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MPI Policy Brief Iraq 4 Policy Brief MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE February 2003 ■ No. 2 Refugees from War in Iraq What Happened in 1991 and What May Happen in 2003 Peter W. Galbraith, Professor of National Security Studies at the National War College and a former US Ambassador to Croatia SUMMARY The 1991 Gulf War produced nearly three million refugees. Almost all them left Iraq and Kuwait before the war started or after Desert Storm was over. The largest groups were Kurds and Shi’ites fleeing Saddam Hussein’s vengeance after a failed post-war uprising, Palestinians driven out of Kuwait, and foreign workers who lost their jobs in Iraq and Kuwait. The international community failed to anticipate the uprising against Saddam Hussein (even though the president of the United States called for it to take place) and was poorly equipped to deal with the massive humanitarian consequences. Ultimately, the victorious coali- tion intervened to save the Kurds by creating a safe area in the north- ern part of Iraq that solved the immediate humanitarian problem and enabled people to return home. No one intervened on behalf of the Shi’ites, most of whom were not able to find refuge in another country. Some estimates indicate up to 200,000 Shi’ites were killed between March and October 1991. Refugee flows from a new Gulf war between Iraq and a US-led coalition are very scenario-dependent, but will not be a replay of 1991. Protected by the US and UK and controlling territory free from Saddam Hussein’s control, the Kurds are the Iraqis least likely to be displaced in a new war. The other populations who moved en masse in the last war—the Palestinians, along with other Arabs and Asian guest workers—are no longer around to be displaced. Fighting between a collapsing regime and its rebellious subjects poses the greatest risk to Iraqi civilians in a new war. The risk is particularly acute in the South, where grievances have intensified since 1991, but The views expressed are personal ones and do also in Baghdad which may now be a Shi’ite-majority city. Brutal tactics not reflect the official policy or position of the to repress opposition and revenge-taking by rebels could lead hundreds National Defense University, the Department of thousands to leave their homes at least temporarily. Were Saddam of Defense or the US Government, or the Hussein to stage an effective defense of Baghdad—an unlikely event in views of the Migration Policy Institute. the author’s judgment—more than one million Baghdad residents could MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE flee the fighting. In the worst-case scenario, Iraq’s the auspices of NGOs, the Kurdistan Regional use of weapons of mass destruction could lead to mil- Governments, or (with an expansion of mandate) the lions of refugees and internally displaced persons United Nations. (IDPs). 2. Prophylactic and curative supplies should be Saddam Hussein’s regime is the primary reason Iraqis stockpiled to deal with a possible use of biological have fled their homes and country. An effective alter- and chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime against native administration—whether by the US military, dissident Iraqis. At greatest risk are Shi’ites in the the UN, or a new Iraqi government—should enable southern cities, who are likely to rebel against the IDPs and refugees to return to their homes. If, as is regime as US forces approach. The Kurdish-con- likely, the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime is trolled region is also vulnerable. In August 2002, chaotic, it may take an occupation force or a new gov- Kurdish leaders formally asked the US Administration ernment some time to create conditions that will for antibiotics (including CIPRO), smallpox vaccines, enable people to return home safely. This may be par- and protective gear against chemical weapons attacks. ticularly true in the South, where Shi’ite rebels may While it is now too late to distribute supplies to the have no functioning leadership structure. urban populations in Iraqi Kurdistan, it is still possible to deliver antibiotics to hospitals, to vaccinate In contrast, the quasi-democratic Kurdish administra- Kurdish first responders, and to provide first respon- tions in the North will almost certainly emerge from a ders and medical personnel with protective clothing. war unscathed, and possibly strengthened. Since This should be done before the start of hostilities. Kurdish-controlled areas will be an easily accessible safe area for Iraqis, it could see a large influx of civil- 3. The United States and its allies should initiate dis- ians during and after a war. The local authorities do cussions with Kurdish and Turkoman leaders regarding not have the resources to cope with such an influx, the return of displaced people to Kirkuk, and other and will require significant outside help. While the areas now under government control that have histori- infrastructure to facilitate the delivery of humanitari- cally had a large Kurdish