An Aristotelian Solution to the Problem of Internal Minorities
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AN ARISTOTELIAN SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL MINORITIES by Cynthia Swinehart B.A. in political science, American University, 1993 M.A. in philosophy, University of Michigan, 2002 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2014 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH KENNETH P. DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This thesis was presented by Cynthia Swinehart It was defended on April 7, 2014 and approved by James Allen, Professor of Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Sandra Mitchell, Professor and Chair, Department of History and Philosophy of Science Kieran Setiya, Professor, Department of Philosophy Thesis Director: Michael Thompson, Professor, Department of Philosophy ii Copyright © by Cynthia Swinehart 2014 iii AN ARISTOTELIAN SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL MINORITIES Cynthia Swinehart, M.A., Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh, 2014 In this thesis I consider what type of authority religious and cultural minority groups should be allowed to exercise over their members and how the use of this authority can be justified. This has become an important question in political philosophy over the past forty years, as these groups have demanded greater autonomy from the state, while treating their members in ways that are incompatible with liberal commitments to equal protection and individual autonomy. This issue is sometimes referred to as the problem of internal minorities. Virtually all of the approaches to the problem of internal minorities rely, either directly or indirectly, on the liberal principle of legitimacy. According to this principle, the exercise of political authority is legitimate only if the individuals affected by the use of this authority have consented to it. I argue that the liberal principle of legitimacy should not be used to resolve questions related to the treatment of internal minorities because it presupposes a conception of autonomy that cannot be satisfied by the members of religious and cultural minority groups. Autonomy requires the capacity for sunesis, which involves making accurate judgments about the actions, motivations and advice of other people, especially about what is needed to live well. Because many religious and cultural minority groups are socially and linguistically isolated, impose strict punishments for disobeying the practices of the community and discourage their members from questioning the authority of their leaders, it could be difficult for them to develop this capacity. iv In light of these problems, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of eunomia should be used to determine whether the norms and practices of these groups are legitimate. A well-ordered community promotes political excellence and justice as a virtue of character; makes legal decisions based on facts, rather than prejudice or anger; gives honors to the virtuous; and prevents its citizens from being very rich or very poor. Eunomia fosters the moral development of community members, strengthens relationships between them and helps the community achieve homonoia, a condition in which individuals agree about what is in their common interest and do what they have resolved in common. v TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 2.0 AUTONOMY ............................................................................................................... 8 2.1 CRITICAL REFLECTION .............................................................................. 10 2.2 OBJECTIONS.................................................................................................... 14 3.0 SUNESIS ..................................................................................................................... 23 3.1 SUNESIS AND AUTONOMY .......................................................................... 25 3.2 INTERNAL MINORITIES AND SUNESIS ................................................... 36 3.3 OBJECTIONS.................................................................................................... 42 3.3.1 Hypothetical Consent .................................................................................... 43 3.3.2 Neutrality ........................................................................................................ 48 3.3.3 Renegotiation and Dissent............................................................................. 53 4.0 EUNOMIA .................................................................................................................. 58 4.1 EUNOMIA AND LEGITIMACY .................................................................... 58 4.1.1 Political Excellence ........................................................................................ 61 4.1.2 Justice ............................................................................................................. 72 4.1.3 Honor .............................................................................................................. 75 4.1.4 Emotion........................................................................................................... 77 4.2 INTERNAL MINORITIES AND EUNOMIA ................................................ 79 vi 4.3 ADVANTAGES ................................................................................................. 85 4.4 OBJECTIONS.................................................................................................... 88 4.4.1 Neutrality ........................................................................................................ 89 4.4.2 Education ........................................................................................................ 90 4.4.3 Normativity .................................................................................................... 93 5.0 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 101 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 106 vii PREFACE I would like to thank the members of my committee for their assistance with this project. I also would like to thank the other faculty members of the Philosophy Department at the University of Pittsburgh who have discussed this project with me, including Anil Gupta, Kristen Inglis, Michael Kessler and Japa Pallikkathayil. Elizabeth Anderson, Steve Darwall, Lisa Parker, Peter Railton, Laura Ruetsche, David Vellemen and Andrea Westlund have helped to develop my interests in ethics, feminist theory and political philosophy over the years. I am grateful to all of them. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my parents and grandparents for their encouragement and support. viii 1.0 INTRODUCTION In On Liberty John Stuart Mill argued that the practice of polygamy among Mormons is ‘a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them.’ Still, he argued, no community has a right to force another to be civilized. So long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities, I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are distinctly interested appear to be satisfied should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant, who have no part or concern in it. (On Liberty 177-179) The question of whether Mormons should be allowed to practice polygamy, the Amish should be permitted to withdraw their children from school at the age of fourteen and, more generally, how religious and cultural minority groups should be allowed to treat their members has been widely debated since Mill wrote On Liberty. It has become an increasingly important question in political philosophy over the past forty years, as these groups have demanded greater autonomy from the state while treating women, political dissidents and other minorities within the community in ways that are incompatible with liberal commitments to equal protection and individual rights. This issue is sometimes referred to as the problem of internal minorities (Deveaux 2; Moore 272). 1 In On Liberty Mill argued that the state should not intervene in the practices of religious and cultural minority groups as long as they do not harm other groups and allow those who are dissatisfied with their practices ‘perfect freedom of departure’ (On Liberty 178). Today liberals such as Brian Barry, Jeff Spinner-Halev and Chandran Kukathas also appeal to the idea of exit rights to decide how religious and cultural minority groups should be allowed to treat their members. Kukathas, for instance, argues that, as long as the members of these groups have minimal rights of exit, they have consented to its authority – and the exercise of this authority is legitimate (Mertel 4-6).1 Liberals who do not appeal to exit rights to resolve questions related to the treatment of internal minorities also rely on the idea of consent. For example, Marilyn Friedman argues that the norms and practices of religious and cultural minority groups are legitimate if all of the groups within the community that are affected by these practices have consented to them (Friedman 183).2 In fact, virtually all