2020 FIU CUBA POLL HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Creating a Just, Peaceful and Prosperous World
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2...... Foreword
3...... About the Pollsters
4...... Executive Summary
6...... Main Findings
46...... Discussion and Policy Implications
48...... Appendix 1: Methodology
49...... Appendix 2: Selected Trends
50...... Appendix 3 How Were the Questions Asked?
Recommended Citation: Grenier, Guillermo and Qing Lai. 2020. 2020 FIU Cuba Poll: How Cuban Americans in Miami View U.S. Policies Toward Cuba. Miami, FL: Florida International University. 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA FOREWORD
uch has changed in the narrative shaping U.S./Cuba Various units within Florida International University policy during the administration of President Donald J. contributed to funding the 2020 FIU Cuba poll. Along with MTrump. The policy shifts initiated by President Obama the Steven J. Green School of International and Public in 2014 have all but disappeared. Old hostilities, dating to Affairs, these units include the Office of the President, the the Cold War period, now dominate relations between the Division of External Relations, Strategic Communications & two neighbors. Marketing, the Cuban Research Institute and the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center. We appreciate Two FIU Cuba Polls have been conducted since Trump’s their generous support. inauguration. The trend measured in the 2018 Poll of a community hardening its isolationist views have continued Finally, we would like to take this opportunity to once again in this 2020 FIU Cuba Poll. The community’s attitudes reflect recognize the co-principal investigators, Dr. Guillermo J. those of the administration. Relations between the two Grenier and his new collaborator, Dr. Qing Lai. Dr. Grenier countries since the last poll have not followed the path of has led the FIU Cuba Poll for almost three decades, keeping engagement. While the community still supports quite a few his finger on the pulse of the public opinions of the Cuban- engagement policies that it holds out as “carrots,” the overall American community in South Florida. We would also like to tendency is to establish a stronger hold on the “stick” that acknowledge the collaboration of the staff members of the promotes sanctions and isolation. Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, especially Pedro Botta and Amy Ellis. The findings of the poll suggest that there is a return to traditional hard-line views toward U.S.- Cuban relations. John F. Stack Jr., Ph.D While political and social engagement policies still have Founding Dean proponents, support for the wielding of the “stick” of the Steven J. Green School of International & Public Affairs embargo—the economic isolation of Cuba from the U.S. economy—has increased among Cuban Americans as a whole. The second and third generations of Cuban Americans are driving the hope for engagement while more established residents insist on a tougher stand. The return to hard-line views might be driven by the slow pace of change on the island, or the hostile national narrative that currently surrounds U.S./Cuba relations in the United States. Whatever the reason, the demographics of the Cuban-American community in South Florida continue to change while many of their attitudes directed at the state-to-state relations between the U.S. and their homeland remain conflicted.
2 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA THE POLLSTERS
Guillermo J. Grenier is a professor of sociology Qing Lai is an associate professor of sociology at the and the chair of the Department of Global and Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Sociocultural Studies at Florida International Florida International University. He earned his Ph.D. University. Born in Havana, Dr. Grenier is one of the in sociology at the University of Michigan. Dr. Lai founders of the Miami school of social analysis and received graduate training at the Institute for Social has authored or coauthored seven books and dozens Research’s Population Studies Center and Survey of articles on labor, migration, immigrant incorporation Research Center. His research interests include and Cuban-American ideological profiles. His books Chinese Muslims, development, demography and include A History of Little Havana, with Corinna J. survey research. Dr. Lai has published peer-reviewed Moebius (2015); This Land Is Our Land: Newcomers articles in Social Science Research, Journal of Muslim and Established Residents in Miami, with Alex Minority Affairs, Chinese Sociological Review, Chinese Stepick, Max Castro and Marvin Dunn (2003); The Journal of Sociology, Research in the Sociology Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States, with of Work, Natural Hazards and Proceedings of the Lisandro Pérez (2002); Newcomers in the Workplace: National Academy of Sciences of the United States of Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. America. His current research focuses on the Muslim Economy, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick population in China. He analyzes census and survey (1994); and Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity and data to examine the group’s heterogeneity and its Social Change, edited with Alex Stepick (1992). Dr. relations with the majority Han society, the Chinese Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and a faculty State and the Islamic world. He has participated in fellow of the University of Notre Dame’s Institute survey projects on various Asian Muslim communities, of Latino Research and the director of the Florida including the Xidaotang Islamic sect in Gansu and the Center for Labor Research and Studies. He lectures Dungan people of Central Asia, and studied Chinese nationally and internationally on his research. He Muslim pilgrims to Mecca. received his Ph.D. in sociology and his M.A. in Latin American studies from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 3 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The majority of the Cuban-American population in 6. Cuban Americans strongly support the resumption of South Florida supports the way that President Donald the issuing of visas at the Cuban Embassy in Havana Trump has handled key issues of national importance. (62%). All respondent categories are in support of this He receives high marks in his handling of immigration change in current U.S. policy. (Figure 14) (64% support), race relations (55% support), national protests (55% support), healthcare (67% support), 7. Cuban Americans support the resumption of Family Cuba policy (66% support), China policy (71% Reunification Parole Program 60%( ). Only the oldest support), the COVID-19 crisis (65% support) and the respondents and those migrating before 1995 oppose economy (80% support). (Figures 26-33) this policy by as much as 50%. (Figure 16)
2. While the Republican Party maintains a slight majority 8. The community is evenly split on the issue of reinstating among registered voters (53%), it is receiving new blood the “Wet Foot/Dry Foot” policy. (51% oppose and 49% from the most recent arrivals. Seventy-six percent of support reinstating the policy.) This split is evident along registered voters who arrived between 2010-2015 report all respondent categories. (Figure 15) registering as Republicans. (Figure 36) 9. The economy and health care remain the two most 3. It is expected that President Trump will receive important national issues for Cuban Americans. approximately 59% of the Cuban-American vote in Respondents were asked to independently rank the November. (Figures 38) importance of six policies related to the economy, health care, race relations, immigration, Cuba and China. The 4. Sixty percent of Cuban Americans in South Florida economy and health care were considered to be the support the continuation of the embargo. (Figure 5) two most important issues facing the community across all age groups, migration cohorts and political party 5. The support for some policies promoting engagement registration. Cuba policy ranked last for all but the oldest remains relatively high, such as the selling of food (69% cohort and the non-citizens in the sample. (Figure 23-25) support) and medicines to the island (74% support) maintaining diplomatic relations (58% support) and the resumption of airline travel to all regions of the island (65% support). (Figures 8, 9, 13, 21)
4 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
About Florida International University Florida International University, a public university located in Miami, has a passion for student success and community solutions. The university is classified by Carnegie as “R1.” FIU is among the top 100 public universities in U.S. News and World Report’s 2019 Best Colleges and 18 academic programs are individually ranked. FIU was recently ranked as the second best performing university in Florida and graduates are among the highest-paid in the state. FIU has multiple state-of-the-art research facilities including the Wall of Wind Research and Testing Facility and FIU’s Medina Aquarius Program. FIU has awarded more than 330,000 degrees since 1972 and enrolls more than 57,000 students in two campuses and centers including FIU Downtown on Brickell, FIU@I-75, the Miami Beach Urban Studios, and sites in Qingdao and Tianjin, China. FIU also supports artistic and cultural engagement through its three museums: Patricia & Phillip Frost Art Museum, the Wolfsonian-FIU, and the Jewish Museum of Florida- FIU. FIU is a member of Conference USA with more than 400 student-athletes participating in 18 sports. For more information about FIU, visit www.fiu.edu
About the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs Launched in 2008, the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs at FIU educates the leaders and changemakers of tomorrow through innovative teaching and research that advances global understanding, contributes to policy solutions and promotes international dialogue. One of the largest schools of its kind in the world, the Green School enrolls more than 5,700 students and employs 360 fulltime faculty. It offers 38 interdisciplinary degree programs at the bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral levels, as well as 54 undergraduate and graduate certificate programs. The Green School encompasses eight signature departments: Criminology and Criminal Justice, Economics, Global and Sociocultural Studies, History, Modern Languages, Politics and International Relations, Public Policy and Administration and Religious Studies. Home to 16 of the university’s most prominent international centers, institutes and programs, the Green School is an affiliate member of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA).
