The Fractured Alliance

An Account of the Unsuccessful Alliance between the French and Algonquians in the Great Lakes Region 1650- 1750

Alex Ferge History 489

Capstone Advisor: Dr. Patricia Turner Cooperating Professor: Dr. James Oberly

Copyright for this work is owned by the author. This digital version is published by McIntyre Library, University of Wisconsin Eau Claire with the consent of the author.

Table of Contents

Abstract 1

Introduction and Historiography 2

French Population Problems 14

I. Lack of Population 14 II. Jesuits vs. Traders 16 III. Traders vs. Administrators 22 IV. Administrators vs. Administrators 24

Cultural Misunderstanding between the Algonquians and French 26

I. Manitous 27 II. Trade with the Sioux 29 III. Lake of Village Compulsion 30 IV. Importance of Gifts 32 V. French Lack of Respect for Algonquian Culture 33

The Advance of the British 34

I. Advance of British Markets 35 II. British Population Advance 37

Epilogue 39

Conclusion 42

Bibliography 44

Map 46

1

Abstract

French traders, missionaries, and administrators arrived in the Great Lakes region in the middle of the 17th century. Upon their arrival they found villages of Algonquian speakers who they attempted to force into a coercive alliance. Unfortunately, for the French they would not have the ability to establish a coercive alliance. Their low population would limit the ability of the

French to create a stable economy to trade with the Algonquians. Also, the population was made up of different constituencies that often opposed one another. They also would not understand the cultural elements of Algonquian life. The French could not provide the type of alliance that the Algonquians had set out to create with them. Finally, the encroachment of the British into the Ohio River Valley during the Seven Year’s War would dismantle the French alliance and oust them from the continent.

2

Introduction and Historiography

The French arrived in the Great Lakes Region early in the 17th century. The settlers that came to New France would be few in comparison with the British. Among the population they sent were traders, missionaries, and administrators. The French traders who arrived hoped to secure a fur trade that would prove profitable for them and for New France. The missionaries that came with them wished to create a loyal flock of converts from the indigenous population.

Administrators would be sent to control the colony and would have a variety of goals that ranged from protection of the colony to financial success. The French found a population consisting mostly of Algonquian speakers who had been pushed westward by the Iroquois of the

Northeast.1 The colony of New France found initial success in the area and helped the

Algonquians oppose the Iroquois who were constantly raiding for beaver furs and captives. New

France was able to protect its allies through the fur trade. Algonquians received from them the very weapons that the Iroquois had used to force them west.2 Also, French traders made fantastic profits through the trade. This protection would serve as foundation for the alliance they would create with each other. The ultimate goal of the French monarchy was to establish a

North American stronghold that would prove profitable for them. To accomplish this goal the

French would have to establish a coercive alliance. A coercive alliance would allow them to dictate policy to the Algonquians and also extort them for financial gain. The Algonquians

1 Algonquians are the language group that was most common in the Great Lakes region at the time of French presence. While not all of the allies were Algonquian speakers it is easier to reference them as such in contrast to the Iroquois who generally allied with the British. 2 Richter, Daniel K. The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992),98. 3 hoped to carve out a new existence in the Great Lakes Region where they could survive. Neither the Algonquians nor the French could achieve their goals alone. Both sides ultimately failed to accomplish these goals. The French never created a powerful Great Lakes Region alliance in which they could dictate to the Algonquian people. The Algonquians found their way of life under attack from both Native American and European interests. The French never succeeded in founding a coercive alliance with the Algonquians for three reasons. First, New France had a low population of French migrants and the traders, missionaries, and administrators that were in the territory each had different and often conflicting visions for the colony. Second, New

France’s inability to understand and adapt to Algonquian culture hindered success. Finally, the arrival of British markets and immigrants in the Ohio River Valley led to the ultimate failure of the alliance.

The French and Algonquian alliance has been a topic thoroughly covered over the years by historians. The first historian to write of its existence was Francis Parkman in 1892. He was followed by many others including Reuben Gold Thwaites in 1905, George M. Wrong in 1928,

Richard White in 1991, and finally Claiborne A. Skinner in 2008.

Many of these sources are recognized as significant historical contributions that are still used in modern studies of the pays d’en haut3, but the landmark text in this area of study is

Richard White’s The Middle Ground. In his work, he effectively shifts the sole responsibility of alliance away from the French. He argues the French and Algonquians were instead equal partners in the alliance. The Algonquians were not passive members in the alliance who simply carried out the will of the French imperial force. They assumed a role that was as significant, if

3 Pays d’en haut was a French term to describe the land West of Montreal and Quebec. It effectively described the area now recognized in the United States as the Midwest. 4 not more significant, than the French. Prior to Richard White’s work, the historiography did not illustrate this central point which is so essential to understanding the past in the colonial Great

Lakes.

Histories on the relationship between the French and their Algonquian allies have undergone a tremendous change since Richard White’s contribution. The first historians in this field did not see the Algonquians as powerful or intelligent enough to oppose French demands.

Some of the early writers succumbed to racial logic to explain the history of the colonial Great

Lakes. Parkman and Thwaites are guilty of this and barely mentioned the Native Americans in their accounts. Over time, more and more weight has been given in the historical literature to the power of the Algonquians to influence and later outright direct French action at opportune times.

Another change that has taken place in the literature was the understanding of the economics in the pays d’en haut. The earlier accounts speak inaccurately of French resources attained from the fur trade throughout their stay in America. White again directs the reader’s attention to the fact that New France’s initial returns were outstanding, but they were greatly diminished by the flooding of the beaver fur market in Europe. In fact, later on in their relationship the French monarchy was bleeding economically to keep the alliance alive.

Francis Parkman set out to create an extensive history of the imperial struggle between

France and Great Britain when he attended Harvard at age eighteen. He struggled for forty-five years to complete his study and had it published in 1892. The majority of his work was based on primary sources and held great acclaim. Up until the 1950’s edited selections of Parkman’s work were continually published. He based his studies primarily from the interpretation of primary documents including Jesuit relations and French governmental documents. His works have, however, been largely discredited due to the racial logic he applied to explain the Seven Year’s 5

War and its outcome. His focus was solely on the European powers and only briefly addressed the Native Americans of the region. Since Parkman’s discussion of Great Lakes history includes primarily European players his argument as to why the French ultimately lost is based solely on the Europeans themselves.

The German race, and especially the Anglo-Saxon branch of it, is peculiarly masculine, and therefore, peculiarly fitted for self-government. It submits its action habitually to the guidance of reason, and has the judicial faculty of seeing both sides of a question. The French Celt is cast in a different mould. He sees the end distinctly, and reasons about it with an admirable clearness; but his own impulses and passions continually turn him away from it.4 His brief discussion of Native Americans was included in his chapter entitled “The

Jesuits in North America”. In this chapter, he simply separated the Algonquians and Iroquois and assumed their inferiority to the British or French imperial power. Parkman viewed the

Algonquians and Iroquois as steadfast supporters of the European powers they were linked with.

He denied that Algonquians had any influence on the French. When the Algonquians did not act as the French wished them to he described it as treachery. Parkman did not believe these Native

Americans could act in their own interests. In his description of the Huron, he references the size of their brains in relation to others indigenous people in the New World.

If the higher traits popularly ascribed to the race are not to be found here, they are to be found nowhere. A palpable proof of the superiority of this stock is afforded in the size of the Iroquois and Huron brains. In average internal capacity of the cranium, they surpass, with few and doubtful exceptions, all other aborigines of North and South America, not excepting the civilized races of Mexico and Peru.5 Although some of Parkman’s logic is clearly flawed he nonetheless made important contributions to pays d’en haut history. He accurately documents, for example, the population shortage in New France and the colonists’ pleas for more support.6 Parkman did not think the lack of population was the doom of the colony, but he did mention it as a factor limiting New

4 Parkman, The Old Regime in Canada II, 201 5 Parkman, The Jesuits in North America, 32. 6 Parkman The Old Regime in Canada II , 95. 6

France. He also writes of the creation of Detroit and the problems that arose between the Jesuits and Antoine Laumet de la Mothe, sieur de Cadillac.7 The Jesuits disagreed with the movement of Algonquians eastward to Detroit. The location of the settlement would bring them in greater contact with European traders. The Jesuits were afraid that the interaction between Algonquians and European traders would damage Jesuit ability to convert them to Catholicism. Cadillac, who was interested in making himself rich through the fur trade, disagreed with their arguments. One argument about the brandy trade became especially nasty and Parkman quotes Cadillac within his work:

He told me that I gave myself airs that did not belong to me, holding his fist before my nose at the same time. I confess I almost forgot that he was a priest, and felt for a moment like knocking his jaw out of joint; but, thank God, I contented myself with taking him by the arm, pushing him out, and ordering him not to come back.8 This illustrated the strain between the Jesuits and fur traders present in New France. The Jesuits and fur traders’ were often in opposition. Instead of helping the colony succeed they hindered one another. Parkman’s work is still of use today. While his argument is racially biased, he documented problems that led to the fall of the New France.

