Aspects of Fides in Roman Diplomatic Relations During the Conquest of Iberia
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Fides Romana: Aspects of fides in Roman diplomatic relations during the conquest of Iberia. Sara Perley A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the degree of Master of Arts, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. January 2012. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the ideology and reality of fides in Roman international relations, using the conquest of Iberia as a case study. It seeks to show that despite the ideology, the self-belief in Rome’s cultural superiority and the competitive nature of the Roman state resulted in the disregard for the precepts of fides in martial diplomacy. The first chapter looks at the role of fides in domestic and international society and examines how the ethical principle of fides developed into a nationalistic ideology. The second chapter investigates Roman conduct during the conquest of Iberia from the second Punic war until Tiberius Gracchus established a treaty with the Celtiberi in 178 BCE in light of this ideology. The final chapter reviews the reality of fides in Roman action in both Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior during the Celtiberi and Lusitanian wars and the Roman quest for control. This discussion ultimately seeks to provide an analysis of fides in international diplomatic affairs and a justification of Rome’s choice of action in the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. It emerges that fides was a principle appealed to only when it served the ultimate goal of commanders and the Senate. However, when faced with the realities of war, fides was sacrificed for success and dominion. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge and thank all those people who have provided me with inspiration, support, and encouragement over the last 18 months. In particular, I am grateful to my supervisor, Associate Professor Jon Hall for his patience and assistance throughout my thesis. His advice and comments on my various drafts have been invaluable. I would like to thank my friends and family, especially my mother and Chelsea Johnston, their insights and suggestions on improvements were greatly appreciated. I am indebted to Laura Imanse. I am grateful for her continuous support and encouragement. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i Acknowledgements iii Abbreviations v Maps vi Introduction x I - The Roman Perception of Fides 1 Fides in Domestic Affairs 5 Ideology in International Affairs 16 II - Fides in Iberia: Roman Conduct 210-178 47 Difficulties and Methodology 47 Iberia: 231-177 - Warfare and “Rebellions” 69 Individualism of Commanders 98 The Reality of Fides 218-178 105 III – Fides in Iberia: Roman Conduct 177-95 106 Celtiberian Wars 153-133 BCE 107 Lusitanian Wars 154-138 BCE 129 Fides’ Failure 140 Conclusion 143 Bibliography 147 Cover illustration: Submission of the barbarians to Marcus Aurelius, relief panel from a triumphal arch. C. AD 176-182. Palazzo dei conservatori, Rome. Photo from Ramage (2009) 270. iv ABBREVIATIONS AE L’Année Epigraphique, Paris. CIL Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, Berlin. IG Inscriptiones Graecae, Berlin. IGRR Cagnat, R. (ed.), Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes, Sofia. ILS Dessau, H. (ed.), Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, Berlin, 1962. MRR Broughton, T. R. S. Magistrates of the Roman Republic, Vol. 1, Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984. OGIS Dittenburger, W. (ed.), Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae I-II, Leipzig. OLD Glare, P. G.W. (ed.), Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. ORF3 Malvocati, H. Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta (3rd edition), Pavia, 1969. RDGE Sherk, R. Roman documents from the Greek East, Baltimore, 1969. SIG Dittenburger, W. (ed.) Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, Leipzig. TLL Thesarus Linguae Latinae. Lipsiae: In aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1900.- Abbreviations for ancient authors and their works follow the conventions used in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (3rd Edition). v MAPS I - SPAIN. RICHARDSON (1986) 12. vi II - SPAIN DURING THE HANNIBALIC WAR. ECKSTEIN (1986) 192. vii III – IBERIAN PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS DURING THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. LE ROUX (2010) 365. viii IV - THE ROMAN CONQUEST OF IBERIA. RICHARDSON (1996) 42. ix INTRODUCTION The study of diplomacy and foreign affairs allows us to understand how the Roman people understood themselves and their world, and how Rome viewed its own empire at different stages of its development. Investigations of Roman diplomacy have traditionally been subsumed into studies of Roman imperialism. Scholars of imperialism examine how and why the Roman state came to amass and control a large area of Europe and the Mediterranean. However, martial