About the Cuban Research Institute FIU’s Cuban Research Institute (CRI) is dedicated to creating and disseminating knowledge about Cuba and Cuban Americans. The institute encourages original research and interdisciplinary teaching, organizes extracurricular activities, collaborates with other academic units working in Cuban and Cuban-American studies, and promotes the development of library holdings and collections on Cuba and its diaspora. Founded in 1991, CRI is the nation’s premier center for research and academic programs on Cuban and Cuban-American issues. No other U.S. university surpasses FIU in the number of professors and students of Cuban origin.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 5 MAIN FINDINGS This section presents the responses to key questions of the poll. The exact wording for selected questions, along with the Spanish version, is included in Appendix 3.
Cuban Americans and U.S./Cuba Relations: Old Wine in Old Bottles
The Trump administration has altered all of the dynamics established by President Obama in U.S./Cuba relations. A dramatic shift in the tone of the relations between the two countries has established a new/old normal in the Cuban-American community. The hope of normalizing relationships—economic, familial, political, cultural—raised by the Obama policies has disappeared in the rearview mirror. The national narrative toward Cuba is one of hostility rather than engagement, confrontation rather than negotiation. While diplomatic relations have not been severed, diplomacy has all but disappeared. The reduction of consular activities at the United States Embassy in Havana has had a chilling effect on Cuban migration to the United States. The restrictions on direct flights to the island as well as the reduction in the categories available for legal travel by Americans has had a severe impact on the island economy, which had begun the slow process of diversification driven by the opening of the American market. The anticipated cessation of charter flights in October of 2020 combined with the impact of the COVID-19 crisis have added significant obstacles to the establishment of communications between the South Florida diaspora and Cubans on the island. It is in this climate that our respondents express their views in this 2020 edition of the FIU Cuba Poll. It is not the best of times. It is not the worst of times. It’s simply another poll measuring fluctuating attitudes toward policies that have changed little in 60 years. The main findings of the poll follow. We present the sample distributions of selected variables as well as their conditional distributions by age, migration/nativity and voter registration/party. All results are weighted to represent the current Cuban-American population aged 18 or older in Miami-Dade County. In the brief discussions associated with the charts, we will highlight the opinions of the entire sample and mention any category that diverges from the general opinion of the community as represented by the total sample. The Cuban-American community is not monolithic in its attitudes, even when certain tendencies might dominate.
Contextualizing the Cuban-American Population in South Florida
Most of the Cuban Americans in the United States live in Florida and most of the Cuban-American Florida residents live in the South Florida region. As a result, Cuban Americans consist of a miniscule percentage of the national population but dominate the demographic landscape of Miami-Dade County. Their overwhelming presence in Florida makes their political involvement critically important, particularly in presidential election years.
Figure 1: Population Estimates: Cubans, Other Hispanics, Non-Hispanics CHART TITLE
Cuban Other Hispanic Non-Hispanic
0.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 100.0
National 0.7 17.1 82.2
Florida 7.2 18.0 74.8
Miam-Dade 36.3 31.8 31.9
6 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Key Characteristics of the Cuban-American Population in Miami-Dade County
As Table 1 shows, the methodology utilized in conducting the 2020 FIU Cuba Poll has resulted in a representative profile of the Cuban- American population in South Florida along multiple dimensions. The weighted sample percentages reflect the estimates established by the Census Bureau in its 2014-2018 5-year sample of the American Community Survey. In our questionnaire we allow respondents greater flexibility in self-identifying racial categories. This accounts for the lower number of “white” respondents and a larger number of “others,” which would include the “mulato,” and “mestizo” categories. Overall, we achieve an excellent representation of the demographics of the Cuban-American population in Miami-Dade County.
Table 1: Cuban Americans in Miami Dade County: Migration/Nativity, Age, Gender, Race (ACS and Cuba Poll Sample Estimates)
ACS Cuba Poll (2020 weighted) Nativity & immigrant cohort Cuba Migrated before 1980 19.2 19.6 Migrated in 1980-1994 15.2 15.5 Migrated in 1995-2009 29.8 30.4 Migrated in 2010-2020 15.0 13.6 United States 19.1 19.5 Other countries 1.6 1.5 Age group 18-39 29.5 30.0 40-59 36.2 36.9 60-75 20.2 19.1 75 or older 14.1 14.0 Gender Male 48.6 49.3 Female 51.4 50.7 Race White 95.4 80.0 Black 1.9 3.6 Other 2.8 16.5
Years of education 12.5 14.3
Note: The Cuba Poll results are weighted toward ACS using a three-way weight based on nativity/immigrant cohort, age, and gender. Sources: 2020 Cuba Poll; American Community Survey 2014-2018 5-year sample.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 7 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Voter Registration Estimates for Cuban Americans in Florida and Miami-Dade County
Table 2 presents our estimate of the current number of registered Cuban Americans by party affiliation in Florida and Miami- Dade County. These numbers become relevant when voting preferences are disclosed. The charts that follow the table visually highlight the dominance of the Republican Party in the Cuban-American political life at the state and the county levels.
Table 2: Estimated Number of Registered Cuban-American Voters by Party (Florida and M-D County)
FLORIDA MIAMI-DADE
All Hispanic Cuban All Hispanic Cuban
Republican 4,927,507 587,552 367,233 398,542 294,020 253,830
Democrat 5,167,930 920,324 180,227 622,818 272,397 124,572
Other 3,795,933 866,043 150,325 478,734 305,050 103,904
Total registered 13,891,370 2,373,919 697,785 1,500,094 871,467 482,306
Notes: Non-Cuban numbers are official voter registration data as of July 30, 2020. Cuban numbers are estimated based on American Community Survey 2014-2018 5-year sample, 2020 Cuba Poll, and official Florida voter registration data.
8 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Figure 2: Estimated Florida Voter Registration by Party (by Cuban/Hispanic/Non-Hispanic) FLORIDA ESTIMAT E
Republican Independent Democrat
0.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 100.0
Cuban 52.6 21.5 25.8
Other Hispanic 13.1 42.7 44.2
Non-Hispanic 37.7 25.4 36.9
Figure 3: Estimated Voter Registration by Party: Miami-Dade County (By Cuban/Hispanic/Non-Hispanic) MIAMI- D AD E ESTIMATE
Republican Independent Democrat
0.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 100.0
Cuban 52.6 21.5 25.8
Other Hispanic 10.3 51.7 38.0
Non-Hispanic 16.6 27.6 55.7
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 9 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Embargo and Economic Relations
Over 70% of Cuban Americans living in South Florida believe that the embargo has not worked.
Since the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll, a majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida have agreed: the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba has not worked. The question never interprets what could be considered a “successful embargo,” so each respondent is free to evaluate success/failure in her or his own terms. This year is no exception to the rule. Seventy-one percent of respondents recognize that the embargo has not worked. Respondents across all categories share this opinion although registered Republicans and the oldest members of the society tend to give the embargo the highest marks.