Reuben Gold Thwaites published his work shortly after Parkman in 1905. His work was also a study of the imperial struggle in the New World between France and England. This leads him to focus primarily on the territory east of the Great Lakes. Accordingly, his overall argument details the reasons the French lost the imperial struggle to the English. Native

Americans do not play much of a role in his history. The blame for losing New France rested with the King in Versailles. Thwaites included the pleas of a French official in the pays d’en

7 The Jesuits were the predominant missionaries in the Great Lakes Region. They were a Catholic movement that had two main goals. The first was to stop the spread of Protestantism. The second was to convert non Catholics. This would be their main objective upon arriving in the Great Lakes Region. 8 Parkman, A Half Century of Conflict 20-21. 7 haut for a reaction to check English advances in the region around 1686. He lamented in his work that “As usual, however, nothing was then done to check the fast-opening bud of English aspirations. Versailles waited until it had grown into a stout tree.”9 Thwaites argued the loss of

New France was the fault of the far-off French monarchy that did not check English aggression.

The presence of Native Americans in Thwaites work is lacking as well. Native

Americans are almost completely excluded as power players from his works and he studies the area from a Eurocentric perspective. In his works, it seemed that Native Americans had no ability to resist imperial powers. He does not recognize the constant uncertainty of Native

American alliances with the French and British. While he did exaggerate the loyalties of Native

Americans in the Great Lakes, he nevertheless understood the importance of the British invasion of the Ohio Valley. He writes of French and British traders in the Ohio Valley and their ability to “tamper with eachother’s Indians”10. Prior to this he mentions several documents containing the worries of French colonists at the advance of the British. He also mentions the problems of low population in New France. Thwaites includes a description of government attempts to increase population in their colonial holdings.

Bounties to immigrants, importation of unmarried women to wed the superabundant bachelors, ostracism for the unmarried of either sex, official rewards for large families-all these measure were freely and persistently adopted by the French colonial officials. And yet, after nearly a century and a half, but eighty thousand whites constituted the semi-dependent and unprogressive population of Canada and Louisiana, over a stretch of territory above two thousand miles in length, against the million and a quarter of self- supporting English colonists…11 Another example is a letter from the Ohio Valley later included in his work insisting that the

British would take the valley if ten thousand French settlers were not sent there immediately.12

9 Thwaites, Reuben Gold, France in America: 1497-1763 (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1970), 124. 10 Thwaites, 91. 11 Thwaites, 128. 12 Thwaites, 152. 8

Thwaites agreed with Parkman that the Algonquians were less than equal partners in their alliance with New France. However, his work documents New France’s low population.

The next addition to the history of the pays d’en haut was made by George M. Wrong in

The Rise and Fall of New France published in 1928. This was the first history that contained a limited understanding of Algonquian culture. The Rise and Fall of New France offered information that had been ignored previously. Although he did include Algonquian and

Iroquoian culture he did not recognize the power and ability each group held in comparison to the imperial powers. This was still a strictly European struggle between France and England.

Wrong argued the reason the French failed to maintain their holdings in the New World was because of the inept support from Versailles. King Louis XIV pulled financing from the colony at exactly the wrong time. This was a mistake that would be made over-and-over. Wrong first mentioned the lack of lack of financial support in 1672, when he believed that New France was increasing its hold over of the Great Lakes Region.13

As written above Wrong did make an attempt to humanize the actions of the Native

Americans in this power struggle. He did not grant them an ability to oppose the Europeans, but he attempted to understand them. He includes an understanding that it was rude of a host to not give a guest something that he wanted. Immediately after this he also warns his readers to not judge Native American warfare as a brutal when held in comparison with Europe’s past.

When Lescarbot condemned the natives as thieves he did not know that their traditions of hospitality might require a host to give a guest anything which he desired and that to the natives the European’s hold on his possessions might well seem grasping meanness. When we are startled at the barbarity of native warfare we should remember that the laws of war in Europe permitted the massacre of all, including women and children found in a place taken by storm.14

13 Wrong, George M., The Rise and Fall of New France(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928),436. 14 Wrong, 196. 9

His knowledge of Native American culture was limited, but for the first time an historian made an attempt to understand. He also grasps that the French fur trade was limiting the colony from growth.15 Wrong also includes an extensive history of the disagreements between the French imperial government and the Jesuit missionaries. He wrote of the Jesuits’ goals in the Great

Lakes and their disappointment of the traders’ arrival:

For nearly a half century the Jesuits had had the missions on the Great Lakes to themselves. Is it any wonder that they should have come to look upon the field as their own and to be jealous of intruding rivals? They hoped to found native communities, to teach them the Christian faith, to govern them for their own good, under a strict moral regime, and to protect them from evil by excluding corrupting traders and settlers.16 Wrong’s book is an important step forward in the historiography in that it actually represents the

Native American population as people with a culture worthy of studying. Even though it was an important step forward it still did not accurately convey the history of the Great Lakes.

Europeans had never had the stranglehold over Native American allies that he described.

The earlier histories largely focused on the eastern conflict between the British and the

French leading up to the Seven Year’s War. They rarely diverted attention away from the east and looked into the west. The first work to reverse this trend was Richard White’s The Middle

Ground. The previous works also didn’t examine Algonquian influence on the French in the

New World. White would argue that the Algonquians were not simply subjects to the French, but rather individuals who were capable to changing French policy in the New World. In his introduction he develops this argument.

But this is an imperialism that weakens at its periphery. At the center are hands on the levers of power, but the cables have, in a sense, been badly frayed or even cut. It is a world system in which minor agents, allies, and even subjects at the periphery often guide the course of empires. This is an odd imperialism and a complicated world system.17

15 Wrong, 361. 16 Wrong, 421. 17 White, Richard, The Middle Ground (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xi. 10

White also correctly addressed the fact that the French did not control the Algonquians as well as past historians had assumed. Part of this argument was the fact that Algonquians were drawn to

European goods. The French began inviting Algonquians to come to Montreal for trade fairs.

The French hoped to bring these Indians to them so they could trade in greater volume. These fairs were never successful during times of Iroquoian threats. The Algonquians valued safety and their well being over the trade with the Europeans. Because of their value of safety and well being over material goods they did not often make the journey to Montreal.18

Along with those first revolutionary findings White also highlights the ways in which

Europeans did not comprehend Algonquian culture. Upon arriving in the Great Lakes the French had been known as manitous, however their new role as of early 1680’s was that of Onontio.

This new role according to the Algonquians was similar to that of a father. The French were unaware that this relationship would lead Algonquians to believe that he owed them the protection and resources they sought. This shift in identity was a step down from their original role of manitous or grandfathers.19 White continues to explain that the French could not fathom the lack of coercion involved in village politics. They would search and eventually attempt to create puppet leaders among the Algonquians to try to push their interests. Unfortunately for the

French, Algonquians had never possessed any form of coercive leadership. There were individuals would have influence, but no one was subject to the will of another man. In fact the chiefs only held these positions of influence and the French thought them mad to take them.

The chief was under an obligation to give to all who asked. Villages were not homogeneous; they contained members of different lineages, clans, families. The chief intervened to mediate quarrels between them, but they were under no obligation to listen to him. Chiefs and elders deliberated on what course a

18 White, 24. 19 White, 36. 11

village should pursue, but no one was obliged to obey them. Chiefs were men with large responsibilities and few resources.20 White’s main argument is that the construction of a middle ground or a cultural acceptance or understanding was the greatest resource to New France. He argued that neither the

Algonquians nor the French had the power to overcome the other. They needed to work together in order for them both to succeed.21 These findings were a far cry from previous studies and served as a landmark change in the historiography of the region. The construction of the Middle

Ground did not end its evolution. White would write of the middle ground taking on its own existence. The Algonquians were not people incapable of change. The construction of the

Middle Ground continued as the French and Algonquians lived together in the pays d’en haut.

This cultural agreement would give the French and Algonquians the opportunity to oppose the united front of the British. However, when France moved against British intrusions into the

Ohio River Valley, they did so by abandoning the Middle Ground. The French went about their operations in a high handed manner in Ohio. They did not trust or respect the Algonquians who had been their allies for so long. The British presence had undermined French trust. The French began to build forts to protect Ohio and eventually alienated their remaining Algonquian allies.22

The most recent source on the pays d’en haut is The Upper Country by Claiborne A.

Skinner, published in 2008. His history largely examines the Great Lakes from the perspective of the French. It is not as revolutionary as Richard White’s work, but he does comprehend the tenuous position of the French in the New World. He describes a military expedition in which the French were humiliated and abandoned their allies. Previous historians would not have recognized the importance of this event. The French would have perhaps lost one ally and it

20 White, 38. 21 White, 50-52. 22 White, 243. 12 would not have begun a domino effect against their power. However, Skinner recognizes the gravity of the situation.

