THE POLITICAL TRAJECTORIES OF DUXIU AND QU QIUBAI, TWO FOUNDING LEADERS OF THE : TO AND BACK AGAIN

A THESIS Presented to The Faculty of the Department of History Colorado College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Arts

By Kelly Cheung December/2012 Cheung 2

Table of Contents Preface and Introduction 4 List of Abbreviations 9 Names 9 Brief Historiography 10 Biographic Similarities 16 Early Family Life 16 Education and Pre-Marxist Revolutionary Activities 22 Professional Posts 24 The Western-Informed Development of in and Qu Qiubai 27 Introduction 27 Historiography 28 Historical Context – Previous Attempts at Reform in 30 “What is Marxism?” as Interpreted by Lenin and Stalin 32 Chen and the Deweyan Individual 39 Chen’s Shift From Anti-Traditionalism 42 The West as Interpreted through Dewey and Lenin 44 Dewey’s Lessons on Cultural, Political and Economic Arrangements 48 The Impact of Deweyan Thought on Qu 59 Chen’s Conversion to Marxism and the Role of the Comintern 60 Comintern’s Role in the Rise of the CCP 61 The Peak of Chen’s Marxism 66 Qu Qiubai’s Critical Role in the Chinese Understanding of Marxism 71 Conclusion 75 Shaping the Chinese Literary Revival 77 Introduction 77 Problems of Using Literature as Propaganda 80 The Use and Debate over Western European and Russian Influences 83 Personal Writing Styles 86 The Rise of Anti- In The Post-WWI Era 90 The Literary Revolution’s Audience and Enlightened Leader 95 Qu’s Critical Development As Fostered by Marxist Studies 106 Coercive Influence of the Comintern 112 Chen’s Loss of Self at the Hands of the Comintern 114 Conclusion 126 Recantation: Chen’s Return to Western Ideals and Qu’s Return to the Chinese Classics 128 Historiography 128 Chen’s Animosity Against Politics 130 WWII and Progress Toward 133 Historiography of Qu’s Superfluous Words 137 Rejection of Public Life and Political Work 139 Conclusion 143 Appendix 147 China Timeline 147 Europe/The West Timeline 149 Cheung 3

Bibliography 150

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Preface and Introduction

The fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 ushered in the end of the 4,000-year-old

Chinese dynastic system of governance, and the beginning of endless opportunity for a new political system. Attacks on the Qing were in part fueled by reformers attempting to adapt the system to the changes of the 20th century, and in part fueled by the expansion of warlords’ control over vast tracks of both rural and urban land in the country. One of the most notable warlords, Wu Peifu, almost succeeded in overpowering the other warlords in

1924, but a mutiny prevented this. These two groups, reformers and warlords, which emerged during the last years of the Qing dynasty prefigure the constant tension between reform-in-theory and militarism-in-practice that Chinese leaders face.1 The fall of Wu proved the impossibility of a warlord-dominated territory in the face of impending

Western imperialistic powers. The two Opium Wars, 1839-42 and 1856-60, stripped the

Qing dynasty of a level of respect, especially on the international stage, and took away any remaining level of Chinese autonomy.

Chinese political reformers signaled the general shift of modern governments from pursuing authoritarian programs to listening and responding to the needs and wants of the people. To pursue a responsive and responsible political program, China needed a change in what constituted the prevailing political theory, towards a system more democratic and dynamic. Two early and formative Chinese Communist Party leaders, Chen Duxiu (1879 –

1942) and Qu Qiubai (1899 – 1935), were largely responsible for the importation of

Western ideas of government. The field of Chinese communist history is overrun with

1 Peter Gue Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949, (London: Routledge, 2005), 87. Cheung 5 books about Mao, but the intellectual fruition of communist ideology and importation to

China rests on the efforts of Chen and Qu. Their contribution to the development of the CCP into a real political party with actual clout in China from its inception to the 1930s shows they deserve probably more scholarship than they have received. Interest in Chen arose before interest in Qu, but a natural link between them seemed to naturally emerge. After studying their respective backgrounds, I found significant similarities unaddressed in my sources.

Capitalism’s supremacy remained virtually unchallenged until the rise of Marxist-

Leninist communism in Soviet Russia. The daily effects of Western , most notably in the port cities but including the trickle-down effects to the countryside, were inextricably linked the more contemptible effects of Western and colonization.

The , the "government" that followed the fall of the Qing, was coerced into maintaining the dynastic trade concessions to foreign markets. The struggle for a unified national identity was compounded by the country’s land mass and ethnic makeup as noted earlier; but also involved seeking liberation and independence from the West. The need to establish a national identity that was indigenous to the Chinese was dwarfed by the economic powers of the West.

The level of independence is naturally limited by the integration of the capitalist- imperialist international market, but is also by Western-minded reformers. The revolutionary route taken by the emergent Western of the 18th century –

England, France, and the US – served as one possible solution to a post-Dynastic China. The more recent success of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 also had great appeal because of its radical ideological and geographic differences from the imperialism of the West. The Cheung 6 answer to a post-dynastic China lay in an adoption of some already instituted form of governance – most sharply divided among the lines of democracy versus .

Because Chen and Qu were unique in their roles as some of the very first pioneers of developing a Chinese government, they were still struggling with the questions of Chinese versus Western political ideology – which inevitably included the conflict between a peaceful or armed revolution to instill a new way of living.

The Anglo-West was not the only foreign power that threatened Chinese sovereignty and modern development; was stabilizing and increasing their own colonial possessions in China. A key difference between the Anglo-West and Japan was the latter’s desire to occupy and conquer China, assimilate her and validate the small island’s capacity in an international field. The era of the Meiji Restoration (1868 – 1912) included an assimilation of the Western mode of capitalism, which heralded great domestic growth.

This new economic flourishing allowed for Japan to pursue an international colonization program of its own, one directed towards challenging the hegemony of the West in the Far

East. Japan’s colonial aggression against America most notably materialized in their railway construction in Manchuria (1898 – 1903), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894 – 1895), and the Massacre (6 weeks in 1937). Without the advent of WWII, Japan’s potential to conquer a China that was embroiled in civil war was surely promising.

The most competent form of a domestic political party to solve the confusion and displacement of the Chinese population within their own land was the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) because of their organization and membership prominence. The self-proclaimed Nationalist party of China (the GMD) ruled by Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek throughout the 20th century has a longer history than the CCP, as it Cheung 7 was founded in Hawaii in 1894 by western-educated Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen formulated the basic guiding principles of the GMD, but ’s megalomania pushed Sun out of leadership in China, and Yuan subsequently served as president from 1912-16. Yuan’s concessions to Western and Japanese powers and conviction to reviving the dynastic system was obviously not the kind of answer appropriate to the emerging modernity in

China. Following Yuan’s death in 1916, there was a 12-year period of political discord – virtually provisioning the further fortification of warlord-controlled territory.

Warlordism proved unsustainable against the strengthening of both the physical and theoretical basis of the GMD and CCP. The strength of the GMD was historically founded in their military might, most clearly exemplified by the rise of Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek in the late 1920s, and the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy in

1924. The relative youth of the CCP in comparison to the GMD – being founded in 1921, 27 years after the GMD – made it more difficult for them to accrue members, arms, funding and all the other elements necessary to successfully rise against a country with an established counter-political presence. Despite the GMD’s claim to nationalism and the

CCP’s use of “Chinese” in their name – both these parties were heavily influenced by foreign ideals, Western and Russian alike, and attempted to appropriate them to their transitional state.

Foreign influence remained a key element in the rise of domestic parties such as the

GMD and the CCP. Translations of major political and cultural works alike, from Marx to

Chernyshevsky, Dewey to Seignobos, Russell to colonial newspapers, were slowly becoming more widely available. This was in conjunction with the literary movements heralded by CCP leaders Chen Duxiu and Qu Qiubai. The that brought Cheung 8 down the Qing prefigured the rise of as a response to the illegitimacy of

Chinese traditionalism. Cultural aspects were taken into greater consideration with the dawn of a new style of polity – where the position of the individual as a political citizen was becoming a central tenant to modern government. This lies in awkward tension to the position of the individual in the Soviet system – where the illusion of the liberated citizen from the Czar was promoted despite the Russian socialist reality of gulags, and hegemonic collectivization of agriculture and industry.

The eventual triumph of the CCP over the GMD – which was not obvious pre-Mao – suggests the greater appeal of imported and re-adapted Western ideals to ‘fix’ China rather than a nationalistic program that was more limited by its dependency on domestic precedence rather foreign ideals. The field of Chinese communist history is overrun with books about Mao, but the intellectual fruition of communist ideology and importation to

China rests on the efforts of Chen and Qu. Their contribution to the development of the CCP into a real political party with actual clout in China from its inception to the 1930s shows they deserve probably more scholarship than they have received.

My hope is that I contributed new observations about the formative leaders of the

CCP; including an attempt at explaining how their biographical similarities serve as partial explanation for their similar tracts away from communism in their final works. The paper begins with an introduction to their respective biographic histories and a subsequent comparison, a brief historiography of which sources were chosen and the previous treatment of comparable topics, the development of Marxism in China through the efforts of Chen and Qu, their employment of literary movements as vehicles for the development and popularization of Marxism, and finally, a comparison of Chen’s and Qu’s respective Cheung 9 recantations. In the appendix, I have also included a timeline of relevant events in Chinese and European history for ease of reference.

List of Abbreviations CCP – Chinese Communist Party GMD – Guomindang (Nationalist Party) KUTV – Communist University of the Toilers of the East, Moscow ECCI – Executive Committee of the

Names For the most part I have chosen to use the system of Romanization of Chinese script, but there are some instances where the Wade-Giles system continues to prevail in all references, like in the case of author Chow Tse-tung. The Wade-Giles form is spelled out in parenthesis. Chen Duxiu (Ch’en Tu-hsiu) Qu Qiubai (Chu Chiu-pai) Sun Yat-sen Chiang Kai-shek Dazhao (Li Ta-chao) Hu Shi () Chow Tse-tung Cheung 10

Brief Historiography

As noted in the introduction, scholarship on the formation of the CCP is sparse until the rise of Mao in the 1930s. This is an unfair marginalization of the great political and social contributions Chen and Qu made towards modernizing China in light of the changing international stage of imperialism and capitalism. These early CCP leaders’ contributions addressed the urban masses in a style more democratic than before, and laid a theoretical and practical framework in the inclusion of more people in the political process. Mao solidified the triumph of the CCP over the GMD with the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s army and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949; but this CCP triumph is only possible because of Chen and Qu’s study and importation of Communist tenets to

China.

Sinologists Thomas Kuo, Lee Feigon, Richard Kagan and Yu-ju Chih each made significant contributions to the biographical history of Chen – with Lee publishing a 1983 biography entitled, Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party as a extension of his 1977 doctorate dissertation from University of Wisconsin-Madison, “Ch’en Tu-hsiu and the Foundations of the Chinese Revolution.” Lee’s book is only the second book-length study of Chen’s life, despite his importance to the founding and development of the CCP.

Kuo preceded Lee with his 1975 work, Ch’en Tu-hsiu and the Chinese Communist Movement.

Lee’s biography is more an account of Chen’s intellectual development; Kuo’s focuses on material evidence such as CCP, Comintern and GMD documents serve as the primary sources through which to analyze Chen’s life. Lee’s intellectual argument is a powerful one, and serves as a springboard for this thesis as a comparative work of the material and Cheung 11 intellectual changes Chen and Qu underwent, which eventually shaped their surprising finales of recanting their faith in the promise of Marxist society as a panacea for the challenges of modernizing China into a country that is viable and competitive in the 20th century.

Lee amends certain long-standing elements of Chen’s biography, such as his alleged years in France from 1907-09, and Chen’s age at the time of his father’s death. Lee revises many accounts, including Kuo’s, by proving that Chen was actually in Japan during this period – and that the misconception stems from records of Chen’s sons in France during this time. Chen’s autobiography states that he lost his father at two months old, but Lee finds new evidence to show his father’s death occurred when he was actually two years old.

Small amended mistakes such as these may seem trivial, but it highlights the inadequacy of

English-language scholarship of these works. The greatest challenge, however, remains in examining Chen’s intellectual development during his years of leadership of the CCP, between 1924-27. Attempts by Lee and Kuo to parse the varying motivation and origin of

Chen’s doing and political agenda are underdeveloped. Though sources continue to be released in English translations, there is not yet a translated anthology of writings of Chen

Duxiu, nor La Jeunesse. Spheres of influence on Chen varied widely and internationally due to his prominence as a political figure, and subsequent exposure to multiple international strains of political thought.

Yu’s and Kagan’s doctoral dissertations, 1965 from Indiana University and 1969 from University of Pennsylvania, respectively, are closely related. They rely on a similar and limited pool of sources. Kagan’s “The Chinese Trotskyist Movement and Ch’en Tu-hsiu:

Culture, Revolution and Polity” and Yu’s “The Political Thought of Ch’en Tu-hsiu” are Cheung 12 significant political biographies in a still-developing field. Kagan’s appendix of an English translation of Chen’s unfinished autobiography gave me hope in my own project, offering one of the relatively few translated works written by Chen – especially compared to the entirety of the breadth of his works. I am not sure of the total number of articles Chen published, as he heavily relied on the power of journal and propaganda articles to disseminate his changing ideas. Yu’s dissertation was written under Sinologist C. Martin

Wilbur (a man so respected in Sinology that an entire essay collection themed on “Changing

China” was complied in commemoration of his retirement2) but I think her admiration of

Qu as an historical figure should make the reader wary of the objectivity of her biographic narration.

Earlier historians than those already mentioned working with CCP history include

Chow Tse-tung, Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and Maurice Meisner. Their contributions to the ideological origins of revolution, primarily revolution by Western means such as anarchism, socialism and Marxism, are extremely helpful for an introduction to the political and social culture the spawned. Chow Tse-tung’s

1960 book, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China exponentially advanced the scholarship of the May Fourth movement, and analyzed the specific factors that made May 4, 1919 a date worthy of remembrance in telling the story of the rise of an intellectually modern China. Chow ascribes great significance to May 4, saying the movement is “one of the most eventful and crucial stages in the long process of China’s transformation to adjust herself to the modern world…” Chow’s work propelled the May

2 C. Martin Wilbur, Joshua A. Fogel , and William T. Rowe, Perspectives on a changing China : essays in honor of Professor C. Martin Wilbur on the occasion of his retirement, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979). Cheung 13

Fourth movement out of a vague zone of loose significance into a specific set of ideas, which morphed first into a sectarian change, then into the paradigm shift of an entire country.3

Qu, like Chen, has a very limited amount of scholarship addressing his life and contributions to the intellectual climate of a burgeoning socialist revolution. There are only two English-language biographies of Qu Qiubai, both of which are doctoral dissertations:

Yu-ning Li’s “A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai: From Youth to Party Leadership, 1899-1928,” earned in 1967 from Columbia University, and Paul Pickowicz’s “Ch’u Chʻiu-pai and the

Origins of Marxist Literary Criticism in China,” in 1973 from University of Wisconsin. Only

Pickowicz’s has been edited to a full-length book, Marxist Literary Thought in China: The

Influence of Ch’u Ch’iu-pai. Pickowicz focuses on the change Qu undergoes after his involvement in the and his journey to Russia. Pickowicz’s work shows how it was Qu’s Marxism – which came from his thorough exposure to it through his multiple trips to Russia – that formed an ideological basis for his rejection of his own countrymen’s ideas. In particular, and Chen Duxiu, once viewed as mentors and role models, came to symbolize the phoniness of the supposed proletariat literary movement. T.A. Hsia, a former professor at UC Berkeley, wrote an article4 in The China

Quarterly that presents Qu as a “tender-hearted communist.” Hsia emphasizes how Qu’s artistry and expressive language permeates his writing as a key characteristic to this

Marxist leader’s personality. A “tender heart” is not a typical characteristic of communist leaders – Stalin’s purges and Pol Pot’s genocide in Cambodia, among many others, attest to

3 A more in-depth study of the recent historiography behind May Fourth is found in Qian Zhao, "A Review of Studies of May Fourth Movement in China over the Past Decade," Chinese Studies in History 43, no. 4 (2010): 79-89.. 4 T. A. Hsia, "Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's Autobiographical Writings: The Making and Destruction of a "Tender-Hearted" Communist," The China Quarterly , no. 25 (1966): pp. 176-212. Cheung 14 this characterization. Li cites Hsia as a major inspiration. She chooses many of the same passages Hsia quotes in his article, only differing slightly in their English translations.

Qu’s works, like Chen’s, are collected in Chinese-language anthologies dedicated solely to Qu, but there is no comparable English anthology of his works. More of Chen’s works, as mentioned, are available in English translations in various anthologies of Chinese revolutionary literature. Qu’s are found more often in Chinese literary theory anthologies.

Chen’s articles come to prominence in modern Chinese history because of his instrumental involvement in the New Culture Movement that followed May Fourth. Since there is no historiographical work about Qu, I think his most significant contribution is his modernization of the Chinese classical literary style. This shows Qu’s personal interests remained in the literary arts, no matter how politically charged his leadership role in the

CCP became. Chen and Qu undoubtedly had different aims as CCP leader, but they both molded the ideological landscape of the CCP for years after their respective depositions from post and party in 1927 of Chen and 1934 of Qu.

The English translations of both Chen and Qu’s final works – Chen Duxiu’s Last

Articles and Letters and Superfluous Words – show the historical significance of their swan songs. Chen’s Last Articles explain his return to sympathizing with liberal democracy. Even though he died in poverty and obscurity in 1942, the changing international political climate – like WWII and the rise of fascism – coupled with the changes in China of the early- mid 20th century – including Mao and the assertion of the peasant class – adversely affected

Chen’s opinion on the merits of socialism. Superfluous Words too is Qu’s text of apostatization. Superfluous Words is still a contested apocryphal text among hard-lined

Party members since it voices so many recantations and criticisms of socialist theory. The Cheung 15 current CPC, until about 10 years ago, was mostly unwilling to accept that a figure so essential to preparing China for the acceptance of Marxism would recant his views, to the point of even declaring having a “gentry” and “literati consciousness.” Qu is regarded as a martyr for the CCP, especially because he accepted his death with great willingness – but such a reverential title would be inappropriate for a figure who, according to his texts, did not even believe in communism at the time of his death.

Although translations of the works of Chen and Qu are found in varying thematic anthologies, these men share obvious and not-so-obvious lives in both the private and public spheres. Biographic similarities arose in my research, and I was surprised when there was no comprehensive comparison of their lives. I argue that their biographic similarities explains the overlap in their preliminary interpretations of Marxism, especially as adapted to the Chinese needs, as well as their eventual disappointment and condemnation of the state of Chinese communism.

Cheung 16

Biographic Similarities Biographic similarities between Chen Duxiu and Qu Qiubai are startling: despite the differences in the trajectories of their respective careers, their intellectual finales of ideological recantation were nearly identical. From their family life to educational background, their intellectual life to renunciation of communism, Duxiu and Qiubai show much greater similarity than expected, since it has not been yet addressed in the academic field. As arguably the most significant framers of the CCP mission and ideology before the rise of Mao, a comparison of these two has not been undertaken.

Early Family Life Chen and Qu shared an upper-middle class social status, but the realities of their economic situations were bleaker than the socio-economic title would suggest. Chen’s father died in his youth, leaving Chen’s mother to raise their three children by herself. Qu’s father was a Daoist5 and opium addict; his mother was without any income or inheritance to support the family of six children. An ideal application of the Confucian system of family values6 would prescribe that the Chen and Qu clans would help their mothers in raising the family, a crux of Confucian teachings, but there was little help to be found from this source.

Despite the fatherless upbringing, their mothers maintained a traditional family – most notably in their pursuit of a classical education. I contend that the earliest criticisms against traditionalism made by Chen and Qu stem from constant systemic failures of the Confucian

5 Daoism after the early 1900s was condemned by the late Qing reformers such as Kang Youwei and . This was prefigured by the mid to late 19th century movement led by the Confucian literati class to rid China of superstitious traditional beliefs, which included Daoism, Buddhism and local religions (that were mostly practiced in the countryside). This was fueled by the 6 “When the perfect order prevails, the world is like a home shared by all….All men love and respect their own parents and children, as well as the parents and children of others…There is a means of support for the widows, and the widowers; for all who find themselves alone in the world…Every man and woman has an appropriate role to paly in the family and society” "The Record of Rites, Book IX: The Commonwealth State," [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.confucius.org/lunyu/edcommon.htm.. Cheung 17 system – most intimately experienced through the callous treatment of their mothers by the Confucian clan.7

Chen does not directly attribute much of his maturation to his fatherless upbringing, except for a brief mention of social ridicule he encountered in 1921.8 Interestingly enough,

Chen’s first account of the “various events which made a deep impression on him when he was young was [that] the first thing is I was a fatherless child.”9 The use of present tense in

“is” and the primacy of this blunt statement in the opening chapter of his autobiography suggests his fatherless upbringing had a greater impact than he either dares to admit, or sees fit for an autobiography which he wants to keep brief in order to pursue his political program and “concentrate on [providing] a living experience for modern youth.”10 Chen’s grandfather filled the role as patriarch of the family; Chen’s adolescent experiences with his grandfather during tutoring sessions and personal family time alike had the most formative effect on Chen’s future. Chen attributes many of his personality traits to his mother’s own mannerisms and expectations for her son. Chen’s statement of purpose also serves as a reason for why he glosses over what we now call ‘Freudian’ details of his life. The experiences which he deems not directly relevant to his oppositionist views and his rise

7 I purposely have not included the families Chen and Qu start themselves as I do not think their wives or children exerted any significant influence over their intellectual and political development. For the most part, political fracas did not penetrate the private sphere until the late 20s or early 30s. Chen’s family was more affected than Qu’s – which can most likely be attributed to Chen’s role as the figurehead of the revolutionary leftist movement. The execution of both of Chen’s sons can be directly attributed to the antagonism between the GMD and CCP. In sources available to me, Chen does not make any public decree against the GMD after his sons’ deaths, and there was no great shift in Chen’s ideology after these great personal losses. I do not believe any member of Qu’s family suffered a comparable fate, or any form of punishment by the GMD. 8 “People say that you have organized an ‘association for attacking fathers.’ Is is true?” I replied in an equally serious vein: “…I do not even have the proper qualifications to join because ever since I was a child I did not have a father.” Of the people sitting around me at that time, some heard me and laughed…some silently stared at me as if they did not understand what I had said.” Richard C. Kagan, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Unfinished Autobiography," The China Quarterly , no. 50 (1972): 302. 9 ibid.: 301, with minor changes. 10 ibid.: 301. Kagan also points out that Chen originally intended this to be published in a popular and colloquial magazine, which also explains his inclusion of humorous anecdotes and sarcastic social criticism. Cheung 18 and fall from the CCP are irrelevant to serving his long-standing May Fourth purpose of educating the masses.

Unlike Chen, Qu never produces a propagandistic autobiography, but instead writes the retrospective memoir Superfluous Words11 that gives the reader an introduction to his family background.12 Qu’s father, Ch’u Shih-Wei, remained somewhat absent figure throughout his life – Ch’u Shih-Wei even asked for a compilation of all of Qu Qiubai’s writings before he left for Russia in 1920.13 Despite his father’s general absence, and the great hardship that caused his mother, Qu never denounces his father or his family. His father’s absence must have been a contributing factor to the events that led to Qu’s mother’s suicide.

With an absent father, Qu’s mother had the responsibility of upholding Confucian values despite her status as single mother. She greatly valued education for her children, and was able to borrow from the clan and strategically use the family inheritance from the grandfather’s post as an imperial official to put Qu through school in their home province of

Jiangsu14. Despite her best efforts, Qu’s mom could not pay for his entire schooling so Qu began teaching primary school. One month after his 16th birthday in February 1915, Qu witnessed his mother’s final moments after she drank a poison concoction of phosphorus match heads. Suicide in the Confucian tradition was regarded more honorable for the family than enduring her ‘inadequacy’ in cultivating classical values in her children. Qu

11 The possible reasons for this split in autobiographical style between Chen and Qu are discussed in the following section, “Literary Movement and Style”. 12 There are some Chinese-language biographies of Qu Qiubai – but he remains a fairly obscure figure in Chinese history for English-language speakers. Nearly all of my biographical information about Qu’s early life – before his return from Russia to China in 1922 – comes from Bernadette Yu-ning Li, "A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928)" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970), . See the bibliography of this dissertation the sources she uses to compile the best-available English biography of Qu. 13 ibid.48. 14 Now Nanjing, in Central-Eastern China. Cheung 19 perceived great injustice and absurdity in an ethical system that set impossible standards, especially for women. Qu does not write as lengthily on women’s rights as Chen15 – but their mother’s deaths had a profound effect on their general mentality, particularly in their reform-minded political careers.

The Qu clan in Kiangsu could not support all six Qu children – especially after the death of the mother, so they were sent to live with various relatives. Qu eventually moved to Peking in 1916 – a year after his mother’s death – where his cousin worked an administrative job for the central government. Despite the harrowing expectations of traditional Confucianism, by choosing to live with his cousin, Qu wanted to maintain a semblance of family ties and the natural comfort that they bring.

Chen is more polarizing against his family at the advent of his political career. The timing seems too coincidental: renunciation of his family entails renunciation of the

Confucian family system. The Confucian system as adhered to by his grandfather probably exemplified hypocrisy for Chen, where despite the grandfather’s hatred of “dirt and noise,” he went “frequently downtown to a filthy and tumultuous opium den to smoke…to satisfy his desires.”16 His grandfather had the accurate reputation of being “stern and fearful,” where his entrance alone would make “everyone shut up and not dare to make another

15 An analysis of Chen’s work in women’s rights would be interesting since it is such a dramatic departure to the blatant sexism of Confucius. Chen’s article, “The Way of Confucius and Modern Life” William Theodore De Bary et al., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999; 2000), 353-56. points out the obvious incompatibility between the prescribed duties of women with modernity. He exalts Western culture and women’s liberation – like in the form of suffrage and re-marriage – as the antithetical savior against the stagnation of Confucianism. As noted, Qu did not write as much as Chen on women’s rights, but strong evidence suggests he advocated gender equality. An example is his post as Dean of University in 1923, a school which allowed both female and male students. If I had space and time I would have included such a discussion in the following “Literary Movement and Style” section. Li Changli, a research fellow at the Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in , wrote an article in 2010 that appealed to many of my own interests in long-term effects of the women’s movement. See Changli Li, "The Social Consequences of the May Fourth Movement," Chinese Studies in History 43, no. 4 (2010): 20- 42.. 16 Kagan, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Unfinished Autobiography, 302, with minor changes. Cheung 20 whimper.”17 Chen’s sister was “fiercely beaten [by the grandfather] but [she] never understood why”; Duxiu was slapped and cursed at when he “failed to memorize the whole lesson [on the Chinese classics of Four Books, Five Classics and the Classic of Poetry]” and his grandmother “feared his unreasonable cursing at her noisy movements.”18 Chen struggled against his grandfather’s illusion of upright morality and superior education with this type of irrational behavior against his own family.

Qu was not openly disdainful of his father’s drug interests19 but the disregard for family responsibilities showed how adherence to the traditional status quo was no longer an absolute requirement. Qu father’s inability to support the family is an obvious sign of disrespect for familial ties and implicit obligation of a patriarch in a patriarchal society.

Opium addiction, as cultured by British imperialists in the 19th century20 and culminating in the Chinese defeat in the Opium Wars of 1839-42 and 1856-60, shows the destructive effects of Western colonization on the structure of the traditional Chinese family.

Chen employs the characters of his grandfather and the leader of the clan in the first chapter of his autobiography to strengthen his argument against the Confucian hierarchical system. Qu does not offer any remarks as scathing as Chen’s – which is a reflection of his lifelong adherence to certain elements of the Confucian ways. Knowing Chen’s propagandistic intentions, it is reasonable to assume hyperbole in his character descriptions of these representations of the Confucian ideal. Even if it is just for literary

17 ibid.: 302. 18 ibid.: 302. 19 At least in any English translations of Qiubai’s texts. 20 See Peter Ward Fay’s The Opium War 1840-1842 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975) for an overview of the First Opium War from the Asiatic perspective. Fay includes a study of India’s role, as well as renowned Sinologist Frederic Wakeman’s analysis of Chinese peoples’ reactions. Although Fay’s purpose is to expound on the issue of Chinese reaction and impact, his inclusion of India and England makes for a well-rounded read of this inherently international conflict. Cheung 21 effect, Chen’s grandfather and clan leader serve as bleak anecdotal tropes to the living incompatibility between the modern man and the requirements of Confucianism. The clan leader’s own corruption at the expense of his own clan mirrors the Chen’s grandfather’s domestic abuse and Qu’s clan’s inadequacy after his father’s departure and his mother’s death: “for [Chen’s clan leader’s] standard of judgment, he relied entirely on the amount of pay in terms of chickens, rice, opium, or money that he received from the litigants. Because of this, sometimes his own relatives were found guilty and the outsiders were victorious.

The villagers in the area praised him as an upright and unselfish member of the gentry!”21

The final sentence’s caustic sarcasm makes obvious the difference between Chen’s and Qu’s criticisms against traditionalism – Qu does not fault anybody for the breakdown of clan morale and ethics, even though clan support directly failed him.