Figure 4 EMBWORK
DK Worked very well Worked well Worked not very well Not working at all
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 7 9 17 25 41
Total 10 19 27 44
76+ 16 19 22 42
60-75 10 17 23 50
40-59 9 20 28 43
18-39 9 18 31 43
Mig. before 1995 13 19 26 41
Mig. since 1995 9 19 22 51
Not Cuba-born 7 19 40 35
Republican 15 21 27 36
Independent 6 19 28 47
Democrat 4 11 27 59
Non-citizen 11 23 23 44
10 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Embargo and Economic Relations
A majority of the Cuban-American community supports the continuation of the embargo
An increase in support for the embargo, first noted in the 2018 FIU Cuba Poll, has continued to gain strength in the current environment. Approximately 54% of the Cuban-American community supports, either strongly or mostly, the continuation of the U.S. embargo on the island when Don’t Know is considered a response. When an opinion is expressed, 60% of respondents support the continuation of the embargo. The youngest respondents, those born outside of the island and registered Democrats are the least supportive of the almost 60-year-old policy.
Figure 5 FAVCONE M B
DK Strongly favor Mostly favor Mostly oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 8 39 15 14 24
Total 43 17 15 26
76+ 49 11 16 25
60-75 45 16 10 29
40-59 46 16 14 24
18-39 33 20 18 28
Mig. before 1995 55 13 10 22
Mig. since 1995 43 13 15 29
Not Cuba-born 21 28 23 27
Republican 61 13 11 15
Independent 30 24 14 31
Democrat 14 14 23 48
Non-citizen 46 14 20 20
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 11 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Other Economic Relationships
A majority of the community supports the temporary suspension of trade sanctions on Cuba during the COVID-19 crisis.
Despite the reinforced support for the embargo, a strong majority of respondents support its temporary suspension in an effort to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. Sixty-one percent of respondents support a temporary halt to all economic sanctions. The hypothetical cessation of sanctions has broad support across all categories. The strongest desire to put the embargo on hold during the pandemic is expressed by registered Democrats and respondents not born in Cuba.
Figure 6 UCSANCTION
DK Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 6 29 8 17 40
Total 31 8 18 43
76+ 30 10 11 49
60-75 45 4 20 32
40-59 29 9 17 45
18-39 27 9 20 44
Mig. before 1995 38 9 18 36
Mig. since 1995 33 7 13 47
Not Cuba-born 18 9 27 45
Republican 40 7 18 35
Independent 29 3 17 51
Democrat 16 7 20 56
Non-citizen 29 22 15 35
12 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Other Economic Relationships
A minority of respondents support the continuation of cruise ship operations to Cuba.
A minority of respondents (42%) support the resumption of cruise ship operations to the island. Several categories of respondents either support or are in a statistical split in their support for the resumption of cruise traffic. The youngest respondents (49%), the respondents not born on the island (54%) and registered Democrats (65%) are the groups most interested in resuming the operations of cruise ships to Cuba.
Figure 7 UCCRUIS E
DK Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 48 7 15 25
Total 50 8 15 27
76+ 57 9 8 27
60-75 56 9 16 19
40-59 52 6 15 26
18-39 42 9 18 31
Mig. before 1995 61 9 9 20
Mig. since 1995 49 5 16 30
Not Cuba-born 36 11 24 30
Republican 66 6 8 19
Independent 43 10 20 28
Democrat 27 8 24 41
Non-citizen 35 11 27 27
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 13 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
A majority of Cuban Americans support the sale of food products to Cuba by U.S. companies.
Figure 8 SELLFOOD
DK Strongly oppose Mostly oppose Mostly favor Strongly favor
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 21 8 24 42
Total 22 8 25 44
76+ 21 9 28 42
60-75 28 8 15 48
40-59 22 8 27 43
18-39 19 9 28 45
Mig. before 1995 34 10 22 35
Mig. since 1995 16 6 25 53
Not Cuba-born 16 11 32 41
Republican 35 11 20 35
Independent 15 6 28 51
Democrat 12 7 30 50
Non-citizen 11 7 28 53
14 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
A majority of Cuban Americans support the sale of food products The sale of medicine to the island is strongly supported. to Cuba by U.S. companies. Figure 9 SELLMED
DK Strongly oppose Mostly oppose Mostly favor Strongly favor
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 4 17 7 25 46
Total 18 8 26 48
76+ 12 8 29 51
60-75 26 9 20 46
40-59 18 7 26 49
18-39 15 8 30 47
Mig. before 1995 26 9 26 38
Mig. since 1995 11 5 24 60
Not Cuba-born 17 12 33 38
Republican 26 9 23 42
Independent 15 10 30 46
Democrat 12 5 31 52
Non-citizen 9 5 24 61
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 15 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Politics of the Carrot and the Policy of the Stick
Does Cuba pose a threat to vital American interests? Most say, “no.”
A majority of Cuban Americans do not consider Cuba a threat to vital American interests. The exception to this view is presented by the oldest group of respondents as well as those migrating before 1995 and registered Republicans. Cuban Americans born outside of Cuba, the youngest group and registered Democrats are most emphatic about the majority’s answer to the question.
Figure 10 THREAT
DK Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 35 8 14 38
Total 37 8 14 40
76+ 47 7 11 35
60-75 42 6 13 39
40-59 41 6 14 39
18-39 26 13 17 44
Mig. before 1995 51 8 13 27
Mig. since 1995 36 4 14 46
Not Cuba-born 16 17 19 47
Republican 51 9 13 27
Independent 38 8 10 45
Democrat 14 10 22 54
Non-citizen 27 4 16 53
16 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Wielding the stick: a majority of respondents support policies designed to put maximum pressure on the Cuban government to promote regime change.
Since the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll in the 1990s, the desire to wield a punishing stick on the Cuban government while simultaneously extending some kind of conciliatory carrot has been a constant in the community’s attitudes toward U.S./Cuba relations. This ambivalent carrot/stick attitude is clearly seen in the two questions asking respondents to express their general policy preference. Asked in a general and abstract manner, both questions received overwhelming support. Seventy-three percent of respondents approved, in general, of policies designed to put maximum pressure on the Cuban government in order to promote regime change. All categories of respondents expressed overwhelming support for hard-line policies, with only registered Democrats and the oldest respondents (76 years of age and above) opposing the proposition by as much as a third of respondents.
Figure 11 HARDPOL
DK Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 7 55 13 7 17
Total 59 14 8 18
76+ 55 8 7 31
60-75 65 12 2 22
40-59 63 15 8 14
18-39 54 19 12 15
Mig. before 1995 64 9 4 22
Mig. since 1995 59 15 8 18
Not Cuba-born 53 21 14 12
Republican 66 12 6 16
Independent 61 11 9 19
Democrat 44 21 10 25
Non-citizen 60 19 8 13
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 17 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Offering the carrot: a majority also support policies directed specifically at improving the economic well-being of the Cuban people.
Respondents are equally in favor of policies directed at improving the well-being of the Cuban people living on the island. Overwhelming support is expressed for these “softer” political approaches. There is sizable opposition (over a third of respondents) by several categories of respondents, as can be seen in Figure 12. Over a third of older respondents, the earliest migrants as well as Republicans and independents oppose this softer approach to U.S./Cuba policies.
Figure 12 SOFTPOL
DK Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 6 22 6 21 45
Total 23 6 22 48
76+ 31 3 15 51
60-75 31 6 16 47
40-59 22 8 21 49
18-39 17 5 31 47
Mig. before 1995 34 6 16 43
Mig. since 1995 18 6 19 56
Not Cuba-born 17 7 37 40
Republican 31 6 22 42
Independent 30 7 21 43
Democrat 7 5 28 60
Non-citizen 15 5 21 59
18 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
On the issue of maintaining diplomatic relations
While there seems to be a retrenchment of attitudes toward the embargo as an economic pressure point to bring about change, Cuban Americans are also in favor of maintaining political connections to the island. The maintenance of the status quo in diplomatic relations is supported by a majority of all respondent categories except those migrating before 1995 and registered Republicans. The oldest respondent category (76+), is statistically evenly split on the issue. There has been a retrenching of support for the policy since 2018, however, when 67% expressed support for the maintenance of diplomatic relations, as contrasted with the 58% support this year within the general population.