The Western Nations had long feared that the French would sell them out if push came to shove. The Huron plot to kill Annanhac at Michilimackinac had sought to force the French into open war with the Iroquois. The massacre of their negotiators at Fort Saint Louis came out of the same concern. Now despite their best efforts the French had in fact abandoned them. The Illiniwek were clients of the King of France. If he could not protect his Indian allies, they would have no reason to remain allies and New France would have no reason to exist.23 Skinner also documents the differences in culture that were never fully understood by authors prior to Richard White. The Fox nation had given the French a great deal of trouble for a few decades. New France after greatly weakening them mounted an expedition to annihilate the remaining Fox. Skinner described the French lack of understanding.

They (Algonquians) waged ware as vengeance for perceived wrongs and the degree of injury dictated the level of revenge. To kill more of the enemy than the insult warranted violated this, and carried with it the threat of retaliation from the spirit world. Beauharnois’s campaigns of 1729-1733 had gone far beyond anything justifiable in the traditional scheme of warfare. In doing so, he had struck at the very foundations of the Algonkian’s{sic} moral universe.24 He also marked the failings of New France’s economic policy. The practice of the fur trade did not remain profitable to the French.25 Skinner believed the French lost their land due to

British advance from the east. He also stressed the limitations of New France that led to failure in trade and in the alliance.

All of these works have made important contributions to the history of the pays d’en haut. The authors have created a solid foundation from which readers can understand this region historically when France had a presence there. Many of the arguments that will be explored in the coming pages are not revolutionary in comparison with previous narratives. However, the

23 Skinner, Clairborne A., The Upper Country (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,2008), 63. 24 Skinner, 110. 25 Skinner, 136. 13 argument of this paper focuses more specifically on the combination of factors that limited

France’s success in the New World.

Along with the vast amount of secondary sources there were also many primary sources. The

Jesuit Relations is the account of Catholic missionaries in the New World and their experiences reported back to France. The relations were in existence throughout the existence of New France and provide valuable insight into the minds of 17th and 18th century missionaries. Some of the sources utilized were books that took selections of the Jesuit Relations and published them. The

Memoir of Nicholas Perrot was an account by a trader and mediator of New France for over forty years in the Great Lakes Region. The memoir is located in Emma Helen Blaire’s The

Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi and Region of the Great Lakes. Perrot’s writings centered on the late 17th century and illustrate how Frenchmen of the day viewed Algonquians.

The Cadillac Papers were another vast resource that contained letters to and from and even about a commandant of New France. These letters demonstrate the cracks in New France’s population. The letters date from the early 18th century to the 1730’s. Another valuable contribution was made in The French Foundations. The French Foundations included several letters from the King to the administrators of New France regarding the modern day region of

Illinois. Finally, the Journal of Celeron documented the final attempt of New France to ally nations of the Ohio River Valley prior to the Seven Year’s War.

All the secondary and primary sources provided a valuable insight into the history of the

Great Lakes Region. The sources also supported that fact that New France was hindered by three variables in the Great Lakes Region. France’s desire to create a coercive alliance with the

Algonquians was limited by their lack of population and its makeup, an inability to understand

Algonquian culture, and the eventual presence of the British in the Ohio Valley. 14

French Population Problems

I. Lack of Population

The French population that inhabited New France faced several problems. The first problem was that there simply were not enough of them. Great Britain’s colonies were thriving and had a population that expanded aggressively pushing their colonies westward. New France would never experience a population explosion and it would continue to be a problem that plagued the colony for its entire existence.26 This would remain a challenge that New France could not overcome in attempting to establish a coercive alliance with the Algonquians of the

Great Lakes. Also, the economy of New France would suffer from this small base of residents.

Governor Generals who administered New France constantly sought an influx in population from

Versailles. The administrators of New France believed this would allow the colony to protect itself from Iroquois and English advances. Phillip de Rigaud de Vaudreuil27 the Governor

General in New France during 1706 pleaded with the King for more settlers to protect the colony.

My Lord, from the census, only numbers altogether 842 men above 50 years of age, 2,054 below, and 1,828 below 15 years of age. Hence, taking away the 842 over fifty, who cannot serve, and the 1,828 below fifteen who are unfit to do so, I have only 2,054 men left, in which number the people at Detroit, for M. de la Mothe, are included, those whom we send in one direction or another for fishing, and elsewhere, which naturally causes a considerable reduction; so that I reckon, My Lord, that with the few troops I have

26 Thwaites, 128. 27 Governor General of New France from 1703-1725. The Governor General was in charge of the population referred to in this work as the administration of New France. Vaudreuil was recognized in Richard White’s The Middle Ground as one of the administrators aware of the strength of the Algonquian nations in comparison with the small French population. 15

here, if I were attacked I could not, after garrisoning my forts, put fifteen hundred men in the field without employing the savages.28 Vaudreuil claimed that more men were needed in order to protect the colony. Cadillac,29 the Commandant at the post of Detroit would claim in 1702 that “It is necessary to have settlers here in order to develop the trade”30. This is an example of one of the serious problems that arose from New France’s low population. The colony was not self-sufficient and depended upon shipments from overseas to engage in trade. These trade goods never approached the quality or price that the British could offer the indigenous populations of North America. This was a problem that would continue to threaten the colony as the British colonists advanced closer to

Algonquian villages. Cadillac in his letter went on to note:,

This country, so temperate, so fertile, and so beautiful that it may justly be called the earthly paradise of North America, deserves all the care of the King to keep it up and to attract inhabitants to it, so that a solid settlement may be formed there which shall not be liable to the usual vicissitudes of the other posts in which only a mere garrison is placed.31 In this statement Cadillac characterizes the rest of the settlements of New France as simply garrisons. He is correct in his assessment as large populaces did not extend far into the Great

Lakes region of New France.

An example of these small garrisons is brought to us from Nicholas Perrot32. In 1686 while attempting to organize a war party of Miamis, he heard of unrest at his post. The tribes near his post intended to steal the merchandise he had left unmanned. He arrived before the plot

28 Vaudreuil to King Louis XIV, November 4, 1706, in Cadillac Papers, ed. Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society (East Lansing: Robert Smith Printing Co., 1904), 313. 29 Cadillac was the Commandant who created the post of Detroit. He experienced fierce opposition from the Jesuit fathers at Michimackinac. His main incentive in creating was Detroit was to make himself rich. Historians generally credit the creation of Detroit with accelerating the fall of New France. 30 Cadillac to Louis XIV, September 25, 1702 in Cadillac Papers, 136. 31 Cadillac to Louis XIV, September 25, 1702, in Cadillac Papers, 136. 32 Nicholas Perrot was a trader and Commandant in the Great Lakes region for over forty years. He became disillusioned with the violence of the Western Algonquians and thought them to constantly be plotting treachery. Early on during New France’s presence in the Great Lakes Region Perrot was there most gifted mediator. 16 could unfold and met with the headmen of the tribes involved. In order to impress them he employed an interesting tactic:

I made them believe that we [Frenchmen] numbered forty men, not counting those whom I had sent out to hunt. They believed this, just as I said it, because the men whom they had seen there, going into a cabin, quickly changed their clothing and again appeared before them.33 This population problem would continue to deter the ability of New France to dominate

Algonquians in a coercive alliance. King Louis XIV would recognize the danger of desertions in

New France. This is apparent in the unthinkable order he issued to then Governor General

Denonville and Intendance Champigny.

His majesty has approved that the said Sieur de Denonville has ordered the Sieur du Luth to whom he has given the command of the garrison at Detroit of Lake Erie, to shoot such French as flee from the colony, being certain that nothing is so important to prevent the continuance of such desertions as to make examples of those Frenchmen34 The French would never have the population they needed to establish a coercive alliance in New

France.

II. Jesuits vs. Traders

Of the limited population in New France there were three main groups that had competing interests. The Jesuit missionaries that arrived hoped to shepherd an Algonquian flock whose souls they saved through the act of baptism. The traders who arrived went off into the lands of the Algonquians and immersed themselves in their culture to find profits. The final group was the administration that was sent to New France to control the colony. All three of these groups would find themselves in disagreement as to how the colony should function.

33 Perrot, Nicholas. The Indian tribes of the upper Mississippi Valley and region of the Great Lakes, trans. and ed. Emma Helen Blaire (Cleveland, Arthur H. Company, 1912), 246. 34 King Louis XIV to Denonville and Champigny, March 30, 1687, in The French Foundations: 1680-1693, ed. Theodore Calvin Pease and Raymond C. Werner (Springfield, Illinois State Historical Library, 1934),103. 17

Instead of working together or even existing peacefully, they would continue to struggle with one another throughout the history of New France.

One constant source of controversy was the brandy trade. The Jesuits deplored the trading of brandy to the Algonquian villages. The missionaries believed that the traders known as coureurs de bois35 ruined conversion rates of Algonquians. Jesuits often resented their presence in the far west of New France.36 Missionaries had been the predominant population prior to the arrival of the traders. The coureurs de bois understood that brandy was valued by the

Algonquian villages and would always have a high trade value.