In their childhoods, it was their mothers who showed them the greatest genuine affection and maintained their affinities to the Confucian clan organization – Qu remained faithful to the clan tradition for longer than Chen, as the latter renounced his family’s wealth and Confucian attachments in order to wholeheartedly live out his reform policies of a socialist state.22 Their mothers, espousing upright Confucian values such as through the devoted emphasis on education, encouraged schooling and wanted to bring honor to the family through the success of their sons in the imperial exams. Since Qu’s father had swindled away so much money on his opium addiction, and was only sporadically employed, there was not enough of his mother’s inheritance money to put Qu and his five siblings through school.

21 ibid.: 304. 22 The date of Chen’s mother’s death is unknown. If she was alive, I think Chen would have waited until after her death to renounce family ties out of love for his mother. Cheung 22

Chen was luckier than Qu, and although similarly lacking a father figure, the finances of his merchant family background23 afforded him a multitude of educational opportunities

– from attending school in Japan, to the achievement of an imperial examination degree, to becoming Dean of Letters at . Chen repeatedly cites his mother’s kind encouragement:

“My little child, must study conscientiously, and when you will have completed your studies, you can become a chu-jen and obtain merit for your father. Although your father studied his whole life, he never passed the chu- jen examination, and this remained a great burden until his death.” When I saw my mother crying, I unexpectedly cried.24

Their early involvement in the education system exposed them to characteristics of society, which they would later criticize and attempt to rectify in

China’s 20th century quest for modernization.

Education and Pre-Marxist Revolutionary Activities The abolishment of the imperial examination in 1905 came after both Chen and Qu had already taken the exams. Chen passed and earned his imperial degree, despite a lack of traditional education. Qu did not pass the imperial exams, but went finished middle schooling in classical education. Despite Chen’s disdain for everything classical, he took the exam to appease his mother.25 He offers a humorous anecdote regarding the absurdity and impracticality of Confucian ‘decorum’ during examination season in Nanjing:

…whenever [the orthodox Confucian scholar] engaged his mouth…he had learned from Mencius that “men and women ought not get too close”…but if any one of them spied a young girl approaching, he would run out and immediately loosen and let down his pants in order to get ready to let loose;

23 Chen’s uncle ran a soybean purchasing center and struck a monopolistic deal with a British firm, securing a fixed price for some years. Lee Feigon, Chen Duxiu, Founder of the Chinese Communist Party, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 27.. 24 Kagan, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Unfinished Autobiography, 303. Also see pp. 307, 309, 310. 25 “The only reason that I had prepared for the exams was for my mother’s sake. I did not take it seriously” ibid.: 309.. Cheung 23

it seemed as if he couldn’t wait to show his precious cargo even though he didn’t have the urge [to impress women nor go pee].26 Chen’s mockery of the population of exam takers show how far his adherence to modern social is, which in turn prefigures his political liberalism that characterizes his entire career.

Qu’s inability to afford studies at Peking University coupled with his failing of the imperial exams led him to enroll in the tuition-free, government-sponsored Russian

Language Institute (RLI), where he learned Russian and French. Qu had moved to Beijing after being passed around to different distant family members until he settled with his cousin who was already living in the capital. The RLI afforded him great opportunity, including a trip to Japan to study political philosophy. The Westernization of Japan in the wake of the Meiji Restoration opened up the body of resources available to Far East students. Like Chen, who studied in Japan in the early 1900s, Qu gained even greater exposure to texts from European philosophers while abroad. The implications of living and studying in the Chinese capital during the May Fourth era were instrumental to exposing

Qu to reform and revolution movements which were springing up in urban areas.

Chen’s education was different since he did not attend schools like Qu, rather, Chen was home-schooled by his grandfather and brother. They both though were exposed to the same classic texts, Qu just was more accepting of them – remaining a lifelong reader of many of the classic Chinese epic poems and narratives. Chen’s preferences were more directed to the Western body of literature, shaping his intellectual arsenal in order to launch a future attack against . Chen’s disdain for the classics can be

26 ibid.: 312-13, with minor changes. Cheung 24 rooted in his grandfather – since his grandfather was the one who regimented a rather draconian plan to force Chen into learning them.

It seems Chen and Qu were bright students in different ways: Chen hated the eight- legged essay and submitted one so “muddled” and disappointing to his brother that he

“wrinkled his eyebrows into a frown and was silent for an hour.” Despite the actual poor content of Chen’s essay, “the Provincial Director of Education…marked me first place in the examination. With this, I despised the examination system even more.”27 Chen followed the structure of the eight-legged essay perfectly, but his subject matter was frivolous and random: “I filled up my essay with the obscure terms for the birds, animals, and bamboo …

I didn’t care about coherence; whether the cow’s head did not fit on the horse’s mouth, or whether there was no connection between the beginning and the end of the essay.”28

Chen’s effortless mastery attests to his natural writing ability, but also to the perversion of the spirit of the exams through the systematization of grading standards. Although achievement of an exam degree would have been helpful in finding employment, Qu found success at the RLI. Qu’s essay probably read better because of his exaltation of classical style and imagery. Qu’s inclinations could be seen as more artistic and traditional, whereas

Chen’s as more scientific and progressive one.

Professional Posts Both these figures were obviously deeply involved in academia for both personal and public reasons. Despite Chen’s disdain for the imperial exams, he believed in the importance of education in a modern society. Chen served as Dean of Letters at Peking

University from 1917-19; Qu was both a translator and teacher at the Communist

27 ibid.: 309. 28 ibid.: 309. Cheung 25

University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV) in Moscow, as well as the inaugural Dean and

Chair of the Sociology Department at the (then) newly opened Shanghai University in 1923.

Chen’s leadership of the May Fourth movement was precipitated by his awareness of student concerns. As the dean to the foremost university in the country at the time, Chen’s social consciousness and a desire to address these problems actually led to his resignation of his post so he could better devote himself to Marxist studies towards a revolutionary effort. Qu played a different academic role. His financial situation did not allow for him to resign from paying jobs, especially in Russia where the economic situation was already desperate post-Revolution. Qu’s professorship at KUTV did not play the same role as Chen at Peking University. Qu remained more removed from his students as a professor – which is a notable contrast to his decidedly democratic involvement in the student protests at

May Fourth. He suffered severe beatings and was imprisoned for his involvement in the movement. At KUTV he remained isolated from his students; his semester-long stint at

Shanghai University29 did not afford him much time to become involved in student life. The discrepancy between Qu’s actions as a student at RLI versus his time at KUTV and Shanghai

University suggests a shift in Qu’s view of his role as a participant in Chen’s revolution to an architect of his own revolutionary stance.

The revolution in education that allowed for a more open curriculum gave administrators and teachers such as Chen and Qu more power in schools. The examination system alone determined education curriculums – its abolishment heralded the way for a more liberal and inclusive education system. Antiquated books and writing styles were not initially dismissed, but adapted and reformulated to be relevant in the 20th century. The

29 I do not know why he stayed at the University for such a short amount of time. Cheung 26 modernization process of education was in part informed by Marxist ideas, those which eventually took complete control over CCP-run schools. Cheung 27

The Western-Informed Development of Marxism in Chen Duxiu and Qu Qiubai Introduction The success of May Fourth and the rise of figures like Chen were the first signs of a yet-to-be-named political movement that would, ideally, sweep a deeply fractioned and archaic China. The early era of characterized the eradicative stance young revolutionaries were taking against the sedentary problems raised by traditional Chinese culture. The arrival of American educator John Dewey, in addition to Marxists from the

Soviet Union, signaled a shift in revolutionary politics: the revolution became more focused along a pre-established theoretical line. The tension between American, Russian, and indigenous Chinese custom in government, authority, and social problems challenged Chen and Qu in their decisions made pre, during, and post CCP involvement such as regarding policy of the United Front, militarism and an intellectual revolution. Chen was more torn between American and Russian sensibility, whereas Qu shows the dichotomy between

Russian and beliefs. The three stages of political involvement that Chen and Qu play throughout the early 20th century – from groundwork theorists, to public figures, to excommunication and obscurity – highlight their shifting political interests as motivated by personal allegiance and interest, and pressure from the Soviet’s Communist

International for CCP growth. Since both Chen and Qu became ostracized from the party, in

1929 and 1935, respectively, allegiance to CCP-Soviet beliefs waned in deference of their original attitudes. Cheung 28

Historiography The cursory treatment of the Dewey’s influence on the spate of new political ideas – especially those in praise of a Western democracy – in post-May Fourth urban China prevents a thorough understanding the (relative) liberalization of China after the fall of the dynastic system, and Chen’s progressive political development. The rippling effects of the end of WWI further integrated China into international policy, in turn affecting their perception and exposure to Western modes of polity. Dewey’s effects on Chen are subtle, and seem to fade away totally during Chen’s tenure as CCP Secretary-General, but these

Western liberal-mindedness returns in his last writings from 1937-42, after his alienation from the revolutionary groups of the CCP and the Trotskyites. Qu was less directly influenced by Dewey than Chen, but he too had latent reservations against communism that were informed by both his access to alternate world views, as well as an adherence to dynastic tradition. His allegiance to the dynastic system was not centered specifically on the politics of imperial rule, but social customs and culture. Chen similarly was attracted to elements of the Deweyan West that extended beyond mere politics to inform the daily lives and attitudes of average citizens. Marxism’s strong arm through the form of the Communist

International outmuscled the appeal of Dewey or old Chinese dynasty because the Soviets provided on-the-ground monetary and political aid to the CCP, and the CCP’s rival revolutionary party, the GMD.

I identify two of the most influential factors on the early establishment of a revolutionary practice post-May Fourth as the Versailles Treaty of 1919 and John Dewey’s lectures in China from 1919-1921. These two events informed Chen’s, and to a slightly lesser extent, Qu’s, decisions to seriously pursue a revolutionary line in a country steeped in nearly 4,000 years of dynastic rule, as well as conservatism from Confucianism that Cheung 29 began in the Han Dynasty.30 Although the final line of the tradition of dynastic politics ended in 1912 with the fall of the Qing,31 the succeeding Beiyang Government proved ineffective. The power vacuum left in the wake of the failure of Qing and Beiyang allowed for the revolutionary stances held by May Fourthers, the established GMD, and the eventual

CCP. Changes in the international sphere, most notably the end of WWI, had an effect on the collective Chinese mentality because of their country’s embarrassment by the terms in the

Versailles Treaty. John Dewey’s lectures were delivered at an extremely opportune moment: Chinese morale was low because of the inadequacy of the Beiyang in both a domestic and international sphere, and the country had no direction for its future in an increasingly globalized world. Shortly after Dewey’s presentation of a multitude of

American-informed suggestions for a modern Chinese culture, Lenin’s Communist

International arrived in China with a different, yet still radical and pragmatic approach. The differences and similarities between Deweyan democracy and Lenin’s Marxism are startling, and explain the theoretical basis and political reactions of Chen and Qu during their time as leaders or participants in May Fourth and the CCP.

Even though Qu’s ambivalence towards accepting and importing Western ideas for

China contrasts with Chen’s excitement, Qu Qiubai was a nonetheless a primary influence on Chen’s more explicitly Marxist development. Qu’s intellectual passions eclipsed many others, including Chen – most clearly evidenced in his lifelong pursuit of the literary arts.

Qu was one of the first intellectuals to deliver translated Marxist texts to China after he returned from his first of two trips32 to Russia in 1923. In Moscow, Qu says he was the

30 The Han Dynasty lasted from 206 BC – 220 AD. 31 The Qing enjoyed a very brief revival in July 1917 by a Qing loyalist named Zhang Xun. 32 Qu taught at KUTV in 1923, and returned in 1928-30. Cheung 30

“only person who could translate [Chinese] from Russian.”33 He had the unique knowledge of Russian34 – compared to Chen who knew French,35 English and a little Japanese. Qu translated Stalin-approved texts for the Chinese revolutionary population in efforts to excite greater native knowledgeable application of it. Qu advocated Marxist dialectics – placing an emphasis on the scientism of the world,36 inescapability of historical context and also the importance of the collective individual.

Historical Context – Previous Attempts at Reform in China The widespread shock and despair over the Chinese defeat at the hands of the

Japanese Meiji Empire at the close of the First Sino-Japanese War in September 1895 served as a catalytic movement to inspire early reformers like Kang Youwei and later revolutionists like Chen Duxiu and Qu Qiubai alike. The acceptance of the Treaty of

Shimonoseki, which ended the war wholly on the Japanese’s terms, became an embarrassment to the already waning ability and the general inadequacy of the Qing. The

Treaty’s terms were also embarrassing on a similar level to the Western treaties China signed after her defeat in both Opium Wars.37 The terms of this April 1895 treaty include: the total independence of Korea from China, the concession of the Liadong Peninsula and

Taiwan, and the reparation of 200 million taels of silver. Japan was also to become China’s

“Most favoured nation” in trade arrangements. The Qing and China held no diplomatic clout, and this inadequacy was reflected in their poor dealings of domestic problems like

33 Qiubai Qu and Jamie Greenbaum, Superfluous Words, (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2006), 143. 34 Qu entered the Russian Language Institute in the summer of 1917 after he failed his imperial examinations, even though he was unaware that Russia had had a revolution, and [he] knew nothing of the great significance of Russian literature. [He] just saw Russian as a skill” ibid., 141.. In addition to Russian, he, like Chen, had a knowledge of English and French. 35 This is contested, just like his trip to France itself. Chen clearly exhibits knowledge of the French language in circa 1898 translation of Seignobos’ texts. 36 Chenshan Tian, Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), qtd87. 37 The First Opium War was from 1839 – 1842; the Second Opium War was from 1856 – 1860. Cheung 31 living wages, conditions in the countryside, but also foreign problems like reparations and foreign imperialism. The Treaty of Shimonoseki also further reinforced the geographic shift of Asiatic power: China’s wane was complete after accepting such one-sided, pro-Japanese terms.

Despite the grim and disappointing outcome during the last years of the Qing, there were some key figures who attempted to work within the Qing Empire context, and did not advocate such a destructively contrary program as the revolutionists of Chen’s era of May

Fourth. Principal late-Qing reformers include Kang Youwei and his student, Li Qichao. Chen and Kang had differing views about the best approach to reform, but Kang similarly advocated the abolishment of the examination system. One of the reforms that were actually instigated by the late Qing was the 1905 abolition of the imperial examination system. The dissolution of the exam system relieved middle-class figures who simply hated the classics, like Chen Duxiu, from the pressures of taking it; but it also liberated lower classes from both urban and rural areas to pursue jobs, especially those that previously required an imperial degree for hire.38 Reformers’ faith in the ability to salvage the imperial system contrasted with revolutionists’ faith in a wholly new Eastern coalescence of

Western polity.

Tensions between the appeal of Marxism, Western liberalism, and the old dynasty were evident in the writings of Chen and Qu during their lives. Taken generally, these three ideologies are certainly competing, but the intellectual development of Chen and Qu show

38 Ideally, the exam system also permitted for social mobility – but persisting problems of funding education and the difficulty of literacy did not make this system as ideally egalitarian as Western democracy and capitalism. The exam system allowed for anyone, who studied hard enough, to achieve any post according to test score and ability. Both capitalism and the exam system have less-than-ideal results when actually practiced. Cheung 32 there can be a successful hybridization of these three systems. Each of these systems influenced Chen and Qu simultaneously, and was selected for certain elements that appealed to whatever their political program was at the time. As their public roles and private views changed over time, one system came to influence another more so – yet an allegiance to Western liberalism for Chen, and old dynasty for Qu, remained on the periphery throughout their lives.

“What is Marxism?” as Interpreted by Lenin and Stalin The novelty of Marx and Engel’s economic and political system as set forth in their

1848 publication of the Communist Manifesto laid the theoretical foundation for the development of communist societies around the world. Marx’s later work, A Critique of

Political Economy39 introduced the notion of , and elaborated further the relationship between the economic base and socio-political superstructure. Marxian history progresses due to inevitable class antagonisms that arise due to the disparity in wealth in a society. The economic base is the force of production and material basis of society that changes according to individual societies and historical periods. The superstructure includes the political, legal and cultural institutions of a society and is determined by the economic base. The relationship between base and superstructure is fluid, but it is not always satisfactory; dissatisfaction and internal contradiction arise which naturally leads to the emergence of Marx’s version of an end of history: a communist utopia.

Lenin’s employment of Marxism adapted to the need for answers in a post-Czarist

Russia, which led to the creation of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin placed more ability and

39 Published in 1859. Cheung 33 responsibility in the hands of world-historical individuals instead of the objective historical forces Marx emphasizes in his notion of historical materialism. According to Lenin, people themselves are responsible and able to affect the course of history.40 In Lenin’s view of history, the main objective is the rise of the dictatorship of the proletariat, yet he recognizes the necessary intermediary steps, which include a capitalist economic system ruled by a bourgeois-democratic class. The influence on Marxist history by Hegelian thesis- antithesis-synthesis results in the notion of historical materialism, or dialectical materialism, as the determining source of social events. One of the main differentiating factors between orthodox Marxism and Marxism-Leninism is Lenin’s emphasis on people themselves, the most prominent of whom he calls professional revolutionaries, to bring about historical change. Lenin’s theory still fits within the Hegelian framework, the thesis is the Czarist regime, the antithesis is the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the synthesis is a total socialist revolution. In order to realize the necessity and content of the antithesis stage, the class of enlightened and convicted professional revolutionaries has to emphasize the injustice of the thesis in order to present change as self-evident.

Before the publication and subsequent translation into Chinese of Lenin’s “What Is

To Be Done?” in 1902, Marxism in China was barely understood in a practical context that applied to the unique socio-political conditions of the early 20th century.41 However,

Lenin’s emphasis on the effects of imperialism in less-advanced countries like Czarist

Russia clearly applied to Qing dynasty China, especially in comparison to actively

40 This is best explained through Lenin’s emphasis on the necessity of a revolutionary vanguard: “The revolutionary proletariat must directly support, and not merely support [the] actual incitement [of a peasant uprising]” "What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement," in Marxists Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2011]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/.. 41 The first time a Socialist party appeared on a Chinese ballot was in 1905. Cheung 34 colonizing countries such as the US and Britain. “What Is To be Done?”42 outlines the conditions necessary for the rise of the dictatorship of the proletariat. These conditions include the development of a professional class of revolutionaries who can elevate the proletariat masses from capitalism to socialism, the highest form of government.43 The socialist revolution in Russia would naturally spread throughout the world because it allegedly would not be plagued by the internal contradictions of capitalism.44 Lenin’s establishment of the Communist International, abbreviated as the Comintern,45 in March

1919 shows the beginning of Russia’s fear of ever-encroaching capitalist powers on their socialist agenda. Post-WWI China and Russia similarly shared the hesitation and anxiety over the expanding sphere of Western capitalistic hegemony. The purpose of the

Comintern was to spread Marxism-Leninism around the world as an alternative to the evil effects of imperialism – a mode of world relations that is destined to come to an end as the

“antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.”46 The struggle for 18th and 19th century world hegemony can be summarized as the struggle for international colonial possessions – yet Russia, especially under Stalin, saw imperialism as an evil necessitated by the inherent competitive factor of world capitalism. A Russian confusion occurred between the effects of capitalism

42 This title is inspired by Nikolay Chernyshevsky’s 1895 book, What is To Be Done? Chernyshevsky was a socialist and led the Russian democratic reform movement in the 1860s, and explores the themes of Russian radicalism in response to Western cultural encroachment and the effects of modernization in an orthodox country. What is To Be Done? served to be one of the most influential texts among 20th century revolutionaries, and the title itself becomes a phrase to encompass the plethora of questions that surround times of revolution when the entire old social order is discarded. 43 ibid. 44 ibid. 45 Also known as the Third International. 46 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Cheung 35 and the effects of imperialism, and Soviet ideology conveniently made this confusion in order to advance the necessity of a socialist revolution via historical materialism.

Although orthodox communist ideology maintains a decidedly anti-capitalist stance in the eventual socialist utopia, it recognizes the necessity of a pre-socialist stage that includes democracy and the accretion of capital. Lenin issues Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1917 as a reinterpretation of a Marxist economy in a globalized world consisting of rich and capital-laden colonizing countries and poor, underdeveloped colonial possessions. Lenin especially notes the conditions in Russia and Eastern Asia during this time, especially as compared to other less-developed countries. According to Marxist-

Leninist theory, these conditions placed these two regions in tension to global development.

[the] two areas where capitalism is little developed: Russia and Eastern Asia. In the former, the population is extremely sparse, in the latter, it is extremely dense; in the former political concentration is high, in the latter it does not exist. The partitioning of China is only just beginning…47

Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism denounces the wealth disparity presented during exchanges between the colonizing and the colonized. Dewey similarly is against the effects of imperialism on the colonized, which is in conjunction with Dewey’s anti- military/anti-violence stance. The answer to the question of militarization as means for global dominance is more affirmative in Lenin’s theory:

The question is: what means other than war could there be under capitalism to overcome the disparity between the development of productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and spheres of influence for finance capital on the other? The enormous dimensions of finance capital concentrated in a few hands and

47 "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in Lenin Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/. Cheung 36

creating an extraordinarily dense and widespread network of relationships and connections which subordinates [those who participate].

Lenin’s bellicose tendencies blatantly contrast with Dewey’s program for peace48, one of the most obvious discrepancies between their visions of a global, modern society. The huge state government, and accompanying Red Army, that Stalin eventually builds is what the

USSR perceives as their only possible answer to the encroaching powers of imperialists and their capitalistic societies. The strengthening of the Red Army was ideologically based in this defense against imperialism, whereas its actual effects of colonizing and invading places like Poland and Finland were no different than Western capitalist imperialism.

Marx’s emphasis on the decisive role of objective, material forces in the propulsion of his history stands in contrast to both Chen’s and Qu’s early political views of liberalism and exaltation of the individual, before their indoctrination to Marxism in 1919 and the early 20s, respectively. In using the actual modes of production as the progressive forces causing historical development, Marx removes a level of accountability from the subjective, human level: “Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand.”49 Emerging from a history where the individual has minimal effective voice in either the dynastic or Confucian system, Chinese leaders, contrary to Marx, wanted to place more impetus in the hands of the Chinese people themselves and to minimize the effect of their Marxism superstructure.

48 Dewey exalts the peacefulness of the May Fourth protesters, despite the police’s application of brute force. He is disgusted at the accurate characterization of the political climate in China because “brute force is such a factor in [the] official government…[but] in no other country could moral and intellectual force accomplish so quickly and peaceably what was effected in China [during the May Fourth movement…[It is the] standing paradox of China” John Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899-1924, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), 186-91.. The police beat students at the Russian Language Institute, which included Qu Qiubai – inciting his first serious bout of tuberculosis. 49 Karl Marx, Grundrisse. Foundations of the critique of political economy, (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 265. Cheung 37

The Chinese superstructure itself needed to be totally redefined – one of the missions of the

May Fourth movement and a reason behind the rise of the CCP. The mentality of stagnation and loyalty to Confucianism were to be discarded along with the dynastic and semi-feudal system. This would make way for the socialism as realized by the Russian Bolshevik

Revolution. The May Fourth movement’s revitalization of the power of the individual stood in contrast to the collectivity of subordination endured as a colonial state in the 19th century. Although freedom from imperial powers was not fully achieved in China during the Communist revolution,50 I argue that China’s assertion of self was undeniable during the early 20th century, which translated into an assertion of the individual.

Labor relations as defined by the foreign capitalistic powers in coastal cities, and warlordism and feudalism in rural towns were unsatisfactory to early revolutionists such as Chen and Qu. Chen even perceived the modes of production as dehumanizing, 51 where the only way to gain it back is for “the tools of production [to be] taken over by the public” or else “every man will have to sell his labor to the capitalists.”52

Imperialistic modes of production integrated China into the modern economy, and

Chen cites class differences as the reason for his country’s failure to fully integrate and benefit from the international economy of modernity. The Qing abolishment of the examination system brought unprecedented strain on the urban labor market because of the influx of labor. “[China’s] organization of old society” – which includes the split between rural and urban populations – is incompatible with the inherently globalized system of production that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. “China, long known for her

50 remained a British colony until 1997. 51 Ssu-yü Teng and John King Fairbank, China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839 -1923, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 249. 52 ibid., 246. Cheung 38 adherence to ancient tradition, now extends a cordial welcome to this new culture which has developed through so many stages out of the old.”53

Viewed in Marxist terms, this phenomenon of rural to urban migration due to a major change in social conditions emphasizes the interrelatedness between the superstructure and the base. The elements of the superstructure had changed because a major social institution, the exam system no longer existed; and the economic base, consisting of these new available workers, was reacting against the superstructure’s dearth of available jobs. Chen makes his own Marxist conclusion, saying, “Classes with different economic interests naturally are engaged in conflict,”54 which in turn stifles the possibility of countrywide economic flourishing. Chen criticizes the feudalism of an “agricultural- patriarchal society” where “wife and children” are dehumanized into “tools of production, as a kind of property.”55 Rural and urban job conditions were equally detestable – especially since workers associations were rare and suppressed, until the rise of the CCP’s labor movement in the late 20s. The aversion against working conditions of farmers in rural areas and industrial workers in urban areas hints at Chen’s political uncertainty over the clear advantageous mode of labor. A peasant army like the one advocated by his later successor , or an urban vanguard class like the one advocated by Qu, were both imperfect systems in Chen’s mind. Framing these scenarios with the goal of a Marxist socialist society led Chen to emphasize the workers themselves, wherever they may be.

53 John Dewey, "The Development of Democracy in America; a series of lectures delivered in Chiang-su in 1919," (1919): 1. 54 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839 -1923, 251. 55 ibid., 249. Cheung 39

Chen and the Deweyan Individual Chen’s intellectual period of championing the individual had roots in the Marxist theory of valuing the individual and his role in changing culture and society. The superstructure of politics operates depending on the conditions of the base, which are the economic and productive forces of a society. The individual directly affects the base of the society because they comprise the labor of the productive forces. Although Marx’s view of historical progress is deterministic, Chen and other Chinese-Marxist scholars attempted to make progress seem more rooted in the will of the individual rather than in lofty and deterministic historical forces. In China, there seemed to be an underlying notion that the dynastic political and Confucian ethical systems were inescapable – even if they were not being actively adhered to, like in the case of Chen’s clan leader or Qu’s father. Chen’s clan leader even went so far as to use Confucian tenets to justify his swindling of fellow clan members. These long-standing systems were being subverted, even before the introduction of Western liberalism to China. Contradictions of such restrictive systems were coming to the forefront, where ones who were supposed to serve as paragons of virtue were failing. A potential wellspring of reform could come from the individual, but the prevailing top-down structure left no precedence for individual potential to incite change (unless they passed the imperial examination).

This newly recognized role of the individual in politics shows Chen’s willingness to

“demolish” the foundations of the old system in order to “reconstruct China by sweeping away all the oppression”56 A significant part of Chen’s political theory his unique readiness to assign such a large role to the individual, even though he observes that the “backwards”

Chinese population no longer had the qualities of “independence and self-respect,” and “no

56 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Cheung 40 spirit.”57 The individuals have not been proactive enough in changing the course of socio- political history – and Chen advocates they adopt this Leninist view of the true affective force of the people themselves. Chen does not fault the individuals themselves for this lack of motivation, but rather the previously unmovable societal forces of which they were inherent subjects. Chen assimilates the notions of both individuals and society as forces of history – but also strives to completely reshape what defines the progressive forces of history.

Even before Chen’s interpretation of Marx, and Marx-as-interpreted-by-Lenin, Chen was already looking to Western sources to provide ideological justification for the elevated role of the individual in society. John Dewey’s 1919 lectures were probably the most direct address regarding the necessary role of a liberated individual for a representative government. Even before Dewey’s lectures, Chen already admired the French Revolution for its progress towards achievement of a secular modernity. He lamented his countrymen’s social tendency to “absolute obedience…to the Confucian ethical code,”58 which in turn engendered a latent resistance to change due to the long-standing nature of the Confucian order. Chen formulated a reinterpretation of Dewey’s “individual” to proclaim that the Chinese people cannot be bound by their duty to tradition because of their familiarity or sentimental attachment, but rather should be unafraid to embrace a modern and new 20th century China. Another effect of such long-standing systematization was the individual’s ability to evade responsibility to instead blame it on the system. In

57 See “On Literary Revolution” and “The True Meaning of Life,” by Chen Duxiu in Kirk A. Denton, Modern Chinese literary thought : writings on literature, 1893-1945, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 141-45. and De Bary et al., Sources of Chinese Tradition,, respectively. 58 Duxiu Chen, "The French and Modern Civilization," Contemporary Chinese Thought: Translations and Studies 31 (1999): 55. Cheung 41 biographic evidence of both Chen and Qu,59 we see multiple instances of individuals eluding the system’s prescriptions for proper social conduct. A system more representative of its peoples, such Dewey’s liberal democracy or a socialist utopia, would naturally foster personal accountability according to Chen’s world view. The incompatibility between traditional Confucian and dynastic systems and modern states inspired by egalitarianism was insurmountable.