Figure 13 FAVDIP
DK Strongly oppose Mostly oppose Mostly favor Strongly favor
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 32 7 21 35
Total 34 8 22 36
76+ 42 8 16 33
60-75 42 3 20 35
40-59 33 10 22 36
18-39 25 8 27 40
Mig. before 1995 49 7 18 26
Mig. since 1995 31 7 21 41
Not Cuba-born 14 10 32 44
Republican 49 8 20 23
Independent 28 3 22 46
Democrat 11 9 26 54
Non-citizen 26 11 20 43
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 19 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Strong disagreement with the restriction on the issuing of visas at the U.S. Embassy in Havana.
Sixty-two percent of respondents disagree with the policy of curtailing the consular services of the U.S. Embassy in Havana regarding the issuing of visas to Cuban nationals. Only registered Republicans and those migrating before 1995 are split on the issue. All other categories disagree with the cessation of visa distribution at the Havana-based embassy.
Figure 14 UCCONSULATE
DK Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 26 10 16 42
Total 28 11 17 45
76+ 35 6 19 40
60-75 32 11 10 47
40-59 29 10 18 43
18-39 20 14 19 48
Mig. before 1995 40 11 15 35
Mig. since 1995 22 8 16 54
Not Cuba-born 21 17 22 40
Republican 38 12 13 37
Independent 24 10 19 47
Democrat 13 12 18 58
Non-citizen 21 5 25 49
20 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Should the United States reinstate the “wet foot/dry foot” policy? Maybe yes…maybe no.
The community is evenly split on the “wet foot/dry foot” policy issue. Fifty-three percent would oppose the reinstatement of the preferential immigration policy while 47% would support it. Most respondent categories are similarly divided.
Figure 15 WETFOOD DK Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat support Strongly support
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 3 40 11 13 32
Total 42 11 14 34
76+ 43 8 14 35
60-75 46 8 11 35
40-59 44 13 13 31
18-39 36 13 15 36
Mig. before 1995 47 8 11 34
Mig. since 1995 40 12 11 37
Not Cuba-born 37 15 22 26
Republican 46 8 12 33
Independent 42 9 14 35
Democrat 35 16 20 29
Non-citizen 42 10 11 38
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 21 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Do you support the suspension of the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program? No!
There is strong opposition to the suspension of the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program by respondents in almost all categories. Only the oldest and pre-1995 respondents support the suspension of the program while 70% of the post-1995, a population who can be assumed has the closest ties to those on the island, express support for the resumption of the program.
Figure 16 REUNION
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 3 30 9 12 46
Total 31 9 13 47
76+ 48 8 14 30
60-75 38 6 9 47
40-59 30 12 14 45
18-39 19 10 12 59
Mig. before 1995 45 11 11 33
Mig. since 1995 24 6 11 58
Not Cuba-born 22 13 18 47
Republican 44 14 10 32
Independent 27 7 12 54
Democrat 14 4 13 69
Non-citizen 20 5 19 56
22 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Support for allowing all Americans unrestricted travel declines but younger Cuban-Americans and new arrivals beg to differ.
For the first time in many years, support for unrestricted travel declined below the 50% mark, although staying within the margin of error. Only 47% of respondents expressed support for allowing all Americans to travel to the island. The younger populations, those born outside of Cuba and the new arrivals are the exception. Each of these categories log in at over 50% support for free travel as do Democrats and independent voters.
Figure 17 UNRTRAV
DK Strongly oppose Mostly oppose Mostly favor Strongly favor
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 39 12 16 29
Total 41 12 17 30
76+ 47 14 11 28
60-75 42 10 15 33
40-59 43 12 18 28
18-39 34 13 21 32
Mig. before 1995 56 13 13 18
Mig. since 1995 36 11 16 38
Not Cuba-born 27 14 26 33
Republican 52 13 15 20
Independent 38 8 17 37
Democrat 20 12 22 46
Non-citizen 35 15 20 30
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 23 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Ties that bind
A large majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida have relatives or significant others living in Cuba.
The South Florida Cuban-American community is developing into a true transnational diaspora. Despite the recent travel restrictions, many families have experienced the migration of one or more of their members. Approximately 70% of Cubans living in South Florida have relatives living in Cuba. Unsurprisingly, a higher percentage of those who migrated since 1995 (84%) have relatives left behind.
Figure 18 RELATIVE
DK No Yes
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 1 30 70
Total 30 70
76+ 32 68
60-75 27 73
40-59 27 73
18-39 34 66
Mig. before 1995 34 66
Mig. since 1995 16 84
Not Cuba-born 54 46
Republican 31 69
Independent 34 66
Democrat 37 63
Non-citizen 8 92
24 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Some remaining relatives will eventually be our neighbors. Others will not.
While a majority of Cuban-Americans have relatives on the island, a minority of community members plan to have these relatives travel to the United States to join them. The only group with a keen interest in reuniting with the relatives left behind are the post-1995 migrants and the noncitizen category, which is dominated by the most recent arrivals. A majority of both of these groups (57% and 69% respectively) hope to reunite with close relatives left in Cuba.
Figure 19 JOIN
DK No Yes
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 54 41
Total 56 44
76+ 68 32
60-75 65 35
40-59 50 50
18-39 54 46
Mig. before 1995 72 28
Mig. since 1995 43 57
Not Cuba-born 72 28
Republican 64 36
Independent 62 38
Democrat 54 46
Non-citizen 31 69
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 25 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Have you traveled to Cuba since leaving?
Over half of the respondents report traveling to the island since their departure. Most recent migrants are the most frequent travelers. More than a quarter of Cuban Americans born outside of the island have made the journey to their parents’ homeland. Travel is similarly distributed across party lines.
Figure 20 TRAVCU BA
DK No Yes
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 0 47 53
Total 47 53
76+ 46 54
60-75 50 50
40-59 41 59
18-39 52 48
Mig. before 1995 60 40
Mig. since 1995 24 76
Not Cuba-born 72 28
Republican 52 48
Independent 52 48
Democrat 55 45
Non-citizen 12 88
26 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Let the American airline companies resume previously established routes throughout the island, say a majority of Cuban Americans.
A strong majority of respondents are of the opinion that U.S. airline companies should be able to establish services throughout the island, not just to Havana. Approximately 65% of the community shares this opinion. Seventy-two percent of post-1995 migrants support this expansion of services, 62% feeling “strongly” about it. All respondent categories express majority support for expanding airline services beyond the capital.
Figure 21 UCAIRLIN E
DK Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Strongly agree
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 26 7 14 48
Total 27 7 14 51
76+ 29 7 12 52
60-75 31 7 12 50
40-59 27 6 14 54
18-39 25 10 18 47
Mig. before 1995 36 7 15 41
Mig. since 1995 23 4 10 62
Not Cuba-born 21 13 22 44
Republican 37 7 13 43
Independent 28 9 14 49
Democrat 14 9 20 57
Non-citizen 8 3 14 74
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 27 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Remittances matter. Almost half of Cuban Americans send them to family members on the island.
Approximately half of all Cuban-American families send remittances to relatives in Cuba. The most recent arrivals are the most likely to send remittances while the older population group and the pre-1995 migrants are the least likely to send money to relatives on the island. It’s worth mentioning that the most recent arrivals have fewer resources to contribute to relatives on the island but, nevertheless, manage to share these resources with those left behind. The old saying comes to mind: “Cubans share what they have, not what is left over.”
