US Targeted Killing, Quasi-Secrecy and the Assassination Ban', Security Studies, Vol

University of Birmingham Killing norms softly Quinn, Adam; Banka, Andris DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2018.1483633 License: Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY) Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Citation for published version (Harvard): Quinn, A & Banka, A 2018, 'Killing norms softly: US targeted killing, quasi-secrecy and the assassination ban', Security Studies, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 665-703. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1483633 Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal General rights Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the copyright holders. 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Published by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Published online: 19 Jul 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 8075 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 2 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fsst20 SECURITY STUDIES 2018, VOL. 27, NO. 4, 665–703 https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1483633 Killing Norms Softly: US Targeted Killing, Quasi-secrecy and the Assassination Ban Andris Banka and Adam Quinn ABSTRACT This article argues that when actors engage in controversial new security practices, it is misconceived to view secrecy as an opposed, counterproductive alternative to the pursuit of legitimation. Rather, we propose, deployment of “quasi-secrecy”—a combination of official secrecy with leaks, selective disclosure, and de facto public awareness—can be an effective strategy for achieving normalization and legitimation while containing the risks entailed by disclosure. We support this claim via a detailed case study of US targeted killing. First, we establish the existence of an American norm against targeted killing during the period 1976–2001. We then detail the process by which an innovation in practice was secretly approved, imple- mented, became known, and was gradually, partially officially acknowledged. We argue that even if quasi-secrecy was not in this instance a coherently-conceived and deliberately pursued strategy from start to finish, the case provides proof of concept for its potential to be deployed as such. Introduction How does a once-forbidden practice become normal, legitimate, even routine? More specifically, how can those in government who desire this outcome make it so? We ask this question apropos of a particular case: the program of targeted killing conceived and executed by the United States under the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. In construct- ing an answer, we proceed as follows. First, we define targeted killing. Next, we survey general theory regarding how political actors accomplish normative shifts, scrutinizing the intuitively plausible idea that engineering a stable new normative settlement requires direct and persuasive public advocacy for any innovation. In this framework, secrecy is an alternative to legitimating new practices—and likely a counter-productive one. Using US targeted killing as a detailed case in support, we propose a contrary analysis: that official secrecy, deployed in a partial form we term “quasi-secrecy,” can play an Andris Banka is assistant professor in International Relations at C¸ag University in Turkey. Adam Quinn is senior lecturer in International Politics at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, UK. ß 2018 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons. org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 666 A. BANKA AND A. QUINN instrumental role in the process of normalizing potentially controversial shifts. With the central argument thus outlined, section 2 concludes by providing a concise explanation of the concept of quasi-secrecy and the context for its deployment in this case, as well as some methodological reflection regarding the parameters of what we seek to demonstrate. Turning to the case in detail, we first establish that between 1976 and 2001, US administrations operated as though the executive order banning assassination tightly constrained, and perhaps prohibited altogether, US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations with the direct aim of killing specified individuals. This prohibition was domestic in origin, stemming from the Church Committee’s recommended reforms of the intelligence agencies in the 1970s. Second, we establish that after September 2001, this prohibition was reinterpreted to permit a category of killing previously treated as proscribed. Facilitated by technological advance, this practice sub- sequently became frequent and routinized. While this shift did not consti- tute a total erasure of the norm against assassination, it did represent a substantial revision of it and constriction of its scope. Third, we detail and analyze the process by which the shift in practice became publicly known and via which the executive sought to legitimate it. Here we demonstrate the operation of quasi-secrecy and illustrate its utility for normalizing potentially controversial innovation. We conclude that this case provides proof of concept for quasi-secrecy’s viability as a legitimation strategy. Even if we do not suppose it to have been clearly and comprehensively conceived as such at the outset in this instance, it could indeed be deployed as deliberate strategy in the future. Defining Targeted Killing (and Assassination) Targeted killing, for our purposes here, means the deliberate killing of an identi- fied individual, specified in advance as the target, approved by an authorized part of a government bureaucracy without independent judicial process.1 The distinction between permissible targeted killing and assassination— and the sustainability of such a distinction—is a matter of contest. In common parlance, assassination refers to any planned, individually-targeted extrajudicial killing with a political or ideological rationale, especially where the target occupies a leadership role. In international law, the permissibility of such killing hinges on whether the target can be legitimately classified as a combatant in war, their location relative to the lines of battle, and whether treachery or perfidy is 1 Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann, “Law and Policy of Targeted Killing,” Harvard National Security Journal 1 (2010): 148; Avery Plaw, Targeting Terrorists: A License to Kill? (London: Routledge, 2008), 3; John Yoo, “Assassination or Targeted Killings after 9/11,” New York Law School Review, 56, no. 1 (2011): 79; Nachman Ben-Yehuda, “Gathering Dark Secrets, Hidden and Dirty Information,” Qualitative Sociology 13, no. 4 (December 1990): 349. SECURITY STUDIES 667 involved in the execution.2 Preemptive use of lethal force against individuals out- side a conventional battlefield may be justified by appeal to the principle of self- defense, but legal scholars have sought to establish criteria limiting this. The threat must be clear and imminent, not “distant, unviable, or merely foresee- able.”3 The killing should not simply be punishment for past action: the individual targeted must be “actively involved in an imminent attack.”4 The extent of collateral damage must be weighed,5 and the government carrying out the killing should articulate the legal basis for its actions.6 Much remains unresolved in the interpretation of these criteria, however. For example, “there is considerable debate as to how far in anticipation [of harm to oneself] it is legitimate to act.”7 In the analysis

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