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“Successful minorities”: A critical reexamination of the Cuban-American case
Vidal de Haymes, Maria del Rosario, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1991
Copyright ©1991 by Vidal de Haymes, Maria del Rosario. All rights reserved.
UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106 "SUCCESSFUL MINORITIES": A CRITICAL REEXAMINATION
OF THE CUBAN AMERICAN CASE
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University
By Maria Vidal de Haymes, B.S.S.W, A.M.
*****
The Ohio State University
. 1991
Dissertation Committee: Approved by
Keith Kilty
Elizabeth Segal Adviser f James Upton College of Social WorJ Copyright by Maria Vidal de Haymes 1991 A Mis Padres,
Diana Trujillo de Vidal y Alberto Vidal, quienes me
ensenaron que "success" se mide en terminos de compasion, justicia, virtud, amor y lucha para el mejoramiento humano.
ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My sincere gratitude goes to the members of my dissertation committee. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Keith
Kilty. As my advisor, he offered infinite patience, support, encouragement, and advice. Without his assistance I would not have been able to complete this study. I am also very appreciative of Dr. Elizabeth Segal and Dr. James Upton. Their critical reading of the research proposal greatly helped in clarifying issues.
I also offer my gratitude to Drs. Vilma Ortiz and Melvin
Oliver of the University of California-Los Angeles for listening to me when I was initially struggling with ideas. My sincere appreciation also goes to three fellow students, Karin
Gregory, Terry Cluse-Tolar, and Vinolia Fubara, who helped in more ways than I can name.
I gratefully acknowledge the technical assistance of
David Reed and Fred Ruland of Ohio State and Fran Johannes and
Rick Miller at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Without their help I could not have tackled SAS, SPSS, census tapes, and the mainframe computer. My thanks also go MaryAnn Riggs of UW-M who patiently read the document format specifications and worked with my draft to make it conform.
Lastly, I am deeply appreciative of my family. To my husband, Stephen, I offer sincere thanks for his confidence, ideas, and love. I also thank my son, Maceo, for understand ing at the young age of two what a dissertation is and for his frequent interruptions. And to my parents, I am forever indebted for the love and interest they have always shown me. VITA
October 28, 1962 ...... Born - Trinidad, Cuba
1985 ...... B.S.S.W., University of Nebraska-Lincoln
1987 ...... A.M., School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago
1991 to Present ...... Assistant Professor, School of Social Welfare, University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee.
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Social Work Studies in Social Welfare Policies: Professors Salvatore Imbrogno and Richard First Studies in Social Work Research: Professors Keith Kilty, Beverly Toomey, Richard Boettcher, and Rocco D'Angelo
Studies in Social Functioning: Professors Keith Kilty and James Lantz
Studies in Social Work Practice: Professors Daniel Lee and James Billups
Principle Advisors: Professors Keith Kilty, Elizabeth Segal, and James Upton
v TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION ...... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iii
VITA ...... V
LIST OF TA B L E S ...... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ...... X
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
General Area of C o n c e r n ...... 1 Significance of the Issue and Justification of the Investigation . . . 7 Organization of the Dissertation ...... 9
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ...... 11
Introduction ...... 11 Cuban Immigration to the United States . . . 11 Literature Relevant to the Success S t o r y ...... 22 Theoretical Foundation ...... 47
III. METHODOLOGY...... 50 P u r p o s e ...... 50 Major Research Hypotheses ...... 50 Research Design ...... 51 Research D a t a ...... 54 Research Sample ...... 56 Variables of Interest ...... 57 Analysis Procedures...... 60 CHAPTER PAGE
IV. RESULTS ...... 66
Introduction ...... 66 Predictor, Criterion and Concomitant V a r i a b l e s ...... 66 Relationship Between the Concomitant and Criterion Variables ...... 86 Results of the Analysis of Variance and Covariance...... 88
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION...... 96
Introduction ...... 96 Overview and Discussion of Main F i n d i n g s ...... 100 Limitations and Implications for Future R e s e a r c h ...... 104 Discussion of Findings Within the Context of Minority "Success" Stories and Its Implications for Social W o r k ...... 108 APPENDIX Variable Transformations ...... 114
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 118
vii LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
1. Frequencies for Households by Ethnicity . . . 68
2. Household Income Medians, Means, and Standard Deviations by Ethnicity ...... 73
3. Household Income Quartiles by Ethnicity . . . 73
4. Percent Distribution According to Source of Household Income by Ethnicity ...... 75
5. One-Way Analyses of Variance for Sources of Household Income by Ethnicity ...... 76
6. Mean Family Income by Number of Workers in Household and E t h n i c i t y ...... 77
7. Percent Distribution According to Number of Workers in Household by Ethnicity .... 78
8. Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of Income of Individuals 15 Years of Age or Over Working Full-Time Year-Round by Sex and Ethnicity...... 80
9. Income Percentiles in Dollars by Ethnicity and G e n d e r ...... 81
10. Means and Standard Deviations of Concomitant Variables for Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Households in all 12 States Sampled ...... 83
11. One-Way Analyses of Variance for Concomitant Variables for 12 State S a m p l e ...... 84
viii TABLE PAGE
12. Means and Standard Deviations of Concomitant Variables for Cuban Households in 12 State and Florida Only S u b s a m p l e s ...... 85
13. One-Way Analyses of Variance for Concomitant Variables for Florida Only for Cubans Sample ...... 86
14. Product-Moment Correlations Between Covariate and Criterion Variables for the 12 State Sample and the Florida Only for Cubans Subsample ...... 87
15. Summary of One-Way Analysis of Variance for Household Income by Ethnicity for 12 State Sample ...... 88
16. Summary of One-Way Analysis of Variance for Household Income by Ethnicity for Florida Only for Cubans Subsample ...... 89
17. Summary of the Beta Weights and Significance of the Covariates for the 12 State Sample ...... 91
18. Summary of the Beta Weights and Significance of the Covariates for the Florida Only for Cubans Subsample ...... 91
19. Summary of Analysis of Covariance for the Twelve State Sample ...... 92
20. Summary of Analysis of Covariance for Florida Only for Cubans Subsample ...... 92
21. Observed Means and Means Adjusted for Covariates by Ethnicity for Twelve State S a m p l e ...... 93
22. Observed Means and Means Adjusted for Covariates by Ethnicity for Florida Only for Cubans Subsample ...... 93
ix LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
1. Model 1: Relationship Between Ethnicity and Household Income ...... 53
2. Model 2: Relationship Between Ethnicity and Household Income Considering Household Organizational Factors Research Data ...... 54
3. Combined Income Frequences for Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Households ...... 69
4. Mexican Household Income ...... 70
5. Puerto Rican Household Income ...... 70
6. Cuban Household Income ...... 71
7. Observed and Adjusted Means for Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Households (Model with all Twelve States for Cubans) ...... 95
8. Observed and Adjusted Income Means by Ethnicity for Model with Florida Only for C u b a n s ...... 95
x CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
General Area of Concern
Cuban Americans constitute the third largest Latino group in the United States, following Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.
By September of 1980 there were over 800,000 Cubans residing in the U.S. (Diaz-Briquets and Perez 1981). Despite this large number, Cuban immigration to the U.S. prior to the
Cuban Revolution of 1959 was small, amounting to probably less than 50,000 (Perez 1980).
Irrespective of their short tenure in the U.S., Cuban
Americans have been the subject of innumerable journalistic rags-to-riches stories of successful bank executives, doctors, architects, and entrepreneurs. A sample of a few titles include: "Those Amazing Cuban Emigres" (Fortune 1966) , "Cuba's
New Refugees Get Jobs Fast: Opportunities in the U.S."
(Business Week 1969), "How the Immigrants Made it in Miami"
(Business Week 1971), "Cuba's Exiles Bring New Life to Miami"
(National Geographic 1973), "Making It" (Wall Street Journal
1980), "To Miami, Refugees Spell Prosperity" (Business Week
1962), "Miami: New Hispanic Power Base in U.S." (U.S. News and
1 2
World Report 1979) and "A Cuban Success Story in the United
States" (U.S. News and World Report 1967). The following
excerpt is illustrative of the type of narratives found in these and other articles:
[S]ince Cubans began fleeing to the U.S. from Castro, they have made faster progress in their adopted country than has any other group of immigrants in this century. Almost overnight they have emerged from the deprived, refugee state and moved into the middle class, skipping lightly over -or never even touching -the lowest rung of the economic ladder that was the first step for the Irish, the Jews, the Italians, and others...In fact, the Cubans have enjoyed an economic success that is spectacular (Business Week 1971:88).
The above narrative and others like it have constructed
a Cuban American "success story" which has been widely
accepted by both Cuban and non-Cuban Americans alike.
According to the "success story" Cubans have achieved an
economic victory of mythic proportions in exile through either
entrepreneural activities or employment in professional, management, or executive positions. Consequently, the Cuban
emigres have come to be known as "the golden exile" and more recently "yucas" (Portes 1969, Lincoln Journal-Star 1990).
The later term has been used to describe younger foreign born and first generation Cuban Americans and is an abbreviation
for "young up-scale Cuban Americans," which represents a play on the name of a common Cuban dietary staple.
Even the last wave of Cuban immigration to the U.S., the
1980 Mariel exodus, has largely overcome its initial negative media portrayal. Unlike earlier Cuban refugees, the 1980 3
arrivals were initially greeted with suspicion, fear,
resentment and hostility which was reflected in the popular
press. Immediately following this influx there was a flood of
negative articles appearing in magazines and newspapers, but
in a short time the number of articles concerning this group
diminished drastically. With time, the media silence allowed
their initial negative image to fade in the popular mind.
The few articles that did surface later in popular
magazines and newspapers concerning the 1980 entrants mirrored
the same message that was being carried in more scholarly
journals. This message was that with the exception of less
than 5,000 the remaining 120,000 entrants were not
distinguishable from the earlier refugees and had largely been
absorbed within the already existing Cuban American community
(e.g. Bach et al. 1981/1982; Bach 1980, 1987; Fernandez 1982;
Babcock 1981; Lincoln Journal-Star 1990, Lowenstein 1986).
The early misinformed sensationalized descriptions of this population as "the dredges of Cuban society" had been dropped
or ex-changed for "entrant-turned- Valedictorian" (Silva
1985:11) stories or more often to less spectacular, but more
accurate accounts of this groups accommodation such as the one
carried in Newsweek (Feb.l, 99, 1982:28): "Nearly 2 years after the Freedom Flotilla, the vast majority of the 125,000
Cuban refugees who fled Mariel Harbor have found jobs,
sponsors and new lives in the United States." Thus with time, the last wave of immigration has come to share the popular 4
"success story" by becoming indistinguishable from the older
Cuban American community in the popular mind.
Cuban "success" has usually been explained in the popular
press, either implicitly or explicitly, in terms of the
cultural characteristics that the media has associated with
them. Journalistic accounts describe the Cuban cultural value
system as one that stresses education, group unity, respect
for authority, self-discipline, hard work, family unity,
deferred gratification, obedience to laws, self- sacrifice,
endurance, and persistence. In sum, Cubans are said to have
brought with them "a vast capacity for hard work; unshakable
faith in God; respect for the laws of the land; a family united; [and] an unquenchable thirst for liberty" (Linehan
1973:95). So culturally well endowed are Cubans, according to
one author, that "even their harshest critics acknowledge that the immigrants are resourceful, aggressive and energetic"
(Business Week 1971:88). This portrayal is in sharp contrast with that of other American minority groups and is reminiscent
of what Jiobu (1990:160) has termed a "culture of success".
He uses this term to refer to the cultural determinist argument that particular ethnic groups, such as Japanese
Americans, have reached economic parity with white Americans because of particular elements found in their culture that promote upward mobility. These cultural elements are the same as those attributed to Cubans above. While this line of reasoning has strong appeal, it lacks rigorous testing.
Nevertheless, Jiobu states, it has received wide support.
But of course, "success" is a relative concept. Popular
versions of the "success story" imply that Cuban's have
achieved a level of economic prosperity equal to or surpassing
that of whites or earlier white ethnic immigrants. Usually
only anecdotal "evidence" emphasizing exceptional cases is
presented in the popular dailies and journals in support of
their claims. Yet, when more reasonable indicators of economic
achievement are presented, usually in professional rather than
popular journals, other U.S. minority groups form the point of
reference rather than whites or the U.S. population as a
whole. Most frequently, comparisons have been made between
Cubans and other Latinos (e.g. Pedraza-Baily 1981/1982 and
1985, Perez 1985, Portes 1986, Portes et al. 1980, 1985)
However, a few comparisons have been made with recent Hatian
immigrants and African Americans (e.g. Mohl 1985, Portes et
al. 1985, Rose 1989).
This claim of relative Cuban success is supported by
initial comparisons between Cubans and other minority groups
along household level economic measures. A glance at some
economic indicators for the year of 1987, the most recent year
that there is a breakdown by national origin for Latino groups, illustrates this point. For example, the poverty rate
for Cubans, Mexicans, and Puerto Rican households were 13.8,
25.5, and 37.9 percent respectively (Bureau of the Census 6
1988). The median Cuban household income was 27,294 dollars, compared to 19,968 dollars for Mexican and 15,185 dollars for
Puerto Rican households (Bureau of the Census 1988). And finally, the mean incomes for Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican households were $36,572, $25,010 and $20,553 respectively
(Bureau of the Census 1988).
However, the picture changes when non-hispanic whites form the reference for comparison. In this context, there really is no "success story" at all. Again, a look at some
1987 economic indicators will illustrate this point. The median Cuban household income ($27,294) was nearly 5,000 dollars lower than that of non-Hispanic white households
($32,274) for that year (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988,
1989). Also, the Cuban household poverty rate for that same year was 13.8 percent, while the poverty rate for whites was
10.5 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988, 1989).
Furthermore, the popular perception of Cuban Americans is that they are primarily accomplished professionals, entrepreneurs, managers, and executives. This is simply not the case. For example, in Miami where the greatest number of
Cubans live and Cuban owned businesses operate, only 7 percent of Cubans are self-employed and of those working for others only 18 percent hold professional, technical or management positions, while 28 percent are clerical workers, 37 percent are skilled laborers, and 16 percent are unskilled laborers
(Greneir 1989:2). 7
Significance of the Issue and Justification of the
Investigation
From the preceding discussion it is clear that the Cuban
"success story" is questionable. While it is worth while in and of itself to pursue investigations aimed at reaching a conclusion as to whether or not Cuban success really exists it becomes even more important if the consequences of this claim are considered. Prohias and Casals (1980:7-8) have identified five consequences of the "success story" for the Cuban
American community:
[It has] a) prevented the Cubans themselves from achieving a clear image of their own characteristics and needs; b) obscured for Cubans a realization of the realities of power in a complex, heterogeneous society where "ethnicity" is a fundamental fact of socio-political life; c) been instrumental in helping to isolate Cubans from other minorities, who frequently perceive Cubans as receiving a privileged treatment which in most cases is pure fiction; d) insensitized Cubans and the surrounding community to the hidden costs of the superficial success story; [and] e) blinded Cubans and the surrounding community to the heterogeneity of the Cuban migration and has rendered invisible those who most desperately need help.
However, the consequences of the "success story" are not exclusive to the Cuban community. There are several broad assertions or assumptions imbedded in the "success story" regarding the nature of American social/cultural/economic relations that extend far past the Cuban American community.
The set of underlying assumptions include: 1) The U.S. economy provides equal and ample opportunity to all regardless or race, ethnicity, and or gender; 2) All participants in the economy are compensated and advanced equally for their
services regardless of race, ethnicity, and or gender; and 3)
Individual or group economic outcomes are a result of merit or
individual characteristics relevant to employment (e.g.
education, ability, attitudes...) rather than structural,
institutional or ideological forces (e.g. market positions,
racism, sexism...).