Figure 22 SENDREMIT
DK No Yes
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 1 51 47
Total 52 48
76+ 57 43
60-75 53 47
40-59 45 55
18-39 57 43
Mig. before 1995 60 40
Mig. since 1995 34 66
Not Cuba-born 77 23
Republican 58 42
Independent 51 49
Democrat 56 44
Non-citizen 33 67
28 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs say, lastinimportance,bythree ofthefourage groupings. over-76 categoryofrespondents considershealthcare themostimportantpolicy. Cubapolicyisrankedthesixth,thatto respondents categorizedbyage. us toevaluatehowtheCuban-Americancommunityprioritizesthem.Letlookatimportanceofeachpolicy on afive-pointscale.The results present aclearpicture oftheimportanceeachpolicy. Combiningtheanswersallows Respondents were notforced toprioritizethepoliciescompared toeachother, simplytorankthepolicy’s importance Figure 23 China andCuba the economy, healthcare, immigration, The importanceofnationalpoliciesregarding Cuban Americansare notone-issueponies. Importance ofNationalIssuesbyAge 3 3 4 4 5 . . . . . The economy ranks as the most important policy concern amongallrespondentThe economyranksasthemostimportantpolicyconcern categoriesEXCEPToldest. Respondents were askedtoranktheimportanceofeachthesepolicies.Eachpolicywasrankedindependently. 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.76
T 4.68 o
t 4.09 a Economy
l 4.04 3.82 3.81 Health care 2020 FIUCUBAPOLL:HOWCUBANAMERICANSINMIAMIVIEWU.S.POLICIESTOWARD CUBA
4.47 Race 4.68 76+ 3.84 4.00 3.37 Immigration 3.81
4.81
60- 4.76 3.93 Steven J.Green andPublicAffairs29 SchoolofInternational 7
5 4.05
China policies 3.78 3.78
4.90
40- 4.71 4.12 5
9 4.01 3.95 Cuba policies 3.83
4.69
18- 4.58 4.26 3
9 4.08 3.89 3.79 30 StevenJ.Green andPublicAffairs SchoolofInternational 2020 FIUCUBAPOLL:HOWCUBANAMERICANSINMIAMIVIEWU.S.POLICIESTOWARD CUBA policy more importantthanU.S./Chinapolicybutallregistered votersputCubaissuesastheleastimportantofsixpolicyconcerns. Democrats, whoconsiderhealthcareNoncitizens,thatisthemostrecent themostimportantpolicyconcern. arrivals,considerCuba for allgroups exceptthepost-1995migrants,whoconsideritshandlingmore importantthanU.S.policytoward China. Cuban AmericansinSouthFlorida.Thegovernment’s handlingofCubapolicyremains theleastimportantpolicyconcern Figure 25 Importance ofNationalIssuesbyVoter Registration Figure 24 Importance ofNationalIssuesbyMigrationPeriod The economyremains themostimportantissueforregistered votersandnoncitizensalike,withtheexceptionofregistered Again, regardless ofwhentherespondents leftCuba,theeconomyedgesouthealthcare asthemost importantissuefor 3 3 4 4 5 3 3 4 4 5 ...... 0 5 0 5 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.76 4.76
Total 4.68 4.68
4.09 Total Economy 4.04 Economy 4.09 3.82 4.04 3.81 3.82 3.81 Health care Health care Republican
Race 4.82 4.58 Race 3.88 Mig. before1995 4.00 4.74 3.95 Immigration 3.87 Immigration 4.72 3.86
Independent 4.02 4.74 4.66 3.82 4.20 3.71 4.06
China policies 3.84 China policies 3.75 Mig. since1995 4.83 4.76 4.23
Democrat 4.51 4.76 4.07 4.30 3.73 3.93 4.01 3.67 Cuba policies 3.56 Cuba policies Not Cuba-born 4.64 Non-citizen 4.93 4.44 4.90 4.17 4.32 4.00 4.21 3.58 4.01 4.01 3.55 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Approval for Trump’s Handling of Key Issues
Trump receives support for his handling of the issue of immigration.
An overwhelming majority of Cuban Americans (64%) strongly or somewhat support the way that President Trump has handled the issue of immigration. Respondents not born in Cuba and registered Democrats are the only two categories who express significant opposition to the President’s handling of immigration policy (50% and 78% opposition respectively.)
Figure 26 TIMMIG
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 44 17 11 23
Total 46 18 11 25
76+ 58 11 12 19
60-75 51 18 3 28
40-59 48 18 12 22
18-39 37 21 15 28
Mig. before 1995 56 20 4 19
Mig. since 1995 47 14 16 23
Not Cuba-born 29 21 13 37
Republican 68 18 7 7
Independent 33 22 11 33
Democrat 11 12 13 65
Non-citizen 50 17 21 12
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 31 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump receives support for his handling of the issue of health care.
The respondents express solid support for the President’s handling of health care policy as well. Approximately 67% of respondents express the opinion of “strongly” or “somewhat” supporting the President’s approach. A majority of all categories of respondents, except those not born in Cuba and registered Democrats, express support. Approximately 52% of the non-Cuba-born respondents oppose the President’s handling of health care as do 75% of registered Democrats.
Figure 27 THEALTH
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 7 40 21 10 21
Total 44 23 10 23
76+ 52 22 9 17
60-75 56 20 3 21
40-59 40 27 10 22
18-39 37 20 15 28
Mig. before 1995 51 25 6 17
Mig. since 1995 46 22 11 21
Not Cuba-born 26 22 16 36
Republican 61 25 9 5
Independent 40 19 12 29
Democrat 8 18 10 65
Non-citizen 51 33 7 9
32 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets mixed reviews for his handling of the issue of race relations.
A majority of respondents (55%) support the way that President Trump has handled race relations issues during his term. The support is not unanimous across all of the categories of respondents. A majority (54%) of younger respondents (18-39) oppose the President’s handling of race issues as do a majority of the non-Cuba-born category (60%), independent voters (54%) and registered Democrats (84%). The opposition of the post-1995 migrants (47%) is within the margin of error of the poll as is the opposition expressed by the respondents included in the non-citizen category (48%).
Figure 28 TRACE
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 35 17 13 29
Total 37 18 14 31
76+ 50 15 16 20
60-75 39 23 6 32
40-59 37 19 18 26
18-39 31 16 14 40
Mig. before 1995 47 21 7 24
Mig. since 1995 38 14 22 25
Not Cuba-born 19 21 8 52
Republican 56 25 9 11
Independent 27 19 12 42
Democrat 7 10 10 74
Non-citizen 43 10 33 15
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 33 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets mixed reviews for his handling of the recent national protests.
The President’s handling of the wave of protests that have swept the country for weeks receives mixed reviews. While 55% of respondents support the President’s handling of the protests, the younger respondents and the non-Cuba- born respondents voice significant opposition (53% and 60% respectively) as do registered Democrats (76%) and independents (50%).
Figure 29 TPROTEST
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 5 36 15 14 30
Total 39 16 14 31
76+ 51 15 8 26
60-75 37 22 15 26
40-59 40 14 16 30
18-39 33 14 14 39
Mig. before 1995 47 18 12 24
Mig. since 1995 38 15 18 29
Not Cuba-born 26 15 11 49
Republican 56 16 12 17
Independent 32 18 13 37
Democrat 14 10 11 65
Non-citizen 35 18 26 20
34 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets strong support for his handling of Cuba policy.
Approximately 66% of Cuban-Americans in South Florida support the President’s handling of Cuba policy in general. The main opposition comes from the non-Cuba-born respondents (52%) and registered Democrats (74%).
Figure 30 TCUBA
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 7 45 17 10 22
Total 48 18 11 23
76+ 50 20 10 20
60-75 54 18 6 22
40-59 52 18 9 21
18-39 38 18 16 28
Mig. before 1995 55 22 6 18
Mig. since 1995 51 15 10 24
Not Cuba-born 29 19 21 31
Republican 65 21 7 7
Independent 36 21 14 29
Democrat 11 15 16 58
Non-citizen 66 13 7 15
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 35 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets high marks for his handling of China policy.
The President’s handling of China policy also receives strong support, with only the loyal opposition of registered Democrats raising a voice of dissent (68% oppose).
