Survey of Maryland Court of Appeals Decisions
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Maryland Law Review Volume 38 | Issue 2 Article 7 Survey of Maryland Court of Appeals Decisions Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr Part of the Courts Commons Recommended Citation Survey of Maryland Court of Appeals Decisions, 38 Md. L. Rev. 242 (1978) Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/7 This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SURVEY OF MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS THE INHERENT POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION - STATE DEPARTMENT OF ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION v. CLARK Maryland courts have frequently claimed an inherent power to review and correct arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable administrative decisions.' Recently, however, in State Department of Assessments and Taxation v. Clark,2 the Maryland Court of Appeals restricted the scope of this power by finding that a circuit court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether administrative authority to reduce a real property assessment pursuant to article 81, section 67 of the Maryland Code was exercised in an arbitrary fashion.3 The Court of Appeals held that the circuit courts' jurisdiction is limited to questions concerning the constitutionality of the administrator's actions. 4 Clark implicitly recognized that circuit courts 1. E.g., Zion Evangelical Luth. Church v. State Highway Admin., 276 Md. 630, 634-35, 350 A.2d 125, 128 (1976); Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500-01, 331 A.2d 55, 65 (1975); Baltimore Import Car Serv. v. Maryland Port Auth., 258 Md. 335, 342, 265 A.2d 866, 869-70 (1970) (dictum); State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 300-01, 236 A.2d 282, 286 (1966) (dictum); Town of Dist. Heights v. County Comm'rs, 210 Md. 142, 146, 122 A.2d 489, 492 (1956) (dictum); Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. v. Dishong, 198 Md. 467, 473-74, 84 A.2d 847, 850 (1951); Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280-81, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945). Inherent judicial power has been described in terms of: (1) powers that were not granted by the legislature, and that cannot be taken away by the legislature; (2) powers that are essential to the court's existence and protection; and (3) those powers essential to the due administration of justice. See State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 77-78, 275 P.2d 887, 889 (1954). The term "inherent judicial power" has been understood as "that which is essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the court from the very fact that it is a court." In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 287, 275 N.W. 265, 267 (1937). In analyzing this inherent power, the Nebraska court aptly stated that "'[t]he judicial power of this court has its origin in the Constitution, but when the court came into existence, it came with inherent powers. Such power is the right to protect itself, to enable it to administer justice whether any previous form of remedy has been granted or not.'" Id. at 287, 275 N.W. at 267 (quoting In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 55, 248 N.W. 735, 737 (1933)). For additional cases describing inherent judicial power, see 20 AM. JUR. 2d Courts §§ 78 & 79 (1965). A thorough discussion on the scope of inherent judicial power is found in In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts, 308 Minn. 172, 241 N.W.2d 781 (1976). 2. 281 Md. 385, 380 A.2d 28 (1977). 3. Id. at 411, 380 A.2d at 42-43. 4. Id. (242) 1978] THE INHERENT POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW may continue to review administrative determinations in other contexts, but its analytic underpinnings suggest the possibility that such review might be destroyed for all administrative actions and raise serious problems pertaining to judicial checks on administrative determinations and the separation of powers in Maryland's system of government. Fitzhugh and Geraldine Clark, appellees, owned a tract of land in Montgomery County, Maryland. In 1970 this tract was rezoned from rural- residential to multiple family, medium density. A year later this rezoning (combined with a general property reassessment) resulted in a more than tenfold increase in the property's assessment for the 1972 tax year.5 The Clarks did not protest this reassessment, and it became final on January 1, 1972. In May of 1972, however, the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission imposed a moratorium on new sewer extensions and hook ups in parts of Montgomery County, including the Clark land, effectively precluding its use for multiple family, medium density housing during the 1972 tax year.6 Because the 1971 reassessment was based upon the availability of the Clark land for such use in 1972, the moratorium resulted in an overvaluation of the land for tax purposes in that year. The finality of the 1972 assessment prevented the Clarks from protesting the assessed value of the property through ordinary channels. 7 Article 81, section 67, however, provides a mechanism for reducing an assessment after it has become final if the reduction is approved by the county supervisor of 8 assessments, the county director of finance, and the appeal tax court. 5. The land assessment increased from $12,640 for the taxable year 1971 to $132,150 for the taxable year 1972. Brief for Appellant State Dep't of Assess. & Taxation at 11, State Dep't of Assess. & Taxation v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 380 A.2d 28 (1977). 6. The resolutions of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission restricted authorizations for sewer extensions and connections to the then existing sewer lines in Montgomery County. Id. 7. Article 81 of the Maryland Code (1975) contains a comprehensive procedure for challenging assessments. Under § 29(a), notice of the assessment is required and the opportunity to lodge a timely protest must be provided. A taxpayer may then, pursuant to § 255(a), request a hearing before the supervisor of assessments. A further hearing may be demanded before the property tax assessment board under § 255(b), and § 256 provides for appeal to the Maryland Tax Court. These administrative procedures are available as of right, provided the assessment is protested before the date of finality. Upon exhaustion of administrative remedies, the taxpayer may appeal from the Tax Court to the county circuit court (or, in the case of Baltimore City residents, to the Baltimore City Court). MD, ANN. CODE art. 81, § 229(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Appeal may be taken to the Court of Special Appeals, id. § 229(p), and the Court of Appeals may be requested to review the Court of Special Appeals' decision. MD. CTS. & JUD. Paoc. CODE ANN. § 12-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977). 8. At the time this litigation began, article 81, § 67 read in pertinent part: The final assessing authority [in Montgomery County, the Appeal Tax Court], the supervisor of assessments and the county treasurer (in Montgomery County the director of finance) of each county and in Baltimore City, the city solicitor, and the director of the department of assessments, . may by an MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 38 Pursuant to this provision, in August of 1972 the Clarks requested the Supervisor of Assessments for Montgomery County to grant them an abatement. The three assessing authorities decided upon a twenty-five percent reduction of the original assessment. Dissatisifed with this result, the Clarks sought a declaratory judgment from the Montgomery County Circuit Court to enjoin the collection of taxes levied upon their property without providing them a rehearing on the question of the effect of the sewer moratorium on the property's value. They also sought a declaration that section 67 as it applied to them was unconstitutional in that it violated their equal protection and due process rights, and amounted to a taking without just compensation. 9 The case was decided on cross motions for summary judgment. First, the trial court held that it had jurisdiction over the case because of its inherent power to review administrative actions for arbitrariness, illegality, capriciousness, and unreasonableness.10 It then found the administrative actions taken pursuant to section 67, which had resulted in the twenty-five percent abatement, were in fact arbitrary, capricious, and illegal." The Court of Special Appeals agreed that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the case, but reversed the circuit court's determination that the abatement figure was arrived at arbitrarily 2 and remanded the case to the trial court for resolution of the order, decrease or abate an assessment after the date of finality for any year, whether the protest against said assessment was filed before the date of finality or not, in order to correct erroneous and improper assessments and to prevent injustice, provided, that such reasons for such decrease or abatement shall be clearly set forth in such order. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 67 (1975). 9. State Dep't of Assess. & Taxation v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 390, 380 A.2d 28, 31-32 (1977). 10. The trial court reasoned that the legislature had no obligation to provide § 67 relief, but once it had decided to provide some relief, the inherent power of the court could be exercised to correct "abuses of discretion, and arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable acts." Id. at 397, 380 A.2d at 35. 11. The trial court found two instances of arbitrary action: (1) adoption of a 25% reduction without consideration of data pertinent to the Clarks' unique situation, and (2) selection of 25% as an abatement figure without consideration of the other county property affected by the moratorium.