Nicolas Sarkozy and NATO

Ryan Hendrickson

President Nicolas Sarkozy’s announcement that France seeks to reintegrate into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s military command is welcome news to an Alliance in challenging times. Many analysts have portrayed NATO as an organisation with profound policy differences during the presidency of George W. Bush. Moreover, NATO faces a growing insurgency in Afghanistan that will be difficult to defeat. Since President Bush came to office, broad transatlantic differences have surfaced between the United States and much of Europe, yet within NATO Headquarters, many of the more significant debates have been between the United States and France. In this context, Sarkozy’s interest in France’s heightened military integration has both valuable symbolic as well as practical significance for NATO’s future. This essay provides a brief summary of France’s recent history with NATO, and follows with a discussion of the potential gains that may result with Sarkozy’s proposals.

France’s Evolution in NATO

At NATO’s inception, France was one of Europe’s leading advocates for an Alliance that pledged American strategic and military interests explicitly to Europe. Although historians note that French views in 1948 and 1949 were shaped primarily by its fears of a resurgent German military rather than potential threats from the Soviet Union, France was still a critical founding member in encouraging this new military Alliance.1

After its creation, diplomatic relations between the NATO Allies were never as rosy as some post Cold War analysts suggest, although the common threat of the Soviet Union served as the catalyst for some degree of strategic cooperation.2 NATO’s most profound Cold War crisis that continues to have relevance today came with French President Charles de Gaulle’s call in 1966 for the removal of NATO’s political headquarters from France within one year’s time, and for France’s departure from the Alliance’s integrated military command. These demands, which resulted in the creation of NATO’s Defence Planning Committee – a military planning body that can operate without explicit French approval – has shaped France’s relationship with NATO since this time.

Many analysts have examined France’s relations with NATO during and after the Cold War, most of which maintains that France continued to exercise considerable independence from the Allies since De Gaulle’s unilateralism.3 Notably, French President , however, made important advances to improve relations between France and the Allies in 1996. Yet when the Allies met at NATO’s 1997 Madrid Summit to discuss membership enlargement, French differences with many of them were significant, and were only resolved after last hour diplomatic efforts. Moreover, during NATO’s bombing campaign against Slobodan Milosevic in 1999 – Operation Allied Force – France was more willing than others to veto military targets that Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Wesley Clark had selected. French military leaders have since criticized what they perceived as American military dominance of the operation.4 Thus, despite Chirac’s overtures, French independence was still alive and well.

After the 11 September 2001 terrorist strikes on the United States, the Allies coalesced to invoke North Atlantic Treaty Article 5, indicating robust Alliance support for America’s challenge to address global terrorist movements. This transatlantic support, however, evaporated rapidly over the next year with President George W. Bush’s movement to war with Iraq. At NATO, these differences culminated in February 2003, when Secretary-General George Robertson failed to successfully utilize the Alliance’s silence procedure in an effort to gain consensus: Belgium, France, and Germany openly spoke out against American foreign

1 policy interests in Turkey. Later, Robertson turned to the Defence Planning Committee to help resolve this crisis.5

Since 2003, debates within NATO have followed along similar lines. In Alliance discussions in 2004 and 2005 over NATO’s role in Iraq and Sudan, the intra-Alliance discord is best described as policy differences between France and the United States.6 In 2006, differences over the placement of training operations for the NATO Response Force (NRF) pitted France against the U.S.7 While European opposition to the Bush administration’s policies toward Iraq shaped much of the transatlantic dialogue, at NATO it has often been France that has frequently quarreled with the United States on major strategic as well as tactical aspects of Alliance operations, which makes Sarkozy’s calls for change all the more novel and welcome.

Sarkozy’s Rapprochement and Demands

Given the Gaullist legacy evident in French foreign policy and the recent debates between France and the United States in Brussels, President Sarkozy’s calls for change potentially represent a meaningful break from the past. In September 2007, Sarkozy announced that France sought to fully reintegrate into all facets of NATO’s organisational structure.8 To be sure, one should not over-emphasise the degree of France’s ‘absence’ from NATO’s internal debates since 1966 as noted above. Nonetheless, for an Alliance that suffered considerably in the weeks leading up to the war in Iraq, and with NATO’s ongoing and ostensibly long- term challenge in Afghanistan, France’s call for a new relationship has important value to an Alliance in need of a political boost. Sarkozy later clarified his position on reintegration, noting that he sought American approval for an independent defence capacity for the European Union, and for France to obtain military leadership positions ‘at the highest level’ within NATO’s military command structures.9 Although these calls come with some potential risks to the Alliance, for a number of reasons Sarkozy’s calls should be welcomed.