Lenin’s proclamation of salvation through communism-socialism served as viable challenge to the old Chinese and Confucian ways. Before Stalin’s collectivization and subsequent destruction of the individual, a heavily Marx-influenced Lenin asserts the identity of the individual especially in a post-Czarist world. The discrepancy between the values placed in the Czar’s identity versus each of his subjects’ identities was attacked in order to pursue a program that was based in the masses. Lenin begins his fourth chapter in

The State and Revolution with a quote from Marx which explains the rise of the individual in a post-capitalist society: “In a higher phase of communist society, the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor…has vanished;”60 the individual will be able to assert himself without any of the restrictions that comes with his socio-economic class, especially in subordination to the capitalist powers. The unending labor of the peasantry under Czarist Russia did not allow for any social mobility, a social landscape that paralleled China’s skewed population distribution that weighed heavily in the countryside.

These restrictive societies clearly contrasted with Deweyan promises of social liberty and mobility in a democratic society. Marxism-Leninism’s allowance for discrepancies between

59 See chapter on Biographic Similarities. 60 "The State and Revolution," in Marxists Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/. Cheung 42 individuals’ abilities is exemplified through the constant USSR assertion: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”61 Motivation and ability became ideologically more important than social class, which would empower a generation to topple antiquated and caste-like political system. Through this reading, the Marxist-

Leninist view’s main concern is to fight back against the restrictions of capitalism on the individual – a fight that cannot be achieved without a violent revolution.

Chen’s Shift From Anti-Traditionalism As a member of an affluent social class,62 Chen’s intellectual development began at home under his grandfather, who administered strict lessons of classical texts and

Confucian morality in preparation for imperial exams. Chen’s initial resistance to family traditionalism stemmed from his grandfather’s poor treatment of his beloved and widowed mother.63 His grandfather lived out the sexism of Confucianism where women were expected to be wholly subordinate and dependent.64 In Chen’s 1916 New Youth article entitled, “The Way of Confucius and Modern Life,” Chen contrasts Western modernity with antiquated Confucianism. Chen quotes Confucius’ Book of Rites, “To be a woman means to submit,” and, “The wife’s words should not travel beyond her own apartment.” These and other similar Chinese classical teachings, Chen perceived two great injustices: one against the egalitarian political involvement and the other against the spirit of the individual. As an advocate of liberalism in contemporary society, Chen advocates, “destroy[ing] the old

61 ibid. 62 Chen was born to a merchant family and his father had attained the first-level degree (xiucai) of the imperial examination. 63 See Richard C. Kagan’s translation of Chen’s unfinished autobiography for Chen’s character description of his grandfather: Richard C. Kagan, "The Chinese Trotskyist Movement and Ch'en Tu-Hsiu: Culture, Revolution and Polity" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylania, 1970), 174, 176. 64 Chen’s grandfather’s view on the natural subordination of women is exhibited in his admonishment of Chen’s sister: “When my second elder sister was young she did not understand the consequences of making noise, and so each time she walked noisily she was fiercely beaten but never understood why” Kagan, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Unfinished Autobiography, 302. Cheung 43 curiosity shop of Confucius” because “the objectives, ethics, social norms, mode of living, and political institutions did not go beyond…the feudal age.”65 Notions of gender equality stemmed from Chen’s study of Western democratic states, and also the Third

International’s treatment of women. Suffragettes were evident as early as the French

Revolution, yet they did not gain the right to vote until 1944. Russian women were granted suffrage earlier during the era of WWI. The conviction of the to human equality66 overlaps with the principle of equality in many Western constitutions. Because the two geographic regions that Chen particularly admired espoused human equality as part of their quest for modernization – despite their opposite political systems – Chen might have detected a correlation between equality and modernization. Although gender equality was an early program point for Chen, it evolves into a broader equality for all which included hopes for liberation from discrimination based on class or political view.

Chen’s individualism goes beyond the human individual to assert individualism on a national level through asserting the absolute sovereignty of the Chinese state as a whole.

After being divided and ruled by the imperialist forces of Great Britain and Japan, post-

WWI and the Treaty of Versailles, China’s revolutionary movement of the early 20th century sought to create a sense of national independence as a significant state in international relations, including the Communist International movement. Tinges of British colonial rule began in the 1700s with the birth of the opium trade, and by the turn of the 20th century,

China’s economy was clearly no longer her own.67

65 De Bary et al., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 355. 66 See Alice Erh-Soon Tay, "The Status of Women in the ," The American Journal of Comparative Law 20, no. 4 (1972): pp. 662-692. for information about the movement for gender quality in Marxist terms as applied by the Bolsheviks. 67 The 1842 Treaty of Nanjing ended the Opium Wars, but also was the first of a series of humiliating foreign treaties (also called the Unequal Treaties, bupingdeng tiaoyue) against China of the 19th and 20th centuries – Cheung 44

Confucianism and old imperial customs served as a unifying force in large and fragmented country, Chen turned to Western liberal politics as an alternative tool of unification in bringing a massive country into the modern era. From the inception of his attraction to the West, he was careful to temper it with a critical eye to its actual applicability. His attraction to the West began at the dawn of his post-exams intellectual career in mid 1910s. Exposure to translated texts during his time abroad and dialogue with other internationally-minded Chinese intellectuals offered both sides of the traditional versus modern debate occurring during the transitional period between the fall of the Qing

Dynasty and the rise of the CCP and GMD.

The West as Interpreted through Dewey and Lenin In June 1917, Chen proclaimed, “Republicanism is the paragon in politics,”68 one month after American John Dewey’s arrival in China. Dewey, a pragmatist who taught philosophy at Columbia University, wanted to go to China to “learn something of the

East.”69 Dewey visited China on an invitation from his former student and eventual interpreter to the Chinese audience, Hu Shi.70 Hu learned Dewey was visiting Japan during

which includes the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1915 21 Demands, 1919 Treaty of Versailles, among others. This treaty opened up the Chinese market to foreign investment, but also foreign control. 68 Yü-ju Chih, "The Political Thought of Ch'en Tu-hsiu" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1964), qtd 52. 69 Jessica Ching-Sze Wang, John Dewey in China: To Teach and to Learn, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), qtd 3. Although Wang has done a wonderful job providing an informational overview of John Dewey in China, the reader should be careful because she is primarily focused on elevating Dewey’s reputation of reform in China. One of the main goals of Wang’s book is to show the value of Dewey’s contributions to shaping pre- revolutionary ideas of China in the 1920s. Although she makes a compelling case about Dewey’s contributions, I think some of it may be slightly over exaggerated because of Wang’s underlying reliance on the assumption of an innate Chinese attraction to pragmatism as the most effective response to the contemporary social unrest. Wang’s book was a great aid to jumpstarting my research on Dewey in China, but should not be a researcher’s only reference, nor be taken as an objective introductory text to this aspect of early 20th century Chinese history. 70 Hu Shi wrote for New Youth before it turned decidedly communist, but split with the magazine and the party after May Fourth. He taught English Literature at Peking University from 1917-26, and travelled to Cheung 45 his sabbatical,71 so he encouraged the American professor to visit his home country – where Dewey’s political and economic democratic ideals were so strikingly absent in a warlord-ruled, disheveled country that still lay under the “haze” of Confucianism. Dewey’s first impression of China was that it lay in stark contrast to the “feeling of uncertainty, hesitation, even of weakness [in Japan].”72 The May Fourth movement happened three days after his arrival – further confirming his excitement in the plasticity of the Chinese context, especially in moving towards a more liberal and democratic system.

In the first issue of New Youth,73 Chen praises Western civilization as led by the

French in their pioneering movement towards political liberalism and away from

“uncultured savagery.”74 Chen’s interest in Western civilization stems from his rejection of the antiquated pointlessness of the classics, and was affirmed in Dewey’s praise of the

French revolution and definition of democracy. The way, or dao, of ancient civilization such as those of China and Japan, can be propelled toward a “modern civilization [through] marking a new era in human thought and society. These are the ideas of human rights

(renquan), evolutionism, and socialism.”75 These three elements come to constitute Chen’s basic political views, throughout his entire career. Although some fall to the fringes at the peak of his CCP leadership, mainly evolutionism explicitly, he never completely discards

England and America from 1926-30. He cites the origin of his political and literary thought to be based in studies of John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, and becomes a pragmatist. His disagreement at the founding tenets of the CCP pushed him to exploring Western liberalism, an advocacy he pursued until his death in 1962. Another Western-educated (attending university in Germany) Chinese intellectual named was also instrumental in bringing Dewey to China. He served as President of Peking University, and also wrote for New Youth. It was during Cai’s tenure as president that Chen and Li Dazhao became employed by the university. Cai was heavily influenced by Anarchism, which Chen personally did not espouse, yet Cai’s publication in New Youth shows the diversity of voices permitted during the early stages of the magazine. 71 From Dewey’s professorship at the University of California at Berkeley. 72 Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899-1924, 174. 73 New Youth Magazine was also known as La Jeunesse or Xin Qingnian. 74 Chen, The French and Modern Civilization, 54. 75 ibid.: 55. Cheung 46 them – especially if we view evolutionism as a more specific form of scientism. The anti- religious nature of the Soviets and Soviet offshoots, like , finds justification through scientism, especially as a development of Marx’s anti-religious viewpoint.

From the beginning, even before the success of the Russian Bolsheviks, Chen does not see political liberalism to be at odds with economic socialism. Both these modes of polity and economy come from French thinkers76 whom Chen directly cites – showing both his knowledge of the French language and familiarity with foreign philosophies as applied in a Chinese context. Chen quotes Charles Seignobos’77 text, Histoire de la Civilization

Contemporaine – one that he himself translated shortly after its publication in the late

1890s:78 “Modern society is democratic; everyone is equal before the law. Although inequality has not yet been eliminated completely, the only remaining problem is the inequality of private property.”79 Chen fully supports analyzing and reconciling the tension between democracy and socialism, and to apply its solution to modernizing China. Dewey’s exaltation of the French Revolution, especially in comparison to the British Revolution probably held great inspiration for Chen and his subsequent pieces about the importance of precedence in carrying out revolutionary practice. Although the tri-partite slogan of the

French Revolution is “liberty, equality, and fraternity”, Dewey contends that democracy is the “ideal” that necessarily includes these three characteristics. Dewey was instrumental to breaking down the French Revolution into its component parts for his Chinese audience

76 Chen’s references include these 19th century revolutionary socialists: Charles Seignobos, Francois-Noel Babeuf, Jean Baptiste Fourier, and Henri Saint-Simon. 77 Charles Seignobos was a late 19th to early 20th century French historian and a member of the French League for Human Rights. Seignobos’ histories of European culture are lauded for being highly scientific and exact in language for its age. 78 Stephen C. Angle and Marina Svensson, The Chinese Human Rights Reader: Documents and Commentary, 1900-2000, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 66 note 1. 79 Chen, The French and Modern Civilization, 55. Cheung 47 who had limited access to European history. The French, as the Americans, similarly fought against the traditionalism of the preceding regimes while still retaining certain elements of the old.

Even though Dewey’s lecture series is directed towards touting the ethics and ideals of democracy, much of his rhetoric could be interpreted as pro-socialism, especially since his audience was embarking on the birth of major social upheaval, catalyzed in part by the

Versailles Treaty. Such an excited interpretation especially happened in Chen – a figure whose political interests during these lectures were at an important turning point away from traditionalism towards anything alternative and revolutionary. Lenin similarly held this view over the unfair terms presented in the treaty, denouncing it as the foundation of the “modern imperialist world.”

Dewey probably perceived the most disappointing outcome of WWI to be the failure of the international community to ratify the League of Nations. He asserts the primacy of

“diplomacy on the level of international relations” as the first responsibility of the federal government – once a representative government has taken power. Dewey is against the mainstream American view of isolationism especially in the years preceding WWI.80 The

USSR practices the opposite of non-intervention with the establishment of a Comintern branch. Dewey, echoing Comintern concerns, cannot divorce domestic affairs from their context in the international sphere. The Comintern’s obsession with a “world revolution”81 brought about through civil wars around the globe show the relationship between domestic and international affairs. According to Comintern doctrine, civil war between a

80 See Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899-1924, 177. for Dewey’s warning against isolationism as a policy for foreign affairs. 81 "First Congress of the Communist International," in Lenin Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/mar/comintern.htm. Cheung 48 country’s “proletariat and the democratic bourgeois republic”82 is a necessary step towards the final goal. Dewey is not as disgusted by the state of world affairs as the Soviets, which partially explains his more peaceful approach to instigating change – especially against the exploitative imperialist powers that the Soviets were also looking to topple.

The one-sided negotiations between who were viewed as the greedy colonizing capitalists left less-developed countries, such as China, out of the main peace negotiations.

In speech delivered to workers in 1920, Lenin asks, “What then is the Treaty of Versailles?

It is an unparalleled and predatory peace, which has made slaves of tens of millions of people, including the most civilized. This is no peace, but terms dictated to a defenseless victim by armed robbers.”83 Both Dewey and Lenin lament such unfair treatment – Dewey is hopeful about diplomatic reform through peaceful and pragmatic means whereas Lenin calls for necessary preparations towards an armed overthrow of any antagonistic bourgeois societies.

Dewey’s Lessons on Cultural, Political and Economic Arrangements Dewey’s tenets of a democratic America in a modern political economy appealed to

Chen in both its progressiveness, especially as compared to the Chinese system, but also in

Dewey’s status as an intellectual rather a politician. Chen too was an educator, and had thought more about his political ideas than put them into practice, which explains his attraction towards a more pragmatic approach. As an educator, political theorist and family man,84 Dewey was an accurate representation of American ideals; but he also served as an

82 ibid. 83 "Plan of a Speech at the Trade Union Congress," in Lenin Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/may/x01.htm. 84 John Dewey travelled to China with his wife, Evelyn Dewey. There is an entire collection of John and Evelyn’s letters to their children during their 1918-19 travels to Japan then China. See John Dewey, Harriet Cheung 49 important critic of American practices. Although Dewey was not the first to present the idea of democracy to China or Chen, Dewey’s presentation proved more attractive as he was not only a well-respected scholar, but also a direct citizen of democracy in America.

Dewey defined democracy in a new light for his Chinese audience during his early

June 1919 three-part lecture, “The Development of Democracy in America.”85 In 1922, Qu

Qiubai recalled Dewey’s lecture as having presented democracy in “a unique explanation of this term [as it] was presented among Chinese intellectuals.”86 Dewey’s 1919 lectures included patriotic zeal for the greatness of American innovation that begins with the

European colonists, yet he tempered such zeal with critiques on capitalism’s greed and other Western manifestations in the early 20th century. Dewey’s role as one of the main architects of pragmatism was highlighted in these lectures through his espousal of citizens’ rights, the representative role of the government, and the role of nationalism/patriotism in establishing a new country. These three main elements pervade Chen’s thinking throughout his career, even during the height of his Communist phase, because of a general

Alice Chipman Dewey, and Evelyn Dewey, Letters from China and Japan, (New York: E. P. Dutton company, 311.. 85 I was amazed at how there is no comprehensive study of the intellectual effects of Dewey on Chen. Although these connections are neither direct nor explicit, Dewey’s 1919 lectures are virtually disregarded in discussions of Chen’s political theory. Lee Feigon’s biography Chen Duxiu is a novel contribution to the field of early CCP history – but Feigon allows only 4 pages in his biography to the intellectual relationship between Dewey and Chen. Needless to say, this amount of space does not give enough credence to the lasting effects of Dewey’s lecture through the end of Chen’s life. For the sake of readability – as this is the only full-length English-language biography about Chen – Feigon may have not decided to include something that seems tangential. Schwartz’s Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao permits Dewey less than one paragraph about Dewey and the formation of broadly, CCP theory, but more specifically, Chen’s political trajectory. Interestingly enough, Meisner’s Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism allots the most pages to Dewey’s influence out of these three books. A fairly obscure doctorate dissertation from 1974 by Ma King- Cheuk entitled “A study of Hsin ch’ing-nien (New Youth) Magazine, 1915-1926” allots 5 pages to “The Influence of Dewey” under the chapter heading “The Development of the Split between the Liberals and the Marxists on HCN, May 1919 – February 1921.” 86 Edward X. Gu, "Who Was Mr Democracy? The May Fourth Discourse of Populist Democracy and the Radicalization of Chinese Intellectuals (1915-1922)," Modern Asian Studies 35, no. 3 (2001): pp. 589-621. Cheung 50 liberalism in both a political and social sense that served as an important precedence for the leftist leaders to disseminate among the population.

Dewey’s arrival in China heralded a new era of political and ideological exchange – an elevation from the mere economic parasitism that had classified the West’s capitalist- colonization of China. 87 In speaking to a country with a broken morale, especially in the wake of WWI, Dewey was careful in balancing praise and critique of the Chinese context.

The important precedence set by the ancient establishment of both the dynastic and the

Confucian systems to the Chinese had a determinate tinge over the way of modernization of this country. America’s advantage during the colonization period was the ‘fresh start’88 they had in unchartered territory, actually physically leaving behind “[Europe’s] old culture.”89 Dewey cited the historical context of European warfare in the 17th and 18th centuries, class antagonism and general social discontent90 as reasons why the settlers

“parted from their families, they forsook their property, they abandoned many of their habits and customs, they left all that was familiar to build new lives for themselves in a strange land.”91 The necessity of change could not be realized in Europe because of the long-standing tradition of social stratification, so therefore a geographic, physical shift was necessary. The social and political elements that pushed early European settlers out of the

Old World in search of something new closely mirrored the historic elements that immediately preceded Dewey’s lectures here. The Qing Dynasty’s abdication of power in

1912 reflected the fact that the rulers themselves had no faith in their ability to govern.

87 Not to exclude Japanese and Russian colonial possessions, like those in Manchuria. 88 Native Americans excluded. 89 Dewey, The Development of Democracy in America; a series of lectures delivered in Chiang-su in 1919, 5. 90 ibid.: 7. 91 ibid.: 4. Cheung 51

This distinguishes the contemporary political situation from the relative strength and stability of the European governments during the rise of American colonies – which made a geographic shift even more necessary for settlers in America. “The westward movement [of early European-American settlers], by natural selection, produced a population more willing to forsake the old and familiar, more disposed to seek the new, more receptive to the idea of reform.”92

Despite the fall of the Qing, the Beiyang Government barely passed as representative or adequate to serve the needs of a changing tide in China. Its leader, Yuan Shikai, and his army still, “fit traditional modes of Chinese political and organizational behavior … the warlord phenomenon of the 1916-27 period was also the result of an immediate break- down of class structure and of social and political institutions other than military…”93 After

Yuan’s death in 1916, the already evident factionalism of competing warlords resulted in an extremely uncertain and unstable governing politics for the country. Although Yuan had desires to set up a more fair and representational government, his reliance on his military might did not serve the true interests of the May Fourth revolutionaries. Although there is a parallel between early settlers to America and May Fourth participants, Dewey realizes that geographic re-placement would not address May Fourth’s concerns of reshaping their country, instead of abandoning it as the European settlers did.

Although Chen’s May Fourth was in part a reaction against the parasitism of the

Versailles Treaty, his focus and employment of scientific language was directed towards a more sociological point, rooted in ordinary members of the population. He believes science

92 ibid.: 5. 93 Stephen R. Mackinnon, "The Peiyang Army, Yuan Shih-k'ai, and the Origins of Modern Chinese Warlordism," The Journal of Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (1973): 405-423. Yuan even wanted to be called a new emperor, but settled for a less imperialistic and totalitarian title of President of the Republic of China. Cheung 52 is “useful to practical life,” because it is oriented towards the future, and is based in physical evidence; the Beiyang Government was “revering only the [dynastic] history and making no plans for progress and improvement.”94 This future-oriented scientific vision could not be constructed without a proper examination of the current realities at-hand.

Disillusionment through imagination is a loud warning from Chen, as he characterizes imagination to “overstep the realm of objective phenomena, and then discard reason itself.”95 The bleak reality of a damaged Chinese morale post-WWI is an example of an objective phenomenon that needed to be addressed in a more modern fashion that was unafraid to challenge the authority figures responsible for such a demoralizing treaty. The suffocation of intellect and pragmatism in deference to traditionalism held the prospect of an elimination of the country “by natural selection because of failure to adapt to the environment.”96 Chen disparaged the status quo by criticizing the Chinese scholars total lack of knowledge of “science” – which is defined as the “general conception of matter… [is the] sum of objective phenomena as analyzed by subjective reason, contains no contradiction within itself.”97 As noted in the biographical chapter, the Confucian system was riddled with internal contradictions that contributed to its failure. Tenets of

Confucianism were being subverted by their so-called adherents, and this philosophy became merely a hollow shell. Chen cites the European development of science and human rights to be the reason for their “supremacy…over other races,”98 which explains Chen’s

94 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839 -1923, 241. 95 ibid., 244. 96 ibid., 241. 97 ibid., 244. 98 ibid., 245. Cheung 53 later emphasis on a Western mode of polity in order to reclaim a sense of national honor post the 1919 Versailles Treaty.

Dewey’s comparison of the population of Euro-American settlers to contemporary

Chinese demographics showed not only a fairly developed understanding of the specificity of the Chinese situation; but it is also an attempt to include this ‘alien’ and ‘backwards’ nation in a modern hegemonic view of an international coalition of advanced countries.

Dewey does not immediately pigeonhole the entire Chinese population under a single ethnicity, and recognizes the challenges of unification in a state with one of the largest landmasses in the world with a variety of ethnicities.

The discussion of geography occurred in Dewey’s first lecture, and continued through the following two lectures, “Freedom, Equality, Individualism, and Education in

American Democracy” and “The Social Aspects of Social Democracy”. The negative political associations of China after Yuan and the warlords were interpreted as a catalyst for a total revolution that would bring about conditions necessary for a more liberal sphere. There is a similar reliance by Chen and Dewey on what is the most “natural” course of action and policy for a country – especially if the country’s goal is towards liberalism. This “nature” is not conceived as a universal standard across all countries, instead it is highly dependent on the situational context. Nature serves as a combination of a country’s history, coupled with its contemporary reaction to it. Just as Darwin’s natural selection adheres only to a broad dogma of survival of the fittest in a specific environment, the liberal-scientist theories of

Dewey and an early Chen also reflect the necessity of a context-specific practice of a universal dogma. In “Call to Youth,” Chen has faith that natural selection will rid the country of the “old and rotten,” and cites Bergson’s creative evolution theory: “[It is] plain Cheung 54 that those races that cling to antiquated ways are…disappearing … [whereas those] who seek progress and advancement are just beginning to ascend in power and strength.”99

The economic stratification that Dewey laments about European society has tinges of communism in it, and he justifies this economic equality through use of scientific language. He contended that it is “natural that the society they formed in the new land tended to be an egalitarian one.”100 Pragmatism’s definition of and realization of citizens’ natural tendencies and desires allowed for a philosophic fulfillment of living life. Dewey’s argument that it was the natural mode of social interactions to be egalitarian is a radical departure from world history that has been characterized by monarchs, oligarchs and dictators. Darwinian evolution, viewed in a social context, means the elimination of weak traits, such as hierarchical governments, and the survival of the strongest and innate traits, such as an egalitarian government that is based in science rather superstition and recognizes citizen’s rights.

The scientism of this language lent credence to Chen’s early Darwinian program that paved the way for Chen’s desire to move away from the superstitions of Chinese scholars.

In one of Chen’s earliest and most famous New Youth articles, written in 1915 entitled “Call to Youth,” Chen explicitly criticized the Chinese scholar class’ lack of scientific education:

“[They] do not know science” – superstitious, critique of their belief in “auspicious signs…miracles from dry skeletons…five elements…yin and yang.”101 In the philosophy of

Western pragmatists like Dewey, scientism made a natural fit with this system. Even before

99 ibid., 241. 100 Dewey, The Development of Democracy in America; a series of lectures delivered in Chiang-su in 1919, 5. 101 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839 -1923, 245. Cheung 55

Dewey, Chen’s readings in French scientific literature, such as Henri Bergson,102 informed his incendiary article, “Call to Youth,” which exemplified his excitement about the boundless potential of a new generation, informed by a more scientific and pragmatic view.

The difficulty103 in connecting Bergson and Darwin existed, but Chen’s ability to hybridize contrasting views is a precursor to his later roles as CCP leader to outcast Trotskyite. His future political stances were across the spectrum of parties – yet his later admonishment of joining any specific political parties attests to his fluidity and constantly evolving thought.

Chen’s use of Darwinian language reflected Dewey’s broad program of modern pragmatism based in the advancements of science. Dewey emphasized innate propensities and natural abilities in a population as the most basic elements to instilling social change.

Chen in turn adopted such a scientism in his language, even after his conversion to

Marxism a year after Dewey’s lectures. Lenin develops Marx’s original anti-scientific stance in a 1905 piece, where,

Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which everywhere weighs down heavily upon the masses of the people, over burdened by their perpetual work for others, by want and isolation…Those who toil and live in want all their lives are taught by religion to be submissive and patient while here on earth, and to take comfort in the hope of a heavenly reward. But those who live by the labour of others are taught by religion to practise charity while on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploiters and selling them at a moderate price tickets to well-being in heaven. Religion is opium for the people. Religion is a sort of

102 Bergson was a French philosopher (1859-1941) most noted for his pioneering work in the field of “process philosophy.” Process philosophy believes in the dynamism of the world, and heavily relied on theories of evolution to support these claims. Interestingly, Bergson has nearly identical birth and death dates as Chen, being 20 years Chen’s senior, and dying one year before Chen. This age similarity must have contributed to Chen’s confidence in a revolution based on principles devised by people his age. 103 Apparently. Paul-Antoine Miquel opens his 2007 article exploring the intellectual relationship between Darwin and Bergson, “At first glance it seems impossible to reconcile Bergson and Dawrin.Paul-Antoine Miquel, "Bergson and Darwin: From an Immanentist to an Emergent Approach to Evolution," SubStance 36, no. 3 (2007): 42-56. Cheung 56

spiritual booze, in which the slaves of capital drown their human image, their demand for a life more or less worthy of man.104

Science, as viewed as one of the defining developments of modernity, can also be viewed as antithetical to Chinese superstitions, which the May Fourth movement attempted to eradicate.

Dewey’s “natural tendency” also fits nicely with Marx’s Hegelian view of history. The ultimate goal of history as an egalitarian state, whether it is through the construction of a

Deweyan liberal democracy or a Stalinist-Leninist socialist-communism, speak to Chen’s hopes for the future of his China. Lenin would argue that the Deweyan liberal democracy is an incomplete realization of the ultimate historico-future goal,105 but Dewey’s lectures came before Chen’s exposure to Lenin’s works. The necessity of a federal government was another “natural” element to the rise of a modern country. A federal government – at least until the achievement of Lenin’s state without government106 – was the only way to operate a country in order to best address all the needs of all the people. The failure of Kang Youwei and late-Qing reformers to fully address the necessary changes that had to take place in

China in order to propel her into modernity showed just how radical the changes needed to be. Working within the system would not be enough as the system was, using Darwin-

Dewey terminology, “unnatural.”

104 "Socialism and Religion," in Marxist Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/dec/03.htm. 105 “No, democracy is not identical with the subordination of the minority to the majority. Democracy is a state which recognizes the subordination of the minority to the majority, i.e., an organization for the systematic use of force by one class against another, by one section of the population against another” Lenin, The State and Revolution,. 106 “We set ourselves the ultimate aim of abolishing the state, i.e., all organized and systematic violence, all use of violence against people in general… In striving for socialism, however, we are convinced that it will develop into communism and, therefore, that the need for violence against people in general, for the subordination of one man to another, and of one section of the population to another, will vanish altogether since people will become accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social life without violence and without subordination” ibid.. Cheung 57

Overall, Dewey prescribed a minimalist government to reflect the self-governing systems of the earliest European settlement colonies in America, which contrasted with the mega-empire and micro-managed Communist International. “The need for a stable federal government created a difficult problem”107 in the wake of the growth in the colonies.

Dewey particularly cited “dissatisfaction both with the political practices and arrangements, and with the state of religious affairs”108 as the main elements that encouraged the growth of a sort of federal government, one which had the means to address these problems. In that sentence, Dewey could have been outlining the exact social conditions that preceded the fall of the Qing and the rise of the GMD and CCP parties as reactionary parties that rose against the superstition and the traditionalism that plagued the Confucian dynastic system. Lenin’s criticisms against capitalism are not antithetical to

Dewey’s economic system. Throughout his three China lectures, Dewey included a discussion of capitalism’s role in the life of education, the development of the citizen as an individual, or as any other sort of tangential support to whatever the lecture’s main theme is. Exalting capitalism as an economic system is never Dewey’s goal in these lectures, rather it is to promote the socio-political life democracy affords its citizens. He mentions the

(capitalist) economy as the fourth and final element to democracy, because it “demands the right of every man to a decent standard of living.”109

The necessity of establishing a base standard of living is one of emerging modern government’s main concerns. Dewey’s use of capitalism as the best way to secure a “decent standard of living” contrasted with the deplorable ‘standard’ of life in Russia before, and

107 Dewey, The Development of Democracy in America; a series of lectures delivered in Chiang-su in 1919, 8. 108 ibid.: 7. 109 ibid.: 3. Cheung 58 during, the rise of the Bolsheviks. Qu’s account of his time in Russia attests to this fact – he expresses great gratitude for his steady income from his post as a foreign professor among a country ravaged by famine and political unrest.110 Dewey did not see the capitalist system as parasitic and exploitative – especially considering how the US embarked on a massive two-year relief campaign of Russia111 in the wake of the 1921-23 famine.112 Rather, Dewey views capitalism as the best economic system to compliment all the social securities and comforts garnered by a democracy. A strong economy not only secures its citizens, but also strengthens the nation as a whole. Dewey was against a country’s self-assertion through taking up arms because it would just “create an hallucination as to national power.”113 This can be read as the mark of the beginning of Chen’s inner tensions between a peaceful or militaristic approach to a revolution. Throughout the early to mid 20s, there was tension within the CCP regarding the militarism of the GMD. The CCP’s focus on the development of propaganda would be expected of a party that was founded by the propaganda-heavy

Soviet Union, but the method of dissemination – peacefully or forcefully – was contested.