Father Carheil37 a Jesuit missionary at Michimackinac38 complained of the brandy trade in a letter to the Governor of New France in 1702. The traders and the commandants of the

Northwest were attacked in Carheil’s letter.

The first (occupation) consists in keeping a public Tavern for the sale of brandy, wherein they trade it Continually to the savages, who do not cease to become intoxicated, notwithstanding our efforts to prevent it. The second occupation of the soldiers consists in being sent from one post to another by the Commandants in order to carry their wares and their brandy thither, after having made arrangements together; and none of them have any other object than That of assisting one another in their Traffic.39 Commandants and traders were not there to spread the gospel amongst the Algonquians. They were in New France to make a profit. Some commandants were more responsible than others in the brandy trade, but many practiced trading alcohol with the understanding that they could make a profit. Even some Governor Generals were implicated in making a fortune for themselves at

35 Coureurs de bois were traders that traveled throughout New France’s wilderness. They were beyond the control of the administrative officers and could not be controlled. New France’s administration attempted to control them through a variety of devices, but was never successful. 36 Wrong, 421. 37 Carheil arrived in New France in 1666. He was assigned to Michimackinac in 1686 where he served until the creation of Detroit. This took many of his flock away and Michimackinac was almost deserted. He was one of the most determined adversaries of the brandy trade in New France. 38 See map on page 46. 39 Carheil to Monsierur Louis Hector de Callieres, Governor, August 30, 1702, in Black Gown and Redskins. ed. Edna Kenton (Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1956), 398. 18 the expense of the colony. The Jesuits opposition to the brandy trade led to many disagreements.

These disagreements would affect the ability of the French to provide a united front to the British and the Algonquians. Nowhere was this battle to be as intense as it was surrounding the construction of Detroit.

The establishment of Detroit was a vision of La Mothe, Antonine Laumet de Sieur de

Cadillac. His plan was to effectively move all the tribes of the pays d’en haut40from their various locations and resettle them all around the area of Detroit. Cadillac argued to the crown that it would be advantageous to trade with the allied tribes, halt the advance of the English, and control the coureurs de bois.41 The Jesuits opposed the move from Michimackinac to Detroit and delayed the advance of the Algonquians who were a part of the church. The Jesuits knew that the trip east would bring their flock into contact with more traders and brandy. Cadillac was infuriated with their tactic and wrote to the Jesuit Joseph J. Marest on the subject. Marest replied in a letter informing Cadillac that they were not delaying and he should not question their resolve;

All that I have to answer at present, as to what you write to me of, by Mikinick {sic} is that what Father de Carheil and I have done has not been in order to hinder the settlement of your post but to act for the best; you will perhaps know that too well hereafter, condemning your hasty accusations yourself….for in short we are the servants both of God and of the King and have no other interest which could induce us to act contrary.42 The animosity continued to build as Cadillac wrote to his superiors that the Jesuits were dragging their feet in arriving at Detroit in order to destroy the settlement. He told his superiors the only way he felt he could have success interacting with the Jesuits in a letter from 1706;

I have only found three ways of succeeding in that. The first is to let them do as they like; the 2nd, to do everything they wish; the 3rd to say nothing about what they do. By letting them do as they like, the

41 Cadillac to Monseur Du Lhu, June 6, 1686, in Cadillac Papers, 43. 42 Marest to Cadillac, May 30, 1702, in Cadillac Papers,121. 19

savages would not settle at Detroit and would not be settled there; to do what they wish, it is necessary to cause the downfall of this post; and to say nothing about what they do, it is necessary to do what I am doing; and {yet}, in spite of this last essential point, I still cannot induce them to be my friends…Thus only about twenty five of them remain at that place where Father de Carheil, their missionary, remains ever resolute. This autumn I hope finally to tear this last feather from his wing; and I am convinced that this obstinate vicar will die in his parish without having a parishioner to bury him.43 The conflict was finally resolved in 1706. During this period the Jesuits had not taken command of the Detroit Mission and Cadillac approached the Governor General Vaudreuil for a solution. Their inability to work together allowed another Catholic missionary group to seize control of the Detroit mission temporarily. Vaudreuil quoted the King in his letter “Things being thus ordered, you will have no more quarrels with the Jesuits”. In this particular contest the traders were able to oppose the Jesuits successfully. This was not the only conflict that would arise between the two groups however.

New France’s struggling population needed settlers. More settlers would allow them to secure their holdings in the New World with garrisons and it would also be positive for the colony’s economy. There was one problem; French women did not accompany the French men down the St. Lawrence River Valley. As traders and soldiers stayed in the New World they looked to another source for their sexual appetites. Their choice would be supported by the commandants in the far west, but again the Jesuits would oppose them. This argument predated the establishment of Detroit, and Father Carheil complained of it in the same 1702 letter in which he complained of the brandy trade;

There are also some other necessities less common and less usual than those 4 which are the chief ones, of which they make use to lure the women to their houses, and to give themselves a pretext for going to theirs if it pleases them….All else is but a proximate occasion for sin.44

43 Cadillac to Vaudreuil, August 31, 1706, in Cadillac Papers,),162. 44 Carheil to Monsierur Louis Hector de Callieres, Governor, August 30, 1702, in Black Gown and Redskins. ed. Edna Kenton (Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1956), 402. 20

Cadillac again would be at the center of controversy with the Jesuits. After the initial establishment of Detroit he listed a set of criteria that would be essential to its success.

Operating on the fringe of French occupation, Cadillac understood the importance of creating lasting relationships with the Algonquian population. Frenchmen in the Great Lakes Region did not have the strength in numbers to avoid working with the Algonquian populations who he asked to immigrate to Detroit. He described the potential relationship he envisioned with the

Algonquians in a 1701 letter;

It would be absolutely necessary also to allow the soldiers and Canadians to marry the savage maidens when they have been instructed in religion and know the French language….Marriages of this kind will strengthen the friendship of these tribes, as the alliances of the Romans perpetuated peace with the Sabines…45

This is an argument that the Jesuits would win initially with the administration in New

France. The colony’s administration was convinced to recognize the Jesuits point of view. To the Jesuits and the colonial administration mixed breeding was a threat to the French population.

This theory convinced the Governor General and the Intendant of the colony that these relations should not be allowed as they would weaken the French population. They would hold this position until a higher power ruled in Cadillac’s favor. Cadillac would approach the court in

Versailles to rule in his favor and was successful in persuading them. In this 1709 letter, they provided their reasoning for ruling against Cadillac’s wishes to the monarchy. This serves as evidence that the court’s siding with Cadillac did not end the matter;

It is true, My Lord, that the Sr. de Vaudreuil, by the order he gave to the Sr. de La Mothe in 1706 when he went up to Detroit, forbade him to let French people marry savages until such time as he should receive order from you to the contrary. He did so as he is convinced that bad should never be mixed with good. Our experience of them in this country ought to prevent us from permitting marriages of this kind, for all

45 Cadillac to Champigny, October 18, 1700, in Cadillac Papers, 99. 21

the Frenchmen who have married savages have been licentious, lazy, and intolerably independent; and their children have been characterized by as great slothfulness as the savages themselves.46 Cadillac circumvented this order and presented the urgency of relations between the

Algonquians and the French. He would be successful in convincing the King of its great importance to the colony’s safety. In a letter to Vaudreuil from Cadillac, he brought up the matter and illustrated the King’s favor in this issue. He even quoted the Court in his response to

Vaudreuil;

“His Majesty permits you to grant lands at Detroit as you think fitting, and advisable in the interests of the new colony; and that you should give the soldiers and Canadians, who wish to marry, permission to do so” &c.47 The majority of Frenchmen saw themselves as superior to the Native Americans they encountered in the New World. The difference was that the commandants and traders out on the fringe of the French occupation realized they needed Algonquian cooperation to succeed.

Commandants and traders realized that when faced with a disadvantage in resources they could not enjoy the privilege of racism. The Jesuits opposed these relations because their offspring would provide a lasting population of traders that would be present in the pays d’en haut in the future. With their racist charges they convinced the government of New France, but Cadillac appealed to King Louis XIV and overcame their initial ruling.

These disagreements arose naturally between the two groups. After all there was an elementary difference in how they saw the colony of New France. In order for Jesuits to be able to have success converting Algonquians they needed them to be a sedentary population. In fact upon arriving in the Great Lakes Region the Jesuits primary goal was to create a sedentary population that they could preach to. Algonquian populations, however, often moved from

46 Vaudreuil and Raudot to Versailles, November 14, 1709, in Cadillac Papers, 454. 47 Cadillac to Vaudreuil, March 20, 1706, in Cadillac Papers, 298. 22 resource to resource throughout the year for their subsistence. In the 1646 Jesuit Relation, a missionary named Ragueneau told of the problems facing Jesuits in restraining migratory populations;

The mission of the Holy Ghost can have no fixed abode, as it is not possible to settle five or six Algonquin and roving nations, which are spread along the shores of our great lake, more than one hundred and fifty leagues from here, — and for whose conquest we have, nevertheless, been able to send only two of our Fathers48 The only problem was that the traders did not wish them to be sedentary. To trap the furs and other trade items desired by the coureurs de bois they would need hunt and live nomadically.