In short, if one accepts the "success story" one also
must accept the assumptions that are at its base. More
specifically, if one accepts the Cuban "success story", at
least in its popular form, one must also agree that the U.S.
economic system and its corresponding relations work equally
well for everybody, including minorities. Consequently,
unequal outcomes for different groups can be explained by
individual characteristics which are fostered by particular
cultural values or practices. The implied corollary argument
is that of a "culture of failure" or more commonly known as a
"culture of poverty", which blames the inferior economic
outcomes of particular groups on their cultural inheritance
(Lewis 1965). Elements or characteristics of the "culture of poverty," as you would expect, are in opposition to those of
a "culture of success". This is a serious conclusion that can be and has been used to explain and justify the unequal position of U.S. minorities and that ironically derives
support from stories of "minority success". 9
Given the popular perception of Cuban success and its
implications, research that critically assesses the validity
of this view is warranted. Unfortunately, little scholarly
work of this nature has been done. Grenier (1989:2) cites only
three "exceptions" (Perez 1986; Jorge and Moncarz 1982; and
Moncarz 1978) to the preoccupation of researchers with the
relative success of Cubans in comparison with other minority
groups. Although I would add several more exceptions to
Grenier's list (e.g. Arguelles 1982, Ferree 1979), I concur
with his conclusion. It is precisely this void in the
literature that this study addresses.
Organization of the Dissertation
The purpose of the preceding section was to provide the
reader with a general understanding of the issue of interest
and a justification for further inguiry. The following
chapter presents a survey the literature that is relevant to
the issue. This review is organized into three sections.
First, literature describing the nature of Cuban immigration to the United States is discussed. Secondly, literature relevant to Cuban American success is reviewed and thirdly, the theoretical foundation of the study is discussed.
Chapter III, which presents the methodology and a brief discussion of the procedures of analysis employed in the research. Chapter IV provides the results of the 10 investigation. And the fifth and final chapter, presents a discussion of the findings and conclusions. CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background
information on Cuban immigration to the United States and a discussion of the "success story" that has come to characterize this group. Literature describing the nature of
Cuban migration to the U.S. will be presented first, followed by a review of scholarly writings relevant to the "success story".
Cuban Immigration to the United States
Waves of Immigration
Cuban Americans constitute the third largest Latino group
in the United States, following Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.
By September of 1980 there were over 800,000 Cubans residing
in the U.S. (Diaz-Briquets and Perez 1981) . In spite of this large number, Cuban immigration to the U.S. prior to the Cuban
Revolution of 1959 was small, amounting to probably less than
50,000 (Perez 1980).
11 12
There is a great deal of literature describing the characteristics of Cuban immigrants (e.g. (Casal and
Hernandez 1975, Casal 1979, Diaz-Briquets and Perez 1981,
Portes et al. 1977, Bach 1987, Pedraza-Baily 1985, Prohias and
Casal 1980, Azicri 1981/1982). Most descriptions divide the
Cuban exodus into three to six different "waves'1 or "vintages" according to the changing characteristics of the emigres and the circumstances under which they came. I have adopted the more detailed use of six waves because it illustrates more clearly the heterogeneity of the Cuban immigrant community.
The first major wave of Cuban immigration began in
January of 1959 and ended in October of 1962 with the "Missile
Crisis". During the early revolutionary period exodus through the U.S. Embassy and the Santiago de Cuba Consulate could be secured with little difficulty. However, on January 31st of
1961 the the United States broke diplomatic relations with
Cuba, making departure for the States more difficult, except for children aged 6 to 16. For this group an exception was made by the U.S. in the form of facilitated immigration in an effort to "prevent their Marxist indoctrination" (Azicri
1981/1982j56-57). This marked the beginning of the flow of over 14,000 unaccompanied Cuban children to the U.S. (Bach
1985). Estimates of the numbers of Cubans immigrating during this time range from 153,534 to 215,000 (Azicri 1981/1982,
Boswell 1984, Diaz-Briquets and Perez 1981). 13
The second wave also spanned a period of about three years, beginning with the "Missile Crisis" of 1962 to the opening of the port of Camarioca in September of 1965. It is believed that between 29,962 and 56,000 Cubans came to the
U.S. during this period (Azicri 1981/1982, Boswell 1984). The
"Missile Crisis" led to a termination of regular flights and communication between Cuba and the U.S. Consequently, most
Cubans leaving for the States after that time traveled by way of a third country, usually Mexico or Spain. A small number left clandestinely by boat or plane (7,000) or were allowed to come directly (6,000) by both governments (Boswell 1984).
The third wave occurred between September 1965 and April
1973. On September 25, 1965 Castro announced that the Port of
Camarioca would be opened to all Cubans in the United States desiring to pick up any family members remaining in Cuba who wished to join them stateside. Three months later a
Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Johnson and
Castro administrations, which commenced what were called the
"freedom flights" or the "aerial bridge" between Varadero
Beach and Miami. These family reunification flights continued under the Nixon administration until April of 1973, when the
Cuban government suspended emigration. An estimated 268,040 to 344,000 Cubans came to the States during this period, accounting for nearly half of all Cubans currently residing in the U.S. (Azicri 1981/1982, Diaz-Briquets and Perez 1981). 14
The fourth wave stretched over five years, from April
1973 to September 19, 1978. With restrictions on emigration and without the airlift, the number of Cubans coming to the
U.S. dropped to between 17,899 and 35,000 during this period
(Azicri 1981/1982, Diaz-Briquets and Perez 1981).
Most Cubans coming to the United States during this wave came via Spain with difficulty and delay.
The fifth wave, occurring from October 1978 to April
1980, was closely connected to the Havana Dialogues (Azicri
1981/1982). On September 28, 1978 the Cuban government issued an invitation to Cubans abroad to return to dialogue with their island nationals. The first Dialogue brought 55 young
Cubans to their homeland in December 1977 and another 275 over the summers of 1979 and 1980. All of the participants of the
Dialogue were members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, which has an official stance that is sympathetic towards the revolution and an organizational membership that is composed of Cubans who as children left for other countries because of their parents wishes. Three of the major issues addressed in the
Dialogue were: the status of political prisoners, reunification of families, and the opportunity for Cubans living abroad to visit the Island. These talks were largely responsible for the ability of many Cubans to subsequently return to Cuba for visits and for the release of many political prisoners. A small number of prisoners were released to join their families in the States just prior to 15 the Dialogue, followed by a stream the following year. During this stage 16,642 Cubans, mostly former political prisoners and their immediate family members, emigrated to the United
States (Azicri 1981/1982, Bach 1985).
The sixth and last wave of immigration occurred over the five month period of April 21 to September 26 of 1980, yet brought over 125,000 Cubans to the U.S., accounting for over one-sixth or nearly 16 percent of all Cuban Americans (Azicri
1981/1982). This last wave began in early April of 1980 when a number of Cubans approached the Peruvian Embassy for political asylum. Within a matter of days a rush on the
Embassy ensued with dramatically increased numbers. In response, the Cuban government issued open permission to all those desiring to leave the Island to do so by boat through the Port of Mariel. The United States, then under Carter, agreed to accept 3,500, but was flooded with over 120,000 more individuals who were reluctantly accepted. This last exodus was precipitated by the Cuban economic slump beginning in the late 70's, the family ties that were rekindled by the return visits of more than 100,000 Cubans living abroad and the material aspirations that were sparked by those same visits which were accompanied by the perceived possibility of satisfying them in the United States (Bach 1985, Diaz-
Briquets and Perez 1981, Azicri 1981/1982, Winn 1980). 16
Educational. Occupational. and Class Characteristics of Waves
Furthermore, not only did the socio-political
circumstances under which the various waves occur differ, but
the class backgrounds of the individuals that comprised them
also varied. Those coming immediately after the Revolution until the 1962 "Missile Crisis" over represented the Island's
elites, professionals, and business people. For example, nearly 13 percent of the first emigres had completed four or more years of college and 37 percent of the heads of households were proprietors, managers or professionals (Fagen et al. 1968). In contrast, the Cuban census of 1953 reported fewer than one percent of its population had completed four or more years of college and categorized about 10 percent of the
islanders as proprietors, managers, or professionals (Fagen et al. 1968). Also over represented among the early exiles were individuals in clerical and sales occupations which accounted for 33 percent of this group (Fagen et al. 1968).
The class and occupational positions of the emigres declined by the second wave. Professionals accounted for 18 percent, clerical and sales workers for 12 percent, agricultural workers and fishermen for 10 percent, and skilled and unskilled workers for 49 percent of those arriving between
October of 1962 and September of 1965 (Pedraza-Baily 1985).
This downward class trend followed through the period of the "freedom flights" of the late sixties and early seventies.
By 1970 only 12 percent of the new emigres were professionals and 57 percent were bluecollar, service or agriculture workers
(Pedraza-Baily 1985). Of the service workers most were cooks,
domestics, shoe shiners, hairdressers, cab drivers, street
venders or small retail venders (Pedraza-Baily 1985). The
occupational gradations continued to drop through the late
seventies and the sixth and final wave. Those arriving in the
Mariel exodus, like their 1970 counterparts, were primarily
urban workers of lower class origins (Diaz-Briquets and Perez
1981). Of those coming during this period, 11.2 percent were
professionals, 11.4 percent were service or sales workers, and
70.9 percent were bluecollar workers (Bach et. al 1981/1982).
Of the blue-collar workers 25.5 percent were craft and 45.4
percent were semiskilled and unskilled laborers (Bach et al.
1981/1982). Also, like the previous "freedom flight" emigres,
the Mariel entrants averaged nine years of schooling (Dixon
1988).
Racial Composition of Waves
Another dimension that distinguishes the various waves is
the racial composition of the emigres. The 1953 Cuban census
indicated that 12.4 percent of the Island's people were
"black" and 14.5 were of "mixed racial ancestry", yet
Afro-Cuban immigration to the U.S. has been relatively small
(Diaz-Briquets and Perez 1981). Prior to the Revolution,
approximately 13 percent of the emigre population was composed
of Afro-Cubans (Greenbaum 1985). In the post-revolutionary 18 waves, Afro-Cubans comprised an even smaller proportion of the emigres until the last wave. The 1980 U.S. census, which captured all waves except for that of 1980, indicated that 84 percent of Cuban Americans identified themselves as "white",
3 percent as "black", and 13 percent as "other". Estimates for the 1980 entrants suggest that between 20 to 50 percent are black or of mixed race (Llanes 1982, Bach 85). However, it is important to note that these figures are rather soft, since there are many problems involved in attempts to racially classify Cuban Americans. Dixon (1988:234-235) summarizes that:
The [1980] census data on racial classification must be approached with the utmost caution. There was substantial confusion concerning the self-identification of both race and ethnicity... It is conceivable that unknown numbers of Cubans did not even answer the racial identification item and were classified as "other" racially. Also, it is possible that certain Cubans understood "black" to refer to black-Americans exclusively. Owing to different racial classification schemes in the United States, i.e. dichotomous (black or white) or tricotomous (black, white, or mixed), some individuals may have experienced difficulty in reconciling the two schemes for the "middle" elements. At a minimum, that individuals who did identify themselves unequivocally as black or white suggest a North American racial consciousness over that of those Cuban-Americans should be viewed as suggestive, i.e. tentative, rather than definitive in nature.
The relatively small numbers of post-revolutionary Afro-
Cuban emigres has been explained as a result of both the U.S. immigration policies, the pre-1959 Cuban class/race structure and the revolutionary ideology and policies of post-1959 Cuba
(Aguirre 1976). As previously noted, the first exiles coming 19
to the U.S. after the Cuban Revolution were the Island's
elites, which were almost exclusively white. This, coupled with the subsequent U.S. immigration policy favoring family
reunification (except in the case of the Mariel exodus),
insured small numbers of Afro-Cuban emigres (Aguirre 1976).
Furthermore, many would be Afro-Cuban emigres did not leave
Cuba because of the promise the Revolution held in removing the last traces of racial discrimination, which was paired with their knowledge of racism in the U.S. (Aquirre 1976).
Migration and Settlement Trends
Once in the United States, Cubans have concentrated in a
few areas. Prior to the Cuban Revolution, the largest assemblage of Cubans in the U.S. was in New York, followed by
Florida, claiming 45 and 27 percent respectively (Boswell
1984). This relationship was reversed by the migration that followed the revolution. Presently the largest numbers are in
Florida, in the Miami-Ft.Lauderdale area in particular, where over 52 percent of all Cuban Americans reside (Perez 1985).
The second largest concentration is in the Greater New York area, which includes Union City and West New York, New Jersey and is home to nearly 20 percent of Cuban Americans (Boswell
1984). Furthermore, if you add the Cubans in Los Angeles to those in Miami-Ft. Lauderdale and Greater New York you can account for more than three-fourths of all Cuban Americans
(Perez 1985). 20
Only Florida showed a net gain in Cuban residents between
1970 and 1980 (Perez 1985, Boswell 1984). This coincides with
the "trickle-back" migration pattern that was first identified
by Prohias and Casals in the early seventies. Prohias and
Casals (1973) noted that the Cuban Refugee Resettlement
Program's attempts to disperse the immigrants across the U.S.
were in part futile, since many Cubans returned to the Miami
area after having settled elsewhere initially. Further
support for their observation was provided by a Miami Herald
survey which found that 40 percent of all Cuban residents in
Dade County had previously lived in other parts of the country
(Boswell 1984).
A second migration pattern was first observed by Benigno
Aguirre in the mid seventies. Using 1960 and 1970 U.S. census
data, Aguirre noted that while the largest numbers of white
Cubans were concentrated in the southern states, Florida in particular, the majority of non-white Cubans had settled in the Northeast (Aguirre 1976, Aguirre et al. 1980). This pattern remained true over the next decade. Dixon (1988)
found that in 1980, 89 percent of Cubans in Florida identified themselves as white, whereas only 69 did so in New York State.
Furthermore, the largest concentration, 35 percent, of black
Cuban Americans is in New York State (Dixon 1988).
Several possible reasons for this migration pattern have been offered by Aguirre (1976). First, he has suggested that
Afro-Cubans may have been drawn to the North because of the 21
South's history of greater discrimination against blacks.
Secondly, Afro-Cubans are marginalized and discriminated
against by the solidly white Miami (99 percent) Cuban
community, so consequently they have avoided geographical
proximity. He contends that they have been largely rejected
by the Miami exile community because of the pre-1959 racist
ideology carried over to the States, which has been greatly
exasterbated by the belief that Afro-Cubans are staunch
supporters and benefactors of the Revolution. Furthermore,
the findings of other researches have corroborated both the
assertion of discrimination and that of revolutionary support.
For example, Nicolas and Prohias (1973) found the strongest housing discrimination against Afro-Cubans in Miami's Cuban
areas, even more so than in white, black, and integrated tracts. And, in his study of working class Cubans in Chicago,
Fox (1971) found strong support for the Revolution and its
leaders among the black Cubans he interviewed.
Unfortunately, the figures presented here concerning the geographical distribution of Cubans in the U.S. do not include the 125,000 Cubans who came in the last wave. They were not counted by the 1980 census because they arrived too late that year to be included and there is no other comprehensive source containing this type of information. However, Perez (1984) has estimated that about 100,000 or 80 percent of the Cubans who arrived via the Port of Mariel have settled in the South
Florida area. 22
Summary
In short, the majority of Cuban immigration to the U.S.
has occurred since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 in a series of waves that have reflected the relations between the sending
and receiving states. The white, upper occupational strata of
the Island population is overrepresented in the Cuban exile
group as a whole, but all sectors of Cuban society are
represented. However, representation of Cuba's lower strata
among the exile group has increased over time (Casal and
Hernandez 1975). By the 1970's the immigration of the upper
class had almost come to a halt and the exile group took on primarily an urban blue collar composition (Diaz- Briquets and
Perez 1981). Although there has been some controversy
regarding the nature of the last wave of Cuban immigrants
(Gamarra 1982a and 1982b), most Cuban scholars conclude that
it simply reflects a continuation of the downward class trend
emigres (Diaz-Briquets and Perez 1981, Bach 1987, Bach 1980,
Fernandez 1982, and Bach et al. 1981/1982). Lastly, once in the United States, most Cubans have settled in urban areas (98 percent), particularly in the Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, Greater
New York, and Los Angeles metropolitan areas (Perez 1985).