The CCP-GMD split was evidenced in the organizational structure of the Whampoa

Academy, a GMD military academy, funded by the Russians, that opened in May 1924.

Whampoa, as with every CCP or GMD organization during this time, had heavy involvement

110 In her doctorate biography of Qu, Li notes how the food served at the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Russia was at the “malnutrition” level, but “much better than that eaten by the average Russian at the time.” Plain white rice became a “feast for those Chinese in Moscow” Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), 60-61.. 111 Bertrand M. Patenaude, The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 8187. Patenaude makes an argument for the indispensability of American aide to Russia during this time, and its direct effect in ameliorating the potential death toll of this famine. 112 This famine was not caused by natural disasters, but rather due to the Soviet Union’s collectivization of grain, known as prodrazvyorstka. 113 Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899-1924, 181.. Dewey is not so idealistic as to completely disregard the necessity of the “armed forces, since these exist to defend the nation against foreign aggression” Dewey, The Development of Democracy in America; a series of lectures delivered in Chiang-su in 1919, 10.. Cheung 59 in both the military and propagandistic training elements – but there was a clear CCP-GMD split between positions. GMD Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was the first commandant of the Whampoa military academy, whereas Zhang Guotao, a CCP member, was head of the propaganda department. Both these roles are instrumental in the entire process of communist indoctrination – a process that seemed to fill the educational void left by the abolishment of the examination system, at least for CCP members. CCP members can be generalized to represent the more educational, ideological side of the political revolution, whereas GMD members represented the militaristic, strong-armed stance. Revolutionary propaganda had to maintain a fine balance between a strictly Chinese and strictly Soviet program.

The Impact of Deweyan Thought on Qu Qu may or may not have been in the audience for Dewey’s lectures, but his intellectual circle involved people who would have attended these lectures. As noted earlier, Qu was initially in praise of the contributions Dewey brought to China, probably as influenced by Chen and other leading May Fourthers. There are no sources of Qu’s writings in 1919 in response to Dewey, but in 1924 he publishes a critique against the scientism and pragmatism of Dewey’s approach to social reform.114 The mid 1920s is also when the adoption of a formal United Front between the CCP and the GMD is signed, and Chen’s relations with the Comintern start to show signs of strain. Qu is not as easy to accept the benefits of pragmatism like Chen. Qu’s generation marks the followers of the May Fourth movement, most of them at university-age; Chen’s generation marks the older leaders of the movement. Because Qu was not as politically active as Chen in the tense international

114 A full translation of this article is not available in English. Cheung 60 moments immediately following the end of WWI, he was never disillusioned by the panacean powers of Western democracy, capitalism and overall modernity. Qu is skeptical of broad importation of a directly translated version of pragmatism, or any Western convention because he believed in the true uniqueness of China – where a truly revolutionary philosophy needed to be developed and implemented. In his lectures, Dewey directly addresses the need for hybridization of any foreign imported ideology, expressing the same concerns as Qu: “each country must develop its own political structures, institutions and ideals. Any attempt to follow in the footsteps of another country, or to adopt political patterns which have evolved in other situations, is foredoomed to failure.”115 For Qu, revolutionary philosophy implies reliance on some sort of general theoretical basis like Marxism or Liberalism, but with specific modifications to address the specific problems at hand in his country. Qu’s fervent propaganda work from 1923-27, especially in touting the superiority of the United Front Policy, shows his political concerns with the application of Marxism to the country’s own affairs. He actively publishes Marxist critiques of Chinese revolutionary events to show how the broad and international program of Marxism can be applied to local and domestic affairs. Qu’s prevailing “gentry consciousness,” something he came to admit never left him, could be viewed as preventing him from taking many of the radical socialist egalitarian views Chen advocates.

Chen’s Conversion to Marxism and the Role of the Comintern Although the Western European model of modern polity was the object of Chen’s initial attractions, his conversion to Marxism can be predicted because of two events: the

115 ibid.: 14. Cheung 61 imperialist powers’ welshing of Chinese rights at Versailles, and the overwhelming support of the Comintern in establishing the CCP. One can even indirectly attribute the enabling of the official establishment of the CCP in July 1921 to the departure of both Dewey and

Bertrand Russell from China. The acceptance of American ideals to the Chinese intelligentsia during Dewey’s two-year stay shows a sort of Chinese desperation for any sort of social and political ideology that could catalyze the next “evolutionary” step for

China.

Chen’s status primarily as a general political leader rather than as a Marxist theoretician shows how from its initiation, the CCP did not have a solid theoretical base for the programs it was pursuing in the name of Marxism. Chen did not personally enter active political life until his election to the post of Secretary-General of the CCP at the First

Congress in 1921. The early CCP relied on figures that specialized in Marxist theory, and this began with Li Dazhao,116 but with time, Qu Qiubai’s expertise became clearly superior to any other Chinese revolutionary’s. In 1920, Qu was even able to recognize that

[the Society for Socialist Studies under Li at Peking University] thinking was as vague as watching the morning mist thru a screened window. We were confused by the different socialist schools, and were not quite clear about the definition of socialism…none of us at that time was a real socialist in the strict sense.117

Comintern’s Role in the Rise of the CCP As Russia become more cognizant of China as a developing international force – notably in the Far Eastern country’s large population, land mass and natural resources –

Moscow began sponsoring the intellectual development of the burgeoning Chinese

116 Li Dazhao (1889 – 1927) was born into a peasant background, but was able to receive a classical education, and even studied abroad in Japan from 1913 – 16. Two years after his return from Japan, he established the Marxist Research Society at Peking University in 1918, which was later broadened to the Society for the Study of Socialism. Since Li worked at the University the same time Chen was there, he and his society were instrumental for Chen’s introduction to socialist ideas. Li’s impact is discussed later in greater detail. 117 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 37. Cheung 62 intelligentsia class – a population recently freed from the shackles of the imperial examination system. The pursuit of a Comintern program occurred from 1919 to 1943, with the invitation of various international socialist and communist parties. China’s

Nationalist Party (GMD) was not invited in 1919 because it had just been founded that year, and news of its founding was probably scarce in Russian headlines, although its dedication to socialism was codified in their founder, Sun Yat-sen’s, “Three Principles of the People.”118

The GMD was founded without any Comintern fiscal, material or ideological aide, but the

CCP was completely dependent on the Russian hand to help establish itself as a party in

China in the early 1920s, and was persuaded to join the Comintern in 1922.119 Maring,120 one of the first significant Comintern representatives to China, arrived in Shanghai in 1921 to shape and achieve a Soviet agenda in China. He wanted to turn Li Dazhao and Chen’s

Socialist Youth Corps121 into an actual political party, to encourage CCP and GMD collaboration, and to meet the leader of the GMD, Sun Yat-sen. These three these missions were necessary to the survival of a Communist party in China because of the GMD’s mounting superiority in financial, military and membership seemed insurmountable for the

118 Issued in 1905 after Sun travelled abroad to liberal-democratic regions such as Western Europe and the United States. 119 Bruce A. Elleman, "Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China," Modern China 21, no. 4 (1995): 457. 120 Maring was Hendricus Sneevliet’s . Born in Holland May 13, 1883 and joined the Dutch Socialist Democratic Party in 1902. With the outbreak of WWI, he sympathized with the extreme left and already having joined the Bolsheviks, he moved to the USSR in 1920. His 1918 work under the Comintern included the establishment of the Indonesian Communist Party – so in 1921, the Comintern chose him again for the Asian affair of establishing a Communist Party in China. In 1924, he returned to Moscow from his years in China. He continued in revolutionary affairs – even siding with Trotsky – until his death by the German Nazis in April 1942. 121 This study group underwent three name changes between 1918-20. Li Dazhao established the Marxist Research Society in late 1918, then in December 1919 the group was broadened to include socialism as the Society for the Study of Socialism. Then in 1920, members regrouped to form the Peking Society for the Study of Marxist Theory. The purpose of this/these groups was not to organize uprisings among the working class (like what Lenin would have suggested), but rather to simply discuss the prospect of a Chinese adaptation of any sort of leftist government. Cheung 63

CCP. The GMD’s military might, especially under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would come into light after the 1926-28 GMD victory at the Northern Expedition.122

The Comintern task of discerning which Chinese political party, the CCP or the GMD, would best serve its interests was necessary to achieve Comintern hegemony to battle the imperialism of Western capitalists. One of the founding principles of the GMD123 was that socialism was a reaction against the malicious effects of exploitative foreign capitalism; the newly-formed CCP had very little independent policy apart from Maring’s suggestions. The lack of CCP independence becomes glaringly obvious with the ratification of a United Front policy at the Third Congress, June 1923.124 This United Front policy, heavily denounced by

Chen, yet advocated by Qu, called for the assimilation of CCP members into the then- predominant GMD party. Party numbers from July 1921 show the glaring discrepancy: the

CCP had only 56 registered members, whereas the GMD had over 200,000.125 After advocating and succeeding with the United Front Policy, Maring returned to Moscow in

1924. This policy, despite repeated attempts by members of the Comintern, left-wing GMD, and CCP alike, failed in bringing about an alliance between the parties. Although there are only fragments of available documents126 about Chen’s personal denouncement of the

122 The greatest effect of the Northern Expedition was the dissolution of the Beiyang Government, but it failed at its attempt to unify the country under GMD rule through displacement of warlords. Warlordism continued to be a problem for China through WWII. Chen had mixed feelings about the Northern Expedition, believing it was over-demanding of the peasant population only to result in a bourgeois rule as he had been suspicious of Chiang Kai-shek’s intentions since the young general’s ascension to prominence. (see Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 142.). Chen supported it because a unified country was also a goal of the CCP. 123 The GMD has three founding principles (also called San-min doctrine) as outlined by Sun Yat-sen in 1905. They are nationalism, democracy and socialism. 124 The date of the founding of a United Front policy differs – some scholars use this date of June 1923 at the Third CCP Congress. Others, such as Bruce A. Elleman, sets the date earlier to 1922 because Elleman believes it better explains the friction between the GMD and the CCP Elleman, Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China, 451. 125 ibid.: 453. 126 See historiography section on the difficulty of obtaining Chen’s writings in English. Cheung 64

United Front Policy until his “Appeal to all the Comrades of the Chinese Party” in late 1929, the strict terms of this arrangement were to the total detriment of the CCP.

The United Front Policy was initially read as a way for the CCP to appease Moscow in order to get more funding and general support for their wobbly new party, yet the results were severe against the health of the CCP. The CCP did petition from 1924-27 to withdraw from the United Front, but was repeatedly denied permission by the

Comintern.127 An April 1922 letter by Chen to the next Comintern representative, Voitinsky, shows this initial trepidation about the United Front, where CCP members in places like

Beijing, Shanghai and Wuchang were “absolute not in favor” of the United Front Policy because the GMD was only “fighting for power and profit,” rather for a true socialist revolution.128 The terms of this policy stipulated that CCP members become GMD members, and generally forge stronger ties with the GMD, despite ideological differences in their parties. Successive Comintern figures, like Voitinsky129 and Bukharin130 both rejected

Chen’s pleas. By July 1925, relations between the GMD and CCP became very polarized, and the GMD demanded the dissolution of the CCP in order to show their party’s absolute devotion to a revolution led solely by the GMD. 131 The Northern Expedition was the first major event of GMD betrayal of the United Front – in 1927, Chiang launched a violent purge and execution of CCP members who had joined the GMD. Despite this purge of Communists from the GMD, the Comintern refused to accept responsibility for this violence and loss of

127 ibid.: 451. 128 ibid.: qtd 458. 129 Served in China as the Comintern Representative from 1920-24, 1924-25, and 1927. 130 A leader in Executive Committee of Communist International (ECCI) from 1919-28. 131 Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965, 141. Cheung 65

CCP lives. Trotsky’s support of the CCP during this debacle paved the way for Chen’s attraction to Trotskyism after his own expulsion from the CCP in 1929.

The Comintern’s establishment of the Communist University of the Toilers of the

East (KUTV) in 1921 and Sun Yat-sen University in 1925 – both located in Russia – provided an intellectual home where the Comintern could teach a codified Marxism to an international student audience. The opening of KUTV was contemporaneous to Maring’s arrival in China, which precipitated the official founding of the CCP in July of that year. The simultaneous efforts of the USSR to inseminate propagandistic ideology both on their soil and abroad show the conviction of the Third International to a worldwide phenomenon of socialism. Chen never attends either university nor receives any formal, Soviet-approved training in Marxism like Qu does. I believe Chen’s educational inadequacy can be excused because he is operating completely without precedence in his leadership roles of new, post-

May Fourth culture, new doctrine, and new political party. Chen though did have close associates who took Marxist study very seriously – including Qu. The rapid and impatient pace that seems to characterize revolutionary movements speaks to the irrepressible enthusiasm of the leaders, but also the absolute pertinence of inciting change.

The trend of Russian involvement in Chinese politics continues until the rise of Mao, but Comintern clout begins to wane once the Chinese Communists become more cognizant of the Comintern’s inability to appropriately deal with the issue of political upheaval in

China. The Comintern’s hesitancy over assuming the problem of the peasant population, among other political blunders, showed the obvious point that popular support is more important. Mao’s peasant revolution was more relevant, and exposed the true frailty and misunderstanding of a foreign-based program such as the Comintern. CCP and GMD leaders Cheung 66 alike saw the economic and ideological benefits of allying with the Russians, especially in the wake of the success of the of 1917. The achievement of the first socialist revolution in world history gave legitimacy to Comintern advice, at least initially.

The Peak of Chen’s Marxism

The most blatantly Marxist language Chen exhibited was in his 1933 protest to

Kiangsu High Court.132 This was written in response to his arrest by the GMD in October of the previous year for breaking the “Special Decree Against Endangering the Republic” and

“betraying the state.”133 Chen’s protest used the most orthodox Marxist syntax and phraseology – which suggests Chen still held the belief that Marxism served as adequate justification of authority for even a Chinese audience. Although the GMD was not based in

Marxist ideology, the opposite of the foundations of the CCP, Chen still showed his faith in a universal, or at least statewide, respect for Marxism. In ‘33, Chen had already been expelled by the CCP and felt great tension and contradiction in his alliance with the Chinese

Trotskyists. Both these socialist parties were rivals of the GMD, and were based in Marxist theory, but the CCP used a Leninist-Stalinist interpretation whereas the Trotskyists used an interpretation espoused, by . Each interpretation held various advantages in

Chen’s eyes; he partially allied with the Trotskyists (never believing in their actual potential) but still found great satisfaction with any defined party’s interpretation and application of Marxism.

Chen flipped the charges raised against him by the GMD on to the greater governing body of the Comintern, as well as the GMD’s blind deference to the Comintern. “The GMD

132 To my knowledge, the only English translation of this document is in a handwritten form at the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University. The anonymous translator prefaces the document by acknowledging the awkward nature of the translation. 133 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Cheung 67 charges are contrary to what I do and think,”134 and the GMD has betrayed a nationalistic allegiance to their fellow countrymen’s party in order to secure GMD favors. Because the state of his political allegiance to the CCP and Comintern was non-existent by this point,

Chen was finally able to voice his opinion on how these charges were unfairly pressed on him. The charges against Chen point to a level of desperation by the GMD, especially since the revolution had reached a stagnant point – especially with the tension between new revolutionary recruits from either the rural or urban class. In what Chen believed to be the misplaced funds and faith by the Comintern on the GMD are attacked, Chen criticizes the nationalist campaign of the GMD, based on the fact that there has been no Chinese

“resistance towards these foreign [Japanese] invasions” that have swept “one-fifth of the whole territory of China.”135 Chen laments the inconsistency of a so-called nationalist party that breaks Chinese sovereignty by overthrowing the CCP: “[The GMD] overthrows and dispenses another party or group which is in power can not be termed as State-union…

[and] betrayed the state several times.136” Chen believes the GMD itself is endangering the republic by polarizing the country among the partisan line between GMD and CCP.

Chen passionately maintained his innocence throughout the Protest, and used socialist ideological terms to highlight the bourgeois identity the GMD maintained. Chen charged the GMD for hating democracy, republicanism, liberalism, dissent; and for loving imperialism, oppression of the masses, threatening the republic, and authoritarianism. “I am not guilty of any crime. What I am guilty [of] in the ‘crime’ which consists in persistently supporting the national interests and the interests of the majority of toiling masses, and

134 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. 135 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. 136 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Cheung 68 which offense Kuo Min Tang.” Chen’s maintenance of the importance of dissent, which has its roots in Dewey’s lectures, is notable especially because of Stalin’s total muting of anything contrary to the party line. Chen’s value for dissent is rationalized by very Western liberal ideas of free speech, ones that he picked up through his readings of the French and

American Revolutions. Dissent was also important for Marxist dialectical materialism, where change can only happen through synthesis because ideas are always in flux, depending on context.137 Dissent was especially important as a mode of ascertaining historical change in the Marxist “base” of a society. The Marxist base’s change is then reflected in the superstructure, which is wholly determined by the status of the base.

Speaking out against the superstructure, which was represented by Stalin and the

Comintern, the GMD’s perception of the United Front, should theoretically have had progressive, Hegelian synthesizing effects. The case of Trotsky versus Stalin mirrored

Chen’s battle against the GMD because Trotsky and Chen used similar ideologically-based arguments against the treason charges levied against them. Trotsky and Chen shielded themselves against defamation by their relative superstructures on this Marxist ideological basis.

Chen’s Marxist language in his protest to Kiangsu High Court is reminiscent of a combination of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, among others prominent in international Marxist development. Chen’s almost tiring repetition of “the toiling masses of workers and peasants” works to align him obviously with the joint audience of urban and rural people and to emphasize the class struggle between the masses of the workers against the bourgeoisie. It also aligns him with the other prominent people who used the

137 "Marxism and Ideology," [cited 2011]. Available from http://www.colorado.edu/English/courses/ENGL2012Klages/marxism.html. Cheung 69 same phraseology for the same purpose, like Mao,138 Lenin,139 and Trotsky.140 Major criticisms of Chen’s socialism came against his favoritism of specifically the urban proletariat as leaders of the revolution instead of both the urban and rural populations.

This favoritism of the ‘enlightened’ urban class has its origins in the New Youth era where he relies on the youth and intelligentsia to lead the new culture movement, which eventually evolves into the socialist movement.

Chen remains a faithful adherent to dialectical materialism through the end of his life, and this continued view is evident in this protest. He “devoted [himself] to the cause of the revolution,” allied with the “anti-imperialistic proletariat,”141 because he recognized the moral and economic superiority of the world revolution, especially as compared to the warlordism and colonial victimization that had affected China as a state under the “yoke of imperialism,”142 as most obviously manifested in the first two decades of the 20th century.

The “internal conditions” and contradictions of China were reflections of the warlord-ruled, broken economy that needed to be replaced by socialism. The CCP sought “equilibrium between the production and consumption through the common agency of society,”143 in order to eradicate the competitiveness of capitalism that is detrimental to a society’s unity.

The “toiling masses of workers and peasants…of national emancipation are streaming

138 See "A Letter from the Chinese Worker's and Peasant's Red Army to Our Brothers the Soldiers of the White Army on the Subject of the Forced Occupation of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialism," in Marxists Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_13.htm. It is interesting that he would choose the same very recognizable words as Mao in this 1931 work, because Chen is very consciously detaching himself from the party at this point after being ostracized. 139 See "The War and Russian Social-Democracy," in Marxists Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/sep/28.htm. 140 See "Appendix: Manifesto of the Congress of the Georgian Soviets to Workers of the World," in Marxists Internet Archive [database online]. March 3, 2007 [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1922/red-white/appendix.htm. 141 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. 142 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. 143 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Cheung 70 together” in the form of Chen’s CCP to fight against the GMD’s “[guidance of] the countrymen to the complete moral bankruptcy and sheer shamelessness.”144

Chen’s choice of this Protest to exemplify his Marxist tendencies reflects his deep- seated anti-GMD, anti-Comintern tendencies. Chen was using his knowledge of Marxism to assert the CCP’s supremacy and purity of their socialist cause, especially in contrast to the bourgeois orientation of the GMD. At this point, he is still defending the CCP, more specifically, his leadership of it, because of the GMD’s charges of inadequacy against him.

Chen believed in his own consistency in advocating a true socialist revolution, and the removal of agency by the GMD’s stratified and hieratic approach attacks one of the core principles of a socialist agenda. Chen attested that he,

advocate[d] persistently and openly that the people should, by means of their own strength, enlarge their own organization and armament, that the revolutionary war of national emancipation against the imperialism should be waged for the purpose of solving the northeastern question and carrying out the national independence.145

The assertion of individual’s impetus continues from Dewey through to the 30s. Chen’s pursuit of a pro-individualistic line shows the lasting impact of Dewey’s liberalism, even in the context where Chen is defending something as opposite to Dewey as Marxism.

Although Qu’s study of Marxism was much more thorough than Chen’s, Chen’s ability to synthesize seemingly polar schools of political thought of Dewey and Marx/Lenin clearly points to his political prowess and intellectual capacity. Qu’s formal study of pro-

Russian socialist texts afforded him a different approach to the study of communism, one that followed more orthodox lines and mirrored more closely the intellectual progress of

Russian Marxist scholars themselves. In their assertion of the supremacy of Marxism, they

144 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. 145 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Cheung 71 both treated the same points: the problem of adapting a Western mode of thought,

Marxism, to China’s particular socio-political context, and the role of a selectively-free individual in this history-driven natural world.

Qu Qiubai’s Critical Role in the Chinese Understanding of Marxism Nick Knight’s comprehensive in China: From Qu Qiubai to Mao

Zedong, 1923-45 includes a thorough analysis of four main figures of the CCP. Knight begins with Qu, rather than how this paper began with Chen, as the spearhead of Marxist thought and development in China. This approach is equally valid as Qu was a greater theoretician than Chen, and spent much of his political career in the CCP developing content for party members. Knight allots three chapters to Qu’s Marxist development (whereas other figures get one or two), and makes a thorough investigation into Qu’s contributions to the Chinese understanding of Marxism. Knight’s treatment of Qu’s politics is very insular, as he does not pay much attention to contemporary events, especially the polarizing influence of the

Comintern, especially in regards to relations between the CCP and GMD. Nonetheless,

Knight’s work pulls together orthodox Marxist texts with Qu’s interpretation of them – especially along the lines of historical and dialectical materialism, and citizens’ agency and freedom. The “Sinification of Marxism”146 remains a problem through to Mao, but Qu’s

Russian skills and passions for literary study – of figures from Plato, Turgenev to Bukharin

– sets the theoretical foundation for the intellectual and practical success of a Marxist revolution in China.

Qu exhibits early tension between materialism and idealism; the former is defined as “the subjective as built on objective reality,” the former as “the objective as constructed

146 Nick Knight, Marxist Philosophy in China: from Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong, 1923-1945, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 102. Cheung 72 on the basis of the subjective…philosophically erroneous…and [reinforces] social inequality.”147 Qu defends materialism, and uses it as an attack against the superstitions and religiousness of the past of his country. Materialism also tends towards “a scientific mode of thought,”148 which stands in contrast to religion generally. Through the scientism of Chen and his Marxist reading of Dewey, the materialism of science is more reliable, present, and necessary for the rise of this type of socialist government. The tangibility of materialism reflected the pervasiveness of socialism: materialism was an inseparable, necessary facet of our living in the natural world; the socialist revolution rose from all the proletariats, stemming from their realization of the internal contradictions of their hieratic society. According to Qu in the mid 20s, communism is inevitable and has a teleological purpose: “[communism] establish[es] the objective correctness of a particular view of social development, one which predicted the ultimate realisation of a very particular sort of social organization.”149 Communism is a “firm prediction guaranteed by scientific reading of the objective character of society,” and a “communist society of reason and justice in which class contradictions and class moralities no longer existed” is a manifestation of

“materialist philosophy.”150 The mid 20s is when Qu and Li Da – another CCP Marxist theoretician who did extensive translations of Russian works in Chinese – work together to present a comprehensive Marxist philosophy to the party. By framing it in teleological means, Qu and other principal CCP theoreticians showed that this movement was inevitable. Despite the telos of this argument, Qu still maintained some level of autonomy for citizens at the individual level. Knight cites Qu’s reading of Hegel, and Qu’s contrast

147 ibid., 35, 37. 148 ibid., 36. 149 ibid., 48. 150 ibid., 51. Cheung 73 between Marx and Hegel.151 Marx holds a level of “objective correctness” as opposed to

Hegel’s German idealism and absolutism of the Geist over the individual, time-bound citizen. Qu’s rise of a socialist revolution was Hegelian on a broad, narrative level – yet it operated according to Marxist standards.

China’s lack of an explicit pre-revolutionary capitalist stage that prefigures the socialist revolution set it on a different political trajectory than Russia. Despite this lack, Qu still discussed the evils of capitalism throughout the 20s – while recognizing its necessity as a preliminary step of historical significance in order to prepare the way for socialist revolution.

The capitalist system, like all previous economic stages, was an historical phenomenon, and the development of its productive forces and the progress of its class struggle would lead to its ultimate elimination…[a] firm prediction guaranteed by scientific reading of the objective character of society…A communist society of reason and justice in which class contradictions and class moralities no longer existed [as manifestation of] materialist philosophy.152

Chen’s critiques against capitalism were not as fervent or as Marxist-informed as Qu’s. As noted earlier, Dewey’s focus during his lectures were not a defense of capitalism, rather, just a promotion of liberal democracy.

Qu’s treatment of Western sources for his Chinese audience is pedantic and has an air of superiority, which is similar to Chen’s initial fears of introducing such progressive ideas to a “backwards” audience in China. Nick Knight’s book, Marxist Philosophy in China:

From Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong 1923-45, argues that Qu completely rejected the “possibility that Marxist philosophers in China could [understand] Western philosophy,”153 and that

151 ibid., 49. 152 ibid., 51. 153 ibid., 87. Cheung 74

Western European philosophers were really the greatest and most advanced example of intellectual thought. The Chinese population was so intellectually stunted according to

Knight’s reading of Qu that any Eastern philosophy was inferior to the likes of Hegel and

Immanuel Kant.

Like Chen – especially as influenced by Dewey’s reading of citizenship – Qu believed in the power of the individual. Qu peculiarly defined “freedom” as the human ability “to achieve their goals,” and is a realm where “laws of nature do not apply, but one in which those laws, particularly those of cause and effect, are known and acted on.”154 The individual as a single person does not have much impact on the course of historical events, as socialism is a movement that ripples throughout the population. Qu’s “individual” was similarly influenced by Western sources as is Chen’s “individual,” but Qu drew on more philosophic sources. By 1923, Qu “was conversant with the philosophies of Plato, Spinoza,

Descartes and Hume…and was capable of making fine philosophical distinctions.” Using a

Hegelian-Marxist viewpoint of the individual, Qu defined the base as the “materialistic belief that social life, as with nature is governed by natural laws,” and that individuals are always part of an aggregate, bound by the constraints of their time and culture and its laws.