With the huge populations that had been pushed westward by the Iroquois these resources soon became scarce. This would lead to Algonquians traders hunting further and further away from their villages and the missions. The majority of Algonquians did not decide to live this way.

However, someone was providing the furs and this no doubt was a point of contention between the Jesuits and the French traders.

III. Traders vs. Administrators

The argument between traders and commandants with the Jesuits would not be the only quarrel in New France. The dispute between the administration and the coureurs de bois would weaken New France. The Governor General and Intendants would not be able to control the coureurs de bois. These Frenchmen would travel far into the Canadian wilderness and live free of any European law. The administration did not want too many Frenchmen to trade with

Algonquians in the wilderness. Instead they wanted the majority of the population to live in

48Paul Rageneau Missionary among the Huron to Estiene Charlet Provincial of the Society of Jesus in France, May 1, 1646, in The Jesuit Relations, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites. (Cleveland; Burrows Brothers Company, 1898),256. 23 settlements where they could farm and improve the land. Perrot described the creation of the coureur de bois in his memoirs;

and that was the reason why most of the young men in the country left it, and returned only by stealth to obtain trade-goods, and bringing back peltries, which were secretly sold. This traffic opened the eyes of the merchants, who found it greatly to their own advantage; they advanced to these young men the goods that were necessary for their voyage…49 French administrators struggled to control a trade in the distant lands of the Great Lakes

Region. Governor Generals attempted to establish conges. A conge was a permit to trade with the allies of New France. Through this device they attempted to control the numbers of traders that were in the pays d’en haut. The concept was that the only traders that New France would purchase furs or other trade items from were the individuals who owned a conge. The merchants however as Perrot described above took advantage of the young men of New France and sent them out into the wilderness in search of profit. A letter from then Governor General

Champigny to the King Louis XIV promised to stop the trade altogether in 1697.

You will see from the joint letter, which Mons. De Frontenac and I are doing ourselves the honor of writing to you, what arrangement we have made for putting a stop to this trading in the distant countries altogether, and making all the French return from them next year.50 These promises often could not be kept. The coureurs de bois would continue to trade illegally in the Great Lakes Region. In 1700, a letter from then Governor General Callieres reported a case of illegal trade in pays d’en haut;

You have already learned that last autumn I sent for Sieur De Louvigny to command at Fort Frontenac, forbidding him, according to the orders of the King, to carry on any commerce there. I was apprised of his violation of these orders by some Indians of the Sault this spring. They told me they had been stripped at that post, where they traded for their furs, thereby depriving them of the means of paying their debts in Montreal.51

49 Perrot, Nicholas. 230. 50 Champigny to Versailles, October 13, 1697, in Cadillac Papers, 73. 51 Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin page 73 Callieres to Versailles, November 7, 1700, in Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin Volume V ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites (Madison; Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1907),73. 24

The practice of illegal trading would never effectively be controlled by the Governor General and it would serve as another point of contention between the populations of New France. If they could not stop the trade altogether it would not be surprising that they could not stop the coureurs de bois from trading alcohol to the natives. The coureur de bois would be a population that slipped away from New France. This was another opportunity that New France missed to expand its loyal population. They would supply France with furs illegally and advance the relationships with Native Americans in the pays d’en haut.52 However, what they would not do was become part of the villages and towns created by New France.

IV. Administrators vs. Administrators

There was seemingly no unity in New France among its populations. Even the administration turned on itself. This is not a new insight and was recognized by both French and

British colonial historians. A British colonial historian named Doyle summarized the relationship between the Intendant and the Governor General as naturally opposing one another;

He as Governor was responsible for the general administration of the colony. But he had at his right hand the Intendant, an officer appointed to protect the financial interests of the Crown, and to act as a check and a spy on the Governor.53 With the two elite administrators opposing one another, it is no surprise that New France had many policy complications. The two most obvious are the decisions that were made in trading licenses54 and in the alcohol trade. The liquor trade would fluctuate as threats to the alliance grew. The French were not fond of the violence that grew out of the brandy trade and usually attempted to restrict Native American alcohol consumption. As the British increased

52 White, 128. 53 Doyle, J.A. English Colonies in North America: The Middle Colonies. (New York; Henry Holt Company, 1907), 172. 54 White, 108. 25 their trading presence in the Great Lakes Region, the French were forced to use alcohol as a means to attract Algonquian support. While these administrative decisions did not always control the illegal trade, they do illustrate the indecision of the administration.55 Another example of this inconsistency in New France’s administration was the creation of conges.

Conges were set up to allow for a certain amount of traders to go west and return with furs to trade to fermiers.56 These fermiers continually were in threat of bankruptcy as they were forced to purchase all furs that met a quality requirement. They would then flood the markets with these furs and destroy the once lucrative fur trade. Once again fur traders were often not licensed and did not heed the administration’s orders.57

Even the Governor General was accused of wrongdoing by the King of France. During the 1680’s La Salle was busy conducting his famous exploration of the New World. He traveled great distances and was often out of reach for long periods of time. During the very beginning of his travels he founded Fort Frontenac.58 During one of his long absences Governor General La

Barre took control of the Fort and the profit it yielded from the fur trade. The King had to settle this matter when he wrote to him in 1684 to denounce his scheme;

I have been informed that you have taken possession of Fort Frontenac, which belongs to the Sieur de la Salle, that you have driven away the men who were there under his command, that the lands which surround it remain uncultivated, that most of the cattle have died, and that you have even given permission to the Iroquois to seize him as an enemy of the colony…..repair the wrong done to the said De la Salle, and to this end you return all that belongs to him to Sieur de la Forest.59 In addition to the problems between the different sub-groups, the French administration did not promote and abide by the same coherent policy. How could they possibly ever control New

55 White, Richard, The Middle Ground (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991),127. 56 Fermiers were companies of French merchants that had monopoly access to the furs of New France. They would export the furs from the New World to the Old. 57 White, Richard, The Middle Ground (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 108-109. 58 See map page on page 46. 59 Louis XIV to La Barre, April 10, 1684, in The French Foundations: 1680-1693, ed. Theodore Calvin Pease and Raymond C. Werner (Springfield, Illinois State Historical Library, 1934),49-50. 26

France when they were not united in common interests? New France was already handicapped in man power, and economics. If New France was able to succeed be essential that administrators would work together to create a stronger colony.

Cultural Misunderstandings between Algonquians and the

French

Along with the problems created by the French demography in the New World, France also struggled to understand their hosts. The Algonquians and French had many differences in values and these would lead to miscommunication between them. These miscommunications were often interpreted by one side or both as offensive and did not allow for a cooperative alliance. Richard White’s famous work The Middle Ground, is known for showing these differences in culture and how the French and the Algonquians moved past them to create a common understanding. These cultural misunderstandings would be more detrimental to New

France than they were to the British colonies. New England would constantly have an expanding population that could push Native Americans westward. So it would not be as essential to the

British colonies to work with the Native Americans as it would be for New France. New

France’s ultimate goal of creating a coercive alliance was one of the most prominent misunderstandings between the Algonquians and the French.

To understand the beginning of the Algonquian French alliance it is essential to be aware of the status of the Algonquians prior to the arrival of the French. The Algonquians were in dire straits and had been defeated and forced to retreat from their Iroquoian enemies. The Iroquois 27 had been able to employ successfully iron weapons and eventually guns which they acquired in trade from the Dutch and the English. The Algonquians were pushed further inland by the

Iroquoian Wars and did not have access to this weapons trade. The French who came inland through the St. Lawrence River Valley finally provided them with European technology and allies with which they could resist the Iroquois’ aggressiveness. They honored the French as their fathers and hoped that they would be able to supply them with the resources and friendship to oppose the Iroquoian attacks. The most important resource offered by the French was protection. The French could supply the Algonquians with arms to oppose their enemies and maintain their way of life.

I. Manitous

As the French understood it Algonquians worshipped Manitous. They were spirits that generally helped them succeed in their endeavors. One of the first missionaries who arrived was

Father Jean Claude Allouez who was certainly aware of these spiritual beings. He described them in his journal printed in the Jesuit Relations;

The Savages of these regions recognize no sovereign master of Heaven and Earth, but believe there are many sprits—some of whom are beneficent as the Sun, the Moon, the Lake, Rivers, and Woods; others malevolent, as the adder, the dragon, cold, and storms. And, in general, whatever seems to them either helpful or hurtful they call a Manitou, and pay it the worship and veneration which we render only to the true God.60 Upon the French arrival the Algonquians had been decimated by Iroquoian attacks fueled by superior technology. It seems obvious that the Algonquian population would be welcoming to a French arrival, especially when they saw the superior weaponry they possessed. The

Algonquians would recognize these weapons as the very same that had chased them to the pays

60 Allouez, Claude in The Jesuit Relations, ed. Rueben Gold Thwaites (1610-1791), vol. 50 Lower Canada, Iroquois, and Ottawas 1664-1667 (Cleveland: Burrows Brother’s Company, 1911) 283. 28 d’en haut. To honor the French they referred to them as Manitous in order to gain their friendship.61 They sought their protection from the Iroquois. The French believed that Manitou applied to all Frenchmen who arrived, but this was not so. The first French in the area did not come with the skills to protect them. They came with crosses. Algonquians treated missionaries differently than they treated the traders who arrived. The difference between Jesuits and traders would be that the traders possessed the technology to protect Algonquians. Missionaries would be unable to provide the support the Algonquians desired to oppose the Sioux and Iroquois.