Literature Relevant to the Success Story
Introduction
The scholarly literature that is relevant to Cuban
American "success" has been grouped into four general areas of 23 focus: 1) the human and cultural capital possessed by Cuban immigrants; 2) the large scale Cuban re-settlement program sponsored by the federal government; 3) the establishment of
Cuban enclaves in the U.S.; and 4) Cuban American household organization. This will be followed with a final section that will establish the basis for the present inquiry.
Human Capital Arguments
Human capital arguments have received more attention from social scientists than any other attempt to explain inequality in earnings and advancement among minority groups (Jiobu
1988). Therefore, it is not surprising to find that many of the writings concerning the structural assimilation of Cubans have advanced a human capital argument, either explicitly or implicitly.
The concept of "human capital" refers to the varying amounts of education, experience, training, and ability individual workers bring to the workplace. According to human capital theory, in a free market an individual worker will receive wages that correspond with their marginal productivity. Hence, a worker's wage will vary in accordance with his/her productivity or contribution, which is thought to depend largely on his or her human capital. In other words a worker with more human capital will produce more and consequently will be paid more (Jiobu 1988). 24
By far the earliest and most common explanation of why
Cubans have done so well economically in the United States in
comparison with other Latino immigrant groups is that Cubans
started out with an advantage — a higher social class of
origin (Pedraza-Baily 1982, Diaz-Briquets 1987). In general,
Cubans are seen as a dramatic case of "selective migration",
in which the upper, middle, and professional classes
overwhelmingly left the island following the revolution that
destroyed the social system which benefitted them.
With them, these emigres brought the human capital associated with their class position. This exodus has been perceived as
so selective that it has been described as "the greatest brain-drain of the century" (U.S. News and World Report
1967:104) and the "golden exile" (Portes 1969:508).
The work of Fagen and Brody (1964) and Fagen, Brody and
O'Leary (1968) support the selective migration view. These authors provide a comprehensive analysis of the demographic characteristics of pre-1963 exiles. They conclude that there was an overrepresentation of pre-revolutionary Cuba's upper strata in the exile group. Comparing the demographic profile of their exile sample with 1953 Cuban census, they found that professionals and semi-professionals were overrepresented in the sample by more than five times that of the island population. They also found that 36 percent of the exiles had at least a 12th grade education, compared to 4 percent of the
1953 Cuban population. Wenk (1968) studied Cuban adjustment by surveying 300
Cuban families living in different areas of the United States
randomly chosen from the case files of the U.S. Catholic
Conference. He found an extraordinary level of economic
adjustment as measured through unemployment (0.9%), public
assistance (0 cases), and poverty (5.1%) rates. Wenk
attributes these positive outcomes to the "backgrounds" of the
adult family members, who he described as being for the most
part "well educated, professional, and skilled". He argues
that upon resettlement, Cubans "gravitated" into their previous occupations or a derivative thereof, often of lower
status. However, he predicted that over time they would
regain their previous status.
The findings of Raul Moncarz' (1970a, 1970b, 1972, 1978) various studies concerning the transference of status and professional standing among Cuban exiles directly conflict with Wenk's prediction. Although Wenk acknowledged the
initial downward mobility of professional Cubans upon
immigration to the U.S., he maintained that with time they would (or in some cases already had) resume or approximate their previously held social/occupational positions. In contrast, Moncarz' research has indicated that for a great number of professional Cubans this has not been the case. In short, over 15 years after the initial Cuban influx to the
U.S., Moncarz found a very significant "downward loss of occupational status" among this group. He found a doubling of 26
Cuban workers in unskilled labor categories (from 15.9% in
Cuba to 32.3% in Florida's Dade County) and a four to one loss
in the professional, technical, managerial, and proprietor
category (from 48.2% in Cuba to 12.7% in Dade County)
(Moncarz 1978:163).
Moncarz (1970a, 1970b, 1972) found considerable there
variability in adaptation among different professional groups.
He found the greatest under utilization of human capital among
Cuban trained lawyers, veterinarians, optometrists, teachers,
and pharmacist. For example, 77 percent of the Cuban lawyers,
50 percent of the veterinarians and 46 percent of the teachers
he surveyed 10 years after their arrival indicated that they had not been able to practice their profession in the U.S.
(Moncarz 1970a, 1970b, 1972). And while the balance of the veterinarians (50 percent), 69 percent of the optometrists,
and 49 percent of the pharmacist reported having been able to
continue in their fields, they have done so at a salary lower than that of their North American counterparts and have often done so as technicians versus licensed practitioners and/or
are underemployed (Moncarz 1970a) . Physicians and nurses have been the more successful in utilizing their training in the
U.S. Moncarz (1970) found that 96 percent of physicians and
94 percent of nurses he surveyed had been able work in their
same field. However, their earnings too were substantially
lower than their North American counterparts. Regarding the 27
perception of Cubans as a very successful group, Moncarz
concludes:
The overstating of personal achievements has been to the detriment of the larger group of Cubans who have been unable to use their education and experience and face the tremendous task of emulating or believing in a success that has never been theirs, and as time goes by becomes more elusive...If significant changes in occupational status do not occur in the near future in terms of educational and job opportunities in a few more years, the Cuban group will be another minority without economic power (1978:171-172).
While Moncarz found downward mobility for Cubans in
Miami, Portes (1969) and Prohias (1967) found parallel
professional adjustment in Milwaukee and Indianapolis
respectively. These authors argue that the Cubans in Milwaukee
and Indianapolis have been able to regain a level of income
and status of employment close to that prior to immigration.
Moreover, most of the Cubans in these communities were former professionals and white collar workers, the same type of workers that experienced the most severe downward mobility in
other studies (Fagen and Brody 1964; Fagen, Brody and O'Leary
1968; Wenk 1968; Rogg 1980). The authors attribute this in part to the small Cuban populations in these communities, which they contend facilitated a more rapid integration of
Cubans within the greater community, whereas other authors have found much less integration in areas where large, strong
Cuban communities have emerged, like Miami and West New York
(Gil 1968, Rogg 1970 and 1980, University of Miami 1967). The findings of Eleanor Rogg (1974) in her 1968 study of the role 28
of class and community in the adjustment (structural
assimilation) and acculturation (cultural assimilation) of
Cubans in West New York, New Jersey offer some qualified
support to human capital explanations for Cuban "success".
Although she found that the Cubans with the highest socio
economic status of origin suffered the most drastic downward
mobility, upward mobility was found to be related to education
and gender, with better educated males receiving the higher
status jobs and women faring poorly regardless of educational
level. She concluded that Cubans of middle class origin
adjusted and acculturated with less difficulty than Cubans
from lower class origins. Furthermore, she found that
occupational adjustment occurred before acculturation for
Cubans of lower class, while the inverse was true for Cubans
of higher class backgrounds.
Over 10 years later Rogg and Cooney (1980) studied this
same geographic community using a trend design, which allowed
them to make comparisons with the 1968 sample. Although Rogg
(1974) found moderate to high downward mobility in the initial
jobs that Cubans had secured upon arrival, Rogg and Cooney
(1980) observed what they considered an "encouraging" amount
of upward mobility 12 years after immigrating to the U.S.; 46 percent were upwardly mobile while 47 percent remained downwardly mobile.
In closing, it is worth noting that most of the work advancing a human capital explanation for "success" was done in the late sixties and even studies published later utilized data that was collected prior to 1970. This is of relevance because it indicates that these studies focused on Cubans who had come to the U.S. in the first and second waves of immigration in which elites and professionals were over represented. This is important because if you recall from the previous section, the subsequent waves were comprised of individuals who in general had less human capital as evidenced by their level of education and occupation status. Of equal importance is the fact that the first two waves account for only 23 percent of all Cuban Americans, therefore caution should be used when relating these findings to Cuban Americans as a group.
State Intervention Arguments
The Cuban Refugee Program represents the only comprehensive refugee program ever planned and executed by the
U.S. Government (Prohias and Casal 1980). The program offered a wide array of services and benefits including: employment opportunities, financial assistance, health services, surplus food distribution, financial aid for the care and protection of unaccompanied children, training and educational opportunities, funds for resettlement, assistance to local public schools for bilingual programs, retraining programs for professionals, college tuition loans, and reimbursement to voluntary relief agencies providing daily 30
necessities of refugees (Thomas 1963, Pedraza-Bailey 1985).
This comprehensive program has been credited in part for the
good adjustment of the Cubans to life in the U.S. as indicated
by the near absence of dependency, juvenile delinquency,
mental health hospitalizations, and crime in the Miami Cuban
community (University of Miami 1967).
Pedraza-Bailey (1985) has executed the most substantial
study to date regarding the role of the Cuban resettlement
program in the structural assimilation of Cubans. Using 1970
census data, Pedraza-Bailey set out to study the effects of
this program and U.S. refugee policies on the economic
adjustment of Cuban refugees by comparing them against Mexican
immigrants in terms of annual earnings. In her comparison she
controlled for differences between the two groups along the
dimensions of: social class of origin (based on educational
attainment), length of time in the U.S., age, citizenship
status, number of weeks worked, region of employment, and vocational training. She also differentiated between pre-1959 and post-1959 Cuban immigrants. The pre-revolutionary
immigration was deemed economic and the latter political, which is a distinction that is central to her thesis.
In this analysis she found that Cubans had experienced a greater degree of structural assimilation. However, while she found that being Cuban was of value to the post-1959 political
immigrants it was inconsequential to the pre-1959 economic
immigrants in terms of earnings and prestige. As political 31
immigrants, Cuban men and women enjoyed higher levels of
occupational prestige than their Mexican counterparts.
Furthermore, being political immigrants raised the annual
salary of Cuban women $617 dollars above that of their Mexican
counterparts, and that of Cuban men by $432.
For Cuban economic immigrants, being Cuban carried a $234 loss
annually for women, but carried a $224 advantage for Cuban men. These findings lend support to her assertion that there
is a distinct difference between political and economic
immigrants.
She argues that Cubans as a group started out with a
social class advantage, but that this alone could not account
in full for the observed differences between the two groups.
State intervention is then offered by Pedraza-Bailey as a partial explanation. Her argument proceeds with the observation that the U.S. government did not respond in the same way to both Mexican and post-1959 Cuban immigration because they represented different types of immigration,
serving dissimilar functions for both the sending and receiving states (Pedraza-Bailey 1981/1982, Pedraza-Bailey
1980). She contends that as political exiles, Cubans served the U.S. by building legitimacy for its Cold War policies and served Cuba by externalizing dissent that could have undermined its new revolutionary government. As economic immigrants, Mexicans serve the U.S. by providing cheap labor to fill "arduous and badly paid jobs", while at the same time 32
acting as a "safety valve" for Mexico, which has been unable
to provide enough jobs for its population.
Pedraza-Bailey maintains that since Cubans were
considered by the U.S. to be "political immigrants" or
refugees, the state "lent them a firm hand". In contrast,
Mexicans were perceived as "economic immigrants" so the "state
largely ignored them". Furthermore, she claims that the
Cuban's initial social class advantage paired with the state
intervention resulted in a process of "cumulative advantage".
In the case of Mexican immigrants, their relatively low
initial socio-economic status, combined with state neglect resulted in a process of "cumulative disadvantage". In short, according to Pedraza-Bailey state support through the Cuban
Refugee Program has been a critical factor in the relatively successful structural assimilation of Cubans in the U.S.
However, not all views on the Cuban refugee program have been so favorable. Rogg (1970) found that the government programs were much less effective than the strong refugee community of West New York in aiding the adjustment of its members. Prohias and Casal (1973) argue that the Cuban
Refugee Program "was conceived as an emergency structure, reluctant to engage in rehabilitation efforts, creating a parallel ethnic system for the delivery of social services which has isolated Cubans from other minorities and from other federal, state, and local agencies, leading to high levels of 33
institutionalized dependency" (Cited in Casal and Hernandez
1975:41).
The previously discussed work of Moncarz' concerning the professional adjustment of Cuban immigrants is also of relevance here. In summary, Moncarz (1970a, 1970b, 1972,
1978) found considerable downward mobility, great under utilization of the skills and training, and poor to moderate professional adjustment for Cuban professionals in most
fields. Moreover, he found this to be the case even for professionals in fields offered retraining programs through the Cuban Refugee Program. For example, one of the largest retraining efforts was the Cuban Teacher Retraining Program, which was offered by eight different universities across the
U.S. under the sponsorship of the department of Health and
Human Services and the Cuban Refugee Program and retrained 920
Cuban educators (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985). Despite this large effort, Moncarz (1970a) found that 46 percent of the Cuban
educators he surveyed had not been able to make a successful professional transition and were doing work that was unrelated to their training. The barriers to resuming their professional practice in the U.S. most cited by the respondents were: "lack of opportunities to attend special programs, the age effect (inverse relationship between age and the ability to learn a language), lack of recognition of their
Cuban degrees, the unwillingness to resettle in other parts of the United States, and the strong educational and legal 34 restrictions by state boards of education blocking their entry
into the teaching profession" (Moncarz 1970a:115). Thus, although the Cuban Refugee Program assisted many Cubans in making a transition, it also failed to reach many and
furthermore did not eliminate all of the barriers to transferring skills acquired prior to emigration in this new
setting.
Ethnic Enclave Arguments
Like Pedraza-Bailey, others believed that the individual pre-immigration human capital of Cubans could not fully account for the relative economic success of Cubans. Also like
Pedraza-Bailey, they were looking for structural explanations.
Their efforts resulted in a theory of economic benefits derived from participation in an ethnic economic enclave. The bulk of the most recent work on Cuban Americans has focused on the ethnic enclave concept (e.g. Forment 1989, Portes 1984 and
1987, Portes and Jensen 1989, Portes and Bach 1980, Sanders and Nee 1987, Wilson and Martin 1982, Wilson and Portes 1980,
Rose 1989). Building on segmented labor market and ethnic solidarity theories, Alejandro Portes has done the most to advance the ethnic enclave economy concept regarding the Cuban
American community in Miami.
According to the segmented-labor-market perspective, in advanced capitalism labor is organized into two or more different markets: primary and secondary (Gordon 1972). The primary market is characterized by skilled or professional
jobs that are stable, often unionized, carry high earnings and
returns on human capital investments, and provide internal
labor markets offering opportunities for advancement within
the same firm. The secondary labor market is characterized by
less stable, unskilled or low skilled jobs with few if any
internal labor markets, thus closing off the opportunity for
advancement. In comparison with the primary market, pay and returns on human capital are low in the secondary market.
Entry into the primary market is difficult because of existing barriers such as, human and cultural/ class capital requisites, informal filters, and institutional and individual discrimination. Entry into the secondary market is more open
or easier, resulting in disproportionate concentrations of racial and ethnic minorities, women, and immigrants in this market.
As an immigrant group that lacks the language skills and other requisites for primary labor market employment, it would
seem likely that Cuban Americans would be concentrated in
secondary market positions and thus economically fare more or
less like other immigrant-minority groups. However, Portes and others (e.g. Portes 1984 and 1987, Portes and Jensen
1989, Portes and Bach 1980) contend that the higher household
income of Cubans when compared to Mexican immigrants, is a product of their participation in an ethnic economic enclave.
They argue that through the establishment of an ethnic 36
economic enclave in Miami, Cuban immigrants have been afforded
a more desirable alternative to the secondary labor market.
Portes (cited in Sanders and Nee 1987:746) has defined the
composition of an enclave as "immigrant groups which
concentrate in a distinct spatial location and organize a
variety of enterprises serving their own ethnic market and/or
the general population. Their basic characteristic is that a
significant proportion of the immigrant work force works in
enterprises owned by other immigrants."
The form that the Miami Cuban community has taken on fits
this definition. In 1982 Cubans owned 84% of all Latin owned
businesses in Miami or 20,795 businesses (Grenier 1989).