The human will is not free either due to the principle of historical materialism, and is

“subordinate to the laws that govern social phenomena.” If there were such a thing as total freedom on an individual-by-individual basis, there would be no meaningful connection between individuals in a society. Qu even applied this detractive view of the individual to

Lenin himself. One of the ideological departures from Marxism-Leninism that Stalin made was the universalizing of historical materialism. Qu and Lenin’s treatment of the

154 ibid., 54. Cheung 75

“individual” definitely minimized its importance, and favored one’s capacity for a cultural- historical impact. Qu, a great Lenin enthusiast, even discredited the significance of Lenin himself, but in his “Outline of Social Philosophy,”155 called him an “no hero, no great man, but the instrument of the world proletariat of the 20th century.”156 Qu believed the

“greatness” of such impactful figures like Marx and Lenin is “derived from [their] capacity to comprehend the historical changes set in motion by the emergency of industrial capitalism and articulate these in a manner which could inspire the working class a widespread desire for change.”157 The emphasis on socio-temporal context as the key to success, either ideologically in the case of Marx, or politically in the case of Lenin, was truly the marker of an individual’s ability to make impactful change. This is the Marxian theoretical basis of the preliminary stages of a socialist revolution, where humans as a group are causes of the stages of first a bourgeois-democracy. The final stage of a socialist- revolution is made historically available through the preparatory steps of the bourgeois- democracy. This final stage is also more optimistic for the individual, as Qu believed it

“enhanced human agency, a society in which collective and conscious action would have a greater impact than in the class societies of the past.”158

Conclusion As evident through the comparison of Chen and Qu’s approaches to historical and dialectical materialism, the notion of the individual and the problem of defining the Chinese audience, many subtle yet significant ideological differences arise. These differences show how Chen and Qu’s intellectual interests were different, especially since they occupied

155 I believe this was published in 1924, but it is not clear Tian, Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism, 103. 156 Knight, Marxist Philosophy in China: from Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong, 1923-1945, qtd 61. 157 ibid., 61. 158 ibid., 64. Cheung 76 various roles in the CCP – and therefore their interests and writings had to serve these particular roles. Qu’s status as theoretician for the CCP led to an intellectual approach, where a range of readings from Western philosophy and Russian political tradition informed his interpretation of the Chinese situation. His conclusions required a far stretch in order to apply them to the present, as his Hegelian notion of history and the individual cannot be observed in the present. Chen’s interpretation of society, as informed by a pragmatist such as John Dewey, had much more timely applications. The problem of parsing personal affinities from public duty remains, especially for Qu as it is difficult to reconcile his idolatry of both Western and Chinese sources. Cheung 77

Shaping the Chinese Literary Revival Introduction The utmost importance of the role of propaganda is obvious for fostering the emergence of burgeoning political parties. Marxist propaganda was especially important in laying the foundation for the formation of the CCP, especially since this was an emerging concept in the efforts of early CCP members. Chen and other May Fourth associates were instrumental in introducing the concept of democratic revolution, and Qu’s generation followed suit in embellishing and adapting Marxism for the age and place. Promoting

Marxism was not the initial goal when Chen and Qu began their public literary endeavors – instead, they responded to the change of international tides, from American President

Woodrow Wilson and WWI to the Russian uprising of the Bolsheviks. The progression of their writings were informed by international politics, especially as a way to assert China’s relevancy in a new modernity with the emergence of the political paradigm of Western democracy versus Russian socialist-communism. It is important to note their age gap of 20 years, and therefore, the roles they played in the CCP in an analysis of their writings. Since

Chen was older than Qu, his concerns, and therefore writings, address similar problems as

Qu did regarding the development of a truly 20th century China – free of backwardness – yet their responses were informed by different contemporary foreign and domestic events.

The emerging state of Marxism during the era of mature political development of

Chen and Qu posed problems for them in ideological assimilation. Coming from a dynastic Cheung 78 tradition of heavy-handed hierarchical stratification,159 Chen and Qu faced a radically differing ideology that espoused the ideal of egalitarianism – from Deweyan democracy to the Soviet Comintern. Their interests in these new political ideologies were manifested most clearly in their writings, which translated into desire to reform the entire scope of style and content of the traditional Chinese literary tradition under the banner of revitalization and reinvention. The literary interests of Chen and Qu began with their early desires to reform the Confucian education they themselves had endured. The inaccessibility of classical education stemmed from not just economic barriers, but also the inapplicability of the Confucian tradition to a modern age. Those intentions translated into a desire to reform the entire scope of style and content of the traditional Chinese literary tradition. Classical literature such as the Four Major Classic Novels (some of Qu’s personal favorite reading) seemed antiquated in an age of political and social upheaval of the 20th century.

Chen, as the older of the two, popularized the use of revolutionary magazines, most notably his pet project of the New Youth and Qu followed close suit for a time, until he developed a supposedly more “orthodox Marxism,” that conformed to party lines better than Chen’s Deweyan-informed liberalism did. The problem of defining an appropriate audience for such a radical cultural move affected Chen and Qu’s approach to a literary revival. Defining, in addition to appropriately communicating with this audience was another element to the eventual rift that occurred between Chen and Qu regarding CCP policy. Their recantations in part can be predicted through a rhetorical analysis of the

159 See previous chapter on their political developments, for a discussion the origins of their revolutionary stances as originally rooted in anti-traditionalism. Cheung 79 stages of their writings – which are informed by their reactions to social and political changes on both the Chinese and international stage.

Chen had early ambitions of revolutionary leadership, which can be traced to his first literary magazine established in in 1904. The magazine’s goal of popularizing the use of the vernacular (bai hua) for written works is echoed in his 1915 establishment of

La Jeunesse. Chen’s revolutionary pursuits extended far beyond the literary world, holding the belief that reform to Chinese culture should not be reduced to just reform of art and literature.160 Chen’s involvement in the development of the burgeoning CCP is invaluable, with a 21st century comrade161 even citing the CCP’s continued indebtedness to the “early twentieth century’s man of the hour.”162 Even the Chinese Trotskyists – of which Chen had a tumultuous relationship from their inception in the late 20s to early 30s – held his national contributions of engendering a social and political revolution in high esteem.163

This early reformist attitude of Chen and Qu endured throughout their lives, and had a direct effect on the mission and method of their political campaigns. Not just the

Confucian education system, but also the dynastic mode of governance itself were broken beyond saving. Instead, both Chen and Qu proposed the wholly foreign concepts of egalitarianism and Marxism to China. They strove to make this new literature accessible

160 Duxiu Chen and Gregor Benton, Chen Duxiu's Last Articles and Letters, 1937-1942, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 86. Although this passage can be read as criticism against Qu’s plan of the 30s which was wholly anchored in reform of Chinese culture through art and literature, I do not think Duxiu would have been so pointed in criticism against a comrade who met such an unceremonious death at the hands of the GMD. 161 General . 162 ibid., 150. 163 See ibid., 121-26. for Gao Yuhan’s eulogistic work on Chen’s contributions to the CCP. This text shows that the Chinese Trotskyists held onto hope that Chen would have come back to their party if had not died so soon. This is consistent with one of the prevailing contemporary historical interpretation that if Chen had lived long enough to develop his post-CCP political beliefs, it would be an articulation of the return to orthodox Marxism-Leninism, see ibid., 11.. Cheung 80 and applicable for an audience based in the masses, under a dual banner of revitalization and reinvention of Chinese literary and cultural works.

Problems of Using Literature as Propaganda The democratization of literacy was a foremost concern for Chen and Qu. With over tens of thousands of Chinese characters, full literacy was virtually impossible, especially for lower classes. The expenses of education sometimes outweighed the importance of labor to the family, so very rarely did the working class attain an education of adequate literacy – for example, it takes knowledge of a few thousand characters to read a newspaper. The dynastic emphasis on the importance of a good education though complicated this decision for families of the lower-class, highlighting the tension between practical economics and dynastic ideals. Chen and Qu shared an immense appreciation for their classical education, which became the initial target of their social critiques on late Qing and republican China.

Knowledge of the morality espoused by Confucian classics164 led to dissent against the society it prescribed. They differed regarding the exact constituents of a literary revolution in China, but both agreed on its necessity. Chen’s leadership of the highly intellectually- based 1919 May Fourth Movement contrasted with Qu’s post-1931 hopes and plans for an exclusively proletarian-led “people’s own cultural [revolution]”165 – even though Qu was a staunch supporter and active participant of the May Fourth Movement. As Qu developed a distinct public persona from Chen, he charged Chen’s May Fourth to be contrary to

Marxism, and attacked Chen’s (1) use of “the vernacular,” (2) assignment of leadership roles, (3) alienation of the rural population through its structural elitism, and (4) modes of

164 Among other sources, such as local religions, Buddhism, and Daoism. 165 Paul G. Pickowicz, "Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and the Chinese Marxist Conception of Revolutionary Popular Literature and Art," The China Quarterly , no. 70 (1977): qtd 314. Cheung 81 propaganda. One of the greatest differences and similarities lies in Chen and Qu’s treatments of education and literacy. The former used foreign references, the latter used domestic references in his works – but they were both working towards the goal of promoting a new Chinese, yet internationally-informed, polity.

Despite their proclamation of democratizing the entire system, neither man’s works can be considered wholly democratic or universally accessible due to choices in either an overly strict stylistic adherence to the Chinese classical style, or content of obscure references. The use of foreign references in Chen’s works immediately alienated a large percentage of the population – those who had not studied, especially studied abroad. Qu’s poetics trumped Chen’s less imaginative works – but that cannot be credited to an inadequacy in Chen’s learning or ability. An example of such poetry can be seen in one of

Qu’s writings from when he was aged 21, from circa 1920:

I was born at the beginning of the twentieth century, truly a new era in Chinese history. China had slowly awakened from her sweet and pleasant dream to find the sun already high in the sky. But she lazily stretched herself with her eyes half open, still reluctant to rise.166

Qu held deep admiration for his country, even though it was still sleeping while other countries, such as Russia, were making great social reforms. Although China was “behind” in this respect, Qu still sees beauty in the country that stemmed from some sort of intrinsic appreciation for his home country.

Stylistic differences were caused by their respective attraction or repulsion to the classical tradition and each man’s current political role and purpose. As evident in Qu’s biographic history, education was expensive, and one usually had to earn a chance to study abroad. Despite the legal requirement of four years of school, by 1900, less than 20% of

166 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 3. Cheung 82 males and 3.5% of females in the working-age population of China had completed their schooling.167 Foreign references were obviously not included in the highly nationalistic program of the classical system, and studying abroad was limited to an even more select group within the educated class. In using foreign references, Chen wanted to assert intellectual authority and justification for his revolutionary ideas. Chen perceived intellectual inferiority in the Chinese population because they were unaware of many of the

Western ideals he introduced to them through New Youth.

Chen founded New Youth in as an outlet and form of dissemination of his views. The magazine quickly rose to prominence as the voice of the May Fourth movement – establishing plans of actions and ideological justification of the movement – prefiguring its later role as the voice of the CCP. He believed that written works, publications and periodicals should reflect popular opinion and be readable by those they are meant to represent.168 New Youth could be classified by three main stages: the first lasting until 1918 classified by an anti-traditionalist, anti-dynastic stance, the second lasting until 1924 classified by pro-socialism, and the last lasting until its shutdown in

1926, classified by its role as a sort of manifesto for the CCP. As a mouthpiece for the CCP, it became one of the distinguishing factors between the CCP and its rival revolutionary party, the GMD. Before its last Marxist phase, New Youth was accepting of contradictory viewpoints or different approaches to the revolution – it included writers such as Chen himself, Li Dazhao, and Hu Shih.

167 Evenlyn Sakakida Rawski, Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1979), 152. 168 A belief he borrows from Dewey’s view that government should represent the views and satiate the desires of the people. Cheung 83

The Use and Debate over Western European and Russian Influences The tension in Chinese politics before and after WWI heavily informed the movements of political upheaval in China since the results of the Great War reflected the ongoing tide of Western imperialism against the Far East. Chen founded New Youth

Magazine in September 1915 as an outlet and form of dissemination of his views, becoming one of the first magazines that voiced political concerns of the urban “proletariat.” As the reading of old classics faded into obscurity,169 new political vanguard magazines and relatively more accessible forums for discussion and debate appeared. China did not enter

WWI until two years after the magazine’s founding, declaring war on Germany in 1917 in attempts to assert international recognition. As disappointment set in after realizing the inadequacy of the concessions made in the Versailles treaty – most notably the Chinese land concessions to Germany and Japan – early Chinese revolutionaries were tasked with finding a new guiding hand that would aid their revolutionary goals. The magazine quickly rose to prominence as the voice of the May Fourth movement – establishing plans of actions and ideological justification of the movement – prefiguring its later role as the voice of the CCP.

From the founding to the cessation of New Youth, Chen had remained the principal editor of the publication. Chen’s editorial allegiances shifted the direction of the magazine into each of its three stages, and were instrumental in elucidating the changing political stance of the first CCP leader, Chen himself. He believed that written works, publications and periodicals should reflect popular opinion and be readable by those they are meant to

169 Qu, especially as compared to Chen, is an exception since he maintained a personal passion for them – despite his revolutionary activities. Cheung 84 represent.170 New Youth could be classified by three main stages: the first lasting until 1918 classified by an anti-traditionalist, anti-dynastic stance, the second lasting until 1924 classified by pro-socialism, and the last lasting until its shutdown in 1926, classified by its role as a sort of manifesto for the CCP. These three stages were not only a reflection of

Chen’s own political interests, but a reflection on the changing tides of the general revolutionary fervor in China, especially post-WWI. Before its last Marxist phase, New

Youth was accepting of contradictory viewpoints or different approaches to the revolution

– it included writers such as Chen Duxiu himself, Li Dazhao, and Hu Shih.

The May Fourth movement’s unequivocal rejection of the Chinese government’s authority and ability facilitated a paradigmatic shift in the mentality of the Chinese population regarding the potential of change. The nearly 4,000-year-old imperial system had fallen. Its republican replacement became ineffective after the death of its leader, Yuan

Shikai in 1916. The declaration of war on Germany in 1917 propelled China into WWI: a decision that inspired varied works of criticism, hope and praise.

Chen was deceived by his overzealous hope in the messianic potential of Western progress, as were many his many other leftist contemporaries. Being familiar with Wilson’s

Declaration of War on Germany in 1917, Chen idolized Wilson as China’s American ‘big brother’– a country that clearly held enough diplomatic clout to lead liberalization movements for China if it so desired. Wilson’s audience included “world peoples,” “nations great and small,” and “men everywhere,” which raised hope in people like Chen of the potential victory of the Allies in WWI. One of Wilson’s most notable lines from the

170 A belief he borrows from Dewey’s view that government should represent the views and satiate the desires of the people. Cheung 85

Declaration of War is, “The world must be made safe for democracy,”171 which struck Chen as a principle for rectifying the contemporary conservative wrongs of his home country’s government. After realizing that democracy was not imported to China along with Western capitalism, the beginning of Chen’s theory that idea dissemination was the key to provoking change in a stagnant and defeated country.

The public announcement of the Versailles concessions, which did not address any of the Chinese requests, especially regarding the long-contested Shantung Province, made

Chen and other Westernphiles turn away from the potential of Western leadership in their revolution. In giving Japan the previously German controlled Shantung Province,172 Wilson directly went against the fifth point in his 1918 Fourteen Points Speech, which states:

A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.173

Disappointment in Wilson’s ideals for international peace and democracy led New Youth towards a new thematic era after 1919. The initial four years were centered on an attack against Confucianism and an advocacy of democracy, but this next era turned to socialism and Marxism.

171 "War Message to Congress, 2 April, 1917," in World War I Document Archive [database online]. Provo May 29 [cited 2011]. Available from http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson%27s_War_Message_to_Congress. 172 The Washington Conference (1921-22) made a qualified return of Shantung to China, but that was too late to re-instill faith in Chinese leaders. The Soviet Union had already sent their first Comintern representative in 1919, and the First CCP Congress already adjourned in 1921. 173 "Fourteen Points Speech," in Wikisource [database online]. July 23 [cited 2011]. Available from http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fourteen_Points_Speech. Cheung 86

Personal Writing Styles The inaccessibility of Qu’s writings lay in their obscure references to historical

Chinese myth and history: knowledge he gained through his schooling in preparation for the exams, and personal study. His highly advanced knowledge of Marxism – no matter how much he denied it in Superfluous Words174 – also alienated him from the majority of the revolutionary population. Marxist texts were barely available in Chinese in the early

20s, so Qu’s command of Russian – or any foreign language – isolated him intellectually. His

1920 journal, L’Humanite (jen-tao),175 had a heavy dose of the Chinese classical style (wen- yen) with obscure references to Chinese history. 176 Wen-yen stands in direct contrast to the vernacular style (bai-hua), which Qu comes to promote. Although the magazine was promoting socialism, Qu’s understanding of the necessary elements of bringing about a socialist society were obviously still developing in the 1920s due to his mannered writing style. A student from the University of the Toilers of the East177 (KUTV) recalls how Qu made a conscious decision in separating himself from the students through his “very genteel” dress, speech and lodgings. 178 He became increasingly acquainted with Marxism and its emphasis on the role of the proletariat during his two-year stay in Russia.

Nevertheless, upon his return to China in early 1923, he continued dressing in a genteel manner, and asserted quiet superiority over his students at Shanghai University.179

Whether this was a refusal (conscious or unconscious) to let go of the Confucian power

174 For laments on his own failures in the advancement of Marxism among the Chinese, see Qu and Greenbaum, Superfluous Words, 175 Which only published one issue in 1920 before it was shut down by the authorities for promoting socialism. 176 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), 32. 177 Qu taught at the KUTV as an additional source of income during his first trip to Moscow. KUTV was established in 1921 under Stalin. 178 The student was named Qin Diqing (Ch’in Ti-ch’ing) ibid.qtd 70. 179 Shanghai University opened in the Fall of 1923, and Qu was chosen as the Dean and also Chair of the Sociology Department. Cheung 87 dynamics between student and teacher or an outward expression of intellectual authority,

Qu persisted in distinguishing himself from others. Although Qu’s actions of drawing a clear line of demarcation between him and an “inferior” class of students could be viewed as anti-socialist, it could also be interpreted as a manifestation of the role of the Bolsheviks in the : the importance of a higher class of revolutionary leaders.

Operating on the former interpretation of Qu’s internal contradiction as the reason for his behavior at KUTV, one could predict his preference for a bourgeois life in Superfluous

Words.

Qu’s disunion between public and private writings contrasts with Chen, who maintained a consistent style throughout his publications, employing a standard expository style. No sources suggest Chen experimented as much with poetic references, or any poetic style at that. He did not refer to any revolutionary poetry, which echoes Bukharin’s call for an exclusion of poetry from the Soviet program.180 This contrasted with Qu’s poetic style evidenced in writings such as Journey to the Land of Hunger, that included highly descriptive language and other embellishments. In addition to intrinsically enjoying the tropes and style of dynastic literature, it must have served as a type of grief counseling for

Qu because his mother gave him his initial introduction to it during his earliest years of education. As a member of the gentry class, his mother had knowledge of Chinese history, poetry and classics, and could engender her children with this cultural heritage. Although women did not have equal access to education as men did, Qu’s mother fulfilled the

180 A Comintern representative to China from the USSR. See "Poetry, Poetics and the Problems of Poetry in the U.S.S.R." in Marxist Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/bukharin/works/1934/poetry/index.htm., which is published in 1937. It’s interesting that Bukharin so adamantly opposes poetry, yet during his imprisonment under Stalin, he wrote nearly 200 poems. Cheung 88 classical expectation of a housewife’s basic knowledge of Chinese history, poetry and the canonical texts. By age 4 – before entering a formal school –he had already learned poetry from the Tang Dynasty, and he stated his favorite Chinese novels were Romance of the

Three Kingdoms,181 and Dream of the Red Chamber.182 The death of his mother brought forth the rise of Qu’s criticism on Confucian family structure in addition to the normal pain of losing one’s only parent. Around 1915, when Qu was 16, he wrote a poem in mourning for his mother: “in poverty, I can no longer regard kin as kin,/I acquire nothing but new traces of tears on my blue gown./Now, who will show concern for the hunger and cold/Of the departed parent’s beloved child?”183

Chen’s main language tropes and imagery reflected his understanding and adherence to the Soviet program, and eventual denial of the USSR. The artistry in Qu’s works is one of the main distinguishing factors between himself and Chen. Qu’s enthusiasm and use of his classical literary training stands in contrast to Chen’s long-standing hatred of the “lifeless eight-legged essay.”184 Although Qu produced standard party documents during his tenure as head of propaganda at Whampoa Military Academy in the mid-20s, he maintained personal journals throughout his political career. Qu was chosen for this post

181 A novel which mixes history and myth, by Luo Guanzhong in the 14th century. His opening line is one of the most famous and well-read in Chinese late imperial literature: “It is a general truism of this world that anything long divided will surely unite, and anything long united will surely divide,” as an immediate commentary on the ebb and flow of the dynastic system, but could also be read as a reflection of Qu’s critical view of the Confucian clan organization. 182 One of the Four Great Classical Novels which every Confucian student was expected to read, it exemplifies the pinnacle of the vernacular tradition (which became during the 14th century) during the Qing Dynasty. Its author, Cao Xueqin, was a member of an aristocratic family – which afforded him the experiences of 18th century Qing luxuries that he so vividly paints in his novel. In the 1920s, the field of ‘redology’ was established; whose sole focus is the study of Dream of the Red Chamber. Although criticized by C.T. Hsia for a “dense style” and lack of “comparative aesthetics” Andrew H. Plaks, Archetype and allegory in the Dream of the red chamber, (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 269. is a book which offers a broad introduction to the various influences such as historical mythology and contemporary events that shaped modern Chinese literature. 183 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 15. 184 Kagan, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Unfinished Autobiography, 307. Cheung 89 because of his studies in Moscow, the capital of Marxist thought in Russia. These works at

Whampoa for the party are in standard Marxist rhetoric – which stood in stark contrast to his personal writings. Qu was a life-long poet, using the classical poetic style as a medium through which he could express his own feelings about the quickly changing international scene. This lyrical and descriptive style was evident beyond his poetry in his books and magazine articles. Qu produced three books, the first two from his years living in Russia, and the last from his final jail term: Journey to the Land of Hunger, A History of the Heart in the Red Capital and his final work, Superfluous Words. Whether he had intended these to be published remains open to question185 – particularly since his language is so reminiscent of the loquacious literary past.

Despite this refutation of traditionalism, especially traditionalism in government, he entertained adherence to various religions, most notably Buddhism, as a way to inspire educational and social change:

My interest in classical studies led me to the ambition to reform such studies through a revival of the "Modern Text School." My attempts at solving life's problems through Buddhism resulted in another ambition: to humanise Buddhism and practise altruism as contained in the idea of Bodhisattvahood (p'u-sa-hsing). These were the vain and boastful wishes of a young man, but they epitomized the dualistic view of life evolved in my solitude.186

Qu’s religious interests seem to have encouraged a more academic and internalized pursuit.

Prefiguring the desire for a “cultural” revolution, Qu saw a deep connection between religion and culture. Even into the 30s, Qu entertained the possibility of using Buddhism as

185 Especially compared to Chen’s autobiography, which was written with the explicit intention to further a Marxist agenda in a publicly accessible sphere. 186 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 21. Cheung 90 a “cultural” way to “save China.”187 Qu comes to abandon Bodhisattvahood as a way to help others, and turns to the secular, yet cult-like Soviet politics to help others. Like Chen, Qu was heavily influenced by various social movements around him – but he was a much different revolutionary since he holds firm to certain tenets of Chinese religious or literary historical periods despite his public involvement in revolutionary politics. Qu repeatedly reported on his preference for the solitary life in his autobiographical writings, but the

“whirlpool” of May Fourth “swept [him] into its vortex, [and his] solitary life was broken.”188

The Rise of Anti-Confucianism In The Post-WWI Era China’s entry into WWI furthered Chen’s pre-existing interest in the political ideologies of the Allied states. Initially his focus was on the democracies of France and the

US. It later became the transition from a czarist to socialist Russia. Because Chen began investigating Western liberal ideas before his exposure to Marxism or Russian socialism, a version of the Deweyan program informed any future interpretation of different political systems. Chen’s 1915 article, “The French and Modern Civilization,” was featured in the first issue of his revolutionary magazine, New Youth. In it, he lauded France as the “leader and creator of modern civilization,” through its “marking a new era in human thought and society. These are the ideas of human rights (renquan), evolutionism, and socialism.”189

Chen’s references to Lafayette, Seignobos, Babeuf, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Darwin and

Lamarck in this one article show his early predilection for justification through foreign

 187 Merle Goldman, Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 104. 188 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 25. 189 Chen, The French and Modern Civilization, 55. Cheung 91 examples. In using a diverse population of Western thinkers, where the first five listed were French political theorists, and the latter two were natural scientists, Chen showed his belief that ‘Mr. Democracy’ and ‘Mr. Science’ were the most effective and intelligible path to modernity. Modernity could only happen through the “marking of a new era in human thought and society,” 190 a difficult task in a country on the brink of “elimination by natural selection because of [its] failure to adapt to the environment.”191 Mr. Democracy and Mr.

Science became Chen’s mascots for the Western-inspired revolution, as anthropomorphized symbols of progressive ideas and action. Although Chen eventually moves away from Deweyan inspired ideals of democracy and science towards a more

Russian-socialist agenda, Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science serve as the first sign of Chen’s literary attempt to both popularize and familiarize Western reform ideals for China, especially as a viable alternative to the stagnation of the period between the fall of the

Beiyang and the rise of the CCP and GMD.

Chen’s 1916 New Youth articles, “The Constitution and Confucianism”192 and “The

Way of Confucius and Modern Life,”193 attacked Confucianism and its “suffocation” of the population’s impetus to awake from “its long dream” and liberate the “intellect, in discarding resolutely the old...and refusing to be contaminated.”194 Confucianism had long fallen from its pedestal of superiority in the eyes of the revolutionaries like Chen or Li

Dazhao, but others like Qu maintained some faith in its value. Ever since Chen’s introduction to classical texts due to his obligation to his clan and class, Chen was

190 ibid.: 55. 191 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839 -1923, 243. 192 Published in Oct 1916, vol 2, issue 3. 193 Published in Dec 1916, Among numerous other anti-Confucianism articles he published – these two were chosen because they are the only ones I could find translated into English. 194 ibid., 240 quote slightly modified. Cheung 92 disdainful of and repulsed by their “lifeless” nonsense.195 Chen criticized everything about the education system, including its content of the eight-legged essay and the Four Books and Five Classics,196 and its delivery by his abusive opium-addicted grandfather. Chen’s description of the exam city’s atmosphere, exam halls and test candidates are harrowing and graphic, yet they can also be hilarious. Chen paints an image of the stifling exam rooms, where “the air became dead...the heat of the cooking fires plus the heat of the blazing sun overhead turned the long passageway into a fire alley.”197 Chen had experienced physical discomforts throughout his journey to the Nanking examination hall. But the encounter of the “fat candidate from Hsuchow who stood absolutely naked except for a pair of broken shoes on his feet and a big pig-tail coiled on top of his head” epitomized

the whole strange phenomenon of selecting men of talent by the examination system. It was just like an animal exhibition of monkeys and bears performing every few years; and then I pondered whether this system was not as defective as every other system in the nation. This meditation of a couple of hours determined by activities for the next 10 or so years. Although I had unwillingly taken the provincial examination, I unexpectedly received great unforeseen benefits from it.198

Notions of the appropriate leaders of a proletarian revolution first overlapped between

Chen and Qu, but Qu later found Chen’s line to be neither revolutionary enough nor fast enough – which interestingly enough, was Chen’s own criticism of the Russian model in the late 1910s. Before May Fourth and Chen’s rise to prominence, in his writings we see greater patience for action and ideological shift to happen.

195 Kagan, The Chinese Trotskyist Movement and Ch'en Tu-Hsiu: Culture, Revolution and Polity, see 182, 187 for Chen’s charges against traditional forms and subject matter. 196 They are considered the authoritative texts of Confucian teachings, selected during the Song Dynasty (r. 960-1279). The Ming (r. 1368-1644) and Qing (r. 1644-1912) dynastic examination system was based around knowledge of these texts. The Four Books include Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects and Mencius. The Five Classics include Classic of Poetry, History, Rites, Changes, Spring and Autumn Annals. 197 ibid.314. 198 ibid.314. Cheung 93

Chen directs his anti-Confucian calls for modernization to a young and educated audience. Widely regarded as an outline of the founding tenets of the New Culture

Movement, “Call to Youth” sets forth the principles of independence and individuality, progression, aggression, cosmopolitanism, utilitarianism and scientism,199 for “calm consideration” by the youth of China. In the pre-war years, Chen found no fault in these

Western ideals, seeing them as the only way China could catch up to the rest of the world.

The elevation of the individual along the same vein as the French and Americans during their 18th century revolutions gave real historical possibility to a revolution in China that was similarly centered around and rose from the people themselves. In order to achieve a revolution of the people, Chen defined what characteristics were necessary in this set of people. “What is needed is for…youths…to use the full natural intellect of man, and judge and choose all the thoughts of mankind, distinguishing which are fresh and vital and suitable for the present struggle for survival.”200 The process of change is intellectually complicated, involving an assimilation of wholly foreign ideas in the indigenous and

“backwards” population of China. Chen’s definition of “youth” is not limited to those physically young, but rather those not stuck in the “old and rotten” ways of dynastic tradition. Chen’s youthfulness is a term contrary to Confucianism, due to its dynamism and plasticity in its “self-awareness and [willingness to] struggle for survival.”201 The Confucian teaching of respect for one’s elders is evident in the Classic of Filial Piety,202 or in the

Analects.

199 Although “Call to Youth” prefigures Chen’s later development of “Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science,” these explicit terms did not appear until a 1919 New Youth article by Chen. 200 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839 -1923, 240-41. 201 ibid., 242. 202 "The Classic of Filial Piety," [cited 2012]. Available from http://www.chinapage.com/confucius/xiaojing- be.html. Cheung 94

The fall of the dynastic and Confucian systems meant there had to be an establishment of alternative ways to justify authority. It was comparatively simple before, where dynasties were established through family lineage; Confucian teachings clearly stated the primacy of a patriarchal structure and respect for elders. In a modern society that was moving towards a bottom-up government meant these top-down modes of authority were no longer applicable, nor consistent with the broader program of these

Chinese revolutionaries. Chen and Qu both use their superior knowledge of foreign references, Western European, American and Russian alike, to assert their authority over the masses. The establishment of such authority by means of foreign education made revolutionary and vanguard publications like New Youth more legitimate.

