Than Half the Battle Information and Command in a New American Way of War

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Than Half the Battle Information and Command in a New American Way of War MAY 2021 More than Half the Battle Information and Command in a New American Way of War Chris Dougherty About the Author Acknowledgments Chris Dougherty is a Senior Fellow in I’d like to thank Will Mackenzie, Ed McGrady, and Becca the Defense Program at the Center for Wasser for being my partners in wargaming, providing a New American Security (CNAS). His support to this project, and helping to review this paper. research areas include defense strategy, I’d like to thank Molly Parrish for her tireless support of the strategic assessments, force planning, and defense program. I’d like to thank the CNAS interns who wargaming. have helped put on our wargames and served as note- takers. In particular, I’d like to thank Jessie Dietz and Ripley Prior to joining CNAS, Mr. Dougherty Hunter for their research assistance. I’d like to thank Alec served as Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary Barker, Peter Revay, and Group W for their modeling and of Defense for Strategy and Force Development at the simulation support. I’d like to thank Loren Schulman, Maura Department of Defense (DoD). During this time, he led a McCarthy, and Usha Sahay for providing much-needed handful of major initiatives including the development and feedback on the structure of the paper. I’d like to thank the writing of major sections of the 2018 National Defense following folks for reviewing the paper and providing their Strategy. thoughts, feedback, and edits: Elbridge Colby, Jon Solomon, Frank Hoffman, COL Buzz Phillips, Col Brian “Brutus” Stahl, About the Defense Program Maj Kevin “Klinger” Mendel, Jennifer McArdle, Tim Walton, Andrew Metrick, Jacob Cohn, Will Schlickenmaier, CAPT Over the past 10 years, CNAS has defined the future of Greg Malandrino, Adam Comfort, Scott Kendricks, Iskander U.S. defense strategy. Building on this legacy, the CNAS Rehman, CAPT Mike Martinez, MAJ Sarah P. White, Tom Defense team continues to develop high-level concepts Shugart, and Shawn Steene. I’d also like to thank many of and concrete recommendations to ensure U.S. military our wargaming “regulars” without whom this project would preeminence into the future and to reverse the erosion of not have been possible: Eric Coulter, Derreck Holian, Mark U.S. military advantages vis-a-vis China, and to a lesser Goolsbay, Col Dan Skuce, COL Sarah Albrycht, Scott Boston, extent Russia. Specific areas of study include concentrating Eric Heginbotham, Cristina Garafola, Mark Seip, Greg Grant, on great-power competition, developing a force structure Chris Rielage, Nina Kollars, Caitlyn Leong, Col Steven Sutey, and innovative operational concepts adapted for this Col Kaveri Crum, Col Paul Calhoun, Shane Bilsborough, more challenging era, and making hard choices to effect Maj Jason Buell, Ryan Boone, Michael Kofman, et al. My necessary change. sincerest apologies if I left anyone off of this list—the next post-wargame round is on me. Finally, I’d like to thank Jennie Matuschak for helping me get this over the line, and most of all Susanna Blume for her patience, direction, and leadership. Dedication To Bernie, Susan, and Mary Jo: You always believed in me and you were always there for me. I miss you all dearly. TABLE OF CONTENTS 01 Executive Summary 03 Introduction 08 Seeing Red: Chinese and Russian Approaches to Information and Command 20 Operational Vignette: Eastern Latvia 2030 22 Achieving Degradation Dominance in the Techno-Cognitive Confrontation 35 Domain-Specific Concepts and Capabilities 40 Rēzekne Revisited: Eastern Latvia 2030 43 Conclusion DEFENSE | MAY 2021 More than Half the Battle: Information and Command in a New American Way of War Executive Summary to the 1970s and ’80s. Still, a myopic focus on technology misses the critical cognitive and organizational aspects of hina’s rise and Russia’s reemergence as serious the confrontation with China and Russia. The obsession military competitors to the United States during with regaining information dominance is perhaps even more C the last decade have changed the character of deleterious. Barring some wholly unforeseen event, the DoD warfare as profoundly as the U.S. victory in the Gulf is unlikely to regain its post–Cold War techno-cognitive War. Precision-guided munitions and other advanced dominance against China or Russia. They are too capable weapons systems likely will play an important role in this and too competent to allow this to happen, and the chaotic new era of warfare. However, to confer an advantage, character of modern warfare vitiates against the kind of these systems will require the ability to gather, transmit, lopsided information advantage U.S. forces enjoyed against process, understand, and act on information faster and