These businesses are geographically concentrated in parts of
the Miami SMSA and employ a great many Cubans (Portes and
Jensen 1989). Regarding this community, Portes has argued
that Cubans have benefited from the development of a strong
economic enclave. He asserts that both the Cuban boss and the
Cuban employee experience enhanced economic gains from their relationship to the enclave-economy, which is supported by
"ethnic solidarity". The term "ethnic solidarity", as it is used by theorists in this area, refers to the mobilization
internal resources within ethnically/racially distinct communities for the purpose of economic advancement in the
face of persistent discrimination and initial disadvantage
(Sanders and Nee 1987). 37
In the ethnic enclave economy, solidarity "serves to
provide entrepreneurs with privileged access to immigrant
labor and to legitimize paternalistic work arrangements"
(Portes 1981:291). In turn the worker benefits from the
"protection" the enclave offers from the secondary labor
market. Although the immigrant workers often work longer
hours, are ununionized, and so forth, Portes argues that the
enclave workers benefit from the "reciprocal obligations"
involved in the relationship with the employer:
If employers can profit from the willing self- exploitation of fellow immigrants, they are also obliged to reserve for them, those supervisory positions that open in their firms, to train them in trade skills, and to support their eventual move into self-employment. It is the fact that enclave firms are compelled to rely on ethnic solidarity opportunities for mobility unavailable in the out-side. (Portes and Bach 1985:343).
These reciprocal obligations he contends, insure that the
enclave-economy parallels the primary labor market in returns
on human capital in the form of earnings offered to Cuban
immigrants.
Sanders and Nee (1987) have directly questioned Portes' hypothesis regarding the Miami enclave-economy. They found that both employees and self-employed Cubans in the enclave area earned about 70 percent of what their non-enclave
Floridian counterparts earned. Furthermore, they found that private sector enclave workers received lower returns to human-capital characteristics than Cubans employed in the non-enclave private sector in Florida, which is in direct 38
conflict with the enclave economy thesis. However, they found
that self-employed enclave participants typically earned
returns to human capital equal to self-employed Cubans and
non-hispanic white immigrants outside of the enclave. They
suggest that their findings are different than Portes' because
his analysis do not distinguish between immigrant bosses and
immigrant employees when considering the earnings gained
through participation in the enclave.
In short, their work supports Portes' and others' enclave
economy hypothesis as it relates to the immigrant
entrepreneur/owners, but "soundly rejects it with regards to
the immigrant employee. In the case of the enclave employee,
their work seems to be in agreement with some of the
assertions made by theorists who are critical of enclave
economy thesis, such as Bonacich and Modell. In their studies
of Asian enclave-economies Bonacich and Modell (1980), have
found that immigrant workers are offered greater rewards in
the open economy. Bonacich (1987:459) further argues that,
immigrant enclave workers "tend to be among the most oppressed workers in the society" because their wages are low and benefits are nonexistent. In conclusion, Sanders and Nee
(1987:763) offer a revised economic enclave hypothesis:
While immigrant-minority workers in the open economy tend to receive higher returns to human capital than immigrant-minority workers in an ethnic-enclave economy, immigrant-minority entrepreneurs in an ethnic-enclave economy tend to gain returns to human capital similar to immigrant-minority entrepreneurs in the open economy. 39
Others have also been critical or skeptical of the economic-enclave hypothesis, or aspects thereof (Arguelles
1982, Forment 1989, Jorge and Moncarz 1981). Jorge and
Moncarz (1981:36) have suggested that the enclave has "limited employment capabilities" and that further investigations regarding returns on human capital for Cuban enclave workers need to be done which "define the economic terms of discourse in an explicit and rigorous fashion."
Arguelles (1982) has presented a strong case for her assertion that the material and ideological bases of the Cuban enclave lie in Havana-Miami organized crime connections dating back as far as the 1940's and C.I.A. covert activities in
Latin America and in the U.S. involving Cuban emigres.
Furthermore, she notes the oppressive wages and conditions of work enclave employees endure and ideological, coercive and terrorist techniques of intimidation an domination that are employed by C.I.A. trained exile community elites in order to reproduce and control the enclave.
Forment (1989:74) has described the Miami Cuban American community as an "expression of exploitation and domination along with representation" and has labeled it an
"authoritarian enclave". He attributes its origins to four state sponsored political movements:
The four movements under review [Batistianist, Conservatives, Terrorists, and Liberals] left an indelible imprint on the material and ideational contours of the enclave. The Batistianists, Conservatives, and Terrorists contributed to the formation of an emigre moral economy where politics and profit were fused. The 40
Batistianists, by investing their smuggled capital in the Miami area, by relying on the civil wing of their movement to rejuvenate old allegiances and networks, and by boycotting and harassing politically heterodox merchants, established a type of political monopoly over the local economy. The Conservatives, by misappropriating C.I.A. funds reselling weapons, learned the art of buying and selling, developed sympathetic sources of credit from politically like-minded militants and gathered enough investment capital to establish small enterprises in the Miami area. The Terrorists, by bombing Liberal merchants, prevented their discourse from gaining a local material base of power. The militant Liberals, through their inactivity in the community, facilitated, unintentionally, the rise of the enclave.
Both Arguelles' and Forment's analysis of the Miami
enclaves's origins are in sharp contrast with Portes (1987)
presentation. According to Portes, the emergence of the
enclave economy can be attributed to institutional diversity
within the emigre community (i.e. religious, political,
occupational and regional associations) and the class
heterogeneity of the exile community, tied to the successive
waves of immigration (i.e. newer cohorts provide a steady
labor supply for businesses of earlier emigres).
Family Organization Arguments
The relationship between family organization and
household income has been the main focus of only one
investigation concerning Cuban Americans (Perez 1986).
Nevertheless, many early studies have contributed to knowledge
in this area. For example, in 1968 Wenk argued that the "high
cohesiveness" of the Cuban family furthered their economic progress and could account in part for the absence of public 41
assistance dependency. Ten years later Moncarz' (1978) survey
of 100 adult Cubans randomly sampled from Immigration and
Naturalization files in the Florida Dade County area suggested
that Cuban economic achievements were largely a function of
familial structure, female labor force participation and
economic cooperation. In support of this assertion he noted
that when individual, not family, income was considered, 76%
of respondents in his study had incomes below the U.S.
average.
Perez (1986) has summarized the consequences of the lack
of attention on household forms in inquiries concerning Cuban
economic status. He states that analysis of Cuban Americans'
economic adjustment has traditionally been done at the
individual or enclave level. However, when comparisons are
made regarding relative economic success of Cubans they are
"usually made with household level data, while the
explanations for the economic achievements of Cubans are made
at the level of the individual or the community" (Perez
1986:17). This incongruousness, he argues, has in some ways promoted a distorted view of Cuban American economic
adjustment and has tended to overstate the "success".
Using aggregate 1980 census data, Perez provides a household level analysis of Cuban economic adjustment. It is the only study that I am aware of that specifically addresses the relationship between Cuban household structure and income.
His findings indicate that the Cuban "success" has been 42 overstated at the individual level as it is more of a family, rather than individual, phenomenon (Perez 1986:4). He attributes the Cuban economic achievements largely to familial structure and economic cooperation. He characterizes the
Cuban American family as having: "a relatively large number of workers, high rates of female employment, the presence of an elderly generation that contributes directly and indirectly to the household's economic welfare, low fertility, and high levels of school enrollment" (Perez 1986:17). He adds that the emergence of a Cuban enclave has facilitated this type of family organization.
Perez (1986) found that 61.1 percent of Cuban households had three or more workers, while the figures for other
Spanish-origin households and all U.S. households were 52.4 and 54.2 respectively. The percentages of households with only one worker were 28.5 for Cuban, 35.0 for other
Spanish-origin, and 33.0 for all U.S. households. He also reported that the median household income for Cubans in 1979 was closer to that of the total U.S. population than that of other Spanish-origin households, but if the number of workers per household were considered this relationship changed — the gap between Cuban and other Spanish-origin households income narrowed, while it increased in relation to the general U.S. figure. Furthermore, he notes that median income for individual Cuban workers was closer to that of other 43
individuals of Spanish-origin, than that of the total U.S.
population.
Not only did Perez (1986) find a greater number of
workers in Cuban households, he also found Cuban households
were more likely to have elderly family members living in the
home, forming a three-generational household. More
specifically, he found that 30 percent of Cuban elderly
identified themselves as "other relative" in relation to the
householder. This figure is triple that of all U.S. elderly
and over 10 percent above that of other Spanish-origin
households. These older family members, Perez suggests,
contribute to the household income either directly through
income derived from Social Security or public assistance
programs, or indirectly through the provision of childcare.
Perez findings regarding the Cuban elderly are
corroborated by those of a national survey of older Hispanics
conducted by the Asociacion National Pro Personas Mayores
(ANPPM) in 1980. This survey employed a probability sample of
209 elderly Cubans. Among this population 37 percent were receiving social security benefits (many only qualifying for the minimum social security benefit) and 26 percent were receiving benefits under the Supplemental Security Income program. The ANPPM study also found that 32 percent of elderly Cuban live with their children (cited in Queralt
1983). Perez' (1986) work also highlights the importance of paid female labor for Cuban households. He found the 44
proportion of Cuban women (55.4 percent) in the workforce to
be higher than that of other Spanish-orign women (49.3
percent) or U.S. women in general (49.9 percent). Furthermore,
Cuban women were more likely to work full-time, year-round
than their non-Cuban counterparts, regardless of whether they were married or had young children.
The importance of paid female labor to the total household income of Cuban Americans had previously been
recognized by others (e.g. Prohias and Casals 1973, Moncarz
1978, Rogg 1974). In 1973, the Manpower Report of the
President made statements that paralleled Perez' regarding the
extent and nature of Cuban women in the workforce, indicating
a longstanding pattern: Cuban American women are more likely than other Hispanic women and white women (although less so than black women) to be in the labor force, regardless of marital status or motherhood. The report concluded that "the higher average in family incomes of the Cubans are undoubtedly traceable in part to the Cuban women's more frequent employment" (U.S. Department of Labor 1973:98).
The labor force participation rates for Cuban women may even be higher than what has been indicated by the Department of Labor and census documents due to unreported income from enclave and/or the informal economy employment. For example,
Stepick (1989) has estimated that between 30 and 50 of the production in Miami's rapidly growing garment industry 45
consists of illegal homework or piece work that is largely
done by Cuban women.
Ferree's (1979) study of working Cuban-American women has
added depth to the understanding of this group. She has
observed that high rates of female labor force participation
for Cuban women has been a phenomena associated with
immigration. In pre-revolutionary Cuba, women constituted
only 13 percent of the workforce and were concentrated at both
poles of occupational categorization schemes— either domestics
or professionals. In contrast, Ferree notes that 1970 census
figures indicate that 47 percent of female Cuban emigres above
the age of 16 work. In her survey of 122 Cuban women residing
in Dade County, Ferree found the majority of working Cuban women concentrated in white collar-jobs (51 percent), followed
by blue collar (28 percent) and professional/managerial (21
percent) occupational categories. The women Ferree surveyed were in higher occupational categories than what 1976 Current
Population Survey figures indicated for all U.S. Cuban women:
55 percent blue-collar, 30 percent white-collar, and 15 percent professional/managerial.
Furthermore, despite high rates of labor force participation among Cuban women, Ferree found a strong adherence to traditional standards of female behavior. Thus employment for Cuban women was a function of economic necessity rather than a function of egalitarian views on women and work. Ferree (1979:48) summarizes: 46
Since the Cuban woman is working for her family, her employment is not seen as an expression of her independence or the loosening of traditional controls and restraints that it would have been in Cuba. In such a context, employment is seen as contributing to the respectability of the family rather than the diminishing it in any way. The central norm remains the subordination of the woman to the needs of her family. While in Cuba, this norm prohibited employment for the sake of the honor of the family, but in the United States this same value makes employment an obligation for the sake of the family's upward mobility.
This is consistent with Fox' (1973) study of working
class Cuban American men who expressed that in the "natural
order" home was a feminine domain, while the workplace and the
streets belonged to men. Among the men Fox interviewed, women
working outside of the home was considered tolerable only out
of economic need and shared housework was inconceivable.
In conclusion, the research relevant to Cuban American
families suggests that the form they have taken has, at least
in part, its origins in the economic difficulties that these
families faced upon emigration. In particular, the high rates
of female labor force participation, the greater number of workers per household, and the relatively high rate of
three-generation households indicate a strategy for familial
economic survival and/or advancement. Furthermore, the
research reviewed point out that it has paid off in terms of
household income. In summary Perez states:
Viewed in that context [family], it can be said that there is a Cuban "success story". But it is a success story based not, as is popularly assumed, on the meteoric upward mobility of some individuals whose rags-to-riches stories invariably catch public attention. Instead, it is the somewhat less spectacular story of an immigrant 47
group with a family unit that is organized around realizing aspirations of economic achievement (Perez 1986:18).
Theoretical Foundation
It is clear from the review of the literature relevant to
the Cuban "success story" that there is not a consensus among
scholars regarding the extent of Cuban "success" nor its
source. However, there does appear to be some agreement that
if there is a Cuban American "success story," it has been misrepresented and grossly overstated by the popular media.
Nevertheless, the popular press has strongly influenced the research agenda of scholars which is reflected in the focus most investigations have taken. For example, while U.S. News and World Report and National Geographic have discussed Cuban emigres in terms of "the greatest brain-drain of the century" and "revitalizing the business community," more academic research has spoken of them in terms of selective migration/human capital and enclave economies/ethnic entrepreneurs.
In reviewing the literature, I found the most compelling argument to be that of the relationship between household organization and income, which also happened to be a focus
largely neglected by most researchers. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics between household income and structure within the Cuban 48
American community and its contribution to their "success
story.11
Lisandro Perez (1986) has articulated the most complete
family versus individual success thesis to date. In brief,
Perez states that the Cuban "success story" is exaggerated and
only true in part. He argues that the relative success of
Cubans when compared to other Latino groups can largely be
attributed to a "high degree of economic cooperation within
the family" rather than the popular notion of the "meteoric
upward mobility of some individuals" (Perez 1986:17-18). He
characterizes this type of family/household organization as
having: a large number of workers; high rates of female labor
force participation, financial and in-kind contributions of
elderly persons in the household, low fertility rates and high
levels of enrollment in schools. This form of household
composition, argues Perez, is facilitated by the presence of
an ethnic economic enclave which lends itself to female
employment.
Using aggregated census data, Perez supports his thesis with descriptive statistics, but does not statistically test
it (Perez 1986). And, although his thesis suggests a multivariate model, Perez' (1986) investigation is limited to
a bivariate analysis of household characteristics (e.g. median
income by number of workers in household). Perhaps the source
of this limitation lies in the constraints imposed by
aggregated data. 49
It is Perez' work in this area that provides the theoretical foundation and justification for the present inquiry. A focus on household organization, rather than the individual, state, or community, represents a new departure from the more dominant views regarding Cuban American
"success" and can perhaps provide some fresh insight into the illusive origin(s) of Cuban American "success". This dissertation will build on his thesis by statistically testing it using unaggregated household level data in a multivariate design. CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Purpose
This chapter presents: the major research hypotheses; the research design, data, and sample; definitions of the variables of interest; and a discussion of the analysis procedures utilized in this study.
Major Research Hypotheses
Two primary hypothesis are tested in this study. The two are related, with the second hypothesis building on the first. They are:
1. Simple comparisons between mean Mexican American,
Puerto Rican and Cuban American household income yield differences, indicating a significantly higher mean for the latter. 2. However, if differences in household organization that have a direct bearing on household income are considered in comparisons between Mexican American, Puerto Rican, and
Cuban household income, the favorable position of Cubans
50 51 diminishes. The household composition factors which should be taken into account are: female labor force participation; number of workers present; total number of hours and weeks worked; the presence of family members over the age of 65 drawing Supplementary Security Income, Social Security,
General Assistance or public assistance income.