Figure 31 TCHINA
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 11 46 17 10 17
Total 52 19 11 19
76+ 43 26 6 26
60-75 56 18 9 17
40-59 58 16 11 16
18-39 45 19 15 22
Mig. before 1995 57 19 7 18
Mig. since 1995 55 20 11 15
Not Cuba-born 38 16 17 29
Republican 69 19 5 7
Independent 47 16 17 21
Democrat 16 16 15 53
Non-citizen 58 29 8 4
36 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump receives support for his handling of the COVID-19 crisis.
The President’s often criticized handling of the COVID-19 crisis receives high marks from Cuban Americans in general. Approximately 65% support Trump’s handling of the novel coronavirus crisis. Although over a third of respondents in several categories do not support his handling of the crisis, only non-Cuba-born respondents, registered Democrats and independents voice significant opposition (60%, 71% and 49% respectively).
Figure 32 TCOVID
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 3 41 22 9 25
Total 42 23 10 26
76+ 47 26 8 19
60-75 50 22 8 20
40-59 45 21 11 23
18-39 32 24 10 35
Mig. before 1995 51 23 7 18
Mig. since 1995 45 24 11 20
Not Cuba-born 20 20 11 49
Republican 59 24 8 9
Independent 27 24 13 36
Democrat 10 19 11 60
Non-citizen 56 22 8 14
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 37 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets high marks for handling the economy.
Registered Democrats are the only category of respondents that express a muted if majority opposition to the President’s handling of the economy (54%). All other respondent groups overwhelmingly endorse the President’s work on the economy. Although the question did not guide respondents’ evaluation, it is clear that the present condition of the economy is not having an impact on the overall view of the President as doing a good job in steering economic policy.
Figure 33 TECON
DK Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 4 62 14 9 11
Total 65 15 9 12
76+ 62 14 7 17
60-75 70 14 6 10
40-59 70 13 7 10
18-39 57 18 13 12
Mig. before 1995 72 13 6 9
Mig. since 1995 68 16 6 10
Not Cuba-born 47 15 18 20
Republican 85 7 4 4
Independent 58 17 11 14
Democrat 24 22 20 34
Non-citizen 74 20 2 3
38 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Politics Writ Large
Yes, Virginia, Cubans are still conservative.
Most Cuban Americans consider themselves to be on the conservative side of political ideology. When asked to place their political views on scale where 1 is extremely conservative and 7 is extremely liberal, only Democrats cross into what might be called the “moderate” dimension of the ideological scale.
Figure 34 CONLIB
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00
Total 3.23
76+ 3.10
60-75 3.05
40-59 3.26
18-39 3.37
Mig. before 1995 2.74
Mig. since 1995 3.42
Not Cuba-born 3.65
Republican 2.35
Independent 3.59
Democrat 4.25
Non-citizen 3.86
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 39 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
High citizenship participation is a characteristic of the Cuban-American population.
The literature on Cuban Americans highlights their political engagement. Our sample lives up to expectations. Only the wave of migrants who arrived during the past decade, many of whom have not been in the country the necessary time to become citizens, lags behind in naturalization activity. All questions asking about voting preferences exclude respondents who are non-citizens and are not registered (or have no intention of registering) to vote.
Figure 35 CUBA POLL WGTED
Non-US citizen US citizen
0 25 50 75 100
Total 13 87
prior to 1959 0 100
1959-1964 0 100
1965-1979 1 99
1980-1994 7 93
1995-2009 11 89
2010-2020 61 39
Born in other countries 11 89
Born in U.S. 0 100
40 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Republican Party maintains a slight majority of registered voters and is replenishing itself with the energy of new arrivals.
Figure 36 PARTY BY TYPE
Republican Independent Democrat
0 25 50 75 100
Total 53 24 23
prior to 1959 67 11 22
1959-1964 56 22 22
1965-1979 68 17 15
1980-1994 59 25 16
1995-2009 49 31 20
2010-2015 76 20 5
Born in U.S. 40 24 36
Born in other countries 25 38 38
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 41 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Cuban Americans are politically engaged and politically motivated to vote in upcoming elections.
Another measure of political engagement is the likelihood of registered voters to actually vote in the upcoming elections. Ninety percent of registered voters are committed to casting a ballot in November. Republicans are somewhat more motivated than Democrats or independents. The young voters are, as usual, the most ambivalent. Only 85 percent express certainty about casting their ballot.
Figure 37 VOTENOV
DK Definitely Probably Probably not Definitely not
0 25 50 75 100
Total (w/ DK) 1 90 8 11
Total 90 8 11
76+ 92 7 10
60-75 92 8 0
40-59 94 5 02
18-39 85 11 2 1
Mig. before 1995 93 6 01
Mig. since 1995 89 9 11
Not Cuba-born 89 8 21
Republican 94 5 10
Independent 88 10 11
Democrat 87 10 12
42 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Horserace
If the election for President were held today with Joe Biden and Donald Trump as candidates, whom would you vote for?
Cuban-American voters since the 1980s have expressed overwhelming support for Republican candidates. This year will be no exception. Approximately 59% of all registered voters intend to cast their vote for President Trump. Among registered Democrats, 71% intend to vote for Biden. Cuban-American independent voters usually vote like Republicans and they intend to do so in November. The support for Trump among non-Cuba-born respondents is a bit under 50%. Swaying the undecided might have an impact for the Biden campaign in a race where receiving the majority of the Cuban vote is not a reasonable expectation. Ten percent of all registered voters remain undecided and most of these are distributed among independent voters, post-1995 migrants and a couple of age cohorts.
Figure 38 GOVVOTE
Biden Trump Neither Undecided No answer
0 25 50 75 100
Total 25 59 4 10 1
76+ 23 59 2 12 4
60-75 24 62 4 9 1
40-59 23 62 4 11 0
18-39 29 55 6 8 2
Mig. before 1995 18 71 2 8 2
Mig. since 1995 25 56 5 14 1
Not Cuba-born 37 46 8 8 2
Republican 6 87 1 5 1
Independent 26 49 10 14 0
Democrat 71 15 6 8 0
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 43 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Lastly: On the Health and Economic Impact of Covid-19 on our Community
The impact of Covid-19 on the health of the community: muted but significant.
The COVID-19 crisis has had an impact on the physical health of the Cuban-American population in South Florida. Although the questionnaire does not explore the full impact of the virus in the community, nearly half (44%) of respondents report having been affected (slightly, somewhat, badly or very badly) by the pandemic. Approximately 56% of the younger respondents (18-39) report having been affected to some degree. This is roughly the same impact suffered by the non- Cuba-born and Democrat categories of respondents.
Figure 39 CVHEALTH
Very badly affected Badly affected Somewhat affected Slightly affected Not at all affected
0 25 50 75 100
Total 6 4 16 19 56
76+ 5 2 12 21 60
60-75 3 2 12 17 66
40-59 5 4 15 18 57
18-39 9 6 20 21 44
Mig. before 1995 5 3 13 19 60
Mig. since 1995 5 4 15 17 58
Not Cuba-born 7 6 21 23 44
Republican 6 4 15 16 60
Independent 5 2 12 18 63
Democrat 7 3 25 22 43
Non-citizen 6 4 13 21 56
44 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Economic impact due to COVID-19: broad and deep.
The financial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is more widespread than its health impact. Sixty-five percent of all respondents report being financially affected by the pandemic. The most vulnerable population seems to be the noncitizens, who, presumably, are also the most recent arrivals. Democrats report being more affected than Republicans or independents. The personal finances of post-1995 arrivals and non-Cuba-born have been similarly jeopardized. The population most protected from financial calamity, ironically, seems to be the elderly, although 50% of that age cohort reports some financial impact from the consequences of the pandemic.