Both these leaders needed a way to separate themselves from the masses in order to assert intellectual authority during what they considered a crucial transitional period.

During this time, Chinese political history was riddled with supposed ‘leaders’ of the country who repeatedly failed in asserting a Chinese identity. Chen needed a literary style that would legitimize his position as leader of a revolutionary tide, without being patronizing or pedantic. Chen hailed these Western thinkers as modern and progressive – two qualities that he found alarmingly absent in the Chinese population, a problem that originated in the limitations of the Confucian system. This reliance on the more intellectually-evolved Western thinkers was consistent with Chen’s Darwinian program, and that allowed for Qu to use his and the population’s long-standing reverence for dynastic tradition as a legitimizer to his power.

Chen needed a literary style that would legitimize his self as leader of a revolutionary tide, without being patronizing or pedantic. Chen hails these Western Cheung 95 thinkers as being modern and progressive – two qualities that he finds alarmingly absent in the Chinese population, a problem that originates in the limitations of the Confucian system. Qu uses his and the populations long-standing reverence for dynastic tradition as a legitimizer to his power. The unabashed authority of the teacher in the Confucian student- teacher relation was unquestioningly accepted – even among a population of Chinese scholars studying something as non-traditional as Marxism.

The Literary Revolution’s Audience and Enlightened Leader The question of the audience of the New Youth Magazine and potential members of this vanguard political party of the CCP persisted through Chen’s career. Explicitly defining the proletariat class, especially whether it would consist of the rural, urban or both – was surreptitiously addressed through the content and style of both Chen and Qu’s writings throughout their careers. The lack of conviction in establishing a set audience can also be seen in their approaches to their posts in the party. The schism between urban and rural proletariat groups – even just the geographic difference – affected any sort of educational outreach plan of a CCP leader. Chen remains consistent in referring to Western sources through his communist writings, although he did shift from France and the United States to

Germany and Russia as intellectual and ideological sources. Chen’s continued reliance on foreign references throughout his life – even if he moved away from Western European writers towards Russian – is evidence to his disillusionment with Chinese thinkers. His closest associates for a while, such as Li Dazhao and Qu Qiubai, both similarly relied on foreign works to build their revolution and political party.

Qu did exhibit a distinct stylistic shift towards easier to comprehend language to more closely reflect the CCP goal of recruiting greater numbers from the working classes, Cheung 96 and the greater Marxist goal of achieving a proletarian ruling class. The reorganization of

New Youth in 1923 brought Qu greater editorial clout, which further necessitated the shift of his personal literary style. Upon his return to China, he was a contributor not just to New

Youth, but also The Guide Weekly and The Vanguard – two other highly influential socialist urban magazines in China, the former being another publication project of Chen and Li

Dazhao. New Youth’s 1923 socialist manifesto was “[to be] a proper guide to Chinese social thought and an intellectual weapon for the Chinese proletariat” and “the compass of the

Chinese proletarian revolution.”203 Qu’s material alienation exhibited during his teaching stint stands in clear contrast to his solely-proletarian literary revolution of the 30s.

New Youth launched an anti-Confucian, pro-vernacular campaign in 1916 to establish “a republican constitutional system based on independence, equality, and freedom,”204 which boosted readership from the mere hundreds to 16,000. 205 Perhaps the ineffectiveness of Chen’s 1915-1921 articles can be explained by his constant reference to foreign intellect. Although it could be viewed as an effective way of asserting authority, it was used in writings that were meant to combat the very origin of these authorities. Chen’s articles were ineffective in that they did not motivate the “masses,” in an objective sense of pure numbers, because they were written. As noted earlier, literacy is difficult to achieve, especially regarding the complexities of the Chinese script. The problem of identifying the target population of a revolution persisted throughout the pre-Mao years of the CCP, and was a point of contention between Chen and Qu. The early CCP wrangled between targeting a literate and semi-intellectual urban class, or an uneducated rural class that would have

203 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 115. 204 Feigon, Chen Duxiu, Founder of the Chinese Communist Party, qtd 116. 205 ibid., 116. Cheung 97 limited access to the urban centers of revolution; or between the young and old. There were equally valid ideological defenses of using either group in the revolution, Chen and Qu both left the party before any consensus was determined.

Chen and his New Youth contemporaries had clear intellectual superiority over the masses in China, and use this knowledge in a variety of ways to instill a revolutionary mindset in the population. Chen wants to be a bridge between Western innovation and

Chinese backwardness; and import the principles “of human rights and equality,” “without any distinction between superior and inferior,” to China.206 In 1916, Chen still shows his belief that China may be actually inferior to the rest of the world:

we Chinese are a lower race, with a culture very different from that of the white people, and that we cannot successfully force ourselves to imitate them. I would disagree in my heart but could not argue…207

So although Chen was still Chinese by birth, he used his broad education as a justification for his leadership in an intellectual movement. He believed the masses are too ‘stuck’ in the feudalistic and outdated culture of the old, therefore a revitalized and Western-minded leader was necessary to disseminate the viability and advantages of these ideas. Chen wants to create a microcosm of world change through his own leadership of China.

Education of the masses should be thoroughly republican, so “we must completely awaken to the fact that Confucianism is incompatible with this new society, new country, and new faith, and still have the dauntless resolution to proceed.”208 Initially, only certain

‘enlightened’ leaders have this courage, and therefore must convince the masses that such a radical shift is absolutely necessary to the modernization of China. New Youth, although

206 Angle and Svensson, The Chinese Human Rights Reader: Documents and Commentary, 1900-2000, qtd 72. 207 ibid., 73, emphasis added. 208 ibid., 74. Cheung 98 claiming to be the mouthpiece of the revolutionary movement, Qu later came to charge it with elitism in its bourgeois-democratic nature.

Qu similarly believes in the necessity of an “enlightened leader” to catalyze the revolutionary movement. In a 1919209 article published in New Society, Qu believed that leaders of China’s revolution should be of the intelligentsia class and already indoctrinated in the tenants of socialism.210 Contrary to Marxist historical materialism – this article was published before his trip to Russia and studies at the University of the Toilers of the East –

Qu esteems the subjective force of the individual in bringing about the socialist revolution; rather than the objective material forces of wealth and production. Without socialist leaders, Qu did not believe that the idea of a socialist revolution was innate in the population. Like Chen, Qu shared the belief that the “old and rotten” effects of traditional

Chinese society had permeated the masses too deeply. Although the return of Shantung post-Versailles Treaty showed China did have a level of international respect, but the coastal holdings of foreign capitalistic powers did remain. In a 1932 article entitled,

“Freedom for Literature,” Qu believes still in the intellectual limitations of the Chinese:

China’s emergent class, as well as that of Japan, England, etc. is of course still under the heavy weight of oppression. This is especially true of China’s emergent class, for the cultural constraints placed on them by the vestiges of feudalism are particularly tight.211

Qu describes three different classes in this article to establish the different necessary social roles in bringing about a revolution: the intellectual class, emergent class, and working class. Qu’s villanizing of the intellectual class does not mean he is against the work of the

209 Or 1920 article, the exact date is not known to me. 210 Paul G. Pickowicz, Marxist Literary Thought in China: The Influence of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 26. An English translation of this article, “Victims of the Social Movement” is not available. 211 Denton, Modern Chinese literary thought : writings on literature, 1893-1945, 379. Cheung 99 neo-literati like himself, rather, he finds the intellectual and cultural contributions as contrary to the desires of the masses. Qu does not explicitly define the constituents of the intellectual class, but he would probably include advocates of the Confucian social hierarchy and Chinese nationalists. An introspective quest for reform will be fruitless because indigenous “cultural constraints” prevent any real revolution from happening – necessitating the role of the “emergent class” as a hybrid of foreign ideals embodied in the new Chinese intelligentsia.

The emergent class is fighting for its own liberation, fighting to liberate the broad masses of working people; they want to reform this world, and reform themselves – reform the broad masses. They want to purge the ruling class of its intellectual influence, purge it of its influence in shaping consciousness. 212

The emergent class encompasses both Qu and Chen, since they had broken the cycle of blind adherence to tradition, coupled with a willingness to forge totally unchartered intellectual and political territory in a Far Eastern context. Qu, being twenty years Chen’s junior, finds the intellectual climate of China already extremely volatile, but in turn, extremely receptive to change and influence. Even at age 21, Qu records a more explicit observation of the peculiarity of the developmental stages of China.

I was born at the beginning of the twentieth century, truly a new era in Chinese history. China had slowly awakened from her sweet and pleasant dream to find the sun already high in the sky. But she lazily stretched herself with her eyes half open, still reluctant to rise. By the time when I was seven or eight years old, Chinese society had undergone a tremendous shake-up and showed an uncontrollable and very apparent tendency toward drastic change. Social life during my childhood was considerably influenced by this. By then I was already not a pure product of Chinese culture. The upheavals in economic life had brought about myriad changes. I was only one of them.213

212 ibid., 379-80. 213 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 3. Cheung100

The changes Qu mentions are in part caused by the efforts of Chen and other early revolutionaries (New Youth’s first issue was in 1915, when Qu was only 14 years old214).

Chen’s target audience of revolution was the entirety of China’s classes – whereas in reality it was unlikely he could reach such a broad range with the content and style of New

Youth.215 As evidenced in “Call to Youth,” among numerous other articles by the entire staff of New Youth writers, the youth would ideally form the revolutionary base for catalyzing and disseminating the movement among the less or non-literate masses. Many factors contribute to the youth’s inability to carry on the movement, such as too-deep roots in the

Confucian tradition, inadequate financial support, and apathy towards politics.

Nevertheless, Chen dramatized the youth’s conviction to the movement and their prominence in society to carry on the May Fourth movement. The invaluable involvement of the youth in Chen and Li’s Socialist Youth Corps, which served as a predecessor to the official formation of the CCP, gave Chen hope in the ability of the youth.

Rather than pursuing Chen’s overly idealistic plan centered on the youth, Qu developed a plan for a new and hybridized intelligentsia class in the 20s-30s, with a goal of providing a “revolutionary movement for colloquial literature.”216 Qu believed literature was the most effective to “alter philosophies of life and breakdown down social customs,”217 so he was in agreement with a revolution that approached their audience via literature. Although Qu had harsh criticism against the spirit of the May Fourth movement, he recognized the importance of precedence set by Chen in increasing the mental

214 Although Qu mother’s committed suicide this same year, Qu had not developed, and some may argue never develops, a stance as anti-Confucian and anti-classical as the initial years of New Youth writing. 215 New Youth was available in libraries and large towns – but editors did not make an effort to disseminate the publication among rural areas. 216 Pickowicz, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and the Chinese Marxist Conception of Revolutionary Popular Literature and Art, qtd 309. 217 Goldman, Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era, qtd 105. Cheung101 malleability of the Chinese population in accepting such radical ideas that stood in total opposition to the country’s historical trends. In Journey to the Land of Hunger, written when

Qu still thoroughly respected the efforts of the May Fourth movement and the rise of socialism in China as led by Chen and his comrades, Qu notes:

the ideological revolution as reflected in New Youth and the New Tides joined forces with the public sentiments in the student movement; and they together raised cataclysmic waves that shook through all China. The taste of colonialism, in its full bitterness, had never come home to the Chinese until [the May Fourth movement], even though we had already had the experience of several decades of foreign exploitation behind us. The sharp pain of imperialistic oppression then reached the marrow of our bones and it awakened us from the nightmares of impractical democratic reforms.218

Qu does not express explicit criticism of the May Fourth movement and the failure of the

CCP until the early 1930s. Before this, Qu was like many other urban revolutionaries during the May Fourth period – he supported the political direction espoused in New Youth and in

Chen and Li’s Peking socialist groups. Chen was a role model for people exactly like Qu during May Fourth – but Qu’s education and exposure to Russians in the early 30s contributed to his slow divorce from Chen’s ideas. Qu never attacks Chen directly for his inadequacies in leading a truly proletarian revolution, but it is clear from Qu’s political context that Chen was the obvious scapegoat and bearer of fault for failures in revolutionary practice in China. In 1938, Chen’s letter to Trotsky showed remaining bitterness over Stalin’s blind eye towards Chiang’s coup.219 Because in practice Chen’s audience was an intelligentsia class as led by more-or-less petty bourgeois and bourgeois intellectual authorities, Qu praised the practicality of this preliminary step – but advocated

218 Hsia, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's Autobiographical Writings: The Making and Destruction of a "Tender-Hearted" Communist, qtd 187-88. For an alternate translation, see Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 24. As noted in the historiography section of this paper, Hsia and Li almost always overlap in the passages they chose to translate from Qu’s Journey to the Land of Hunger. 219 Chen and Benton, Chen Duxiu's Last Articles and Letters, 1937-1942, 46, note 31. Cheung102 the necessity of moving past this stage towards mass leadership of a cultural movement.

Even during the height of his criticism, Qu never noted any ideological contradictions in

Chen’s movement; Qu’s objections were due to the actual application and structure of the

May Fourth era. In a 1932 article from Literature Monthly “There has been so much hollow chatter in the revolutionary literary world about popular literature and art and the popularization of [elite] literature and art, while, on the other hand, there has been no effective struggle,”220 due to the protracted stay of the bourgeois leaders. Qu’s criticisms are not well-founded through his own practices and are hypocritical against his own actions. His gentry way of dressing at KUTV and interest in the Chinese classics were clearly against his advocacy for proletarianism.

Qu’s revised seems even more out of touch with the actual condition of the masses of the laboring classes than Chen’s May Fourth. The state of the peasantry post-May Fourth did not change much, since Chen’s intentions at this point were mainly focused in changing the urban proletariat through exposure to the works of the urban intelligentsia. Educated people were naturally concentrated in urban areas where access to both local universities and opportunity for study abroad was higher. The May

Fourth movement did achieve a legacy of a degree of effective communication to the urban proletariat, as evidenced by the establishment of workers communes by the CCP. For the most part, rural workers remained a minority in the party program under Chen.

Qu, who briefly occupied the role of CCP leader from 1927-28, did not pursue any more aggressive peasant plan than Chen did, but he assigned more intellectual impetus to the working class in his version of a cultural revolution. Qu believed “the workers

220 Pickowicz, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and the Chinese Marxist Conception of Revolutionary Popular Literature and Art, qtd 300. Cheung103 themselves will study to the point where they can make use of their own language capabilities,”221 which is an idealistic call in itself. A working-class lifestyle did not afford individuals the time to pursue intellectual studies. The writing capabilities of an average individual were limited due to both the sheer number of Chinese characters and also the inadequate education requirements of the state, which many even aborted before completing. Cleverly, Qu did not specify whether these workers are rural or urban, and explicitly ignored the potential of the rural class to learn his written vernacular language.

Qu’s, and perhaps Chen’s anti-rural bias probably stems from Marxism’s prejudice against the role of the rural peasantry in a socialist revolution. Marx’s view on the peasants stands in contrast to Lenin’s acceptance of them.222 Lenin and the Soviet departure from the anti- peasant call of Marx shows how Lenin realized the necessity of adopting broad Marxist ideology to his country that was majority peasant. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx calls the rural life idiotic.223 Contrary to Marx’s disdain for the peasants, Lenin’s 1905 article,

“The Proletariat and the Peasantry” groups the workers and the peasants together as wholly instrumental to the success of the revolution. Although Lenin developed the theoretical and practical basis for the kadry, or professional revolutionaries, in this article, he was filling out the gaps of all types of people who were necessary to sustain the revolution.

Today the question of the peasant movement has become vital not only in the theoretical but also in the most direct practical sense. We now have to transform our general slogans into direct appeals by the revolutionary

221 ibid.: qtd 301. This article is from April 25, 1932, from the vanguard magazine entitled, Literature Monthly. 222 Marx’s strict so-called prejudice against peasants is a point of contention. See Michael Duggett, "Marx on Peasants," The Journal of Peasant of Studies 2, no. 2 (2008): 159-182. 223 “The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life” Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Cheung104

proletariat to the revolutionary peasantry. The time has now come when the peasantry is coming forward as a conscious maker of a new way of life in Russia. And the course and outcome of the great Russian revolution depend in tremendous measure on the growth of the peasants’ political consciousness.224

Practically, the masses of the peasants, coupled with their frustration at the “struggle, not only for land and freedom, but also against all exploitation of man by man, struggle against the poverty of the masses of the people, against the rule of capital”225 would be helpful in bringing about the revolution and completely disbanding antiquated ways of thought.

Another way of framing the issue of revolutionary population is to question the emphasis on which groups. A socialist-communist revolution, such as that in Russia or China, could acknowledge the necessity of all three groups (kadry, urban workers, and rural peasantry) yet recognize that one group is more valuable than another in securing the materialization and success of a revolution.

Qu did not want to disvalue the burgeoning intellectual potential of the urban proletariat by calling upon the countryside: “The proletariat cannot be compared to the rural peasantry; the language of ‘rural folk’ is primitive and obscure,”226 therefore it had no value in enriching the street vernacular (p’u-t’ung hua),227 as a language of mass communication. The idealism of Qu’s revolution lay in his projected success of the audience’s both learning how to write the (spoken) language of the street vernacular (p’u- t’ung hua), but also their using it in an intelligible yet accessible and revolutionary manner.

224 "The Proletariat and the Peasantry," in Marxists Internet Archive [database online]. [cited 2011]. Available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/nov/12.htm. 225 ibid. 226 Pickowicz, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and the Chinese Marxist Conception of Revolutionary Popular Literature and Art, qtd 300. This article is from June 10, 1932, from the vanguard magazine entitled, Literature Monthly. 227 As opposed to Chen’s vernacular (pai hua). Cheung105

Qu’s charge against the bourgeois nature of Chen’s writing style and content was hypocritical because Qu was just as socio-economically removed from the target audience as Chen. Despite Qu’s relatively impoverished upbringing, especially compared to the Chen family’s upper-middle class standing, he was never reduced to lower class poverty due to the support he received from his fellow clan members. Qu later addresses his irrefutable

“gentry consciousness” in Superfluous Words:

My proletarian consciousness and my gentry consciousness have long been struggling inside…[my] proletarian consciousness never achieved a true victory in my innermost being. I have been unable to overcome my gentry consciousness. I could not become a proletarian fighter.228

Chen never mentioned a return to his landed, upper-middle class background as the reason for a rejection of the Soviet model, and it is more difficult to point to a biographical reason as to why Chen decided to recant.

The necessity of some sort of enlightened class in both these literary revolution programs show how both Qu and Chen have not totally shed elements of their traditional upbringing. The revered position of an enlightened leader throughout Chinese history is evident in Confucius and the tradition he spawns as evident through subsequent dynastic emperors such as during the Tang Dynasty. The trend of an “enlightened leader” shows many societies’ tendency to eschew responsibility from the individual onto the government, especially using something like a plea of ignorance. Confucianism’s contribution to the liberalization movements of Chen and Qu are most evident in its dissection of the effect of human efforts on political and social order, or harmony. The adherence to this style of leadership could also be viewed as a Chinese hybridization of the

Soviet notion of a bourgeois-democracy to necessarily precede the socialist revolution.

228 Qu and Greenbaum, Superfluous Words, 148, 170. Cheung106

These Socialist Democrats are necessary in order to ameliorate the scars left on society from the previous government, which in Russia’s case would be the Czar, in order to prepare for the even more radically different system of full communism-socialism.

Qu’s Critical Development As Fostered by Marxist Studies Initially, Qu held no criticisms of May Fourth. Rather, he staunchly supported it and was even imprisoned for three days because of his involvement in the Peking student protests. Qu was attending the Russian Language Institute, an auxiliary of the Chinese

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which offered graduates guaranteed employment as ambassadors or in other foreign posts in Russia.229

May Fourth attacked the inadequacy of the Chinese Beiyang government during the

1919 Versailles Peace Conference, which showed the government and the country’s stagnant inability to adapt to the modern world in face of the advanced industrialized powers who controlled the conference and the post-war time concessions. Qu was in turn protesting against the same government that was offering him a tuition-free education. He was willing to sacrifice his education for the sake of involvement in these protests.

Education and literacy always held some sort of intrinsic value for Qu. However, it was difficult for him to give an exact purpose to any of his studies of classics, Buddhism, or

Marxism in a time of such social upheaval. Qu’s stance on the purpose and value of education is difficult to characterize, as in 1921, at age 22, Qu said he was bored at school

229 Knowledge of the widespread desolation of Russia, post-Bolshevik ascension was limited. Visitors, like Qu, were often in more advantageous positions because their salary came from a country whose currency was not totally ravaged by political upheaval. Qu talks about his relative luxury of eating palatable food compared to the Russians – his disgust at Russian black bread in Journey to the Land of Hunger is comical because he really detests it, but it also elucidates the impoverished living conditions in the aptly named Land of Hunger. (Qu named the book because in Chinese, ‘Russia’ sounds similar to ‘land of hunger’.) Cheung107 because of its concentration on a “lifeless education [that was] unable to withstand the shock of ugly political realities and the decadence of developing literary thought.”230

Taking into consideration his impoverished status, Qu was highly cognizant of the social and economic elevation a good education held, even after the abolition of the examination system in 1905. Self-sufficiency and purposefulness were Qu’s perceived effects of good education: a step towards when he

could someday eat my own rice; for the rice I then ate was not mine, but my cousin's. My parasitic existence could not fail to stimulate me, now and again, into thinking about social problems, the problem of the relationship between man and man.231

The joint failure of the American and Chinese representatives to protect Chinese interests and advancement at the Versailles Peace Conference strained Chen’s faith in the West, and also forced questioning among leading intellectuals about where to look now for guidance towards reform. John Dewey’s 1919 arrival in China ushered in a Western viewpoint that

Chen found to easily assimilate and bolster his developing political agenda. Dewey, like

Chen and the Chinese who were following the results of the conference, was similarly disappointed in Versailles outcome, feeling betrayed by Wilson’s pretense of defending peace.232 Published shortly after the Versailles results were publicized, Dewey’s “The

Discrediting of Idealism” presents a scathing critique of the Westerners’ war, where the

“chief tangible effect was to strengthen Imperial Japan in its encroachments upon the

230 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 9, quote slightly modified. 231 Hsia, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's Autobiographical Writings: The Making and Destruction of a "Tender-Hearted" Communist, qtd 187. 232 “…to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples...We have no selfish ends to serve” Wilson, War Message to Congress, 2 April, 1917,. Cheung108 people of China”233. Dewey’s lectures in China had a lasting impact on Chen, and catalyzed his interest in more egalitarian modes of writing, and governance.

Qu’s idea of revolution was strongly conceptually influenced by his study of the

Marxian notion of historical materialism. He outlined the preliminary steps of his cultural revolution very carefully, citing the relevance of “historical inertia”234 in establishing vital precedence for the flourishing of a new wave of Chinese society. In addition to the historical necessity of the May Fourth movement and its hierarchical structure, Qu also cited the use of Chinese classical references, Western sources, and the written vernacular

(pai hua) as vital predecessors to his movement. He is methodical in an outline of what problems socialism should address, and what were the historical conditions that brought these problems to the forefront of a political revolution:

It was because of this that the students' movement in China inevitably leaned towards socialism. Our social problems became further complicated with the bankruptcy of the clannish rural economy which took away the basis from the old social structure. The problems of (1) Confucianism, (2) women, (3) labour, and (4) social reform, the (5) literary problems centred on the vernacular, and the philosophical problems related to the view of life all rose up at the same time; they have ever since revolved around the social thinking of new China.235

This is very similar phrasing to Chen’s New Youth works, primarily around the time of

Dewey’s lectures. The emphasis on what is “natural” for this burgeoning revolution shows the influences of Western notions of determinism, whether it be Darwinian natural selection or Marxian materialism. Socialism was what the masses naturally needed, and in the historical-cultural context of the post-Qing, had to ground its revolution in remedying

233 Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899-1924, 183. 234 Pickowicz, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and the Chinese Marxist Conception of Revolutionary Popular Literature and Art, qtd 308. 235 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 24. Numerals added for clarity. Cheung109 the five problems. These problems, excluding the point about Confucianism, could be viewed as social issues in any country, including Western so-called liberal countries. If

Confucianism is generalized to the problem of traditionalism, then surely all five of these issues Qu lists are applicable to virtually all countries aspiring for any level of liberal reform.

Previous writings from both China and the West held a constitutive role in Qu’s continued education over the course of his life. Although he lacked the lengthy formal education of Chen, Qu read and wrote more passionately than Chen, relishing both the personal emotional satisfaction he gained from introspective intellectual work and its historical value in building his literary movement. In Superfluous Words, Qu identified himself as a life-long scholar whose intellectual pursuits were constantly hampered by external forces of political life.236 Before his final autobiographical reflections, Qu hid his disdain for politics well – actually using his political clout to his advantage in spreading the ideas behind his new movement. His extensive knowledge of various writing styles as well as content helped him create journal articles to exemplify the literary fodder for his movement.237 His delineation of progressive stages in his revolution is a notable point of pragmatic departure from Chen’s May Fourth Movement. The latter was the student uprising of one day in 1919 that was not prefigured by any plan like Qu’s, but was instead plastic and malleable according to the needs of the masses under the banners of liberalism and socialism. Qu’s careful planning contrasts with anything in the preliminary stages of

236 “[I’ve been] reluctantly engaged in political work for the last fifteen years… [by 1927] I had actually completely lost all interest in political matters…” Qu and Greenbaum, Superfluous Words, 140, 46, . 237 There is a much more limited body of Qu’s work available in English as compared to Chen’s, so I have not read many of Qu’s writings – but rely on the scholarly body of work available regarding the new literary movement in China of the early 20th century to compare Qu’s and Chen’s respective contributions. Cheung110

May Fourth: the lofty ambitions of a new culture for a new China were prefigured by progressive scholars as early as 1917,238 but they did not express ambitions or project plans as wide-reaching as the May Fourth movement proved to be.

The stages of Qu’s revolution are reminiscent of the stages of socialist revolution as outlined by Lenin because of the sine qua non of linear and gradual progression, and the temporary indispensability of the bourgeois leadership. Lenin’s dictatorship of the proletariat absolutely could not arise without the bourgeois democratic revolution because gradual stages towards a revolutionary politic of socialism in Russia were necessary to guarantee the highest form of democracy of the proletariat. Qu was cognizant of his plan’s close reflection to the Soviet Union line, and used this similarity to assert the superiority and virtually guaranteed success of his movement over the failures of May Fourth. His stages are along the same lines of bourgeois rule that leads to proletariat rule: the intelligentsia would provide a sort of concealed impetus to the masses after they have

“[gone] to the people and learn”239 because “it will be necessary to do research on what the people are reading these days, on what sort of views the people have of life and society,…and finally on the type of literary and artistic works the people will need as they struggle in this society.”240

What is missing from Qu’s, more so than Chen’s, target audience of revolution is a

“professional class of revolutionaries,” termed by Lenin as cadres (kadry in Russian, gunbu in Chinese). The rise of a defined class of Bolsheviks in Russia in the 20th century was a

238 Cezong Zhou, The May fourth movement : intellectual revolution in modern China, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 1. 239 Pickowicz, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and the Chinese Marxist Conception of Revolutionary Popular Literature and Art, qtd 305. 240 ibid.: qtd 306, emphasis added. Cheung111 major pillar to the Bolshevik Revolution’s success. Lenin’s conception of the necessity of cadres to the inception and growth of communist states has been absorbed into Marxist doctrine. The lack of well-qualified leaders, meaning those thoroughly indoctrinated in the shifting ideas evident during the early years of Bolshevik reign, caused problems in the establishment of regime legitimacy. Lenin’s cadres were re-interpreted by Stalin in the late

30s where there was a purge of the old cadres, which was comprised of older Leninists. 241

Because Stalin’s revision did not come until after Chen’s expulsion from the CCP and Qu’s execution by the GMD, it is reasonable that there is no incorporation of cadres in their plans for revolutionary dissemination. Chen does not begin reading Trotskyist documents until

1929,242 which is when he learns of Trotsky’s notion of a class of not just professional, but also permanent, revolutionaries. Chen does show interest in Trotsky’s permanent revolution,243 but full pursuit of Trotsky’s leftist views does not occur until the early 30s – over ten years after the May Fourth movement.244

As Qu became more familiar with historical materialism, he was better able to legitimize his immense efforts in developing a “free and democratic literature” that is consistent with the “methodology [of] historical materialism.”245 In July 1932, Qu publishes an article entitled “Freedom for Literature, but Not the Writer” to answer contemporary

241 For more information on the history of cadres in Russia, see Silvio Pons et al., A Dictionary of 20th-century Communism, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 83-84. 242 Chen and Benton, Chen Duxiu's Last Articles and Letters, 1937-1942, 7. 243 Trotsky’s notion of permanent revolution states, see Leon Trotsky and Isaac Deutscher, The age of permanent revolution : a Trotsky anthology, (New York: Dell Pub. Co., 1964), 384. For Trotsky’s writings about permanent revolution as applied to individual states or Leon Trotsky and Leon Trotsky, The permanent revolution, and Results and prospects, (New York: Merit Publishers, 1969), 281.. 244 Chow Tse-tung marks the end of the May Fourth era in 1921. New Youth ceases publication in 1926; from 1921-26, the magazine’s focus was no longer about new forms of literature, but rather became a vessel of CCP propaganda. 245 Denton, Modern Chinese literary thought : writings on literature, 1893-1945, qtd 376, 380. Cheung112 criticism against the use of literature for propaganda, or as a “gramophone for politics.”246

Although Qu never fully let go of a “gentry consciousness” in his personal writings and the way he treated his subordinates during his teaching stints, he had the broad ambition of creating a body literature – a style of writing and characters – that “is a weapon that can be used to reform the worldview and lifeview of the masses … Literature, broadly speaking is all agitation or propaganda; consciously or unconsciously, it is all propaganda. Literature is always and everywhere a political ‘gramophone.’”247 This is opposite to his views right after May Fourth, where “there was a the real significance of the student movement. There was a demand for change, and that demand came out in an outburst. It had then at least its shocking and rousing effects, for as Prince Kropotkin said, ‘One riot does more than thousands of books and pamphlets.’”248

Coercive Influence of the Comintern As editor of New Youth, Chen was disseminating ideas that he and the editorial board found necessary for the Chinese population; as CCP leader, Chen had to adhere to a

Marxist-Leninist line and appease the Comintern delegation from the Soviets. The pre-1924 phase of New Youth also held more editorial liberty because the antagonistic faction that alienated the CCP from the GMD and the warlords – principally after Chiang Kai-shek and the Northern Expedition of 1927 – had not yet come into fruition. Arrested by the GMD in

1932 for “endangering the republic” and “betraying the state,”249 Chen was arraigned in

Shanghai at age 55, three years after his expulsion from the CCP. His peak of official power

246 ibid., 377. 247 ibid., 379-80.. Emphasis added. 248 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 25. 249 Folder 1, Chen Duxiu Appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives. The anonymous translator acknowledges the awkward English in the translation, but I didn’t find it to be too obscure. Cheung113 culminated in his leadership of the CCP from July 1921 – July 1926, but one could argue that he had even less autonomy during these five years than he did as editor of New Youth.