The specific variables identified for the second hypothesis were chosen because of their utility in operationalizing some of the concepts found in Perez' thesis regarding organization and income in Cuban households.
Research Design
A post-facto research design was utilized. Post-facto designs are frequently used in the social sciences when experimental designs are impossible, as in this investigation, due to the nature of particular research problems or constraints involving ethics or resources (Sprinthall 1987,
Kachigan 1986) . In experimental designs equivalent groups are created through random assignment of individuals to different groups which receive varying treatment via the manipulation of the independent variable by the researcher. Random assignment to groups is necessary so that any change seen between groups can be attributed to the independent variable with some degree of certainty. In other words, random assignment is a 52 prerequisite for any inferences of causality between the independent and the dependant or criterion variable.
In contrast, in post-facto research in-tact or already existing groups known to vary on some dimension of interest are used. In this sense the independent or predictor variable is not manipulated, but rather is the basis for group definition (Sprinthall 1987). The different groups are then assessed for difference on some other variable or dimension of interest (criterion or dependent variable). However, in the absence of random assignment, causal links between the predictor and criterion variable cannot be inferred.
Consequently, research such as this, involving in- tact groups, is correlational in nature since causality can not be established (Kachigan 1986).
In this particular case, two models were developed. In both the unit of analysis was the household and individual households were assigned to either Cuban, Puerto Rican, or
Mexican categories on the basis of the ethnic self- identification of the householder (predictor or independent variable) . The three different groups of households were then compared on the dimension of household income (criterion or dependant variable). For both models, the relationship between ethnic identity and household income was of primary interest. However, the first model looks at this relationship without examining any other factors. This first model addresses the first research hypothesis listed: Simple 53 comparisons between mean Mexican American, Puerto Rican and
Cuban American household income yield differences, indicating a significantly higher mean for the latter.
Predictor Variable Criterion Variable Ethnic Identity Household Income
Figure 1
Model Is Relationship Between Ethnicity and Household Income
The second model introduces several extraneous, concomitant or covariate variables: total number of contributors in household; proportion of female contributors in household; total number of hours worked; and number of contributing elderly. These additional variables serve to operationalize Perez' thesis and address the second research hypothesis: If differences in household organization that have a bearing on household income are considered in comparisons between Mexican American, Puerto Rican, and Cuban household income, the favorable position of Cubans diminishes. Two separate trials of the second model were run: one comparing
Cubans drawn from Florida only and a second comparing Cubans drawn from twelve states with Mexican Americans and Puerto
Ricans drawn from the same twelve states. The trial including only Cubans residing in Florida was run in an attempt to get at the enclave component of Perez' thesis. 54
Predictor Variable Criterion Variable Ethnic Identity Household Income
A
v Concomitant Variables Total Number of Contributors in Household Proportion of Female Contributors in Household Total Number of Hours Worked ______Number of Contributing Elderly______
Figure 2
Model 2: Relationship Between Ethnicity and Household Income Considering Household Organizational Factors Research Data
Research Data
The study involved a secondary analysis of existing
survey data. The data analyzed comes from the Public Use
Microdata Sample A (PUMSA) of the 1980 United States Census of the Population and Housing. The PUMSA is a 5 percent random
sub-sample of the total U.S. population surveyed in the 1980 census. The data contained in this set represent the responses of individuals to the self-administered long-form census questionnaire, which includes about 150 items regarding
individual and household characteristics. This data set was chosen because it includes a large Latino sample that can be broken down by national groups and contains relevant detailed
individual and household level data, allowing for the study of 55
family relationships and individual workers in households.
Furthermore, it is the unaggregated form of the data set used
by Perez (1986) in developing his thesis.
Although the 1980 PUMSA contains the information needed
to complete this analysis it has several limitations. The
data is over 10 years old and does not have information on the
more than 125,000 Cubans who came to the United States during
the 1980 Mariel boatlift operation. However, this may not
pose as large of a problem as it appears initially. Research
on this population indicates that the Mariel population is not
significantly different from the Cuban population coming to
the United States in the 1970's in regard to labor and human
capital characteristics (Bach, Bach, and Triplett 1981-1982;
Bach 1987; Bach 1980; Fernandez 1982). Furthermore, the vast majority of the Mariel entrants had family in the United
States with whom they were reunited, thereby possibly
continuing the beneficial family structure described by Perez.
However, there is some support for the assertion that the
small camp populations, totaling approximately 5,000 were
significantly different from earlier waves (Babcock 1981).
The camp entrants were characterized as mostly "young, single black men with few job or language skills and no friends or relatives in the United States," (Babcock 1981). It is in regard to this small, distinct subset of the Mariel population that the limitations of the study are most severe. 56
Given these limitations, other options were explored, but were found to be either impossible or inadequate. For example, while more recent data can be found in the 1990 census, detailed household level information is not yet available for public use. In addition, more current data sets were considered, such as the Current Populations Surveys of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Hispanic Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey, and records kept by the U.S. Department of
Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service. Unfortunately, these data sets either lacked a sufficient number of households or did not contain the type of information needed for this analysis.
Research Sample
A random sample of 180 Latino households consisting of
4,978 individuals was drawn from the PUMSA. More specifically, the study sample consisted of 600 Cuban, Puerto
Rican and Mexican households, which contained 1309, 1715, and
1954 individuals respectively.
These households were randomly selected by household identification numbers from a file composed of twelve states with large Latino populations. Sampling was limited to twelve states because utilizing all 50 states was not practical. The states sampled were Florida, New Jersey, New York, California,
Illinois, Texas, Massachusetts, Arizona, Connecticut, 57
Pennsylvania, Colorado, and New Mexico. These 12 states were considered home to over 93 percent of Cubans and 91 percent of the Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans counted in the 1980 census.
Variables of Interest
Several of the variables utilized in the study were taken directly from the census survey, while others were created by combining different census variables expressly for this investigation. The variables names used by the Bureau of the Census were kept for the variables used that were already present in the census survey: Spanish, state, sex, income 1, income 2, income 3, income 4, income 5, income 6, income 7, and hhincome. The variables that were constructed for this study were: total number of contributors in household, total number of workers in household, proportion of female contributors in household, total number of hours worked, proportion 1, proportion 2, proportion 3, proportion 4, proportion 5, proportion 6, proportion 7, number of contributing elderly, and full-time worker. The variables are defined below.
Spanish: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban ethnic identity as determined by the response of the householder to a self-identity item on the census questionnaire regarding
Spanish origin. 58
Sex: the sex of a particular household member.
Income 1: the amount of income that a particular individual in the household received from wages or salary in the previous year.
Income 2: the amount of income or loss that a particular individual in the household received from nonfarm self- employment in the previous year.
Income 3.: the amount of income or loss that a particular individual in the household received from farm self- employment in the previous year.
Income 4: the amount of income or loss that a particular individual in the household received from interest dividends or rent in the previous year.
Income 5: the amount of income that a particular individual in the household received from social security in the previous year.
Income 6: the amount of income that a particular individual in the household received from public assistance in the previous year.
Income 7: the amount of income that a particular individual in the household received from all sources other than those included in income variables 1 through 6.
State: the state in which the household is located.
Hhincome: total of any money income received in the previous calendar year (1979) by all members of the household who are 15 years of age or older. 59
Total Number of Contributors in Household; the total
number of individuals contributing money income to the total
household income in the previous year (1979).
Total Number of Workers in Household: a count of the
number of self-employed members and wage or salary earners in
household.
Proportion of Female Contributors in Household: the
proportion of all workers in the household who are female.
Total Number of Hours Worked: the total number of hours
worked by all household members who are 15 years of age or
older. This variable represents the product of the census
variables detailing the usual number of hours worked per week
(hours79) and the total number of weeks worked (weeksw79) in
1979. This represents a more accurate measure of the total
amount of work for wages in which a household engages than
simply considering the number of wage earners because it
differentiates between seasonal, part-time, and year round
full-time work.
Proportion l: the proportion of the total household
income received from wages or salary in the previous year.
Proportion 2: the proportion of the total household
income or loss received from nonfarm self-employment in the
previous year.
Proportion 3.: the proportion of the total household
income or loss received from farm self-employment in the previous year. 60
Proportion 4: the proportion of the total household income or loss received from interest dividends or rent in the previous year.
Proportion 5: the proportion of the total household income received from social security in the previous year.
Proportion 6: the proportion of household income received from public assistance in the previous year.
Proportion 7: the proportion of the total household income received from all sources other than those included in income variables 1 through 6.
Number of Contributing Elderly; count of any members in the household over the age of 65, who are neither the householder or spouse of the householder and are contributing income.
Full-time Worker: identifies any person age 15 or older, working 40 hours o^ more a week, 52 weeks a year. This variable is a composite of the weeksw79, hours79, and age census variables.
Analysis Procedures
One of the primary concerns of this study was to determine if the household incomes of Latinos vary significantly by ethnic group. A way to address this is to conclude if the mean income for the three Latino groups differ 61 more than would be expected by chance alone. In terms of the null hypothesis, it can be stated
Ho: M M = M Cuban Puerto Rican Mexican
This is essentially the same as saying that there is no relationship between household income and the ethnicity of the
Latino householder. In contrast, the alternative hypothesis states that the means of said groups are significantly different, suggesting a relationship between the ethnicity of the householder and the household income.
The alternative hypothesis can be stated as
Ho: M + M f M Cuban Puerto Rican Mexican
In this study, a one-way analysis of variance was used to test the alternative hypothesis specified above. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) refers to a set of procedures that are frequently used to test the null or alternative hypothesis concerning the means of several population samples (Norusis
1988) . This is done by calculating an F value from the actual scores which are then compared to the tabled critical value.
The calculated F value simply represents the ratio between two estimates of the population variance: the between groups variance estimate to the within groups estimate (Kachigan
1986:278). When the calculated F value is larger than the 62 tabled critical value, a significant difference is said to exist between the means of the groups being compared.
This procedure is appropriate for several reasons. First, it allows one to compare two or more groups in terms of mean scores in models which specify only one dependent and one independent variable (one-way). Second, the assumptions required for the correct use of this procedure are met by the data: independent samples from normally distributed populations with the same variance (Norusis 1988).
Furthermore, where the calculated F value was larger than the tabled critical value, Tukey's HSD was performed. This procedure identifies the source or location of the significant difference in cases where multiple comparisons are being made. This is done by analyzing each possible pair of means for significant difference (Huck et al. 1974).
More specifically, this additional procedure identifies if the significant difference lies between Cuban and Puerto Rican households, Puerto Rican and Mexican households, Mexican and
Cuban households, or between all three.
As stated earlier, the second research hypothesis builds on the first by adding several additional factors for consideration: If differences in female labor force participation, the number of income contributors present, the total number of hours and weeks worked, and the presence of family members over the age of 65 drawing social security or public assistance income are considered in comparisons between 63
Mexican American, Puerto Rican, and Cuban household income, the favorable position of Cubans diminishes.
Again, this second hypothesis can be tested through a comparison of group means. However, a test of this statement requires that the researcher somehow control or compensate for the aforementioned differences in household organization.
This can be achieved by either establishing equivalent groups or by somehow adjusting the means to reflect the differences.
The first possibility— establishing equivalent groups— was ruled out since this study involved in-tact groups, which by definition precluded the formation of equivalent groups.
Consequently, the second option was pursued— adjusting the group means to offset any relevant initial differences that the groups possessed. This is necessary to determine if the found differences in the dependant variable can be attributed to the predictor variable or if some other confounding variable(s) might be contributing to the found difference.
Fortunately, there is a type of analysis of variance, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), that helps to solve this problem by acting as an "after the fact control" (Sprinthall
1987:231). ANCOVA is ideal for analyzing differences between in-tact groups because it identifies and extracts the influence of concomitant or covariate variables on the variation of the other variables (Kachigan 1986). This procedure is most often used by researchers to compare the means of groups on the criterion variable, after adjusting 64 them for differences on relevant concomitant variables (Huck et al. 1974). Adjustments to group means are made by using a single regression equation that is derived from pooled estimates of the correlation between the concomitant and criterion variables within in each group (Kachigan 1986).
Once adjustments have been made, the observed differences between groups will be diminished, magnified or eliminated depending on the extent of correlation between the confounded and criterion variable and how much groups varied from one another with respect to the confounded variable (Kachigan
1986).
In this study, the ANCOVA procedure was used to determine if the observed differences between the three groups in household income (criterion variable) was due to ethnic identity (predictor variable), or to differences in the total number of income contributors in household, the proportion of female contributors in household, the total number total of hours worked by all members in the household, and the number of elderly contributing income to the household (confounding or concomitant variables).
The ANCOVA technique is appropriate in this case given the nature of the hypothesis and the data, which lends itself to the use of ANCOVA, since it meets all of the assumptions necessary for proper application of this procedure. As an extension of ANOVA, the aforementioned assumptions for ANOVA still hold for ANCOVA, as well as two additional ones: a 65 common slope for groups and a linear relationship between the covariate variables and the criterion variable (Huck et al,
1974). CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Introduction
The objective of this chapter is threefold: first, to provide a description of the predictor, criterion, and concomitant variables, including measures of central tendency and variability; second, to describe the relationship between the concomitant and criterion variables; and third, to present the results from the analysis of variance and the analysis of covariance for both the twelve state sample and the Florida only for Cubans subsample. All statistical analysis were executed with the SPSS Release 4.0 statistical package.
Predictor, Criterion and Concomitant Variables
Since the primary interest of this study was to assess the effect ethnicity on Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican household income, with consideration given to household compositional factors, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) approach was chosen. More specifically, ethnicity was designated as the predictor variable, household income as the
66 67 criterion variable and the total number of income contributors, the proportion of female contributors, the number of income elders, and the total number of hours worked as the concomitant variables whose effect was parceled out with the ANCOVA procedure. The ANCOVA procedure was executed with two different samples: one included Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban households from twelve states; the second, included the same Mexican and Puerto Rican households from the twelve states, but only included the Cubans from Florida. The second subsample was used to test Perez's argument that the Cuban economic enclave encourages the particular household form that is described in his thesis.
Predictor Variable
The predictor variable, ethnic identity, was determined by the response of the householder to a self-identity item on the census questionnaire regarding Spanish origin. Based on the householder's response, households were categorized as either Cuban, Mexican, or Puerto Rican. Since ethnicity in relation to household income was of primary interest, only those households of the 1800 randomly sampled reporting either positive or negative income for the previous year were included in the analysis. This step removed households reporting no income, which included vacant units and group quarters, from the samples used for the analysis. However, included in the sample were households reporting negative 68 income, or income loss for the previous year (e.g. negative net from self-employment). Table 1 presents the number of households by ethnic group included in both the twelve state sample and the Florida only for Cubans subsample.
Table 1
Frequencies for Households by Ethnicity
Frequencies for Samples Predictor Variable 12 State Florida Only Cuban 561 70
Mexican 576 576
Puerto Rican 560 560
Criterion Variable
Household income was selected as the criterion variable.
This variable represents the total of any money income received in the previous calendar year (1979) by all members of the household who are 15 years of age or older.
Furthermore, it is a composite of seven income types or sources: 1) income from wages or salary; 2) income or loss from non-farm self employment; 3) income or loss from farm self employment; 4) income or loss from interest dividends or rent; 5) social security income; 6) public assistance income; and 7) income from all other sources (e.g. child support, unemployment insurance). The distribution of household income varied among the three groups on both measures of variability and central tendency. Figure 3 offers a combined frequency polygon for the three income distributions. Figures 4 through 6 present more detailed separate frequency distributions for each group. Mote that in Figures 4 through 6 the income intervals are equal to $3,110, but only the midpoint is specified on the Y axis of the graph.
