China's Strategic Choices Towards North Korea and Iran
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University of Denver Digital Commons @ DU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 1-1-2015 China's Strategic Choices Towards North Korea and Iran Kang-uk Jung University of Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd Part of the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Jung, Kang-uk, "China's Strategic Choices Towards North Korea and Iran" (2015). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1033. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1033 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. CHINA’S STRATEGIC CHOICES TOWARDS NORTH KOREA AND IRAN __________ A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver __________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy __________ by Kang-uk Jung August 2015 Advisor: Suisheng Zhao ©Copyright by Kang-uk Jung 2015 All Rights Reserved Author: Kang-uk Jung Title: CHINA’S STRATEGIC CHOICES TOWARDS NORTH KOREA AND IRAN Advisor: Suisheng Zhao Degree Date: August 2015 Abstract This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison— that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material ii interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states. iii Acknowledgements This dissertation could not have been completed without the help and support of many Professors. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the greatest intellectual debt I owe to Professor Karen Feste who read my all versions of manuscript with exceptional care and thoughtfulness. I am also deeply grateful to Professor Jack Donnelly who has been a constant source of insight by giving constructive and warm feedbacks. I was also fortunate to know Professor Shih Chih-yu. They are my three role models of my academic career and their deep intellect and sharp eyes greatly improved my research. I am thankful to Professor Suisheng Zhao, my dissertation director, for the nine- years unwavering encouragement. I must note my gratitude to Professor Martin Rhodes for generosity and helping me along the way in the graduate school. Professor Bob Uttaro and Professor Rob Prince have taught me how to teach and love students. I should like to express my deep gratitude to Professors Heungho Moon, Seong Heung Chun, Taeho Kim, Sukhee Han for their encouragement back in Korea. Above all I appreciate to Dr. Yi-tsui Tseng for her love. The dissertation is dedicated to my fine mother, Eunlye Kim for her unconditional support and to the memory of my father, Ho-yong Jung. iv Table of Contents Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 Puzzling Behavior ................................................................................................... 3 Goals of the Study ................................................................................................... 5 Cases by Period ....................................................................................................... 6 Calculated Reactiveness? ...................................................................................... 10 Methods................................................................................................................. 13 Variables ............................................................................................................... 18 National Interests ...................................................................................... 19 Strategies ................................................................................................... 22 Balance of Interest Model ..................................................................................... 24 Testing Arguments .................................................................................... 27 Findings .................................................................................................... 28 Outline ................................................................................................................... 30 Chapter Two: Arguments .............................................................................................. 34 What China Has Done .......................................................................................... 36 What China Has Said ............................................................................................ 38 What China Has Prioritized .................................................................................. 42 Arguments ............................................................................................................. 45 Weighing Interests .................................................................................... 46 Before and After 2006 .............................................................................. 49 Reacting, not Planning .............................................................................. 50 North Korea and Iran are Different ........................................................... 53 Chapter Three: Hypotheses ........................................................................................... 56 Behavioral Typology of the Third Party ............................................................... 58 Classical Realism .................................................................................................. 59 Straddling .................................................................................................. 61 Structural Realism ................................................................................................. 68 Balancing .................................................................................................. 71 Bandwagoning .......................................................................................... 72 Offensive Realism ................................................................................................. 76 Abetting ..................................................................................................... 78 Defensive Realism ................................................................................................ 79 Delaying .................................................................................................... 82 Hiding ....................................................................................................... 84 Liberalism ............................................................................................................. 87 English School ...................................................................................................... 90 Mediating .................................................................................................. 91 Constructivism ...................................................................................................... 93 Roles for China in Crisis ....................................................................................... 96 Propositions .......................................................................................................... 98 v Chapter Four: From 1990 to 1997 ..............................................................................