The Jesuits would be the first Europeans to enter the Great Lakes Region and their treatment by the Algonquians war far from welcoming. The Jesuit Allouez came to the modern day state of Wisconsin in 1665. While completing a 2,000 mile journey of the Great Lakes

Region his Indian guides decided they didn’t want him around;

On the morrow, accordingly, when I came down to the water’s edge, they at first received me well, and begged me to wait a very little while, until they were ready to embark. After I had waited, and when I was stepping down into the water to enter their Canoe they repulsed me with the assertion that there was no room for me, and straightway began to paddle vigorously, leaving me all alone with no prospect of human succor.62 Allouez had not been a representative of the group the Algonquians were eager to ally. Perrot’s arrival in the Great Lakes would be met with eagerness from the indigenous population. He would experience quite a different type of welcome from the Miamis because of his ability to supply them with trade goods to oppose their enemies;

Continuing on their route, they halted near a high hill, at the summit of which was the village; they made their fourth halt here, as the ceremonies were repeated. The great chief of the Miamis came to meet them, at the head of more than 3,000 men, accompanied by the chiefs of other tribes who formed part of the village. Each of these chiefs had a calumet63, as handsome as that of the old man;64

61 White, 9. 62 Allouez, Claude in The Jesuit Relations, ed. Rueben Gold Thwaites (1610-1791), vol. 50 Lower Canada, Iroquois, and Ottawas 1664-1667 (Cleveland: Burrows Brother’s Company, 1911) 249. 63 A calumet was extremely important in making and maintaining peace to many of the tribes of the Great Lakes region. This showed their eagerness to meet Perrot and ally him. 29

Perrot was a military man who came with the weapons and friendship desired by the Algonquian villages.65 Only later would the Jesuits enjoy the ceremonial title of Manitou from the villages after it became evident that the Jesuits were at least on paper allied with the military men. It would take four years later until Allouez would be recognized as a Manitou by the Fox villages.66 The description of Manitou in the early history of the Great Lakes region made it apparent that Algonquians honored the French ability to protect them. It was also made evident that the French did not understand that this protection was of the utmost importance to their alliance with the Algonquians.

II. Trade with the Sioux

The French would mismanage the alliance most notably in their trading with the Sioux.

The Sioux had long been the enemies of the Algonquians allied to the French. Traders who were greedy for profit traveled inland toward the Sioux and traded ammunitions with them. The coureur de bois were not interested in the alliance system created by the French administration.

Traders were simply interested in making a profit. One particular example of this trade took place in 1703 during a war with the Iroquois. Cadillac struggled to explain to his allies how the

French could simultaneously be fighting a war side by side against the Iroquois and also be trading with an Algonquian enemy to the west;

our allies complained strongly of it, and pointed out to me that it was unjust that at the very time when they had arms in their hands in our own quarrel against the Iroquois, the French were going to the Sioux taking munitions of war to have them killed…..I informed the late Comte de Frontenac and M. de Champigny of it; and they, having considered the reasons which I had put before them, had a decree promulgated at

64 La Potherie. The Indian tribes of the upper Mississippi Valley and region of the Great Lakes, trans. And ed. Emma Helen Blaire(Cleveland, The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1911), 327. 65 It was often difficult to separate the military from the trade. Many former soldiers took up the position of the trade after they finished their military careers. 66 White, Richard, The Middle Ground (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991),9.

30

Montreal forbidding anyone to go among the Sioux to trade with them under the penalty of a fine of one thousand livres, or the confiscation of their goods, and other penalty at the judge’s discretion67 Their Algonquian allies had made it clear that they valued France’s ability to protect their way of life through the trade of weaponry. As usual the administration of New France could not control the fur trade by the coureurs de bois. They would continually travel to the land the Sioux and trade with them, despite the Algonquians disapproval. The Algonquians desired to have the trade of the French and with it the protection provided by the goods they received. The French traders who sought out the Sioux did not recognize that this trade violated the protection of the

Algonquians. Without the French trade the Sioux were incapable of being aggressive towards the Algonquians. The French had just given them the ability through technology to be a threat to

Algonquians once again.

III. Lack of Village Compulsion

Another problem that would be experienced by the French in establishing a cultural bond with the Algonquians was the lack of compulsion in village culture.68 In order to establish the coercive alliance the French desired, they needed to have influence over the leaders of the villages. Unfortunately for the French these people did not hold much influence over the villagers. Also, the chiefs in Algonquian culture did not possess the authoritative power that the

French were used to in their leaders as well. Perrot documented this annoyance in his memoirs;

The savage does not know what it is to obey. It is more often necessary to treat him than to command him….The Father does not venture to exercise authority over his son, nor does the chief dare to give commands to his soldier. If their chiefs possess some influence over them, it is only through liberal presents and the feasts which they give to their men.69

67 Cadillac to Louis XIV, August 31, 1703, in Cadillac Papers, 174. 68 White, 38. 69 Perrot, Nicholas. 145. 31

The Algonquians would have relative freedom from subordination and administrators would struggle with this notion throughout the history of New France. One of the most confused among the French was Cadillac. To solve the soldier shortage he introduced a plan to the King of France in 1707. His plan was to create four Native American companies that would fight under the direction of European leaders. These companies in Cadillac’s mind would act just as

French soldiers did. This plan was never put into action because some of the administrators did understand the lack of European subordination in Algonquian culture. The Senor d’Aigremont denounced Cadillac’s scheme in a 1708 letter to the King;

He told me that he had proposed to you, My Lord, to form whole companies of savages, on which I could not help telling him that I thought him very daring to have made such a proposal to you, and that it seemed strange to me to wish to undertake the discipline of men who have no subordination amongst themselves and that their chiefs have no right to say to the others- “Do so and so,” but only-“It would be advisable to do such and such a thing,” without naming anyone for otherwise they would not do it at all, as they hate all compulsion.70 This would be an error that would be illustrated to the greatest degree in the command of the Algonquians under French leaders. In 1684 Nicholas Perrot was gathering Algonquian allies in pays d’en haut for Governor General La Barre’s attack on the Iroquois. This attack would remove Algonquian men from protecting their villages as well as limit the harvest of the year. In

Perrot’s memoir he illuminates the differences in Algonquian and European ideas of priorities.

In Perrot’s mind the bravest thing the Natives could do would be to join the expedition and destroy their enemies. Algonquians did not see it that way. They were more than willing to fight their enemies, but not at the expense of their families. Providing for one’s family was the greatest priority to the Algonquians;

The people from the Bay whom I have previously mentioned joined us at two league’s distance from Longue Point on Lake Erien{sic} and they informed the Outaouas {sic}that if they remained long absent from their women the latter would starve as they did not know the method for catching fish. They desired

70 Sr. d’Aigremont to Versailles, November 14 1708, in Cadillac Papers, 430. 32

therefore to return home; but I opposed this purpose telling them that there was cowardice in their resolutions.71 This concept of providing for one’s family and protecting them was central to

Algonquian culture. For these tribes around modern day Green Bay to pack up and join an attack on the Iroquois seemed foolish to them. A trip of roughly 600 miles to the east would obviously be time consuming and limit their ability to provide. At the same time their advance to the east would leave their villages unprotected. When the French commander they were supposed to meet up with did not come the Algonquian war party began to speak against the French and

Perrot. “They began to tell me that I had deceived them, and that the French were intending to betray them and deliver them into the hands of the Iroquois; who would (now) have no difficulty in carrying away their wives and children.”72

IV. Importance of Gifts

To compound this problem not only would the chiefs have to be liberal to acquire influence, but so would the French through gifts.73 The necessity of appeasing tribes was evident in the practice of gift giving. The gifts supplied by the Crown would be essential in influencing their Native American allies to remain loyal. While Cadillac was laboring to have the tribes of the Great Lakes region relocate to Detroit he wrote to the King of the importance of gift giving;

You know that in the same way that promises, contracts, bonds, agreement, &c. serve as security with civilized nations, so belts and presents, among the savages, confirm all the words we say to them and the steps we wish them to take; and without these they have no effect, and they let them fall to the ground….If you wish the rest of the tribes to come there, it is necessary to order a few presents (to be made) for that purpose.74

71 Perrot, Nicholas. 237. 72 Perrot, Nicholas. 239. 73 White, 36. 74 Cadillac to the Louis XIV, September 25, 1702, 141. 33

This would drain the French’s trust of their Algonquian allies in the New World and they would see it only as a ploy by their Native American allies to extort supplies from them. What they did not understand was that this truly was part of Algonquian culture. Algonquians honored those who could provide for their family and their resources. A person’s influence was derived from their ability to protect and provide for his family. This is the reason why their chiefs were occasionally described by Frenchmen as destitute.