Income Frequencies For Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban Frequency 90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
-3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74 Income by Thousands of Dollars
Mexican — Puerto Rican Cuban
Figure 3 Combined Income Frequences for Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Households Midpoint by Income $74,305 $71,195 $68,085 $64,975 $61,865 $58,755 $55,645 $52,535 $49,425 $46,315 $43,205 $40,095 $36,985 $33,875 $30,765 $27,655 $24,545 $21,435 $18,325 $15,215 $12,105 $8,995 $5,885 $2,775 $335 $3,445
Frequency of Income
Figure 4
Income Frequences for Mexican Households
Midpoint of Income $74,305 $71,195 $68,085 $64,975 $61,865 $58,755 $55,645 $52,535 $49,425 $46,315 $43,205 $40,095 J $36,985 $33,875 1 $30,765 $27,655 $24,545 $21,435 $18,325 $15,215 $12,105 $8,995 $5,885
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Frequency of Income
Figure 5
Income Frequences for Puerto Rican Households 71
Midpoint of Income 7 4 ,3 0 5 7 1 ,1 9 5 6 8 ,0 8 5 6 4 ,9 7 5 6 1 ,8 6 5 5 8 ,7 5 5 5 5 ,6 4 5 5 2 ,5 3 5 4 9 ,4 2 5 4 6 ,3 1 5 4 3 ,2 0 5 4 0 ,0 9 5 3 6 ,9 8 5 3 3 ,8 7 5 3 0 ,7 6 5 2 7 ,6 5 5 2 4 ,5 4 5 2 1 ,4 3 5 1 8 ,3 2 5 115,215 5 ,2 1 5 '~ »«Hiww5 1 2 ,1 0 5 ' BMBBBMI! $ 8 ,9 9 5 BBMBWMiB I " H W H 8HB BB 8 S5HSEE2IBHB
Frequency of income
Figure 6
Income Frequencies for Cuban Households
Of the three distributions, the Cuban household income distribution exhibited the greatest variability, as measured by the range and standard deviation. The range, which is simply the difference between the lowest and highest score, was largest for Cubans, equaling 77,975, with a minimum of
-$2,975 and a maximum of $75,000. The range for both the
Puerto Rican and Mexican household income distribution was
75,000, with $0 as the minimum and $75,000 as the maximum income reported. However, for all three groups the range, and certainly the maximum, were largely artifacts of the census 72
questionnaire design, which did not differentiate household
incomes of $75,000 and above.
The standard deviation, which is a much better index of
dispersion, was also largest for Cubans and smallest for
Puerto Ricans. The standard deviations for Cuban, Mexican,
and Puerto Rican household income were 15626.06, 12408.91, and
10457.57 respectively. In other words, on the average the
incomes individual Cuban households varied more from the group
(Cuban) mean than did Mexican and Puerto Rican households, in
that order.
The median, or the midpoint of the income distribution,
was highest for Cuban households ($16,810), followed by
Mexican ($14,073) and then Puerto Rican households ($10,635).
The mean income for Cubans households was also higher than
that of Mexican or Puerto Rican households. The average Cuban
household income of $19,949 was $3,178 higher than the
Mexican average of $16,771 and $6,711 higher than the Puerto
Rican average of $13,238. The mean Mexican household income was $3,533 higher than the Puerto Rican mean. Table 2 presents
the medians, means and standard deviations for all three
distributions and Table 3 presents the corresponding
quartiles. 73
Table 2
Household Income Medians, Means, and Standard Deviations by Ethnicity
Standard Ethnicity Median Mean Deviation Mexican 16,073 16,771 12408.91
Puerto Rican 10,635 13,238 10457.57
Cuban 16,810 19,249 15626.06
Table 3
Household Income Quartiles by Ethnicity
Quartiles Mexican Puerto Rican Cuban 1st 7,555 4,956 8,598
2nd 14,073 10,635 16,810
3rd 23,276 19,075 26,545
The composition of household income also varied among the
three groups, but not so much in terms of the rank of each
income source, but rather in terms of the actual proportion of
the total household income that was accounted for by the various sources. Differences notwithstanding, the relative
importance of each of the various income sources were most
similar between Cuban and Mexican households. For all three groups the primary source of income was wages or salary, which accounted for 82.3 percent of Mexican, 64.4 percent of Puerto
Rican, and 74.8 percent of Cuban household income. The second 74 largest proportion of household income for the three groups comes from public assistance, particularly for Puerto Rican households. Public assistance accounts for 5.7 percent of
Mexican, 7.7 percent of Cuban, and 21.7 percent of Puerto
Rican total household income. From this point on the rank of sources diverged for all three groups. For Cuban households the rank of the remaining sources in ascending order were: social security (5.6%), non- farm self employment (5.5%), other income (4.4%), interest or rental income (1.9%) and farm self employment (0.1%) . For Mexican households the rank order for the remaining sources was: other income (4.9%), social security (4.3%), non-farm self employment (1.9%), interest or rental income (0.8%), and farm self employment (0.1%). For
Puerto Rican households the rank order was: other income
(6.4%), social security (5.0%), non-farm self employment
(1.6%), interest or rental income (0.9%), and farm self employment (< 0.1%). Table 4 lists the various income sources and the proportion of the total household income they represent by ethnic group. 75
Table 4
Percent Distribution According to Source of Household Income by Ethnicity
Source of Income Mexican Puerto Cuban Rican Wage or Salary 82.3 % 64.4 % 74.8 % Non-Farm Self Employment 1.9 1.6 5.5 Farm Self Employment 0.1 0.0 0.1 Interest or Net Rental 0.8 0.9 1.9 Social Security 4.3 5.0 5.6 Public Assistance 5.7 21.7 7.7 Other Income * 4.9 6.4 4.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 * Income from all other sources not identified (e.g. unemployment, child support, veterans payments, scholarships, disability or workers compensation, pensions, Cuban Refugee Program Funds, etc.)
A series of one-way analyses of variance were performed to determine if the differences between the three ethnic groups regarding the proportion of the household income accounted for by source were statistically significant. At the
.01 level of statistical significance was found for wage or salary, non-farm self employment, and public assistance sources. Interest or net rental income was significant at the
.05 level. The differences between the groups for farm self employment, social security and "other" income sources were found insignificant. Table 5 provides a summary. 76
Table 5
One-Way Analyses of Variance for Sources of Household Income by Ethnicity
MS MS W ith in Source of Income B e tw e e n * ** F P Wage or Salary 4 .5 5 1 0 .1 5 1 3 0 .0 7 9 .0 0 1 Non-Farm Self Employment 0 .2 5 9 0.238 10.911 .0 0 1 Farm Self Employment 0 .0 0 1 0.001 0.661 .517 Interest or Net Rental 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 0 7 3 .0 6 5 .0 4 7 Social Security 0 .0 2 2 0.033 0.687 .503 Public Assistance 4 .2 6 6 0.079 54.060 .001 Other Income * 0 .0 6 0 0.031 1.904 .149 * d f = 2 ** df = 1694
A Scheffe's multiple range test was executed for each of
the significant one-way analyses of variance. All three
groups were significantly different from each other, when
compared two at a time, at the .01 level for wage or salary
income. Puerto Rican households were found to differ from
both Cuban and Mexican households at the .01 level, with
regard to the public assistance income source. Cuban
households were significantly different (p =.01) from both
Mexican and Puerto Rican households concerning non-farm self
employment. Finally, although the ANOVA for interest or
rental income indicated a significant difference at the .05
level for the three groups, no two groups were significantly different at the .01 or .05 level when grouped two at a time.
Since income from wages or salary was the primary source
of income for all three ethnic group households and because paid female labor and the number of workers per household were previously identified as important factors, two other bivariate descriptive statistics concerning income were calculated: the mean household income by number of workers in the household and ethnicity; and the mean income of workers
15 years of age or older working full time year round by ethnicity and gender. These means are listed in Tables 6 and
8. Table 7 presents the proportion of households by number of workers and Latino subgroup.
Table 6
Mean Family Income by Number of Workers in Household and Ethnicity
Number of Workers Mexican Puerto Rican Cuban 0 5,062 5,413 7,496 1 16,152 14,197 19,507 2 18,500 18,700 22,386 3 22,902 28,468 31,331 4 26,024 24,847 32,882 5+ 37,605 ------78
Table 7
Percent Distribution According to Number of Workers in Household by Ethnicity
Number of Workers Mexican Puerto Rican Cuban 0 8.7 % 25.5 % 13.0 l 53.1 54.3 55.3 2 26.2 16.1 19.8 3 8.9 3.4 10.5 4 2.6 0.7 1.4 5+ 0.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
The average Cuban household income remained above that
of Mexican and Puerto Rican even when the number of workers
in the household were considered. On the average, Cuban
household income was $4,992 above Mexican and $4,395 above
Puerto Rican household income when the number of workers per
household were considered. This reflects a $1,814 widening
on the average of the previously mentioned income gap between
mean Mexican ($16,771) and Cuban ($19,949) income, but a
$2,316 narrowing between the mean Cuban and Puerto Rican
($13,238) household income. Furthermore, the $3,533
difference between the mean Mexican and Puerto Rican household income dropped to an average of $597 when the
number of workers in the household were considered.
Nevertheless, even after the number of workers in the household were considered, a one-way analysis of variance
indicated that the differences in mean income between the 79 three groups was significant at the 0.001 level (F=37.36, df=2/1694, p<.001). Furthermore, a Pearson chi-square test was used to determine whether the number of workers per household differed statistically among the three groups. The obtained chi-square value of 102.8, df=10, was significant at the .001 level.
While there were significant income differences between the three groups at the household level, a one-way analysis of variance indicated that differences at the individual level for women 15 years of age or older, employed full time year round were statistically insignificant (F =.5355, df
=2/251, p =.59). However, for their male counterparts, the differences between the income means remained statistically significant at the .001 level (F =15.53, df =2/615. Scheffe's multiple comparison procedure revealed that the differences in income between Cuban and other Latino males persisted (p
= .01) , but was insignificant between Mexican and Puerto Rican men. Table 8 provides the specific means for each ethnic group by gender.
The distributions of individual income for full-time year-round workers by gender and ethnicity also differed in terms of variability as indicated by the range and standard deviation. For Mexican women incomes ranged from $525 to
$45,005, with a standard deviation of $5,625. For Puerto
Rican and Cuban women income ranged from $135 to $50,005 and
$665 to $40,005, respectively. The standard deviation for the Puerto Rican female distribution was $7,237 and was
$5,373 for that of Cuban women. For men the income range was
$445 to $49,270 for Mexicans, $155 to $40,005 for Puerto
Ricans, and $1,205 to $75,000 for Cuban men. The standard deviations for the male income distributions were $7,853,
$6,912, and $12,510 for Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Men respectively. Again, Table 8 provides a summary.
Table 8
Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of Income of Individuals 15 Years of Age or Over Working Full-Time Year-Round by Sex and Ethnicity
S t a n d a r d M e d ia n M ean D e v i a t i o n Ethnicity Male Female Male Female M a le F e m a le
M e x ic a n 1 1 ,0 0 5 8 ,7 0 0 1 2 ,9 7 7 9 ,5 6 8 7 ,8 5 3 5 ,6 2 5
Puerto Rican 1 1 ,7 2 5 7 ,4 1 0 1 2 ,9 8 0 8 ,7 6 0 6 ,9 1 2 7 ,2 3 7
C u b an 1 4 ,1 6 5 8 ,8 6 5 1 7 ,5 0 9 9 ,8 1 7 1 2 ,5 1 1 5 ,3 7 3
From the previous discussion and table, it is evident that there is greater variability in income among the men than there is among women. Furthermore, of all gender/ethnic groups, the greatest variability in income is found among
Cuban men. A look at the income percentiles for each of the groups further clarifies this point. The percentiles are presented in Table 9. 81
Table 9
Income Percentiles in Dollars by Ethnicity and Gender
Mexican Puerto Rican C u b an
P e r c e n t i l e M a le F e m a le Male Female Male F e m a le 5 t h 4 ,8 7 5 3 ,4 6 3 3 ,0 0 5 1 ,3 3 7 5 ,6 1 4 3 ,4 7 7 1 0 t h 5 ,7 2 5 5 ,0 2 9 5,725 1,621 7,975 4 ,7 8 1 2 5 t h 7 ,5 8 0 6 ,6 3 0 8 ,0 0 5 5,380 11,005 6 ,7 6 5 50th 11,005 8,700 11,725 7,410 14,165 8,865 75th 17,682 11,103 17,005 10,598 20,005 11,855 90th 22,365 14,045 22,005 14,355 28,589 15,005 95th 27,045 17,914 25,565 18,530 41,652 18,875
Concomitant Variables
Four concomitant variables were included in the study design: total number of contributors in household, proportion of female contributors in household, total number of hours worked, and the number of elderly contributors. The total number of contributors variable represents a count of the number of individuals contributing money income to the total household income in the previous year. The proportion of female contributors variable specifies the proportion of all workers in the household who are female. The total number of hours worked variable represents the total number of hours worked by all household members who are 15 years of age or older and is the product of the census variables detailing the average number of hours worked per week and the total number of weeks worked in 1979. And the fourth concomitant variable, number of elderly contributors, identifies the presence of any member the household who is 82
over the age of 65, who is neither the householder or spouse
of the householder and is contributing income.
Mexican households had the largest mean number of income
contributors (1.69) and total hours worked (2378) per
household when compared with Cuban (1.58 and 2204) and Puerto
Rican (1.46 and 1574) households. Cuban households had the
largest mean number of income contributing elderly persons
present in the home (0.04), followed by Mexican (0.02) and
Puerto Rican (0.01) households. The largest proportion of
female income contributors per household was evidenced in
Puerto Rican (0.49) homes, with Cuban (0.45) and Mexican
(0.42) household means following. Table 10 presents the means and standard deviations for the concomitant variables
for all three groups in the 12 state sample. 83
Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations of Concomitant Variables for Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Households in all 12 States Sampled
Mexican Puerto Cuban Rican Variable Mean 8D Mean SD Mean SD Number of Income Contributors 1.69 0.93 1.47 0.76 1.58 0.83
Proportion of Female Contributors 0.42 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.45 0.41
Number of Elderly Contributors 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.19
Total Number of Hours Worked 2378 1698 1574 1440 2204 1632
One-way analyses of variance run on each of the
concomitant variables indicated that the differences in means between the three groups were statistically significant for
all four. Differences in the number of income contributors
and the total number of hours worked between the three groups were significant at the .01 level. Differences in the number of elderly contributors and the proportion of female contributors in the household between the groups were
significant at the .05 level. Table 11 provides a summary of the one-way ANOVAs for the 12 state sample. 84
Table 11
One-Way Analyses of Variance for Concomitant Variables for 12 State Sample
V a r i a b l e MS Between * MS Within ** F P Number of Income Contributors 7 .5 3 0 .7 1 1 0 .6 2 .0 0 0 Proporation of Female Contributors 0.62 0.17 3 .6 7 .0 2 6 Number of Elderly Contributors 0.09 0.02 4 .0 4 .0 1 9 Total Number of Hours Worked 10119265.9 2543090.6 39.79 .000
* d f = 2 ** df = 1694
Scheffe's procedure indicated that the statistically
significant differences always involved Puerto Rican households. Puerto Rican households differed significantly
from Mexican households with respect to the proportion of women contributors (p=.05) and the number of contributors
(p=.010). Puerto Rican households differed significantly
(p=.01) from Cuban households in the number of elderly
contributing income. And, Puerto Rican households differed
significantly from both Mexican and Cuban households on the dimension of total hours worked (p=.01). All other pairs of means were found insignificant. The aforementioned observations regarding the relative rank and statistical significance of differences between the three groups with respect to the concomitant variables also hold true for the
Florida only Cuban subsample, which is not very different 85 from the 12 state Cuban sample. Furthermore, the results from the ANOVAs and Scheffe's tests run with the Florida only subsample parallel those of the 12 state sample with the exception of those concerning the presence of elderly contributors in the household. In the Florida only subsample the difference between the three groups on this dimension was statistically insignificant. Table 12 presents the means and standard deviations for the concomitant variables for Cuban households only, differentiating between the Florida only and the 12 state samples and Table 13 summarize the corresponding
ANOVAs.