Figure 40 CVFIN
Very badly affected Badly affected Somewhat affected Slightly affected Not at all affected
0 25 50 75 100
Total 8 10 25 22 35
76+ 3 6 23 16 52
60-75 8 7 17 23 45
40-59 10 13 28 21 29
18-39 9 10 28 24 29
Mig. before 1995 6 6 19 22 47
Mig. since 1995 10 14 28 19 29
Not Cuba-born 9 8 29 26 28
Republican 5 8 24 19 44
Independent 7 9 27 21 36
Democrat 11 10 27 24 28
Non-citizen 16 14 29 21 20
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 45 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The major conclusion drawn from this poll is that many the Politics of the Stick and support for the Politics of the Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County are reevaluating the Carrot. These cryptic categories are associated with policies engagement attitudes that they supported during the brief period of isolation and policies of engagement, respectively. It is of glasnost under the Obama administration. It is likely that the not surprising that the poll measures a certain amount of reevaluation is influenced by the dramatic change in the narrative ambivalence in the population. Most Cubans desire change, toward Cuba adopted by the Trump administration. If this is the in Cuba and in U.S. Cuba policy. They are unclear, even after case, Cuban Americans are not so much shaping as reflecting 60 years of experience, whether isolation or engagement U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. will bring about change so they are leaving the door open to Another social force potentially shaping the general shift in more engagement while signaling that, perhaps due to the attitudes is the high expectations established by the Obama leadership provided by Trump and his administration, they engagement policies and the unsteady handling by the Cuban are willing to give isolation policies their support. Still, both government of economic reforms. Cubans here and on the island tendencies are evident in the community. expected great changes and they never came. The revival of antagonism initiated by the Trump administration is building on the frustrations accumulated by the modest and nonsustainable Policies of the Carrot changes brought about by engagement, and the result is a 1. There is strong support for suspending the sanctions passionate response to the unambiguous policy initiatives codified in the embargo to allow for humanitarian emanating from Washington. Cubans in South Florida follow assistance during the COVID-19 crisis. There is broad the lead of strong leadership from Washington, in engagement support across all respondent categories for this or in isolation. A strong status quo bias seems to govern the hypothetical, temporary interruption of the embargo. attitudes of the community, and the status quo is established by 2. The support for some policies promoting engagement Washington policies. At least that is a hypothesis worth testing. remains high, such as the selling of food and medicines. The Cuban-American population is not immune to the national narratives. It is part of this society and, as much as 3. While support for a policy of unrestricted travel for all Cuba remains a source of identity and pride, the members of Americans has diminished, the support for airlines to the community are embedded in the sociopolitical structure establish routes to all regions of Cuba is strong. of the United States and South Florida, where all Cuba news 4. Policies designed specifically to improve the economic is magnified, and its importance often overblown in service of well-being of Cubans on the island are strongly broader political agendas. The negative national narrative, plus supported (as the counterbalance to the stick policies the slow pace of changes taking place on the island, combine mentioned below). to create a less than hopeful view of the future and a more ambivalent attitude about the way forward. These are possible 5. Approximately half of Cuban Americans in South Florida explanations for the shifting attitudes. More analysis is required send remittances to family members on the island. to make more definitive statements. Seventy percent have close relatives or significant others The tendencies evident in the results of the 2020 FIU Cuba living in Cuba. The Cuban family remains a bond that poll can be categorized into two broad camps: support for transcends geography and ideology.
46 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Policies of the Stick Pro-Trump Hispanics 1. Support for isolationist policies has increased. Support 1. The traditional support that Cubans have consistently has increased most dramatically for the economic expressed toward the Republican Party (since the 1980s) embargo. Younger Cuban Americans are more likely to has transformed itself into support for the presidency of oppose the embargo (46%). Cuban Americans not born Donald Trump. He receives high marks on handling all of in Cuba also support lifting the embargo (50%) as do the measured key national issues as well as his handling registered Democrats (72%). of Cuba policy and will receive a majority of the Cuban- American vote on November 3. 2. There is a lack of support for resuming cruise ship operations to the island from U.S. ports. Younger respondents, the non-Cuba-born and registered Democrats are the most supportive of the resumption of cruise traffic to the island.
3. While a majority of Cuban Americans do not believe that Cuba is a threat to American vital interests, there is significant support for policies that exert maximum pressure on the government to promote regime change.
Views toward other existing polices 1. Cuban Americans support the resumption of the issuing of visas at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. All respondent categories are in support of this change in current U.S. policy.
2. Cuban Americans support the resumption of the Family Reunification Parole Program. Only the oldest respondents and those migrating before 1995 oppose this policy by as much as 50 percent.
3. The community is almost evenly split on the issue of reinstating the “wet foot/dry foot” policy. This split is evident along all respondent categories.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 47 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Methodology
Following the methodology used in previous polls, the 2020 FIU Cuba Poll is the latest telephone survey of Cuban-American residents in South Florida. The intended population includes all self- identified Cuban adults (aged 18 or older) who currently live in Miami-Dade County (MDC). The sampling frame consists of all Telephone Consumer Protection Act compliant LAN and cell numbers operating in the area. A probability sample was constructed using Random Digit Dialing (RDD) procedure. FIU contracted the NORS Surveys, Inc. to conduct the interviews. The respondents who self-identified as Cuban were interviewed with our bilingual (English and Spanish) questionnaire and the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system. Data collection took place from July 7 to August 17, 2020. We successfully reached a total of 4,355 telephone users (757 LAN and 3,598 cell phone users), among whom 1,117 (25.6%) identified themselves as Cuban. Most (89.7%) completed the interview, yielding a final sample of 1,002 respondents. A majority (81.1%) of those who completed interviews did so via cell phone. Approximately half (45.4%) of the interviews were conducted in Spanish. All results presented in this report are weighted to better represent the intended population. A three-way weight is constructed based on gender, age and nativity/migration cohort. Our population benchmark is the person-weighted American Community Survey (ACS) 2014-2018 5-year sample, which represents the 2018 U.S. population. Our weight variable adjusts our sample composition toward all MDC Cuban residents aged 16 or older in 2018. All figures in this report are graphed using precise values. However, in some figures the percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding error. In Table 2 we estimated the number of Cuban-American registered voters by party. Two assumptions were made. First, the registration rate is assumed to be the same (84.1%) for all Hispanic communities. Second, the state-level party distribution of Cuban-American registered voters is assumed to be the same as that in Miami-Dade County. Figures 2 and 3 are also built upon these assumptions. Figures 38 and 39 summarize the health and financial impacts of COVID-19. The results might involve a survival bias. For instance, Figure 38 shows that those aged 60 or older are less affected by the pandemic in terms of health. This needs to be interpreted with caution. It is known that COVID- 19-induced mortality is highly age-dependent, which means that many elderly Cubans did not survive to our window of observation. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that our results reflect the perceptions of the surviving Cuban adult population in MDC.
48 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Appendix 2: Selected Trends
Support for the Embargo and Diplomatic Relations Over Time (2007-2020)
T RE N D S O F % E N D O RS E M E N T Figure 41
embargo diplomatic
75 72 70 67 65 66
60 60 59 59 55 56 54 54 50 47 47 45
40
35 34 30 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Party Affiliation Over time (2007-2020) PARTY BY YEAR Figure 42 Rep ubl ic a n Independ ent Democrat
0 25 50 75 100
200 7 68 15 17
201 0 49 24 27
201 4 45 25 29
201 6 49 29 23
201 8 51 30 20
202 0 53 24 23
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 49 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Appendix 3: How Were The Questions Asked?