and Turkoman population. an supplies is quite good in Iraqi Kurdistan, it would The goal should be to devise clear procedures for be useful if some supplies were in-country before the returns, which then must be publicized to the dis- refugees arrived. placed populations. A program for returns provides the best hope to avoid chaos and violence associated Certain categories of people will be especially vulner- with spontaneous returns. able during and after regime change. These include the supporters of Saddam Hussein, Ba’ath Party mem- 4. The US and allied military forces should establish bers, and the security services, many of whom are procedures under which Iraqis fleeing the fighting or responsible for human rights abuses and other serious internal unrest can find sanctuary behind allied lines. crimes. Arabs resettled in Kurdish homes in Kirkuk, Anti-regime Iraqis will need to be sheltered in a differ- and other regime-held parts of Kurdistan, may find ent location from fleeing supporters of the old regime. themselves suddenly homeless. Iraq has provided a base for radical and terrorist groups that likely will be 5. A broad amnesty (for all but the top leadership) targeted by the occupation forces of the US and its may be militarily useful in inducing those holding allies, or a new Iraqi regime. military and other positions in the current regime not to fight. However, an amnesty may further encourage Iraqis to administer summary justice to regime sup- RECOMMENDATIONS porters. If there is an amnesty, it should be limited to Iraqi military personnel, and not include security per- 1. Humanitarian supplies should be pre-positioned sonnel or Ba’ath Party officials. The US and its allies inside Iraqi Kurdistan to cope with a possible influx should publicize procedures under which Iraqis of Iraqis from government-controlled territory. responsible for crimes will be tried, making clear that Supplies can be stored in existing warehouses under ad hoc justice is neither necessary nor tolerable. 2 Policy Brief 6. Arrangements should be made to enable the orderly ders with Turkey and Iran, the Kurds died at such a surrender of the Mojahideen-i-Khalq, the PKK (now rapid rate that the Allies had to re-intervene militarily Kadek), and other non-Iraqi armed groups operating in Iraq to find a solution. The Shi’ites did not have in the country. Those involved in terrorism should be the same escape valve, and their suffering after the interned and eventually tried. The Kurdistan uprising was enormous. Those fortunate enough to Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I), which has operated make it to Iran (or Kuwait or Saudi Arabia) did not in the north of Iraq for decades and whose leadership attract much attention, in part because these areas has been the victim of state-sponsored terrorism, were much less accessible to western media. should be left alone. Kuwait Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 created I:THE FIRST GULF WAR (1990–1991) the first group of refugees in the Gulf conflict. These included Kuwaitis caught outside their country and The 1991 Gulf War produced between two and those who escaped across the desert after the invasion three million refugees from Iraq, as well as signifi- began, Asian guest workers who moved to camps in cant movements of people from Kuwait and the Iraq before being repatriated through Jordan, and Arab other Gulf states. The largest single group of (mostly Egyptian) workers in Iraq who lost their liveli- refugees was made up of Iraqi Kurds, 1.85 million hoods as a result of sanctions imposed on the country. of whom fled to the Turkish (450,000) and Iranian These, too, mostly were repatriated by way of Jordan. A (1.4 million) borders in the aftermath of the failed few thousand western men in Iraq and Kuwait were March 1991 uprising. Palestinians constituted the held as human shields at Iraqi military and industrial second major group uprooted by the war, as sites before finally being released in January 1991, just 300,000 settled in Jordan after either being before the start of military operations. expelled from a liberated Kuwait and other Gulf states, or leaving an Iraq that no longer offered eco- After the liberation of Kuwait, most of its substantial nomic opportunities. More than 500,000 foreign Palestinian population left or was expelled. Kuwaitis workers lost their livelihoods as a result of Iraq’s saw Palestinians as a potential Iraqi fifth column, a invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing war. These perception abetted by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s include several hundred thousand Egyptian laborers decision to side with Iraq against Kuwait and by some in Iraq, as well as Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Sri high-level collaboration between the Iraqi occupation Lankans, Indians, and Filipinos who were the authorities and Palestinians in Kuwait (notably those housekeepers, maids, construction workers, street managing the country’s financial resources).
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