Table 12
Means and Standard Deviations of Concomitant Variables for Cuban Households in 12 State and Florida Only Subsamples
Variable Florida Only All 12 States Mean SD Mean SD Number of Income Contributors 1.63 0.90 1.58 0.83
Proportion of Female Contributors 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.41
Number of Elderly Contributors 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19
Total Number of Hours Worked 2209 1450.65 2204 1631.75 86
Table 13
One-Way Analyses of Variance for Concomitant Variables for Florida Only for Cubans Sample
1
MS MS W ith in V a r i a b l e B e tw e e n * ** F P Number of Income Contributors 7 .6 2 0.72 10.53 .000 Proporation of Female Contributors 0 .6 1 0 .1 7 3 .5 7 .0 2 9
Number of Elderly Contributors 0.02 0 .0 2 1 .2 2 .2 9 6
Total Number of Hours Worked 9 3 6 0 4 8 9 2 .9 2462300.1 38.02 .000
* d f = 2 ** df = 1694
Relationship Between the Concomitant
and Criterion Variables
The four aforementioned concomitant variables were included in the design of this study because it was believed that the three different groups varied along these dimensions and because these variables were thought to have an influence on the criterion variable. The previous section addressed the first assumption. This section will engage the second assumption by focusing on the relationship between the concomitant variables and the predictor variable. The strongest relationship that was found between any of the concomitant variables and the criterion variable for the 12 state sample involved the total number of hours worked 87 variable. The correlation between this variable and household income was 0.986. There was a moderate correlation
(r=0.528) between the number of income contributors and household income and a low correlation (r=0.116) between the number of elderly contributors and the later. The proportion of female contributors in the household had a low negative correlation (r=-0.206) with household income. Furthermore, the relationships between each of the concomitant variables and the criterion variable is approximately the same for both the twelve state sample and the Florida only for Cubans subsample. Table 14 lists the correlations between the concomitant variables and the criterion variable for both subsamples.
Table 14
Product-Moment Correlations Between Covariate and Criterion Variables for the 12 State Sample and the Florida Only for Cubans Subsample
Household Income Covariates 12 state Sample Florida Only Number of Income Contributors 0.528 0.531
Proportion of Female Workers -0.206 -0.175
Number of Elderly Contributors 0.116 0.172
Total Number of Hours Worked 0.986 0.975 88
Results of the Analysis of Variance and Covariance
Analysis of Variance
Since one of the primary concerns of this study was to determine if the household incomes of Latinos vary significantly by ethnic group, a one-way analysis of variance was used to test the hypothesis of equal income means for
Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican households. The results for the twelve state sample are presented in Table 15. Table 16 presents the results for the Florida only for Cubans subsample. Both tables indicate significant differences between the means at a greater than .01 level.
Table 15
Summary of One-Way Analysis of Variance for Household Income by Ethnicity for 12 State Sample
Source DF MS F Value Between Groups 2 6315711730 37.3550* Within Groups 1694 169072701.4 Total 1694 * p < .0001 Table 16
Summary of One-Way Analysis of Variance for Household Income by Ethnicity for Florida Only for Cubans Subsample
Source DF MS F Value Between Groups 2 2377421586 17.2649* Within Groups 1203 137702400.1 Total 1205 * p < 0.0001
Since multiple comparisons were being made, Schefffe's procedure was performed to identify the source or location of the significant difference. This additional procedure identified a difference between the income means of Cuban and
Puerto Rican households, Puerto Rican and Mexican households, and Mexican and Cuban households at a 0.01 level of significance for the twelve state sample. However, when this procedure was used with the Florida only for Cubans subsample significant difference at the 0.01 level was found between the Mexican and Puerto Rican, and Cuban and Puerto Rican household income means, but not between the Mexican and Cuban household means. This later finding is explained by the $636 difference between the mean household income of Cubans in the
12 state sample ($19,949) and those in the Florida only sample ($19,313). 90
Analysis of Covariance
A separate analysis of covariance was performed with the two samples (twelve state and Florida only for Cubans) to determine if the statistically significant differences in means uncovered by the analysis of variance procedure remained after the effects of the covariates were parceled out or controlled for. Again, ethnicity was used as the predictor variable and household income as the criterion variable, but now the number of income contributors, the proportion of female contributors, the number of elderly contributors, and the total number of hours worked were included in the model as covariates.
Not all of the covariates were found to be significant in predicting household income in the analyses. The total number of hours worked and the number of elderly contributors covariate variables yielded regression weights that were significant at the .001 level for both samples. However, the proportion of female contributors and the number of income contributors variables produced statistically insignificant regression weights for both samples. Tables 17 and 18 summarize the beta weights and corresponding tests for significance for each of the covariate variables for both samples. 91
Table 17
Summary of the Beta Weights and Significance of the Covariates for the 12 State Sample
S t a n d a r d C o v a r i a t e s B B e ta E r r o r T V a lu e P Number of Income Contributors -757.39 -.04905 428.72 - 1 .7 6 7 .0 7 7
Proportion of Female Workers -396.71 -.01258 703.136 - . 5 6 4 .5 7 3
Number of Elderly Contributors 6481.16 .07364 1966.263 3 .2 9 6 .0 0 1
Total Number of Hours Worked 3.93 .4 8 1 7 7 .2 3 1 7 .4 2 8 .0 0 0
Table 18
Summary of the Beta Weights and Significance of the Covariates for the Florida Only for Cubans Subsample
S t a n d a r d Covariates B Beta E r r o r Z V a lu e P Number of Income Contributors -576.16 -.04177 432.27 - 1 .3 2 7 .1 8 5
Proportion of Female Workers 446.23 -.01573 742.72 .6 0 1 .5 4 8
Number of Elderly Contributors 9995.28 .10880 2361.45 4 .2 2 3 .0 0 0
Total Number of •t* Hours Worked 3.81 .5 0 9 9 8 • to 1 5 .9 8 5 .0 0 0
Even with the inclusion of the covariates in the analysis, the difference in means persisted for both samples at a greater than 0.01 level of statistical significance.
However, the model with the four covariates accounted for approximately 23 percent (r-squared=0.226) of the variability 92 between the mean incomes of Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban households in the 12 state sample and for approximately 26 percent (r-squared=0.258) in the Florida for Cubans only subsample. Tables 19 and 20 provide a summary of the analysis of covariance for both samples.
Table 19
Summary of Analysis of Covariance for the Twelve State Sample
Source DF MS F Value R-Squared Model 2 1.690E+10 123.59 * 0.226 Error 1692 136774544 Total 1696 176321096 * p < .0001
Table 20
Summary of Analysis of Covariance for Florida Only for Cubans Subsample
Source DF MS F Value R-Squared Model 4 1.098E+10 104.23 * 0.258 Error 1201 105327405 Total 1205 141419776 * p < 0.0001
For the twelve state sample, the mean Mexican, Puerto
Rican, and Cuban household incomes moved from $16,771 to
$15,575, $13,238 to $15,119, and $19,949 to $19,265 respectively once adjusted for covariates. And for the 93
Florida only for Cubans subsample, the mean Mexican, Puerto
Rican, and Cuban household incomes moved from $16,771 to
$15,595, $13,238 to $15,069, and $19,313 to $18,659, respectively. Tables 21 and 22 present the observed and adjusted means and the differences between them for both samples.
Table 21
Observed Means and Means Adjusted for Covariates by Ethnicity for Twelve State Sample
Mean Household Income D ifference Between G ro u p Observed Adjusted Observed & Adjusted Means
Mexican 16,771 15,575 - 1,196
Puerto Rican 1 3 ,2 3 8 1 5 ,1 1 9 + 1 ,8 8 1
Cuban 19,949 19,265 668
Table 22
Observed Means and Means Adjusted for Covariates by Ethnicity for Florida Only for Cubans Subsample
Mean Household Income D ifference Between G ro u p Observed Adjusted Observed & Adjusted Means Mexican 16,771 15,595 - 1 ,1 7 6
Puerto Rican 13,238 15,069 + 1 ,8 3 1
Cuban 19,949 18,659 654 Another way of looking at the movement of the means after adjustment for the covariates is to look at them in relation to each other. After the ANCOVA procedure, Cuban and Mexican household income means moved further apart. The gap between both widened by $512 in the 12 state sample and
$522 in the Florida only for Cubans subsample. However, the
Puerto Rican mean moved closer to both Mexican and Cuban means. Puerto Rican and Mexican means moved $3,077 and $3,007 closer after adjustment in the 12 state sample and Florida only for Cubans subsample, respectively. Finally, the distance between Puerto Rican and Cuban means shrunk by
$2,565 in the 12 state sample and $2,485 the Florida only for
Cubans subsample. Figures 7 and 8 provide graphic representations of the relative movement of the means. 95
Observed Adjusted Mexican Puerto Rican Cuban
Figure 7
Observed and Adjusted Means for Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Households (Model with all Twelve States for Cubans)
Observed Adjusted Mexican ffffi Puerto Rican Cuban
Figure 8
Observed and Adjusted Means for Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Households (Model with Florida Only for Cubans) 96
Again, since more than two means were being compared, a multiple comparisons procedure was performed to identify the source or location of the significant difference. This procedure indicated that for the twelve state sample the difference between the income means of Cuban and Puerto Rican households, and Cuban and Mexican households had a greater than 0.001 level of significance. The difference between
Mexican and Puerto Rican household income was determined statistically insignificant (p=0.515). However, when this procedure was used with the Florida only for Cubans subsample significant difference at the 0.01 level was found between
Puerto Rican and Cuban household income means, and at the
0.018 level between Mexican and Cuban household means. Again, the difference between the Mexican and Puerto Rican household income means were found to be statistically insignificant
(p=0.402). CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
The Cuban American "success story" has dominated much of the popular and scholarly discourse concerning this group.
According to the "success story" Cubans in exile have achieved an economic victory of mythic proportion as entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, or executives. With the exception of a few researchers (e.g. Perez, Jorge, Moncarz) the success story has largely been accepted by scholars and is reflected in their preoccupation with the relative economic success
Cubans in comparison with other minority groups (e.g. Bach,
Portes, Clark, Pedraza-Baily, Diaz-Briquets, Fagen, Brody,
O'Leary, Wenk, Thomas, Wilson).
The research concerning this subject has generally taken one of two forms: research that describes the relative
"success" of Cubans and research that attempts to explain it.
Thus far four explanatory theories have dominated. The theory that has primarily been voiced by the popular media, argues that Cuban culture is characterized by values that promote upward mobility, such as an appreciation for hard
96 97 work, education and family unity. According to this theory,
it is this core of values that has enabled Cuban's to seize and maximize the opportunities that the U.S. has extended to them. In lieu of rigorous testing, the popular media has offered only anecdotal "evidence" in support their "culture of success" theory.
The remaining three theories have more scholarly origins and have been subjected to more rigorous testing. The first has its basis in human capital theory and contends that because recent Cuban immigration to the U.S. has been selective, individuals leaving the Island after the Revolution had high levels of educational attainment, experience, training and ability. Once in the U.S., the argument continues, Cubans were able to draw on their human capital and quickly incorporate themselves into the U.S. economic mainstream (Fagen et al. 1964, 1968; Wenk 1968).
The second is a statist argument that builds on the human capital argument. In short, this theory states that the
Cuban's initial class advantage, coupled with the assistance the U.S. state offered them by virtue of their refugee status, lead to a "cumulative advantage" that translated into higher prestige and income for Cubans relative to economic immigrants (Pedraza-Bailey 1980, 1981/1982).
Finally, the third thesis builds on segmented labor market and ethnic solidarity theories to advance an ethnic economic enclave argument. According to this theory, Cuban 98
immigrants, unlike other immigrants, have been spared from
the secondary labor market, through the establishment of a
Cuban economic enclave in the Miami, Florida area. This
enclave, the theory contends, has afforded immigrant workers returns on human capital that mirror those found in the primary market while giving Cuban entrepreneurs access to a
loyal and cheap stream of ethnic workers. In short, the enclave theorist argue that both the Cuban enclave workers and proprietors benefit from the enclave in terms of wages, promotions, profits, and market expansion (Portes 1981, 1984,
1987; Portes et al. 1980, 1989).
An alternative to the aforementioned theses is offered
Lisandro Perez (1986). Perez argues that the Cuban "success story" is exaggerated and only true in part. He attributes the relative success of Cubans when compared to other Latino groups to a "high degree of economic cooperation within the family" rather than the popular notion of the "meteoric upward mobility of some individuals" (Perez 1986:17-18). He characterizes Cuban household organization as having: a large number of workers; high rates of female labor force participation, financial and in-kind contributions of elderly persons in the household, low fertility rates and high levels of enrollment in schools. This form of household composition, argues Perez, is facilitated by the presence of an ethnic economic enclave. However, while Perez elaborated an alternative theory he did not test it. 99
The purpose of this study was to reexamine the Cuban
American "success story", particularly as it relates to other
Latinos. Towards this end, two research hypotheses based on
Lisandro Perez' family versus individual success thesis were articulated and tested with two samples drawn from the Public
Use Microdata Sample A (PUMSA) of the 1980 United States
Census of the Population and Housing. One sample included all of the Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban households with incomes not equal to zero drawn from a random sample of 600 households from each ethnic group from a twelve state pool.
The second sample was really a subsample of the first, which included the same Mexican and Puerto Rican households found in the first sample, but only included the Cubans in Florida from the first sample. This subsample was drawn to test the enclave component of Perez' argument. The two hypotheses were:
1. Simple comparisons between mean Mexican American, Puerto Rican and Cuban American household income yield differences, indicating a significantly higher mean for the latter.
2. However, if differences in household organization that have a direct bearing on household income are considered in comparisons between Mexican American, Puerto Rican, and Cuban household income, the favorable position of Cubans diminishes. The household composition factors which should be taken into account are: female labor force participation; number of workers present; total number of hours and weeks worked; the presence of family members over the age of 65 drawing Supplementary Security Income, Social Security, General Assistance or public assistance income. 100
Overview and Discussion of Main Findings
The first hypothesis was tested with the analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure. This procedure indicated that there was a significant (p < .01) difference in household income among the three groups in both samples. Furthermore, when Scheffe's procedure was performed with the twelve state sample, difference at the 0.01 level was found between the three separate groups, when compared to at a time. With the
Florida only for Cuban's sample, the same level of difference
(p < 0.01) was found between the Mexican and Puerto Rican, and
Cuban and Puerto Rican household income means, but not between the Mexican and Cuban means. In other words, Mexican, Puerto
Rican and Cuban household income means in the twelve state sample differ more than would be expected by chance alone, thus suggesting a relationship between the ethnicity of the householder and the household income. Knowing this, the first hypothesis can be accepted for the 12 state sample. The hypothesis of difference can also be accepted for Florida only for Cubans sample, but only conditionally since the difference between Cuban and Mexican mean household income was found to be statistically insignificant.
The second hypothesis, although similar to the first, introduces four concomitant variables: number of income contributors, proportion of female contributors, number of elderly contributors, and the total number of hours worked per 101
household. This hypothesis was tested using an analysis of
covariance (AN00VA) procedure. Even with the effects of the
covariates parceled out, the difference in means persisted for
both samples at a greater than 0.01 level of statistical
significance when ANCOVA was performed. Thus, the second
hypothesis was rejected.
Although the second hypothesis was rejected, the findings
offer partial support for Perez thesis. In agreement with
Perez' assertion that the higher Cuban income can be
attributed in part to household organizational factors, the
Cuban household income mean did drop by $684 for the 12 state
sample and $654 for the Florida Only subsample one adjusted
for the influence of the covariates. Furthermore, when the
covariates were considered, the mean Puerto Rican household
income dramatically rises by $1,881 and $1,831 for the 12
state and Florida only for Cubans samples, respectively, thus
drawing it even nearer to the Cuban household mean.