V. French Lack of Respect for Algonquian Culture

There were many reasons that Algonquians and French did not communicate culturally, but the most severe was the French disinterest in learning or even respecting Algonquian culture.

Nicholas Perrot was the French commandant who mediated conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.

In other words he was the man sent to solve problems between the different tribes. He would show the ability to understand the essential aspects of Native American culture. However, he would only learn the things that were absolutely necessary to his survival while in the

Algonquian world. He perfectly understood the importance of the calumet in his memoirs;

The calumet halts the warriors belonging to the tribe of those who have sung it, and arrests the vengeance which they could lawfully take for their tribesmen who have been slain. The calumet also compels the suspension of hostilities and secures the reception of deputies from hostile tribes who undertake to visit those whose people have been recently slain by theirs. It is, in one word, the calumet which has authority to confirm everything, and which renders solemn oaths binding.75 Beyond his survival Perrot did not care to learn anything of Algonquian culture. He despised their religion and thought it full of fanciful tales. One wonders what the Algonquians

75 Perrot, Nicholas. 186. 34 thought of the Jesuit’s preaching. There is no better representation of Perrot’s opinion of

Algonquian culture than the first paragraph of his memoirs;

All the peoples who inhabit North America have no knowledge about the creation of the world save what they have learned from the Europeans who discovered them, and those with whom they have constant intercourse; and they give hardly any attention even to that knowledge. Among them there is no knowledge of letters or of the art of writing; and all their history of ancient times proves to be only confused and fabulous notions, which are so simply, so gross, and so ridiculous that they only deserve to be brought to light in order to show the ignorance and rudeness of those peoples.76 The French would never grasp the importance of being familiar with Algonquian culture.

The very man the French felt most knowledgeable of the Algonquians made no secret of his disgust with their culture. It is hard to say what would have occurred in the New World had the

French humbled themselves to understand a culture different than their own. Perhaps they would have created a lasting cultural bond with the Algonquians and been more successful in opposing the British. It is obvious however that their lack of effort did not help them create a successful alliance. Great Britain’s colonies did not have to depend on New World allies the way the

French did. French interests rested upon working with the Algonquians. These factors would limit the alliance’s ability to oppose British interests. That weakness would be one of Great

Britain’s greatest advantages in the War for the New World.

The Advance of the British

The British colonial advance westward would be a problem that would plague New

France throughout its existence. All members in the colony were threatened by the advance of the actual population of the British and their superior markets as well. The population advancing would grant them the control that the French could never muster over the Native Americans of the New World. The markets that advanced with them would threaten the alliance they had

76 Perrot, Nicholas. 31.

35 created with the Algonquians. The arrival of superior markets would happen before the British colonial population would be a threat.

I. Advance of British Markets

One of the first to be worried about the English presence in the New World would be La

Salle. The famous explorer created a report to the King of the status of the Illinois Country.

Close to the beginning of his report he stressed the importance of securing lands from the British in the New World. He described the location of the Chickasaw to the King and then informed him of the importance of this exploration in opposing the British advance in trading;

It is important that this exploration be carried out because the river on which the Chickasaw live, and which probably is the Sakakoua, has its source near Carolina, where the English are, 300 leagues to the east of the river Colbert in French Florida near Appalachee; whence the English would be able to come by ship to the Illinois, to the Miami, and close to the Baye des Puans and the country of the Sioux, and secure thereby a great portion of our trade.77

What La Salle failed to realize was that French exploration would not keep these lands safe from the British. To fortify the frontier they would need a population and not discovery rights. La

Salle’s worries were probably unfounded in the year 1680 as the British did not have the ability to push past the Native Americans of the east coast. The British could not yet threaten the

French trade. But, this was a source of anxiety for the French.

La Salle was anxious that British economic hegemony would overrun New France. King

Louis XIV was also worried about the advance of the British empire and made it apparent in a letter of instructions to his Governor General Denonville and Intendant Champigny. Responding to New France’s administration Louis attempted to calm them by promising the creation of a

77 La Salle to the King, 1680, in The French Foundations: 1680-1693, ed. Theodore Calvin Pease and Raymond C. Werner (Springfield, Illinois State Historical Library, 1934) 7. 36 treaty finalizing the rights of landholding in the New World. The King would work with the

British to come to an agreement posting who owned what land;

With regard to the pretensions of the English in North America, his majesty has approved the said Sieur de Denonville’s sending a memoir on the rights, which his majesty has to the greater part of that country; and he is pleased to let them know with regard to this matter, that he will name immediately the commissioners who will work with others whom the king of England will name, on his behalf, in executing the said treaty of neutrality for putting an end to all the disputes which there may be at present between the French and English over the lands which the two kings hold in America.78 Despite not having a permanent presence in the Ohio River Valley the English would continue to threaten the French-Algonquian alliance because of their superiority in trade and settlers. The English presence would be increasingly more powerful on the eastern borders of the pays d’en haut. By 1706, Governor Vaudreuil wrote to the King of the troubles of the colony. They had begun to lose allies to the British because of their inability to match British trade.

In the meantime I shall keep it constantly harassed by our savages, if only to keep them from forming any tie with the English, which was all the more necessary as the small stock of goods we had left this summer from last year, and the uncertainty felt in this country as to the price of beaver-skins, had entirely ruined the trade of Montreal, and had compelled us- if we were not to lose out savages altogether, whoere were dispersing without consulting us,- to let some of them go to the Orange…..79 The French would never be able to stop the trade between the Algonquians and their rivals the

British. As the economy bled they were unable to supply the gifts that were needed to secure their Native American’s alliance. They were unable to provide as well as the English could.

These problems would always deter the French in North America. A clear piece of evidence that

France could not compete with Great Britain economically was found in a 1709 letter to the King from his Intendant Raudot;

namely scarlet, which is a cloth that the savages are very fond of, and they make themselves coverings of it. They are great admirers of this stuff, and it is to be feared that if they do not find it at our merchants’ they

78 King Louis XIV to Denonville and Champigny, March 30, 1687, in The French Foundations: 1680-1693, ed. Theodore Calvin Pease and Raymond C. Werner (Springfield, Illinois State Historical Library, 1934)97-98. 79 Vaudreuil to King Louis XIV, November 4, 1706, in Cadillac Papers,311. 37

will go to Orange for it;…….They [the Srs. Raudot] have considered all these difficulties, which are sure to arise if those interested in the beaver trade adhere absolutely and strictly to the decrees they have obtained prohibiting these English goods, which appear to the said Srs. Raudot to be injurious rather than advantageous…..80 This last and most obvious piece of evidence indicates the problems the French had with competing with the British in the fur trade. This particular cloth the French could not produce.

They had to instead purchase it from the English and trade it to the Algonquians. That the

French even had a decree to not sell British goods at French trading forts illustrates they had a problem competing to begin with. Also, Raudot was the King’s Intendant or the person in charge of attempting to sustain a profit in the New World. The British could supply the

Algonquians with a better deal. As the British population advanced westward their ability to dominate the French trade only increased. Now the Algonquians did not have to travel long distances to receive superior trade. Perrot may have summed up the British problem the best in his memoirs. “It may be objected to this that all the tribes would be ranged on the side of the

English. Alas! Are not they [already] thus ranged? Where are the peoples who do not allow themselves to be attracted by cheap merchandise?”81

II. British Population Advance

The markets would be first to arrive, but the populations that came later would deliver a death blow to the French-Algonquian alliance. The British had made many incursions past the

Allegheny Mountains, but they typically had not been intended to be permanent. Perrot was involved in arresting thirty Englishmen at Michimackinac in 1687.82 These movements became more permanent as modern day Western Pennsylvania and the Ohio River Valley began to be

80 Raudot to King Louis XIV, November 14, 1709, in Cadillac Papers, 460. 81 Perrot, Nicholas. 261. 82 Perrot, Nicholas. 250. 38 settled. In 1749, a man named Celeron was sent in an attempt to ally the various nations in this area. In order to convert a village he warned of British intentions;

As you have in the past heard with attention the word which I bring you on his part, the experience you have had, my children, of the evil intentions of the English in your regard ought always to be remembered. Remember that you formerly possessed at Philadelphia, beautiful lands, upon which you found in abundance wherewith to sustain your family.83 This reminder of what the British would do if they established a population did not work however. The Native American Nations that the French preached to had become increasingly reliant on the goods traded by the English. Celeron wrote down the response of the Loup village he encountered as well;

Consider, my father, the situation in which we are placed. If you compel the English to retire, who minister to our wants, and in particular the blacksmith who mends our guns and our hatchets, we shall be forced to remain without succor and be exposed to the danger of dying of hunger and misery on the Beautiful River (Ohio River).84 The small trading communities that had been established in the modern day state of Ohio could not be forced out by the French without the assistance of the Native Americans present.