Courting Sarkozy

French Input…

For a variety of reasons the Allies should do as much as possible to respond reasonably to Nicolas Sarkozy’s requests. First, it must be recognised that France plays a major role in global security and has the ability to project force like few others in the Alliance. At the present time, France has approximately 13,000 troops deployed in a variety of security and peacekeeping operations. The breadth of France’s international presence speaks to its capability and willingness to project force beyond its borders (see Table 1). The relevant point is that in an era when so many of the Allies struggle both politically and financially with force projection, France has demonstrated its ability to conduct an array of operations abroad. One especially notable operation was its leadership of the European Union’s Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003, which according to a number of measures, would have never happened without French leadership.10

On another potentially important measure of national defence capabilities, military spending levels, France is also considerably different from most of the Allies. It has consistently spent more than 2 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on military expenditures, which is a goal that all of the Allies agreed to at NATO’s . As Table 2 indicates, France has maintained this spending level since 2002 and Sarkozy has reiterated his interest in continued spending on modernised defence forces.

Although the measure of 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product has its analytical limitations since countries could still spend and invest wisely with smaller defence expenditures, it is nonetheless striking how different France is from others on this measure. For example, in

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2005 Germany spent only 38 billion dollar on defence, or 1.4 per cent of its GDP. Belgium devoted a mere 1.1 percent of its GDP to military expenditures, or 4.2 billion dollar. Among Europe’s NATO Allies, only Bulgaria, France, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and the United Kingdom spend at or above the 2 per cent level. Within Europe, apart from the United Kingdom, France spends more in absolute dollars than all others.11 Indeed, in an era when investments in defence capabilities and force projection are viewed as critical measures for meeting current and future security challenges, France stands above many, and thus is and will be increasingly well-positioned to conduct global security operations. This gap in military spending and capabilities between France and most in Europe remains a real concern among both Americans and Europeans, but also speaks to the potential role for France within NATO and its attractiveness to the Allies in future security operations.12 Under Sarkozy, France has indicated its willingness to play a larger role in Afghanistan.13 Thus, when French political will matches with Alliance interests, France is positioned to make significant contributions to NATO, which benefits all members in current and future operations.

…and Demands

Apart from the potential utility of France’s military to the Alliance, which it is already demonstrating on a number of fronts, Sarkozy’s demands that run parallel to its reintegration into NATO represent only a minimal risk to the Alliance. His first concern, that the European Union works to develop an autonomous military capability, squares well with NATO’s needs. As has been suggested many times before by NATO’s current and previous Secretaries- General, the European Allies need to spend more on defence. If the principle of a militarily stronger EU serves as a catalyst for higher defence spending, then NATO stands to benefit as well. Moreover, with now 27 EU members, it is increasingly difficult to envision the European Union engaging in military operations that are not widely supported across Europe, and thus implicitly, by the United States.14 Given that some EU members are more closely aligned with the United States than others in Europe, it is difficult to see an EU mission that would not square with American interests. In this respect, the United Kingdom has been unwise to express its initial concerns with this element of Sarkozy’s demands.15

French demands to obtain posts in Table 1: French Deployments in Crisis NATO’s top military commands raise Management Operations 1 more concerns, but is not an Country of Deployment App. Troop Numbers unreasonable request given the Chad 1,300 potential capabilities that France may Central African Republic 250 provide to the Alliance in a heightened Kosovo 2,400 role. In its present state, the Allied Bosnia 500 Joint Force Command in Brunssum is Lebanon 1,600 headed by German General Egon Afghanistan 2,000 Ramms. The Deputy Commander of Ivory Coast 3,500 Allied Joint Command in Lisbon is Haiti 73 Portuguese Lieutenant General Mário de Oliveria Cardosa; the Deputy 1. These numbers do not include deployments where France Commander of Allied Joint Force has military bases or a major naval presence, including the Command in Naples is British Antilles, the Indian Ocean, Gabon, Germany, French Lieutenant General Peter Pearson. Guyana, Djibouti, New Caledonia, Polynesia, and Senegal. While American generals occupy See www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/deploy.htm, 20 November 2007; UN Mission’s Summary detailed by nearly all top military leadership Country, 31 October 2007; and Embassy of France in the positions within the Alliance, there is United States, ‘National Defense’, at www.ambafrance- still a significant presence of non- us.org/atoz/defense.asp, 24 April 2007. Americans in meaningful military leadership posts.