However, the movement of the Mexican household mean
contradicts what one would predict from Perez' thesis. Once
adjusted for the effects of the four covariate variables, the
Mexican household income suffered a loss of $1,196 for the 12
state sample and $1,176 for the Florida only for Cubans
subsample. So instead of shoring up the difference between the Cuban and Mexican mean household income, the ANCOVA procedure actually increased the disparity between the means
of these two groups. However, given the drop in the Mexican 102 household income mean after adjustment and the increase in that of Puerto Rican households, the difference between the means of these two groups were dramatically narrowed — so much so that the multiple comparison procedure performed with the adjusted means found the difference between Puerto Rican and Mexican household means to be statistically insignificant for both samples. However, the multiple comparison procedure yielded statistically significant differences between Cuban and Mexican, and Cuban and Puerto Rican adjusted household income means in the twelve state sample and Florida only for
Cubans subsample at a 0.01 level of significance.
Furthermore, the analysis yielded a couple of important, yet unexpected findings. First, although the purpose of the model was to explain the difference between the mean Cuban household income and that of other Latinos, it seemed to better explain the differences between Puerto Rican household income and that of other Latinos, namely Cubans and Mexicans.
This was evidenced by the model's ability to eliminate statistically significant income differences between Mexican and Puerto Rican households and to narrow the differences between the former and Cuban household income.
Secondly, Perez' assertion that Cuban household organization differed significantly from that of other Latinos along the dimensions identified in this study as covariates was not fully supported. Mexican and Cuban households were not significantly different from each other with respect to 103 the number of income contributors, proportion of female contributors, number of elderly contributors, and the total number of hours worked. However, significant differences were found between Puerto Ricans and Cubans and Puerto Ricans and
Mexicans along these variables. Again, this seems to suggest that the model is more efficient in explaining the income differences between Puerto Rican households and other Latino households, than it is in explaining the differences between
Cuban and other Latino households.
Thirdly, not all of the concomitant variables were found to be significant in predicting household income as Perez' thesis would suggest. More specifically, the effects of the total number of hours worked and the number of elderly contributors present were statistically significant at the
.001 level, but the proportion of female contributors and the number of income contributors had statistically insignificant effects on household income in the analysis.
And lastly, the findings provide little, if any, support for the enclave component of Perez' thesis. Although the model works better for the Florida only subsample (r- squared=.26) than it does for the 12 state sample (r-squared
=.23), as one would expect given Perez' argument, it does not do so because Cuban households in Florida better fit the organizational form defined in his argument. The differences between the Florida only and the 12 state Cuban sample with respect to Mexican and Puerto Rican household composition 104 along the dimensions represented by the concomitant variables were statistically insignificant, with the exception of the number of elderly contributors present in the household. The mean number of elderly contributors in the household in the 12 state sample followed the model more closely than did the
Florida only sample.
Limitations and Implications for Future Research
Lack of Reference Group
The greatest limitation of the study was that it did not include a non-latino white reference group. Although, the data necessary to do this is present in the PUMSA data, the file structure and the sheer number of cases make sampling very cumbersome, requiring a great deal of manipulation even before a sample can be drawn. Unfortunately, the time and technical resources needed to add a white sample were prohibitive. Consequently, the study was limited to comparison of only Latino groups. The inclusion of a non minority referent would have greatly enriched the discussion of the "success story".
Source of Data
Several other limitations of the study stem from the source of data utilized. The study relied on already existing data because the resources needed to collect original data 105
were not available. Although the best possible data source
available for this study was utilized, the study still
suffered from some of the liabilities inherent in secondary
data analysis. A great limitation of the study is that the
data utilized was collected in 1980, consequently at the time
of the study the data was 11 years old. Secondly, since the
data was collected in 1980 the sample did not include Cubans
from the last major wave of immigration, which accounts for
over one-sixth of the Cuban population currently residing in
the United States. The last wave occurred the same year as
census was being taken, but was too late to be included in the
sample.
Model Tested
Another limitation lies in the model tested in the
study. Underlying the model is an assumption of homogeneity
regarding the Cuban American population. Although this
assumption is not explicit it, is implicit in that the model
assumes the same explanation for all Cuban households. This
is a limitation that is shared by all of the other research reviewed concerning Cuban American "success". However, it is this last limitation, coupled with the aforementioned findings of the study that carry the greatest implications and promise
for future research.
As was stated earlier, this study provides only partial
support for Perez' theory. In this respect, this theory is 106
not unlike the others that have previously been advanced to
explain the higher household incomes of Cuban Americans
relative to other minorities — each offering partial answers
or at least finding only partial support, Knowing this, and
recognizing the diversity in the Cuban American population, I
now offer that perhaps the human capital, ethnic
economic-enclave, state intervention and family organization
arguments are not necessarily antagonistic, but rather each
better corresponds with a particular wave(s) of immigration.
More specifically, I think that the economic enclave and human
capital arguments correspond with the first wave; the human capital and state intervention arguments with the second wave; and the family organization argument with the subsequent waves of post-revolutionary Cuban immigrants.
As was detailed in Chapter 2, each wave of post revolutionary Cuban immigration reflected differences in occupational, educational, class, and racial characteristics
(Dixon, 1988; Diaz-Briquetes et al., 1981; Azicri (1981/1982).
Furthermore, the context of immigration (e.g., U.S.-Cuban relations), the particular developmental stage of the Cuban
American community upon arrival, the changing political/ economic context of both the sending and receiving states, and the motivations for emigrating varied among the different immigration waves (Pedraza-Bailey, 1981-1982, 1985; Azicri,
1981/1982). 107
The first major wave brought the Islands' elite, some
whom were able to bring their capital with them, thereby
allowing them to restablish themselves as rentiers or start
new businesses in Miami (Portes 1987). Many others in the
first wave were experienced businesspersons who were able to make use of previous business ties established in the U.S
prior to emigration, which allowed them to secure the credit
necessary to launch them into private businesses (Portes
1987) . These characteristics coupled with the more convincing
research done thus far concerning ethnic economic enclaves, which indicate that immigrant entrepreneurs, not workers
benefit from ethnic enclave arrangements (e.g. Sanders et al.
1987, Bonacich 1987, 1989), suggests that perhaps the enclave
argument can go far in explaining why this small group of
Cubans have prospered in the U.S.
The second wave showed a decline in the class composition
of the emigres. This group was more representative of Cuba's professional and skilled laborer class(es) than of the capitalist class which comprised the first wave. For this group, it appears as though human capital and
Perdraza-Bailey's (1985) state intervention arguments would provide a better fit. Of all the waves, it would seem that this group would be most likely to have benefited from the professional retraining, vocational training, student loans, and relocation programs offered through the Cuban Refugee
Program. 108
Finally, the subsequent waves, with perhaps the exception of the small group of political prisoners arriving in the 5th wave, were marked by a continued downward class trend. These waves brought mostly bluecollar and unskilled service workers. For this group, family organization, rather than entrepreneural or professional training strategies for economic advancement make more sense. Therefore, for this section of the Cuban American population Perez' thesis would probably provide the best explanation for enhanced household income.
In short, further research is needed to understand the reasons for the differences in household income between Cubans and other minorities. I suggest a more complex model that incorporates the human capital, ethnic economic-enclave, state intervention and family organization arguments, but tests each argument against the corresponding wave of immigration identified above. This revisionist model can be tested with the same data set used in this study because the 1980 census questionnaire included an item that identifies the year of immigration.
Discussion of Findings Within the Context of Minority "Success" Stories and Its Implications for Social Work
This study has shown that economic "success" is in part a function of household organizational form. This idea contradicts with the "culture of success" thesis found in the popular press, and consequently popular mind, concerning Cuban 109
Americans. Furthermore, these findings parallel some of the critiques that have been made by Asian Americans concerning the "model minority" thesis that has been advanced concerning this group. This lends support to some of the important observations that have been made by Asian American scholars concerning minority "success" stories. Furthermore, these observations have important implications for social work.
Like Cuban Americans, Asian Americans are commonly perceived as immigrants who have been successful in economic or structural integration into North American society. And again, the popular press has published story after story describing them, usually without acknowledging differences between the many Asian groups in the U.S., as a "model minority". For example, some of the titles have read: "The
Success Story of one Minority Group in the U.S." (U.S. News and World Report, 26 December 1966), "Success Story:
Outwhiting the Whites" (Newsweek 21 June 1971), "The Triumph of Asian Americans" (New Republic 15 July 1985) , and "Japanese in the U.S. Outdo Horacio Alger" (Los Angeles Times 7 October
1977). In short, the popular image presented is that Asians are a "'model minority' who had overcome racism and 'made it' in American society through hard work, uncomplaining preserverence, and quiet accommodation" (Suzuki 1989:14).
And, as in the case of Cuban Americans, the success view finds support in more scholarly articles (e.g. Kitano 1969, Peterson
1971, Varen 1967, Wilber 1975, Makaroff 1967). 110
In contrast with the Cuban case, there has been a substantial body of scholarly literature accumulated that is critical of the "model minority" view (e.g. Kim and Hurh 1983,
Suzuki 1989, 1977, Woo 1985, Wong 1985, Jiobu 1988, Cabezas
1985, Tachiki 1971). There is not room here to summarize all of the specific arguments each work represents, but in general all share the position that although Asians have attained high levels of education, their upward mobility has been limited by racism. Racism, in this case, often comes in more subtle forms like differences in earnings between Asians and whites of comparable educational levels in comparable types of employment. It also comes in the form of differences in the guality of jobs Asians are given in contrast to whites of equal qualifications. In other words, while Asians may have attained some success in the area of education, their success is questionable in terms of corresponding occupation and income.
Unfortunately, as in the Cuban case, comparisons that are frequently made between Asians and others to show the former's relative success are often misleading because the basis of comparison is typically household income without consideration for differing household structures. Chun (1980) cautions that:
High income may be the result of longer work hours or sacrificed weekends. It follows that for the household income to be a usable index for purposes of group comparison, one has to make adjustments for the number of wage earners and the number of hours worked. In addition, since education is known to be a substantial Ill
contributors to occupational mobility as well as higher income, the level of wage income should be adjusted at least for wage earner's education (Cited in Kim and Hurh 1983:8).
However, the "model minority" image has not always been assigned to Asians in the U.S. Previously, they were referred to as "invading yellow hordes" (Suzuki 1977) or the "yellow peril" (Suzuki 1989). The "model minority" view began in the
1960's, during a time urban protest and mounting civil and welfare rights movements. This period also coincides with the time the "Cuban success story" was being promoted. While many
Asians were somewhat flattered by the changing stereotype, others reacted against it:
The late 1960's saw the start of a movement among Asians toward greater ethnic consciousness and political activism. Many of these activists took strong exception to this overly felicitous view of the status of Asians; they did not find it fortuitous that these success stories were being publicized at a time when the country was facing a racial situation of crisis proportions. They charged that Asians were being promoted as a model minority to discredit the protests and demands for social justice of other minority groups and were being used to hold up a 'shining example' to other groups (Suzuki 1989:14).
This observation is critical and has deep implications for social work. It identifies the importance of considering how different images and ideologies have been evoked over time regarding specific minority groups in an effort to understand the purposes they have served. This point is particularly timely given the current resurgence of "culture of poverty" type theses and attacks on muticulturalism that have been used 112
to legitimate or set the ideological terrain for the
dismantling of race/ethnicity sensitive policies and programs
aimed at addressing discrimination and institutional racism.
In defining particular groups as "successful" or "model"
minorities, the problems of other minorities consequently come
to be defined in ways that do not involve an indictment of
historical and contemporary U.S. social relations.
Furthermore, the reality of the experiences of many of the
individuals who are members of a "model" group, yet experience
less than successful outcomes recede from view. In other
words, minority "success" stories leave one blind to the
inherent inequalities in U.S. society, both in terms of
minorities who are considered successful and those who are
not.
Furthermore, these views go hand in hand with other
popular discourses which have come to name issues of
unemployment, capital disinvestment, poverty, racism, sexism,
and other forms of economic and social inequality in terms of
"reverse discrimination", "economic dependency", "urban
underclass", "permissive welfare state", "family
disorganization" and "social disintegration." These manipulations in perception are at the core of current popular
calls for legislative and judicial "reforms" concerning social welfare and affirmative action programs and policies.
And finally, by parading one minority group in front of
others as a "model", divisions are carved out between groups 113 who probably have more income in terms of oppression and exploitation than dissimilarities. As a consequence, a minority pecking-order is set up, which prevents the building of multi-ethnic/racial solidarity, coalitions or understandings aimed at transforming oppressive situations. In a call for unity in forging such a multicultural democracy in the United States, Manning Marable (June 1991:4-6) summarizes this problem:
Unity between progressives of color is essential if multicultural democracy is to be achieved. This doesn't mean that we minimize the difficulties inherent in such a project, the differences of perspective which exist between groups. Unfortunately, the experience of oppression does not inoculate one from being intolerant towards others. There are white lesbians and gays who are racist, and people of color who are homophobic; there are Asian-Americans who are hostile to Latinos, Latinos who are hostile to African-Americans, and African- Americans who are prejudiced against Asians. We frequently speak different languages; we have different historical experiences, religions, political ideologies and social values. But so long as these differences divide us into potentially antagonistic camps, the powers which dominate and exploit us collectively will continue to flourish. As long as we bicker against perceived grievances, maximizing our claims against each other, refusing to see the economic, political, cultural and social common ground which can unite us, we will be victimized by capitalism, sexism, racism, national oppression, homophobia, and other systems of domination. APPENDIX
VARIABLE TRANSFORMATIONS
114 115
Particular variables utilized in the study were created expressly for this investigation by combining different census variables. These variables are listed and described below, with the names of the census variables used in their construction given in parentheses. Total Number of Contributors in Household; count of the number of individuals (relatel, relate2) contributing income
(incomel, income2, income3, income4, incomes, income6, income7) to the household (serialno).
Total Number of Workers in Household: a count of the number of self-employed members (anyone reporting income2 or income3 sources) and wage or salary earners (anyone reporting income from income 1 source) in the household (serialno).
Proportion of Female Contributors in Household: This variable was composed by getting the household mean of the sex variable (0=male, l=female) for all individuals contributing income from any source (incomel, income2, income3, income4, incomes, income 6, income7) to the household (serialno).
Total Number of Hours Worked: the sum of the product of the usual number of hours worked per week (hours79) and the total number of weeks worked (weeksw79) for each individual in the household (serialno) reporting income from wages or salary
(income 1) or self employment (income 2 and income3).
Number of Contributing Elderly: count of any members in the household (serialno) over the age of 65 (age), who are neither the householder or spouse of the householder 116
(relate 1, relate2) and are contributing income (incomel,
income2, income3, income4, income5, income6, income7).
Full-time Worker: identifies any person age 15 or older
(age), working 40 hours or more a week (hours79), 52 weeks a
year (weeksw79).
Proportion 1: sum of any income reported (incomel +
income2 + income3 + income4 + incomes + income6 + income7) by
all household (serialno) members, divided by the amount of
income received from wages or salary (incomel) by all
household members.
Proportion 2: sum of any income reported (incomel +
income2 + income3 + income4 + incomes + income6 + income7) by
all household (serialno) members, divided by the amount of
income received from nonfarm self-employment (income2) by all
household members.
Proportion 3.: sum of any income reported (incomel +
income2 + income3 + income4 + income5 + income6 + income7) by
all household (serialno) members, divided by the amount of
income received from farm self-employment (income3) by all
household members.
Proportion 4: sum of any income reported (incomel +
income2 + income3 + income4 + income5 + income6 + income7) by
all household (serialno) members divided by the sum of income received from interest dividends or rent (income4) by all household members. 117
Proportion 5: sum of any income reported (incomel + income2 + income3 + income4 + income5 + income6 + income7) by all household (serialno) members, divided by the amount of income received from social security (incomes) by all household members.
Proportion 6: sum of any income reported (incomel + income2 + income3 + income4 + income5 + income6 + income7) by all household (serialno) members, divided by the amount of income received from public assistance (income6) by all household members.
Proportion 7: sum of any income reported (incomel + income2 + income3 + income4 + incomes + income6 + income7) by all household (serialno) members, divided by the amount of income received from all sources other than those included in income variables 1 through 6 wages or salary (income7) by all household members. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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