Celeron’s men could not force the hand of the men they were attempting to ally. They would be forced to leave the English traders in the camps which were dependent upon them.

Celeron would complain of his men’s numbers and their inability in the field.85 On the

25th of August in 1749, Celeron encountered more British in the Ohio River Valley. He approached them, but was unable to command them to leave;

I was ordered to do this in my instructions, and even to plunder the English, but I was not strong enough for that, the traders having established themselves in the village and being well sustained by the Indians, I

83 Celeron’s Journal, in Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications Volume XXIX trans. A.A. Lambing(Columbus; Fred T. Heer, 1920), 347. 84 Celeron’s Journal, in Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications Volume XXIX trans. A.A. Lambing(Columbus; Fred T. Heer, 1920), 348. 85 Celeron’s Journal, in Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications Volume XXIX trans. A.A. Lambing(Columbus; Fred T. Heer, 1920), 365. 39

would only be undertaking a task which would not have succeeded , and which would only have rebounded to the disgrace of the French.86 The French would be unable to oust the British from the valley and it would eventually be their ultimate undoing. The English traders had arrived and immersed in villages in of the

Ohio River Valley. The British were able to accommodate the trade needs of these communities.

Examples of what the British provided were scarlet, iron weapons and many other material goods all at a lower price than the French could offer. The French were not able to support the

Native Americans the way the British did. Celeron failed to carry out his mission. New France did not create enough allies before the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War. The French would ultimately lose the battle for the New World and these mistakes in policy would haunt them throughout the war.

Epilogue

The struggle for control of the Ohio Valley and the pays d’en haut would be decided by the Seven Years’ War. The conflict began in 1754, when Pennsylvania and Virginia escalated their attempts to secure the land beyond the Alleghenies. Prior to this time, the English had not had the population to occupy and control the area. Most of the Ohio indigenous population would side with the French initially. After all, the British colonists had forced these peoples westward from their traditional lands.

Initially, the British stumbled from catastrophe to catastrophe as they failed to work together and understand guerrilla fighting. After the first two years of the war the British could not have glimpsed victory ahead. In 1755 on the Monongahela, Edward Braddock led his men

86 Celeron’s Journal, in Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications Volume XXIX trans. A.A. Lambing(Columbus; Fred T. Heer, 1920), 365. 40 into a massacre against French and Native American allies. Fifteen of eighteen British officers were shot dead within the first ten minutes of battle.87 This disaster stemmed from the European style of warfare Braddock imposed on his troops. The English columns organized in the forest were easy to mow down from protected positions.88 This was one of many English defeats that occurred in the first three years of the war. Eventually the war was left to provincial soldiers from the British colonies who learned how to fight a guerilla war. From the late 1750’s onward the British would have equal footing in battlefield tactics.

The British were faced with a complex series of problems in mobilizing the war effort in the British colonies. Among their problems were quartering troops, financing the war effort, tension between colonial and regular officers, and more. The British would solve these problems with the policies of William Pitt in 1758.89 After solving these internal problems the British would be able to muster a fighting force that would hold a crushing advantage over the French in the New World.

After the first three years of success over the British the French had a serious problem.

The population held by the British colonies could replenish their forces and fight again. Despite winning crushing victories at a series of sites, the French would be unable to achieve the upper hand in the Seven Years’ War. William Pitt changed the way the colonies were treated. They were now understood to be equals and not subordinates in the war effort. In 1758 alone, the colonies would assemble 23,000 troops.90 This does not include the amount of troops that the

87 Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War. (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 100. 88 Anderson, 99. 89 Anderson, 229. 90 Anderson, 227. 41

English crown would allocate to the New World. It was clear that the French would be fighting an uphill battle and that their Native American allies would be essential.

The only problem was the administration was split over how to use the Algonquians and the other Native American allies. The Governor General appointed in 1755 was Pierre de

Rigaud de Vaudreuil de Cavagnial, marquis de Vaudreuil. He was none other than the son of the former Governor General who served from 1703 to 1725. The new Governor General, like his father before him understood the importance of having a strong relationship with Native

American allies. The General assigned to carry out the Seven Years’ War in the New World was

Montcalm. He did not see eye-to-eye with Vaudreuil on this subject and preferred the use of regular troops to Canadian or Native Americans.91 Once again the administration of New France would not be able to work together against the common enemy. Vaudreuil and Montcalm would disagree over tactics and manpower for the duration of the war. Montcalm’s decision to avoid the use of Native Americans in the field would magnify his shortage in fighting men.

Montcalm’s mind would be made up for him at the siege of Fort William Henry located in modern day New York in 1757. His lack of understanding would lead to an embarrassing debacle after a victory. A large contingent of Native American, including almost a thousand

Algonquians allies, had rallied to New France’s side after hearing of a series of successful battles. After this siege, New France would never have as many allies from the pays d’en haut serve as soldiers. Montcalm would lead 6,000 French regulars and 2,000 Native Americans to besiege the fort on August 2nd. By August 9th,the British officer capitulated to the French and surrendered Fort William Henry92 under honorable European terms. The British were to be led

91 Anderson, 238. 92 See Map page 46. 42 back in safety to Fort Edward where they would be released. What would follow after would undoubtedly change the course of the war. Montcalm could not control his Native allies who wanted to take their cultural rewards of war.93 Primarily they took scalps and slaves from the enemy they defeated. When the march began, the French and British were fallen upon by French allies who led what British colonists would refer to as the Massacre of Fort William Henry.

Three hundred to five hundred English were taken and the French struggled to ransom them back. Their inability to understand Native American culture allowed for the massacre to take place. What happened outside Fort William Henry disgraced Montcalm’s military record as he was unable to carry out terms he had promised. Afterwards, Montcalm would advocate the use of Canadians and French regulars only.94

The fallout from the siege of Fort William Henry did not bode well for France’s holdings in the New World. When news of the massacre reached the British colonies an explosion in recruiting took place as the English colonials sought vengeance. These troops did not turn the tide of the conflict, it would be another three years before the English colonies were organized well enough to begin to win the war. This was an event that motivated unity throughout the colonies as they recognized a common foe. After this embarrassment, the British never offered honorable European terms to a surrendering French general.95

Conclusion

93 Anderson, 196. 94 Anderson, 185-201. 95 Anderson, 201. 43

New France would fall due to several causes. The French never commanded a population that could oppose the British markets and military. Because of limited manpower the

French would need to strive to understand their Algonquian allies to create a successful alliance.

The French would fail in this regard. Traders, missionaries, and administrators worked to undermine one another and crushed New France’s chances for success. New France never fully realized that the Algonquians prized the protection the French could provide through trade.

Finally, factions of the French population including missionaries, traders, and administrators would quarrel with each other. Even at the end of French occupation in the New World when fighting a common enemy, the administrators could not put aside differences and cooperate.

When Great Britain expanded into the Ohio River Valley the French were already too late in creating alliances among the Algonquian villages. New France would be able to resist the advance of the British colonies only until the British were organized to mount an organized attack.

44

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Blaire, Emma, Helen, ed. and trans. The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi and Region of the Great Lakes. Cleveland: Arthur H. Company, 1911.

Celeron. Journal of Celeron. ed. A.A. Lambing. Columbus: Ohio Agricultural and Historical Publications, 1920.

Kenton, Edna, ed. Black Gown and Redskins. New York: Green and Co., 1956.

Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, ed. Cadillac Papers. East Lansing: Robert Smith Printing Co. 1904.

Pease, Calvin Theodore and Raymond C. Werner, ed. The French Foundations: 1680-1693. Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1934.

Thwaites, Reuben Gold, ed. Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin Volume V. Madison: Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1907.

Thwaites, Reuben Gold, ed. Jesuit Relations. Cleveland: Burrow’s Brothers Company, 1898.

Secondary Sources

Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766. New York: Vintage Books,2000.

Doyle, J.A. English Colonies in North America: The Middle Colonies. New York: Henry Holt Company, 1907.

Parkman, Francis. The Works of Francis Parkman. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915.

Richter, Daniel K. The Long Ordeal of the Long-house: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. 45

Skinner, Clairborne A. The Upper Country: French Enterprise in the Colonial great Lakes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2008.

Tanner, Helen Hornbeck, ed. Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History. Cartography by Miklos Pinther. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986.

Thwaites, Reuben Gold. France in America: 1497-1763. Westport: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1970. White, Richard. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region 1650- 1650-1815. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Wrong, George M. The Rise and Fall of New France. New York: Macmillan Company, 1928.

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Map of Useful Locations in the pays d’en haut Sources Fred Anderson’s Crucible of War, The Middle Ground by Richard White