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Given the ongoing relevance of France’s Gaullist legacy at NATO Headquarters, it is understandable that many Allies, especially the United States, would be wary of French independence within a military command. However, it is worth recalling that all NATO military commanders receive political instructions from the , and military direction and oversight from the Military Committee, which in both cases contain ambassadors or military representatives from all member states. The Supreme Allied Commander also maintains his leadership position over all ongoing missions. Thus, NATO military commanders are still subordinate to higher political and military authorities within the Alliance leadership structure. In addition, competing views on tactical military issues are not inherently international in nature, as was evident during Operation Allied Force, when two Americans, SACEUR Wesley Clark and NATO Commander Air Forces Southern Europe Mike Short, differed considerably over the conduct of the war.16 Strong differences of opinion on military tactics are possible in ostensibly any circumstance, yet the SACEUR still has the final say.

Table 2: Military Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 2 Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 Defence Budget (Million US Dollar) 51,257 52,643 54,018 52,917 Percentage of GDP Spent on Defence 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5

2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at first.sipri.org/non_first/milex.php (France), accessed 15 November 2007.

Nonetheless, to alleviate the concerns of French independence within the Alliance, Sarkozy must continue to reiterate France’s shared values with the NATO Allies. In addition, Sarkozy could also do more to increase France’s military presence in Afghanistan, which would certainly be well received by Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, that are bearing the heaviest combat role for the Allies. Such a move may also help to address current British concerns with Sarkozy’s proposals. In addition, as Leo Michel suggests, France will need to demonstrate some flexibility in its diplomatic negotiations over the leadership post(s) it hopes to secure. Given its streaks of independence from both the United States and many European states, all Allies must be assured that French and NATO interests are marching in concert.

Conclusion

Despite the concerns, French President Sarkozy’s interest in NATO represents a very positive step in improving transatlantic relations on security matters. Although many have lamented over NATO’s alleged demise since the war in Iraq, the Alliance has managed to remain relevant in a variety of ways. Yet the transatlantic wounds from Iraq are still evident, and the challenges in Afghanistan remain. Sarkozy’s rapprochement is a welcome development for an embattled Alliance.

R.C. Hendrickson is Associate Professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University, United States, and author of Diplomacy and War at NATO and The Clinton Wars.

Notes

1. Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984, p. 3. 2. On the many internal quarrels among the Allies during the Cold War, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004.

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3. Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981-97, New York: New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000; Shaun Gregory, French Defence Policy into the Twenty-First Century, New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000; Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1993. 4. Dag Henriksen, NATO’s Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 1998-1999, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2007: p. 21. 5. For a more complete discussion of these events, see Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War, University of Missouri Press: Columbia, MO, 2006. 6. Ryan C. Hendrickson, ‘Public Diplomacy at NATO: An Assessment of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s Leadership of the Alliance’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 8, p. 2 (2005- 2006). 7. Gareth Harding, ‘NATO Tests Troop Deployment Skills’, Washington Times, 15 June 2006, p. A14. 8. James Blitz, Ben Hal, and Fidelius Schmid, ‘France Weighs Taking Full Role in NATO’, Financial Times, 14 September 2007, p. 8. 9. Quoted in Elaine Sciolino and Alison Smale, ‘Frenchman in a Hurry Maps His Path’, New York Times, 24 September 2007, p. A6. 10. Ryan C. Hendrickson, Jonathan R. Strand, and Kyle Raney, ‘Operation Artemis and : EU Prospects for a Stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy’, Canadian Military Journal, Spring 2007, pp. 35-42. 11. France, however, is quite similar on defence spending levels to the United Kingdom, which devoted 2.7 percent of its GDP to military expenditures in 2005, or approximately 60 billion dollar. 12. On the wider concerns among EU defence officials on defence spending, see ‘EU Increases Budget for Defense Agency, Sets Benchmarks for Military Spending’, International Herald Tribune, 19 November 2007. 13. Peter O’Neil, ‘France to Step Up Afghan Commitment’, National Post, Canada, 15 November 2007. 14. Christopher Reynolds, ‘Military Capability Development in the ESDP: Towards Effective Governance?’, Contemporary Security Policy 28, 2 (2007), pp. 357-383. 15. Ben Hall and James Blitz, ‘Sarkozy Fears UK Will Resist its NATO Plans’, Financial Times, 11 November 2007. 16. Henriksen, NATO’s Gamble, p. 194.

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