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UNHCR Mosul Emergency Response Since October 2016 25 September 2017

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UNHCR Mosul Emergency Response Since October 2016 25 September 2017 UNHCR Mosul Emergency Response Since October 2016 25 September 2017 UNHCR Co-coordinated Clusters: 1,097,466 displaced since 17 October 2016 Camp/Site Plots Tents Complete +of whom 823,260 are NFI Kits WƌŽƚĞĐƟŽŶ ƐƟůůĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůLJĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ & ;ŽͲĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚďLJhE,ZΘZͿ Targets:44,000 60,000 87,500 ƐƐŝƐƚĞĚďLJhE,Z 10,586 KĐĐƵƉŝĞĚ DistribƵted SŚĞůƚĞƌΘE&/ 8,931 2,252 454,392 249,493 16,849 ( (Co-coordinated ďLJhE,ZΘEZͿ 19,576 16,557 16,398 ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ Developed Plots Available assisted assisted Camp ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƟŽŶΘ 34,671 74,662 ĂŵƉDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ in camps ŽƵƚŽĨĐĂŵƉƐ 7,924 34,220 /ŶĐůƵĚĞƐĐŽŶŇŝĐƚͲĂīĞĐƚĞĚ ĚĚŝƟŽŶĂůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĚĚŝƟŽŶĂůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ! ;ŽͲĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚďLJhE,ZΘ/KDͿ ƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶǁŚŽǁĞƌĞ ŶĞǀĞƌĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ in 2017 in 2017 Derkar dhZ<z Batifa 20km UNHCR Protection Monitoring for Mosul Response Zakho Amadiya Amedi Mergasur Soran Ü 47,937 HHs Assessed Dahuk Sumel Dahuk ^zZ/EZ 226,503 IndividƵals ZWh>/ DAHUK Akre Choman Mosul Dam Lake Shikhan Soran Choman Amalla ISLADIC B Mosul Dam Nargizlia 1 Nargizlia 2 B ZEPUBLIC Tilkaif Zelikan (new)(n Telafar OF IZAN BQaymawaQ (Zelikan) Shaqlawa 62,522 64,442 53,110 46,429 NINEWA HHamdaHdHamHamdaniyaddaa iyaiyyay Al Hol HasanshamHaasasanshams U2 campp MosulMoMosuMososussululul HasanshamHasansham U3 Rania BartellaBartellBartelllalaB Pshdar BBBBHasanshamHhM2HHasanaanshnnsshamsh M2 Mosul KhazerKhazehaha M1 Plots in UNHCR Constructed Camps Sinjar BChamakorChamakor Al Salamiyah SSaalamiyahalamiyyah Erbil Hammamammama Al-AlilAlil 2 Al Salamiyah 2 & 3 DUKAN BB B RESERVOIR Occupied Plots Developed Plots Undeveloped Plots HammamHammH Al-Alil AAl Alil Erbil B Al ^alamiyaŚ 2 & 3 4͕1,104724 1͕028 4,248 Z/>ZZ/ZZ//>> Koisnjaq Ba'Aj Dokan B Hammam AlͲAlil 2 4͕622 50 Debaga 1 Debaga stadium BB Debaga 2 B Surdash B Debaga (Extension)) Amalla 3͕032 B Sharbazher Al Qaiyaraaraa A total of 28,729 plots planned Qayyarah Airstriprststripsstrsttrtripipp B CŚamakor 1͕250 1͕15045 BBBBHHaj Ali for 172,000 IDPs B QayyaQaQayyQQayyarah-Jad’ahayyaya y Dabes B HasansŚam U3 1͕648 288 Makhmur IZAQ Sulaymaniyah Ba'aj BBustan Al Sheuokh B Daquq 1͕600 Ͳ of which SULAzDANIzAH Al Qawsiat Chamchamal B 1͕131 429265 Shirqathirq Kirkuk HasansŚam U2 Rashedeya A total of 24,481 plots developed Al-Fawqania B 147 882 Besan Qaymaǁa (Zelikan) Jarf Military KIZKUK for 146,886 IDPs Almawsil Area Jawania Al-Araby Al-Kindy Alnahda 65 Al-Qayrawan