Adherents of Marxism-Leninism would argue that the early failures of the CCP rested on its leaders incomplete understanding of communist theory and practical application. Chen’s introduction to Marxism came through Li Dazhao’s Marxist Study

Group, where Chinese scholars muddled through oftentimes poorly translated texts of

Marx, Bukharin, and other theoreticians in attempts to apply the same theories to their country. Chen’s single trip to Russia was limited in scope and duration, as it only lasted for three months between 1922-23, and he was met with disrespect in proportion to his prominence in China.

Chen’s writings before his ascension to the post of Secretary-General of the CCP in the Summer of 1921 showed an excited plasticity in thought – a necessary characteristic in a young and upstart revolutionary. Chen’s excitement over whichever thought he espoused in his writings, which was as varied as Wilsonian democracy to French humanitarianism, anti-Confucianism to youth empowerment, reflected both the contemporary national and international scene at the turn of the century. Chen’s most important contribution was the mere introduction of such previously aberrant ideas to the Chinese intellectual scene.

Chen’s admiration of Westernism does not persist through September 1920,250 when his writings state the inevitable superiority of socialism over all other government forms, including republicanism – most likely due to the influence of the Comintern. None of the

250 Wan-chin Tai, "Chen Duxiu's Conversion from a Liberal Democrat to a Marxist-Leninist," Tamkang Journal of International Affairs : 120. Cheung114 articles Chen published during his Marxian conversion period are available in English,251 but his November 1923 article252 explicitly addresses his support of historical materialism, especially as an attack against the “agricultural-patriarchal society” where “wife and children” are dehumanized into “tools of production, as a kind of property.”253

The November 1923 article clearly shows Chen’s shift in using Marxist language, like

“tools of production” in his criticism of economic systems. Between 1920-23, Chen gained greater knowledge in not just orthodox Marxism, but also the workings of the Communist

International and the Soviet system. “My Views on the Current Situation,”254 published in

1920 in New Youth, shows a much more elementary view of Marx’s notion of class struggle where the world is divided among the line of capitalist versus communist-socialists.

Because the initial years of New Youth were just generally attacking Confucianism from simply an angst-ridden and disillusioned Chinese perspective, Chen’s early writings do not show any adherence to any set of syntax or wording. He addresses class conflict as well:

“classes with different economic interests naturally are engaged in conflict,”255 asserting that an imported Marxian system is the only way to solve China’s problems.

Chen’s Loss of Self at the Hands of the Comintern Chen’s true conviction to his political services began to wane after the overextension of the Comintern’s powers – which happened most notably during the 20s during the CCP’s aggrieved relationship with the Comintern representative Voitinsky – who

251 To my knowledge. I worked within a limited research period, so there may be translations of his other works somewhere. 252 This article has no official title, but the anthology titles it “Argument for historical materialism.” Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839 -1923, 249-51. 253 ibid., 249. 254 This article is not available in English, but Benjamin Schwartz cites this article in his discussion of Chen’s acceptance of the role of Western thought in Chinese revolution. See Benjamin Schwartz, "Ch'ên Tu-Hsiu and the Acceptance of the Modern West," Journal of the History of Ideas 12, no. 1 (1951): 70. 255 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839 -1923, 251. Cheung115 served as Comintern representative to China from 1920-27 and Maring – who served from

1921-24. Without the Comintern, the CCP would not have been founded – especially to the ideological capacity it achieved through its dissemination of pre-established propaganda materials. In contrast to the founding of the CCP, the evolution of the new culture movement was in direct contact with the problems facing Chinese civilization; and it was indigenously grown by Chinese leaders who fully adapted and morphed Western ideas into

Chinese theories for revolution and reform. Because the course of the early CCP under Chen lacked both these elements of the new culture movement, problems of reconciliation between the actual needs of Chinese society and what Marxism-Leninism retroactively prescribes arose.

The arrival of the first Comintern representative Grigori Voitinsky256 in 1920257 catalyzed Chen and the Comintern’s formation of the CCP, but also influenced him to adopt a pro-Soviet personality rather than one of his own. Chen’s repeated dissent from the policy line of the Comintern in Moscow during his time as Secretary General shows his commitment to maintaining an independent spirit to protect and engender a communist revolution in China. The presence of the Comintern exacerbated the problems between the

GMD and the CCP, forcing the less-affluent CCP to fit more with the greater Soviet program.

Although Voitinsky was a proponent of the United Front program, he was also more sympathetic to Chen’s vision for China than other Comintern representatives.258 Voitinsky’s encouragement of Chen to remain conciliatory to the GMD was a significant reason why

256 Voitinsky was born in 1893 and emigrated to the US and Canada in his young adult years. He returned to the USSR in 1918 and worked for the Comintern from 1920-27. His main assignment throughout his time in the Comintern was Far East relations, and met with Sun Yat-sen, Chen, and other communist militants. It is unknown whether he was affected by Stalin’s purges, nonetheless, he survived and died in 1953 in Moscow. 257 Tai, Chen Duxiu's Conversion from a Liberal Democrat to a Marxist-Leninist, 134 n.33. 258 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 178-79. Cheung116

Chen allowed for the progression of the United Front, but some say that Voitinsky did this in order to preserve a level of political autonomy for Chen.259 Bernadette Yu-ning Li, the author of a Qu Qiubai dissertation, insists that “Voitinsky always took part in these meetings which formulated all major policies, although [Chen Duxiu] held the

‘chairmanship.’”260

The muted debacle of the Summer 1923 Third Congress of the CCP261 occurred due to Chen and Maring’s262 disagreement over the integration of the CCP. Maring was the

Comintern representative to China sent by Lenin, and he supported the GMD as a “bloc of various classes,”263 despite Chen’s charge of the GMD being a pro-democracy, anti- communism, bourgeoisie-led program.264 Chen disagreed with Maring almost immediately after the Comintern representative’s arrival to China in 1921. Maring was much less understanding than Voitinsky about Chen’s desire for autonomy, and with Maring, Chen was increasingly confused as to the real meaning of Comintern involvement in Chinese revolutionary activities.

Chen wrote the manifesto of the Third Congress of the CCP – despite all of the ideas being drawn from Maring’s strategy for a Chinese revolution. This is the first whole document Chen produces where none of the ideas are his own, and we know of his open

259 ibid.161. 260 ibid.161, quote modified. 261 The Congress was held in Canton, instead of Shanghai where the previous two had been held, to avoid punishment by the Beiyang Government. Voitinsky had an apartment in Shanghai, and CCP meetings were secretly held there for a time. 262 Maring’s real name was Henk Sneevliet, but he used over thirteen Chinese, Russian and English . Lenin sent Maring to China in April 1921, and he arrived in Shanghai in June Dov Bing, "Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP," The China Quarterly , no. 48 (1971): 678. 263 ibid.: 685.. 264 See Folder 1, Chen Duxiu Appeal, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives and "Appeal to All the Comrades of the Chinese Communist Party," [cited 2011]. Available from http://www.marxist.com/chen-du-xiu-appeal- comrades-ccp.htm. for Chen’s specific charges against the GMD. Both are written after his expulsion from the CCP.

Cheung117 dissent against Maring’s policy of GMD collaboration and peasant inclusion. Chen nonetheless faithfully wrote Maring’s strategy into the manifesto to be disseminated among CCP delegates and members alike. Chen correctly thought an alliance with the GMD would be detrimental to the mission of the CCP, especially since these two parties pursued diametrically opposed goals in Chen’s opinion. Chen’s relationship with the Comintern during his years of party leadership was heated and antagonistic from the beginning. The first manifesto of the CCP was drafted under Maring’s close supervision – after which he suggested a wholly Maring proposal for future CCP relations between the party and the

Soviet Union, but more indigenously, the party and the GMD. Maring’s persuasion of the

CCP to join the Comintern – for membership entailed great material and ideological support – set Chen on a long path of blind adherence to Comintern policy, despite personal disagreements with it.

The Kremlin, as voiced by Comintern Representative Maring, believed in the pan- class nature of the GMD, Chen remained skeptical of the prospect of equal treatment of these two parties by the Communist International. Chen’s fears were realized shortly after the resolution of the United Front Policy. The United Front policy’s blatant favoritism of the

GMD was

Comintern policy under Maring erred in two major and irreparable ways: the call for dual-membership of CCP members to join the GMD, and the immediacy of the task of the national revolution. Both Chen and Qu eventually disagree with these Comintern calls, but it is difficult to discern the beginning of their true dissent due to the didactic nature of their public texts. Cheung118

Maring issued an order for “United Front” between the CCP and GMD shortly after his arrival in China in Spring 1921. This was one of the first antagonistic events of the

Comintern against the CCP where the Comintern overexerts their power in Chinese affairs.

The absolute necessity of Comintern aid is evident due to the CCP ailing initial years, where party membership was under 1,000 pre-1925, and grew to more than 27,000 in 1927.265 In writings after 1927,266 Chen openly voices his disdain for the obvious stupidity of a United

Front with a party such as the GMD, which was obviously hostile to the efforts of the CCP.

In May 1927, Chen and a GMD member Wang Jingwei267 issued a joint statement with “complete frankness” to publicly proclaim the potential success of a joint venture between CCP and GMD “comrades.” There is recognition of the clear political differences between the CCP and the GMD, but Chen and Wang said, “we should unite closely like brothers” to avoid “being tricked into discord.” 268 Chen voices a total surrender of CCP pride and worth in this statement, where the CCP abandons its own mission for the sake of

Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles: “They are doubtless what the Chinese revolution needs,”269 instead of the Chinese-Soviet policy with heavy tinges of Marxist revolutionary theory.

Sun’s Three Principles,270 principally that of democracy, were interpreted through a

265 Hans J. Van de Ven and Berkeley University of California, From Friend to Comrade: the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 3. 266 The year Duxiu leaves his post as Secretary-General of the CCP. 267 (1883-1944) A member of the left-wing GMD (the right-wing was opposed to CCP collaboration) who advocated joint partnership in state revolutionary efforts with the CCP. He was always skeptical of CCP philosophy, doubting its ability to bring about a revolution in China. He eventually decided to collaborate with Japan in creating a new government, against Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist wishes. He is now known in China and as a traitor for his activities with the Japanese and his abandonment of both the GMD and CCP. 268 Warren Kuo and Zhonghua Minguo guo ji guan xi yan jiu suo, Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party, 2ded. (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1968), 309. 269 ibid., 307. 270 The Three Principles are minzu, minquan and minsheng, which most usually translate to nationalism, democracy and welfare. These are heavily Western, especially American, ideals, which Sun openly admitted after his reading of Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. Sun enumerated Three Principles of the People in Cheung119

Marxist lens – which resulted in very divergent conceptions of democracy between GMD and CCP theoreticians. Sun’s advocacy of democracy was defended by Chen and Wang as a necessary step in the revolution: the democratic dictatorship is necessary before a proletarian revolution in order “to deal with the counter-revolution” of warlords, the

Beiyang, and anti-communist forces.271 Sun’s conception of western liberal democracy contrasted with the jaded Marxist view of liberal democracy as an impossible utopian ideal.

Lenin’s State and Revolution defines Marxism as it should be viewed under his regime, and therefore defines Marxism – including its criticisms – for Comintern policy. Lenin blasts the abomination of democracy in capitalist states because it only benefits an

insignificant minority, democracy for the rich…These restrictions, exceptions, exclusions, obstacles for the poor seem slight, especially in the eyes of one who has never known want himself and has never been in close contact with the oppressed classes in their mass life; but in their sum total these restrictions exclude and squeeze out the poor from politics, from active participation in democracy.272

Chen’s support of the GMD comes into direct contrast with his other proclamations273 of the correctness of Marxism in theory and application for the peculiarity of the Chinese situation.

Four months after his joint letter between himself and Wang, Chen issued multiple decrees that went directly counter to this pro-GMD/Comintern statement. The first, “A

Letter from Chen [Duxiu],” came in the Fall of 1927, and the second, “Appeal to All

Comrades of the Chinese Party,” in the Winter of 1929. The 1927 piece is slightly tamer in

1925 during a speech delivered in Brussels. The first time a Chinese audience received this ideology was on March 6, 1921 in Canton. De Bary et al., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 314-330. 271 Kuo and Zhonghua Minguo guo ji guan xi yan jiu suo, Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party, 308. 272 Lenin, The State and Revolution, 273 See Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839 -1923, 249-51. and Chen, Appeal to All the Comrades of the Chinese Communist Party, for examples of Chen’s adherence to Marxism. Cheung120 its rejection of the Comintern and GMD, but this 1929 “Appeal” foreshadowed the even greater political extremism as an anti-Soviet figure that Chen takes up in his 1933 “Protest to Kiangsu High Court.”274 The gradual progression toward a more intrepid and outspoken stance against the contemporary power dynamic that held the GMD and Comintern at the top is evidence of Chen’s increased confidence in his own, independent political prowess – even in face of his own political party’s members.

After even saying “We must uphold our [meaning CCP and GMD alike) revolutionary viewpoint and get rid of mutual suspicions, discredit rumors, and consult each other in a spirit of mutual respect and goodwill,”275 Chen totally left aside this principle of brotherhood and cooperation in order to the correctness of his approach to the revolution, which he claimed was more egalitarian, yet still trepidatious about the benefits of constant uprisings as the “childish comrades” of the GMD were advocating.276 Chen did not totally discredit the GMD’s revolutionary efforts, but wanted there to be a greater difference between the roles of the CCP and GMD. Chen was concerned that the masses were losing the spirit of the revolution due to the political bickering between the GMD and CCP, and were not able to distinguish “between the uprising and the Northern Expedition…[the CCP] must have more economic flavor in our movement and uprisings.”277 Chen is referring to the Shanghai Uprising that happened in Spring 1927 where GMD forces, led by Chiang Kai- shek, brutally suppressed a CCP uprising, driving CCP members to meet underground in

274 This 1933 document is examined in more detail in the previous chapter on the Development of Marxism since the “Protest” piece exemplified Chen’s command of Marxist thought. 275 Kuo and Zhonghua Minguo guo ji guan xi yan jiu suo, Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party, 309, emphasis added. 276 ibid., 475. 277 ibid., 474. Cheung121 order to avoid persecution or execution.278 Chen criticized the Northern Expedition, another military project of Chiang’s, for hurting the CCP cause and making undue high demands on peasants. 279 The massacre of CCP members during the Shanghai Uprising solidified the military might of the right-wing GMD, and seriously threatened the survival of the CCP.280 Despite such obvious antagonistic and offensive moves by Chiang’s GMD, Stalin remained supportive of the partnership between the two parties.

By December 1929, Chen had wholly given up on the prospect of a Chinese

Revolution the way he imagined it. Chen specifically names Stalin, Zinoviev, and Bukharin

(the latter two were Chinese Comintern representatives), as part of the direct causal factor of the failure of the CCP to incite a revolution in China. This “Appeal to All Comrades of the

Chinese Party,” foreshadows his self-pitying language in the Kiangsu court protest. “[I] expect comrades to criticize me mercilessly with theoretical argument and fact…[in the past], comrades have pointed out my past opportunist errors, I earnestly acknowledged them.”281 Chen sarcastically attacked Qu – as during this time, Qu was publically supportive of anything issued by the Comintern – and blamed Qu for being full of “self-confidence,” while describing himself as humble, and always dedicating himself wholly to the revolution rather any power plays. “[I must] continually and humbly learn form the teachings of Marx and Lenin in the struggles of the proletarian masses and in the mutual criticism of comrades.”282 Nostalgia for Lenin seemed to gain increased momentum the more tumultuous relations between the CCP and GMD got. To further emphasize the social value

278 Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965, 142. 279 ibid., 142. 280 The GMD had split between left and right wing factions, fueled mostly by Chiang’s megalomania. Chiang led the right-wing branch of the GMD. 281 Chen, Appeal to All the Comrades of the Chinese Communist Party, 282 ibid. Cheung122 of humility, he says the “main cause” of the CCP’s failure was “the error of opportunism, the error of our policy in dealing with the bourgeois [Guomindang].”283 This was a collective problem among all CCP members for not speaking out against the Comintern’s original orders for a United Front, but Chen assumed the greatest responsibility and guilt for allowing such destructive policy to occur. “All the responsible comrades of the Central

Committee at that time, especially myself, should only and courageously recognize that this policy was undoubtedly wrong.”284 Chen was grateful that he was able to recognize the speciousness of a United Front, citing that knowing the fault is only the first step, where the

CCP can avoid “the repetition of former opportunism in the next revolution.”285 Chen had not given up on the potential for a revolution; staying faithful to the tenets of Marxist-

Leninist historical materialism, he was waiting for a more appropriate historical context – one where CCP members were not being prosecuted by the “bourgeois” GMD – that would allow for, and foster a socialist revolution.

The rise of Chiang’s military might in the late 20s, coupled with systemically bad decision by the Comintern created conditions that were anti-Chen. Qu quickly became critical of Chen’s approach, and blamed him for opportunism. Like the GMD and Comintern,

Qu’s assignment of blame fell wholly on Chen himself. Qu was a mouthpiece of the

Comintern’s interests; when Chen decided to speak out against the Comintern, Qu had very little political liberty to defend Chen. Like Chen during the rise of the United Front policy,

Qu felt trapped in his role in the CCP as a pawn of the Comintern.

Qu’s Approach to the Literary Revolution of the 30s

283 ibid. 284 ibid. 285 ibid. Cheung123

Qu’s approach to a literary revolution in the 30s is much different from Chen’s, as Qu thought that Chen’s May Fourth Movement fell too much into the category of the

“bourgeois-democracy” rather than “proletarian-democracy.” Although they both come from highly educated background, Qu points out Chen’s alienation of the non-intelligentsia, which included city laborers and agrarian peasants a like – which was precisely the population that Qu believed the CCP should support, teach and most importantly involve in the creation and dissemination of educational propaganda.

The points of Qu’s historical legacy lay mostly in his contributions to the literary movement and revival, and secondarily, they lay in his contributions to Marxism in

China.286 These two elements of Qu are not mutually exclusive, as his literary interests informed and in part shaped his approach to interpreting Soviet Marxism. Qu’s superior

Russian language skills aided him in both these efforts: he lamented the Chinese lack of

“beautiful, enjoyable language” defined by Turgenev’s works, but also Pushkin and

Tolstoy.287 Qu combined his knowledge of the Russian language and literature in order to strengthen his command of Russian pro-socialist texts. In his translations of Russian stories, he included author’s analysis of the story’s relevance to the revolution. In his preface to his Russian to Chinese translation of Nikolai Gogol’s The Servant’s Room,288 Qu emphasizes the necessity of patience during the revolution, because slow change is not apparent to the population.

286 I’m sure one could argue that his contributions to Chinese Marxism are more apparent than his literary impact, but judging from his personal affinity for the literary classics, Qu would have liked to have been remembered for his literary efforts rather than his political efforts. Overall, English sources on Qu are very limited, more so than works on Chen. 287 Goldman, Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era, 103. 288 This translation probably happened in the very early 20s after his graduation from the Russian Language Institute. I do not know what The Servant’s Room is by Gogol, but if it is organized among the same thematic lines as a work such as Dead Souls, then a preface like Qu’s would be appropriate to a work that expresses frustration over the structural inadequacies of the Russian social sphere. Cheung124

Chen and Qu both produced many translations of foreign texts, the former translated mostly Western European texts, like of French socialists’ works, whereas the latter’s highly advanced knowledge of Russian produced translations of Marxist texts and literary realist works alike. The purpose of Chen’s translations was to introduce the extremely different modes of thought evident in the West, especially those of revolutionized and liberalized countries like England, France and America. Chen’s translation of Seignobos quickly after its publication in 1898 reflected his deepening interest in melding empiricism with historical accounts and championing the individual as a figure of historical significance. By using the works of Western historians, Chen reveals two elements of his notion of progress: that it is an imported good to China, and historical literary works above all others that have the greatest benefit to said progress.

The highly personal emotionality of Qu’s descriptive and poetic language reflects his lifelong pursuit of artful literary expression. After his mother’s death, Qu’s writing makes a distinct turn from a mere regurgitation of classical style and content to an intimate expression of self. A Western enthusiast like Chen might criticize Qu in his reliance on the classical forms, but Qu’s writings elevate the old style towards a sense of liberal autonomy and individuality. Chen’s desire of a total purge of the “old and rotten” from the “fresh and living” in China contrast with Qu’s style and interests. Chen’s use of the standard paragraph essay form as influenced by Western texts, contrasts with Qu’s use of Classical Chinese style

(wen-yen) that pulls from obscure mythological and historical references. Qu wanted to use these embellishments in propagandistic literature in order to attract the masses. In

September 1932, three years before he is executed by the GMD in June 1935, Qu speaks fawningly at the abilities of literature, especially Russian literature: 1932 “Not only do Cheung125 works of lit function artistically to move the masses; they also serve the broader purpose of setting high standards of writing. The ‘beautiful, enjoyable language’ of Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Turgenev is useful even today and makes suitable textbook material.”289

Although Chen did reject the Confucian system of education, there is no doubt that

Chen greatly appreciated poetry. Historians and a veteran Communist General Xiao Ke alike find Chen’s poems to be an alternate approach to “understanding other aspects of his career.”290 According to Xiao, during a speech presented at an academic symposium in

August 1981, Chen wrote at least 140 poems from 1903-42.291 Only one of poems was written in 1920s – when Chen was mostly occupied with the burdens of beginning a new revolutionary political party. He resumed poetry in the early 1930s, after he was imprisoned by the GMD. Xiao admits he admired Chen’s “struggle to resist feudal remnants and superstition and to promote science and democracy,”292 and believes Chen’s poetry can offer a more nuanced side of Chen’s beliefs and disappointments at the state of the Mao- controlled CCP, views that perhaps he could only express through poetic means without being persecuted by government censors.

Once a distinctly modern and patriotic culture developed as a product of these two nationalist parties, the CCP and the GMD, the constant reference to and reliance on foreign intellect became suspect. In the early 1930s, one of Qu’s roles in the literary movement was to wholly shift away from the use of Western European and Russian sources in Chinese literature in order to re-claim it as indigenous and natural. Qu was vague on what constituted over-reliance on foreign sources, as he still used Russian texts in his own

289 ibid. 290 Chen and Benton, Chen Duxiu's Last Articles and Letters, 1937-1942, 151. 291 ibid., 152, note 75. 292 ibid., 150. Cheung126 personal and political writings.293 This is obviously a clear shift from Qu’s work in the early

20s when he translated specifically-chosen Russian works for the sake of conveying particular social goals.

Conclusion The difference in content and style between the literary works of Chen and Qu make it difficult to compare their approaches to their contemporary events in China. The available works by Chen in English are solely politically oriented, so it is more difficult to glean Chen’s most personal attitudes towards political changes. Much of Chen’s political works, especially of the late 20s, are wholly determined by their use as a response and rejection to Comintern policy. The Comintern’s constant systemic failures at working with the CCP were an obvious and necessary target for attack by Chen. The problem of the

United Front permeated much of Chen’s political writings since this contentious policy was instated shortly after his ascension to Secretary-General of the CCP. Qu’s political narrative is less singularly targeted as Chen’s, as the writings available to us are focused around literature as revolutionary means and audience. The very limited works of Qu in English are more balanced between political and personal writings, therefore, it is easier to paint a more complete picture of the differences raised by the tension of being a public figure.

293 Even before going to Russia, Qu praised their literature. This suggests that there were other Chinese studying Russian literature in order to bring it to Qu’s awareness. Cheung127 Cheung128

Recantation: Chen’s Return to Western Ideals and Qu’s Return to the Chinese Classics Their unceremonious departures from the CCP could be used as a simple way to explain Chen and Qu’s recantation of their socialist-communist views. I argue that their turns away from the political party that they sacrificed so much to build can be prefigured much earlier, especially due to the prevailing endurance of their original intellectual passions – for Chen it was a Deweyan liberalism, for Qu it was the great Chinese dynastic classics. The social upheaval prefiguring May Fourth and through Mao’s ascension to head of the Communist party in China, was a time of great ideological flux. There was a constant importation of various degrees of understandings and interpretations of international political and social practices. Coupled with this constant dialogue of ideas, was the constant dialogue and debate between the Comintern, CCP and GMD, over how to put these ideas into practice. The militarism that enveloped the United Front under Chiang’s GMD army, or

Mao’s peasant uprisings in the late 20s to 30s challenged the political program developed by Chen in the early 20s, and obviously went against Qu’s “real” desires for an apolitical, intellectual life. The discussion of authenticity in Chen and Qu’s apostate texts – whether they were made for the sake of expressing their true feelings, or to remove themselves from the tumult of the state of revolutionary politics under Chiang and Mao.

Historiography Gregor Benton’s collection of Chen Duxiu’s Last Articles and Letters, 1937-42, was published in part because of the editor’s view of the dearth of English sources that investigate Chen’s political views after his expulsion from the CCP in 1929, and subsequent conversion to Trotskyism due to the latter party’s appeal in its “oppositionist” stance, for Cheung129 example, opposition to Stalin, the GMD, and other political powers that pervert orthodox ideology. Benton had Wang Fanxi, a close associate, admirer and critic of Chen’s write the preface to this collection of works. Fanxi and Benton both share the desire to rectify the

English-speaking historian’s understanding of Chen. Through these “last articles and letters,” Benton wants to illustrate the variety of thoughts Chen continually entertains throughout the end of his life, and the difficulty of characterizing Chen’s life political views under certain ideological umbrellas.

The fissure between the GMD and the CCP became fueled by the Russian ideological fissure between Stalin and Leon Trotsky that began even before Lenin was out of office.

Disputes on theory and practice of international revolution in China between Stalin and

Trotsky led to Trotsky’s expulsion from the Communist Party in 1927. The Russian fissure between these two leaders was contemporaneous to GMD leader Chiang Kai-shek’s 1927

Shanghai coup against CCP members, leaving relations irreparable between the parties from Chen’s point of view. Despite Chiang’s intensification of violence and antagonism between the two Chinese revolutionary parties, Moscow nonetheless blamed Chen for the failure of a united front between the GMD and the CCP. Like Chen, Trotsky held a disdain against Chiang – especially due to Stalin’s support of Chiang. Chen tendered a resignation from his post contemporaneous to Chiang’s coup, and went on to advocate left-wing

Trotskyism until his Shanghai arrest in 1932, leading to his second long-term incarceration behind the bars of a GMD prison. Trotsky found a

The period of Chen’s Trotskyism is not as significant as the broader picture of his return to pro-liberal, anti-traditionalism. He was never fully accepted into the Chinese

Trotskyist party, nor did he really want to be as partisan politics had taken away Chen’s Cheung130 highly valued autonomy to believe what he wants. Trotskyism was only an intermediary step between Chen’s break from the CCP and his rejection of all political associations.

Chen’s recrudescence to anti-traditionalism in the 30s is a reflection of his view of Chinese society as stagnate; the revolutionary change being only superficial.

Chen’s Animosity Against Politics Chen’s enthusiasm in analyzing political theories for best practice in China contrasted greatly to his jaded and dismissive view of politics that emerged in the late 30s.

