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The Fractured Alliance An Account of the Unsuccessful Alliance between the French and Algonquians in the Great Lakes Region 1650- 1750 Alex Ferge History 489 Capstone Advisor: Dr. Patricia Turner Cooperating Professor: Dr. James Oberly Copyright for this work is owned by the author. This digital version is published by McIntyre Library, University of Wisconsin Eau Claire with the consent of the author. Table of Contents Abstract 1 Introduction and Historiography 2 French Population Problems 14 I. Lack of Population 14 II. Jesuits vs. Traders 16 III. Traders vs. Administrators 22 IV. Administrators vs. Administrators 24 Cultural Misunderstanding between the Algonquians and French 26 I. Manitous 27 II. Trade with the Sioux 29 III. Lake of Village Compulsion 30 IV. Importance of Gifts 32 V. French Lack of Respect for Algonquian Culture 33 The Advance of the British 34 I. Advance of British Markets 35 II. British Population Advance 37 Epilogue 39 Conclusion 42 Bibliography 44 Map 46 1 Abstract French traders, missionaries, and administrators arrived in the Great Lakes region in the middle of the 17th century. Upon their arrival they found villages of Algonquian speakers who they attempted to force into a coercive alliance. Unfortunately, for the French they would not have the ability to establish a coercive alliance. Their low population would limit the ability of the French to create a stable economy to trade with the Algonquians. Also, the population was made up of different constituencies that often opposed one another. They also would not understand the cultural elements of Algonquian life. The French could not provide the type of alliance that the Algonquians had set out to create with them. Finally, the encroachment of the British into the Ohio River Valley during the Seven Year’s War would dismantle the French alliance and oust them from the continent. 2 Introduction and Historiography The French arrived in the Great Lakes Region early in the 17th century. The settlers that came to New France would be few in comparison with the British. Among the population they sent were traders, missionaries, and administrators. The French traders who arrived hoped to secure a fur trade that would prove profitable for them and for New France. The missionaries that came with them wished to create a loyal flock of converts from the indigenous population. Administrators would be sent to control the colony and would have a variety of goals that ranged from protection of the colony to financial success. The French found a population consisting mostly of Algonquian speakers who had been pushed westward by the Iroquois of the Northeast.1 The colony of New France found initial success in the area and helped the Algonquians oppose the Iroquois who were constantly raiding for beaver furs and captives. New France was able to protect its allies through the fur trade. Algonquians received from them the very weapons that the Iroquois had used to force them west.2 Also, French traders made fantastic profits through the trade. This protection would serve as foundation for the alliance they would create with each other. The ultimate goal of the French monarchy was to establish a North American stronghold that would prove profitable for them. To accomplish this goal the French would have to establish a coercive alliance. A coercive alliance would allow them to dictate policy to the Algonquians and also extort them for financial gain. The Algonquians 1 Algonquians are the language group that was most common in the Great Lakes region at the time of French presence. While not all of the allies were Algonquian speakers it is easier to reference them as such in contrast to the Iroquois who generally allied with the British. 2 Richter, Daniel K. The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992),98. 3 hoped to carve out a new existence in the Great Lakes Region where they could survive. Neither the Algonquians nor the French could achieve their goals alone. Both sides ultimately failed to accomplish these goals. The French never created a powerful Great Lakes Region alliance in which they could dictate to the Algonquian people. The Algonquians found their way of life under attack from both Native American and European interests. The French never succeeded in founding a coercive alliance with the Algonquians for three reasons. First, New France had a low population of French migrants and the traders, missionaries, and administrators that were in the territory each had different and often conflicting visions for the colony. Second, New France’s inability to understand and adapt to Algonquian culture hindered success. Finally, the arrival of British markets and immigrants in the Ohio River Valley led to the ultimate failure of the alliance. The French and Algonquian alliance has been a topic thoroughly covered over the years by historians. The first historian to write of its existence was Francis Parkman in 1892. He was followed by many others including Reuben Gold Thwaites in 1905, George M. Wrong in 1928, Richard White in 1991, and finally Claiborne A. Skinner in 2008. Many of these sources are recognized as significant historical contributions that are still used in modern studies of the pays d’en haut3, but the landmark text in this area of study is Richard White’s The Middle Ground. In his work, he effectively shifts the sole responsibility of alliance away from the French. He argues the French and Algonquians were instead equal partners in the alliance. The Algonquians were not passive members in the alliance who simply carried out the will of the French imperial force. They assumed a role that was as significant, if 3 Pays d’en haut was a French term to describe the land West of Montreal and Quebec. It effectively described the area now recognized in the United States as the Midwest. 4 not more significant, than the French. Prior to Richard White’s work, the historiography did not illustrate this central point which is so essential to understanding the past in the colonial Great Lakes. Histories on the relationship between the French and their Algonquian allies have undergone a tremendous change since Richard White’s contribution. The first historians in this field did not see the Algonquians as powerful or intelligent enough to oppose French demands. Some of the early writers succumbed to racial logic to explain the history of the colonial Great Lakes. Parkman and Thwaites are guilty of this and barely mentioned the Native Americans in their accounts. Over time, more and more weight has been given in the historical literature to the power of the Algonquians to influence and later outright direct French action at opportune times. Another change that has taken place in the literature was the understanding of the economics in the pays d’en haut. The earlier accounts speak inaccurately of French resources attained from the fur trade throughout their stay in America. White again directs the reader’s attention to the fact that New France’s initial returns were outstanding, but they were greatly diminished by the flooding of the beaver fur market in Europe. In fact, later on in their relationship the French monarchy was bleeding economically to keep the alliance alive. Francis Parkman set out to create an extensive history of the imperial struggle between France and Great Britain when he attended Harvard at age eighteen. He struggled for forty-five years to complete his study and had it published in 1892. The majority of his work was based on primary sources and held great acclaim. Up until the 1950’s edited selections of Parkman’s work were continually published. He based his studies primarily from the interpretation of primary documents including Jesuit relations and French governmental documents. His works have, however, been largely discredited due to the racial logic he applied to explain the Seven Year’s 5 War and its outcome. His focus was solely on the European powers and only briefly addressed the Native Americans of the region. Since Parkman’s discussion of Great Lakes history includes primarily European players his argument as to why the French ultimately lost is based solely on the Europeans themselves. The German race, and especially the Anglo-Saxon branch of it, is peculiarly masculine, and therefore, peculiarly fitted for self-government. It submits its action habitually to the guidance of reason, and has the judicial faculty of seeing both sides of a question. The French Celt is cast in a different mould. He sees the end distinctly, and reasons about it with an admirable clearness; but his own impulses and passions continually turn him away from it.4 His brief discussion of Native Americans was included in his chapter entitled “The Jesuits in North America”. In this chapter, he simply separated the Algonquians and Iroquois and assumed their inferiority to the British or French imperial power. Parkman viewed the Algonquians and Iroquois as steadfast supporters of the European powers they were linked with. He denied that Algonquians had any influence on the French. When the Algonquians did not act as the French wished them to he described it as treachery. Parkman did not believe these Native Americans could act in their own interests. In his description of the Huron, he references the size of their brains in relation to others indigenous people in the New World. If the higher traits popularly ascribed to the race are not to be found here, they are to be found nowhere. A palpable proof of the superiority of this stock is afforded in the size of the Iroquois and Huron brains.