diplomacy and Roman foreign interaction are topics in their own right. To fully understand the rationale and motivation behind Roman action, Roman methods of conquest in different areas need to be studied individually. Typically, scholars examine Roman foreign interactions in a broad and theoretical manner. Few investigations examine how well the reality of Roman martial diplomacy matched the Roman ideological view of their actions. Habitually, scholars examine the theory and practice of Roman affairs both domestically and internationally in an attempt to understand the Roman political system as a whole, or they study the acts of Roman armies to support a view of Roman imperialism. Studies that focus on one area are often equally as broad in scope, focussing on the history of the conquest of an area and the later ramifications of this conquest. Such studies provide rationalisations and understandings of Roman action. However, such large scopes offer conclusions about Rome in general. They risk over-generalising Roman action and offering grand conclusions that do not fit in particular and contingent circumstances. An understanding of how Rome formed its empire was fundamental to my investigation. Studies of imperialism provide perspectives on Roman motivations of conquest. Sources such as Badian’s 1958 Foreign Clientelae argue that the Roman state x in general was reluctant to subjugate and oversee foreign lands. His thesis supports that of ‘defensive imperialism’.1 Rome did not set out to conquer the world. But at the same time, the Roman state desired to control it. According to Badian, to fulfil this desire for superiority, without the burden of administration, Rome extended its domestic procedure of patronage to international relations. Instead of annexing nations, the Senate enrolled them as clients. It left them to their own devices so long as they acknowledged Rome’s authority. Somewhat problematically, Badian believed in a common purpose of the Senate. He denied the individual motives and effect of aristocratic competition on international affairs. Harris’ War and Imperialism in Republican Rome (1979) focuses on the idea of Rome’s aggressive imperialist agenda and attempts to counter the thesis of ‘defensive imperialism’ argued by numerous scholars preceding him, most famously by Mommsen. Harris provides valuable information about the usefulness of war for individual aristocrats in Rome. He discusses the ramifications of individualism and how it, along with the greed, motivated the Roman state to actively seek new territory. Individuals’ desire for status, wealth, and gloria forced the continuation of conflict. Harris’ points are valid. However, he attempts to argue that economic gain was a formula that explained all Roman martial expeditions, and that all wars were due to Roman aggression. He denies the Roman Senate any sense of morality or that other nations induced conflict. Aggressive imperialism ignores the complexities of international affairs. Gruen in The Hellenistic world and the coming of Rome (1984), rebuts Harris’ doctrine of Roman aggression. He argues instead that Rome entered the Greek world 1 Defensive Imperialism is the idea that Rome never set out to conquer the world, instead it entered war to preserve its safety and security and that of its allies. Any new territory was only gained as a consequence of Rome defending itself against threats. xi fully accepting the Greek methods of diplomacy. They were willing to accept Greek customs rather than aggressively interfering. Gruen asserts that Rome was reluctant to enter into martial disputes, reacting only when necessary rather than instigating battles. They did however interfere freely. Problematically, he, like Badian, assumes senatorial decisions are cohesive. This assumption is not supported in this investigation, and is contrary to Roman social competition. He, unlike Harris, acknowledges Polybius’ flaws and falsehoods, regarding what he perceived to be fact, instead of always taking Polybius’ words as truth. Gruen asserts that Rome did not have a grand plan when they entered Greece, but instead conquered due to circumstance. As we shall see, the idea of circumstantial conquest can be attributed to the Iberian conquest as well. Richardson’s Hispaniae: Spain and the development of Roman Imperialism 218- 82 B.C. (1986) provides a closer examination of Roman imperialism focusing on its effects in the Iberian Peninsula from 218-82 B.C.E. Like Harris, he argues that military aggression was the source of Roman power and that the commanders sent there to wage war established the groundwork for provincial government, thus allowing conquest. Through their own volition, these individual commanders made agreements to stop conflict. As conditions for doing so, they regularly established new towns and taxation policies. Richardson’s monograph emphasises the circumstantial and accidental nature of conquest. He argues that it was through these procedures that Rome could establish