Over the years, the United States 5. On the issue of the embargo, Do Algunos dicen que las compañías government has often supported you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, aéreas estadounidenses deberían Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose poder establecer servicios en cualquier different policies toward Cuba. I am continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba? región de la isla, no solo en La Habana. going to read you some of the policies ¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de continúe el embargo a Cuba? acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en that have been proposed and I would desacuerdo con esta recomendación? like you to tell me whether you favor 6. On the issue of maintaining diplomatic or oppose these policies. relations with Cuba, do you Strongly 10. Allowing cruise ships to continue Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, regular operations to Cuba. Do you or Strongly Oppose maintaining strongly agree, somewhat agree, diplomatic relations with Cuba? somewhat disagree, or strongly 1. First, allow companies to sell ¿Está usted a favor o en contra del disagree with this policy? medicine in an unrestricted way to restablecimiento de las relaciones Permitir que los cruceros continúen Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly diplomáticas de los Estados Unidos las operaciones regulares a Cuba. favor, mostly oppose, or strongly con Cuba? ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de oppose this? acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en [Esta es una pregunta sobre Cuba 7. The United States has stopped issuing desacuerdo con esta política? actualmente.] Durante años el gobierno visas to Cubans from the Havana de los Estados Unidos ha apoyado embassy. Do you strongly agree, 11. Do you or your family in Miami send a menudo diversas políticas hacia somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, money to relatives in Cuba? Cuba. Voy a leerle algunas de las or strongly disagree with this policy? ¿Me podría decir si usted o algún políticas que se han propuesto, y me Estados Unidos ha dejado de emitir visas miembro de su familia envía dinero gustaría que usted me dijera si está a los cubanos desde la embajada de La a Cuba? a favor o en contra de ellas. Permitir Habana. ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, que las compañías vendan medicinas algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o 12. Some people say that the U.S. a Cuba, ¿está decididamente a favor, muy en desacuerdo con esta política? government should emphasize principalmente a favor, principalmente en policies that put maximum pressure contra, o fuertemente en contra? 8. Some people say that the U.S. on the Cuban government to promote should temporarily suspend the regime change. Other people say 2. Allowing U.S. companies to sell food trade sanctions on Cuba to allow that the U.S. government should to Cuba in an unrestricted way. for humanitarian responses to the emphasize policies that directly [..Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly COVID-19 pandemic. Do you strongly help the Cuban people improve their Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat economic well being. Thinking now Oppose this?] disagree, or strongly disagree with about the policies that put maximum Permitir que las compañías this policy suggestion? pressure on the Cuban Government, norteamericanas vendan alimentos a Algunas personas dicen que do you strongly agree, somewhat Cuba... ¿Está decididamente a favor, Estados Unidos debería suspender agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly principalmente a favor, principalmente en temporalmente las sanciones disagree with this policy approach? contra, o fuertemente en contra? comerciales a Cuba para permitir Algunas personas dicen que el gobierno respuestas humanitarias a la pandemia de los EE. UU. debe enfatizar las 3. Allowing unrestricted travel by all de Covid. ¿Estás totalmente de acuerdo, políticas que ejercen la máxima presión Americans to Cuba algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o sobre el gobierno cubano para promover Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, muy en desacuerdo? el cambio de régimen. Otras personas Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose? dicen que el gobierno de los Estados Los viajes sin restricciones de todos 9. The U.S. government has suspended Unidos debe enfatizar las políticas que los americanos a Cuba ¿deberían ser airline services to all cities in Cuba ayudan directamente al pueblo cubano permitidos o no? except Havana. Some say that U.S. a mejorar su bienestar económico. airline companies should be able to Pensando ahora en las políticas que 4. Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo establish services to any region of ejercen la máxima presión sobre el of Cuba has worked very well, well, the island, not just Havana. Do you gobierno cubano, ¿está totalmente not very well, or not at all? strongly agree, somewhat agree, de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en En términos generales, ¿cree usted que somewhat disagree, or strongly desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con el embargo norteamericano a Cuba disagree with this policy? este enfoque de política? ha dado muy buen resultado, buen El gobierno de EE. UU. ha suspendido resultado, no muy buen resultado, o los servicios aéreos a todas las ningún resultado? ciudades de Cuba, excepto La Habana.
50 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
13. Now thinking now about the policies 16. Do you strongly agree, somewhat support or not support the way that that are directed specifically at agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly President Trump has handled some improving the economic well being agree that Cuba poses a threat to the important issues: Overall, do you of the Cuban people, do you strongly vital interests of the United States. strongly support, somewhat support, agree, somewhat agree, somewhat ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose disagree, or strongly disagree with acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en the way that he has handled … this policy approach? desacuerdo con que Cuba representa Independientemente de su elegibilidad Pensando ahora en las políticas que se una amenaza para los intereses vitales de o intención de votar en noviembre, dirigen específicamente a mejorar el los Estados Unidos? me gustaría saber si apoya o no la bienestar económico del pueblo cubano, forma en que el presidente Trump ha ¿está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de 17. Have you ever traveled to Cuba [ADD manejado algunos asuntos importantes: acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy IF BORN IN CUBA:] since you left? En general, ¿apoya firmemente, apoya en desacuerdo con este enfoque ¿Ha viajado a Cuba alguna vez IF BORN un poco, se opone algo o se opone de política? IN CUBA: desde que salió? firmemente a la forma en que ha manejado la Política de … 14. President Trump has suspended 18. Do you have close relatives or the Cuban Family Reunification significant others living in Cuba now? 23. Finally, we would like to get an idea of Parole Program, which allows ¿Tiene parientes cercanos u otras COVID-19’s impact on you and your Cuban Americans to sponsor their personas significativas que están family. First, in terms of health, would close family members in Cuba viviendo en Cuba ahora? you say you or your family have been for immigration to the United very badly, badly, somewhat, slightly, States. Do you strongly support, 19. How likely are you to vote in the or not at all affected by the pandemic? somewhat support, somewhat general election in November? Are Finalmente, nos gustaría tener una idea oppose or strongly oppose President you definitely going to vote, probably del impacto de COVID-19 en usted y su Trump’s suspension of the Family will vote, probably will not vote or are familia. Primero, en términos de salud, Reunification Parole Program? definitely not going to vote? ¿diría que usted o su familia han sido El presidente Trump ha suspendido el ¿Qué tan probable es que usted gravemente, mucho, algo, un poco o Programa de Parole para la Reunificación vote en las elecciones generales de nada afectados por la pandemia? Familiar Cubana, que permite a los noviembre? ¿Definitivamente va a votar, cubanoamericanos patrocinar a sus probablemente votará, probablemente 24. In terms of financial situation, would familiares cercanos en Cuba para que no votará o definitivamente no votará? you say you or your family have been puedan migrar a los Estados Unidos. very badly, badly, somewhat, slightly, ¿Apoya firmemente, apoya un poco, se 20. If the election for President were held or not at all affected by the pandemic? opone algo o se opone firmemente a la today with Joe Biden and Donald En términos de su situación financiera suspensión del Presidente Trump del Trump as candidates, whom would ¿diría que usted o su familia han sido Programa de Parole de Reunificación you vote for? gravemente, mucho, algo, un poco o Familiar de los cubanos? Si las elecciones para presidente se nada afectados por la pandemia? celebraran hoy con Joe Biden y 15. Some people say that the U.S. should Donald Trump como candidatos, reinstate the “wet foot/dry foot” policy ¿por quién votaría? that allowed Cubans without a visa a guaranteed path to legal entry into 21. Now let me list some important issues the United States when they reached for the general election in November. U.S. soil. Do you strongly support, Regardless of your eligibility or somewhat support, somewhat intention to vote, please tell me oppose, or strongly oppose the how important the following issues reinstatement of this policy? are to you. Algunas personas dicen que Estados Ahora permítame enumerar cuestiones Unidos debería restablecer la “política de que pueden ser importantes en pies secos/pies mojados” que permitió noviembre. Independientemente de su a los cubanos sin visa un camino elegibilidad o intención de votar, dígame garantizado para ingresar legalmente cuán importantes son los siguientes a los Estados Unidos cuando llegaran asuntos para usted. a territorio estadounidense. ¿Apoya firmemente, apoya un poco, se opone 22. Regardless of your eligibility or algo o se opone firmemente a la intention to vote in November, I reinstauración de esta política? would like to know whether you
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 51
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54 CUBAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE