Safe Areas and other threatened areas in attacks on the Safe Areas of Sarajevo, Bihac and Tuzla. Sosnia-Herzegovina. On 4 August 1995, NATO aircraft conducted air strikes against Croatian Dn 9 February 1994, the North Atlantic Council, at the request of the UN Serb air defence radars near Udbina airfield and Knin in Croatia. Secretary General, authorized CINCSOUTH to launch air strikes, at the equest of the UN, against artillery and mortar positions in or around Deny Flight’s mandate was terminated on 20 December 1995, with the Sarajevo which were determined by UN PROFOR to be responsible for transfer of authority from die UN to NATO as stipulated in the UN ittacks against civilian targets in that city. The NATO Council also Security Council Resolution of IS December. This provided for the iecided that all heavy weapons had to be withdrawn from a 20-kilometre creation of the NATO-led Implementation Farce in Bosnia, following the exclusi on zone around Sarajevo or placed under UNPROFOR control Peace Agreement signed on 14 December. Since 20 December 1995 vithin 10 days. Heavy weap ons of any of the Parties found within the IFOR has controlled the airspace over Basnia-Hexzegovina, as part of its :xclusion zone, unless under UNPROFOR control, would be subject to peace implementation missionJoint Endeavour. The North Atlantic :ir strikes after expiration of the 10-day period, in close coordination Council also decided that Operation Joint Endeavour should provide vith the UN and in accordance with the Council decisions of 2 and 9 close air support for UN peace forces (UNTAES) in the region of Eastern vugust 1993. Slavonia (Croatia) in accordance with UNSCR 1037. Control of the airspace over Bosnia-Heizegovina and the provision of close air support imilar decisions were taken on 22 April 1994, in response to a request to UNTAES hive been continued under die Stabilisation Force (SFOR), y the UN Secretary General, to support the UN in its efforts to end the which succeeded IFOR on 20 December 1996. iege of Gorazde and to protect other Safe Areas. The North Atlantic JDuncil decided that air strikes would be launched, unless Bosnian Serb Operation Deliberate Force ttacks ceased immediately, Bosnian Serb forces had pulled back three Following continued attacks by Bosnian Serb artillery on the Safe Area ilometres from the city centre by 24 April, and humanitarian relief of Sarajevo, NATO aircraft, operating within the provisions agreed onvoys and medical teams were allowed to enter the city on that date, between NATO and the UN, commenced a series of air strikes on 30 lie Council declared that air strikes would be launched against August 1995, against Bosnian Serb military targets in Bosnia, supported imaining Bosnian Serb heavy weapons within a 20-kilometre Exclusion by the UN Rapid Reaction Force on M l Igman. The air operations were one around the centre of Gorazde after 27 April. Regarding other initiated after UN military commanders concluded, beyond any rN-designated Safe Areas (Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa), the reasonable doubt, that a mortar attack in Sarajevo two days earlier came Council authorised air strikes if these areas were attacked by heavy from Bosnian Serb positions. The operations were jointly decided by the 'eapons from any range. These other Safe Areas could also become Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) xclusion Zones if, in the common judgement of the NATO and UN and the Force Commander, UN Peace Forces, under UN Security C ouncil (ilitary Commanders, there was a concentration or movement of heavy Resolution 836 and in accordance with the North Atlantic Council's 'eapons decisions of 25 July and 1 August 1995, which were endorsed by the UN ithin a radius of 20 kilometres around them. Secretary General. The common objectives of NATO and the UN were to reduce the threat to the Sarajevo Safe Area and to deter further attacks ■n 5 August 1994, NATO aircraft attacked a target within the Sarajevo there or on any other Safe Area; the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy xclusion Zone at the request of UNPROFOR. The air strikes were weapons from die total Exclusion Zone around Sarajevo; and complete ■dered following agreement between NATO and UNPROFOR, after freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel and eapons were seized by Bosnian Serbs from a weapons collection site non-governmental organisations, and unrestricted use of Sarajevo a r Sarajevo. Airport controlling the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 20 September 1995, CINCSOUTH and the UN Peace Force Commander concluded that the Bosnian Serbs had complied with the By carrying out these tasks, IFOR played a pivotal role in the transition conditions set down in a letter of 3 September by the UNPF Commander to peace in the first year after the Dayton Peace Agreement It ensured and air strikes were discontinued. However, they stressed that any attack a secure environment in which the other organizations, responsible for on Sarajevo or any other Safe Area, or other non-compliance with the the implementation of die civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, could provisions of the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, freedom of movement or thecarry out their work, and in which the return to normal life could start functioning of the Airport would be subject to investigation and resumption of air strike operations. IFOR Command Structure Operation Joint Endeavour was NATO-led, under die political direction Following the conclusion of operationDeliberate Force, NATO and control of the Alliance’s North Atlantic Council, as stipulated in conducted two additional air operations under Operation Deny Flight. Annex 1A of the Peace Agreement IFOR had a unified command On 4 October 1995, NATO aircraft fired three missiles at Bosnian Serb structure. Overall military authority rested in the hands of NATO’s radar sites at two different locations, after anti-aircraft radar had locked Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General George onto Alliance aircraft Joulwan. General Joulwan designated Admiral Leighton-Smith (NATO’s Commander in Chief Southern Command - CINCSOUTH) as Contingency Planning the first Commander in Theatre of IFOR (COMIFOR). In July 1996, Throughout this period, NATO conducted contingency planning for a Admiral Smith retired and Admiral Joseph Lopez was appointed as range of options to support UN activities relating to the crisis.CINCSOUTH and COMIFOR. In November 1996, following a Contingency plans were provided to the UN for enforcement of the replacement of IFOR Headquarters, General Crouch (CINCLANDCENT) no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina; the establishment of relief zonesbecame COMIFOR. and safe havens for civilians in Bosnia; and ways to prevent the spread of the conflict to Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic ofParticipation of non-NATO nations Macedonia. Possible contingency arrangements for the protection ofAll NATO nations contributed to IFOR. But IFOR was more than just humanitarian assistance, monitoring of heavy weapons, and protection ofa NATO operation. Non-NATO forces were incorporated into the UN forces on the ground, were also made available to the UN. unified command structure alongside NATO forces, under the command of the IFOR Commander and his multinational divisional commanders. In mid-1994, due to the degradation of the situation on the ground, At the end of the IFOR mission 18 non-NATO countries were NATO military authorities were tasked to undertake contigency planning participating in Operation Joint Endeavour, most of them being to assist the UN forces in withdrawing from Bosnia-Herzegovina and/or Partnership for Peace countries1 Croatia, if that became unavoidable. Plans for a NATO-led operation to support the withdrawal of UN forces were provisionally approved by the Russian forces joined the Implementation Force in January 1996. North Atlantic Council in June 1995. At the time, the Alliance stressed Russia’s participation in the Implementation Force was subject to special its hope that its planning and preparations would serve to underpin die arrangements agreed between NATO and Russia. The Russian continued UN presence in the former Yugoslavia. contingent was directly subordinated to Col.General Leontiy Shevtsov, as General Joulwan’s Russian deputy. In theatre, the Russian Brigade As prospects for peace in Bosnia improved in autumn 1995, following was placed under the tactical control of the US-led Multinational Operation Deliberate Force, the Alliance reaffirmed its readiness to help Division (NoTth). implement a peace plan and stepped up its contingency planning to do so. With the initialling of a peace agreement in dayton, Ohio (USA) between The participation of Russia and other non-NATO countries in the the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the implementation of the Peace Agreement has been an important element Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on in the of the mission undertaken by the international community 21 November, preparations were expedited for a NATO-led to bring an end to the conflict and to create die circumstances in which Implementation Force (IFOR) to implement the military aspects of the peace can be restored. It has also contributed to die evolving NATO- peace agreement. Russia cooperative relationship and to gaining practical experience of cooperation between NATO and non-NATO forces. Operation Joint Endeavour Following the signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris on 14Majo r IFOR Milestones December 1995, NATO was given a mandate by the UN, on the basis of The advance enabling force of 2,600 troops began deploying to Bosnia Security Council Resolution 1031, to implement the military aspects ofand Croatia on 2 December 1995. Their task was to establish the the Peace Agreement The NATO-led multinational force, called the headquarters, communications and logistics necessary to receive the main Implementation Force - or “IFOR” - started operationJoint Endeavour body of some 60,000 IFOR troops being deployed to the area on 16 December. The deployment of the main force was activated on 16 December, after IFOR’s role was to help the Parties to implement a peace accord to which final approval by the North Adantic Council of die Operational Plan they have freely agreed, in an even-handed way. IFOR did not come to (OPLAN), and die UN Security Council's Resolution 1031 of 15 Bosnia to fight a war or to impose a settlement on any of the Parties. TheDecember, authorising the IFOR’s mission. implementation of the Peace Agreement is the responsibility of the Parties themselves. The transfer of authority from the Commander of UNP eace Forces to die In accordance with die Peace Agreement IFOR undertook the following Commander of IFOR took place on 20 December, 96 hours after the primary military tasks: NATO Council’s approval of the main deployment On that day, all NATO and non-NATO forces participating in die operation came under • ensuring continued compliance with die cease-fire; the command and/or control of die IFOR Commander. IFOR secured • ensuring the withdrawal of forces from the agreed conditions for the safe, orderly and timely withdrawal of remaining UN cease-fire zone of separation, back to their respective territories, and ensuring the separation of forces; • ensuring the collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the The 14 PfP nations that contributed to IFOR were Albania, demobilisation of remaining forces; Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, • creating conditions for the safe, orderly and speedy Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden withdrawal of UN forces that have not transferred to and Ukraine. Four other nations contributed forces: Egypt, the NATO-led IFOR; Jordan, Malaysia and Morocco, all o f which, except Malaysia, are participating in die NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. forces not coming under NATOc ommand and/or control. Finally, IFOR included a specialized group of about 350 personnel bringing together lawyers, educators, public transportation specialists, By 19 January, 30 days after transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to engineers, agricultural experts, economists, public health officials, IFOR (‘EH-30'), the Parties to the Agreement had withdrawn their forces veterinarians, communications experts and many others. These are part from die zone of esparation on either side of the agreed case-fiie line. As of a Civil-Military team, referred to as CIMIC, which provides technical of 3 February (D+45), all forces had been withdrawn from the areas to be advice and assistance to various commissions and working groups, transferred. The transfer of territory between Bosnian entities was civilian organisations, non-governmental organisations and IFOR units, completed by 19 March (EH-90), and a new zone of separation was as well as to the Parties to the Agreement and to local authorities. established along the inter-entity boundary line. Operation Joint Guard In assessing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina four months after On 20 December 1996, IFOR successfully completed its mission. the beginning of the IFOR deployment, the North Atlantic Council Hostilities had ceased and the factions’ military forces had been separated concluded that the Implementation Force had been successful in bringing and moved into cantonments. However, it was also clear that much about a more secure environment The Parties continue to respect the remained to be done on the civilian side and that the environment would cessation of hostilities and have generally complied with the major be too instable and insecure to continue civilian implementation without milestones in the Peace Agreement. an international military presence. Based on planning by the NATO Military Authorities and after a two-year Civilian Consolidation Plan was All heavy weapons and forces were to be in cantonments or demobilized established in Paris and elaborated in London under the auspices of the by 18 April (D+120), which represented the last milestone in die military Peace Implementation Council, NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers annex to the Peace Agreement Due to technical problems, the Parties to concluded dial a reduced military presence was needed to provide the the Peace Agreement were not able to complete the withdrawal and stability necessary for the consolidation of peace. They agreed that demobilisation or cantonment of heavy weapons and forces by the NATO should organise a Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which was deadline, although the revised deadline set by SACEUR of 27 June subsequently activated on 20 December 1996. (D+180) for the cantonment of heavy weapons was met SFOR’s mission is to deter renewed hostilities and to stabilise the peace. Civilian Implementation While SFOR is only half die size of IFOR, it retains the same unity of For lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, frill implementation o f thecommand, robust rules of engagement, enforcement authority and civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement is crucial. By implementing the consent by the Parties that made IFOR a success. SFOR, like its military asects of the Agreement, IFOR helped to ensure a secure predecessor, is a joint operation, led by NATO, but with wide environment conducive to civil and political reconstrucion. The timely participation of non-NATO countries.2 conclusion of an aims control régime and of confidence and security building measures was also of fundamental importance to the peace Conclusion process. Since 1992, when NATO ships first began monitoring die UN sanctions/embargo in the Adriatic, the Alliance has taken an increasingly The civilian aspects of the Agreement are being carried out by active and decisive role in the former Yugoslavia. NATO's involvement appropriate international and nongovernmental organisations. Thefurthered its three objectives of supporting the peace process, helping to London Peace Implementation Conference of 8-9 December 1995 set out protect the UN-designated Safe Areas, and preventing a spillover of the the framework for these efforts. The High Representative named at the conflict to neighbouring countries. NATO's presence in the air and its London Conference, Carl Bildt, was charged with monitoring the preparations to support a possible UN withdrawal allowed UN forces to implementation of die Peace Agreement and coordinating the activities remain on the ground and to cany out their important tasks. At the same of the organisations and agencies involved in civilian implementation. time, NATO's Operation Deliberate Force helped to convince the parties to die conflict that their differences were best settled at the negotiating In view of the importance of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, table rather than on the battlefield. IFOR provided substantia] support for civilian tasks within die limits of its existing mandate and available resources. IFO R worked closely with The NATO-led operation in Bosna-Herzegovina,Joint Endeavour, was the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the International Police NATO’s first-ever ground force operation, its first-ever deployment "out Task Force (IPTF), the International Committee of die Red Cross of area", and its first-ever joint operation with NATO's Partnership for (ICRC), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Peace partners and other non-NATO countries. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and It has successfully completed its mission. Its successor SFOR continues many others, including more than 400 non-governmental organisations. to guarantee the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, by doing so, to IFOR has offered a range of support facilities to these organisations, such stabilise the situation and and consolidate the peace. Both operations as emergency accommodation, medical treatment and evacuation, vehicle have demonstrated that the Alliance is adapting its forces and policies to repair and recovery, as well as transport assistance, security information die requirements of the post-Cold War world, while continuing to and advice, and other logistical support provide collective security and defence for all Allies. In addition to carrying out the core functions of defence of the Alliance, its military IFOR also provided a broad range of support to the OSCE, assisting in forces have the flexibility to be used outside the NATO area, for that Organisation’s task to prepare, supervise and monitor the elections operations under the authority of die UN Security Council and with clear that took place on 14 September 1996. After these elections were political objectives defining the military tasks. NATO's own military successfully held, IFOR provided support to the Office of die High capabilities and the adaptability which enables die forces of non-NATO Representative’s task in assisting the Parties in building new common countries to participate are decisive factors in the Alliance's role in institutions. implementing the Peace Agreemen t The IFOR/SFOR operations show that the Alliance remains vital, relevant and prepared to deal with the IFOR military engineers repaired and opened more than 50% of the roads new, multifaceted security risks facing Europe with the end of the Cold in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and rebuilt or repaired over 60 bridges War. including those linking die country with Croatia They were also involved in die d e-mining and repair of railroads and opening up airports to civilian traffic, in restoring gas, water and electricity supplies, in rebuilding schools and hospitals, and in restoring key telecommunication assets.
Further information on SFOR is available in NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 11. 5 E E S ! press info / info presse
I €THE NATO-LED STABILISATION FORCE (SFORÌ IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Background subsequently activated on 20 December 1996, the day on which the mandate given to IFOR expired. On 14 December 1995 the Bosnia P eace Agreement was signed in Paris, after it had been negotiated in Dayton, Ohio. On 16 December SFOR’s Role and Mandate the Alliance’s North Atlantic Council launched the largest military operation ever undertaken by the Alliance, Operation Joint Endeavour. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1088 of 12 December 1996, Based on UN Security Council Resolution 1031 NATO was given the SFOR was authorised to implement the military aspects of the Peace mandate to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. A Agreement as the legal successor to IFOR. Like IFOR, SFOR operates NATO-led multinational force, called the Implementation Force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement). SFOR has (IFOR), started its mission on 20 December 1995. IFOR was given a the same rules of engagement for the robust use of force, if it should be one year mandate. necessary to accomplish its mission and to protect itself.
IFOR’s primary mission was to implement Annex 1A (military aspects) The primary mission of SFOR is to contribute to the secure of the Peace Agreement. It succeeded in accomplishing its primary environment necessary for the consolidation of peace. Its specific tasks military tasks by maintaining the cessation of hostilities; separating the are: armed forces of the Bosniac-Croat Entity (the Federation) and the • to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or Bosnian Serb Entity (the Republika Srpska) by mid-January 1996; new threats to peace; transferring areas between the two Entities by mid-March; and, finally, • to consolidate IFOR’s achievements and promote moving the Parties’ forces and heavy weapons into approved sites, a climate in which the peace process can continue which was realized by the end of June. In the remainder of the year to move forward; IFOR continued to patrol along the 1,400 km long demilitarized Inter • to provide selective support to civilian Entity Boundary Line and regularly inspected over 800 sites containing organisations within its capabilities. heavy weapons and other equipment. In carrying out these tasks it opened 2,500 km of roads, repaired or replaced over 60 bridges, and It also stands ready to provide emergency support to UN forces in freed up Sarajevo airport and important railway lines. Eastern Slavonia.
Due to IFOR’s early success a secure environment was established, in SFOR’s size, with around 31,000 troops in Bosnia, is about half of which the High Representative nominated at the London Peace IFOR’s size. Building on general compliance with the terms of the Implementation Conference of 8-9 December 1995, and other Dayton Agreement ensured during the IFOR mission, the smaller-sized organisations, could start their work with regard to the implementation SFOR is able to concentrate on the implementation of all the provisions of the civil aspects of the peace agreement and the creation of of Annex 1A of the Peace Agreement, i.e.: conditions in which the return to normal life in Bosnia-Herzegovina could begin. Within the limits of its mandate and available resources • stabilisation of the current secure environment in IFOR provided substantial support to the High Representative and to which local and national authorities and other the other organisations. One important element was the support given international organisations can work; and as a matter of priority to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation • providing support to other agencies (on a selective in Europe (OSCE), in preparing and conducting the elections held in and targeted basis, in view of the reduced size of September 1996 .' the forces available).
From IFOR to SFOR NATO is planning for an 18-month mission for SFOR. The North Atlantic Council intends to review SFOR’s force levels after 6 and 12 After the peaceful conduct of the September elections, IFOR months with a view to shifting the focus from stabilisation to successfully completed its mission. However, it became clear that deterrence and completing the mission by June 1998. much remained to be accomplished on the civil side and that the environment would continue to be potentially unstable and insecure. The role of IFOR(Operation Joint Endeavour) was to implement the One week after the Bosnian elections, at an informal meeting in peace. The role of SFOR(Operation Joint Guard) is to stabilise the Bergen, Norway, NATO Defence Ministers concluded that the Alliance peace. The difference between the tasks of IFOR and SFOR is needed to reassess how it might continue to provide support for the reflected in the names of their missions. establishment of a secure environment after the end of IFOR’s mandate in December. One month later, the North Atlantic Council approved SFOR Command Structure detailed political guidance for a study to be undertaken by the NATO Military Authorities of post-IFOR security options. In November and The Stabilisation Force has a unified command and is NATO-led, December 1996, a two-year consolidation plan was established in Paris under the political direction and control of the Alliance’s North and elaborated in London under the auspices of the Peace Atlantic Council, as stipulated by the Peace Agreement (Annex 1 A). Implementation Council. On the basis of this plan and the Alliance’s Overall military authority is in the hands of NATO’s Supreme Allied own study of security options, NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers Commander Europe (SACEUR), General George Joulwan. General concluded that a reduced military presence was needed to provide the Joulwan has designated General William Crouch (NATO’s stability necessary for the consolidation of the peace. They agreed that Commander of Land Forces Central Europe - LANDCENT) as the NATO should organise a Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which was Commander of SFOR (COMSFOR).
1 Further information on IFOR is available in NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 4. Participation of non-NATO Nations will be applied. To be effective, SFOR and the other organisations will continue to plan together and identify objectives to ensure that SFOR Every NATO nation with aimed forces is committing rtoops to SFOR, support is applied where and when needed. as was also the case with IFOR. Iceland, the only NATO country without armed forces, is providing medical support But SFOR is more Among the institutions and organisations implementing the civilian than a NATO operation. All the 18 non-NATO nations thataspects of the Peace Agreement are the Office of the High participated in IFOR are also participating in SFOR: Albania, Austria, Representative (OHR), the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation for Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine - all of Security and Cooperation in Europa (OSCE) and the International which are Partnership for Peace countries - plus Egypt, Jordan, Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Many other Malaysia and Morocco. All of the last four, except Malaysia, are intergovernmental and non-govemmental organisations are also participating in the Alliance’s Mediterranean dialogue. Slovenia and playing an important role. Ireland have also joined SFOR, bringing the total of non-NATO participating nations to 20. Directed by the North Atlantic Council, SFOR will provide the secure environment for the municipal elections to take place in September Non-NATO nations have been incorporated into the operation on the1997. It will also be prepared to provide other form of support to the same basis as forces from NATO member countries. They take orders OSCE in the preparation and conduct of these elections. SFOR will, from the SFOR Commander through the multinational divisional for example, continue to support the OSCE in its role of assisting the headquarters. Several non-NATO countries are represented in SFOR Parties in the implementation of the Confidence- and Security headquarters in Sarajevo which has personnel from 25 NATO and non Building Agreement and the Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement. NATO nations. The latter Agreement limits the holdings of heavy weapons by the Parties in order to eliminate the danger of a sub-regional arms race and Contributing non-NATO countries have liaison officers at SHAPE and to bring about an overall reduction of heavy weaponry in the area. have been involved in planning operations and generating the necessary forces through the SFORC oordination Centre. At NATO SFOR is also continuing to support UNHCR in its supervising tasks for headquarters, contributing non-NATO countries are consulted at key the return of refugees and displaced persons. It is ensuring that no junctures and are given the opportunity to express their views or weapons, other than those o f SFOR, are carried in the Zone of associate themselves with NAC decisions. The main mechanism for Separation. Any exceptions need die spe cific approval of SFOR which political consultation is the so-called NAC+N - North Atlantic Council is thus providing support for the implementation of the procedures for meeting with non-NATO contributors. facilitating returns to the Zone of Separation negotiated among the various organisations involved and the Parties. SFOR will try to Participation by non-NATO countries not only contributes to the prevent any conflict with regard to the return of refugees and displaced accomplishment of the SFOR mission but has a wider significance. It persons- However, it is the responsibility of the Parties to restore order provides all the participating forces from Partnership Countries with and normal conditions if an incident takes place. practical experience of operating with NATO forces. It shows that NATO and non-NATO countries can work closely together in a Like its IFOR predecessor, SFOR continues to work closely together NATO-led operation in the cause of peace. This has a broader impact with the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF). It will be on the region and contributes to enhanced security in the whole of available to support the IPTF in its role in promoting local law and Europe and beyond. order, which is essential for establishing lasting peace. The implementation of the Brcko Arbitration Agreement of 15 Russian Participation February 1997 is also being supported by SFOR, by providing a secure environment in and around Brcko and by supporting the Brcko The participation of Russia in IFOR and SFOR is very important and Supervisor, the IPTF, UNHCR and other agencies involved m the is an example of how NATO and Russia can work together implementation. successfully. It is a major step in the evolving NATO-Russia cooperative relationship. The support already provided by IFOR to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is being maintained by Russian forces joined IFOR in January 1996 and Russia continues to SFOR. This includes the provision of security and logistic support to contribute to SFOR. Russia’s participation is subject to special ICTY investigative teams, and surveillance and ground patrolling of arrangements between NATO and Russia. The Russian contingent is alleged mass grave sites. The North Atlantic Council has authorised directly subordinated to Col.General Leontiy Shevtsov, as SACEUR’s SFOR to detain and transfer to the ICTY persons indicted for war deputy. In theatre, the Russian brigade is under the tactical control of crimes, when SFOR personnel come into contact with them while the US-led Multinational Division (North). carrying out their duties.
Civilian Aspects Finally, SFOR headquarters includes a specialized group of over 300 personnel consisting of lawyers, educators, public transportation For lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, full implementation of the specialists, engineers, agricultural experts, economists, public health civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement is crucial. By continuing the officials, veterinarians, communication experts and many others. They implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement, are part of the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) structure, which NATO is helping to ensure a secure environment conducive to civil provides technical advice and assistance to various commissions and and political reconstruction. working groups, civilian organisations, non-governmental organisations and SFOR units, many of which have their own CIMIC The civilian aspects of the Agreement are being carried out by experts carrying out civil support work. appropriate international organisations, under the coordination of the High Representative, Carl Bildt In view of the importance of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, SFOR continues to provide support for civilian tasks. However, with fewer forces at its disposal, SFOR has had to prioritise its efforts and carefully select where they PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE
I THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL
The development and enhancement of dialogue and partnership with security-related matters as well as other activities mentioned below. By Cooperation Partners forms an integral part of NATO’s Strategicthe time of the 1997 Autumn EAPC Meeting, a new Work Plan will be Concept The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Councildrawn up to implement the EAPC Basic Document Initially, the EAPC (NACC) at the end of 1991 established a framework for dialogue and Work Plan can be expected to follow a similar pattern to the work of cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the the NACC and is likely to include the following topics : political newly independent states emerging from the former Soviet Union. consultations on specific political and security related matters such as Membership of the NACC increased from 25 countries in 1991 to crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, 40 countries by 1997. Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, as biological and chemical (NBC) proliferation and defence issues; participants in Partnership for Peace (PfP) (see Fact Sheet N° 9), had international terrorism; defence planning and budgets and defence observer status in the NACC. policy and strategy, security impacts of economic developments. There will also be scope for consultations and cooperation on issues such as Building upon the success of NACC and PfP, allied and Cooperation civil emergency and disaster preparedness; armaments cooperation Partner Foreign Ministers inaugurated the Euro-Atlantic Partnership under the aegis of the NATO Conference of National Armaments Council (EAPC) at their meeting in Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May 1997, Directors (CNAD); nuclear safety; defence related environmental with a view to raising political and military cooperation among theirissues; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and countries to a qualitatively new level. The Ministers approved an control; scientific cooperation; and issues related to peace support EAPC Basic Document developed in close cooperation between the operations. Additional areas for cooperation within the framework of Alliance and Partners. In so doing, Ministers reaffirmed their joint the EAPC may be added subsequently. comiintiuent to strengthening and extending peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to cooperating to this end on the basis o f shared Cooperation on defence-related issues, in the military field and in the values and principles, notably those set out in the Framework sphere of peacekeeping (including exercises) will continue as Document of the Partnership for Peace. The EAPC, as the successor to Partnership for Peace activities. NACC, provides the overarching framework for political and security- related consultations and for enhanced cooperation under PfP. Further examples of continuing activities in the framework of the EAPC, focusing on consultation and cooperation, arc as follows: The ex paid ed political dimension of consultation and cooperation which the EAPC offers, allows Partners, if they wish, to develop a o Economic issues direct political relationship with the Alliance. In addition, the EAPC The Economic Committee's work with Cooperation Partners provides the framework for giving Partner countries increased focuses on defence budgets and their relationship with the decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they economy; security aspects of economic developments; and participate. defence conversion issues. Expert meetings, seminars and workshops are held to address these subjects. Databases and The EAPC meets twice a year at both Foreign Ministers and Defence pilot projects are being developed in the field of defence Ministers level and, as a general rule, at Ambassadorial level in conversion with a view to practical application in Cooperation Brussels on a monthly basis. It may also meet at the level of Heads of Partner countries. The annual NATO Colloquium on economic State or Government, when appropriate. developments in EAPC countries also brings together experts for exchanges of views on relevant economic topics. MEMBERSHIP o Information matters There are 44 EAPC members, including all 16 NATO member In the field of information, the NATO Committee on countries plus: Information and Cultural Relations meets with representatives of Cooperation Partners annually to discuss the Albania Hungary Slovenia implementation of cooperative information activities. Armenia Kazakstan Sweden Cooperative programmes organised by the NATO Office of Austria Kyrgyz Republic Switzerland Information and Press include visits, co-sponsored seminars Azerbaijan Latvia Tajikistan and conferences, publications and Democratic Institutions Belarus Lithuania the former Yugoslav Republic Fellowships. Assistance is provided by Missions of of Macedonia1 Cooperation Partner countries in Brussels and by Contact Bulgaria Moldova Turkmenistan Point Embassies o f NATO countries in Partner capitals. Czech Republic Poland Ukraine Estonia Romania Uzbekistan o Scientific and environmental issues Finland Russia NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society Georgia Slovakia (CCMS) meets with Cooperation Partners at least once a year. An extensive programme of cooperative activities in scientific ACTIVITIES and environmental affairs focuses on such priority areas as disarmament technologies, environmental security, high At the time of its establishment, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council technology, science and technology policy, and computer adopted the existing NACC Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and networking. In addition, NATO Science Fellowships are Cooperation, which includes regular consultations on political and awarded to both NATO and Cooperation Partner scientists for study or research. Several hundred scientists from Cooperation Partner countries now participate in NATO's scientific and environmental programmes. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name
Madrid PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE VII • 1997
THE ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAMME ÌPfPÌ
OVERVIEW The overarching objectives of PfP enhancement are:
Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a major initiative introduced by NATO - at strengtheningthe the political consultation element in PfP, taking into January 1994 Brussels Summit. The aim o f the Partnership is to enhanceaccount EAPC and related outreach activities; stability and security throughout Europe. It is focused on defence-related - developing a more operational role for PfP; cooperation, is addressed to all OSCE states able and willing to- contribute providing for greater involvement of Partners in PfP decision making to this programme, and goes beyond dialogue and cooperation and to planning.forge a real partnership, constituting a permanent feature o f the European security architecture. The Partnership serves as the means to expand and To intensify meet each one of these objectives a series of enhancements has been political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase agreed stability, which aims not only to build on the existing programme but to add a diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships new by promoting quality to the Partnership. the spirit o f practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance. NA TO will consult with any active Partner STRENGTHENED if that POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AND DECISION Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political MAKING independence, or security. The consultation element in PfP is being enhanced through the establishment In January ¡994, the states participating in the then North of the Atlantic Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) , a new cooperative Cooperation Council (NACC) and other member countries mechanism of the replacing the former North Atlantic Cooperation Council Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (NACC). able and The EAPC meets in different configurations and at different levels, willing to contribute, were invited to join the NATO member states e ninabling this consultations to take place on a wide range of subjects (see separate Partnership. Twenty-seven states1 have since accepted this invitation information and in sheet on the EAPC). Other enhancements in this respect include: most cases, detailed Individual Partnership Programmes have been agreed and are being implemented. - Increased involvement of Partners in the political guidance and oversight of future NATO-led PfP operations in which they wish to At their Spring 1997 Ministerial Meeting, Alliance Foreign and Defenceparticipate; Ministers agreed on a set o f new initiatives to further strengthen -PfP as The an development of a new political-military framework for PfP enduring element o f the European Security Architecture and as a vehicleoperations. for developing ever closer security relation between NA TO and Partner - nations. Enhancement of die role of Partners Countries in PfP decision making. The Enhanced PfP programme will have a more operational role, strongerDecisions made in this context offer a spectrum of opportunities for political consultations, and increased opportunities fo r PartnersPartners to to associate themselves with the PfP decision making process participate in decision-making and planning o f PfP activities. in the Political Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace and other relevant bodies, ranging from simple exchanges of views to Partnership for Peace constitutes a clearly identifiable element within fullthe involvement in the consensus process leading to decisions. flexible framework o f the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)2 and maintains its own basic elements and procedures. PfP is founded ENHANCINGon the basis THE OPERATIONAL ROLE OF PFP o f a bilateral relationship between NATO and each one o f the 27 countries that have joined PfP. All members o f PfP are also members o f the NumerousE1APC. enhancements have also been agreed in order to make PfP more operational. The most significant of these are: THE ENHANCED PFP PROGRAMME - Participation of Partner nations that so wish, together with NATO The Partnership for Peace initiative has been uniquely successful in Allies, in future PfP operations to be agreed by the North Atlantic influencing stability and security in Europe and fostering improvements in Council. good-neighbourly relations. It has become a permanent and dynamic feature An expanded scope of NATO/PfP exercises to address the full range of the European security architecture. of the Alliance’s new missions, including Peace Support Operations. In mid 1997 the Alliance therefore decided to further enhance the role of the The involvement of Partners in the planning and conduct of PfP Partnership, building on its momentum and success. In Spring 1997 Allied activities, including NATO/PfP exercises and other PfP operations, Foreign and Defence Ministers launched a wide range of enhancement through the establishment of PfP Staff Elements at different NATO measures which have added a new quality to PfP and have substantively Headquarters. Partner countries will thus be able to assume international strengthened PfP in the political, security, military and institutional fields. roles in these spheres and , in addition, will fulfill international functions at the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC). The enhancement of PfP is one of the basic elements of the external The possible participation of PfP Staff Elements in CJTF (Combined adaptation of the Alliance which, together with die special relationship that Joint Task Forces) exercise planning, concept and doctrine has been developed with Russia and Ukraine, sets the stage for new enhanced development, and operations. security arrangements for Europe and emphasises the key role The possible involvement of national personnel from Partner countries of the Alliance in these arrangements. in CJTF headquarters. The enhancement of arrangements for national aliison representatives AIMS OF ENHANCED PFP from Partner Countries at NATO Headquarters as part of the establishment of full diplomatic missions formerly accredited to NATO under the terms of the Brussels Agreement. Expansion of the Planning and Review Process (PARP) modelled on the Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, CzechNATO defence planning system and including the development of Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, KyrghyzMinisterial Guidance and of Partnership Goals, replacing the Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Interoperability Slovak Objectives which form part o f the former PfP process. Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic These of measures will be combined with increased opportunities to Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Note that Turkey recognisesdevelop transparency among PARP participants. the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. Modalities for extending die scope and orientation of die NATO Security Investment Programme to include Partnership projects. Increased scope for regional cooperation activities in the context of the 2 The EAPC was inaugurated on 30 May 1997 as the overarching Partnership, including consultations on both regional security matters framework for political and security-related consultations and for enhanced and on practical cooperation. cooperation under PfP. It replaces the NACC. rHE EVOLUTION OF PFP Military Authorities on the basis of guidance proposed by the PMSC and \s stated in die Framework D ocument published by the Alliance in January agreed by the Council. The PfP working forum on the military side is the 1994, the fundamental objectives of PfP are: Military Cooperation Working Group (MCWG) which acts as a consultative body for the Military Committee. The MCWG meets either at Alliance level - facilitating transparency in national defence planning and budgeting or including Partners. The Military Committee also meets with Partners to processes; discuss military aspects of cooperation in PfP. ensuring democratic control of defence forces; maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations The Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) is a unique PfP structure, based at under the authority of the UN and/ or the responsibility of the OSCE; Mons (Belgium), which operates under the authority of the North Atlantic developing cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose Council. The task of the PCC is to coordinate joint military activities within of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the PfP and to carry out military planning necessary to implement the military ability o f PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of aspects of the Partnership Work Programme, notably, in the field of military peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others exercises. Detailed operational planning for military exercises is the as may subsequently be agreed; responsibility of the military commands conducting the exercise. The Cell is developing, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate headed by a Director and includes staff consisting of NATO personnel and, with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. as of 1998, of Parmer personnel as well, having international status. The Cell also includes national liaison personnel representing each Partner nation. active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role a the evolutionary process of including new members in NATO. Alliance At NATO Headquarters, Partners are represented by liaison elements ovemments have stated that they “expect and would welcome” the addition consisting of diplomatic and military personnel. As a result of the Brussels f new members to the Alliance “as part of an evolutionary process taking Agreement, however, Partners are invited to establish full diplomatic ito account political and security developments in the whole of Europe”, missions formally accredited to NATO and also high level military article 10 o f the Washington Treaty provides for the inclusion in NATO ofrepresentation to die Military Committee. ther European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and 3 contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. PFP PLANNING AND REVIEW PROCESS In January 1995, a Planning and Review Process (PARP) was introduced FP PROCEDURES AND OPERATION within the PfP framework, in order to advance interoperability and increase i country wishing to join Partnership for Peace is first invited to sign a transparency among Allies and Partners. PARP, which is based on a triennial ramework Document which describes die basic principles on which PfP is planning cycle, is modelled on the basis o f the defence planning system of sunded. By virtue of their signature, countries undertake a political the Alliance. Participation of PfP countries in PARP is voluntary. 18 of the ommitment to the preservation of democratic societies and maintenance of27 PfP members have chosen to participate. The first and the second PARP le principles of international law; to fulfil in good faith the obligations ofcycle focused on Interoperability Objectives aimed at facilitating PfP le Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal cooperation and potential future PfP operations. In the future the PARP will >eclaration on Human Rights; to refrain from the threat or use of forcebe further enhanced with the introduction of a Ministerial Guidance process gainst the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; to similar to that which forms a key part of defence planning procedures and the sp e d existing borders; and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also development of Partnership Goals of broader scope than the current a ffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent Interoperability Objectives. :SCE/OSCE documents and to die fulfilment of the commitments and bligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms THE PMSC/AHG ON COOPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING ontrol. The Political-Military Steering Committee/ Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping (PMSC/AHG), which operates in the framework of the Liter signing the Framework Document, each Partner submits its EAPC, serves as the main forum for consultations on political and conceptual resentation Document to NATO. This document, indicates the aims for the issues related to peacekeeping, and for the exchange of experience and the ooperation of the Partner concerned with NATO, the specific areas ofdiscussion of practical measures for cooperation. The PMSC/AHG reports [»operation the Partner wishes to pursue jointly with NATO, and die military periodically to meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers on these matters. nd other assets die Partner intends to make available for Partnership All meetings of die PMSC/AHG include Partners. Ireland, as an interested urposes. OSCE member state with specific experience in peacekeeping, also participates in the work of the group and actively contributes to it A :ased on the statements made in the Presentation Document, and on representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office regularly attends the Iditional proposals made by NATO and the Partner, an Individual meetings of the Group and, occasionally, a representative of the United artnership Programme (IPP) is developed and agreed jointly covering a Nations also participates. lree-year period. The IPP contains statements of the political aims of the artner in PfP, the military and other assets made available by the Partner for AREAS OF COOPERATION fP purposes, the broad objectives of cooperation between the Partner and PfP cooperation covers a wide spectrum of possibilities both in the military le Alliance in various areas of cooperation, and specific cooperationfield and in the broader defence-related but not strictly military area. Areas divides to be implemented for each one o f the cooperation areas included of cooperation, as agreed in the latest version of the Partnership Work i the IPP. Programme, include: Air Defence Related Matters; Airspace Management/Control; Consultation, Command and Control, including he selection of specific activities is made by each Partner separately on the Communications and Information Systems, Navigation and Identification asis of its individual requirements and priorities, in the context of the Systems, Interoperability Aspects, Procedures and Terminology; Civil rinciple of self differentiation, from a list o f such activities contained in the Emergency Planning; Crisis Management; Democratic Control of Forces and artnership Work Programme (PWP). H ie PWP contains a broad description Defence Structures; Defence Planning and Budgeting; Defence Policy and f the various possible areas of cooperation and a list of available activities Strategy; Planning Organisation and Management of National Defence >r each one of the areas of cooperation. The PWP, which covers a three-yearProcurement Programmes and International Cooperation in the Armaments eriod and is reviewed every year, is prepared with full involvement of Field; Planning, Organisation and Management of National Defence artners. Research and Technology; (non-military) Exercises and Related Trai ning Activities; Consumer Logistics; Medical Services; Military Infrastructure; he basic working body in the field o f PfP is the Political-Military Steering Conceptual, Planning and Operational Aspects of Peacekeeping; Operational, 'ommittee on Partnership for Peace (PMSC) which may meet in various Materiel and Administrative Aspects of Standardisation; Language Training; onfigurations either at Alliance level or as the Alliance with Partners. The Meteorological Support for NATO/Partner Forces; Military Exercises and lain responsibilities of die PMSC include: to advise die Council with respect Related Training Activities; Military Education, Training and Doctrine; > PfP, being responsible for the overall coordination of die Partnership Work Military Geography and Electronic Warfare. rogramme; developing political-military guidelines for use by the NATO lilitary Authorities for the preparation of their PWP input on military Each one of these areas is supported by numerous activities sponsored either xercises and activities; providing guidance for die preparation of the IPPs by NATO civilian or military bodies or by NATO or Parmer nations. These nd for submitting diem to Council for approval ; and developing and activities which numbered nearly 1000 in 1997, serve as a “menu” of oordinating work in relation to the Planning and Review Process (PARP). possibilities for Partners to choose for inclusion in their respective Individual Partnership Programmes. Practically all NATO bodies participate in PfP and Tie military aspects of cooperation in PfP are developed by the NATO conduct joint work with die Alliance’s Partner Countries. Madrid PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE
TH E PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has considered the development of Section I of the Act details the principles on which the NATO - Russia constructive and cooperative relations with Russia as a key element for partnership is based. These include commitments to norms of international security and stability in Europe in the interest of all states in the OSCE behaviour as reflected in the UN Charter and the OSCE documents, as well area. Building upon their cooperation in the framework of the Northas more explicit commitments such as respecting states’ Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) since 1991 and the signature of sovereignty, independence and inherent right to choose the means to ensure Partnership for Peace by Russia, the Alliance and Russia agreed on 22 June their security, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Both sides commit 1994 to pursue a “Broad, Enhanced Dialogue and Cooperation” in a themselves to strengthening the OSCE with the aim of creating a common number of fields to which further a reas for cooperation were later added. area of security and stability in Europe. “ 16 + 1" meetings at Ministerial, Ambassadors’ and experts’ level served to exchange information and to consult on issues of common concern. Section II creates a new forum: the NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Cooperation areas included peacekeeping, ecological security, science, and Council (PJC). This is the venue for consultations, cooperation and - humanitarian aspects. A NATO information officer in Moscow took up hiswherever possible - consensus building between the Alliance and Russia. work on a permanent basis in Summer 1995. The PJC will: - hold regular consultations on a broad range of political or The close and effective cooperation between Russia and NATO in the security related matters; implementation of the military aspects of the 1995 Peace Agreement on - based on these consultations, develop joint initiatives on which Bosnia-Herzegovina has added a new dimension to the evolving security NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel; partnership. The participation of Russian troops along with contingents of - once consensus has been reached, make joint decisions, if Allied and other Partne r nations reflects a shared political responsibility. It appropriate, and take joint action on a case-by-case basis. also demonstrates that NATO and Russia can collaborate effectively in the Such joint actions may include peacekeeping operations under the authority construction of cooperative security in Europe, and it has contributed to of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE. overcoming misconceptions about each other. The participation of Russian units in Bosnia has been prepared and supported by a group of Russian Section III details a broad range of topics on which NATO and Russia can officers based at SHAPE. consult and perhaps cooperate, including preventing and settling conflicts, peacekeeping, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Against this background, NATO’s Foreign Ministers, at their meeting on exchanging information on security and defence policies and forces. 10 Decembe r 1996 in Brussels, mandated the Secretary General to explore Conversion of defence industries, defence related environmental issues, and with the Russian side the conclusion of an agreement to deepen and widen civil emergency preparedness are other areas for consultation and possible the scope of NATO-Russia relations and to provide a framework for its cooperation spelled out in this section. future development. As a result of four months of intensive negotiations between Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, Section IV covers military issues. In this section, the members of NATO both sides agreed on the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation reiterate their statement of 10 December 1996 that they have no intention, and Security between NATO and the Russia Federation”. The Founding no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new Act was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997 by the Secretary General and the members, nor any need to change any aspects of NATO’s nuclear posture Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, and by the or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so. President of the Russian Federation. NATO also reiterates its 14 March 1997 statement indicating that in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO plans to carry out its The NATO-Russia Founding Act is the expression of an enduring collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary commitment, undertaken at the highest political level, to build together a interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. It creates the additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, framework for a new security partnership, as one step among others which the Alliance will have to rely on adequate infrastructure to allow for are being taken to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. It allows reinforcement if necessary. the Alliance and Russia to forge a closer relationship, in the interests, not NATO and Russia commit themselves in the same section to pursuing only of NATO and Russia, but also of all other states in the Euro-Atlantic promptly the work relating to the adaptation of the treaty governing area. conventional forces in Europe (CFE), in order to further reduce the levels of Treaty Limited Equipment This commitment will be pursued in the THE FOUNDING ACT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, ongoing negotiations on CFE adaptation in Vienna and will help to achieve COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE a result that reflects the changed security environment in Europe since the RUSSIA FEDERATION Treaty was adopted in 1990. Finally, Section IV provides mechanisms to foster closer military-to- The Founding Act has four sections. It begins with a preamble which military cooperation between NATO and Russia, including by creating establishes the context for a stable and enduring partnership. It states the military liaison missions on both sides. reasons why NATO and Russia believe that it is in their shared interest to cooperate more broadly and intensively. Both sides have agreed that nothing in the Act restricts or impedes the ability of either side to take decisions independently. It does not provide It highlights the profound transformation that the Alliance has undergone NATO or Russia at any stage with a right of veto over the actions of the since the end of the Cold War, through reductions of conventional and other. The provisions of the NATO-Russia Founding Act can also not be nuclear forces, through a revision of its strategic concept, through its new used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states. missions such as peacekeeping, and through its support for security cooperation throughout Europe, in particular within the framework ofThe NATO-Russia Founding Act does not subordinate NATO to any other Partnership for Peace. It also refers to the transformation Russia isorganisation, and it can in no way diminish the political or military undergoing, its force reductions - which will continue - the withdrawal of effectiveness of the Alliance, including its ability to meet its security Russian forces from Central and Eastern Europe, the revision of Russia’s commitment to current and future members. NATO and Russia will work military doctrine, and its participation in the multinational operation in together on a broad spectrum of tasks in the Permanent Joint Council, Bosnia-Herzegovina. which will remain clearly separate from the North Atlantic Council - NATO’s own decision-making body. Secretary Genera] Solana’s visit to Moscow. The Founding Act with Russia has been concluded on its own merits . It does not delay, limit or dilute NATO’s opening for the accession of new 10 May 96 (16+1) Council meeting with Russia to discuss the latest members, and it will not relegate any new NATO membe r to second class situation in the IFOR and the negotiations on the Treaty on status. Conventional Forces in Europe C(FE). NATO and Russia are in ag reement that the provisions of the Founding Act must now be used to their full potential. Both sides are in particular making 4 Jun 96 (16 + 1) NAC Foreign Ministers’ meeting with Russian sure that the new body created by the Founding Act -the NATO-Russia Foreign Minister Primakov in Berlin on the margins of Permanent Joint Council- is fully used. It will build a new pattern of NAC/NACC Ministerial meetings. consultation and cooperation in the interests of all states in the Euro- Atlantic Area. 14 Jun 96 (16 + 1) NATO Defence Ministers meet with Russian Defence Minister Grachev in Brussels. A CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR MILESTONES IN NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS IS GIVEN BELOW : 19 Sep 96 (16+1) Meeting of the Political Committee with Russia on Arms Control and Disarmament issues. 20 Dec 91 The North Atlantic Cooperation Council is inaugurated with the participation of 25 countries (the 16 NATO Allies 20 Sep 96 Meeting of Secretary Genera] Solana with Russian Foreign and Central and Eastern Eu ropean countries). Russia Minister Primakov in Vienna. becomes a founding member of NACC. 26 Sep 96 (16 + 1) NATO Defence Ministers meet with Russian 24-25 Feb 92 Manfred Wömer, Secretary General of NATO visits Defence Minister Rodionov in Bergen , Norway. Moscow. 7 Oct 96 Meeting of Secretary General Solana with the Secretary of 24 May 94 (16 + 1) Special meeting of NATO Defence Ministers with the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed. (16 + 1) the Russian Defence Minister, General Grachev in Informal Council meeting with Alexander Lebed. Brussels. 10 Dec 96 Meeting of Secretary General Solana with Foreien 22 Jun 94 (16+1) Russia signs the PfP Framework Minister Primakov in Brussels. Document.Agreement is also reached on a “Summary of Conclusions” defining the main elements of an enhanced 11 Dec 96 (16 + 1) NATO Foreign Ministers meet with Russian dialogue between NATO and Russia beyond NACC and Foreign Minister Primakov on the margins ofNAC/NACC PFP. Ministerial meetings in Brussels.
1 Dec 94 (16 + 1) NATO Foreign Ministers meet with Russian 18 Dec 96 (16 + 1) NATO Defence Ministers meet with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Brussels. Defence Minister Rodionov in Brussels.
31 May 95 (16 + 1) Russia formally accepts the Individual Partnership 19-21 Jan 97 First round of talks between Secretary General Solana and Programme (IPP) and the “Areas on pursuance of broad, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on a NATO-Russia enhanced NATO-Russia dialogue and cooperation” in Document in Moscow. Noordwijk at a special meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers with Foreign Minister Kozyrev following the regular 23 Feb 97 Second round of talks between Secretary General Solana NATO Ministerial meeting. and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on a NATO-Russia D ocument in Brussels. 17 Jul 95 (16 + 1) Council meeting with Russia on the future development of NATO-Russia relations. 9-10 Mar 97 Third round of talks between Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on a NATO- 11 Sep 95 (16 + 1) At the request of the Russian side, a meeting is Russia Document in Moscow. held with Russia on the situation in Former Yugoslavia. 15 Apr 97 Founh round of talks between Secretary General Solana 20 Sep 95 (16+l)Council meeting with Russia on the implementation and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on a of the CFE Treaty. NATO-Russia Document in Moscow.
19 Oct 95 (16+1) Council meets with Russia on Peace 22-23 Apr 97 Civil Emergency Planning Symposium and meeting of the Implementation Planning in Bosnia SCEPC with Cooperation Partners in Moscow.
28 Nov 95 (16 + 1) NATO Defence Ministers meet with Russian 23-24 Apr 97 Secretary of the Defence Council of the Russian Defence Minister Grachev in Brussels. Federation Yuri Baturin visits Brussels and Mons. Mr. Baturin meets with Secretary General Solana and 6 Dec 95 (16 + 1) NATO Foreign Ministers meet with Russian participates in the “SHAPEX” exercise. Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Brussels. 6 May 97 Fifth round of talks between Secretary General Solana and 13 Jan 96 B eginning of deployment of Russian troops supporting die Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on a NATO-Russia NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. Document in Luxembourg.
13 Mar 96 Russia signs IFOR Participation and Financial 13-14 May 97 Final (sixth) round o f talks between Secretary General Agreements.. Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on a NATO-Russia Document in Moscow. 20-21 Mar 96 Secretary General Javier Solana visits Moscow. 16 May 97 The North Atlantic Council approves the Founding Act. 21 Mar 96 A Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Cooperation between NATO and Russia is signed in 27 May 97 Signing of the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Moscow. Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation” by the Secretary General of NATO and Heads 1 Apr 96 (16 + 1) Council meeting with Russia to assess the way of State and Government of NATO and the Russian ahead in NATO-Russia relations in the aftermath of President in Paris. Madrid PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO’S PARTNERSHIP WITH UKRAINE
NATO’s relations with Ukraine b egan to develop soon after the In the Charter, the NATO Allies reaffirm their support for Ukrainian country achieved independenc e in 1991. Ukraine immediately joined sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and remained an active development, economic prosperity and status as a non-nuclear participant throughout the life of that body. It joined the Partnership for weapons state, as well as the principle o f inviolability of frontiers. Peace program in 1994, and was among the founding members of the These are key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in May 1997. Europe and in the continent as a whole.
President Kuchma visited NATO on 1 June 1995, met the Secretary General and signalled his wish to upgrade NATO-Ukraine relations to NATO has also welcomed Ukraine’s decision to support the indefinite a new level. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Udovenko visited NATO extension of theTreaty on Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear on 14 September 1995 to formally accept the Ukrainian PfP Individual Weapons (NPT) and its contribution to the withdrawal and Partnership Programme and to hold a 16+1 meeting with the North dismantlement of nuclear weapons which were based on its territory. Atlantic Council on issues related to European security. On that same Assurances given to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear weapon state party to day, NATO and Ukraine issued a Joint Press Statement spelling out the NPT, by all five nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the the general principles of NATO-Ukraine relations in PfP and in other Treaty, were also welcomed by NATO. areas. An implementation paper was agreed in March 1996, and the first 16+1 consultation at the Political Committee level took place onAreas for consultation and cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, 3 April 19%. High-level meetings continued throughout 1996 and the in particular through joint seminars, joint working groups, and other beginning of 1997. A Ukrainian liaison officer now works in the cooperative programmes, will cover a broad range of topics including Manfred Woemer wing at NATO Headquarters, and an officer has areas such as civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness; been stationed at the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) Mons. civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, and Ukraine has remained an active participant in PfP activities both at Ukrainian defence reform; defence planning, budgeting, policy, NATO HQ and in Allied and Partner nations and has also hosted a strategy and national security concepts; defence conversion; number of PfP exercises on its own territory. NATO-Ukraine military cooperation and interoperability; economic aspects of security; science and technology issues; environmental Ukraine has made significant contributions to peacekeeping activities. security issues, including nuclear safety; aerospace research and In particular it made an important contribution to the Implementation development; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and Force in Bosnia (IFOR) consisting of one infantry battalion of 550 control. Additional areas for cooperation will also be explored. men. Similarly, Ukraine has participated in the Stabilisation Force Examples include armaments cooperation (beyond the existing (SFOR), contributing one mechanized infantTy battalion and one dialogue taking place in the Conference on National Armaments helicopter squadron of 10 heavy helicopters on call - altogether 400 Directors ( CNAD); military training, including PfP exercises on men. Ukraine has also pledged 30 policemen to the International Police Ukrainian territory and NATO support for the Polish-Ukrainian Task Force, 22 of whom are already deployed. Ukraine is also peacekeeping battalion; and promotion of defence cooperation contributing 105 men to the UN force in Eastern Slavonia. between Ukraine and its neighbours. A military liaison mission of Ukraine will be established as part of a Ukrainian mission to NATO in The Secretary General of NATO paid a visit to Ukraine in April 1996, Brussels. and a further visit in May 1997 to inaugurate the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv. This is the first such centre to be NATO and Ukraine consider their relationship as an evolving, dynamic opened by NATO in any partner country. The Centre will play a process. To ensure that they are developing their relationship and crucial role in disseminating information about NATO and in implementing the provisions of this Charter to the fullest extent explaining Alliance policies. Over the last few years, Ukraine has possible, the North Atlantic Council will periodically meet with absorbed the second largest share of NATO’s information outreach Ukrainian representatives in a new forum to be known as the NATO- budget. As a result, it has been possible to increase the number of Ukraine Commission, as a rule not less than twice a year. The information-related events taking place in Ukraine, such as conferences Commission will assess implementation of the Charter and suggest and seminars, and to invite more Ukrainian groups to visit NATO for ways to improve or further develop cooperation. briefings and discussions. On the parliamentary level, NATO and Ukraine will encourage On 29 May 1997, on the margins of the Spring Meeting of NATO expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Foreign Ministers in Sintra, Portugal, NATO Secretary General Solana Assembly ( which brings together parliamentarians from NATO and and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Udovenko initialled a “Charter for a Partner countries) and the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada). Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine”, in advance of Extensive cooperation between NATO and Ukraine has also taken the formal signing of the document at the July 1997 Madrid Summit of place in the field of disaster relief and civil emergency planning. NATO Heads of State and Government.
Madrid PRESS INFO / INFO PRESSE
T H E MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE
Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the - contributing to security and stability in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean dimension is one of a number of Mediterranean; components of the European security architecture. Consequently NATO has started a dialogue with six countries in the region: Egypt, - achieving a better mutual understanding; and Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. - correcting misperceptions about NATO among Mediterranean dialogue countries. A NEW APPROACH TO MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY
The end of Europe's ideological division fundamentally changed the PRINCIPLES AND MODALITIES nature of European and world politics. NATO changed with it. The Alliance has moved from being a passive provider of deterrence and The dialogue is progressive in nature and, in principle, is bilateral in defence to being an active promoter of cooperation and partnership form, although it allows for multilateral meetings on a case-by-case with other countries. basis.
By building bridges through programmes of outreach, cooperation and The dialogue offers all Mediterranean partners the same basis for partnership, the new NATO has played a role in contributing to an discussion and activities. enhanced sense of stability and security in Europe. The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) currently deployed in Bosnia is the most vivid example The dialogue is meant to reinforce other international efforts with of the effectiveness of this cooperative approach. All 16 Allies and 20 Mediterranean partners such as those undertaken by the Barcelona other countries, including three Mediterranean partners, are united in process, the Middle East peace process, the WEU and the OSCE, this unique coalition for peace. without either duplicating such efforts or intending to create a division of labour. The importance of the Mediterranean is increasingly being recognised and the new NATO can have a positive influence in that region as well. CONTENTS Several NATO Allies are Mediterranean countries and good use can be made of NATO's successful experience gained in Europe in confidence The Mediterranean dialogue consists of: building and in providing fora which encourage and facilitate contact and dialogue. Greater transparency can also help to minimise - political dialogue; and suspicions and misunderstandings. - participation in specific activities. The various international organisations forming the new European Security Architecture, including NATO, have all recognised the The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral political discussions importance of the Mediterranean region for security in Europe and with the possibilty of additional meetings or briefings on a case-by- accordingly have taken initiatives with the common objective of case basis. These discussions provide an opportunity for extensive increasing stability and security in the region. brief ings on NATO's activities, including its programmes of external outreach and partnership, its internal adaptation and its general approach to building cooperative security structures. In turn, ORIGIN Medit erranean partners are invited to share their views with NATO on stability and security in the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean dialogue derives from the Brussels Summit declaration of January 1994 when the NATO Heads of State and Mediterranean partners have been invited to participate in specific Government referred to the positive developments in the Middle East activities such as science, information, civil emergency planning and Peace Process as “opening the way to consider measures to promotecourses at NATO schools in fields such as peacekeeping, civil dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries emergency planning, arms control, responsibility o f military forces in in the region" and encouraged "all efforts conducive to strengthening environmental protection and European security cooperation. regional stability.” At their meeting in December 1994 NATO Foreign Participation in courses is on a self-funding basis. For the sake of Ministers declared their readiness “to establish contacts, on a case-by- transparency, certain activities in the military field may be added to this case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member list. countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability.” To this end they directed the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session “to continue to review the situation, to develop the FUTURE DEVELOPMENT details of the proposed dialogue and to initiate appropriate preliminary contacts.” The Mediterranean dialogue is progressive in nature, both as regards substance and participation. It has been consistently strengthened since it was launched in 1994 and will continue to be reviewed on a regular AIM basis by North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session.
The aim of the dialogue includes:
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I “ € QUICK GUIDE TO KEY NATO ACRONYMS NATO PfP North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Set up by the Washington Partnership for Peace. Set up in January 1994, PfP offers the Treaty of April 1949 as a system of Western collective defence. Alliance’s Cooperation Partners the opportunity of taking part with Currently comprises 16 m ember c ountries. Since the end of the Cold NATO in security cooperation programmes including activities such as War, the NATO Allies have made big force reductions and recast the military exercises and civil emergency operations. Under decisions Alliance’s roles and missions. They have taken major steps towards taken in May 1997 by NATO Foreign Ministers, Cooperation Partners cooperating actively with non-NATO countries in Europe by will have greater say in planning and directing future programmes. introducing Partnership for Peace and signed the Founding Act aimed at establishing a new relationship of cooperation with Russia. The EAPC Alliance is about to invite new members to join. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Created by NATO Foreign Ministers in May, 1997, the EAPC provides an overarching framework NAC for an expanded political dimension to PfP and for closer practical North Atlantic Council. Comprised of representatives of the cooperation. It brings together representatives of the NATO Allies and Alliance’s member countries this is the organisation’s highest decision Cooperation Partner countries, replacing the former North Atlantic making body. It meets regularly in Brussels at the level of Cooperation Council (NACC). Ambassadors, at least twice a y ear at the level of Foreign Ministers and occasionally in summit session at the level of Heads of State and NATO-Russia PJC Government. Permanent Joint Council. New body provided for in the Founding Act signed between NATO and Russia on May 27, 1997, in Paris. CFE Under the terms of the Act, the PJC will bring together representatives Conventional Forces in Europe rteaty. Major arms control treaty of the 16 Allies and Russia. It will provide a venue for consultation, and cornerstone of European security. More than 58,000 pieces of cooperation and possibly consensus building in discussions of political military equipment have been destroyed in Europe since it was signed and security matters. in 1990 by the NATO Allies and members of the then Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Work is going on to reach an agreed framework setting SACEUR and SACLANT out basic elements of an adapted CFE treaty. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Tbe Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. The two major commanders under the CJTF Alliance’s integrated military structure. Combined Joint Task F orce. A military concept being developed within the Alliance for multinational forces which can be deployed SHAPE flexibly and effectively in crisis management and peacekeeping Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Located near Mons, operations. In certain circumstances, in accordance with agreed Belgium, this is the headquarters of Allied Command Europe. procedures, CJTFs drawing on NATO assets may also be made available for operations undertaken under the authority of the Western OSCE European Union. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Formerly known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ESDI (CSCE), the OSCE was initially a political process which set out European Security and Defence Identity. The aim of developing fundamental principles governing the conduct of international affairs ESDI within the Alliance is to enable all European Allies to make a to ease tension and build confidence among states. Now formally an more coherent and effective contribution to NATO as an expression of organisation with 55 members including all Europe, and Canada and their shared resp onsibilities and to reinforce the transatlantic the United States. partnership. It is an essentia] part of the adaptation of Alliance structures. SFOR and IFOR The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) has been deployed in WEU Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 1996 as part of efforts to Western European Union. Originally established by the 1948 Treaty underpin the Dayton Peace Agreement in the former Yugoslavia. It of Brussels. Now numbers 10 member countries, all of which are also replaced the Implementation Force (IFOR) which was responsible for members of NATO. The WEU was reactivated in 1984 with the aim of military aspects of die peace agreement being fulfilled. SFOR is developing a common European defence identity and strengthening the scheduled to stay there until June 1998. Taking part in it are soldiers Alliance’s European pillar. from NATO countries and 20 non-NATO states, including 15 PfP countries, with a total SFOR strength of approximately 35,000.
NATO-Ukrainian Commission. Body established under the terms of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. The Commission will meet at least twice a year to review progress in the development o f the relationship between NATO and Ukraine.
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SFOR FACTS AND FIGURES
Statement by the NATO Spokesman on the Six Monthe viRew In May SFOR removed or participated in the removal of 53 unauthorized of the SFOR Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina checkpoints. In a six month period over 147 unauthorized checkpoints were removed . The SFOR operation is planned to be conducted in phases over a period of 18 months, with its force levelsr eviewed at 6 months and 12 months. SFOR's support toc ivil implementation
The North Atlantic Council, in consultation with the twenty non-NATO Accomplishments countries contributing to SFOR, has now completed the six-month review. SFOR has provided a secure environment for civil implementation to The review confirmed that SFOR is accomplishing its mission successfully, proceed. enforcing military compliance firmly but fairly, contributing to the secure envi ronment for the overall implementation of the Peace Agreement and SFOR has repaired and maintained 64 bridges, 2,500 km of road and providing significant support to the organizations responsible for hundreds km's of railroad. implementing its civil aspects . SFOR has opened Sarajevo airport for civil air traffic and has prepared the While the Parties remain in general compliance with the military provisions opening of Banja Luka, Tuzla and Mostar airports. of the Peace Agreement, there are still serious concerns about the deficiencies remaining in the overall implementation of the Peace Examples of support to civil implementation Agreement NATO and non-NATO contributors to SFOR associate themselves fully with the declaration following the Ministerial meeting of Office of the High Representative (OHR) the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council in Sintra on 30th SFOR provides direct support to the Office of the High Representative with May calling on all the Parties to implement it fully and without delay. technical expertise and assistance in telecommunications and engineering, with air transportation, and Information Campaign assets on a routine basis. A forthcoming milestone in implementing the Peace Agreement are the municipal elections in September. SFOR will provide the general security Or In May SFOR carried out 568 site inspections. SFOR has confiscated Organisation thousands of weapons since the start of its mission. Support to civil implemenation is provided by local forces and SFOR's During the last four weeks SFOR monitored a total of 1,268 training and Civil-Military Task Force (CMTF). The CMTF, located in Sarajevo, movement activities by the Parties' armies. consists of approx. 350 military personnel, most of them being US Army reserves. SFOR monitors de-mining by the Parties; since SFOR's mission started CMTF personnel has mid-level and senior civilian-acquired skills in 20 they have lifted a total of 8,177 mines and unexploded ordnance, bringing functional areas, including law, economics and finance, agriculture, the total number of mined areas lifted to 775. Entity army training is industry, commerce and business, structural engineering, transportation, restricted if compliance is inadequate. utilities, housing, social services (education, public health, etc.), cultural affairs, government management, and political science. b # ♦ 4 * 4 • ... * l Jl V: 1111 i 1 ÍÍS »