His last political affiliation was with the Chinese Trotskyists, but their overly-theoretical approach to reform was too void of action to satisfy Chen’s lasting revolutionary impulse. “I no longer belong to any party…”294 Not only is Chen shunning any organized political party, especially after his extremely negative interactions with the Comintern throughout his association with the CCP. He complained to Trotsky himself in Fall 1938 about the problems of political parties, especially the CCP itself. He did have some faith in the Chinese

Trotskyists, and believed they would be more effective if they took action. He blames the

Chinese Trotskyists for waiting for the revival of industrialization, halted by WWII, instead of taking up action. Trotskyist numbers are small, and Chen estimated them to be “fewer than fifty people in Shanghai and Hong Kong, plus probably one hundred-odd stragglers in other parts of the country.”295 These numbers paled in comparison to the rapid growth of the CCP – in May 1937, CCP membership was membership 50,000, and in July 1940, it was

800,000.296 The unwieldiness, coupled with blind adherence to a perverted socialist line, contributed to Chen’s distance from the CCP, classifying them as “just armed forces with

294 ibid., 39 . 295 ibid., 46. 296 ibid., 46, note 27. Cheung131 intellectuals and no working-class base at all.”297 Chen was advocating for the next stage of the revolution, as the intellectual activity had been sufficiently addressed, and it was time to do rather just think. The question of the role, if any, peasants could play in a socialist- communist revolution became a much bigger problem in the late 20s and 30s. Mao’s 1927 publication of “Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in ” was initially ill received by Chen himself, especially due to its focus on the masses in rural rather urban areas, but it was a sign of the impulse for action among the masses. The

Autumn Uprisings of 1927 led by Mao in the countryside also helped build the superiority of the CCP, especially as the party was still reeling from the effects of Chiang’s Shanghai coup.298

By 1938, the CCP is headed by , the man who immediately preceded

Mao’s ascension to Chairman of the party in 1949. In Fall 1937, he is still using rhetoric that explicitly attacks Confucianism. “I shall always strive to be extreme, I view with contempt the doctrine of the golden mean.”299 The Golden Mean, or Doctrine of the Mean,300 is found in the Analects.301 The Gold Mean praises restraint, tolerance, and equanimity. Chen rejects this peaceful, stagnant vision of life as that, obviously, does not compel change via social reform. Although Chen was proclaiming political sovereignty for himself, Zheng Chaolin302

297 ibid., 46. 298 ibid., 14. 299 ibid., 40 . 300 Analects never explicitly defines the conditions of the mean, but it represents the element of Confucianism that is anti-change, and passionately protects tradition and its inherent value. 301 Book VI, verse 26 Confucius and Burton Watson, The analects of Confucius, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 162. 302 Chen and Benton, Chen Duxiu's Last Articles and Letters, 1937-1942, 43, note 20. Zheng was a contemporary of Chen’s and participated in Marxist study groups with him and Li in Peking. Zhen is author of "Chen Duxiu and the Trotskyists," Available from http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/china/zheng.htm. and wrote extensively on the political history of the early CCP from an inside view, as he was a CCP/GMD member himself. Zheng died in August 1998. Cheung132 says he didn’t really leave the Chinese Trotskyist organization. He still has leftist views and wants to organize people towards revolution, but I think the bureaucracy behind running a political party had turned Chen away from the wasted time and effort of belonging to parties.

All I’m concerned about is my own independent thinking, I won’t give up my own ideas in order to accommodate someone else’s. They’re merely my personal opinion, they represent no one, I no longer belong to any party, I’m subject to no one’s orders or instigation, I make my own proposals and personally take responsibility for them. I’m not in the least afraid of being isolated.303

This naiveté of Chen during the May Fourth era turned into disillusionment over organized political parties. Chen very bluntly stated his basic views in November 1940 making a list of

15 points. These views cannot be limited to one political party, which shows Chen’s political maturity and desire to only believe in views he held true, not the popular views of whatever trends the political scene was taking at the time. Some of his most salient views were that war, especially the present imperialist world war304

His “Basic Views” also brought together democracy and socialism, tension that affected Chen’s receptivity to Deweyan ideas once Marxist views took hold in the early 20s.

His advocacy of “proletarian democracy” was offered as contrast to the Soviet slogan of the

“dictatorship of the proletariat” because his proletarian democracy is more egalitarian.

Chen held democracy to be the supremest form of government, and anything along the lines of a dictatorship – even if it was to exalt the proletariat – would be too limiting. Chen maintained that democracy is the “banner under which in every age, ever since humans first developed political organization, right down until the withering away of politics (in

303 Chen and Benton, Chen Duxiu's Last Articles and Letters, 1937-1942, 43. 304 ibid., 71. Cheung133

Greece, in Rome, today, tomorrow), the majority class opposes the privileges of the minority.”305 Although he was advocating a proletarian democracy, he asserted that this proletarian democracy would afford its citizens the same liberties as other democracies around the world, including capitalist democracies. Such rights are the “freedom to assemble, form associations, speak, publish, and strike; and above all the freedom to form a party of opposition.”306 Chen does not refer to any specific Western government in praise of their citizens’ liberties, but he does continually attack Stalin’s “bureaucratic states” which are “brutal, corrupt, hypocritical, fraudulent, rotten, degenerate, and incapable of engendering any form of socialism.”307 Stalin’s infamy for political persecutions, and Mao’s brutality at the helm of the CCP repulsed Chen and his preference for a welcoming government.

WWII and Progress Toward Democracy A return to the orthodox lines of Marxism-Leninism naturally paved the way for the return to ideals of egalitarianism. Certain members of the CCP had denounced democracy as a form of fascism in the early stages of WWII, but Chen chose to defend the Allies. In a

Spring 1940 letter Chen, attacked Stalin’s support of the Nazi division of Poland in August

1939, and about a year later, the USSR was invaded by the Nazis and Stalin naturally reversed his stance on the Nazis.308 Chen and Stalin’s relationship had always been strained, which explains Chen’s attraction to Trotsky, a fellow anti-Stalinist. Chen rhetorically asks, “Why was Lenin’s theory about the 1914 war right?” This question is not only for the purpose of attacking Stalin’s poor reading of WWII, but also frame it was

305 ibid., 71. 306 ibid., 72. 307 ibid., 72. 308 ibid., 46, note 31. Cheung134 fundamentally different from WWI. Lenin’s WWI theory states that war is an inevitable product of world capitalist contradictions, and called on workers to try to militarily defeat own government via civil war rather than fighting in an imperialist war.309 Lenin viewed the national struggle of oppressed people against imperialism as an integral part to the struggle for proletarian liberties, 310 but the problem of Hitler and Fascism is fundamentally different from the struggles of WWI, of Lenin’s time. Chen admitted that there are some comparisons to be made between WWI and WWII since a world socialist revolution has not yet taken hold, but this 1940 letter revealed a much more pragmatic Chen, one who was talking about current events themselves, rather their ideological implications. “‘If Fascism wins, catastrophe will befall the human race, so we should do everything in our power to prevent its victory…’ As I see it, only if Hitler loses his war…can Fascism be thwarted.”311

Chen painted a seriously grim outcome of the post-WWII world in an article from April

1942, where a global “age of darkness” would ensue if Fascism took over. “We should do everything within our subjective might to rout Hitler,” because the era of Fascism would be one of the delaying intermediary stages towards a “world of extensive democracy.”312

Although he was still hesitant at America’s ability to protect proletarian interests,313 he realized that it held the greatest possibility of rescuing the Allied war effort. Soviet Russia

309 ibid., 51, note 42. 310 ibid., 52, note 46. 311 ibid., 52-53. 312 ibid., 90. 313 Trepidation over America’s real interests in creating and protecting a worldwide alliance stems from Wilson’s failure at WWI to help bring China to a more prominent place in the world. “At the end of the last war, Wilson’s Fourteen Points shook the entire planet; the reason they disappeared from the scene was not because Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau hoodwinked Wilson but because Wilson hoodwinked himself…” ibid., 82. Cheung135 was “not entitled to be leading a country, not only because of its low productivity but also because it has long since abandoned socialism.” 314

One month after publishing his initial critique on Fascism, Chen equates Stalinism with Fascism in July 1940, as he viewed them as equally threatening to a mass democratic revolution.”315 Although the Allies, such as US, Britain, and France, have “imperfect democracy,” they are still “worth defending.”316 These imperfect democracies are nonetheless superior to Stalinism and Fascism in the fields of suffrage, right to life, opposition, freedom of speech, and strikes.317

The WWII-era pieces from Benton’s anthology show Chen’s return to nurturing his understanding of democracy. In September 1940, Chen wrote a letter to Xiliu that had been researched for seven years. A view developed over the course of many years helped Chen develop a micro-historical materialism account of the conditions for the rise of democracy, it has a very “specific content.” 318 He announced this protracted process clearly in the letter, wanting to show the audience that his views on China are not made out of anger against the ruling party, but are deliberate. He mixed democracy with other philosophic views, such as Hegelian history with the belief that all of history has been moving towards a goal of democratization through the form of socialism.319 In this letter he is fairer in distributing blame between the individual figures of Stalin, and his historical context.

Because Stalin was in power when he was, to an extent, it was the Soviet’s historical forces of progress that propelled Stalin “towards dictatorship rather democracy… So to ascribe to

314 ibid., 83. 315 ibid., 54. 316 ibid., 65. 317 ibid., 68. 318 ibid., 65. 319 ibid., 60. Cheung136

Stalin all of the Soviet Union’s evils rather than trace their source to the harmful nature of the Soviet dictatorship is tantamount to saying that by toppling Stalin all the Soviet Union’s wrongs would be righted.”320 Despite all the problems Chen and Stalin had, and bitter disagreement over ideology and practice, Chen did not seek to villanize Stalin. He did want to paint Stalin’s government in a bad light in order to attract more people towards a truer proletarian-democratic stance. The main points of contention between Chen and Stalin were also addressed between Qu and Stalin. One of the policy problems that arose during

Chen and Qu’s literature revolution was the inclusion of peasants within the program.

The peasant question during the formative years of the CCP under Chen, then Qu, was a reflection of the difficulty of appending peasant reform to orthodox Marxism. Marx himself disvalues peasants’ potential contributions to bringing about a revolution. In his devaluation, he does not take into consideration a figure such as Mao who rectified the charges Marx brings against peasants. Their oversimplification of peasants’ impetus to change is clearly rebuked in the situation of China – but this does not serve to undermine the importance of the urban class in revolution. Similar to and influenced by Trotsky and the Mensheviks, in the 20s, Chen places all the responsibility of revolution on the urban proletariat. Due to the transitional nature of China’s industry during the rise of the CCP, the urban proletariat came to encompass rural workers.

Chen’s longstanding marginalization of peasants and their potential contribution to his picture of the Chinese revolutionary cause later became a point of Qu’s criticism on

Chen’s inefficient leadership of the CCP. Qu similarly was hesitant about the usefulness of peasants in starting an uprising. Despite Mao’s persistence over the importance of cooing

320 ibid., 65. Cheung137 peasant uprisings, Chen and Qu ignored his pleas for the sake of a differently focused agenda that adhered to the Comintern instructions of the time. Their strict compliance to

Comintern policy may have been detrimental to their revolutionary cause because they had greater knowledge of the “concerns of Chinese Revolution”. Bukharin, Mif, Maring and

Trotsky each published various reports regarding the peculiarity of the Chinese context which they emphasized set the prospect of a Chinese revolution apart from the trajectory of the completed Russian Revolution.

Historiography of Qu’s Superfluous Words Every element of Qu’s Superfluous Words presents the challenge of assuming a certain mode of interpretation. The shaming of Qu’s reputation during Mao’s Cultural

Revolution of the 60s forced him into obscurity in Chinese history books, and it was not until 1970s CPC reformist, , elevated the prominence of Qu’s legacy for the party.321 Even Lee Feigon, widely-known as “Chen’s biographer,” praises this book’s significance in completing Qu’s intellectual history.322 In Alain Roux’s323 interpretation of

Des Mots de Trops [Superfluous Words], Roux believes that Qu does not actually complete a full renunciation of his early revolutionary beliefs. In returning to the classical literary tradition and re-establishing its value on modern life, Roux says that Qu is seeking an entirely different, yet still revolutionary path. Roux does not take the traditional – which includes his co-author/translator Wang Xiaoling’s – viewpoint of Qu’s final resignation and departure from the entire revolutionary movement. Even in Superfluous Words, Qu says “I

321 Ellen Huang, "Superfluous Words (Review)," China Review International 14, no. 1 (2007): 118. 322 ibid.: 117. 323 A professor emeritus from Paris’ L’ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales whose research includes 20th century Chinese workers, Shanghainese urban history, the political elite during the Chinese Republic and Mao’s biography. Cheung138 merely want to rest”324 and he has been “mentally exhausted and a nervous wreck”325 since his first bout of tuberculosis in late 1921, at age 22. In her 2006 book review of Des Mots de

Trops, Marie-Claire Bergère326 thinks Roux’s interpretation is too radical in accordance to

Qu’s text itself.

Interpreting Qu’s Superfluous Words is overall more difficult than Chen’s last articles

– especially considering the conditions under which Qu was working. His lifelong affliction with tuberculosis was quickly deteriorating under the decrepit GMD prison conditions. He was captured because of his involvement with the CCP and was slated for execution. This was written during the last days of his imprisonment, so it was an abbreviated text that is the result of a lifetime of paradoxical feelings about the motivation and worth of his life’s public work.

Qu’s authorship of Superfluous Words occurred just before his execution at the hands of the GMD, and reflects a similar quasi-recantation of his life’s political work, similar to Chen’s in his autobiography. Qu did not offer an alternate, preferred political system like

Chen’s advocacy of a proletarian democracy, since Superfluous Words suggests he did not care at all about politics. Chen still had political interests, it is just the partisanship and bureaucracy of modern politics that disgusted him. Chen attributes his recantation of his socialist views to his lack of an analytical understanding of Western political philosophy, and the true mission of the Comintern. His return to liberalism and democracy as the best

324 Qu and Greenbaum, Superfluous Words, 170. 325 ibid., 148. 326 Marie-Claire Bergere and Michael Black, "Alain Roux & Wang Xiaoling: Qu Qiubai (1899-1935), "Des mots de trop" (duoyu de hua). L’autobiographie d’un intellectuel engagé chinois." China Perspectives [Online] 67 (2005): 223. Cheung139 mode of governance after approximately 30 years is the best way to prove the lasting influence of Dewey and his

Rejection of Public Life and Political Work Throughout Superfluous Words, Qu continually assert his ineptitude in Marxism, and how the CCP placed a disproportionate amount of theoretical and ideological responsibility on Qu’s supposedly “miserable [and] half-baked” understanding of Marxism.327 Despite his travels to Russia and personal familiarity with not just Marxist theory, but also its application, Qu rejects intellectual superiority about the movement. Qu’s last chapter,

“Marxism and Me,” discusses his desire for an individual pursuit of intellectual endeavors – which could include Marxist study, but disagreed with the implicit necessity of collectivism.328 He had no “no wish to entertain any political views that differed from those of the Party leadership” and “always immediately 'abandoned' mistaken views”329 for the sake of keeping the peace. To lose the ability of critical thinking was especially detrimental for someone like Qu who valued his personal literary work so much.

Qu describes his constant inner conflict between his public political action and personal beliefs in the middle chapter of his memoirs: “[My] outlook on life of the proletariat was completely at odds with my hidden gentry consciousness, with my Chinese- style literati consciousness, and with the petit-bourgeois or sordid-merchant consciousness that I developed later.”330

Although Qu’s ascension to CCP leadership after Chen’s resignation/deposition in

1927, coupled with the development of his line regarding a revolutionary literature

327 Qu and Greenbaum, Superfluous Words, 156. 328 ibid., 149-50. 329 ibid., 161. 330 ibid., 152. Cheung140 movement in the early 30s shows his political growth as directly antipodal to Chen’s; he does not directly address his relationship with his comrade in writing until his last work,

Superfluous Words. “Soon [in the mid 20s] I had no option but to oppose Chen Duxiu himself. But I did not really wish to replace them — especially Chen. I truly am one of those who prefer to make peace.”331 Qu too, in the same vein of Chen’s treatment of Stalin, does not want to create animosity between himself and other fellow politicians. I think Chen and

Qu’s fairly temperate attacks against other politicians really point to their eventual disdain for any involvement in that world. They were more critical of the parties themselves, rather than individuals, which also attests to their disdain of the political life. The machination of the political party took away autonomy, and the right to opinions.

Two major points of similarity between these two final works of Chen and Qu are their firm yet self-deprecating tone, as well as their critique of the aggressiveness (both militarily and ideologically) of Soviet Russia. Their deference to the, in retrospect, absurd wishes of the Comintern, played a pivotal role in their interpretations of their lives with the

CCP. They both maintain how powerless they were to reject the bureaucracy of the

Comintern due to a variety of factors, the inertia of historical forces, or discipline and loyalty to the Communist International.

These two men are humble, even to the point of self-deprecation – which I think is a literary play in efforts to guilt existing political parties to reform the current model of politics. Between the two, Qu was more self-deprecating than others, and insisted that he does not “have any genuine knowledge” in any specific “discipline”332 because he is plagued with “indecision and drifting… My opinions wavered, I did not stand firm, and I

331 ibid., 144. 332 ibid., 163. Cheung141 longed to have something to rely on … I never had the courage to fight for my own views, nor for a long time have I had the courage to admit my mistakes.”333 His repeated admission of his ineptitude of serving in a political post is similar to Chen’s absolute disdain for all the time he spent in the public sphere. They both want freedom for themselves in order to pursue what is most interesting to them, either intellectually or politically, but also recognize the necessity of revolution to enable this freedom for all. Qu presented a much weaker portrait of himself than Chen’s continued vivacity throughout the era of WWII, as he admits that he “could not become a proletarian fighter.”334 Qu’s vision of the “most ideal world is one where people have no disputes, but just 'good-naturedly pass through life'”335 Ideologically, Qu’s understanding of Marxism allowed for this positive understanding of a revolution, but in practice, he only wanted to practice the “parasitic thinking of the reclusive scholar”336; that activity held intrinsic worth for him, which contrasts to the active political life where he always felt like doing that work “'on behalf of someone else.'”337

These final autobiographical works both show that there’s finally been a weight lifted off of Chen and Qu, where they are finally admitting to mistakes, taking responsibility for own faults, while tempering this self-humility with a discussion of the Comintern’s blunders.

333 ibid., 163. 334 ibid., 170. 335 ibid., 164. 336 ibid., 149. 337 ibid., 149. Cheung142 Cheung143

Conclusion The irreconcilable differences between the redacted and personal works of Chen and Qu show the struggle of upholding the responsibilities and expectations of occupying the role of CCP leader. The frailty of the CCP until Mao’s rise, especially relative to the GMD, necessitated the involvement of the Comintern in order to secure this party’s future in an increasingly important state such as China in international affairs. The mass of the population alone in the early 20th century in China attracted Stalin. Stalin’s paranoia over the ever-encroaching capitalist powers into his socialist utopia only served as a motivating factor of interest in securing socialism in a geographic neighbor such as China. A viable CCP was improbable without Comintern ideological and material help, but the necessity of the sacrifices of personal intuition and integrity for such support was evident in Chen and Qu.

The roles they played in the CCP were not chosen by these men themselves, rather the circumstances of their time placed them in their respective positions. Chen’s main CCP role was Secretary-General, the highest post with the most authority. Qu’s main CCP role was Marxist theoretician, and only occupied the role of Secretary (not Secretary-General) for a short time after Chen’s deposition. As an obvious figurehead of the New Culture

Movement with long-standing interests in not just revolutionary work, but leading revolutionary work, Chen’s circumstances in the early 20s spiraled towards party leadership without much pursuit of the post itself on his conscious part. Qu lamented the forces of history even more than Chen does in Superfluous Words, fervently regretting the time he wasted in political work. Although they both recant their loyalties to the party, their original interests of revolutionary theory – Chen’s in anti-Confucianism; Qu’s in the Cheung144 literary realm – remain as evident in their last writings. They had to set the specificity of these revolutionary interests aside in pursuit of the broader Communist International plan, which was not addressed directly at anti-Confucianism or literary interests.

The initial omission of their longtime personal pursuits from the party agenda is probably a result of direct and indirect Comintern coercion. Despite the establishment of a

CCP with Chinese leaders, there still existed a power vacuum because the newly born, meagerly supported party had no way to justify itself without the Comintern. The victory of the Bolsheviks not only proved the viability of a socialist victory, but also suggested the impending success of worldwide socialism. In March 1920, a few months after arriving in

Russia, Qu said, “The Russian situation bore much resemblance to that of China…the

Chinese people should carefully think about this, for the history of Russian rev is a very good reference book.”338 This favorable political omen of Bolshevik success, coupled with the economic clout of newly-communist Russia gave the CCP broader appeal in a country ruled by the highly contentious Beiyang Government. Because the Russians had all of these appealing factors, it is understandable why leaders like Chen and Qu would lay aside personal interests in face of the behemoth Soviet Union.

I argue that Chen’s anti-traditionalism, coupled with his calls in the late 30s for greater patience for a revolution in China would have resulted in a less-bloody CCP uprising as experienced under Mao’s armed peasants. Although elected five times to the post of Secretary-General and serving for a total of six years, the development of independent CCP ideology was meager and policy seems solely Comintern influenced. The calls for revolution pre-conversion to Marxism are rooted in his treatment of Western

338 Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-Pai: From Youth to Party Leadership (1899-1928), qtd 86-87. Cheung145 polity as a panacea for all of China’s problems in a post-dynastic world. Through his

Marxism-Leninism lens, he is perturbed even at Russian historical progress, charging it with lethargy and opportunism. In his final works, we see a return to anti-traditionalism, and an even bolder condemnation of Stalinism in favor of a more piecemeal, slower realization towards an eventual proletarian democracy. He never fully renounces historical materialism because he believes in the inevitability of the realization of a truly socialist utopia – one that will naturally occur due to the objective forces of history.

Qu’s recantation and return to his original dynastic viewpoints were multivalent, especially since they were made under such dire circumstances as a prisoner of war.

Because these circumstances were so contentious, it is difficult to establish a “more accurate” reading of Superfluous Words, but using evidence from his more orthodox days,

Qu’s lasting affinity and respect for dynastic prose becomes more apparent, even though he rejects the conception that he is knowledgeable in it. This overwhelming humility is coupled with an absolute desperation for the possibility of an alternate lifestyle that was filled with literature. The problem of ideas versus practice persisted in Qu’s work of recantation – although he clearly exhibited intellectual prowess in his readings of Marxism, the difficulty in applying such knowledge apparently plagued his time in office for the CCP.

For two men who were fully instrumental in establishing the CCP, their 180-degree recantations could be viewed to prefigure a whole variety of things. It is almost tragic, the way both Chen and Qu seem so defeated about what askew policies transpired during their time with the CCP – yet their final works are not wholly pessimistic. Despite things not going according to their idealistic plans circa May Fourth and New Youth Magazine, the faith and optimism still exhibited for a future China shows a level of pride in their work. Cheung146

Their invaluable contribution of a concerted intellectual and political development of

Marxism for China offered a practical revolutionary ideology that could be molded to enable the Chinese mass’ interest.

The pioneering efforts of Chen’s May Fourth movement and Qu’s development of the

Chinese understanding of Marxism were instrumental in establishing a socialist-based party in China. The failures of dynastic attempt at reform set up the appropriate social and historical conditions that allowed for figures like Chen and Qu to emerge and make a meaningful and historically significant contribution to the emerging revolutionary movement in China of the early 20th century. A further investigation of their final works might explain better the political policies they followed under the Comintern’s direction.

This comparison of their lives and intellectual histories serves as a different way to interpret the CCP as beyond Mao’s mobilization of the peasants.

Cheung147

Appendix

China Timeline

1800s 1839-42, 1856-60 Opium Wars 1866 (Nov 12) Sun Yat-sen born 1874 (April 22) Wu Peifu born 1879 (Oct 8) Chen Duxiu born 1887 (Oct 31) Chiang Kai-shek born 1888 (Oct 29) Li Dazhao born 1893 (Dec 26) Mao Zedong born 1894 (Aug – April 1895) First Sino-Japanese War, Chinese defeated and Japan wins Taiwan according to terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 1899 (Jan 29) Qu Qiubai born

1900s 1899 (-1901) Boxer Uprising 1902 Chen Duxiu goes to Japan for first time for studies, forms Chinese Youth Society 1903 Chen Duxiu returns to China from Japan 1905 Abolition of Imperial Examination System 1907 Chen Duxiu goes to Japan for second time 1911 Republic of China founded 1912 Fall of Qing Dynasty (Feb – Dec 1928) Rise of Beiyang Government 1913 Chen Duxiu arrested for first time, flees to Japan for third time 1915 (Feb) Qu Qiubai’s mother commits suicide (Sept 15) Chen Duxiu founds La Jeunesse in Shanghai 1917 Chen Duxiu named Dean of Letters at Peking University (Summer) Qu Qiubai admitted to the Russian Language Institute 1918 (Jan) Li Dazhao and Hu Shih, among others join New Youth Magazine editorial board Li Dazhao founds Marxist Study Society in Peking (Dec) Weekly Review by Chen Duxiu, 1919 (May – July 1921) John Dewey lectures in China May 4th Movement (June) Versailles Treaty 1920 (March) Qu Qiubai joins Li Dazhao’s Marxist Study Group (Oct – Dec 1922) Qu Qiubai leaves for Russia as correspondent for Peking Morning Post 1921 (July 23-31) Founding/First Congress of the CCP held in Shanghai Chen Duxiu elected Secretary-General of CCP 1922 (July) Second Congress of the CCP held in Shanghai, Chen re-elected Cheung148

(Nov) Chen Duxiu goes to Russia for the Fourth Congress of the Comintern 1923 Adoption of a formal United Front policy between GMD-CCP and Comintern (Jan) Qu Qiubai, along with Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzi arrive back in Peking from Russia Qu joins Literary Research Society in Shanghai (Feb) Warlord Wu Peifu launches successful attack on communist railway uprising (June) Third CCP Congress held in Canton, Chen re-elected (Oct) Borodin arrives in China 1924 (Jan) First GMD Congress 1925 (March 12) Sun Yat-sen dies May 30th Movement 1926 La Jeunesse ends publication (March 20) Chiang Kai-shek leads coup d’état against CCP at Changsha (July – 1928) Northern Expedition led by GMD’s Chiang Kai-shek 1927 Li Dazhao dies (Feb-March) Communists take Shanghai in uprising led by Qu Qiubai (April 28) Li Dazhao dies (April-May) Fifth CCP Congress in Hankow/, Chen re-elected (March) Mao publishes “Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan” (July) Chen Duxiu resigns as Secretary-General of CCP (July) Qu becomes Secretary of CCP (Aug 1) Nanchang Uprising Autumn Harvest Uprisings of Hunan, and Guangdong led by Mao Zedong Canton Commune 1928 (Dec) End of Northern Expedition, bringing the fall of Beiyang Government Chinese reunification under the banner of 1929 (Nov 15) Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzi expelled from CCP (-1930) Qu Qiubai develops a form of Latinized Chinese 1932 (June 15) Chen Duxiu arrested by GMD 1935 (June 18) Qu Qiubai dies (execution by GMD), aged 36 1937 (July – Sept 1945) Second Sino-Japanese War (Aug) Chen Duxiu released from prison 1939 (Dec 4) Wu Peifu dies, aged 65 1942 (May 27) Chen Duxiu dies of heart attack, aged 62 1975 (April 5) Chiang Kai-shek dies 1976 (Sept 9) Mao Zedong dies

Cheung149

Europe/The West Timeline

1700s 1775-83 American Revolutionary War 1789 French Revolution

1800s 1818 (May) Karl Marx born 1839-42, 1856-60 Opium Wars 1848 Publication of Manifesto of the Communist Party by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 1870 Vladimir Lenin born 1878 Joseph Stalin born 1879 Leon Trotsky born 1883 (March) Karl Marx dies

1900s 1905 Russian Revolution Establishment of Constitutional Russian Monarchy under Nicholas II 1914 Start of WWI 1917 US declares war on Germany, marking their entry into WWI October/Bolshevik Revolution 1919 End of WWI, Treaty of Versailles 1921 Lenin's New Economic Policy (Jan) Qu Qiubai arrives in Russia 1922 (Jan) First Congress of Toilers of the Far East (Nov-Dec) Fourth Congress of the Comintern (Dec) Qu Qiubai, Chen Duxiu and Peng Shu-tse leave Russia 1924 Vladimir Lenin dies Founding of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow 1927 (Oct) Trotsky and Zinoviev expelled from Central Committee (Nov) Trotsky and Zinoviev expelled from Russian Communist Party 1929 (until 1920) Qu Qiubai develops his alphabet for romanizing Chinese characters (Feb) Trotsky and family exiled from Soviet Union Trotsky publishes The Permanent Revolution 1938 Founding of the Fourth International comprised of Trotskyist factionalists 1940 Leon Trotsky assassinated in Mexico by Stalin forces 1953 Joseph Stalin dies

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