Iraq in the Gulf War. with greater accuracy than an opponent. Advantage in The DoD needs to embrace, rather than fight against, peace and victory in war will demand a mixture of tech- the changes in the character of warfare and learn to thrive nical information systems and cognitive functions such within its chaos in ways that China and Russia may be as command decision-making. Every effort should be unable to match given their highly centralized and directive expended to attain an advantage by degrading adversary command-and-control structures. Instead of striving for systems and protecting friendly systems while disrupting information dominance, the DoD should seek “degrada- the enemy’s cognitive command processes and sustaining tion dominance” as a way of achieving an advantage in the one’s own. These imperatives create a “techno-cogni- techno-cognitive confrontation with China and Russia. This tive confrontation” that is continual and widespread, notion attacks their theory of victory by demonstrating the crossing delineations between peace and war. Within ability to operate effectively enough with degraded systems in this context, great-power warfare would be far more contested environments, while imposing proportional deg- chaotic, lethal, and contested than the conflicts of the radation on Chinese and Russian systems, thereby causing post–Cold War period. them to lose confidence in their ability to gain an insuperable China and Russia have developed distinct but similar advantage in the techno-cognitive confrontation. theories of victory in this new type of warfare focused on prevailing in the techno-cognitive confrontation. Achieving degradation dominance against China and Russia While their military strategies and concepts are complex comprises four mutually reinforcing lines of effort: and diverse, they share four critical attributes. First, 1. Force them into dilemmas about expanding or esca- they aim to keep conflicts local, limited, and there- lating a conflict by exploiting tensions between their fore relatively manageable, while obviating U.S. global limited-war strategies and their operational imperative military preponderance. Second, they use “peacetime” to attack information and command systems aggres- information operations to (ideally) achieve their objec- sively at the outset of a conflict by: tives without fighting or to create favorable conditions if conflict occurs. Third, they attack critical systems in » Focusing concept and capability development on space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum, limiting the effectiveness of reversible and non-kinetic as well as physical network nodes, to achieve informa- attacks, particularly in space; tion degradation and command disruption, or ID/CD, » Adopting a more dispersed posture for information and against adversary systems and the cognitive processes command systems; they enable.1 Fourth, they increasingly are centralizing, » Working with allies and partners to increase multi- automating, and “intelligentizing” their command lateral cooperation in key information and command and control to enable rapid, coordinated actions mission areas that would be high priority targets for across multiple domains in the critical opening days of China and Russia; and a potential conflict. The Department of Defense 's (DoD) belated response » Forcing China or Russia into dilemmas about attacking to emerging Chinese and Russian concepts has been the U.S. homeland. overly technological and fixated on regaining the kind of 2. Level the playing field in the “peacetime” information information dominance that U.S. armed forces enjoyed environment by: from 1990 until very recently. The DoD certainly needs to » Gaining proper authorities for information operations develop new systems to replace its current information in key theaters and deconflicting with other govern- and command architecture, much of which dates back ment agencies; 1 @CNASDC » Training, educating, and exercising the joint force 4. Organize and train for degraded and disrupted to deal with Chinese and Russian information multi-domain operations: confrontation; » Put the “combat” back in the Geographic Combatant » Serving as a “systems integrator” to leverage allied Commands by refocusing them on warfighting vice and partner expertise with Chinese and Russian military diplomacy; information operations; » Create standing, multi-domain units across multiple » Aligning information operations with military oper- echelons of command down to the tactical level; ations to increase trust with allies, partners, and key » Increase regular joint and multi-domain training and audiences abroad; and Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and » Avoiding civilian casualties to stymie Chinese and Training Transformation (CE2T2) funds; and Russian information operations
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