Hawiga B Laylan 2 935 65 Al-Hadbah Daquq 1 Family per plot and Al-Qusur Al-SadeeqAl-Suker Al-Masarif Al-Tahrir B Laylan 2 Alrriasia BB 6 Individuals per family Al-Markaz Al-BareedAl-Moharebeen /ZY Laylan C B 1͕000 Al-Jamiy Al-Baladyat Olympic ^tadium Mshearfa/al-kaneasa Al-Rabee Al-Jamiaa Al-Rahmaa Al-Andalus Al-Zohoor Al-Thaqafah Ali bn abi taleeb Arbachya B Al-Shortah Al-Mothana AlͲAlam 500Ͳ Al-Ghabat Al-Athar 17 July Kolan Al-Dor Al-Afraah Haramat Almohandiseen SALAH Baiji Kalar Badr Aljeser Althalet Al-Hashemya Al-Akha'a AlA Alam Alam (2,3,4,5) ( ĂŵƉƐĂŶĚĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐLJƐŝƚĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞůŽĐĂƟŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĞƌDŽƐƵůĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌ͘1,350,426 IDPs Al-Kobra Bab Aljeser AlkhamisAl-Zeraee Al Sh'hamahmahmamahB Al-Gazaer Al-Taameem AL-DIN B Baba Nur Singar Al AlamAll Al-Eqtesadyeen Al-Shifaa Al-Naser B ĨƌŽŵƌďŝů͕EŝŶĞǁĂ͕^ĂůĂŚĂůͲŝŶĂŶĚ<ŝƌŬƵŬ'ŽǀĞƌŶŽƌĂƚĞƐǁĞƌĞĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚĚƵĞƚŽŚŽƐƟůŝƟĞƐƐŝŶĐĞ Aljaser Alqadeem Al-Nabi Ninawa Kolan Mosul Al-Khatoneia Al-Faysalya YounisAl-Sharqia Al-Karama Cemetery Olympic Stadiumadiuma TikritTikrit Tooz Al-Senaa Tammam Al-Senaa B ƉƌŝůϮϬϭϲ͘ Shaikh Al-Qudus Al-Thawra Shaikh Al-Malya Fathi Aboalaula Alhuria Al-Safaa Al-Anabi Al-Dobat Kifri Bab Rizgary Al-Yarmook Aljeser Alrabe'a Al-Rafdin Al-Gadeeda Albeez BabAl-Dawassa B Completed IDP Camp ;ϭϬͿ;ϭϴ͕ϳϮϵƉůŽƚƐͿKalar Al-jadeed Tarek Ragem ben zyad Al-Wahda Nablus Hadead Al-Amel Al-Khizlani Al-Rahman 2 Al Janubeya Tal Al-Mansoor Wadie Mosul Almazarie B hŶĚĞƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟŽŶ/WĂŵƉ;ϭͿ;ϭϬ͕ϬϬϬƉůŽƚƐͿ Al-Jadeed Al-Romman Hagar UNHCR Funding Requirements International Al-Sabaawe Daur Kifri Airport Falastin ANBAAl-MaamoonZ Domez B Ghazlani Al-Hureia džŝƐƟŶŐ/WĐĂŵƉǁŝƚŚƐƉĂƌĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚLJKhanaqin Khosravi military @ training center Mosul B Khanaqin Sugar /WŵĞƌŐĞŶĐLJƐŝƚĞŽƌĐĂŵƉďLJƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐDIzALA Factory Ibn-Al-Atheer Daur B ZĞĨƵŐĞĞĂŵƉ USD 212 million Al-Salam Jalawla Jleawkhan Al-Harragiya Husain Samarra DĂŝŶZŽĂĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůŽƌĚĞƌƐSadiyah & Al-Ghabat Basha Samarra BUHAYRAT ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŝŶϮϬϭϳĨŽƌDŽƐƵů Jleawkhan HAMRIN ZŽĂĚ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŽƌĂƚĞŽƵŶĚĂƌLJ Al-Ghazaki Khalis Manssuriyt Al Jabal Ashor Bridge Al MansuriyahŝƐƚƌŝĐƚŽƵŶĚĂƌLJ Thethar ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐLJƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ 2km Balad ŝƚLJMuqdadiya EĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚŽƵŶĚĂƌLJBaladrooz The boundaries and names shown and the designaƟons used on this map do not imply oĸcial endorsement or acceptance by the United NaƟons. Sources: UNHCR, UNOCHA, CCCM Cluster, Shelter/NFI CLuster, IOM DTM. Geographic Coordinate System: GCS-WGS.
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